G.R. No.

115407 August 28, 1995

MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

The adverse decision in this case promulgated by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 32233 on November 24, 1993, as well as its resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the
motion for reconsideration thereof, are challenged by petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga in this
appeal by certiorari through a petition which raises issues centering mainly on said
petitioner's right to be admitted to bail.

On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended information as a co-
conspirator in the crime of multiple murder in Criminal Case No. 86-39 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro City for the killing of members of the Bucag family
sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which petitioner was the mayor at the time. The original
information, filed on October 6, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City, had
1

initially indicted for multiple murder eight accused suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion, Manuel
Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And Richard Doe as the
alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag
and their son, Romeo, Jr. However, only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was
apprehended, tried and eventually convicted. Galarion later escaped from prison. The others
have remained at large up to the present. 2

In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was implicated in the crime. In an
amended information dated October 6, 1988, he was charged as a co-accused therein. As
herein petitioner was his former employer and thus knew him well, Roxas engaged the
former's services as counsel in said case. Ironically, in the course of the preliminary
investigation therein, said accused, in a signed affidavit dated March 30, 1989 but which he
later retracted on June 20, 1990, implicated petitioner as the supposed mastermind behind
the massacre of the Bucag family. 3

Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the case per
his resolution of July 7, 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance of said prosecutor,
designated a replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, for purposes of both the
preliminary investigation and prosecution of Criminal Case No. 86-39. Pursuant to a
resolution of the new prosecutor dated September 6, 1989, petitioner was finally charged as
a co-conspirator in said criminal case in a second amended information dated October 6,
1992. Petitioner assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all the way to this Court in
G.R. No. 96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Hon.
Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan." In
an en banc decision promulgated on April 19, 1991, the Court sustained the filing of the
second amended information against him. 4

Under this backdrop, the trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an arrest
warrant for petitioner's apprehension but, before it could be served on him, petitioner
through counsel, filed on October 28, 1992 a motion for admission to bail with the trial
court which set the same for hearing on November 5, 1992. Petitioner duly furnished copies
 of the motion to State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor's
Office, and the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On November 5, 1992, the trial
court proceeded to hear the application for bail. Four of petitioner's counsel appeared in
court but only Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecution's Office
appeared for the prosecution. 5

As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due to
"acute costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over
the person of their client to the local chapter president of the integrated Bar of the
Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he
considered being in the custody of the law. Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand,
informed the trial court that in accordance with the directive of the chief of their office,
Regional State prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither supporting nor
opposing the application for bail and that they were submitting the same to the sound
discretion of the trail judge. 6

Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was
waiving any further presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated
November 5, 1992, the trial court admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of P200,000.00.
The following day, November 6, 1992, petitioner, apparently still weak but well enough to
travel by then, managed to personally appear before the clerk of court of the trial court and
posted bail in the amount thus fixed. He was thereafter arraigned and in the trial that ensued,
he also personally appeared and attended all the scheduled court hearings of the case. 7

The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution filed twenty (20) days later on
November 26, 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly received his copy of the petition
for admission to bail on the day after the hearing, was denied by the trial court in its omnibus
order dated March 29, 1993. On October 1, 1993, or more than six (6) months later, Prosecutor
Gingoyon elevated the matter to respondent Court of Appeals through a special civil action
for certiorari. Thus were the resolution and the order of the trial court granting bail to petitioner
annulled on November 24, 1993, in the decision now under review, on the ground that they were
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 8

Respondent court observed in its decision that at the time of petitioner's application for
bail, he was not yet "in the custody of the law," apparently because he filed his motion for
admission to bail before he was actually arrested or had voluntarily surrendered. It
further noted that apart from the circumstance that petitioner was charged with a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua, the evidence of guilt was strong as borne out by the
fact that no bail was recommended by the prosecution, for which reasons it held that the
grant of bail was doubly improvident. Lastly, the prosecution, according to respondent court,
was not afforded an opportunity to oppose petitioner's application for bail contrary to
the requirements of due process. Hence, this appeal.

Petitioner argues that, in accordance with the ruling of this Court in Santiago vs. Vasquez
etc., et al., his filing of the aforesaid application for bail with the trial court effectively
9

conferred on the latter jurisdiction over his person. In short, for all intents and purposes, he
was in the custody of the law. In petitioner's words, the "invocation by the accused of the
court's jurisdiction by filing a pleading in court is sufficient to vest the court with
jurisdiction over the person of the accused and bring him within the custody of the
law."
Petitioner goes on to contend that the evidence on record negates the existence of such
strong evidence as would bar his provisional release on bail. Furthermore, the prosecution,
by reason of the waiver by Prosecutor Abejo of any further presentation of evidence to
oppose the application for bail and whose representation in court in behalf of the
prosecution bound the latter, cannot legally assert any claim to a denial of procedural due
process. Finally, petitioner points out that the special civil action for certiorari was filed in
respondent court after an unjustifiable length of time.

On the undisputed facts , the legal principles applicable and the equities involved in this
case, the Court finds for petitioner.

1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security given for the release
of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon
his appearing before any court as required under the conditions specified in said
Rule. Its main purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment
until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial. As bail is intended to
10

obtain or secure one's provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody
over him has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary
surrender. As this Court has put it in a case "it would be incongruous to grant bail to one
11

who is free." 12

The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former
pernicious practice whereby an accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail,
without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and
compliance with the requirements therefor. Thus, in Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et
13

al., where the petitioner who had been charged with kidnapping with murder went into
14

hiding without surrendering himself, and shortly thereafter filed a motion asking the court to
fix the amount of the bail bond for his release pending trial, the Supreme Court categorically
pronounced that said petitioner was not eligible for admission to bail.

As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have either been arrested, detained,
or other wise deprived of their freedom will ever have occasion to seek the protective mantle
extended by the right to bail. The person seeking his provisional release under the auspices
of bail need not even wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed against him as it is
available to "all persons" where the offense is bailable. The rule is, of course, subject to the
15

condition or limitation that the applicant is in the custody of the law. 16

On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is
arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by
warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities. in this light, the ruling, vis-
17

a-vis the facts in Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc., et al., should be explained.
18

In said case, the petitioner who was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, filed through counsel what purported to be an
"Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond." Said petitioner was at the time
confined in a hospital recuperating from serious physical injuries which she sustained in a
major vehicular mishap. Consequently, she expressly sought leave "that she be considered
as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the
required trial and other proceedings." On the basis of said ex-parte motion and the peculiar
circumstances obtaining in that incident, the Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner to post a
cash bail bond for her provisional liberty without need of her personal appearance in view of
her physical incapacity and as a matter of humane consideration.

When the Sandiganbayan later issued a hold departure order against her, she question the
jurisdiction of that court over her person in a recourse before this Court, on the ground that
"she neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she
has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before said court" In
rejecting her arguments, the Court held that she was clearly estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for by her own representations in the urgent ex
parte motion for bail she had earlier recognized such jurisdiction. Furthermore, by actually
posting a cash bail was accepted by the court, she had effectively submitted to its jurisdiction
over her person. Nonetheless, on the matter of bail, the Court took pains to reiterate that the
same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed filed his motion for
admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may,
however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be considered as being
constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance
which attended the filing of his bail application with the trail court, for purposes of the hearing
thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the
law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as
prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by
his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. The latter mode may be
19

exemplified by the so-called "house arrest" or, in case of military offenders, by being
"confined to quarters" or restricted to the military camp area.

It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it known
to the prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he could not
personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College
General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical
clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their
explicit knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the
arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest effort to
place petitioner in the physical custody of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated
and under medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his
confinement or placing him under guard.

The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the law.
Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they
never attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly
submitted to physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the application
for bail with the trail court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual
whereabouts; and, more importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of
the said court. Moreover, when it came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had
been issued, petitioner never made any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the
clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts from the authorities since the day he
was charged in court, up to the submission application for bail, and until the day of the
hearing thereof.

At the hearing, his counsel offered proof of his actual confinement at the hospital on account
of an acute ailment, which facts were not at all contested as they were easily verifiable. And,
 as a manifestation of his good faith and of his actual recognition of the authority of trial court,
petitioner's counsel readily informed the court that they were surrendering custody of
petitioner to the president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Misamis Oriental
Chapter. In other words, the motion for admission to bail was filed not for the purpose or in
20

the manner of the former practice which the law proscribes for the being derogatory of the
authority and jurisdiction of the courts, as what had happened in Feliciano. There was here
no intent or strategy employed to obtain bail in absentia and thereby be able to avoid arrest
should the application therefore be denied.

2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all indictees
shall be allowed bail, except only those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as
amended, now provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a
matter of right. The right to bail, which may be waived considering its personal nature and which, to
21

repeat, arises from the time one is placed in the custody of the law, springs from the presumption of
innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not be inflicted incarceration at the outset
since after trial he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable
doubt.22

Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal offense, an
accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present exceptions thereto being
the instances where the accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and the evidence of guilt is strong. Under said general
23

rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, the court having custody of the accused should,
as a matter of course, grant the same after a hearing conducted to specifically determine the
conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On the other hand,
as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the court under the
exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be summary or otherwise in
the discretion of the court, is required with the participation of both the defense and a duly notified
24

representative of the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong
for the provisional liberty of the applicant. Of course, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to
25

show that the evidence meets the required quantum. 26

Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the prosecution must be give an
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may want to introduce before
the court may resolve the application, since it is equally entitled as the accused to due process. If 27

the prosecution is denied this opportunity, there would be a denial of procedural due process, as a
consequence of which the court's order in respect of the motion or petition is void. At the hearing,
28

the petitioner can rightfully cross-examine the witnesses presented by the prosecution and introduce
his own evidence in rebuttal. When, eventually, the court issues an order either granting or refusing
29

bail, the same should contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, followed by its
conclusion as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The court, though, cannot rely on
30

mere affidavits or recitals of their contents, if timely objected to, for these represent only hearsay
evidence, and thus are insufficient to establish the quantum of evidence that the law requires. 31

In this appeal, the prosecution assails what it considers to be a violation of procedural due process
when the court below allowed Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecutor's
Office to appear in behalf of the prosecution, instead of State Prosecutor Henrick P. Gingoyon who
is claimed to be the sole government prosecutor expressly authorized to handle the case and who
received his copy of the motion only on the day after the hearing had been conducted. Accordingly,
the prosecution now insists that Prosecutor Abejo had no authority at all to waive the presentation of
any further evidence in opposition to the application for bail and to submit the matter to the sound
discretion of the trial court. In addition, they argue that the prosecution was not afforded "reasonable
time" to oppose that application for bail.

We disagree. Firstly, it is undisputed that the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor acted as the
collaborating counsel, with State Prosecutor Henrick Gingoyon, in Criminal Case No. 86-39 on the
basis of an authority from then Chief State Prosecutor Fernando de Leon which was sent through
radio message on July 10, 1992 and duly received by the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor on
the same date. This authorization, which was to be continuing until and unless it was expressly
withdrawn, was later confirmed and then withdrawn only on July 12, 1993 by then Secretary of
Justice Franklin M. Drilon. This was done after one Rebecca Bucag-tan questioned the authority of
Regional State Prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado and State Prosecutor II Erlindo Abejo to enter their
appearance as collaborating government prosecutors in said criminal case. It was in fact by virtue
32

of this arrangement that the same Prosecutor Zozobrado and Prosecutor Perseverando Arana
entered their appearance as collaborating prosecutor in the previous hearing in said case. Hence,
33

on the strength of said authority and of its receipt of the notice of the hearing for bail, the Regional
State Prosecutor's Office, through Prosecutor Abejo, could validly represent the prosecution in the
hearing held on November 5, 1992.

Secondly, although it is now claimed that Prosecutor Abejo was allegedly not familiar with
the case, he nonetheless was explicitly instructed about the position of the Regional State
Prosecutor's Office on the matter. Prosecutor Zozobrado, whose office received its copy of
the motion on the very day when it was sent, that is, October 28, 1992, duly instructed
Prosecutor Abejo to manifest to the court that the prosecution was neither supporting nor
opposing the application for bail and that they were submitting the matter to its sound
discretion. Obviously, what this meant was that the prosecution, at that particular posture of
the case, was waiving the presentation of any countervailing evidence. When the court a
quo sought to ascertain whether or not that was the real import of the submission by
Prosecutor Abejo, the latter readily answered in the affirmative.

The following exchanges bear this out:

PROSECUTOR ERLINDO ABEJO:

I was informed to appear in this case just now Your Honor.

COURT:

Where is your Chief of Office? Your office received a copy of the

motion as early as October 28. There is an element of urgency here.

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

I am not aware of that, Your Honor, I was only informed just now. The
one assigned here is State Prosecutor Perseverando Arena, Jr. who
unfortunately is in the hospital attending to his sick son. I do not know
about this but before I came I received an instruction from our Chief
to relay to this court the stand of the office regarding the motion to
admit bail. That office is neither supporting nor opposing it and we
are submitting to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court.
 COURT:

Place that manifestation on record. For the record, Fiscal Abejo,

would you like to formally enter your appearance in this matter?

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

Yes, Your Honor. For the government, the Regional State

Prosecutor's Office represented by State Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo.

COURT:

By that manifestation do you want the Court to understand that in

effect, at least, the prosecution is dispensing with the presentation of
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong, the denial . . .

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

I am amenable to that manifestation, Your Honor.

COURT:

Final inquiry. Is the Prosecution willing to submit the incident covered

by this particular motion for resolution by this court?

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:

Without presenting any further evidence?

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

Yes, Your Honor. 34

It is further evident from the foregoing that the prosecution, on the instructions of Regional
State prosecutor Zozobrado, had no intention at all to oppose the motion for bail and this
should be so notwithstanding the statement that they were "neither supporting nor opposing"
the motion. What is of significance is the manifestation that the prosecution was "submitting
(the motion) to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court." By that, it could not be any
clearer. The prosecution was dispensing with the introduction of evidence en contra and this
it did at the proper forum and stage of the proceedings, that is, during the mandatory hearing
for bail and after the trial court had fully satisfied itself that such was the position of the
prosecution.

3. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, it was stressed that where the trial court
35

has reasons to believe that the prosecutor's attitude of not opposing the application for bail is
not justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross error or a dereliction of duty, the
 court, in the interest of Justice, must inquire from the prosecutor concerned as the nature of
his evidence to determine whether or not it is strong. And, in the very recent administrative
matter Re: First Indorsement Dated July 21, 1992 of Hon. Fernando de Leon, Chief State
Prosecutor, Department of Justice; Alicia A. Baylon, City Prosecutor of Dagupan City
vs. Judge Deodoro Sison, the Court, citing Tucay vs. Domagas, etc., held that where the
36 37

prosecutor interposes no objection to the motion of the accused, the trial court should
nevertheless set the application for hearing and from there diligently ascertain from the
prosecution whether the latter is really not contesting the bail application.

No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could therefore be attributed to the
trial court here as regards its order granting bail to petitioner. A review of the transcript of the
stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order of
March 29, 1993 abundantly reveals scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. As
summarized in its aforementioned order, the lower court exhausted all means to convince
itself of the propriety of the waiver of evidence on the part of the prosecution. Moreover, the
omnibus order contained the requisite summary of the evidence of both the prosecution and
the defense, and only after sifting through them did the court conclude that petitioner could
be provisionally released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then and up
to the present, petitioner has ever committed any violation of the conditions of his bail.

As to the contention that the prosecutor was not given the opportunity to present its evidence
within a reasonable period of time, we hold otherwise. The records indicate that the Regional
State Prosecutor's Office duly received its copy of the application for bail on the very same
day that the it was filed with the trial court on October 28, 1992. Counted from said date up to
the day of the hearing on November 5, 1992, the prosecution had more than one (1) week to
muster such evidence as it would have wanted to adduce in that hearing in opposition to the
motion. Certainly, under the circumstances, that period was more than reasonable. The fact
that Prosecutor Gingoyon received his copy of the application only on November 6, 1992 is
beside the point for, as already established, the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor was
authorized to appear for the People.

4. What finally militates against the cause of the prosecutor is the indubitably unreasonable
period of time that elapsed before it questioned before the respondent court the resolution
and the omnibus order of the trial court through a special civil action for certiorari. The
Solicitor General submits that the delay of more than six (6) months, or one hundred eighty-
four (184) days to be exact, was reasonable due to the attendant difficulties which
characterized the prosecution of the criminal case against petitioner. But then,
the certiorari proceeding was initiated before the respondent court long after trial on the
merits of the case had ensued in the court below with the active participation of prosecution
lawyers, including Prosecutor Gingoyon. At any rate, the definitive rule now in that the
special civil action for certiorari should not be instituted beyond a period of the three
months, the same to be reckoned by taking into account the duration of time that had
38

expired from the commission of the acts complained to annul the same. 39

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233,

promulgated on November 24, 1993, annulling the resolution dated November 5, 1992 and the
omnibus order dated March 29, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, as well as
said respondent court's resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration of said
judgment, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The aforesaid resolution and omnibus order of
the Regional Trail Court granting bail to petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga are hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

The concept of "constructive custody of the law" in Paderanga is limited to allowing the courts to
proceed with the bail application hearing even without the physical presence of the accused if his or
her absence is due to his or her health condition.
G. R. No. 195002 January 25, 2012

HECTOR TREÑAS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep strictly within the limits of the
law authorizing them to take jurisdiction and to try the case and render judgment thereon. 1

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated 9 July
2010 and Resolution dated 4 January 2011.
2

Statement of the Facts and of the Case

The pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:

Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a house-and-lot in Iloilo
City covered by TCT No. 109266. It was then mortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito
Palma recommended the appellant Hector Treñas (Hector) to private complainant Elizabeth, who
was an employee and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the transfer of the title in the
latter’s name. Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the property in the name of her aunt
Margarita, the following expenses would be incurred:

P20,000.00- Attorney’s fees,

P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax,

P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp,

P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses.

Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt dated
December 22, 1999 and prepared [a] Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently,
Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for P96,000.00 and 00084369 for
P24,000.00. However, when she consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts
were fake. When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that he
used the P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the money.

To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check
No. 0042856 dated November 10, 2000 in the amount of P120,000.00, deducting from P150,000.00
the P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees. When the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati
Branch, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed. Notwithstanding
repeated formal and verbal demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant case of Estafa
was filed against him. 3
On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), both of Makati City. The Information reads as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from
ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 which money was given to her by her aunt
Margarita Alocilja, with the express obligation on the part of the accused to use the said amount for
expenses and fees in connection with the purchase of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-
109266, but the said accused, once in possession of the said amount, with the intent to gain and
abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply
and convert to his own personal use and benefit the amount of P130,000.00 less attorney’s fees and
the said accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice
of complainant Elizabeth Luciaja and Margarita Alocilja in the aforementioned amount of
P130,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

During arraignment on 26 April 2002, petitioner, acting as his own counsel, entered a plea of "Not
Guilty." Allegedly due to old age and poor health, and the fact that he lives in Iloilo City, petitioner
was unable to attend the pre-trial and trial of the case.

On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa
5

under section 1, paragraph (b), of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), with the dispositive
portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding accused Hector Trenas guilty
of the crime of Estafa with abuse of confidence as penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, and which offense was committed in the manner described in the aforementioned information.
As a consequence of this judgment, accused Hector Trenas is sentenced to suffer a penalty of Ten
(10) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of
Reclusion Temporal. Moreover, he is ordered to indemnify private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja the
amount of P130,000.00 with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum, reckoned from the date this
case was filed until the amount is fully paid.

SO ORDERED. 6

We note at this point that petitioner has been variably called Treñas and Trenas in the pleadings and
court issuances, but for consistency, we use the name "Treñas", under which he was accused in the
Information.

On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC
7

in a Resolution dated 2 July 2008. 8

On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC. The appeal was
9

docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32177. On 9 July 2010, the CA rendered a Decision affirming that of
10

the RTC. On 4 August 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by
the CA in a Resolution dated 4 January 2011. 11

On 25 January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on
Certiorari before this Court. He asked for a period of 15 days within which to file a petition for
12

review, and the Court granted his motion in a Resolution dated 9 February 2011.
On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, with the
following assignment of errors:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN ACCUSED HAS TO

PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION
EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF JURISDICTION APPEARS IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION;

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT DEMAND MADE BY A PERSON

OTHER THAN THE AGGRIEVED PARTY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF DEMAND
TO CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE OF ESTAFA; 13

On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution
does it show that ₱ 150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Instead, the
evidence shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner for the money was dated 22 December 1999,
without any indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo City, also on
22 December 1999. Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion is that the money was actually
delivered to him in Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were situated there as
well. Absent any direct proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable
presumption that things happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life. The only time Makati City was mentioned was with respect to the time when
the check provided by petitioner was dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada
Branch in Makati. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness failed to allege that any of the acts
material to the crime of estafa had occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial court failed to
acquire jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to prove lack of
jurisdiction, when such lack is already indicated in the prosecution evidence.

As to the second issue, petitioner claims that the amount of P150,000 actually belongs to Margarita.
Assuming there was misappropriation, it was actually she – not Elizabeth – who was the offended
party. Thus, the latter’s demand does not satisfy the requirement of prior demand by the offended
party in the offense of estafa. Even assuming that the demand could have been properly made by
Elizabeth, the demand referred to the amount of P120,000, instead of P150,000. Finally, there is no
showing that the demand was actually received by petitioner. The signature on the Registry Return
Receipt was not proven to be that of petitioner’s.

On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
to file the latter’s Comment on the Petition. On 27 July 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension,
praying for an additional period of 60 days within which to submit its Comment. This motion was
granted in a Resolution dated 12 September 2011. On 23 September 2011, the OSG filed a Motion
for Special Extension, requesting an additional period of five days. On 29 September 2011, it filed its
Comment on the Petition.

In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the RTC did not err in convicting petitioner as charged. The
OSG notes that petitioner does not dispute the factual findings of the trial court with respect
to the delivery of ₱150,000 to him, and that there was a relationship of trust and confidence
between him and Elizabeth. With respect to his claim that the Complaint should have been filed in
Iloilo City, his claim was not supported by any piece of evidence, as he did not present any. Further,
petitioner is, in effect, asking the Court to weigh the credibility of the prosecution witness, Elizabeth.
However, the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, unless
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance, which is not the case here.

With respect to the second issue, the OSG stresses that the defense of "no valid demand" was not
raised in the lower court. Nevertheless, the demand letter sent to Elizabeth suffices, as she is also
one of the complainants alleged in the Information, as an agent of Margarita. Moreover, no proof
was adduced as to the genuineness of petitioner’s signature in the Registry Return Receipt of the
demand letter.

The OSG, however, submits that the Court may recommend petitioner for executive clemency, in
view of his advanced age and failing health.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is impressed with merit.

Review of Factual Findings

While the Petition raises questions of law, the resolution of the Petition requires a review of the
factual findings of the lower courts and the evidence upon which they are based.

As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. In many instances, however, this Court has laid down exceptions to this general rule, as
follows:

(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;

(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or

conjectures;

(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and
such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on misapprehension of facts;

(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion;

(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on
which they are based; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record. 14
In this case, the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the issue of the place of commission
of the offense are conclusions without any citation of the specific evidence on which they are
based; they are grounded on conclusions and conjectures.

The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense without any finding as to
where it was committed:

Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution through private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja,
the Court is convinced that accused Trenas had committed the offense of Estafa by taking
advantage of her trust so that he could misappropriate for his own personal benefit the amount
entrusted to him for payment of the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax.

As clearly narrated by private complainant Luciaja, after accused Trenas had obtained the amount of
P150,000.00 from her, he gave her two receipts purportedly issued by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, for the fraudulent purpose of fooling her and making her believe that he had complied with
his duty to pay the aforementioned taxes. Eventually, private complainant Luciaja discovered that
said receipts were fabricated documents. 15

In his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner raised the argument that it had no
jurisdiction over the offense charged. The trial court denied the motion, without citing any
specific evidence upon which its findings were based, and by relying on conjecture, thus:

That the said amount was given to [Treñas] in Makati City was incontrovertibly established by the
prosecution. Accused Treñas, on the other hand, never appeared in Court to present countervailing
evidence. It is only now that he is suggesting another possible scenario, not based on the evidence,
but on mere "what ifs". x x x

Besides, if this Court were to seriously assay his assertions, the same would still not warrant a
reversal of the assailed judgment. Even if the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was
executed on 22 December 999 in Iloilo City, it cannot preclude the fact that the P150,000.00 was
delivered to him by private complainant Luciaja in Makati City the following day. His reasoning the
money must have been delivered to him in Iloilo City because it was to be used for paying the taxes
with the BIR office in that city does not inspire concurrence. The records show that he did not even
pay the taxes because the BIR receipts he gave to private complainant were fake documents. Thus,
his argumentation in this regard is too specious to consider favorably. 16

For its part, the CA ruled on the issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction in this wise:

It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will not entertain evidence unless it is offered in evidence.
It bears emphasis that Hector did not comment on the formal offer of prosecution’s evidence
nor present any evidence on his behalf. He failed to substantiate his allegations that he had
received the amount of P150,000.00 in Iloilo City. Hence, Hector’s allegations cannot be given
evidentiary weight.

Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to
have been overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the factual
findings and assessment on the credibility of a witness made by the trial court remain
binding on appellate tribunal. They are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be
disturbed on review. 17

The instant case is thus an exception allowing a review of the factual findings of the lower courts.
Jurisdiction of the Trial Court

The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is
jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed
outside its limited territory. In Isip v. People, this Court explained:
18

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by
courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance
or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited
territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense
was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
(Emphasis supplied.)

In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was committed, it must
also prove the identity of the accused and the fact that the offense was committed within the
jurisdiction of the court.

In Fukuzume v. People, this Court dismissed a Complaint for estafa, wherein the prosecution failed
19

to prove that the essential elements of the offense took place within the trial court’s jurisdiction. The
Court ruled:

More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave
any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap
wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for
that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. x x x

In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the RTC
of Makati. He was charged with estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows: x x x

The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from
the sworn statement executed by Yu on April 19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other
evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu's sworn statement or to prove that any of
the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the
prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu in the amounts of
P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 and
P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show that the
certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires
and that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to Yu in
Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all the elements of the offense charged
had been committed in Parañaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume
in Parañaque; that with the intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended
that he is a representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap wires; that based on
the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid
Fukuzume the initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage. Stated differently,
the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code, was consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latter's house in Parañaque and, by
falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his
money.

xxx

From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the
crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said
city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set
aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the
court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section 1,
paragraph (b) of Article 315 of the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of
Makati City.

That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged in the information as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from
ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) 20

Ordinarily, this statement would have been sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Makati.
However, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to
where the offense was committed. It provides in part:

4. THAT on 23 December 1999, [Elizabeth] personally entrusted to ATTY. HECTOR

TREÑAS the sum of P150,000.00 to be expended as agreed and ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS
issued to me a receipt, a photo copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B",

5. THAT despite my several follow-ups with ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS, the latter failed to
transfer the title of aforesaid property to MRS. MARGARITA ALOCILJA. He also failed to pay
the capital gains tax, documentary stamps and BIR-related expenses. What ATTY. HECTOR
TREÑAS accomplished was only the preparation of the Deed of Sale covering aforesaid
property. A copy of said Deed of Sale is hereto attached as Annex "C",

6. THAT in view of my persistent follow-ups, ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS issued to me a check

for refund of the sum given to him less the attorney’s fee of P20,000.00 and the sum of
P10,000.00 allegedly paid to BIR or in the net sum of P120,000.00. x x x

7. THAT when said check was deposited at EQUITABLE PCI BANK dela Rosa-Rada Branch
at Makati City, the same was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason: ACCOUNT
CLOSED. x x x 21

Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the
prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City.

Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as follows: (1) that money,
goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the
same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or
denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and (4) there is demand by the offended party to the offender. 22

There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution that points to where the
23

offense, or any of its elements, was committed. A review of the testimony of Elizabeth also shows
that there was no mention of the place where the offense was allegedly committed:

Q After the manager of Maybank referred Atty. Treñas to you, what happened next?

A We have met and he explained to the expenses and what we will have to… and she will
work for the Deed of Sale.

Q And did he quote any amount when you got to the expenses?

A Yes. I gave him ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.

Q What was the amount quoted to you?

A ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.

Q Did he give a breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what is the breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A TWENTY THOUSAND is for his Attorney’s fee, NINETY THOUSAND is for the capital gain
tax TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND is intended for documentary sum (sic) and TEN
THOUSAND PESOS is for other expenses for BIR.

Q And did you give him this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did he issue a receipt?

A Yes, sir.

Q If shown to you a receipt issued by Atty. Treñas for this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND, will you be able to identify it?

A Yes, sir.

Q I am showing to you a document, madam witness, already identified during the pre-trial as
exhibit "B". This appears to be a receipt dated December 22, 1999. Will you please go over
this document and inform this court what relation has this to the receipt which you said Atty.
Treñas issued to you?

A This is the receipt issued by Atty. Hector Treñas.

 Q Now, after the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND was given to Atty. Treñas
by you, what happened next?

A We made several follow-ups but he failed to do his job. 24

Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a bank in
Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the
RPC.

Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the prosecution evidence
which even mentions that any of the elements of the offense were committed in Makati. The rule is
settled that an objection may be raised based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the
offense charged, or it may be considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings
or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred
25

upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred

by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner and form
prescribed by law. 26

It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a defendant or accused to
undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or
offense or it is not the court of proper venue. Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
27

Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that "[s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or
where any of its essential ingredients occurred." This fundamental principle is to ensure that the
defendant is not compelled to move to, and appear in, a different court from that of the province
where the crime was committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his
witnesses and other evidence in another place. This principle echoes more strongly in this case,
28

where, due to distance constraints, coupled with his advanced age and failing health, petitioner was
unable to present his defense in the charges against him.

There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no
jurisdiction over the case. 29

As such, there is no more need to discuss the other issue raised by petitioner.

At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to note that the Code of Professional Responsibility strongly
militates against the petitioner’s conduct in handling the funds of his client. Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of
the Code provides:

Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.
1âwphi1

Rule 16.02 — A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those others kept by him.

When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for filing
fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the client
how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must
30

immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if
the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule
16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 31

Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as they fall due or upon
demand. His failure to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he
32

has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him
by the client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs
33

public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. 34

In Cuizon v. Macalino, this Court ruled that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for
35

having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on him, shows lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render
him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.

This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the initiation of disciplinary
proceedings against petitioner. In any case, should there be a finding that petitioner has failed to
account for the funds received by him in trust, the recommendation should include an order to
immediately return the amount of ₱ 130,000 to his client, with the appropriate rate of interest from
the time of demand until full payment.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 July 2010 and the Resolution dated
4 January 2011 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32177 are SET ASIDE on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati City.
Criminal Case No. 01-2409 is DISMISSED without prejudice. This case is REFERRED to the IBP
Board of Governors for investigation and recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: