VOL. XIII, No. 22.

OCTOBER 26, 1916

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS

BEHAVIOR AND THE CONCEPT OF MENTAL DISEASE

FOR some years I have been attempting to understand the phy-

sician's concept of mental diseases. Not long ago I had the
pleasure of attending a medical meeting and of listening to a phy-
sician who has been very successful in his treatment of neurasthenia.
Several cases of neurasthenia were described. Since none of the
patients showed general organic disturbances of a serious kind and
since all of the neurological tests showed normal functioning of the
reflexes of the central nervous system, the physician concluded that
the disease was "purely mental." He then began to describe the
condition of such a patient's ego-the general content of conscious-
ness, the inward reference of attention, and the peculiarities of the
field of attention. At the end of his discourse two or three eminent
physicians stated their satisfaction that the speaker had been willing
to come out clearly and say that the disease was "mental." In
other words, they expressed their approval of the fact that the
speaker did not, in functional nervous cases, deem it necessary to
find lesions in the central nervous system or even a toxic condition
of the nervous system before admitting that the patient had a
disease.
Being the only psychologist present, I did not like to admit that
I did not understand the physician's use of the term "mental." (I
do not wish by this assertion to stir up strife or bitter argument,
but rather to confess ignorance on my own part and to seek for some
common ground of discussion.) As a sequel to this meeting I began to
attempt to formulate my own ideas as to the terminology I should use
in describing a mental disease. I think that at the outset I should
admit that I know a good deal more about terminology than I know
about diseases of any kind. I am strengthened in this attempt to
give my concept of mental diseases by the difficulty I have had in
understanding the terminology (involving throughout and often
transcending the current concept of consciousness) of the psycho-
analytic movement.
I have been for some years an earnest student of Freud (and
other psychoanalysts), but the further I go into their terminology
589

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590 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

the more sure I am that there is a simpler and more common-sense

way (and at the same time a more scientific way) of describing the
essential factors in their theory. I am convinced of the truth of
Freud 's work, but as I teach the Freudian movement to my classes I
drop out the crude vitalistic and psychological terminology, and
stick to what I believe to be the biological factors involved in his
theories (Freud himself admits the possibility of this). The central
truth that I think Freud has given us is that youthful, outgrown,
and partially discarded habit and instinctive systems of reaction can
and possibly always do influence the functioning of our adult sys-
tems of reactions, and influence to a certain extent even the possibil-
ity of our forming the new habit systems which we must reasonably
be expected to form.
To my students in psychology I usually introduce the habit ter-
minology somewhat as follows:
Long before Freud's doctrine saw the light of day William James
gave the key to what I believe to be the true explanation of the wish.
Thirty years ago he wrote: ". . . I am often confronted by the neces-
sity of standing by one of my selves and relinquishing the rest.
Not that I would not, if I could, be both handsome and fat and well
dressed, and a great athlete, and make a million a year, be a wit, a
bon-vivant, and a lady-killer, as well as a philosopher, a philan-
thropist, a statesman, a warrior, and African explorer, as well as a
'tone-poet,' and a saint. But the thing is simply impossible. The
millionaire's work would run counter to the saint's; the bon-vivant
and the philanthropist would trip each other up; the philosopher and
the lady-killer could not well keep house in the same tenement of clay.
Such different characteristics may conceivably at the outset of life
be alike possible to a man. But to make any one of them actual, the
rest must more or less be suppressed. "
What James is particularly emphasizing here is that the human
organism is instinctively capable of developing along many different
lines, but that due to the stress of civilization some of these instinc-
tive capabilities must be thwarted. In addition to these impulses
which are instinctive and therefore hereditary, there are many habit
impulses which are equally strong and which for similar reasons
must be given up. The systems of habits we form, i. e., the acts we
learn to perform, at four years of age will not serve us when we are
twelve, and those formed at the age of twelve will not serve us when
we become adults. As we pass from childhood to man's estate we
are constantly giving up thousands of activities which our nervous
and muscular systems have learned to perform and which they still
have a tendency to perform. Some of the instinctive tendencies
born with us are poor heritages; some of the habits we early develop

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 PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 591

are equally poor possessions. But whether they are "good" or

"bad" they must give way as we put on the habits required of adults.
Some of them yield with difficulty and we often get badly twisted in
attempting to put them away, as every psychiatric clinic can testify.'
I then try to show that such habit systems need never have been
"conscious" (and here all I mean by being "conscious" -and all I
believe the psychopathologists mean by it-is that the patient can not
phrase in terms of words the habit twists which have become a part
of his biological equipment). The implication is clear that in the
psychoneuroses I should look for habit disturbances-maladjust-
ments-and should attempt to describe my findings in terms of the
inadequacy of responses, of wrong responses, and of the complete
lack of responses to the objects and situations in the daily life of the
patient. I should likewise attempt to trace out the original con-
ditions leading to maladjustment and the causes leading to its con-
tinuation. To these statements most psychopathologists will sub-
scribe, but most of them will insist that maladjustments can not be
stated wholly in behavior terms. It is just here that I think my
difficulty in understanding the psychiatrist's position begins. I be-
lieve that the description of "mental" cases can be completed as
well as begun in behavior terms.
I think the chief difficulty in completing the description in terms
of the every-day languauge of habit formation lies in our failure to
look upon language (the patient's here) as being only a system of
motor habits. As a short cut-a system of economy-the human
animal has formed a system of language habits (spoken words,
inner speech, etc.). These language habits are built up from and
always correspond more or less closely to the general system of
bodily habits (I contrast here for convenience of expression lan-
guage habits and bodily habits) such as the eye-hand, ear-hand, etc.,
systems of coordination and their complex integrations. This gen-
eral correspondence between language and bodily habits is shown
clearly in the football field, where we see the player making a com-
plex series of movements and later hear him stating in words what
svstems of plays he employed; and in the case where we hear a man
tell us what acts he is going to perform on a horizontal bar and later
see him executing these acts. Words have grown up around motor
acts and have no functional significance apart from their connection
with motor acts. I have come recently to the view that speech should
be looked upon as a vast system of conditioned reflexes. In a pre-
vious paper2 I sketched the method of establishing motor and secre-
tory conditioned reflexes. As Pawlow and Bechterew have shown,
1 From a written, but unpublished lecture.
2 "The Place of the Conditioned Reflex in Psychology," Psychological Re-
view, March, 1916.

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592 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

the central feature of the method consists in the fact that almost any
stimulus can, under suitable conditions, be substituted for another
stimulus which has a very definite act of its own as a consequence.
An electric contact applied to the sole of the foot will produce a
defensive reflex-a jerking up of the foot. A monochromatic light
produces no such effect. If, however, the light is allowed to fall
upon the retina of the eye at the moment the foot is stimulated elec-
trically, we will (after repetition) bring about a condition such that
the light alone will produce the defensive reaction of the foot. Words
as words are learned largely by imitation, but words receive their
standing as functional units in integrated habit systems by virtue
of the fact that they become substitutable for the stimulus which
originally initiated an act. A simple illustration will possibly serve
to make clear my point. The cold air from an open window leads a
child who has gone to bed to draw up the covers. The words of the
nurse "cover up, dear" will lead to the same act. Of course in
habit systems as complex as those in speech, words get further and
further divorced from the original stimuli for which they were sub-
stituted (i. e., from the original integrations in which they first
played a part). The final test of all words, however, is the question
whether they can stand adequately (be substituted) for acts. We
often see an instructor despair of telling a student in words how to
conduct an experiment. He then resorts to acts and goes through
the experiment for the student. Our words thus stand as a kind of
shorthand sketch of our repertoire of acts and motor attitudes.
I have developed these points at length because a great many of
the symptoms of so-called mental cases consist in disturbances of
speech functions-in maladjustments of that nice balance which
should exist between speech acts and bodily acts (and, perhaps even
more, disturbances among the " speech functions " themselves).
For fear that I may be misunderstood in my use of the term "dis-
turbance " of speech I wish to say that I have no reference here to
aphasia. I mean, among other things, by speech disturbance what
the Freudian means: For example, in the manifest content of dreams
one finds new words, misplacement of words, condensation of words,
etc.; and in the association test the failure of words and an increased
reaction time between stimulus word and response. These are speech
disturbances and hence habit disturbaxnces, exactly on a par with the
paralysis of arm or leg in hysteria, defensive reactions, compensatory
reactions, and the like. All such disturbances of habit-superfluous
and useless conditioned reflexes-may be found to date back to some
primary stimulus (possibly to sex trauma, exposure,3 masturbation,
3 I believe it takes more than a single shock or disturbance to bring such
conditional reflexes in its train. Usually I believe it is a long-continued struggle
with environment which brings them.

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 PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 593

etc., in childhood) which is the conditioning cause operating just as

the electric shock given jointly with a visual stimulus operates in
forcing the visual stimulus finally to release a group of responses
which, until the current was applied, brought none of them.
Motor tics, the seeming paralysis in hysteria, etc., are to be en-
visaged in the same way; as types of conditioned reflexes, which
are no more wonderful and no less wonderful than the cases in the
laboratory where the sound of a bell does not at first cause a subject
to jerk back his arm, but which later comes to do it after we have
jointly stimulated the hand with an electric current and the ear with
the bell. Nor will the objection hold that conditioned reflexes arise
only in the laboratory. Dr. Lashley has shown that numerous such
conditioned reflexes exist in the functioning of the parotid gland in
man, and that these reflexes arise in the regular course of daily
activity. So pronounced are they that a subject can not very well
experiment upon himself. If he reaches forward to get a pipette
full of acid to test its effect in increasing the activity of the gland,
the gland begins to function as he reaches for the acid. Now if con-
ditioned reflexes can arise in the salivary gland, they can and pos-
sibly do arise in all glandular and muscular portions of the body.
The possibility that tics and hysterical manifestations generally
arise in this way is very great. It seems to me to be the only bio-
logical formulation possible in the present state of our knowledge.
Is it not simpler, then, to look upon all such manifestations as
special forms of conditioned reflexes? As long as they do not dis-
turb the subject's ordinary reactions to the objects around him, we
do not class the patient as being "mentally" disturbed (as in the
psychopathological disturbances we see in daily life) ; the moment,
however, that an arm is incapacitated or the glandular and muscular
elements of the sex organs become involved we must take notice of
such grave disturbances and try to see what can be done. If now we
can take what appears to me to be a sensible point of view about
language habits ("thought") and come to look upon them as obey-
ing the laws of all other habits, and describe our patient's symptoms
wholly in terms of habit disturbance, and trace the conditions which
have led to the disturbance, we shall have come a long way. We
could throw over bodily the enormous and burdensome terminology
of a description in terms of consciousness-disturbances of the af-
fections, misplacement or withdrawal of the libido (a concept which,
in Jung's latest book on the "Subconscious," has become the equiv-
alent of Driesch's entelechy), repressions into the subconscious, and
the like.
I think I can illustrate what I mean by describing a hypothetical
"neurasthenic dog." Suppose I take a dog to a canine psychiatric

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594 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

clinic and tell the physician nothing about the dog's previous his-
tory. The physician puts the dog through a searching neurological
examination, makes a thorough test of heart action, examines the
urine, etc. Absolutely no pathological disturbances are found. He
finds, however, on testing the dog's reactions to his normal canine
environment that there are serious functional disturbances. When the
normal dog sees a piece of red meat, he snaps at it. The "neuras-
thenic" dog, however, lies down and becomes absolutely motionless.
When brought near a female of his own kind, far from exhibiting
the usual reactions, he begins to shed tears. When spoken to in
gentle tones, he hangs his head, puts his tail between his legs, but
when spoken to gruffly he brightens up and lifts his head and licks
the speaker's hand. When preparing to sleep, instead of turning
round and round and lying down with anterior and posterior ends
in close relations, the dog jumps up and down and finally lies down
on his back with his paws pointing to the stars. The physician
surely finds here serious conflict with reality and a woeful lack of
normal compensations. But since there are no organic pathological
disturbances, the physician diagnoses the case as neurasthenia with
compulsion neurosis-the disease is mental.
When I come to the clinic and see the physician and talk with
him I explain that there is no need to introduce any concept of the
"mental," I tell him that I have trained the dog during the past
five years to do just these things. The trouble with the dog is that
his habits are twisted. Now if I had started with a dog whose in-
stinctive reaction systems were (possibly) perverted in the begin-
ning (heredity) and I had superposed in addition the above bizarre
group of habit reactions, he would seem a pitiful object indeed when
trying to cope with his environment.
Now as to the cure of the dog. I should begin step by step to
retrain the dog along lines which would make him better fitted to
cope with his environment. If there were sufficient plasticity left
I should undertake it with a good deal of hope. The length of time
required for the cure and the rapidity of the cure would depend
upon several factors-such as my luck in fixing upon just the right
method for breaking up the old non-serviceable habits, the length of
time the old habits had been in force, upon the tractability of the
dog, etc.
If I understand their teachings, this cure which I suggest is the
keynote of the work of the psychopathologists. It is certainly that of
Adolf Meyer. I doubt if Dr. Meyer will go as far as I do in holding
that the time has already come for describing "mental diseases"
wholly in terms of twisted habits, and yet it was a conversation which
I had with him three or four years ago that first led me to think

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 PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 595

over functional nervous cases in this way. Nor can I see where the
straight Freudian adherents can have any cause for complaint.
Every psychopathologist begins with a conversation with his patient.
In the conversation certain words begin to give indications of the
"complex" (maladjustment). The habit twist is made still clearer by
the results of tests with the word-association method, by the analysis
of the patient's dreams, by inference, and by common-sense observa-
tions. In course of time the maladjustment is completely located,
and its origin, development, and consequences are fully traced.
Now during the process of study, the patient's reeducation (usually,
but not necessarily, along sex lines) has already begun. In fact it
began the moment the physician secured sufficient acquaintance with
the patient to begin analysis. (Brill states that he will not attempt
analysis until he has known the patient for at least a week.)
Several psychopathologists have thought that the objective
methods and terminology which we have sought to introduce would
necessarily do away with conversation with the patient. This is not
true. Speech is just as objective as tennis-playing or any other
muscular act and should be looked upon in just as objective a way.
The difficulty has been that instead of looking at speech as at other
muscular acts, we have looked upon it as a revealer of "thought"
-the sacred ilner secret of the "mind." Now in testing out a
neurasthenic patient one of the first things we do is to find out what
disturbances there are in the movements of hands, arms, and body
as a whole. We watch and describe them in wholly objective ways.
Is it not possible to look upon speech disturbances in just such an
objective way and see in them merely signals which will lead us to
the disturbed systems of bodily integrations? In a particular case
we may find (without admitting that we must find it so) that the
speech defects point to the "incest complex" in one form or another.
The faulty and unwise behavior of a mother has led the boy to react
to her in many particulars as does her husband. Such a group of
integrations on the boy's part seriously disturbs the forming of suit-
able boyish habits and may bring in its train a vast series of con-
ditioned reflexes which may show themselves in general bodily dis-
turbances, such as tics, paralysis, etc., or in speech defects, such as
failures in word responses, lengthened reaction time, etc.
My thesis so far has concerned itself with motor habits. The
muscles form only a part of the total reaction system. Every motor
reaction calls for a simultaneous response in the glandular system
(corresponding in part at least to the affective values of the psychol-
ogists and psychopathologists). Now the chief symptom in many
cases of mental disease is the disturbance of "affective values"
(withdrawal of the libido, etc.). It is to take account of this puzzling

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596 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

transfer that has led the Freudian school to speak as though the
"affective process" could be disembodied from any particular re-
sponse and hang suspended as it were in mid-air4 (the "subcon-
scious" is introduced here by Freud). From time to time, to be
sure, it attaches itself to certain responses, but these responses may
bear no relation to the original stimulus which called it forth.
The modern notion of emotional5 reactions calls first for the pres-
ence of an emotionally exciting stimulus, which will, through hered-
itary mechanisms, excite neural arcs leading through the central and
the autonomic systems, finally arousing activity in the glands-espe-
cially in the ductless glands. The latter then set free certain sub-
stances, e. g., adrenin, among other things, which, on getting into
the blood, continue the emotional activity just as though the original
stimulus were present. As I view the matter we have here just the
situation for arousing conditioned emotional reflexes. Any stimulus
(non-emotional) which immediately (or shortly) follows an emotion-
ally exciting stimulus produces its motor reaction before the emo-
tional effects of the original stimulus have died down. A transfer
(conditioned reflex) takes place (after many such occurrences) so
that in the end the second stimulus produces in its train now not only
its proper group of motor integrations, but an emotional set which
belonged originally to another stimulus. To apply this in detail in
functional cases oversteps my ability as well as my present interests.
At any rate the suggestion seems to me to give a reasonable clue as
to the way in which such shifts in the emotional constituents of a
total integration can occur. Surely it is better to use even this
crude formulation than to describe the phenomenon as is done in the
current psychoanalytic treatises. What is simpler than to speak of
a transferred or conditioned emotional response, giving both the
4I quote from Ernest Jones who is interpreting Freud's theory of affective
processes: "Most significant, however, is the assumption that it has a certain
autonomy, so that it ean become released from the idea to which it was primarily
attached, thus entering into new psychical systems and producing widespread
effeets. This displacement of affect from one idea to another Freud denotes as
transference (Uebertragung), and says that the second idea may in a sense be
termed a representative of the first. A simple illustration of the process is when
a girl transfers the affective process properly belonging to a baby to that of a
doll, and even takes it to bed with her and makes attempts to feed it, thus treat-
ing it in all possible respects as she would a baby. " Papers on Psycho-Analysis.
5 I prefer to keep the term " emotion I in objective psychology. I, however,
throw away all of the conscious implications. To me an emotion is a bodily state
which can be observed in man and animal equally well, such as the bristling of
hair, shedding of tears, increase or decrease in respiration, sighing, heightened
muscular activity, and the like. Some day we shall be able to mark off these
objective states and classify them with respect to the types *of stimuli which
call them out (sex, food, shelter, noxious odors, etc.).

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 PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 597

object (or situation) which originally called out the emotional re-
sponse and the object (or situation) to which it was transferred?
In conclusion I wish to say that I am not attempting to launch
criticisms at the head of the psychopathologist. If his terminology
is involved it is the fault really of psychology, since he perforce had
to use the concepts which psychology had developed. I have tried
in this paper merely to raise the question whether the psychopathol-
ogist can not reshape to some extent his formulation of problems
(without doing injustice to the patient) so as to avail himself of bio-
logical and behavioristic concepts.
Psychological terminology is, I believe, being fast outgrown.
Dunlap's recent inquiry6 into the definitions of psychological terms
shows, I believe, more clearly than I can state, just how little agree-
ment there is among psychologists in the use of common psycholog-
ical terms. It seems to me to be a mistake for as useful and fasci-
nating a growth as psychopathology to allow itself to become en-
crusted with the barnacles of an outgrown terminology.
JOHN B. WATSON
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

PHILOSOPHIC FORMALISM AND SCIENTIFIC

IMAGINATION'1

THE art of mathematics possesses so compact a neatness, is so

harmonious a union of fluidity and rigidity, that it exercises a
hypnotic fascination over all types of mind. The philosopher's pre-
occupation with it, since Pythagoras, his abortive attempts to impart
its form to his themes, are notorious. It manifests such a magic pre-
cision, such an ineluctable definiteness, such a so-ness, that the un-
initiate stand in awe, and the initiate find it the quintessence of those
conditions which satisfy our sentiment of rationality: it supplies
activity without frustration, plurality without confusion, unity with-
out monotony. As Mr. Bertrand Russell says, "Mathematics take us
still further from what is human, into the region of absolute neces-
sity, to which not only the actual world, but every possible world,
must conform; and even here it builds a habitation, or rather finds a
habitation eternally standing where our ideals are fully satisfied and
our best hopes are not thwarted. " Again: "the world of pure reason
6 Knight Dunlap, " The Results of a Questionary on Psychological Terminol-
g " Johns Hopkins Circular, 1916, No. 5.
1 A review of "The Concept of Consciousness." Edwin B. Holt. London:
George Allen and Company, Ltd. 1914. Pp. xix + 343.

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