CASE NAME: People vs.

Albert Date: December 11, 1995

G.R. Number: 114001 Court: Supreme Court, Manila (En Banc)

Digested by: KwagiBoi

Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines; the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Accused-Appellant: Rolly Albert y Oliver; the Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.

Principle/Doctrine: Application of Rule 116 (Rules of Court), Sec. 3

Facts:
1. Upon a plea of guilty the RTC of Iba, Zambales convicted accused-appellant Rolly Albert y
Oliver of the crime of murder. Notwithstanding his entry of said plea, appellant now impugns the
judgment of the trial court as being flawed by procedural and substantive errors.
2. The Supreme Court noted that the original case reveals a veritable “rigodon de jueces y
defensores”, that the appellant throughout the proceedings were presided over by different judges
and the counsel de officio also changed hands twice from the Attys. from Citizens Legal
Assistance Office (CLAO) and, thereafter, by the Attys. from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).
3. While the Court did not fault them with the imputed lack of dedication bewailed in People vs.
Dayot, the segmented discontinuity of the duties of legal assignments farmed out to them in
seemingly random fashion is a disquieting feature in this case.
4. The Appellant’s story was one of that which was undergone by many impoverished young men in
the countryside who, in their search for the proverbial greener pastures, end up in unfortunate and
unexpected situations such as the present plight of appellant. Sometime in the late 1980's, Rolly
Albert, with only a fourth grade schooling, left his hometown of San Pablo in Southern Leyte and
headed for Cabangan, Zambales to scout for employment. He soon found work there as a helper
in Alicia Tingho’s Bakery, named the "Big A Bakery”. On December 24, 1990, appellant, for no
apparent reason at all, stabbed to death Alfonso Quimen and wounded two others, namely,
Marcelino Mendoza and Lito Ladao. The three were his co-workers.
5. Appellant was prosecuted for murder in the slaying of Alfonso Quimen and for frustrated
homicide in the assault against Marcelino Mendoza. He later pleaded guilty to a lesser offense in
the charge of frustrated homicide.
6. When first arraigned, the appellant entered a plea of not guilty and the case went to trial. The
prosecution rested its case after it had presented four witnesses, who testified on different dates,
before different judges. Appellant's scheduled appearance as witness for himself was deferred
when the trial court directed his confinement at the National Center for Mental Health in
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for psychiatric evaluation and treatment as he appeared to be
suffering from some form of mental illness. The trial court stated that a provincial jail guard and
the judge himself observed that the accused was acting abnormally, which fact was confirmed by
the senior resident physician of the Integrated Health Office at Iba, Zambales as a personality
disorder.
7. In its first report to the trial court dated, signed by Dr. Edison C. Galindez, Medical Officer III,
the National Center for Mental Health noted that appellant was "suffering from Psychosis or
Insanity classified under Schizophrenia." As it was the opinion of the medical officer that
appellant was incompetent to stand trial, he recommended that appellant remain at the institution
for further treatment and confinement. It was only on May 21, 1993, that appellant was
 recommitted to jail upon the observation and recommendation of said medical center that
appellant's mental condition had improved and he could already withstand the rigors of court
proceedings. His medical discharge was, however, with the specific advice that he should undergo
"regular monthly check-up at Zambales Provincial Hospital, Iba, Zambales to prevent relapse of
his psychotic symptoms." Although the trial court issued an order to the Provincial Warden or his
representative to arrange such check-ups, it does not appear that the same was complied with
even once.
8. On October 19, 1993, appellant finally testified in his behalf. In the course of his direct
examination, he suddenly blurted out, "I admit it. "Aaminin ko yan." " When pressed by his
lawyer as to whether he was admitting his participation in the killing of Alfonso Quimen,
appellant replied, "Yes, I will admit." Hence, without objection from the prosecution, appellant's
counsel then moved, and it was so allowed by the trial court, that there be another arraignment
and that his client's earlier plea be withdrawn and a plea of guilty be recorded in lieu thereof.
9. A supposed re-arraignment was forthwith conducted on the same day in Tagalog, a dialect which
appellant Rolly Albert allegedly understood, after counsel for appellant, upon the instructions of
the trial court, reportedly conferred with and explained to him the import of entering a plea of
guilty. On December 2, 1993, appellant was again called to the witness stand upon the theory of
the trial court that since he had pleaded guilty to a grave offense, he should be heard again in
order to establish the precise degree of his culpability, and to determine as well "whether he really
and truly comprehended the meaning and full significance of his plea." The defense then, rested
its case and, with that, the trial court rendered its judgment which is now being assailed before us.
10. In this appellate review, appellant cites as reversible errors (1) the alleged failure of the trial court
to make sure that he fully understood the import and consequence of his plea of guilty to the
capital offense charged in the information; (2) the order of the trial court allowing appellant to
change his previous plea of not guilty to a conditional plea of guilty; and (3) his conviction by the
trial court despite the fact that his plea of guilty was improvidently entered.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Rule 116 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure was followed.
Ruling:
1. NO, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure was not followed.

According to Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, Section 3. Plea of guilty to capital
offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf. (3a)

In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the procedure followed by the trial court in the case
under review in respect of the affirmative plea of appellant was not in scrupulous adherence to the
requirements of Section 3, Rule 116. The Supreme Court states that “Where a capital offense like
murder becomes the subject of a positive plea, it becomes imperative for the trial court to
administer a searching inquiry and receive evidence undisputedly showing that the accused
admits his guilt freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of
such a plea… What perturbs this Court is that the trial court, in its two and a half page decision,
banked its finding of guilt solely on the plea of appellant when it could definitely have done much
more than that. In fact, a scrutiny of the transcripts appears to indicate the presence of the
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and, at the very least, mental illness diminishing
the exercise of will power by appellant.”

Hence, in this case the lower courts were not able to properly follow Section 3, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court.