G.R. No.

109920 August 31, 2000

CEFERINO A. SORIANO, petitioner,

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to annul the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
121, Caloocan City, on March 15, 1993 in Criminal Case No. C-40740 which acquitted private
respondent Ruel Garcia of direct assault.

The prosecution’s evidence was as follows: Private respondent Ruel Garcia and his uncle, Pedro
Garcia, were members of the Caloocan police. Shortly after midnight on November 7, 1991, they
barged into the barangay hall of Barangay 56, Zone 5 in Caloocan City, looking for petitioner
Ceferino A. Soriano, the barangay captain. Private respondent gave petitioner fist blows on the face
four times with his left hand, while he poked a gun at him with his right hand, at the same time
cursing him, "Putang ina mo cabeza" ("You son of a bitch chief"). Although there were four
barangay tanods (Manuel Montoya, Arturo del Rosario, Ramiro Samson, and Francisco Raton) in
the barangay hall, they could not come to the aid of petitioner because they were held at bay by
Pedro Garcia. The Garcias then left with their companions who had been waiting outside the hall.
Petitioner was treated for his injuries in the hospital.

Private respondent denied petitioner’s allegations. He testified that he went to the barangay hall in
the evening of November 6, 1991 because his younger brother had been reportedly arrested and
beaten up by petitioner. (It appears that the younger Garcia was involved in a brawl with Dennis
Mones and a certain Ocampo. They were arrested and taken to the barangay hall. One of the boys,
who was apparently drunk, vomitted while their names were recorded. Petitioner, therefore, ordered
the three boys to be taken to the Ospital ng Kalookan for a check-up.) As private respondent saw
petitioner near the door of the barangay hall, he asked for the whereabouts of his brother and the
reason for the latter’s arrest. Apparently thinking that private respondent was trying to intervene in
the case he was investigating, petitioner angrily told private respondent to lay off: "Walang pulis pulis
dito" ("Your being a policeman doesn’t pull strings here"). When private respondent insisted on going
inside the barangay hall, petitioner blocked him and then pushed him on the chest. Private
respondent also pushed petitioner, causing him to fall on a pile of nightsticks and injure himself. All
the time, private respondent claimed he had his gun tucked at his waist. Private respondent’s uncle,
Pedro Garcia, then arrived and took him home.

In acquitting private respondent, respondent Judge Adoracion C. Angeles found it incredible that
petitioner did not resist or even say anything when private respondent allegedly assaulted him and
that none of the four barangay tanods who were near him came to his aid. She thought that if
petitioner had indeed been attacked, he would have suffered more serious injuries than a contusion
on the forehead, erythema on the chest, and a lacerated wound on the lower lip. Respondent judge
also excluded from the evidence the testimonies of petitioner and barangay tanod Manuel Montoya
on the ground that their testimonies had not been formally offered in evidence as required by Rule
132, §§34 to 35 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

Hence this petition for certiorari. Petitioner alleges that the decision is void because it was not
rendered by an impartial tribunal. He contends that respondent judge was "hell-bent on saving the
private respondent from conviction and had pre-judged the case" as shown by the fact that (1) on
August 26, 1992, before private respondent’s arraignment, she called the parties and their counsels
to her chambers and urged them to settle the case, and, when petitioner refused, she did not set the
case for hearing until after three weeks allegedly to provide a "cooling off" period; (2) that at the
initial trial on September 15 and 16, 1992, respondent judge again called on the parties to settle the
case. Petitioner alleges that, while respondent judge stated in her order of September 15, 1992
cancelling the hearing on that date that this was done to enable Atty. Maria Lelibet Sampaga to
study the case as she had been appointed as private respondent’s counsel only on that day, the
same was actually a pretext, the real reason being to give private respondent another opportunity to
persuade petitioner to settle the case. The records in fact show that Atty. Sampaga had been private
respondent’s counsel at the arraignment on August 26, 1992; (3) that respondent judge excluded the
testimonies of petitioner and his witness, Manuel Montoya, for failure of the prosecution to offer
formally the same when the transcript of stenographic notes shows this was not so and that, at any
rate, the defense waived the objection based on this ground by cross-examining petitioner and
Montoya; and (4) that respondent judge failed to find private respondent guilty despite the
testimonies of three eyewitnesses (barangay tanods Montoya, del Rosario, and Samson). Petitioner
therefore prays that a mistrial be declared and that the case be ordered retried before another judge.

On the other hand, private respondent Ruel Garcia contends that, if at the outset, petitioner doubted
respondent judge’s impartiality, he should have sought her inhibition right then and there; that it was
not true respondent judge called the parties to her chambers on August 26, 1992 as only the
arraignment took place on that day; that at said arraignment, his counsel, Atty. Emilio Bermas, was
absent for which reason respondent judge designated Atty. Maria Lelibet S. Sampaga to assist him;
that the schedule of the trial (September 15, 16, and 21, 1992) was not fixed by respondent judge
but by the clerk in charge of the matter, taking into account the schedule of the other cases assigned
to the court; that it was only on the first day of trial on September 15, 1992 that respondent judge
first talked to the parties, and, upon learning that both were public officers, thought it proper to ask
them if they were not willing to settle their dispute, and seeing the parties and their counsels to be
receptive, she invited them to her chambers; that as petitioner later appeared to have second
thoughts and, on the other hand, as Atty. Sampaga needed time to prepare for trial, respondent
judge postponed the trial to the next day, September 16, 1992; that on September 16, 1992,
respondent judge again called the parties to her chambers to see if they had come to any
agreement, but as she was told by petitioner that "for him to withdraw his complaint against the
private respondent, he must have to transfer his residence first," thus implying that he wished the
case against private respondent to continue, respondent judge proceeded with the trial that morning.

Private respondent contends that the instant petition does not have the consent and conformity of
the public prosecutor but was instead filed by the private prosecutor who does not have the requisite
legal personality to question the decision acquitting him.

Required to comment, the Solicitor General argues that this petition should be dismissed:

A perusal of the judgment of the trial court showed that the parties were heard conformably to the
norms of due process, evidence was presented by both parties and duly considered, their arguments
were studied, analyzed, and assessed, and judgment was rendered in which findings of facts and
conclusions of law were set forth. These conclusions of fact or law cannot in any sense be
characterized as outrageously wrong or manifestly mistaken or whimsically or capriciously arrived at.
The worst that may perhaps be said of them is that they are fairly debatable and may even be
possibly erroneous. But they cannot be declared to have been made with grave abuse of discretion
(Bustamante vs. NLRC, 195 SCRA 1991). Clearly, there was no mistrial in this case which would
warrant the nullity of the assailed judgment.1
The preliminary issue in this case is whether the petition should be dismissed outright because it
was filed without the intervention of the OSG as counsel for the prosecution.

This question is not a novel one. In the case of People v. Santiago, this Court held:
2

The question as to whether or not U.P., as the private offended party, can file this special civil action
for certiorari questioning the validity of said decision of the trial court should be answered in the
affirmative.

It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant’s role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If
a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the
criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor
General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may
appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.

In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is
alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or
on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved.
In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The
complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action
questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing,
complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may
be prosecuted in name of said complainant. 3

The above ruling has been reiterated in De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals and Perez v. Hagonoy Rural
4

Bank, Inc., in which the legal personality of private complainant to file a special civil action
5

of certiorari questioning the dismissal by the trial court of a criminal case has been upheld subject to
the limitation that the accused’s right to double jeopardy is not violated. As explained by the Court
6

in People v. Court of Appeals: 7

A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due process is void, does not exist in
legal contemplation, and, thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal. However, where the petition
demonstrates mere errors in judgment not amounting to grave abuse of discretion or deprivation of
due process, the writ of certiorari cannot issue. A review of the alleged errors of judgment cannot be
made without trampling upon the right of the accused against double jeopardy. 8

In short, petitioner must establish that the judgment of acquittal resulted from a mistrial so as not to
place private respondent, as accused, in double jeopardy.

In only one case has the Court categorically declared a mistrial, and that is the case of Galman v.
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner would have the Court draw parallelisms between this case
9

and Galman where the Court nullified the judgment of acquittal of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People of the Philippines v. General Luther Custodio, et al."

This cases is, however, a far cry from Galman. There, it was shown that evidence was suppressed
in order to justify the acquittal of the accused. This Court held that "the secret Malacañang
conference at which the authoritarian President called together the Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan [Manuel Pamaran] and Tanodbayan [Bernardo] Fernandez and the entire
prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan [Manuel] Herrera and told them how to handle
and rig (moro-moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings to assure the pre-
determined ignominious final outcome are without parallel and precedent in our annals and
jurisprudence." 10

In contrast, petitioner does not allege any such irregularity in the trial of private respondent. He
simply claims that respondent judge’s bias and partiality denied the prosecution a fair and impartial
trial. Why respondent judge was biased for the defense petitioner does not say. It is noteworthy that
petitioner does not even dispute private respondent’s allegation that respondent judge was not
personally acquainted with him until she heard the criminal case against him.

It is pertinent at this point to cite certain principles laid down by the Court regarding the
disqualification of a judge for lack of the objectivity that due process requires. It is settled that mere
suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties is not enough; there should be evidence to
prove the charge. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, especially weighed against a judge’s
11

sacred allegation under oath of office to administer justice without respect to any person and do
equal right to the poor and the rich. There must be a showing of bias and prejudice stemming from
12

an extrajudicial source resulting in an opinion in the merits on some basis other than what the judge
learned from his participation in the case. 13

The arguments which petitioner advances by way of proof of respondent’s judge’s alleged bias are
not persuasive.

Respondent judge’s efforts to have the parties arrive at an amicable settlement is not evidence of
partiality for private respondent. She could have been motivated by factors other than a desire to
clear private respondent of criminal liability, i.e., the clearing of her court docket or, as pointed out by
the OSG in its comment, in setting a good example considering that petitioner and private
14

respondent were neighbors occupying public offices charged with the maintenance of peace and
order in the community.

As for the allegation that the trial was not held until after three weeks to give private respondent
more time to persuade petitioner to amicably settle the case, it has been shown that it was not
respondent judge but court personnel in charge of scheduling cases who assigned the dates of trial
taking into account the court calendar. The cancellation of the September 15, 1992 hearing, on the
other hand, was made to give private respondent’s counsel, Atty. Maria Lelibet Sampaga, time to
study the case and prepare for trial. Although Atty. Sampaga had once appeared in behalf of private
respondent, it was for the purpose of assisting the latter at the arraignment because the regular
counsel was absent. As new counsel, Atty. Sampaga needed to study the case. A postponement to
the next day, September 16, 1992, was not an unreasonable request. Indeed, this did not involve
resetting the case since September 16, 1992 had been originally designated as one of the initial trial
dates.

Nor is there any showing that respondent judge decided the criminal case on grounds other than its
merits. A reading of her decision acquitting private respondent shows that the same was made on
the basis of her evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution and of the defense. Because of the
conflicting versions of the parties as to what really happened, her decision was necessarily based on
her appreciation of the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution and the defense.

True, petitioner is correct in his argument that respondent judge mistakenly excluded from the
evidence his testimony as well as that of prosecution witness Manuel Montoya on the ground that
the same had not been formally offered at the time they were called to the witness stand. For the
fact was that petitioner and Montoya had been cross-examined at length by the defense and,
therefore, the latter had waived objection to the failure of the prosecution to make an offer of the
evidence. It has been held in Go v. Court of Appeals, however, that divergence of opinion between
15 16

the trial judge and a party’s counsel as to the admissibility of evidence is not proof of bias or
partiality. Besides, though respondent judge stated in her decision that the testimonies of petitioner
and Montoya "cannot be considered by this Court as constituting part of the evidence for the
prosecution," her decision shows that she actually considered the testimonies in piecing together the
prosecution’s version of the events and in evaluating the evidence in the case. The testimonies of
petitioner and Montoya were after all referred to by the other witnesses for the prosecution, namely,
del Rosario and Samson. Thus respondent judge’s decision reads in pertinent part:

The allegation of the private complainant that he neither resisted the punches of the accused nor
said anything to the latter is quite hard to believe. No rational man would allow another to hurt him
without offering any form of resistance, for he is instinctively concerned [with] his self-preservation. It
is more in consonance with human nature that when one is hurt, especially if the feeling of
innocence is within him, to immediately retaliate to an unjust act.

Another equally unbelievable allegation is that the four barangay tanods just stood and watched their
barangay captain while he was being mauled. There were four of them inside the hall yet no one
even dared to defend herein private complainant or stop herein accused. If they could not do it for
their barangay captain and inside their hall, how can they be expected to protect the residents of
their barangay outside their hall?

Furthermore, if herein private complainant was indeed mauled, he should have suffered a lot more
serious injuries than he alleged[ly] incurred. Considering their allegation that the barangay tanods
were guarded at the point of a gun by Pedro Garcia, herein accused thus had all the time and
opportunity to inflict on the private complainant as many serious injuries as he could. But the results
of the medical examination belie this point.

Well-settled is the rule that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on
the weakness of the defense (People vs. Dennis Mendoza, 203 SCRA 148, G.R. No. 85176,
October 21, 1991). After a thorough examination of the pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution, the latter failed to fulfill the test of moral certainty and establish such degree of proof
necessary to support conviction. "If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of one or
more explanations, one of which is consistent with innocence and the other consistent with his guilt,
then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction. The constitutional presumption of innocence stands until overthrown by strong and
convincing evidence, one of which will prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt" (People vs. Gina
Sahagun, 182 SCRA 91, G.R. No. 62024, February 12, 1990).

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are merely unfounded accusations insufficient to gain
conviction. In the case of People vs. Guinto, 184 SCRA 287, G.R. 88400, April 6, 1990, the Supreme
Court held: "Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The accused is protected by the constitutional
presumption of innocence which the prosecution must overcome with contrary proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Even if the defense is weak, the case against the accused must fail if the
prosecution is even weaker. . . . If the prosecution has not sufficiently established the guilt of the
accused, he has a right to be acquitted and released even if he presents naught a shred of
evidence." 17

That respondent judge believed the evidence of the defense more than that of the prosecution does
not indicate that she was biased. She must have simply found the defense witnesses to be more
credible.18
Indeed, no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged
misappreciation of facts and evidence. A writ of certiorari cannot be used to correct a lower tribunal’s
evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Thus, in People v. Court of Appeals, the Court
19

dismissed a petition for certiorari filed by the prosecution from a decision of the Court of Appeals
reversing that of the trial court and acquitting the accused of homicide and serious physical injuries
on the ground that he acted in self-defense. The Court held:

To show grave abuse of discretion, herein petitioner contends that Respondent Court of Appeals
committed manifest bias and partiality in rendering the assailed Decision. It claims that Respondent
Court ignored and discarded "uncontroverted physical evidence" which the trial judge had relied
upon. Furthermore, it allegedly erred in finding that he had "base[d] his decision on the testimony of
witnesses whose demeanor he did not personally witness." In addition, it supposedly harped on
insignificant inconsistencies in the testimonies of some prosecution witnesses, while unquestioningly
accepting the private respondent’s claim of self-defense.

Finally, the solicitor general maintains that the assailed Decision (1) failed to discuss the effect of
Maquiling’s escape from confinement during the pendency of the case; (2) shifted the burden of
proof on the prosecution to prove Maquiling’s guilt, although he admitted killing the victim in self-
defense; (3) ignored the physical evidence ¾ particularly the downward trajectory of the bullets that
had hit the two victims, thereby showing that private respondent was still standing when he shot
them; and the shotgun wound sustained by private respondent, which disabled him and rendered
him incapable of shooting the victims.

It is quite obvious from the foregoing allegations that petitioner imputed grave abuse of discretion to
Respondent Court because of the latter’s supposed misappreciation and wrongful assessment
of factual evidence. However, as earlier stressed, the present recourse is a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is
not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari; which is extra ordinem ¾ beyond the ambit
of appeal. Stated elsewise, factual matters cannot normally be inquired into by the Supreme Court in
a certiorari proceeding. This Court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties
and analyze, assess and weigh them again, in order to ascertain if the trial and the appellate courts
were correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other.

The mere fact that a court erroneously decides a case does not necessarily deprive it of
jurisdiction. Thus, assuming arguendo that a court commits a mistake in its judgment, the error does
1âwphi1

not vitiate the decision, considering that it has jurisdiction over the case.

An examination of the 65-page Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals shows no patent and
gross error amounting to grave abuse of discretion. Neither does it show an arbitrary or despotic
exercise of power arising from passion or hostility. . . .
20

Finally, petitioner’s claim that respondent judge was biased is belied by his failure to move for
respondent judge’s inhibition. Petitioner’s claim that he did not do so because of his "belief and
desire for said respondent judge to finally return to her normal sense of fairness" is a feeble excuse.
His failure to file such motion stands as one more stark difference between this case
and Galman since the private prosecutors in the latter case lost no time in seeking the
disqualification of the members of the Sandiganbayan on grounds of manifest bias and partiality for
the defense. 21

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
OSG’s Comment, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 112-113.

2
174 SCRA 143 (1989).

3
Id., pp. 152-153.

4
253 SCRA 499 (1996).

5
G.R. No. 126210, Mar. 9, 2000.

6
Const., Art. III, §21 provides:

"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act."

7
308 SCRA 687 (1999).

8
Id., p. 690.

9
144 SCRA 43 (1986).

10
Id, pp. 82-83.

11
Geneblazo v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 124, 134 (1989).

12
Pimentel v. Salanga, 21 SCRA 161, 167 (1967).

13
Webb v. People, 276 SCRA 243, 253 (1997).

14
OSG’s Comment, p. 3; Rollo, p. 112.

15
People v. Java, 227 SCRA 669, 680 (1992).

16
221 SCRA 397, 413 (1993).

17
Petition, Annex A, pp. 10-11; Rollo, pp. 22-23.

18
See People v. Tabarno, 242 SCRA 456, 460 (1995).

19
308 SCRA 687 (1999).
20
Id., pp. 700-701.

The Court in fact viewed in a negative light the Sandiganbayan’s rush to judgment
21

notwithstanding the pendency of the motion for inhibition.