Cicero, On the Republic

Translated by C.W.Keyes (1928). The Latin text has survived mostly in a palimpsest,
discovered in 1819, and because there is no complete manuscript, there are frequent gaps in the
text. Click on the L symbols to go to the Latin text of each section. Click on ** to go to the
translator's footnotes.

{ The equivalent of about ten pages is lost at the beginning. Our manuscript commences in
the midst of Cicero's preface to the dialogue: at this point he is evidently combating the
Epicurean hostility to patriotism and the life of a statesman. }

In Defense of the Life of a Statesman: The Roman Virtue of Pietas

[Without active patriotism ].... could [never] have delivered [our native land] from attack,
nor could Gaius Duelius, Aulus Atilius, or Lucius Metellus have freed [Rome] from her fear
of Carthage, nor could the two Scipios have extinguished with their blood the rising flames of
the Second Punic War, nor, when it broke forth again with greater fury, could
Quintus Maximus have reduced it to impotence or Marcus Marcelius have crushed it, nor
could Publius Africanus have torn it from the gates of this city and driven it within the
enemy's walls.
Marcus Cato again, unknown and of obscure birth by whom, as by a pattern for our
emulation, all of us who are devoted to the same pursuits are drawn to diligence and valour -
might surely have remained at Tusculum in the enjoyment of the leisurely life of that healthful
spot so near to Rome. But he, a madman as our friends maintain, preferred, though no
necessity constrained him, to be tossed by the billows and storms of our public life even to an
extreme old age, rather than to live a life of complete happiness in the calm and ease of such
retirement. I will not speak of the men, countless in number, who have each been the salvation
of this republic; and as their lives do not much antedate the remembrance of the present
generation, I will refrain from mentioning their names, lest someone complain of the omission
of himself or some member of his family. I will content myself with asserting that Nature has
implanted in the human race so great a need of virtue and so great a desire to defend the
common safety that the strength thereof has conquered all the allurements of pleasure and
ease.

But it is not enough to possess virtue, as if it were an art of some sort, unless you make use of
it. Though it is true that an art, even if you never use it, can still remain in your possession by the
very fact of your knowledge of it, yet the existence of virtue depends entirely upon its use , and
its noblest use is the government of the State, and the realization in fact, not in words, of those
very things that the philosophers, in their corners, are continually dinning in our ears. For there is
no principle enunciated by the philosophers - at least none that is just and honourable - that has
not been discovered and established by those who have drawn up codes of law for States. For
whence comes our sense of duty? From whom do we obtain the principles of religion ? Whence
comes the law of nations, or even that law of ours which is called " civil " ? Whence justice,
honor, fair-dealing? Whence decency, self-restraint, fear of disgrace, eagerness for praise and
honor ? Whence comes endurance amid toils and dangers ? I say, from those men who, when
these things had been inculcated by a system of training, either confirmed them by custom or else
enforced them by statutes.

Indeed Xenociates, one of the most eminent of philosophers, when asked what his disciples
learned, is said to have replied, "To do of their own accord what they are compelled to do by the
law." Therefore the citizen who compels all men, by the authority of magistrates and the penalties
imposed by law, to follow rules of whose validity philosophers find it hard to convince even a few
by their admonitions, must be considered superior even to the teachers who enunciate these
principles. For what speech of theirs is excellent enough to be preferred to a State well provided
with law and custom? Indeed, just as I think that "cities great and dominant," as Ennius calls
them, are to be ranked above small villages and strongholds, so I believe that those who rule such
cities by wise counsel and authority are to be deemed far superior, even in wisdom, to those who
take no part at all in the business of government. And since we feel a mighty urge to increase the
resources of mankind, since we desire to make human life safer and richer by our thought and
effort, and are goaded on to the fulfilment of this desire by Nature herself, let us hold to the
course which has ever been that of all excellent men, turning deaf ears to those who, in the hope
of even recalling those who have already gone ahead, are sounding the retreat.

As their first objection to these arguments, so well founded and so obviously sound, those who
attack them plead the severity of the labor that must be performed in the defense of the State -
surely a trifling obstacle to the watchful and diligent man, and one that merits only scorn, not
merely with reference to matters of such moment, but even in the case of things of only moderate
importance, such as a man's studies, or duties, or even his business affairs. Then too they allege
the danger to which life is exposed, and confront brave men with a dishonorable fear of death, yet
such men are wont to regard it a greater misfortune to be consumed by the processes of Nature and
old age, than to be granted the opportunity of surrendering for their country's sake, in preference to
all else, that life which in any event must be surrendered to Nature. On this point, however, the
objectors wax wordy and, as they imagine, eloquent, going on to cite the misfortunes of eminent
men and the wrongs they have suffered at the hands of their ungrateful fellow-citizens.

Few may have imagined, in view of all I had suffered, that when,] as I retired from the
consulship, I took my oath before an assembly of the people, and the Roman people took the same
oath, that the republic was safe [as a result of my efforts alone,] I was amply repaid thereby for all
the anxiety and vexation that resulted from the injustice done to me. And yet my sufferings
brought me more honor than trouble, more glory than vexation, and the joy I found in the
affectionate longing felt for me by good citizens was greater than my grief at the exultation of the
wicked. But, as I said before, if it had happened otherwise, how could I complain? For none of the
misfortunes that fell to my lot in consequence of my great services was unexpected by me or more
serious than I had foreseen. For such was my nature that, although, on account of the manifold
pleasures I found in the studies which had engaged me from boyhood, it would have been possible
for me, on the one hand, to reap greater profit from a quiet life than other men, or, on the other
hand, if any disaster should happen to us all, to suffer no more than my fair share of the common
misfortune, yet I could not hesitate to expose myself to the severest storms, and, I might almost
say, even to thunderbolts, for the sake of the safety of my fellow-citizens, and to secure, at the cost
of my own personal danger, a quiet life for all the rest.
 For, in truth, our country has not given us birth and education without expecting to receive
some sustenance, as it were, from us in return ; nor has it been merely to serve our convenience
that she has granted to our leisure a safe refuge and for our moments of repose a calm retreat ; on
the contrary, she has given us these advantages so that she may appropriate to her own use the
greater and more important part of our courage, our talents, and our wisdom, leaving to us for our
own private uses only so much as may be left after her needs have been satisfied. Moreover we
ought certainly not to listen to the other excuses to which these men resort, that they may be more
free to enjoy the quiet life. They say, for example, that it is mostly worthless men who take part in
politics, men with whom it is degrading to be compared, while to have conflict with them,
especially when the mob is aroused, is a wretched and dangerous task.

Therefore, they maintain, a wise man should not attempt to take the reins, as he cannot restrain
the insane and untamed fury of the common herd, nor is it proper for a freeman, by contending
with vile and wicked opponents, to submit to the scourgings of abuse or expose himself to wrongs
which are intolerable to the wise - as if, in the view of good, brave, and high-minded men, there
could be any nobler motive for entering public life than the resolution, not to be ruled by wicked
men and not to allow the republic to be destroyed by them, seeing that the philosophers
themselves, even if they should desire to help, would be impotent.

And who in the world can approve of the single exception they make, when they say that no
wise man will take any part in public affairs unless some emergency compels him to do so? As if
any greater emergency could come upon anyone than that with which I was confronted ; and what
could I have done in that crisis unless I had been consul at the time? And how could I have been
consul unless I had held to a manner of life from my boyhood which led me to the highest office of
State in spite of my equestrian birth ? Hence it is clear that the opportunity of serving the State,
however great be the dangers with which it is threatened, does not come suddenly, or when we
wish it, unless we are in such a position that it is possible for us to take action.

It has always seemed to me that the most amazing of the teachings of learned men is that they
deny their own ability to steer when the sea is calm, having never learned the art nor cared to
know it, while at the same time they assure us that, when the waves dash highest, they will take
the helm. For it is their habit to proclaim openly, and even to make it their great boast, that they
have neither learned nor do they teach anything about the principles of the State, either to establish
it or to safeguard it, and that they consider the knowledge of such things unsuited to learned or
wise men, but better to be left to those who have trained themselves in that business.

How can it be reasonable, therefore, for them to promise to aid the State in case they are
compelled by an emergency to do so, when they do not know how to rule the State when no
emergency threatens it, though this is a much easier task than the other ? Indeed, if it be true that
the wise man does not, as a general thing, willingly descend from his lofty heights to statecraft,
but does not decline the duty if conditions force him to assume it, yet I should think he ought by
no means to neglect this science of politics, because it is his duty to acquire in advance all the
knowledge that, for aught he knows, it may be necessary for him to use at some future time.

I have treated these matters at considerable length because I have planned and undertaken in this
work a discussion of the State ; hence, in order that this discussion might not be valueless, I had,
in the first place, to remove all grounds for hesitation about taking part in public affairs. Yet if
there be any who are influenced by the authority of philosophers, let them for a few moments
listen and attend to those whose authority and reputation stand highest among learned men ; for
even if these have not governed the State themselves, nevertheless, since they have dealt with the
State in many investigations and treatises, I consider that they have performed a certain function
of their own in the State. And in fact I note that nearly every one of those Seven whom the Greeks
called "wise" took an important part in the affairs of government. For there is really no other
occupation in which human virtue approaches more closely the august function of the gods than
that of founding new States or preserving those already in existence.

Transition to the Dialog

Wherefore, since it is my good fortune to have accomplished, in the actual government of the
republic, something worthy to live in men's memories, and also to have acquired some skill in
setting forth political principles through practice and also by reason of my enthusiasm for
learning and teaching, [I consider myself not unsuited to the task I have now undertaken ; for, as
a matter of fact, this combination of accomplishments is rare among those who are considered]
authorities [on statecraft], since while certain men in former times have shown great skill in
theoretical discussion, they are discovered to have accomplished nothing practical, and there
have been others who have been efficient in action, but clumsy in exposition. Indeed the
principles I am about to state are not at all new or original to myself, but it is my intention to
recall a discussion carried on by men who were at a certain period the most eminent and wisest in
our republic. This discussion was once reported to you, in your youth, and to me by Publius
Rutilius Rufus, when we were spending several days together at Smyrna, in it, I believe, very
little is omitted that would contribute greatly to a logical exposition of the whole subject.

Scipio Discusses the Commonwealth in Dialog with Laelius

Laelius....... I desired this, not only because it was proper that an eminent statesman rather
than anyone else should discuss the State, but also because I recollected that you used to converse
very frequently with Panaetius on this subject in company with Polybius - two Greeks who were
perhaps the best versed of them all in politics - and that you assembled many arguments to prove
that the form of government handed down to us by our ancestors is by far the best of all. Now
since you are better prepared than the rest of us to undertake this discussion, you will do us all a
favor, if I may speak for the company, by presenting your ideas on the State.

Scipio. I cannot, indeed, assert that any other subject claims more of my interest and careful
thought, Laelius, than the one which you now assign to me…Well, then, a commonwealth is the
property of a people . But a people is not any collection of human beings brought together in any
sort of way, but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement with
respect to justice and a partnership for the common good. The first cause of such an association is
not so much the weakness of the individual as a certain social spirit which nature has implanted in
man . For man is not a solitary or unsocial creature, but born with such a nature that not even
under conditions of great prosperity of every sort [is he willing to be isolated from his fellow men
] . . .In a short time a scattered and wandering multitude had become a body of citizens by mutual
agreement. . . .Such an assemblage of men, therefore, originating for the reason I have mentioned,
established itself in a definite place, at first in order to provide dwellings ; and this place being
fortified by its natural situation and by their labors, they called such a collection of dwellings a
town or city, and provided it with shrines and gathering places which were common property.
Therefore every people, which is such a gathering of large numbers as I have described, every
city, which is an orderly settlement of a people, every commonwealth, which, as I said, is "the
property of a people," must be governed by some deliberative body if it is to be permanent. And
this deliberative body must, in the first place, always owe its beginning to the same cause as that
which produced the State itself. In the second place, this function must either be granted to one
man, or to certain selected citizens, or must be assumed by the whole body of citizens And so
when the supreme authority is in the hands of one man, we call him a king, and the form of this
State a kingship. When selected citizens hold this power, we say that the State is ruled by an
aristocracy. But a popular government (for so it is called) exists when all the power is in the
hands of the people. And any one of these three forms of government (if only the bond which
originally joined the citizens together in the partnership of the State holds fast), though not
perfect or in my opinion the best, is tolerable, though one of them may be superior to another. For
either a just and wise king, or a select number of leading citizens, or even the people itself,
though this is the least commendable type, can nevertheless, as it seems, form a government that
is not unstable, provided that no elements of injustice or greed are mingled with it.

But in kingships the subjects have too small a share in the administration of justice and in
deliberation , and in aristocracies the masses can hardly have their share of liberty, since they are
entirely excluded from deliberation for the common weal and from power ; and when all the power
is in the people's hands, even though they exercise it with justice and, moderation, yet the resulting
equality itself is inequitable, since it allows no distinctions in rank. Therefore, even though the
Persian Cyrus was the most just and wisest of kings, that form of government does not seem to me
the most desirable, since "the property of the people " (for that is what a commonwealth is, as I
have said) is administered at the nod and caprice of one man ; even though the Massilians, now
under our protection, are ruled with the greatest justice by a select number of their leading citizens,
such a situation is nevertheless to some extent like slavery for a people; and even though the
Athenians at certain periods, after they had deprived the Areopagus of its power, succeeded in
carrying on all their public business by the resolutions and decrees of the people, their State,
because it had no definite distinctions in rank, could not maintain its fair renown.

I am now speaking of these three forms of government, not when they are confused and mingled
with one another, but when they retain their appropriate character. All of them are, in the first
place, subject each to the faults I have mentioned, and they suffer from other dangerous faults in
addition for before every one of them lies a slippery and precipitous path leading to a certain
depraved form that is a close neighbor to it. For underneath the tolerable, or, if you like, the
lovable King Cyrus (to cite him as a pre-eminent example) lies the utterly cruel Phalaris, impelling
him to an arbitrary change of character ; for the absolute rule of one man will easily and quickly
degenerate into a tyranny like his And a close neighbor to the excellent Massilian government,
conducted by a few leading citizens, is such a partisan combination of thirty men as once ruled
Athens. And as for the absolute power of the Athenian people - not to seek other examples of
popular government - when it changed into the fury and license of a mob… and likewise some
other form usually arises from those I have mentioned, and remarkable indeed are the periodical
revolutions and circular courses followed by the constant changes and sequences in governmental
forms. ** A wise man should be acquainted with these changes, but it calls for great citizens and
for a man of almost divine powers to foresee them when they threaten, and, while holding the
reins of government, to direct their courses and keep them under his control. Therefore I consider
a fourth form of government the most commendable - that form which is a well-regulated mixture
of the three which I mentioned at first.

Laelius. I know that is your opinion, Africanus, for I have often heard you say so. Nevertheless, if
it will not give you too much trouble, I should like to know which you consider the best of the
three forms of government of which you have been speaking. For it might help us somewhat to
understand . . .

Scipio.and every State is such as its ruler's character and will make it. Hence liberty has no
dwelling-place in any State except that in which the people's power is the greatest, and surely
nothing can be sweeter than liberty ; but if it is not the same for all, it does not deserve the name of
liberty. And how can it be the same for all, I will not say in a kingdom, where there is no obscurity
or doubt about the slavery of the subject, but even in States where everyone is ostensibly free ? I
mean States in which the people vote, elect commanders and officials, are canvassed for their
votes, and have bills proposed to them, but really grant only what they would have to grant even if
they were unwilling to do so, and are asked to give to others what they do not possess themselves.
For they have no share in the governing power, in the deliberative function, or in the courts, over
which selected judges preside, for those privileges are granted on the basis of birth or wealth. But
in a free nation, such as the Rhodians or the Athenians, there is not one of the citizens who [may
not hold the offices of State and take an active part in the government ] . . .
 [Our authorities] say [that] when one person or a few stand out from the crowd as richer and more
prosperous, then, as a result of the haughty and arrogant behavior of these, there arises [a
government of one or a few], the cowardly and weak giving way and bowing down to the pride of
wealth. But if the people would maintain their rights, they say that no form of government would
be superior, either in liberty or happiness, for they themselves would be masters of the laws and
the courts, of war and peace, of international agreements, and of every citizen's life and property;
this government alone, they believe, can rightly be called a commonwealth, that is, "the property
of the people." And it is for that reason, they say, that "the property of the people " is often
liberated from the domination of kings or senators, while free peoples do not seek kings or the
power and wealth of aristocracies.]

And indeed they claim that this free popular government ought not to be entirely rejected on
account of the excesses of an unbridled mob, for, according to them, when a sovereign people is
pervaded by a spirit of harmony and tests every measure by the standard of their own safety and
liberty, no form of government is less subject to change or more stable. And they insist that
harmony is very easily obtainable in a State where the interests of all are the same, for discord
arises from conflicting interests, where different measures are advantageous to different citizens.

Therefore, since law is the bond which unites the civic association, and the justice enforced by
law is the same for all, by what justice can an association of citizens be held together when
there is no equality among the citizens? For if we cannot agree to equalize men's wealth, and
equality of innate ability is impossible, the legal rights at least of those who are citizens of the
same commonwealth ought to be equal. For what is a State except an association or partnership in
justice ?

... If [the State] leaves [the selection of its rulers] to chance, it will be as quickly overturned as
a ship whose pilot should be chosen by lot from among the passengers. But if a free people
chooses the men to whom it is to entrust its fortunes, and, since it desires its own safety, chooses
the best men, then certainly the safety of the State depends upon the wisdom of its best men,
especially since Nature has provided not only that those men who are superior in virtue and in
spirit should rule the weaker, but also that the weaker should be willing to obey the stronger.
 But they claim that this ideal form of State has been rejected on account of the false notions of
men, who, through their ignorance of virtue - for just as virtue is possessed by only a few, so it
can be distinguished and perceived by only a few - think that the best men are those who are rich,
prosperous, or born of famous families. For when, on account of this mistaken notion of the
common people, the State begins to be ruled by the riches, instead of the virtue, of a few men,
these rulers tenaciously retain the title, though they do not possess the character, of the "best." For
riches, names, and power, when they lack wisdom and the knowledge of how to live and to rule
over others, are full of dishonor and insolent pride, nor is there any more depraved type of State
than that in which the richest are accounted the best.

But what can be nobler than the government of the State by virtue? For then the man who
rules others is not himself a slave to any passion, but has already acquired for himself all those
qualities to which he is training and summoning his fellows. Such a man imposes no laws upon
the people that he does not obey himself, but puts his own life before his fellow-citizens as their
law. If a single individual of this character could order all things properly in a State, there would
be no need of more than one ruler, or if the citizens as a body could see what was best and agree
upon it, no one would desire a selected group of rulers. It has been the difficulty of formulating
policies that has transferred the power from a king to a larger number; and the perversity and
rashness of popular assemblies that have transferred it from the many to the few. Thus, between
the weakness of a single ruler and the rashness of the many, aristocracies have occupied that
intermediate position which represents the utmost moderation , and in a State ruled by its best
men, the citizens must necessarily enjoy the greatest happiness, being freed from all cares and
worries, when once they have entrusted the preservation of their tranquility to others, whose duty
it is to guard it vigilantly and never to allow the people to think that their interests are being
neglected by their rulers.

For that equality of legal rights of which free peoples are so fond cannot be maintained (for
the people themselves, though free and unrestrained, give very many special powers to many
individuals, and create great distinctions among men and the honors granted to them), and what is
called equality is really most inequitable. For when equal honor is given to the highest and the
lowest - for men of both types must exist in every nation - then this very "fairness" is most unfair
; but this cannot happen in States ruled by their best citizens. These arguments and others like
them, Laelius, are approximately those which are advanced by men who consider this form of
government the best.

Laelius. But what about yourself, Scipio ? Which of these three forms do you consider the
best?

Scipio. You are right to ask which I consider the best of the three, for I do not approve of any
of them when employed by itself, and consider the form which is a combination of all them
superior to any single one of them But if I were compelled to approve one single unmixed form,
[I might choose] the kingship . . . the name of king seems like that of father to us, since the king
provides for the citizens as if they were his own children, and is more eager to protect them than
to be sustained by the care of one man who is the most virtuous and most eminent. But here are
the aristocrats, with the claim that they can do this more effectively, and that there will be more
wisdom in the counsels of several than in those of one man, and an equal amount of fairness and
scrupulousness And here also are the people, shouting with a loud voice that they are willing to
obey neither one nor a few, that nothing is sweeter than liberty even to wild beasts, and that all
who are slaves, whether to a king or to an aristocracy, are deprived of liberty. Thus kings attract
us by our affection for them, aristocracies by their wisdom, and popular governments by then
freedom, so that in comparing them it is difficult to say which one prefers.