G.R. Nos.

L-50581-50617 January 30, 1982

RUFINO V. NUÑEZ petitioner,

FACTS:

The petitioner is challenging the validity of the Presidential Decree creating the Sandiganbayan
Court, accusing it of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents. He filed
multiple complaints and filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds. The
respondent Court denied his motions, and a subsequent reconsideration was denied. The
petitioner claims that Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, violates due process, equal
protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution.

The Constitution's concern to combat dishonesty and abuse of trust in public service cannot
justify disregarding constitutional rights. However, the Court, recognizing the counsel of
petitioner and scholarly research, finds that Presidential Decree No, 1486, creating the
respondent Court, has not been invalidated. The petition cannot be granted and the
unconstitutionality of the Decree cannot be determined. The court's vigor and diligence in
studying the issues raised by the Solicitor General's memorandum are acknowledged.

The power of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to create the Sandiganbayan in 1978 is not
challenged in this proceeding. The 1973 Constitution suggested the act should come from the
National Assembly, but the 1976 Amendments ensured Marcos would continue to exercise
legislative powers until martial law was lifted. This affirms the ruling in Aquino Jr. v.
Commission on Elections in 1975, which dissipated doubts about the legality of law-making
authority by the President during Martial Law.

The petitioner is attempting to nullify Presidential Decree No. 1486, citing the guarantee of equal
protection as a principle from J. M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration. The ideal
situation is for the law's benefits to be available to all, excluding chance and favor, and
governing affairs with impartial uniformity. However, the reality of the situation cannot
approximate this ideal, and the constitutional guarantee should not disregard what exists.
Regulations may cut into rights to liberty and property, and those affected may invoke the equal
protection clause only if they can prove that the governmental act was motivated by hostility or
discrimination. Classification is not ruled out, as the principle is that laws should operate equally
and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances, with favoritism and undue preference
not allowed. The restrictions cast on some in a group should be equally binding on the rest.

The petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violate his right to equal protection, as
the appeal process has been reduced to a mere matter of discretion, limited to only legal
questions, and has only one chance to appeal conviction to the Supreme Court. This
classification is not convincing, as it does not meet the criteria announced by the Court in People
v. Vera, which requires substantial distinctions, relevance to the law, and equal application to
each member of the class. The Constitution specifically mentions the creation of the
Sandiganbayan court to address dishonesty in public service. The petitioner should be aware of
the constitutional amendments that allow different procedures for accused individuals, regardless
of their status as a private citizen or public official. The Court's ruling in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno
(1949) also suggests that the general guarantees of the Bill of Rights must give way to a specific
provision reserving public services or utilities to Filipino citizens.

The challenged Presidential Decree is argued to be contrary to the ex post facto provision of the
Constitution, based on the argument that the petitioner's right of appeal is being diluted or
eroded. However, a more thorough examination of the rationale of the Kay Villegas Kami
decision, promulgated in 1970, provides a more binding pronouncement on the matter. The Kay
Villegas Kami decision defines ex post facto law as one that makes criminal acts innocent when
committed, aggravates crimes, changes punishment, alters evidence rules, and deprives
individuals of lawful protection. The "lawful protection" to which an accused "has become
entitled" is qualified and not broad, and the mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right
to appeal is not embraced. The court has previously stated that Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, which does away with the requirement of unanimity under Article 47 of the Revised Penal
Code, does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity, and its applicability to crimes committed
before its enactment would not make the law ex post facto.

The ex post facto clause, as defined in Mekin v. Wolfe, is prohibited in cases where an action
done before the law was criminal and punished, aggravates a crime, changes punishment, or
alters legal rules of evidence. Justice Cooper's opinion states that the case does not fall within
this definition, and the First Instance may commit error in favor of the petitioner, wrongfully
discharge him. A person cannot have a vested right in such a possibility. The case provides the
petitioner and the government with the benefit of the appeal, and the petitioner's situation is not
altered by the act.

Mekin v. Wolfe is a case that is closely related to Calder v. Bull, a 1798 US Supreme Court
decision. The term "ex post facto laws" refers to laws that make an action criminal, aggravate a
crime, change punishment, or alter legal rules of evidence. These laws are considered unjust and
oppressive. Justice Chase, speaking for the US Supreme Court, argued that these terms were
technical and had been used before the Revolution. Sir William Blackstone, Sir Wooddeson, and
the author of the Federalist all considered ex post facto laws in the same light. The Supreme
Court's opinion is based on their extensive knowledge of the true principle of government.

The petitioner relies on Thompson v. Utaha, a decision by the American Supreme Court in 1898,
which established American sovereignty over the Philippines. The first Justice Harlan's
exhaustive opinion highlights the challenges in declaring unconstitutional the challenged
Presidential Decree. Justice Harlan argued that the difficulty lies in determining whether statutes
take away an accused's rights that were considered vital for life and liberty protection at the time
of the offense. Another 1894 decision, Duncan v. Missouri, also cited by the petitioner, stated
that prescribing different modes of procedure and abolishing courts, while leaving existing
protections, are not considered constitutional inhibitions. The petitioner's argument highlights the
complexity of determining whether a Presidential Decree is unconstitutional.

The right to appeal is not dilutioned under Presidential Decree No. 1486, as the Court of Appeals
is the primary review authority. The ex post facto clause is considered vital for the protection of
life and liberty, and the Court of Appeals has the duty to review the facts if convicted. The
petitioner claims that there is no review of the facts, but it is essential to note that the Court must
be convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence has been overcome. This means
that the quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt must be satisfied, as set forth in
People v. Dramayo.

The Court has repeatedly reversed convictions on a showing that this fundamental right to de
presumed innocent has been disregarded. The strongest suspicion must not be allowed to sway
judgment, and the conscience must be satisfied that the defendant could be laid the responsibility
for the offense charged. Moral certainty is required, and the Court has repeatedly reversed
convictions on a showing that this fundamental and basic right to de presumed innocent has been
disregarded. It is farfetched and highly unrealistic to conclude that the omission of the Court of
Appeals as a reviewing authority results in the loss of "vital protection" of liberty.

The argument based on denial of due process has little to recommend, as it is largely based on
the leading American Supreme Court decision, Snyder v. Massachusetts. Justice Cardozo
emphasized that the law is sedulous in maintaining a fair trial for a defendant charged with
crime, regardless of the form of procedure. However, justice is due to the accused as well, and
fairness must not be strained to a filament. Compliance with the due process mandate in criminal
proceedings is required if the accused is informed about why they are proceeded against and
what charges they have to meet, with their conviction based on evidence that is not tainted with
falsity after full opportunity for the accused to rebut it, and the sentence is imposed in
accordance with a valid law. This formulation is a reiteration of the American Supreme Court's
decision in Ong Chang Wing v. United States, which stated that if an accused has been heard in a
court of competent jurisdiction, proceeded against under orderly processes of law, and only
punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice, with an opportunity to be heard, and a
judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, they have had due process of law.

The court ruled that the petitioner cannot declare Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1606 unconstitutional. The decision does not affect the petitioner's right
to a trial with constitutional safeguards. The court believes that the Decree must be interpreted to
prevent any erosion of the Court's powers, which is too clear to contest. The court also
emphasized the importance of the constitutional presumption of innocence in a review by
certiorari of a conviction by the Sandiganbayan. The petition is dismissed without costs.