Adams Press Release and Lawsuit Opt

STATEMENT FROM JULIE ADAMS
GOP Member, Fulton County Board of Registration and Elections (BRE)
Today, on my behalf, the America First Policy Institute Center for Litigation and the law
firm of Chalmers, Adams, Backer & Kaufman filed an action in Fulton County Superior Court,
asking the Court to declare that the Fulton County BRE is the election superintendent for
Fulton County, with legal responsibility for the conduct of Fulton County elections.
Since assuming my position as a BRE member in January of this year, I have sought
repeatedly to have access to the election processes and the materials that are necessary for
me, as a member of the BRE, should have ongoing access in order to fulfill my statutory
duties.
We are asking for immediate review and decision by the Court to remedy this
situation, so that the BRE members can be fully advised about and engaged in the elections
in our county – and to restore the faith of the citizens of this county in the outcome of today’s
primary election and the rest of the elections this year – and every year.
Further questions should be directed to the attorneys who have filed the action today.
Alex Kaufman, Chalmers, Adams, Backer & Kaufman: [email protected]

Richard Lawson, AFPI Center for Litigation: rlawson@americafirstpolicy.com
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
JULIE ADAMS, in her official capacity as a

member of the Fulton County Board of Case No.:
Elections and Registration, a/k/a Fulton
County Board of Registration and Elections, EMERGENCY RELIEF
REQUESTED
Plaintiff,
v.
FULTON COUNTY BOARD OF

ELECTIONS AND REGISTRATION, a/k/a
REGISTRATION AND ELECTIONS, and
NADINE WILLIAMS, in her official
capacity as Elections Director,
Defendants.
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF, INTERLOCUTORY

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, AND PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
INTRODUCTION
The Georgia Legislature carefully crafted the process by which elections would be
conducted in the State of Georgia and by each county of the state. This action seeks to ensure that
these laws are followed in Fulton County. Since assuming her duties as a member of the Fulton
County Board of Registration and Elections1 (the “BRE”), Plaintiff has been prevented from
performing her statutory duties as a BRE member as she has been denied, and continues to be
1
The formal name of the BRE is difficult to determine. The statute refers to the County Boards of Elections and
Registration, the Fulton County ordinance creating the BRE uses the phrase “Board of Elections and Registration;”
the BRE’s Bylaws use “Board of Registration and Elections;” while the BRE’s website uses “Department of
Registration and Elections.” This complaint will use “Board of Registration and Elections” as it is the most common
phrase used by the BRE itself.
.
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denied, access to essential election materials and processes by which elections in Fulton County
are conducted. Over the years, the Board has purportedly delegated core BRE responsibilities to
an appointed Election Director. Plaintiff swore an oath to “prevent fraud, deceit, and abuse” in
Fulton County elections and to “make a true and perfect return.” These obligations are frustrated
by the repeated and continuing refusal to allow Plaintiff access to, and direct knowledge of, the
information Plaintiff reasonably believes she needs to execute her duties faithfully and thoroughly.
Plaintiff’s requests for data have been stymied by direct instructions from the BRE’s Chair
to the staff that Plaintiff is to be denied access to key election information. Defendant Nadine
Williams, Elections Director, has informed Plaintiff that her requests for supporting documentation
relative to election results are unnecessary because the Director’s summaries are submitted to a
“rigorous validation process” and should simply be trusted. Without the ability to confirm the
accuracy of the returns and the ability to observe and inspect the various election processes in
Fulton County, Plaintiff voted against the certification of election results in the recent Presidential
Preference Primary (the “PPP”). The Defendants have confirmed to Plaintiff their decision to
continue their refusal to allow access to key information for the Primary Election of May 21, 2024.
Consequently, Plaintiff is unable to fulfill her oath of office. Highlighting the need for
judicial intervention is the fact that after her vote against certification of the PPP results (due to
lack of information to either confirm or deny the validity of the PPP results as reported to her by
the Elections Director, the Democratic Party of Georgia (the “DPG”) sent a letter to all BRE
members, including Plaintiff, asserting that certification is a ministerial duty, and the failure to
vote in favor of certification is subject to potential legal action, including but not limited to possible
criminal sanctions. This action seeks to clarify that the statutory role of election superintendent
assigned to the BRE by Georgia law cannot be delegated in its entirety to the Director, that
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Plaintiff’s duties are, in fact, discretionary, not ministerial, and that the Director may not prevent
BRE from gaining access to information needed to fulfill their statutory duties. Simply put,
Plaintiff is asking the Court to direct the Defendants to follow the law.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. This Superior Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Georgia law. O.C.G.A. §§
9-4-1 (general jurisdiction), 9-4-2 (declaratory relief), 9-4-3 (injunctive relief), and 9-5-1
(injunctive relief).
2. Venue is proper in this court pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-10-30.
PARTIES
Plaintiff
3. Julie Adams (“Plaintiff”) is a duly appointed member of the BRE and one of the two
nominees of the Fulton County Republican Party, having been appointed to the position by
the Fulton County Board of Commissioners on January 17, 2024.
4. Plaintiff was sworn into her office as a member of the BRE on February 8, 2024, and, as
required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-70(15)(B), took the following oath on that date:
I, Julie Adams, do swear -or affirm- that I will as a member of the board of
elections duly attend all ensuing primaries and elections during the
continuance thereof, that I will to the best of my ability prevent any
fraud, deceit, or abuse in carrying on the same, that I will make a true
and perfect return of such primaries and elections, and that I will at all
times truly, impartially and faithfully perform my duties in accordance
with Georgia laws to the best of my judgement and ability. 2
5. Plaintiff is, and at all times relevant to this Complaint has been, a resident of Fulton County
above the age of majority.
Defendants
2
Julie Adams, Member, Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Reg. and Elec., Oath of Office (Feb. 8, 2024, at 17:32) (emphasis added)
Available as of the date of filing at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P3bVXYkBMLc.
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6. Pursuant to the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-40, the BRE was established in 1989 by the
Georgia General Assembly through local legislation under Ga. L. 1989, p.4577
(“Authorization Act”).
7. The BRE has operated continuously since its creation and is structured as a five-member
board per local legislation under Ga. L. 2019, p.4181 (“Structure Act”).
8. Nadine Williams has served as the chief administrative officer (referred to by the BRE and
herein as the “Director”) since 2023.
9. Defendants are residents and creatures of Fulton County, Georgia and all actions at issue
have occurred or will occur in Fulton County, Georgia.
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
County Boards of Elections and Registration
10. Title 21 of the Georgia Code is the Election Code of the State of Georgia that governs the
structure and operations of elections in the State of Georgia, as well as in every county in
the State.
11. Chapter 2, Article 2 of Title 21 outlines the structure and composition of Georgia’s election
offices, including the State Election Board, County Boards of Elections, and County
Boards of Elections and Registration. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-2.
12. Under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-40(b), “[T]he General Assembly may by local Act create a board
of elections and registration in any county of this state and empower the board with the
powers and duties of the election superintendent relating to the conduct of primaries and
elections and with the powers and duties of the board of registrars relating to the
registration of voters and absentee-balloting procedures.” See also O.C.G.A. § 21-2-45
(regarding joint county boards of election).
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13. Pursuant to the Structure Act, the BRE is comprised of five members: two members who
are selected by the political party whose candidate received the largest number of votes in
the last preceding regular general election, two members who are selected by the political
party whose candidate received the second largest number of votes, and one member,
serving as chairperson of the BRE, who is designated by the Fulton County Board of
County Commissioners.
14. The Authorization Act states that the BRE “shall have the powers and duties of the
election superintendent of Fulton County relating to the conduct of elections and the
powers and duties of the board of registrars relating to the registration of voters and
absentee balloting procedures.” (Emphasis added).
15. The Authorization Act sets out additional affirmative duties, including:
a. an oath requirement for its members;
b. responsibility for the registration of electors of Fulton County;
c. the preparing, equipping, and furnishing of polling places;
d. the counting of all ballots, both absentee and those regularly cast;
e. the selection, appointment, and training of poll workers; and,all duties and powers
for the administration of elections otherwise assigned to the probate judge under
Chapter 2 of Title 21 of the Georgia Election Code.
The Election Superintendent
16. The “Election Superintendent” or “Superintendent” is a statutorily defined term: “Either
the county board of elections, the county board of elections and registration, the joint city-
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county board of elections, or the joint city-county board of elections and registration, if a
county has such[.]” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-2(35)(A).3
17. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-70 states that “[e]ach superintendent within his or her county or
municipality shall exercise all the powers granted to him or her by this chapter and shall
perform all the duties imposed upon him or her” under Chapter 2 of Title 21.
18. These powers and duties include, inter alia:
a. the power to “inspect systematically and thoroughly the conduct of primaries and
elections . . . to the end that primaries and elections may be honestly, efficiently,
and uniformly conducted,” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-70(8);
b. the power to “receive from poll officers the returns of all primaries and elections,
to canvass and compute the same, and to certify the results thereof to such
authorities as may be prescribed by law,” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-70(9); and
c. the duty of each individual board member to swear an oath to “prevent any fraud,
deceit, or abuse in carrying on the same [i.e., elections],” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-
70(15)(B).
19. O.C.G.A.§ 21-2-493 sets out in particularity the methods by which the Superintendent is
to perform its duties of computation, canvassing, tabulating, and certification, stating:
(a) The superintendent shall, after the close of the polls on the day of a
primary or election, at his or her office or at some other convenient public
place at the county seat or in the municipality, of which due notice shall
have been given as provided by Code Section 21-2-492, publicly
commence the computation and canvassing of the returns and continue
until all absentee ballots received by the close of the polls, including
those cast by advance voting, and all ballots cast on the day of the primary
or election have been counted and tabulated and the results of such
3
In May 2024, Governor Kemp signed into law Act 580 which amended O.G.C.A. § 21-2-2(35)(A) to remove the
phrase “the judge of the probate court of a county or” as a designated entity that could serve as a “superintendent” if
elections under Chapter 2 of Title 21 of the Georgia Election Code. 2024 Ga. Laws Act 580, § 3 (amending O.C.G.A.
§ 21-2-2).
Page 6 of 33
tabulation released to the public and, then, continuing with provisional
ballots as provided in Code Sections 21-2-418 and 21-2-419 and those
absentee ballots as provided in subparagraph (a)(1)(G) of Code Section 21-
2-386 from day to day until completed. For this purpose, the superintendent
may organize his or her assistants into sections, each of whom may
simultaneously proceed with the computation and canvassing of the returns
from various precincts of the county or municipality in the manner provided
by this Code section. Upon the completion of such computation and
canvassing, the superintendent shall tabulate the figures for the entire
county or municipality and sign, announce, and attest the same, as required
by this Code section.4
(b) The superintendent, before computing the votes cast in any precinct,
shall compare the registration figure with the certificates returned by
the poll officers showing the number of persons who voted in each precinct
or the number of ballots cast. If, upon consideration by the superintendent
of the returns and certificates before him or her from any precinct, it shall
appear that the total vote returned for any candidate or candidates for the
same office or nomination or on any question exceeds the number of
electors in such precinct or exceeds the total number of persons who voted
in such precinct or the total number of ballots cast therein, such excess shall
be deemed a discrepancy and palpable error and shall be investigated
by the superintendent; and no votes shall be recorded from such precinct
until an investigation shall be had. Such excess shall authorize the
summoning of the poll officers to appear immediately with any primary or
election papers in their possession. The superintendent shall then
examine all the registration and primary or election documents
whatever relating to such precinct in the presence of representatives of each
party, body, and interested candidate. Such examination may, if the
superintendent deems it necessary, include a recount or recanvass of
the votes of that precinct and a report of the facts of the case to the
district attorney where such action appears to be warranted.
(k) As the returns from each precinct are read, computed, and found to be
correct or corrected as aforesaid, they shall be recorded on the blanks
prepared for the purpose until all the returns from the various precincts
which are entitled to be counted shall have been duly recorded; then they
shall be added together, announced, and attested by the assistants who made
and computed the entries respectively and shall be signed by the
superintendent. The consolidated returns shall then be certified by the
superintendent in the manner required by this chapter. Such returns
shall be certified by the superintendent not later than 5:00 P.M. on the
4
Effective until July 1, 2024, with the new statutory language coming into effect on July 1, 2024, adding an 8:00
p.m. deadline on election day for completion of tabulation.
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Monday following the date on which such election was held and such
returns shall be immediately transmitted to the Secretary of State.
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-493(a-b, k) (emphasis added).
20. Georgia law also assigns specific election night procedures and verification management
(the zero tapes, results tapes, and memory cards) to the election superintendent. O.C.G.A.
§ 21-2-379.11(g)provides that:
Upon receipt of the sealed envelope or container containing the zero tapes,
results tapes, and memory cards [previously sealed in an envelope on
election night by a poll manager under O.G.C.A. § 21-2-379.11(e)] the
election superintendent shall verify the initials or signature on the
envelope. Once verified, the superintendent shall break the seal of the
envelope or container and remove its contents. The superintendent shall
then download the results stored on the memory card from each DRE
unit into the election management system . . . [.]”
(emphasis added).
21. The superintendent also has statutorily defined duties regarding the performance of certain
tasks. See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-377 (regarding the designation of a custodian for optical
scanning voting systems); O.G.C.A. § 21-2-483 (regarding the designation of review
panels at tabulation centers); O.G.C.A. § 21-2-132 (regarding municipal superintendent
designation of certain qualifying periods).
22. The Authorization Act vested the BRE with the “powers and duties of the election
superintendent of Fulton County relating to the conduct of elections.”
Chief Administrative Officer
23. The Authorization Act allowed the BRE to create “a chief administrative officer of the
board who shall be appointed by the governing authority of the county upon the
recommendation of the board and shall be designated elections supervisor. He shall have
such duties and functions in regard to elections as may be prescribed by the board.”
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24. “Election supervisor” is a legally distinct office from that of the superintendent. See, e.g.,
Ga. Code. Ann. § 21-2-33.1(f) (describing the duties of a temporary superintendent after
the suspension of a superintendent, including “the authority to make all personnel decisions
related to any employees of the jurisdiction who assist with carrying out the duties of the
superintendent, including, but not limited to, the director of elections, the election
supervisor, and all poll officers.” (emphasis added)).
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
25. Consistent with the Authorization Act, Fulton County enacted an ordinance vesting the
BRE with the “powers and duties of the election superintendent of Fulton County relating
to the conduct of elections and the powers and duties of the board of registrars relating
to the registration of voters and absentee balloting procedures.” Fulton County Local Act
§ 14-32.5
26. In her role as a member of the BRE, Plaintiff has repeatedly sought access to the election
processes, systems, records, materials, data, equipment, reports from poll workers, and
other vital information (“the Election Materials and Processes”) necessary for her, and
other BRE members, to perform their statutory duties. 6
27. While the Election Materials and Processes are discussed more fully in the body of the
complaint, these Election Materials and Processes include but are not limited to receipt and
inspection of:
5
Available as of the date of filing at:
https://library.municode.com/ga/fulton_county/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTILOCO
AMLOAC_CH14EL_ARTIIBOELRE_S14-32CRPODUGE.
6
There are other significant statutory responsibilities vested in the election superintendent as part of overseeing the
elections, including but not limited to the budget for the elections department, finances, vendors and contractors,
personnel policies, voter registration and list maintenance, among others, Those specific duties and responsibilities
are not at issue in this emergency action but Plaintiff does not waive her statutory obligations related to all
components of being a BRE member and election superintendent in Fulton County,
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a. Qualified Voter List: a list of all lawfully registered electors that are eligible to cast
a ballot within a voting jurisdiction.
b. Voter Check-in List: a list of all electors who, upon arriving at a voting precinct to
cast a ballot, signed in at that precinct. There are unique Voter Check-in Lists for
advanced voting and lection ay voting.
c. Poll Open and Close Tapes: Insofar as ballots are cast on voting machines, an Open
Tape is a reflection of the number of ballots cast on a particular machine before the
casting of the first vote on election day (regularly set to zero before the casting of
that first vote) and Close Tapes that reflect how many ballots were cast on a
particular machine after the casting of the last ballot at a polling place on election
night. The Open and Close Tapes, taken together, help reconcile the accurate
numbers of votes cast on a voting machine and are used to verify that the numbers
reported by a particular voting machine are neither inaccurate nor tampered with.
d. Ballot Recap Sheet: The ballots cast by electors during advanced voting are not
counted until election night. A Ballot Recap Sheet is a report reflecting the number
of ballots cast on a voting machine during advanced voting. The report helps with
reconciling the reported number of ballots cast during advanced voting when
tabulated on election night, and the actual number of ballots cast during advanced
voting, ensuring no addition or deletion in the interim.
e. Provisional Ballot Recap Sheets: Provisional ballots are ballots provided to
potential electors, such as electors whose registration status may be uncertain or
otherwise under examination but whose registration status may be perfected on or
before tabulation on election day. Provisional ballots may be cast during advanced
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voting, with the Provisions Ballot Recap Sheet being the Ballot Recap Sheet for
cast provisional ballots.
f. Voting Ballot Removal Forms: During advanced voting, when an individual
scanning machine that accepts and scans paper ballots accumulates a sufficient
number of ballots, the accepted and scanned ballots must be emptied from the
machine. During the emptying process, the scanning machine produces a report of
the removal action called a Voting Ballot Removal Form. These reports are vital in
reconciling the data from internal memory cards for each scanning machine, which
additionally logs cast ballots.
g. Drop Box Ballot Forms: The Drop Box Ballot Form is a chain of custody document
that tracks the collection and transportation of ballots cast at any of the ballot drop
boxes in Fulton County.
h. Cast Vote Record List: a list detailing all ballots cast with digital images of ballots
as they were cast.
i. Absentee Ballot Records: List of all electors who requested, received, and/or
returned an Absentee Ballot. All Absentee Ballot applications and ballot
envelopes.
j. Election Processes: the various procedures required by law to, among other things,
protect and secure ballots, voting and tabulating equipment, the opening and closing
of polling locations, the transporting of ballots, ballot drop boxes, and other voting
materials, and the manner in which poll workers conduct the election at their
respective polling locations, central tabulation, and other physical locations and
other of the election processes and procedures.
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28. Together, the Election Materials and Processes are comprised of the totality of the election
processes that the election superintendent is required by law to oversee and implement.
29. In particular, under the Authorization Act, the BRE has the exclusive power to certify the
results of Fulton County elections.
30. However, without access to any of the Election Materials and Processes needed to verify
the returns and results of an election BRE members are left to rely on the bare
representations of the Director.
31. Importantly, the position of Director is referenced in bylaws (“Bylaws;” a copy of which
is attached and incorporated hereto at Exhibit 1) that were ostensibly promulgated by the
BRE, but despite the request of BRE members, neither the counsel nor the BRE’s staff
have been able to produce an official version of the Bylaws, in a form or on a date on which
the bylaws were passed.
32. The Bylaws provide, inter alia:
a. The selection of a chief administrative officer, the Director, for the Fulton County
BRE. Bylaws Art. I;
b. The conduct of regular meetings for the Fulton County BRE. Bylaws Art. II-III;
and,
c. The voting procedure of the board requiring a majority of the BRE members for
any action of the BRE. Bylaws Art. III, § 6.
33. The Defendants have asserted that the powers and duties of the BRE have been delegated
to the Director by virtue of the Bylaws in Article VI, “Employees:”
Section 1. The Board hereby delegates the powers and duties of the
superintendent and the board of registrars, as provided in O.C.G.A. §
21-2-70 and § 21-2-212, the Director, pursuant to Sec. 14-42 of the Fulton
County Code of Ordinances; provided, however, that the Board
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acknowledges its ultimate responsibility for the discharge of these powers
and duties. (Emphasis added)
34. This purported delegation provision cites Section 14-42 of the Fulton County Code of
Ordinances,7 which, tracking language from the Authorization Act, states as follows:
There shall be a chief administrative officer of the board who shall be

appointed by the governing authority of the county upon the
recommendation of the board and shall be designated [the] “elections
supervisor.” He shall have such duties and functions in regard to
elections as may be prescribed by the board. The elections supervisor shall
be an elector of Fulton County.
35. It appears the Bylaw’s “Director” fills the role of the “election supervisor” established by
the Fulton County Board of County Commissioners.
36. Notwithstanding the clear statutory language in the Georgia Election Code, the Defendants
have taken the position the BRE delegated the statutorily assigned duties and powers of
the Fulton County election superintendent to the Director via adoption of the bylaws and
that BRE members are not entitled to access to the Election Materials and Processes
necessary for the performance of their duties.
37. As a consequence of this delegation (which, as noted above, is unsupported by any official
records of the Bylaws being formally adopted by the BRE), the current and former Chairs
of the BRE and the Director have refused to allow Plaintiff access to the Election Materials
and Processes.
7
Fulton County Code of Ordinances § 14-42 appears to be reserved, see https://library.municode.com/ga/fulton_
county/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIICOORCORE_CH14BUBURE_ARTIITEST_DIV1GE_SS14-42--14-
75RE, however, Fulton County Local Act § 14-42 contains the relevant language cited below, see,
https://library.municode.com/ga/fulton_county/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTILOCOAMLOAC_CH14EL_
ARTIIBOELRE_S14-42CHADOFDUFU.
Page 13 of 33
38. Previous members of the BRE who are no longer serving have likewise sought access to
the Fulton County Election Materials and Processes, only to be likewise denied in their
repeated requests.
39. The denial of access to the Election Materials and Processes during and following the
March 12, 2024, Presidential Preference Primary (the “PPP”) was a material factor in
Plaintiff’s decision to vote against certification of the results of the PPP.
40. Specifically, on March 7, 2024, five days before the upcoming PPP, Plaintiff emailed the
Director and Chair of the BRE requesting the following items be made available with
adequate time for her review prior to voting on the meeting at which certification was to
occur (a copy of Plaintiff’s email is attached and incorporated by reference hereto at
composite Exhibit 2):
a. Qualified Voter List;
b. Voter Check-In List, AV and ED, by location;
c. Poll Open & Close Tapes (AV open & Close status) and ED;
d. Ballot Recap Sheets;
e. Voted Ballot Removal Forms;
f. Drop Box Ballot Recap Sheets;
g. Provisional Ballot Recap Sheets; and
h. Cast Vote Record.
41. That same evening, the Director responded, noting that most of the documents requested
would not be created until after the primary, and that “review of these documents is not
required for certification,” and that “reconciliation is diligently conducted and completed”
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by her office before certification (a copy of the Director’s email is attached and
incorporated by reference hereto at composite Exhibit 2).
42. The then-Chair of the BRE instructed the Director to deny Plaintiff’s requests for
documents and advised the Plaintiff that she would need to seek the approval of the entire
BRE to obtain these documents (a copy of the Chair’s email is attached and incorporated
by reference hereto at composite Exhibit 2).
43. Without access to the Election Materials and Processes, Plaintiff was unable to fulfill her
statutory duties to “inspect systematically and thoroughly the conduct of primaries and
elections . . . to the end that primaries and elections may be honestly, efficiently, and
uniformly conducted,” “to canvass and compute the” election results, and satisfy her oath
to ensure there was no, “fraud, deceit, or abuse in carrying on the [elections].”
44. Accordingly, on March 19, 2024, Plaintiff voted against certification of the PPP results.
45. Compounding the need for judicial clarification is that after the vote against certification
of the March PPP returns, the DPG sent a letter dated March 29, 2024, to all the members
of the BRE, including Plaintiff.
46. The DPG’s letter stated its position that the “certification of election results is a ministerial
task performed by members of the Board of Elections and is not subject to their discretion.”
(A copy of the letter is attached and incorporated by reference hereto at Exhibit 3.)
47. The DPG’s letter opined that failure to certify could be grounds for a mandamus action and
that members of the BRE could also face criminal liability for voting against certification,
stating that “if a member of the Board of Elections either ‘willfully neglects’ or ‘refuses to
perform’ their statutory obligations, they ‘shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,’” (citing
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-596).
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48. After Plaintiff requested access to Election Materials and Processes before and during
meetings of the BRE on March 12, March 18, April 11, and April 17, 2024, the Director
distributed a memorandum to BRE members, setting out her position on access to Election
Materials and Processes. (A copy of the memorandum is attached and incorporated by
reference hereto at Exhibit 4.)
49. In response to one of the Plaintiff’s requests for a specific document (recap sheets related
to vote processing), the Director explained that no access would be granted to anything
beyond the Excel spreadsheets traditionally prepared and provided by the Director to the
BRE.
50. The Director stated that these Excel documents provide seamless error correction and the
documents, “undergo rigorous validation processes to ensure their accuracy and
compliance with legal requirement.”
51. The Director stated that Plaintiff should trust the self-described “rigorous validation
process” employed by the Director to ensure accuracy.
52. Further, the Director stated that Plaintiff’s questions on the issue “leads to misinformation
and distrust in the electoral process” and that they lead to “[b]aseless allegations” that
“work against and divide this unit and work against all the voters we serve.”
53. Plaintiff’s continued concerns over access to Election Materials and Processes prompted
the former Chair of the BRE to request an opinion from the board’s legal counsel as to
“whether or not a board of elections and registration can designate the election
superintendent?”8
8
Patrise Perkins-Hooker, Chairwoman, Fulton County Bd. Of Reg. and Elec., Inquiry to Legal Counsel (April 11,
2024; at 1:51:36). Available as of the date of filing at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=795a9AAnlYY.
Page 16 of 33
54. The BRE’s counsel responded on May 6, 2024, stating that the Authorization Act permitted
the creation of the “election supervisor,” a position filled by the BRE’s “Director.”
55. However, the Authorization Act confers no authority for the BRE to divest itself of its core
statutory duties as election superintendent, and the BRE counsel’s letter cites to no such
authority on this critical point.
56. The counsel’s letter was discussed at length at the BRE meeting on May 9, 2024.
57. BRE member Mike Heekin raised specific concerns regarding “the delegability [sic] of
certain – of powers and duties particularly superintendent and board of registrars,”
recommending that the legal counsel and the BRE “drive a little deeper into can they [the
powers and duties of the superintendent and board of registrars] be delegated.”9
58. At that same meeting, Plaintiff attempted to close the gaps in the counsel’s opinion letter
by making the following motion to the BRE:
That the Fulton County Board of Registrations and Elections resume their
legal responsibility as the superintendent of elections and fully functioning
whether it is the finance department, whether its training, and certainly for
this upcoming election, that the board member have the right to real-time
results of the elections and elections’ documents.10
59. The motion failed on a 2-2 vote (one member of the BRE was absent, and a majority vote
was required for passage).
60. The current BRE Chair, Cathy Woolard, informed the other members of the BRE that the
Election Materials (in whatever form they would be made available) would not be provided
before 8:00 a.m. ET on certification day May 28, 2024.
9
Mike Heekin, Vice Chair, Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Reg. and Elec., Recommendations (May 9, 2024, at 52:30).
Available as of the date of filing at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p4N_rMdpf7c.
10
Julie Adams, Board Member, Fulton Cnty Bd. of Reg. and Elec., Motion (May 9, 2024, at 1:30:30); Available as
of the date of filing at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p4N_rMdpf7c.
Page 17 of 33
61. When Plaintiff suggested that the few hours before the certification vote would be
insufficient, Ms. Woolard responded, “Well that’s gonna be what you get.”11
62. When Ms. Adams asked if she could have the Election Materials (in whatever form they
would be made available) at least a day or two before the day of certification, Ms. Wollard
responded, “You cannot.”12
63. When Mr. Heekin and Plaintiff inquired whether or not they would be provided a ballot
recap sheet, Ms. Williams responded:
I’m sorry the ballot recap sheet, is not produced electronically for election
day, it’s a three-part carbon form that we have to pull from blinders to get
those all together, and we would not have that done by the time
certification happens. But the numbers from those ballot sheets are on the
report that are listed on this form.13
64. The BRE then voted to begin its May 28, 2024, certification meeting at 8:00 a.m. ET and
that the certification vote would be completed no later than 3:00 p.m. ET that same day.
65. The operations of the BRE have long been a matter of concern.
66. In the aftermath of Fulton County’s 2020 primary, the State Election Board (“SEB”) issued
a consent order (“2020 Consent Order”) that detailed over 410 complaints regarding the
BRE’s conduct of the primary. A copy of the consent order is attached and incorporated by
reference hereto at Exhibit 5.
67. Pursuant to the 2020 Consent Order, the SEB appointed a monitor to oversee the BRE’s
operations during the 2020 general election (the post-election report by that monitor is
attached and incorporated hereto as Exhibit 6).
11
Cathy Woolard, Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Reg. and Elec., Statement (May 9, 2024, at 1:22:55).\ Available as of the date
of filing at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p4N_rMdpf7c.
12
Cathy Woolard, Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Reg. and Elec., Statement (May 9, 2024, at 1:23:08). Available as of the date
of filing at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p4N_rMdpf7c.
13
Nadine Williams, Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Reg. and Elec., Statement (May 9, 2024, 1:26:39) (emphasis added).
Available as of the date of filing at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p4N_rMdpf7c.
Page 18 of 33
68. Despite the appointment of a monitor as a result of the errors in the 2020 primary, the
BRE’s conduct of the 2020 general election was also subject to reprimand by the SEB.
69. Specifically, the SEB recently issued a citation in response to Complaint 2023-025, which
alleged that the BRE had engaged in numerous violations of the Georgia Election Code.
(The SEB has yet to formally issue the letter of reprimand, but SEB hearing where the vote
to issue the reprimand was taken was available as of the date of filing at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M6QLSEfbO7w.)
70. At the hearing on Complaint 2023-025, SEB Member Johnson said, “[T]here is enough
evidence to suggest that the Respondents violated Georgia election laws and State Election
Board rules, to such an excess, that we should be embarrassed for the Fulton County
Registration and Elections.”14
71. The specific actions by the SEB during the 2020 and 2022 election cycles are just a sample
of the official actions the SEB’s oversight of the BRE in recent years; attached here is a
list of official actions taken in response to complaints about the BRE (including but not
limited to the reprimands detailed above):
14
Video of the hearing available as of the date of filing at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M6QLSEfbO7w.
Page 19 of 33
Complaint Subject Matter of SEB Meeting Minutes - Date of
Disposition
Number Complaint Disposition Disposition
Double Scanning, Tabulation https://sos.ga.gov/sites/default Reprimand,
2023-025 Errors, Erroneous Results /files/2024- 5/7/2024 Appointment of
2020 General Election 05/Summary%205.7.8.24.pdf Monitors for 2024
https://sos.ga.gov/sites/default
Letter of
2022-356 Tabulation Issues /files/2024- 5/7/2024
Instruction
05/Summary%205.7.8.24.pdf
Letter of
2022-211 AB Fraud /files/2024- 5/7/2024
Instruction
05/Summary%205.7.8.24.pdf
Certification of Incomplete & Letter of
2022-109 /files/2024- 2/13/2024
Erroneous Results Reprimand
05/Minutes%202.13.24.pdf
Election Night Reporting May Letter of
2022-043 /files/2024- 5/7/2024
3, 2022 Issues Instruction
05/Minutes%202.13.24.pdf
Data Review Errors with Risk https://sos.ga.gov/sites/default Consent order
2021-181 Limiting Audit -Approved AG /files/forms/Minutes%206.21.23 6/21/2023 issued by AG's
Report .pdf office
2021-141 Illegal Shredding /files/forms/Minutes%206.20.23 6/20/2023 Refer to AG
.pdf
2020-120 Poll Watcher Issue /files/forms/Minutes%206.21.23 6/21/2023 Refer to AG
.pdf
Issues from August 11th,
2020-080 /files/forms/Minutes%208.1.23. 8/1/2023 Refer to AG
2020, Runoff
pdf
250+ Complaints No AB Consent Order &
2020-016 Consent Order 10/12/2020 10/12/2020
Ballot June Primary Monitor
160+ Conplaints Polling Consent Order &
2020-027 Consent Order 10/12/2020 10/12/2020
Place Issues June Primary Monitor
72. The BRE’s failures continued into the 2022 primary, and the SEB was once again
compelled to reprimand the BRE for “failing to upload and tabulate results in their
entirety…[a]s such, incomplete results were certified[.]” The Fulton County BRE was
“instructed to refrain from further violations…and admonished to comply with all of the
State Election Board rules and Georgia law relating to elections.” (The letter of reprimand
is attached and incorporated hereto at Exhibit 7.)
Page 20 of 33
73. The multiple reprimands issued against the BRE by the SEB highlight that the
administrative irregularities at the heart of this action are anything but unusual or
extraordinary.
74. At the SEB Meetings on May 7-8, 2024, there were discussions about appointing yet
another monitor to oversee Fulton County’s conduct of the 2024 general election.
75. The General Assembly has enacted a bipartisan oversight process for conducting elections,
consisting of appointed members from both political parties having access to the Election
Materials and Processes in real time during the conduct of the elections, to ensure that all
statutory procedures are followed and that the election is conducted in accordance with the
Georgia Election Code.
76. The duly appointed BRE members, acting as the election superintendent, should be both
allowed and required to perform their statutory responsibilities.
77. Because of the repeated and ongoing refusal of the Election Director and the BRE
Chairman to grant Plaintiff’s request for access to the Election Materials and Processes,
Plaintiff requests the Court resolve the legal issues attendant to Plaintiff’s role as a member
of the Fulton County BRE.
78. Specifically, based on her current lack of access to Election Materials and Processes,
Plaintiff will be unable to fulfil her statutory duties to certify the accuracy of the May 21,
2024, Primary Election.
79. Plaintiff requires access to all elements of the Election Materials and Processes of the May
21, 2024, Primary Election in real time as the primary is being conducted as well as post
Election but prior to certification.
80. The need for an expedited ruling is immediate.
Page 21 of 33
81. The need for an expedited ruling and the relief sought is not remediable by money.
82. Failing to provide Plaintiff with the relief sought would cause irreparable harm and damage
to not only the Plaintiff, but the citizen voters of Fulton County and the public at large.
83. Plaintiff has shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
84. Ruling in Plaintiff’s favor is not violative of Georgia’s public policy. In fact, a ruling in
Plaintiff’s favor is consistent with Georgia’s policy of building public trust and confidence
in Georgia’s elections. This policy is particularly emphasized by the fact that the general
assembly has enacted multiple laws to strengthen the integrity of Georgia’s elections during
each of the last three legislative sessions.
85. In addition to the frustration of her statutory role, Plaintiff, in her role as a BRE member,
has been served with a notice from the DPG that her duties are ministerial only and a failure
to automatically certify the May 21 election results may expose her a mandamus action or
even criminal sanctions.15
86. Plaintiff’s role as a BRE member is of paramount concern for the proper execution and
supervision of Fulton County elections.
87. For state and federal elections, the role of “superintendent” is assigned by law to a specific
set of entities identified in the statute:
a) a county board of elections;
b) a county board of elections and registration;
c) a joint city-county board of elections;
15
In light of State v. Trump, et al., Fulton County Superior Court, 23-SC188947, the BRE members, including Plaintiff,
face a credible threat of prosecution by the Fulton County District Attorney—who is presently running for reelection
in Fulton County, as a Democrat, in the May 21, 2024, primary—in the performance of election related activities.
Page 22 of 33
d) a city-county board of elections and registration; or
e) a temporary superintendent after the suspension of a superintendent by the
State Board of Elections.16
Pursuant to the Authorization Act, the Legislature vested the BRE, not the Director, with
the “powers and duties of the election superintendent of Fulton County relating to the
conduct of elections.”
88. This Court’s decision and immediate action are necessary to ensure that the Plaintiff and
other BRE members have the clear authority to exercise their statutory duties regarding the
conduct of elections (free from any threat of mandamus or criminal action) and access to
the vital Election Materials and Processes required to perform such duties and powers.
89. Accordingly, there are the following disputes and controversies between Plaintiff and the
Defendants:
a. Whether the BRE is the Fulton County election superintendent;
b. What duties, if any, can be lawfully delegated to the Director;
c. Whether the Director may deny BRE members access to Election Materials and
Processes;
d. Whether the certification of elections is a ministerial or discretionary function;
e. If such delegation is authorized by law, did the BRE properly “delegate” to the
Director its statutory duties as election superintendent through a valid process in
adopting its Bylaws.
90. This Court’s decision will assure Plaintiff that executing the duties imposed by her oath
will carry no sanctions, civil or criminal.
16
See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-2(35).
Page 23 of 33
91. If the Court agrees that the duties created by her oath are discretionary and nondelegable,
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief prohibiting the Election Director from denying Plaintiff
access to the Election Materials and Processes, including but not limited to the information
and ability to observe the primary election required to assist Plaintiff in her duties to:
a. “inspect systematically and thoroughly the conduct of primaries and elections . . .
to the end that primaries and elections may be honestly, efficiently, and uniformly
conducted,” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-70(8);
b. “receive from poll officers the returns of all primaries and elections, to canvass and
compute the same, and to certify the results thereof to such authorities as may be
prescribed by law,” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-70(9); and
c. “prevent any fraud, deceit, or abuse in carrying on the same [i.e., elections][,]”
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-70(15)(A).
COUNTS
Count I
Temporary and Permanent Injunctive Relief
92. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations in the preceding paragraphs 1-91 as if set
forth fully herein.
93. Plaintiff is a duly appointed member of the BRE with statutorily vested powers and duties.
94. The performance of these duties necessitates access to Election Materials and Processes to
confirm the authenticity of election results.
95. The BRE has illegally delegated responsibilities to the Defendant Director, who has refused
and continues to refuse Plaintiff’s access to the Election Materials and Processes.
96. In the absence of a temporary and permanent injunction, Plaintiff will remain divested of
her statutorily assigned powers and duties.
Page 24 of 33
97. Plaintiff has attempted to remedy the divestment of her statutorily assigned powers and
duties through discussions with the Director and through motions submitted to the BRE
before and during meetings—all of which have failed to affirm the statutory roles
respectively of the BRE and Director, or to ensure BRE member access to the Election
Materials and Processes.
98. The BRE’s legal counsel having been asked for an opinion as to the BRE’s authority to
delegate its powers and duties, counsel failed to answer the question.
99. The Election Materials and Processes Plaintiff sought for the March and May elections will
continue to be at issue for all future elections and primaries held in Fulton County during
her tenure as a member of the BRE.
100. Plaintiff’s prayer for relief that this Court grant Plaintiff’s Temporary, Interlocutory,
and Permanent injunction, thereby enjoining Defendants, jointly and severally, from
inhibiting Plaintiff in the performance of her statutorily assigned powers and duties as a
member of the BRE, is just and proper under the circumstances.
101. Plaintiff’s prayer for relief in the form of a positive temporary, interlocutory, and
permanent injunction against Defendants, jointly and severally, to require Defendants to
provide the requisite access and information sought by Plaintiff in a thorough and timely
manner in order for Plaintiff to perform her statutorily assigned powers and duties as a
member of the BRE is just and proper under the circumstances.
LEGAL STANDARD
102. To obtain a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, the movant must show:
1) The threat of irreparable harm to the moving party;
Page 25 of 33
2) Whether the threatened injury outweighs the burden imposed on the party being
enjoined;
3) Whether there is a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits; and
4) Whether granting the interlocutory injunction is not against the public interest.
City of Waycross v. Pierce County Board of Commissioners, 300 Ga. 109, 111 (2016).
103. The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to “‘protect[] against irreparable harm and
preserve[] the status quo until a meaningful decision on the merits can be made.’” Holmes
v. Dominique, No. 1:13-CV-04270-HLM, 2014 WL 12115947, at *2 (N.D. Ga. May 5,
2014) (quoting Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1297 (11th Cir. 2005)).
104. The duration of the temporary restraint cannot exceed 30 days, as the court fixes, “unless
the party against whom the order is directed consents that it may be extended for a longer
period.” O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65(b)(2). However, if the Court grants the temporary restraining
order, “the motion for a preliminary injunction shall be set down for hearing at the earliest
possible time….” Id.
105. While the grant of a temporary restraining order is an extraordinary remedy that should
not be granted unless the movant clearly carries its burden as to the four aforementioned
elements, Western Sky Financial, LLC v. State ex rel, Olens, 300 Ga. 340, (2016), it is
“designed to preserve the status quo pending a final adjudication of the case.” Bijou Salon
& Spa, LLC v. Kensington Enterprises, Inc., 283 Ga.App. 857, 860 (2007); Poe & Brown
of Georgia, Inc. v. Gill, 268 Ga. 749, 750 (1997).
106. Disputes as to officials’ duties and their ability to execute their responsibilities are
appropriate matters for resolution by this Court. Injunctive relief has long been available
in Georgia for such disputes. See Patten v. Miller, 8 S.E.2d 776 (Ga. 1940) (“The power
Page 26 of 33
and duty of courts of equity to interfere by the exercise of their preventive jurisdiction to
protect the possession of officers de facto is generally recognized.”); Allen v. Wise, 50
S.E.2d 69 (Ga. 1948); Mulcay v. Murray, 136 S.E.2d 129 (Ga. 1964) (“A court of equity
may restrain one who seeks by force or intrusion to interfere with an incumbent's
possession of office.”)
Irreparable Harm
107. The Director’s continued denial of access to data prevents Plaintiff from being able to
execute her statutorily imposed duties governing Fulton County elections. There are
upcoming elections on May 21, 2024, and November 5, 2024 (as well as any special
elections or runoff elections).
108. Shortly after each of these aforementioned elections, the BRE will be called upon to certify
the results. Votes taken without full and complete access to pertinent election data are
incapable of being remedied. Plaintiff’s continued lack of access to the Election Materials
and Processes constitute an ongoing, and irreparable harm.
The Injury to Plaintiff and the Public At Large Outweighs the Burden
109. Plaintiff’s action seeks the resolution of essential matters which impose no burden on the
BRE or the Director.
110. The essential request of this Court is whether the BRE can legally divest itself of the
statutory duties of election superintendent.
111. As set out within this Complaint and Action, the Georgia General Assembly has
established an oath for BRE members which charges them with the duty of ensuring
elections are free from “fraud, deceit, or abuse.”
Page 27 of 33
112. Plaintiff submits that Director’s responsibilities are by definition limited to those aspects
of the BRE’s activities which can be labeled “ministerial” (i.e., transporting voting
machines, supervising full-time employees of the BRE, etc.), leaving with the BRE and its
members all activity which can be described as “discretionary.”
113. Resolution of this matter imposes no burden at all on the BRE, its members, or the
Director.
114. Given the DPG’s position that legal remedies up to and including criminal sanctions may
apply to BRE members using their judgment in a discretionary manner rather than
executing ministerial functions, the resolution of this issue is of paramount concern to
Plaintiff and other similarly situated BRE members across the state of Georgia.
115. If BRE members are charged with discretionary duties that cannot be delegated to the
Director, then it stands to reason that BRE members must have access to the Election
Materials and Processes necessary to satisfy their duty to ensure elections are free from
“fraud, deceit, or abuse.”
116. It cannot logically flow that the BRE is capable of delegating to a Director the power to
conduct the election with no oversight or access by the BRE, and then deny the BRE and
its members access to the Election Materials and Processes under her control.
117. The Election Materials and Processes are first, last, and always the BRE’s responsibility.
Plaintiff has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits
118. The instant case presents a discrete legal issue, and the Court’s decision rests on the
fundamental question as to whether the essential duties of the election superintendent must
be exercised by the BRE.
Page 28 of 33
119. BRE members are part of the detailed and sophisticated elections regime established by the
Georgia Legislature.
120. As detailed above, “election superintendent” is a statutorily defined term, expressly
incorporating BRE members. O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-2(35)(A) & 21-2-70.
121. Election superintendents are required to inspect elections to ensure they are run honestly
and uniformly, and swear an oath to ““prevent any fraud, deceit, or abuse in” elections.
O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-70(8) & 21-2-70(15)(B).
122. Election superintendents also have the responsibility to certify election results. O.C.G.A.
§ 21-2-70(9).
123. If an election superintendent encounters irregularities in election results, the superintendent
may recount a precinct’s votes and, if warranted, refer the facts of the irregularity to the
local district attorney. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-493(b).
124. Furthermore, if an election superintendent discovers any error or fraud the “superintendent
shall compute and certify the votes justly regardless of any fraudulent and erroneous
returns” and shall report the facts to the local district attorney. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-493(i).
125. These duties are anything but “ministerial” in nature, and per the Authorization Act, these
statutory duties have been conferred on the individual members of the BRE—including but
not limited to the Plaintiff.
126. When determining if an act is discretionary or ministerial Georgia courts look to “the
character of the specific acts complained of, not the general nature of the job.” Williams v.
Pauley, 768 S.E.2d 546, 549 (Ga. App. 2015) (citing Davis v. Effingham County Board of
Commissioners, 760 S.E.2d 9 (Ga. 2014)).
Page 29 of 33
127. Importantly, statutorily mandated tasks do not automatically convert a duty into a
ministerial task. See Williams, 768 S.E.2d at 549; Todd v. Brooks, 665 S.E.2d 11 (Ga.
2008).
128. Just as clearly as the Legislature has tasked the BRE—as Fulton County’s election
superintendent—with the task of managing elections, it has necessarily imposed
discretionary duties on the BRE and its members.
129. As the Georgia Supreme Court has held, ministerial procedures are ones where the
instructions must be “so clear, definite and certain as merely to require the execution of a
relatively simple specific duty.” Roper v. Greenway, 751 S.E.2d 351, 353 (Ga. 2013)
(citing Effingham County v. Rhodes, 705 S.E.2d 856 (Ga. 2010)).
130. While ministerial acts are simple, absolute and definite, discretionary acts call for
“examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them in a way not
specifically directed.” Davis, 760 S.E.2d at 14 (citing Grammens v. Dollar, 697 S.E.2d
775 (Ga. 2010).
131. There is nothing “ministerial” at all about investigating election errors, calling for recounts,
computing returns “justly regardless of fraudulent” returns, deciding if a referral to a
district attorney is “warranted,” and ensuring honestly run elections—each of which is a
task the the BRE members have sworn oaths to perform.
132. When executing these duties the Legislature is clearly expecting Plaintiff and other BRE
members will be “examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them
in a way not specifically directed.”
133. Furthermore, just these are discretionary they are also clearly imposed on BRE members,
not the Director.
Page 30 of 33
134. Accordingly, the Plaintiff has clearly established a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits
The Granting of Temporary, Interlocutory, and Permanent Injunctive Relief

Favors the Public Interest
135. With Plaintiff likely to succeed on the merits, it necessarily follows that the issuance of an
injunction favors the public interest. This action speaks to the fundamental issue addressed
by the Georgia Supreme Court in Mulcay when it held that courts of equity may rightfully
adjudicate whether a party has sought to “interfere with an incumbent’s possession of
office.” 136 S.E.2d at 134.
136. If the Court determines that there is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, then
it logically flows that the public interest—the ability of BRE members to execute their
lawful duties—necessarily favors an injunction.
Count II
Declaratory Relief and Judgment
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-4-1, et seq.
137. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations in Paragraphs 1-91 as if set forth fully
herein.
138. Defendants have asserted that Plaintiff is not entitled to access to the Election Materials
and Processes.
139. Defendants have asserted that the Director was properly established by the BRE.
140. Plaintiff asserts that the Director’s role is different from that of the election superintendent
and that it is the BRE, not the Director, who is required by law to perform the duties of the
superintendent.
Page 31 of 33
141. Plaintiff further asserts that the fulfillment of her oath as a BRE member involves
discretionary judgment calls, not simply ministerial duties, and that to properly execute
these duties she requires access to the Election Materials and Processes.
142. There is a dispute and actual controversy as to the duties of BRE members and their rights
to access Election Materials and Processes; Plaintiff seeks an order from this Court holding
that BRE members are necessarily involved in discretionary judgment calls and entitled to
all Election Materials and Processes under the control of the Defendants necessary to the
execution of her duties as a BRE member.
143. This Action for declaratory judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-4-1, et seq., for purposes
of determining a question of actual controversy between Plaintiff and Defendants is ripe
and public policy demands a judgment in Plaintiff’s favor.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully asks that this Court enter judgment in its favor and
provide the following relief:
A. Declaratory relief asserting that the duties of the BRE members are discretionary, not
ministerial, in nature;
B. Declaratory relief asserting that BRE members are required to have full access to
Election Materials and Processes presently under the control of the Director;
C. Temporary, Interlocutory and Permanent Injunctive relief providing that the Defendants
may not inhibit BRE members from gaining access to Election Materials and Processes
now under the Control of the Director; and a Positive Injunction requiring Defendants,
jointly and severally, to provide the aforementioned access in real time during and after
the May 21, 2024, primary,
Page 32 of 33
D. All other relief to which Plaintiff is entitled and that this Court deems just and proper
under the circumstances.
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of May, 2024.
/s/______________________________
Alex B. Kaufman
Georgia Bar No. 136097
CHALMERS, ADAMS, BACKER & KAUFMAN
11770 Haynes Bridge Road #205-219
Alpharetta, GA 30009-1968
404-964-5587
[email protected]
/s/_____________________________
Richard P. Lawson (pro hac vice to be submitted)
Jase Panebianco, (pro hac vice to be submitted)
AMERICA FIRST POLICY INSTITUTE
1635 Rogers Rd.
Ft. Worth, TX 76107
[email protected]
[email protected]
Page 33 of 33
STATE OF GEORGIA

member of the Fulton County Board of
Elections and Registration, a/k/a Fulton Case No.:
County Board of Registration and Elections,
EMERGENCY RELIEF
Plaintiff, REQUESTED
v.

Defendants.
Exhibit 1
STATE OF GEORGIA

EMERGENCY RELIEF
v.

Defendants.
Exhibit 2
STATE OF GEORGIA

EMERGENCY RELIEF
v.

Defendants.
Exhibit 3
Matthew M. Weiss
d: (404) 523-6988
[email protected]
March 29, 2024
VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL & U.S. MAIL
Fulton County Board of Registration and Elections

Chairperson Patrise Perkins-Hooker ([email protected])
Vice Chairperson Michael Heekin ([email protected])
Mr. Aaron V. Johnson ([email protected])
Mrs. Teresa K. Crawford ([email protected])
Ms. Julie Adams ([email protected])
Fulton County Government Center
130 Peachtree ST., Ste 2186
Atlanta, GA 30303
RE: Board of Elections Members’ Denial of Certification of 2024 Presidential

Preference Primary
Members of the Fulton County Board of Registration and Elections:
My name is Matthew Weiss and I am the Deputy General Counsel for the Democratic Party of
Georgia (“DPG”). I am writing on behalf of the DPG to raise concerns about the votes by Michael
Heekin and Julie Adams, members of the Fulton County Board of Registration and Elections (the
“Board of Elections”), on March 18, 2024, against certifying the results of the presidential
preference primary held in Fulton County, Georgia on March 12, 2024 (the “2024 Georgia
Presidential Primary”).
Heekin and Adams’ votes against certification of the 2024 Georgia Presidential Primary were
improper regardless of any purported justification given. The Georgia Election Code is clear that
certification of election results is a ministerial task performed by members of the Board of
Elections and is not subject to their discretion.
The Code provides that each superintendent, which is the Board of Elections in Fulton County,
see O.C.G.A. § 21-2-2(35)(A), “shall . . . receive from poll officers the returns of all primaries and
elections, . . . canvass and compute the same, and . . . certify the results thereof to such authorities
as may be prescribed by law.” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-70(9) (emphasis added). The use of the word
“shall” in this section with respect to the duties imposed on the Board of Elections “indicates the
imposition by the General Assembly . . . of a mandatory duty to perform certain enumerated
functions.” See 1978 Ga. Op. Att’y Gen. No. U78-44.
“Upon the completion of such computation and canvassing, the superintendent shall tabulate the
figures for the entire county or municipality and sign, announce, and attest the same.” O.C.G.A.
§ 21-2-493(a) (emphasis added). “The consolidated returns shall then be certified by the
March 29, 2024
Fulton County Board of Registration and
Elections
Page 2
_____________________
superintendent in the manner required by this chapter. Such returns shall be certified by the
superintendent not later than 5:00 P.M. on the Monday following the date on which such election
was held and such returns shall be immediately transmitted to the Secretary of State.” Id. at
§ 21-2-493(k) (emphasis added).
Each of the above-referenced statutory provisions establish, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that
“[p]ursuant to the Georgia Election Code, the [Board of Elections] is responsible for certifying the
returns of elections.” 1985 Ga. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 85-18. Moreover, in the event of non-
compliance by members of the Board of Elections with their statutory duties “an action for
mandamus by the county governing authority may lie to require performance.” See 1978 Ga. Op.
Att’y Gen. No. U78-44. Ultimately, if a member of the Board of Elections either “willfully neglects”
or “refuses to perform” their statutory obligations, they “shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-596.
Bearing these legal considerations in mind, the DPG implores all members of the Board of
Elections to approve certification of Fulton County’s election results going forward, and in
particular for the remaining elections that will be held in 2024, to avoid unnecessary legal
challenges and disputes.
As always, the DPG looks forward to continuing to work with the Board of Elections to ensure a
fair and transparent election process in 2024.
Sincerely Yours,
Matthew M. Weiss
MMW
cc: Kevin Olasanoye, Executive Director, Democratic Party of Georgia

([email protected])
Sachin Varghese, General Counsel, Democratic Party of Georgia
([email protected])
Y. Soo Jo, County Attorney, Fulton County, Georgia ([email protected])
Ann Brumbaugh, Attorney, Fulton County Board of Elections
([email protected])
STATE OF GEORGIA

EMERGENCY RELIEF
v.

Defendants.
Exhibit 4
STATE OF GEORGIA

EMERGENCY RELIEF
v.

Defendants.
Exhibit 5
STATE OF GEORGIA

EMERGENCY RELIEF
v.

Defendants.
Exhibit 6
State Election Board Report – Post-Election Executive Summary
January 12, 2021
Introduction
Seven Hills Strategies, LLC (SHS) has been contracted by the State Election Board (SEB) to serve as an
independent, non-partisan monitor for the pre-electoral processes in Fulton County leading up to the
November 3, 2020 general election and for any subsequent runoffs. SHS will observe absentee ballot
request processing procedures, absentee ballot processing/scanning, early voting procedures, and actual
ballot counting on Election Day and beyond. The goal of SHS is to ensure that Fulton County is
adequately prepared for the scrutiny that they will be subjected to due to the national implications of the
election results.
Fulton County’s Compliance with the Terms of Sec. 12 of the Consent Order
In addition to this report on compliance with the terms of Consent Order, SHS believes that is necessary
to share this observation: From October to January, I spent nearly 270 hours at various locations
observing every aspect of Fulton County’s election processes. At no time did I ever observe any conduct
by Fulton County election officials that involved dishonesty, fraud, or intentional malfeasance. During
my weeks of monitoring, I witnessed neither “ballot stuffing” nor “double-counting” nor any other
fraudulent conduct that would undermine the validity, fairness, and accuracy of the results published and
certified by Fulton County.
A) Absentee Ballot Procedures:
1) Leading up to the Nov. 3 general election, SHS had the opportunity to observe the signature
matching processes for absentee ballot applications being processed both at Darnell Senior
Center and at Fulton County headquarters. During the runoff, I was stationed at Georgia
World Congress Center (GWCC) and was able to monitor the vast majority of signature
matching for the weeks leading into the runoff.
SHS determined the signature matching processes to be in-line with the terms outlined in the
Consent Order, and generally erred on the side of “give it further research” when there was
any doubt about a signature’s authenticity.
However, although most applications were being processed within 48 hours of being
received, SHS found one ballot application at Darnell Senior Center that had been in
Fulton’s custody for more than two weeks. Given the massive influx of applications and
ballots, it is not surprising that a few ballots might be left behind, but Fulton must re-double
their efforts in future elections to speed up processing times.
Additionally, SHS received multiple reports of absentee ballots being sent to the wrong
addresses, which seems to be the fault of sloppy data entry by staff. Future staff trainings
should underscore the importance of correctly entering the temporary/preferred addresses of
all ballot applicants.
2) Although Fulton County allocated ample resources for absentee ballot processing leading
into the general elections, the processes themselves were extremely sloppy and replete with
chain of custody issues as the massive tide of ballots bounced around the Fulton Gov’t HQ
building.
The system, created by Ralph Jones, Registration Chief for Fulton County, seemed to
function, but there were many processes that seemed to be ad hoc solutions to problems
caused by a lack of organization or permanent staff with the expertise to manage the system
in place. For example, the room which housed the team doing additional voter verification
was also a temporary housing location for ballots between the mail room (which receives,
opens, and records the numbers of ballots) and the ENET processing room. Staff in this
room seemed to not understand the process, and Jones had to intervene to stop a temporary
staffer from moving a pile of recently-accepted but unverified absentee ballots into the stack
to go straight to State Farm Arena for scanning/counting. Had Jones not been there with me
to catch this mistake, it is safe to assume that those ballots would’ve been counted as if they
had been verified.
I observed an additional security issue here, as one staff member told me that people had not
been signing out batches of ballots as they moved around the building in trays between
processing rooms, which is a clear failure in the chain of custody mandated by the O.C.G.A.
Given the inefficiencies of this system and the volume of absentee ballots received, there
was no way that Fulton could possibly comply with the mandate to “process all absentee
ballots by the close of business on the next business day after the ballot is received.”
Despite the aforementioned deficiencies during the general, Ralph and his team were able to
both streamline and improve processes for the Jan. 5 runoff. The Fulton team migrated the
entire signature verification process to the facility established at GWCC and for several days
even attempted to do the voter credit step on-site before resolving to handle that at Pryor St.
before bringing credited ballots to GWCC. Performing the entire process1 linearly and in
full view of the public was a tremendous improvement on the labyrinthine system concocted
for the general. In my opinion, Fulton clearly made available sufficient resources to handle
the influx of ballots for the Runoff.
1
Voter credit à 1st pass signature verification with ENET à 2nd pass signature verification with RocketFile à
Return RocketFile rejects to Pryor St for curing
resources, and procedures to ensure that all voters were able to cast their ballots quickly
regardless of where they lived in the county.
E) Technical Support:
1) Fulton trained 255 technicians for the general election, and additionally ensured that each
early voting site also had a dedicated tech aside from State Farm Arena, which had five techs
on-hand to manage their large number of BMDs. For January, Fulton trained 254 technical
support experts, but 22 did not report for work on Election Day for one reason or another.
F) Audit Preparation:
1) Fulton’s document retention processes at State Farm were adequate for protecting ballots
from tampering and the system of marking boxes with scanner number, batch number, and
date made it much easier to process during the forthcoming audit and recount.
2) Risk-Limiting Audit (RLA)
§ The scale to which Fulton prepared for the RLA was staggering. With a maximum of 174
teams of two processing ballots by-hand, Fulton completed the RLA more quickly and
accurately than anyone had anticipated. It is a testament to the team’s leadership that they
were able to keep feeding the processors while keeping accurate records.
3) Recount
§ As with the RLA, Fulton aggressively tackled the Recount and initially seemed as if they
would complete their recount more quickly than estimated. However, failure to comply
with approved technological procedures led to a server crash and significant, costly
delays that required the Fulton team to completely rescan all ballots once again.
Additionally, during the fourth count (the second lap of the recount), sloppy document
storage procedures led to confusion as box labels no longer had precinct names and batch
numbers on them but instead all said “ELECTION DAY.” This mistake therefore made it
difficult to ascertain which ballots had been missed while trying to solve the second
technical issue that resulted from accidentally naming two scanners “ICC 16” during the
fourth count. Until this point, proper ballot handling, storage, and manifest procedures
had been observed.
Appendices
• Appendix A – Challenges and Recommendations from the Entire 2020 Election Cycle
State Election Board Report
Appendix A - Challenges and Recommendations from the Entire

2020 Election Cycle
I. The Pre-Election Period

• COVID-19 preparedness was obviously on the forefront of Barron’s mind. He and his
team had taken a multitude of steps to ensure that everyone was safely fulfilling all
required duties in the lead-up to Election Day, but the virus had taken a heavy toll on the
permanent staff leading the warehouse team. This caused several pivots and logistical
changes to protect the staff, but there was still concern that a team of new players would
be able to handle the tremendous workload as seamlessly as the high stakes of this
election required. SHS learned that the SOS office offered vendor support to mitigate the
breadth of the COVID outbreak, but this was offer was declined by Fulton.
• SHS received multiple reports that Fulton was slow to update MVP and give voters credit
for having voted by absentee ballot (both mailed in and deposited in a drop box). It was
imperative that - as the Consent Order mandates - the BRE keep accurate and up-to-date
records about who has voted in the publicly-visible portals lest they face double voting
problems. Reports have shown that this problem has affected both absentee and early
voters, so the problem was bordering on systemic.
• Additional training should be done regarding O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(1)(A-G) pertaining
to relatives or helpers filling out the absentee ballot for their temporarily out of state,
disabled, or elderly voters. SHS witnessed multiple staff having difficulty deciding how
best to handle family members and helpers requesting absentee ballots for others.
• SHS has received a multitude of reports of absentee ballots being sent to wrong addresses
even though alternate/secondary addresses were provided or already on file. One notable
case being from a servicemember currently serving out-of-state who felt disenfranchised
by Fulton’s inability to properly process his absentee ballot request. As witnessed at the
Darnell Senior Center, the data entry for processing absentee ballot requests can be
burdensome, but each entry much be triple-checked for accuracy to avoid careless
mistakes like this.
• On 10/23, SHS saw one absentee ballot request dated 10/07. While this was a lone outlier
and the vast majority of the ballot requests seen were dated 10/21, Fulton must ensure
that all absentee ballot requests are processed in a timely manner.
• In his press conference on 10/22, Barron stated that there was no wait time difference
between the early voting locations in the north and south parts of the county; however,
anecdotal accounts have said that there have been long wait times in the Alpharetta/Johns
Creek parts of the county.
• The Senate District 39 special election was a persistent problem. As witnessed during
SHS’ poll worker training, there was a failure in the protocol for the training of trainers
that should be corrected in the event that this occurs in the future. This failure to
adequately prepare trainers regarding this special election led to a countless number of
voters not being able to participate in this election. SHS suggests that to fix this, Fulton
consider pivoting to an “opt out” instead of an “opt in” policy for these types of elections
so that all voters may participate regardless of whether or not they are aware of the race.
• There were myriad problems with the absentee processing system at Fulton Government
Headquarters, including:
o Failure of staff to understand the process of moving ballots around the office
o No chain of custody forms being used as ballots move from room to room
o Mask-optional policy putting essential staff at unnecessary risk for COVID
o Failure to sufficiently protect spoiled and rejected ballots in the mail room
• While touring the mail room at Fulton County Government Headquarters, SHS saw many
ballots set to be cancelled because they were returned to drop boxes without the yellow
exterior oath envelope. It should be stressed more clearly to voters that they must
precisely follow all the instructions on the absentee ballots and return both envelopes if
they want their vote to be counted. Since it is impossible to update the MVP of “naked”
ballots when they are processed, it is likely that some of the complaints that the SOS
office received about a failure to record ballots deposited at drop boxes were due to the
fact that voters failed to correctly follow the necessary protocol.
• While there was a large focus on the “Know Before You Go” Campaign and encouraging
voters to use the FultonVotes App to notify voters that their precincts may have changed,
it is concerning that SHS has received a report that Fulton waited until 5:51pm on
October 26 to mail 169,714 postcards notifying voters of changed precincts. SHS
received complaints that Fulton was “suddenly changing polling locations without
notice.” It would have been prudent to send these notifications earlier so that the news
did not surprise people already making plans for in-person voting on Election Day.
• On October 29-30, widespread power outages resulting from Tropical Storm Zeta forced
seven polling precincts to close on 10/29 and two to stay closed on 10/30. This
unanticipated closure surely had a negative impact on turnout numbers as early voting
came to an end on 10/30, but there was very little that the BRE could have done to avoid
this. In fact, it seems that they handled the crisis well by deploying the two mobile
voting centers to the downed precincts to help manage the flow of voters.
• On October 26, the ACLU raised concern that the Fulton office was sitting on 1,500 voter
registrations that for all intents and purposes seemed to voters to have gone missing. It
took two days before SHS was able to get an update from Ralph Jones, who said that
there were indeed 1,500 remaining voter registrations awaiting processing and that they
would be finished by the end of 10/28. This is cutting it far too close to actual Election
Day for new voters who are likely unsure of the process. These voter registrations should
have been processed weeks ago.
• It was brought to the attention of SHS that Fulton has been using an outdated version of
Easy Vote to check in voters and keep ENET records up to date. All software used must
be updated to benefit from the latest bug and security patches.
• Fulton has leaned very heavily upon an army of temporary workers to fulfill the litany of
tasks that must be completed from logistics to processing ballots to scanning final results.
It would perhaps be best to offset this number of workers with stakeholders from the
local community who would like to get involved in the electoral process. By conducting
multiple interviews with temporary staff, it was made clear that some have no keen
interest in participating in this immensely-important process, which is perhaps to blame
for some of the sloppy clerical errors and logistical shortcomings that have plagued the
complicated electoral process. However, others (particularly those scanning at State
Farm) are the glue that holds the entire process together. It is the opinion of SHS that
several of these leaders should be hired full-time if the budget allows.
II. The General Election
• The 4-BMD unit transporters are not ADA-compliant if used for duplicating ballots.
People must stand for hours to duplicate and the screens are too tall to sit and operate.
One of the Fulton staff has a bad knee and uses a cane. She was saying that her knee was
hurting but she needed to keep working.
• The truth about what happened on the night of November 3rd between 10:30PM and
11:52PM continues to be elusive. GOP party poll watchers say that Fulton staff told
them and the media to go home (implying that they did so in order to count without
supervision). Fulton staff tell me that the poll watchers and the media just left when
Moss sent home everyone but the scanner team. A SOS investigator is involved, so the
truth will come out, but if the party poll watchers are correct, then there is a serious
problem.
• There were persistent chain of custody issues throughout the entire absentee ballot
processing system. Aside from the problems with the system at Pryor St (see executive
summary report), the fact that ballots were being delivered to State Farm Arena in
unsecured mail carts is very concerning. Protocol for securing ballots exists not only to
protect the ballots themselves but also to ensure that no ballot box stuffing occurred.
This problem was exacerbated by poor managerial processes by Ralph Jones, who failed
to do intake counts for the provisional ballots. Similar problems seem to exist at the
warehouse as well (e.g. poll pads for SC11). Fulton must bolster these processes to retain
faith in their process.
• The entirety of events on Saturday, Nov. 7 was plagued by the mismanagement issues. If
there had been a clear process on Friday, then perhaps that mess may have been avoided,
but the fact that no one verified the number of provisional ballots either at intake at State
Farm or at adjudication is concerning. Therefore, there was a possibility that 1) not all
provisional ballots made it to State Farm or that 2) some were missing because they never
did an intake count. It turned out that both were true. If Santé had not gone back into the
office to look up her file on provisional ballots, what would have happened to the 17
ballots that remained at Pryor St?
• The process for equipment delivery at the warehouse is in desperate need of an overhaul.
SHS concurs with Barron that a digital check-in/out system would make the logistical job
much smoother. Monday evening was far too chaotic for an operation of that size, and in
the disorder, many mistakes were made that just caused more trouble for a team that was
already underwater. As a result, SHS has received multiple complaints about a lack of
sufficient numbers of ballot bags making it to precincts, which led to a chain of custody
issue before tabulation. Additionally, SHS caught wind of missing CFs (e.g. Palmetto)
after Election Day that had likely been misplaced due to inadequate check-in processes.
o Furthermore, if Fulton implements a new digital system, it must be used by
both the poll managers and the Fulton staff. The fact that a poll tech was able
to show me that 157 polls were still “open” in Fulton’s backend demonstrates
that they were simply not utilizing a tool that they either developed or
purchased. Working partially from two systems is a fantastic way to forget
mission critical materials.
• Staff not using correct terminology caused confusion on multiple instances, including for
this monitor attempting to audit Fulton’s data. In pre-election reports, Fulton reported that
they had “processed and scanned” 127k ballots. The term “processed” was used multiple
times and by different teams, which indicates organizational silos and led to confusion
because SHS thought that “scanned” meant literally scanned instead of having the
barcode read and processed through MVP. In actuality, few ballots had actually been
scanned in the pre-election period.
o This same problem was evident when a staffer told SHS that ballots had been
“found” instead of “cured.” It is a distinction with dire consequences.
• The entire Fulton team must be more aware of the optics of their actions in such a high-
scrutiny environment. It was a judgment call, but I still think that bringing ballots in
through the back door on 11/5 was the wrong call for transparency purposes. It would
have ignited a media firestorm if the Fulton team had not immediately held a press
conference afterward. By far the worst maneuver for optics occurred on Saturday in
using the OPEX cutters to count ballots. Aside from being slower than counting by hand,
this gave the impression to everyone (myself included) that they had found more ballots
after the deadline. I personally had to talk to the media and the party poll watchers, who
were all understandably concerned by what was appearing to happen, to tell them that
those were empty ballots being counted.
• In the “Provisional Ballot Recap Notice,” Fulton stated that 1,205 people were “Not
found in Express Poll, researched and found to be registered in Fulton County, U.S.
Citizens, and ballot not challenged.” Why were that many people not in the Fulton system
and required to vote provisional?
• The OPEX scanners require constant re-calibration. The machines being out of
calibration and failing to operate properly generated more work for workers that were
already exhausted and stretched thin. Fulton should either insist that OPEX techs remain
available for service calls during election crunch time or dispatch a large number of letter
openers to vote processing centers as a backup plan for the inevitable failure of the
technology.
III. The Risk-Limiting Audit
• There were persistent chain of custody issues throughout the entire RLA process. From
ballots being left unattended in front of party audit monitors to unsealed bags being
transported for storage to zip tie seals being left unattended to not recording the seal
numbers placed on the ballot bags, Fulton’s system is plagued with these procedural
issues. They must strengthen their chain of custody systems to follow the strict guidance
in the O.C.G.A. code given the (inter)national significance of the processes happening
here.
• Additionally, regarding proper seals, Fulton staff complained that the stickers provided
by the Secretary of State’s office for sealing cardboard boxes do not stick to tape and
cardboard. I even noticed a few that had just fallen off boxes of absentee ballots. Would it
be possible to change vendors for these stickers and provide counties with something
more robust?
• Transparency is of utmost importance, and the party audit monitors are completely
necessary, but the parties must strengthen their vetting procedures for their monitors,
train them on the process they are observing, and brief them on their roles. Furthermore,
it is my suggestion that repeat offenders who show a frequent disregard for the rules
should be barred from serving as monitors again.
• Fulton was initially slow to report their numbers into Arlo because they only had one
login. Then, to catch up they overcompensated and assigned too many staff to work on
data entry. Is it possible to split the difference and provide Fulton (and the other large
population counties) with more Arlo logins from the beginning? Fulton leaders were
complaining that they should have more than the one they were initially assigned so that
they could better manage the workload.
• There was a clear training deficit for auditors working through the new audit process. For
future RLAs, additional guidance should be provided about how/when to use the manila
envelopes, what constitutes clear voter intent (checkmarks, bubbles, or x’s), and large
number batch counting best practices to remove as much confusion as possible from the
audit process.
• Following the procedure detailed in the training video, audit teams quickly ran out of
envelopes for write-ins, under-votes, undecideds, etc. It is imperative that the Fulton team
have a back-up supply of these envelopes for the next RLA so that their team does not
have to scramble to help those working according to official procedure.
• Some of the precinct batches (particularly for early voting) were massive (3,500+), which
increase human error due to fatigue as well as call into question the policies regarding
leaving the audit table for necessary bathroom and food breaks. Is it possible to split
batches larger than 1,500 to mitigate these issues if proper ballot manifests are kept?
III. The Recount
• Cardboard seems to be an insufficient storage method for document retention. Glancing

at the boxes, it is clear to see that many of them have been crushed by the weight of the
other boxes on the pallets upon which they were loaded. Additionally, the leak at State
Farm Arena – though certainly anomalous – revealed the necessity for a more robust and
potentially waterproof system for document retention. SHS recommends using plastic
storage bins instead of cardboard for future election cycles.
• Generally poor records keeping led to a multitude of procedural problems for Fulton
throughout the recount process. The poor managerial decision at the Fulton warehouse to
reclaim ballot bags for then-upcoming December runoff and mix ballots of different types
(e.g. early voting and Election Day) together for “deep storage” required additional
rounds of scanning during the recount because the wrong ballots were scanned on two
separate occasions.
o In contravention to what they had done on Count 3 (during which they
labelled all Election Day boxes with the precinct numbers on outer labels), all
of Count 4’s Election Day ballots were simply being placed in boxes marked
“ELECTION DAY” but with no precinct information visible on the outside.
This became a problem later when they had to retrieve particular batches
because they had been overlooked during scanning. This may have produced
a chain of custody issue at the end as two Fulton leaders were sending out
individual ballot batches instead of full boxes to make sure that each batch
contained only Election Day ballots as expected. They were careful to
correctly complete the coversheets for each batch, but it would not be difficult
for a batch to be forgotten or fall to the wayside as it changed hands.
• Transparency is of utmost importance, and the party monitors are completely necessary,
but the parties must strengthen their vetting procedures for their monitors, train them on
the process they are observing, and brief them on their roles. Furthermore, it is my
suggestion that repeat offenders who show a frequent disregard for the rules should be
barred from serving as monitors again. Throughout the time at GWCC, the party
monitors flagrantly disobeyed guidance from Fulton staff and GWCC police regarding
the mask policy and taking photos/videos of the procedure. One monitor even yelled,
“THIS IS TREASON UNDER PENALTY OF DEATH!” in the face of a Fulton manager
who was simply trying to check his party monitor credential – which he turned out to not
have – for sign-in.
• SHS had received reports of several unsealed ballot bags, and hunted down the bag
numbers to investigate. SHS found four unsealed ballot bags that were clearly marked
with zero counts on the exterior labels. For future best practices, it is encouraged that
staff seal every ballot bag regardless if it’s empty to mitigate accusations of “magic
ballots” appearing from thin air. Additionally, if ballot bins are empty, it is a good idea
to place the tops in them so that it is clear to monitors that the box is empty and is not an
unsealed ballot bin.
• Technological issues abounded during the recount. The server crash on November 29 was
a costly error caused by a failure to properly follow protocols for backing up and
uploading data to the servers. This mistake cost Fulton taxpayers several days’ worth of
staff time as the entirety of the ballots had to be rescanned for a fourth time.
Additionally, the small typographical mistake of accidentally naming two scanners
“ICC16” on the fourth count led to a great deal of confusion and another full day of staff
time for solving the problem. Fulton technological team must work more slowly,
carefully, and in accordance with all protocol to ensure that these mistakes do not happen
in the future.
V. The Runoff Election
• When it comes to communicating with monitors, it is encouraged to keep comments short

and to the point without much editorialization. Early in runoff proceedings, Ralph Jones
had a good faith conversation with several GOP monitors, one of which had declined to
sign the sheet that said he would not record in the processing center. It turned out that
that gentleman refused to sign because he was, in fact, wearing a recording device, and
recorded Jones’ answers to his question without Jones’ knowledge. These monitors then
submitted an eight page complaint to the SOS quoting long passages from their nearly 45
minute conversation.
• Monitors were very concerned about compact flash memory cards being left in scanners
in the L&A side of the warehouse. Additional training regarding election security
protocol is required to mitigate alarmist fears that these memory cards are arriving at
precincts pre-loaded with votes.
• Parties must fully brief monitors on their role and the appropriate limit of their duties.
Multiple monitors told me that they had been recording the license plates of the staff that
parked in the deck as well as on the L&A side of the warehouse as “evidence.” This
seems like a massive invasion of the privacy of the election workers. It is recommended
that Fulton County put pressure on the county wings of political parties to have greater
accountability for the actions of the people to whom they provide monitoring credentials.
• Fulton was having an accuracy problem due to the data entry required to verify the
signatures on received ballot envelopes. In order to improve both speed and accuracy it is
recommended that Fulton provide barcode scanners to all signature verifiers in the future.
These scanners allow workers to go directly to the correct voter page in ENET without
worrying about typographical errors. This system was deployed with great success
during the second half of the runoff.
• Fulton staff must be careful to accurately enter data into ENET. SHS received several
reports of voters receiving multiple absentee ballots (N.B. not ballot applications) during
the runoff. Additionally, there were widespread stories of voters showing up at the polls
and being told that they had already voted. Taking voters’ claims of not having voted at
face-value and as the entire system is built to catch double voting, the only logical
explanation for this problem is that an election worker incorrectly pulled voter
information in ENET at some point. Extra training on ENET accuracy must be conducted
in future elections.
• While I vehemently disagree with the assertion that proximity is tantamount to
transparency, it would have alleviated a great deal of stress on Election Day if Fulton had
initially provided more access to the party monitors. The floor was set up to allow more
access, but the potential of the “cattle calls” was not utilized until it became a necessity.
Additionally, SHS suggested that the blue barriers be removed from the UOCAVA
duplication station on 12/30, but my suggestion was not followed for the worthy cause of
ballot security. Unfortunately, the perceived lack of transparency led to a court order that
immensely disrupted Election Day processes. If Fulton had more actively allowed
monitors to approach election processes, then it would have been easier for them to see
that Fulton had absolutely nothing to hide. The resultant overcompensating backlash left
many staff fearing for their personal safety due to monitors violating the photography
rules, staff receiving threats on social media, and astoundingly poor mask hygiene by
monitors. Furthermore, the increased access to the ballot cage generated a considerable
ballot security concern due to the proximity of partisan monitors to ballots being
processed.
• A persistent impediment to continued processing was the rate at which ballots were
transported from Pryor St to GWCC. While most days that can be attributed to sending
all ballots that they had received, on Election Day there must be a faster turnaround.
Though three ballot bins had been delivered at 7:04PM, it was not until 11:30PM on Jan.
5 that five bins arrived at GWCC from the 7pm collection of ballot drop boxes. At that
point most of the election staff had already gone home due to a lack work, but the
massive tide of ballots to be processed made it impossible to finish processing in its
entirety on election night. If the Fulton team had dispatched the ballots sooner – even in
smaller batches – then perhaps everything could have been finalized on Election Day.
This same problem was repeated on Friday, Jan. 8. The tremendous GWCC team had
waited all day for provisional ballots to arrive from Pryor St, but it was not until 3:47PM
that four ballot bins were delivered. A large portion of the staff clocked out at 4:30PM,
but the remaining team was left working until 8:15PM to handle the workload while
shorthanded. This could have been mitigated by sending smaller batches of ballots as
they became available.
STATE OF GEORGIA

EMERGENCY RELIEF
v.

Defendants.
Exhibit 7
June 27, 2023
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND E-MAIL

RETURN-RECEIPT REQUESTED
Fulton County Board of Registration & Elections

130 Peachtree St. SW Suite 2186 F
Atlanta, GA 30303
Re: SEB Case No. 2020-140
Dear Fulton County Board of Registration & Elections:
On June 20, 2023 the State Election Board considered the complaint listed above.
At the meeting, the State Election Board reviewed the facts developed in the investigation
of this matter. The State Election Board found that Fulton County Asst. Elections Director
Dwight Brower signed off on the ballot build project. Director Brower also advised the ballot
builder was provided the correct ballot combination for the project and the submission was
made/occurred post ballot proofing to create more polls. Approximately (94) voters received a
ballot with the incorrect congressional district.
Georgia Election Law, O.C.G.A § 21-2-293(a) provides: “If the election superintendent
discovers that a mistake or omission has occurred in the printing of official ballots or in the
programming of the display of the official ballot on DRE voting equipment or electronic ballot
markers for any primary or election, the superintendent is authorized on his or her own motion to
take such steps as necessary to correct such mistake or omission if the superintendent determines
that such correction is feasible and practicable under the circumstances; provided, however, that
the superintendent gives at least 24 hours' notice to the Secretary of State and any affected
candidates of the mistake or omission prior to making such correction.”
Based on the facts found at the meeting, the State Election Board determined that you
violated O.C.G.A § 21-2-293(a) by signing off on a ballot build project with errors present,
resulting in approximately 94 voters receiving incorrect ballots. Having found this violation, the
State Election Board directed that this letter of findings and instructions be sent to you.
This case is now closed, and no further action will be taken. You are hereby instructed to
refrain from further violations of O.C.G.A § 21-2-293(a) and are admonished to comply with all
of the State Election Board rules and Georgia law relating to elections conducted in the State of
Georgia.
Sincerely,
______________________________
William S. Duffey Jr.,
Chair, State Election Board
State Election Board
April 25, 2024
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL

Fulton County Board of Registration and Elections

130 Peachtree St SW Suite 2186
Atlanta, Ga. 30303
Re: SEB Case No. SEB2021-084
Dear Fulton County Board of Registration and Elections:
On December 19, 2023 the State Election Board considered the complaint listed above.
As a respondent, you were sent a notice of the meeting on November 16, 2023.
At the meeting, the State Election Board reviewed the facts developed in the investigation
of this matter. The State Election Board found that you counted a spoiled ballot as a valid ballot.
Georgia State Election Board Rule 183-1-14-.06(2) provides: “Upon receipt of an

absentee ballot upon which the word "Spoiled" has been written across the face of the
envelope, a registrar or absentee ballot clerk shall write the day and hour of the receipt of
the ballot on its envelope. The registrar or absentee ballot clerk shall, within two days
after the receipt of such ballot, mail or issue another official absentee ballot to the elector.
All returned spoiled ballots shall be safely kept unopened by the board or absentee ballot
clerk and then transferred to the appropriate clerk for storage for the period of time
required for the preservation of ballots used at the primary or election and shall then,
without being opened, be destroyed in like manner as the used ballots of the primary or
election.”
Based on the facts found at the meeting, the State Election Board determined that you
violated Georgia State Election Board Rule 183-1-14-.06(2) when you counted a spoiled ballot
as a valid ballot. Having found this violation, the State Election Board directed that this letter of
findings and instructions be sent to you.
This case is now closed, and no further action will be taken. You are hereby instructed to
refrain from further violations of Georgia State Election Board Rule 183-1-14-.06(2) and are
admonished to comply with all of the State Election Board rules and Georgia law relating to
elections conducted in the State of Georgia.
Sincerely,
______________________________
T. Matthew Mashburn
Acting Chair, State Election Board
The Office of Secretary of State
Brad Raffensperger Sarah Beck
SECRETARY OF STATE DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL

Richard Barron
Fulton County Board of Elections and Registration
130 Peachtree St SW Suite 2186F
Atlanta, GA 30303
Re: SEB Case No. 2020-098
Dear Richard Barron:
You are receiving this letter because the State Election Board found at its Wednesday, August 18,
2021 meeting that you, in your capacity as Election Supervisor, violated Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.) §21-2-414(a)(1) during the September 2020 Georgia Fifth Congressional
District Special Election. Specifically, Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) §21-2-
414(a)(1) states the following:
(a) No person shall solicit votes in any manner or by any means or method, nor
shall any person distribute or display any campaign literature, newspaper, booklet,
pamphlet, card, sign, paraphernalia, or any other written or printed matter of any
kind, nor shall any person solicit signatures for any petition or conduct any exit
poll or public opinion poll with voters on any day in which ballots are being cast:
(1) Within 150 feet of the outer edge of any building within which a polling place is
established;
During the September 2020 Georgia Fifth Congressional District Special Election, a violation of
(O.C.G.A.) §21-2-414(a)(1) occurred when candidates signs were allowed to be posted less than
150 feet from the boundary established by law.
No further action will be taken, and this case is now closed. You are hereby instructed to refrain
from further violations of the Georgia Elections Code and the State of Georgia Election Board
Rules.
Sincerely,
Sarah Beck
Deputy General Counsel
Georgia Secretary of State

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STATEMENT FROM JULIE ADAMS

GOP Member, Fulton County Board of Registration and Elections (BRE)

Alex Kaufman, Chalmers, Adams, Backer & Kaufman: [email protected]

JULIE ADAMS, in her official capacity as a

FULTON COUNTY BOARD OF

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF, INTERLOCUTORY

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2. Venue is proper in this court pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-10-30.

the Fulton County Board of Commissioners on January 17, 2024.

required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-70(15)(B), took the following oath on that date:

above the age of majority.

herein as the “Director”) since 2023.

have occurred or will occur in Fulton County, Georgia.

County Boards of Elections and Registration

Boards of Elections and Registration. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-2.

registration of voters and absentee-balloting procedures.” See also O.C.G.A. § 21-2-45

(regarding joint county boards of election).

absentee balloting procedures.” (Emphasis added).

a. an oath requirement for its members;

b. responsibility for the registration of electors of Fulton County;

c. the preparing, equipping, and furnishing of polling places;

Chapter 2 of Title 21 of the Georgia Election Code.

The Election Superintendent

16. The “Election Superintendent” or “Superintendent” is a statutorily defined term: “Either

county has such[.]” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-2(35)(A).3

18. These powers and duties include, inter alia:

and uniformly conducted,” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-70(8);

authorities as may be prescribed by law,” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-70(9); and

deceit, or abuse in carrying on the same [i.e., elections],” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-

to perform its duties of computation, canvassing, tabulating, and certification, stating:

O.C.G.A. § 21-2-493(a-b, k) (emphasis added).

scanning voting systems); O.G.C.A. § 21-2-483 (regarding the designation of review

panels at tabulation centers); O.G.C.A. § 21-2-132 (regarding municipal superintendent

designation of certain qualifying periods).

superintendent of Fulton County relating to the conduct of elections.”

Chief Administrative Officer

supervisor, and all poll officers.” (emphasis added)).

other BRE members, to perform their statutory duties. 6

a ballot within a voting jurisdiction.

advanced voting and lection ay voting.

voting, ensuring no addition or deletion in the interim.

e. Provisional Ballot Recap Sheets: Provisional ballots are ballots provided to

potential electors, such as electors whose registration status may be uncertain or

otherwise under examination but whose registration status may be perfected on or

cast provisional ballots.

f. Voting Ballot Removal Forms: During advanced voting, when an individual

additionally logs cast ballots.

boxes in Fulton County.

as they were cast.

returned an Absentee Ballot. All Absentee Ballot applications and ballot

other of the election processes and procedures.

results of Fulton County elections.

representations of the Director.

the bylaws were passed.

32. The Bylaws provide, inter alia:

BRE. Bylaws Art. I;

any action of the BRE. Bylaws Art. III, § 6.

to the Director by virtue of the Bylaws in Article VI, “Employees:”

There shall be a chief administrative officer of the board who shall be

the Fulton County Board of County Commissioners.