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:g,upn'llll' \Sou rt
ilt1mla

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 177137

Appellee.
. Present:

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,'
Acting Chairperson.
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
VILLARAMA, JR., ond
PERLAS-BERNABE,'* JJ.

PEDRO BANIG,
ApjJe!lont.
'\ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO,}.:

\\'eddings are imous

...
(.._,
occasions wherein we witness the love and union
~

bet\\ een a man and a woman. In this case. instead of love. the victim witnessed
m;:m s bestiality when during the pre-nuptial dance, herein appellant forcibly had
c;ml<11 knmvledge of her. vVoise. appellant used a knife to bring his victim into

( )n llppeal is the Decision: dated Nmember 13, 2006 of the Cm111 of

,\l~l~cal;., (C\) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02439, \vhich affirmed with modification
tilt' Decision~ dated July 17. 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31.
C~lh<.1rmguis. Quirino. in Criminal Case No. 1292. tinding appellant Pedro Banig
y.
l<'f'PC II nnt) gu iIt beyond reasonable doubt 0 rthe crime or rap~o$

l'c't '--!wci;tl Order '.ltl. 1220 elated ~1<1\ _~0. 20 1.2.

l'n ",pccial Order :.J(1 I 227 elated ~Ja, .~0. 201.:2.
l \ , II". pp I X-+-20~: l'c'nned b; Associate .lu~ticc Vicente S.E. Vcloso and concutTecl in b; Pt-esidin','.
!tt,ltCL' Ruben I. Re\CS at!cl 1\ssociat~r Justice .Juan Q f:nriqttt~z . .lr
1\.L'Lt'tcl'. 1'1' 176-192: pcr111ecl b) .ludge f'vloises ~1. l'arclt>
Decision 2 G.R. No. 177137

Factual Antecedents

On July 1, 1996, appellant along with one Tony Ginumtad (Ginumtad)

were charged with the crime of rape committed against AAA3 in an
Information4 which reads:

That on or about 3:00 oclock dawn of March 28, 1996 in Barangay

XXX, Municipality of YYY, Province of Quirino, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with prurient
desires, and by means of force and intimidation, after conspiring and mutually
helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge [of] AAA against the latters will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Upon arraignment, appellant and Ginumtad pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Trial on the merits subsequently followed.

Evidence for the Prosecution

The prosecution presented AAA as its first witness. She testified that on
the night of March 27, 1996, she attended a pre-wedding dance in their barrio
which lasted until the early hours of the next day, March 28, 1996. At about 3:00
a.m. of March 28, 1996, AAA felt the need to urinate. She thus left the dance
hall and went up to a hill about 50-100 meters away.

Suddenly, two persons came out of nowhere, held her hands, poked a knife
at her thigh, and warned her not to scream for help or else they would kill her.
They then pushed her to the ground with her face up and her hands placed behind

3
The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her identity, as
well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic
Act No. 7610, An Act Providing For Stronger Deterrence And Special Protection Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation And Discrimination, And For Other Purposes; Republic Act No. 9262, An Act
Defining Violence Against Women And Their Children, Providing For Protective Measures For
Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, And For Other Purposes; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-
11-SC, known as the Rule On Violence Against Women And Their Children, effective November 5,
2004. People v. Dumadag, G.R. No. 176740, June 22, 2011, 652 SCRA 535, 538.
4
Records, pp. 1-2.
5
Id. at 1.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 177137

her back crosswise.6 Appellant proceeded to remove her pants and panties while
Ginumtad pressed her shoulders down to the ground. When appellant was already
on top of her, he spread her legs and inserted his penis into her vagina. Although
AAA felt pain, she did not shout for fear that the appellant would kill her. After
a while, Ginumtad took his turn and also inserted his penis into AAAs vagina.
After Ginumtads turn, appellant again had sexual intercourse with AAA and
that was the time that she lost consciousness.7

When AAA regained consciousness, appellant was still on top of her

making thrusting motions, while Ginumtad was already nowhere in sight. When
done, appellant stood up and just left AAA. Luckily, someone came and
brought AAA to the house of the bride where she slept. The incident was then
reported to the police authorities on April 15, 1996.

The prosecution then presented Dr. Briccio Macabangon (Dr.

Macabangon), a medical doctor who examined AAA on April 23, 1996 at the
YYY District Hospital. He issued a Medical Certificate with the following
findings:

Laceration, old, at 8:00 oclock. Admits one finger with difficulty.8

As its third witness, the prosecution presented BBB, the father of

AAA. He testified that Alejandro Pugong (Pugong), the brother-in-law of
appellant, approached him during the pendency of the preliminary investigation
and asked for the settlement of the case. They offered marriage between appellant
and his 20-year old daughter, AAA. This, however, infuriated BBB, hence,
he reported to the police authorities the said offer of settlement. The police then
arrested appellant.

6
TSN, February 18, 1997, p. 5.
7
Id. at 9.
8
Records, p. 10.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 177137

The last witness for the prosecution is Noel Dunuan, the Barangay Captain
of Barangay XXX. He corroborated the testimony of BBB and declared that
Pugong and appellants brother, Afeles Banig, came to his office asking for the
settlement of the case.

Evidence for the Defense

The appellant denied the charges against him. He unfurled his own version
of the events that transpired in this case as follows:

Appellant was invited to a pre-nuptial dance and wedding ceremony of

Mercy Ananayo and Fernando Witawit. It was during the said dance in the
evening of March 27, 1996 that he met AAA. He danced with AAA several
times during that night and eventually courted her by professing his love for her.
Sensing that she was attracted to him, appellant concluded that he had a chance of
winning her heart.9

After dancing for quite some time, appellant and AAA stepped away
from the dance hall and sat down together in a dimly lit place about 8-10 meters
away. Both of them stayed there for about an hour where they chatted and got to
know each other better. When appellant sensed that no one was watching, he held
AAAs hands and kissed her lips five times. They soon returned to the dance
hall and continued to dance the night away until around 4:00 a.m. He told AAA
that he loves her and asked her to wait for him to come back since he had another
wedding to attend in Pangasinan. He promised her that upon his return, he will
talk to her parents and formally ask their permission to marry her.

At around 6:00 a.m., appellant took a bath, accompanied by a certain

Fernando Ananayo. Thereafter, he proceeded to have breakfast in the house of the
bride and groom where he saw AAA also having her breakfast with other

9
TSN, January 20, 1998, p. 8.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 177137

companions. After breakfast, appellant asked her permission to leave for

Pangasinan to attend another wedding. AAA replied that if he really loves her,
he will come back and talk to her parents.

Appellant went to Pangasinan and stayed there for a little over two weeks.
Upon his return and as promised, he talked with AAAs parents. The mother of
AAA informed appellant that if the two of them were really in love and wanted
to marry, then they should start the process of securing the necessary papers for
their marriage.10 Thus, a date was set for the appellant and AAA to proceed to
the Municipal Hall of YYY to apply for a marriage license. On such date,
appellant and AAA went to YYY with AAAs mother and aunt. They first
had lunch in a restaurant as it was already noon. After finishing their meal, a
police officer came over and invited him for interrogation. Appellant obliged but
was later arrested and put behind bars.

Appellant later learned that BBB filed a criminal case against him.
According to the appellant, BBB must have felt embarrassed by the fact that
people saw him and AAA embracing each other during the pre-nuptial dance.
On that same day, AAA visited the appellant. When asked why they were
putting him in jail, AAA replied that if she goes against the wishes of her father,
her parents might disown her.11

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 17, 2000, the RTC convicted appellant of the crime of rape while
his co-accused Ginumtad was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The
dispositive portion of the judgment of conviction reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds Pedro Banig guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as provided for under Article 335

10
TSN, January 20, 1998, p. 16.
11
TSN, January 20, 1998, p. 19.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 177137

of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659 and hereby impose[s] upon
him the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. In addition, said accused Pedro Banig
should pay the victim, AAA, the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity.

As to accused Tony Ginumtad, this Court finds him Not Guilty for
insufficiency of evidence.

SO ORDERED.12

In finding the appellant guilty, the RTC held that he had sexual intercourse
with the victim through the use of force. It gave full credit and weight to the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses, especially that of AAA. On the other
hand, it debunked appellants sweetheart theory for being intrinsically weak.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On October 20, 2000, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal,13 which was

granted by the RTC.14 Consequently, the records of this case were forwarded to
this Court. Conformably with the ruling of this Court in People v. Mateo,15
however, the case was transferred to the CA for intermediate appellate review.
Then on November 13, 2006, the CA rendered its now assailed Decision16
affirming with modification the RTCs judgment of conviction, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the
victim, AAA, P50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.17

Hence, this appeal.

12
Records, p. 192.
13
Id. at 212.
14
See Order dated October 20, 2000, id. at 213.
15
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
16
CA rollo, pp. 184-205.
17
Id. at 205.
Decision 7 G.R. No. 177137

Issue

In his brief, appellant made a single assignment of error that

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT [OF] THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.18

Our Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

[I]n resolving rape cases, primordial consideration is given to the

credibility of the victims testimony.19 This is so because conviction for rape
may be solely based on the victims testimony provided it is credible, natural,
convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.20
Both the RTC and the CA agree that AAA recounted her ordeal in a candid,
straightforward and categorical manner. Thus:

[FISCAL ORIAS]:
Q: And, what transpired after these two persons placed your two hands at
your back?
A: When they put my hands at my back they removed my pants and panty,
sir.

xxxx

Q: Who was that person who removed your pants and underwear?
A: They were the ones, sir, Pedro Banig and Tony Ginumtad.

xxxx

Q: After removing your pants and underwear, Madam witness, what did
Pedro Banig do to you, if any?
A: He insert[ed] his penis, sir.

18
Id. at 98.
19
People v. Noveras, G.R. No. 171349, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 777, 787.
20
People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 167756, April 9, 2008, 551 SCRA 16, 31.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 177137

FISCAL ORIAS -
Q: Where did he insert his penis?
A: [Into my] vagina, sir.

Q: What did you feel when he inserted his penis [into] your vagina?
A: It was painful, sir.

Q: Did you not shout?

A: No, sir, because they told me that if I x x x shout they [would] kill me,
sir.

Q: Was Pedro Banig armed at that time?

ATTY. PAWINGI:
Leading, your honor.

[FISCAL ORIAS]:
That is a follow-up to what she answered, your honor.

COURT:
Let her answer.

A: Yes, sir.

[FISCAL ORIAS]:
Q: [With] what?
A: Knife, sir.

Q: What did he do next, Madam witness, when he inserted his penis [into]
your vagina?
A: He made up and down movement, sir.21

Aggrieved that he was the only one convicted of the crime charged,
appellant argues in his Brief22 that the trial court erroneously concluded that he is
the sole perpetrator of the crime charged. He claims that when his co-accused
Ginumtad was acquitted, he was made to be the fall guy, just because he is
unrelated by blood to the private complainant.23

21
TSN, February 18, 1997, pp. 5-7.
22
CA rollo, pp. 96-116.
23
Id. at 106. The co-accused Tony Ginumtad is related to the private complainant. In his direct
examination, Ginumtad testified that the complainant AAA is his relative within the fifth degree of
consanguinity. He specifically stated that:
Q: By the way, Mr. Witness, how are you related to the complainant in this case AAA, if any?
A: There is, sir.
Q: Do you know the degree of your relationship?
A: She and [I are] fifth cousins, sir. (TSN, October 6, 1997, pp. 8-9. Emphasis supplied.)
Decision 9 G.R. No. 177137

A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable.24 As we have

previously held in People v. Court of Appeals,25 [a] verdict of acquittal is
immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the
appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense.26 True,
the finality of acquittal rule is not one without exception as when the trial court
commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In
such a case, the judgment of acquittal may be questioned through the
extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In the instant
case, however, we cannot treat the appeal as a Rule 65 petition as it raises no
jurisdictional error that can invalidate the judgment of acquittal. Suffice it to state
that the trial court is in the best position to determine the sufficiency of evidence
against both appellant and Ginumtad. It is a well-settled rule that this Court
accords great respect and full weight to the trial courts findings, unless the trial
court overlooked substantial facts which could have affected the outcome of the
case.27 It is not at all irregular for a court to convict one of the accused and acquit
the other. The acquittal of Ginumtad in this case is final and it shall not be
disturbed.

The appellant assails AAAs credibility by arguing that the place where
the alleged rape took place is not one where no other person would be able to
hear her had she opted to cry for help, because it is just ten to fifteen (10-15)
meters away from an inhabited house.28 He also asserts that AAAs actuations
during the alleged sexual assault failed to show the kind of resistance expected of a
young woman defending her virtue and honor.29 To further cast doubt on
AAAs credibility, appellant points to the fact that AAA did not report the

24
People v. Terrado, G.R. No. 148226, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 84, 93.
25
G.R. No. 159261, February 21, 2007, 516 SCRA 383.
26
Id. at 397.
27
People v. Montinola, G.R. No. 178061, January 31, 2008, 543 SCRA 412, 427.
28
CA rollo, p. 108.
29
Id. at 108-109.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 177137

offense at the first opportunity.30 Moreover, he questions the conduct of AAA

as she appeared to be not indisposed in the morning after the alleged rape.31

The appellants arguments are misplaced. The CA correctly ruled that

AAA could not cry for help as she was intimidated and overpowered by her
aggressors who threatened her with a sharp-bladed knife.32 Besides, it is important
to underscore that the proximity of an inhabited house to the place where the crime
took place does not rule out the possibility of the commission of rape. We have
previously held in People v. Mabonga33 that:

[I]t is a common judicial experience that the presence of people nearby does not
deter rapists from committing their odious act. Rape can be committed even in
places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school
premises, inside a house where there are several occupants and even in the same
room where other members of the family are sleeping.

It is well-settled that lust respects neither time nor place. There is no rule
that rape can be committed only in seclusion.34 What the evidence reveals is that
despite the proximity to neighboring houses, the appellant, by means of force or
intimidation, did in fact have sexual intercourse with AAA against her will.
Thus, it is immaterial that an inhabited house was near the place where the crime
was committed. This fact will neither render AAA any less credible nor make
the commission of the crime less conceivable.

With respect to AAAs actuations during the commission of the crime, it

is not necessary on the part of the victim to put up a tenacious physical struggle.
As previously pointed out, AAA was threatened with a sharp-bladed knife. One
shrill cry or a flurry of violent kicks from her could mean the end of her life. In

30
Id. at 114.
31
Id. at 113.
32
Id. at 194-195.
33
G.R. No. 134773, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 51, 65 citing People v. Belga, 402 Phil. 734, 742 (2001);
People v. Antonio, 388 Phil. 869, 877 (2000); and People v. Lusa, 351 Phil, 537, 545 (1998).
34
People v. Arraz, G.R. No. 183696, October 24, 2008, 570 SCRA 136, 146.
Decision 11 G.R. No. 177137

People v. Corpuz,35 we ruled that physical resistance need not be established in

rape when threats and intimidation are employed and the victim submits herself to
the embrace of her rapist because of fear. When the sharp point of a knife is
staring down the eyes of the victim, struggle is futile and the only option left in the
mind of a frightened lady is to submit rather than lose her life. That the victim
allowed the entry of her aggressors penis rather than his knife does not detract
from the fact that rape was committed by means of force and intimidation and
certainly against her will.

As to the matter of delay in reporting the rape incident, the same does not
affect the credibility of AAA. [I]t is not unusual for a rape victim immediately
following the sexual assault to conceal at least momentarily the incident x x x.36
Delay in reporting a rape incident renders the charge doubtful only if the delay is
unreasonable and unexplained.37 [T]here is no uniform behavior expected of
victims after being raped.38 In this case, the delay in reporting the incident only
consists of a little over two weeks. Such a span of time is not unreasonable when
coupled by the fact that the victim AAA was threatened by her aggressor. In
People v. Dumadag,39 we stressed that not all rape victims can be expected to act
conformably to the usual expectations of everyone.

Still insisting on his innocence, appellant likewise invites this Courts

attention to the findings of Dr. Macabangon in his medical report. He argues that it
is highly abnormal and quite amazing for the victim to incur just a single and
quite old laceration.40

The contention deserves scant consideration. It is well entrenched in our

jurisprudence that a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a

35
G.R. No. 175836, January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 465, 473.
36
People v. Malana, G.R. No. 185716, September 29, 2010, 631 SCRA 676, 693.
37
People v. Arellano, G.R. No. 176640, August 22, 2008, 563 SCRA 181, 187.
38
People v. Arraz, supra note 34 at 147.
39
Supra note 3 at 546, citing People v. Madia, 411 Phil. 666, 673 (2001).
40
CA rollo, p. 110.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 177137

prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victims testimony alone, if credible, is

sufficient to convict the [appellant] of the crime.41 Be that as it may, in People v.
Ortoa,42 where the medico-legal findings showed that the victim is still in a state
of virginity when she was examined, we held that:

[T]he lack of lacerated wounds does not negate sexual intercourse. A freshly
broken hymen is not an essential element of rape. Even the fact that the hymen of
the victim was still intact does not rule out the possibility of rape. x x x
Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture
or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape. (Citations
omitted.)

The laceration found by Dr. Macabangon in the medical examination

confirms the victims testimony that she was raped. In his testimony, Dr.
Macabangon stated that the laceration of the hymen usually heals in less than 10
days. In AAAs case, she was examined on April 23, 1996, or more than three
weeks after the rape incident occurred on March 28, 1996. This explains why the
findings showed that the laceration of the hymen was old.

Appellant further argues that AAA agreed to marry him, suggesting that
her presence during a meeting with the barangay captain is a sign of his innocence
of the crime of rape.

We are not convinced. The sweetheart theory hardly deserves any

attention when an accused does not present any evidence, such as love letters,
gifts, pictures, and the like to show that, indeed, he and the victim were
sweethearts.43 Appellants bare testimony that he and AAA are lovers who
agreed to get married is insufficient for the defense of sweetheart theory to
prosper. Moreover, even if it were true that they were sweethearts, mere assertion
of a romantic relationship would not necessarily exclude the use of force or

41
People v. Baring, Jr., 425 Phil. 559, 570 (2002).
42
G.R. No. 174484, February 23, 2009, 580 SCRA 80, 95-96.
43
People v. Madsali, G.R. No. 179570, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 596, 609.
Decision 13 G.R. No. 177137

intimidation in sexual intercourse. In People v. Cias,44 this Court held that [a]
love affair does not justify rape for a man does not have the unbridled license to
subject his beloved to his carnal desires against her will.

With respect to the propriety of the award of moral damages, the CA is

correct in awarding AAA moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, in
addition to the award of civil indemnity. The award of civil indemnity to the rape
victim is mandatory upon a finding that rape took place. Moral damages, on the
other hand, are awarded to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact
of rape under the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the
experience she underwent. 45

Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code which is the law then in force
at the time of the commission of the crime, when the rape is committed with the
use of a deadly weapon, the crime takes a qualified form and the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. In the instant case, we note that the use of
the knife, which is a deadly weapon, was not specifically alleged in the
Information. However, it was duly proven during the proceedings below that
appellant armed himself with a knife which facilitated the commission of the
crime. In People v. Begino,46 we held that the circumstances that qualify a crime
should be alleged and proved beyond reasonable doubt as the crime itself. These
attendant circumstances alter the nature of the crime of rape and increase the
penalty. As such, they are in the nature of qualifying circumstances.47 If the
same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating
circumstances since the latter admit of proof even if not pleaded.48

44
G.R. No. 194379, June 1, 2011, 650 SCRA 326, 341.
45
People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 189847, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 499, 504; People v. Caada, G.R.
No. 175317, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 378, 397.
46
G.R. No. 181246, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA 189.
47
Id. at 196.
48
Id. at 198. See People v. Montesclaros, G.R. No. 181084, June 16, 2009, 589 SCRA 330, 342 where
we held: Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which should be given retroactive effect
following the rule that statutes governing court proceedings will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, every Information must state the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime for them to be considered in the
imposition of the penalty.
lkcisJnll 14 G.R. No. 177137

Consequently, the use of a deadly weapon may be considered as an aggravating

circumstance in this case. As such, exempla1y damages may be imposed on the
49
appellant in addition to civil indemnity and moral damages. Thus, exemplary
1
d21mages in the amount oLP30,000.00 is hereby awarded?

l~inally, on the damages awarded, an interest at the rate of 6% per annum

sh~1ll be imposed, reckoned tlom the tlnality of this judgment until fully paid."'
52
,\pr"'~ell~mt is also not eligible for parole pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.

\VI-IEREFORE, the Decision of the Colll1 of Appeals dated November

I_)_. :::U06 111 CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02439 IS AFFIRMED WITH
:\JODI FICATIONS that appellant Pedro Banig is not eligible for parole and
Clrc.lcred to further pay 'A. AA" P30,000.00 as exemplary damages and interest at

the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all the damages awarded in this case from
the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

~at~~
SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

\\'1 CO\ICUR:

~~&~
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Acting Chailperson

\titlk ::::::~tl of the Ci,il Code pro, ides: .. In criminal offenses. e'\emplary damages as a part ol the
ct, tl lt.Jbtlit~ ma~ be ttnposed ''hen the crime ''as committee! '' ith one or more ag.g.r<l\<lting.
,_. ruttll,l<ltlCc> SuLh clclnag.es are separate and distinct Jiom fines and shall be paid to the oiTendecl
 I5 G.R. No. 1771~7

~VILLARA!\.
Associate Jus tic /

a,
,A IJ_;.J/ ..
ESTELA Ni'JPERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation betore the c1se was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
( oun s Division.

~~It~
TERESITA .J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

I certi J\ that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
ccnlsuiL!tion betC)J"C the case \vas assigned to the \\Titer of the opinion of the
c()urts Di\ision.

Senior Associate Justice

(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of I 948. as amended)