CHAPTER 4

The Knowledge Dimension

Current conceptions of leaming focus on the active, cognitive, and constructive

processes involved in rneaningful leaming. Learners are assumed to be active
agents in their own learning; they select the information to which they will at-
tend and construct their own meaning from this selected information. Leamers
are not passive recipients, nor are they simple recorders of information pro-
vided to them by parents, teachers, textbooks, or media. This move away frorn
passive views of leaming toward more cognitive and constructivist perspec-
tives emphasizes what leamers know (knowledge) and how they think (cog-
nitive processes) about what they know as they actively engage in meaningful
leaming.
In instructional settings, learners are assumed to construct their own
meaning based on their prior knowledge, their current cognitive and metacog-
nitive activity, and the opportunities and constraints they are afforded in the
setting, including the information that is available to them. Learners come into
any instructional setting with a broad array of knowledge, their own goals, and
prior experiences in that setting, and they use all of these to "make sense" of
the information they encounter. This constructivist process of "making sense"
involves the activation of prior knowledge as well as various cognitive proc-
esses that operate on that knowledge.
lt is important to keep in mind that students can and often do use the in-
formation available to them to construct meanings that do not coincide with
authentic aspects of reality or with well-accepted, normative conceptions of the
information: In fact, much of the literature on conceptual change and student
leaming is concemed with how students come to construct conceptions of
everyday phenomena, such as heat, temperature, and gravity, that do not
match the commonly accepted scientific knowledge and models of these phe-
nomena. Of course, there are different stances to take on these "personal" con-
ceptions, "naive" conceptions, or "misconcepti.ons." In our opinion, educators
should guide students toward the authentic and normative conceptions that re-
flect the most commonly accepted and best current knowledge and thinking in
the academic disciplines and subject matter areas.
Accordingly, we are fully aware that students and teachers construct their
own meanings from instructional activities and classroom events and that their
 Chapter 4 The Knowledge Dimension 39

own constructions of the subject matter content may differ from authentic or
normative conceptions. Nevertheless, adopting this cognitive and construc-
tivist perspective does not imply that there is no knowledge worth learning or
that all knowledge is of equal worth. Teachers can, do, and should make deci-
sions about what is worth teaching in their classrooms. As we pointed out in
Chapters 1 and 2, a key question concerns what students should learn in
school. Educational objectives offer teachers some guidance as they try to de-
termine what to teach.
The four types of knowledge described in this chapter can help educators
distinguish what to teach. They are designed to reflect the intermediate level of
specificity associated with educational objectives. As such, their level of gener-
ality allows them to be applied to all grade levels and subject matters. Of
course, some grade levels or subject matters may be more likely to have a
greater number of objectives that can be classified as, say, Conceptual knowledge.
This is most likely a function of the content of the subject matter, beliefs about
students and the way they learn, the way in which the subject matter is viewed
by the teacher, or some combination of these factors. Nonetheless, we argue
that the four types of knowledge included in our framework are useful for
thinking about teaching in a wide variety of subject matters as well as at differ-
ent-grade levels.

A DISTINCTION BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND SUB.JECT

MATTER CONTENT: A TALE OF FOUR TEACHERS
We begin by illustrating the important distinction between knowledge and
content made on pages 12-13. The example involves four teachers-Mrs. Pat-
terson, Ms. Chang, Mr. Jefferson, and Mrs. Weinberg-and their educational
objectives for a unit on Macbeth. Each has a different perspective on what stu-
dents should learn during the unit. Of course, all four teachers have multiple
educational objectives, but the example highlights how these teachers focus on
objectives that reflect different types of knowledge.
Mrs. Patterson believes that her students should know the names of the
characters in the play and the readily apparent relationships among them (e.g.,
Macbeth and MacDuff were enemies). Students should know the details of the
plot, and they should know which characters said what, even to the point that
they can recite certain important passages from memory. Because Mrs. Patter-
son focuses on the specific details and elements of Macbeth, in the language of
the Taxonomy Table she seems to be concerned with Factual knowledge.
Ms. Chang believes that Macbeth enables students to learn about important
concepts such as ambition, tragic hero, and irony. She also is interested in hav-
ing her students know how these ideas are related to one another. For example,
what role does ambition play in the development of a tragic hero? Ms. Chang
believes that a focus on these ideas and their relationships makes Macbeth come
alive to her students by allowing them to make connections between the actual
play and these different concepts that can be applied to understanding the
40 Section II The Revised Taxonomy Structure

human condition. In terms of the Taxonomy Table, she is concemed with Con-
ceptual knowledge.
Mr. Jefferson believes that Macbeth is but one of many plays that could be
included in the English literature curriculum. His goal is to use Macbeth as a ve-
hicle for teaching students how to think about plays in general. Toward this
end, he has developed a general approach that he wants students to use as they
read a play. The approach begins by having the dass discuss the plot, then ex-
amine the relationships among the characters, then discem the messages being
conveyed by the playwright, and finally consider the way the play was written
and its cultural context. Given that these four general steps make up a proce-
dure that can be applied to all plays, not just Macbeth, Mr. Jefferson seems tobe
focused on applying Procedural knowledge, in the language of the Taxonomy
Table.
Like Mr. Jefferson, Mrs. Weinberg sees Macbeth as one of many plays that
students will encounter in high school as weil as beyond. She also wants her
students to leam a set of general procedures or "tools" they can use to study,
understand, analyze, and appreciate other plays. However, Mrs. Weinberg is
also concerned that students do not just apply or use these tools in a rote or
mechanical fashion. She wants her students to "think about what they are do-
ing as they do it," tobe self-reflective and metacognitive about how they are
using these tools. For example, she wants them to note any problems they
have in using the procedures (e.g., confusing plot with character development)
and learn from these problems. Finally, she hopes that students will learn
something about themselves, perhaps their own ambitions or their own
strengths and weaknesses, by identifying with the characters in the play. In the
language of the Taxonomy Table, Mrs. Weinberg is concemed with Metacogni-
tive knowledge.
In all four examples the content of the play is the same. However, the four
teachers use this content in different ways to focus on varied objectives that
emphasize different types of knowledge. All subject matters are composed of
specific content, but how this content is structured. by teachers in terms of their
objectives and instructional activities results in different types of knowledge
being emphasized in the unit. Accordingly, how teachers set their educational
objectives, organize their instruction to meet these objectives, and even assess
student leaming of the objectives results in different outcomes, even when the
content is ostensibly the same.

DIFFERENT TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE

The problem of how to characterize knowledge and how individuals represent
knowledge is a dassic and enduring question in philosophy and psychology. lt
is well beyond the scope of this chapter to survey all the different philosophical
positions and psychological theories and models of knowledge. Our general per-
spective is informed by current perspectives in cognitive science and cognitive
psychology on knowledge representation. We do not adhere to a simple behav-
iorist view that knowledge is best represented as an accumulation of associations
 Chapter 4 The Knowledge Dimension 41

between stimuli and responses (although some surely is) or merely a quantitative
increase in bits of infonnation (a hallmark of the empiricist tradition-see Case,
1998; Keil, 1998). Rather, our perspective reflects the idea that knowledge is orga-
nized and structured by the leamer in line with a rationalist-constructivist tradi-
ti.on. Reflecting recent cognitive and developmental psychological research (e.g.,
Case, 1998), however, we also do not adhere to the idea that knowledge is orga-
nized in "stages" or in system-wide logical structures as in traditional develop-
mental stage models of thinking (e.g., Piagetian models).
Based on cognitive science research on the development of expertise, ex-
pert thinking, and problem solving, our perspective is that knowledge is do-
main specific and contextualized. Our understanding of knowledge should
reflect this domain specificity and the role that social experiences and context
play in the construction and development of knowledge (Bereiter and Scar-
damalia, 1998; Bransford, Brown, and Cocking, 1999; Case, 1998; Keil, 1998;
Mandler, 1998; Wellman and Gel.man, 1998).
There are many different types of knowledge and seemingly even more
terms used to describe them. In alphabetical order, some of the terms are: con-
ceptual knowledge, conditional knowledge, content knowledge, declarative
knowledge, disciplinary knowledge, discourse knowledge, domain knowledge,
episodic knowledge, explicit knowledge, factual knowledge, metacognitive
knowledge, prior knowledge, procedural knowledge, semantic knowledge, sit-
uational knowledge, sociocultural knowledge, strategic knowledge, and tacit
knowledge (see, for example, Alexander, Schallert, and Hare, 1991; deJong and
Ferguson-Hessler, 1996; Dochy and Alexander, 1995; Ryle, 1949).
Some of the different terms signify important differences among the vari-
eties of knowledge, whereas others are apparently just different labels for the
same knowledge category. Later in this chapter we point out that the distinction
between "important dHferences" and "different labels" is central to the different
types and subtypes of knowledge in the revised Taxonomy. Given the many dif-
ferent terms and the lack of agreement about the many aspects of the knowledge
dimension, it is a difficult task to develop a taxonomy of knowledge that cap-
tures the complexity and comprehensiveness of our knowledge base while be-
ing relatively simple, practical, and easy to use, as well as maintaining some par-
simony in the number of categories. In considering these multiple constraints,
we arrived at our four general types of knowledge: (1) Factual Knowledge, (2) Con-
ceptual Knowledge, (3) Procedural Knowledge, and (4) Metacognitive Knowledge.
In the next major section of this chapter we define all four types of knowl-
edge along with their associated subtypes. First, however, we give our reasons
for including both factual and conceptual knowledge and for including
metacognitive knowledge.

A DISTINCTION BETWEEN FACTUAL AND CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE

In cognitive psychology, declarative knowledge is usually defined in terms of

"knowing that": knowing that Bogota is the capital of Colombia, or knowing that
a square is a two-dimensional figure with four perpendicular sides of equal
42 Section Il The Revised Taxonomy Structure

length. This knowledge can be (1) specific content elements such as terms and
facts or (2) more general concepts, principles, models, or theories (Alexander,
Schallert, and Hare, 1991; Anderson, 1983; deJong and Ferguson-Hessler, 1996;
Dochy and Alexander, 1995). In the revised Taxonomy, we wanted to distin-
guish knowledge of discrete, isolated content elements (i.e., terms and facts)
from knowledge of larger, more organized bodies of knowledge (i.e., concepts,
principles, models, or theories).
Titls differentiation parallels a general distinction in cognitive psychology
between the knowledge of "bits of information" and more general "mental
models," "schemas," or "theories" (implicit or explicit) that individuals may
use to help them organize a body of information in an interconnected, non-
arbitrary, and system.atic manner. Accordingly, we have reserved the term
Factital Knowledge for the knowledge of discrete, isolated "bits of information"
and the term Conceptual Knowledge for more complex, organized knowledge
forms. We think this is an important distinction for teachers and other educa-
tors to make.
Moreover, research has shown that many students do not make the
important connections between and among the facts they leam in class-
rooms and the larger system of ideas reflected in an expert's knowledge of a
discipline. Although developing expertise in an academic discipline and dis-
ciplinary ways of thinking is certainly an important goal of education,
students often do not even learn to transfer or apply the facts and ideas they
leam in classrooms to understanding their experiences in the everyday world.
This is often labeled the problem of "inert" knowledge; that is, students often
seem to acquire a great deal of factual knowledge, but they do not understand
it at a deeper level or integrate or systematically organize it in disciplinary or
useful ways (Bereiter and Scardamalia, 1998; Bransford, Brown, and Cock.ing,
1999).
One of the hallmarks of experts is that not only do they know a lot about
their discipline, but also their knowledge is organized and reflects a deep un-
derstanding of the subject matter. In combination, Conceptual knowledge and
deep understanding can help individuals as they attempt to transfer what they
have learned to new situations, thereby overcoming some of the problems of
inert knowl~dge (Bransford, Brown, and Cocking, 1999).
Accordingly, on both empirical and practical grounds, we distinguish be-
tween Factual knowledge and Conceptual knowledge. Tne distinction may not be
appropriate in terms of formal psychological models of knowledge representa-
tion (e.g., propositional network models or connectionist models), but we do
think it has meaning for classroom instruction and assessment. Educati.onal ob-
jectives can focus both the teacher and students on acquiring small bits and
pieces of knowledge without concem for how they "fit" within a larger disci-
plinary or more systematic perspective. By separating Factual knowledge from
Conceptual knowledge, we highlight the need for educators to teach for deep u.n-
derstanding of Conceptual knowledge, not just for remembering isolated and
small bits of Factual knowledge.
 Chapter 4 The Knowledge Dimension 43

A RATIONALE FOR METACOGNITIVE KNOWLEDGE

Our inclusion of Metacognitive knowledge reflects recent research on how stu-

dents' knowledge about their own cognition and control of their own cogni-
tion play an important role in learning (Bransford, Brown, and Cocking, 1999;
Sternberg, 1985; Zimmerman and Schunk, 1998). Although behaviorist psy-
chology models generally excluded ideas such as consciousness, awareness,
self-reflection, self-regulation, and thinking about and controlling one's own
thinking and leaming, current cognitive and social constructivist models of
learning emphasize the importance of these activities. Because these activities
focus on cognition itself, the prefix meta is added to reflect the idea that
m.etacognition is about or "above" or "transcends" cognition. Social construc-
tivist models also stress self-reflective activity as an important aspect of leam-
ing. In this case, both cognitive and social constructivist models agree about
the importance of facilitating students' thinking about their own thinking.
Accordingly, we have added this new category to the Taxonomy to reflect cur-
rent research and theory on the importance of metacognitive knowledge in
learning.
The term metacognition has been used in many different ways, but an im-
portant general distinction concerns two aspects of metacognition: (1) knowl-
edge about cognition and (2) control, monitoring, and regulation of cog-
nitive processes. The latter is also called metacognitive control and regulation
as weil as more generally, self-regulation (Boekaerts, Pintrich, and Zeidner,
2000; Bransford, Brown, and Cocking, 1999; Brown, Bransford, Ferrara, and
Campione, 1983; Pintrich, Walters, and Baxter, in press; Zimmerman and
Schunk, 1998). This basic distinction between metacognitive knowledge
and metacognitive control or self-regulation parallels the two dimensions in
our Taxonomy Table. Accordingly, we have limited Metacognitive knowledge to
knowledge about cognition. The aspect of metacognition that involves
metacognitive control and self-regulation reflects different types of cognitive
processes and therefore fits into the cognitive process dimension, which is dis-
cussed in Chapter 5.
Metacognitive knowledge includes knowledge of general strategies that may
be used for different tasks, the conditions under which these strategies may be
used, the extent to which the strategies are effective, a~d self-knowledge
(Bransford, Brown, and Cocking, 1999; Flavell, 1979; Pintrich, Wolters, and Bax-
ter, in press; Schneiderand Pressley, 1997). For example, learners can know
about different strategies for reading a chapter in a textbook and also about
strategies to monitor and check their comprehension as they read. Leamers
also activate relevant knowledge about their own strengths and weaknesses on
the reading assignment as weil as their motivation for completing the assign-
ment. For example, students may realize that they already know a fair amount
about the topic of the chapter in the textbook and that they are interested in the
topic. This Metacognitive knowledge could lead them to change their approach to
the task by adjusting their speed or using an entirely different approach.
44 Section Il The Revised Taxonomy Structure

Learners also can activate the relevant situ.ational, conditional, or cultural

knowledge for solving a problem in a certain context (e.g., in this classroom; ön
fhis·type of test, in this type of situatiön3n this subculture). For example, they
may know that the teacher uses only multiple-choice tests. Furthermore, they
know that multi.ple-choice tests require only recognition of the correct answers,
not actual recall of the information as in essay tests. This Metacognitive knowl-
edge might influence how they prepare for the test.
During the meetings that led to the preparation of this revised Taxonomy,
we discussed frequently and in great detail both the inclusion and proper
placement of Metacognitive knowledge. Our inclusion of Metacognitive knowledge
is predicated on our belief that it is extremely important in understanding and
facilitati.ng leaming, a belief that is consistent with the basic precepts of cogni-
tive psychology and supported by empirical research (Bransford, Brown, and
Cocking, 1999). Just as the original Taxonomy raised the possibility of teaching
for "higher-order" objectives, our revised framework points to the possibility
of teaching for Metacognitive knowledge as weil as self-regulation.
In terms of proper placement, we debated several issues. Should Metacog-
nitive knowledge be a separate dimension, thus producing a three-dimensional
figure? Should the focus of Metacognitive knowledge be on metacognitive
processes and self-regulation rather than knowledge and, if so, wouldn't it be
better placed along the Cognitive Process dimension of the Taxonomy Table?
Doesn't Metacognitive knowledge overlap with Factual, Conceptual, and Proce-
dural knowledge and, if so, isn't it redundant? These are legitimate questions we
grappled with for a long time.
We chose to place Metacognitive knowledge as a fourth knowledge category
for two primary reasons. First, metacognitive control and self-regulation re-
quire the use of the cognitive processes included. on the other dimension of the
Taxonomy Table. Metacognitive control and self-regulation involve processes
such as Remember, Understand, Apply, Analyze, Evaluate, and Create. Thus, adding
metacognitive control and self-regulation processes to the cognitive process di-
mension was seen as redundant. Second, Factual, Conceptual, and Procedural
knowledge as conceived in the original Taxonomy pertain to subject matter con-
tent. In contrast, Metacognitive knowledge is knowledge of cognition and about
oneself in relation to various subject matters, either individually or collectively
(e.g., all sciences, academic subjects in general).
Of course, Metacognitive knowledge does not have the same status as the
other three types of knowledge. We noted earlier that these types of knowledge
were developed through consensus within a scientific or disciplinary commu-
nity. This is clearly not the case with self-knowledge (De), which is based on an
individual's own self-awareness and knowledge base. Strategie knowledge (Da)
and knowledge about cognitive tasks (Ob) have been developed within different
communities. For example, cognitive psychology has developed a wealth of in-
formation on the usefulness of different cognitive strategies for memory, learn-
ing, thinking, and problem solving. When students come to know and under-
stand metacognitive knowledge about strategies that is based on scientific
research, they may be better prepared than when they rely on their own idio-
syncratic strategies for leaming.
 Chapter 4 The I<nowledge Dimension 411

CATEGORIES OF THE KNOWLEDGE DIMENSION

Four types of knowledge are listed in Table 4.1. The first three categories of our
revised framework indude all the knowledge categories from the original Tax-
onomy (see Appendix B}. Some of the labels are different, however, and some
of the original subtypes are collapsed into more general categories. Moreover,
reflecting the prescient nature of the original Handbook, much of the text and
many of the examples in the sections that follow are taken from the original
Handbook. Finally, as we mentioned earlier, the fourth category, Metacognitive
knowledge, and its subtypes are alJ new.

A. F ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE
Factual knowledge encompasses the basic elements that experts use in commu-
nicating about their academic discipline, understanding it, and organizing it
systematically. These elements are usually serviceable to people who work in
the discipline in the very form in which they are presented; they need little or
no alteration from one use or application to another. Factual knowledge contains
the basic elements students must know if they are to be acquainted with the
discipline or to solve any of the problems in it. The elements are usually symbols
associated with some concrete referents, or "strings of symbols" that convey
important information. For the most part, Factual knowledge exists at a relatively
low level of abstraction.
Because there is a tremendous wealth of these basic elements, it is ahnost
inconceivable that a student could leam all of them relevant to a particular sub-
ject matter. As our knowledge increases in the social sciences, sciences, and hu-
manities, even experts in these fields have difficulty keeping up with all the
new elements. Consequently, some selection for educational purposes is almost
always required. For classification purposes, Factual knowledge may be distin-
guished from Conceptual knowledge by virtue of its very specificity; that is, Fac-
tual knowledge can be isolated as elements or bits of information that are be-
lieved to have some value in and of themselves. The two subtypes of Factual
knowledge are knowledge of terminology (Aa} and knowledge of specific details and
elements (Ab).

AA, KNOWLEDGE OF TERMINOLOGY

Knowledge of terminology includes knowledge of specific verbal and nonverbal la-

bels and symbols (e.g., words, numerals, signs, pictures}. Each subject matter con-
tains a !arge number of labels and symbols, both verbal and nonverbal, that have
particular referents. They are the basic language of the discipline-the shorthand
used by experts to express what they know. In any attempt by experts to commu-
nicate with others about phenomena within their discipline, they find it neces-
sary to use the special labels and symbols they have devised. In many cases it is
impossible for experts to discuss problems in their discipline without making use
of essential terms. Quite literally, they are unable to even think about many of the
phenomena in the discipline unless they use these labels and symbols.
4.1 THE KNOWLEDGE DIMENSION

MAJOR TYPES AND SUBTYPES EXAMPLES

A. P'ACTUAL KNOWL.•DGE-The basic elemmts studenls must know tobe acquainted with a
discipline or sol\·e problems in it
AA. Knowledge of terminology Technical vocabulary, musical symbols
Aa. Knowledge of specific details and Major natural resources, reliable sources of
elements information

11. CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEINIS-The inten'eYtionships among the basic elements within a larger
structure that cnable them to function toget:her
BA. Knowledge of classificati.ons and Periods of geological time, forms of business
categories ownership
Ba. Knowledge of principles and Pythagorean theorem, law of supply and demand
generalizations
Be. Knowledge of theories, models, and Theory of evoluti.on, structure of Congress
structures

c. PRoc:EDURAL KNowu:...-How to do something, methods of inquiry, and aiteria for using

skills, algorithms, tedmiques, and methods
CA. Knowledge of subject-specifi.c skills and Skills used in painting with watercolors,
algorithms whole-number division algorithm
Ca. I<nowledge of subject-specific techniques Interviewing techniques, scientific method
andmethods
Ce. Knowledge of criteria for determining Criteria used to determine when to apply a
when to use appropriate procedures procedure involving Newton's second law, criteria
used to judge the feasibility of using a parti.cular
method to estimate business costs

D. Ma:TACOGNITIV• KNOWL..DCIIE-I<nowledge of cognitioo. in general as well as awareness and

knowledge of one's own cognition
DA. Strategie knowledge Knowledge of outlining as a means of capturing
the structure of a unit of subject matter in a text-
book, knowledge of the use of heuristics
Da. Knowledge about cogniti.ve tasks, I<nowledge of the types of tests particular teachers
including appropriate contextual and administer, knowledge of the cognitive demands
conditional knowledge of different tasks
De. Self-knowledge Knowledge that critiquing essays is a personal
strength, whereas writing essays is a personal
weakness; awareness of one's own knowled.ge
level
 Chapter 4 The I<nowledge Dimension 47

The novice leamer must be cognizant of these labels and symbols and
leam the generally accepted referents that are attached to them. As the expert
must communicate with these terms, so must those learning the discipline
have a knowledge of the terms and their referents as they attempt to compre-
hend or think about the phenomena of the discipline.
Here, to a greater ext~nt than in any other category of knowledge, ex-
perts find their own labels and symbols so useful and precise that they are
likely to want the leamer to know more than the leamer really needs to know
or can leam. This may be especial!y true in the sciences, where attempts are
made to use labels and symbols with great precision. Scientists find it diffi-
cult to express ideas or discuss particular phenomena with the use of other
symbols or with "popular" or "folk knowledge" terms more familiar to a lay
population.

EXAMPLES OF KNOWLEDGE OF TERMINOLOGY

• I<nowl~dge of the alphabet

• I<nowledge of scientific terms (e.g., labels for parts of a cell, names for sub-
atomic particles)
• I<nowledge of the vocabulary of painting
• Knowledge of important accounting terms
• Knowledge of the standard representational symbols on maps and charts
• Knowledge of the symbols used to indicate the correct pronunciation of
words

AB. KNOWLEDGE OF SPECIFIC DETAILS AND ELEMENTS

Knowledge of specific details and elements refers to knowledge of events, loca-

tions, people, dates, sources of information, and the like. lt may include very
precise and specific information, such as the exact date of an event or the ex-
act magnitude of a phenomenon. lt may also include approximate informa-
tion, such as a time period in which an event occurred or the general order of
magnitude of a phenomenon. Specific facts are those that can be isolated as
separate, discrete elements in contrast to those that can be known only in a
larger context.
Every subject matter contains some events, locations, people, dates, and
other details that experts know and believe to represent important knowledge
about the field. Such specific facts are basic information that experts use in de-
scribing their field andin thinking about specific problems or topics in the
field. These facts can be distinguished from terminology, in that terminology
generally represents the conventions or agreements within a field (i.e., a com-
mon language), whereas facts represent findings arrived at by means other
than consensual agreements made for purposes of communication. Subtype
Ab also indudes knowledge about particular books, writings, and other
48 Section II The Revised Taxonomy Structure

sources of information on specific topics and problems. Thus, knowled.ge of

a specific fact and knowledge of the sources of the fact are classified in this
subtype.
Again, the tremendous number of specific facts forces educators (e.g., cur-
riculum specialists, textbook authors, teachers) to make choices about what is
basic and what is of secondary importance or of importance primarily to the
expert. Educators must also consider the level of precision with which differ-
ent facts must be known. Frequently ed.ucators may be content to have a stu-
dent learn only the approximate magnitude of the phenomenon rather than its
precise quantity or to leam an approximate time period rather than the precise
date or time of a specific event. Educators have considerable difficulty deter-
mining whether many of the specific facts are such that students should learn
them as part of an educational unit or course, or they can be left tobe acquired
whenever they really need them.

EXAMPLES OF KNOWLEDGE OF SPECIFIC DETAILS AND ELEMENTS

• Knowledge of major facts about particular cultures and societies

• Knowledge of practical facts important to health, citizenship, and other
human need.s and concerns
• Knowledge of the more significant names, places, and events in the news
• Knowledge of the reputation of a given author for presenting and inter-
preting facts on governmental problems
• Knowledge of major products and exports of countries
• Knowledge of reliable sources of information for wise purchasing

B. CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE
Conceptual knowledge includes knowledge of categories and classifications and
the relationships between and among them-m.ore complex, organized. knowl-
edge forms. Conceptual knowledge includes schemas, mental models, or implicit
or explicit theories in different cognitive psychological models. These schemas,
models, and theories represent the knowledge an individual has about how a
particular subject matter is organized and structured, how the different parts
or bits of information are interconnected and interrelated in a more systematic
manner, and how these parts function together. For example, a mental model
for why the seasons occur may include ideas about the earth, the sun, the rota-
tion of the earth around the sun, and the tilt of the earth toward the sun at dif-
ferent times during the year. These are not just simple, isolated facts about the
earth and sun but rather ideas about the relationships between them and how
they are linked to the seasonal changes. This type of conceptual knowledge
might be one aspect of ~hat is termed "disciplinary knowledge," or the way
experts in the discipline think about a phenomenon-in this case the scientific
explanation for the occurrence of the seasons.
 Chapter 4 The I<nowledge Dimension 49

Conceptual knowledge includes three subtypes: knowledge of classifications and

categories (Ba), knowledge of principles and generalizations (Bb), and knowledge of
theories, models, and structures (Be). Classifications and categories form the basis
for principles and generalizations. These, in turn, form the basis for theories,
models, and structures. The three subtypes should capture a great deal of the
knowledge that is generated within all the different disciplines.

BA. KNOWLEDGE OF CLASSIFICATIONS AND CATEGORIES

Subtype Ba includes the specific categories, classes, divisions, and arrangements

that are used in different subject matters. As a subject matter develops, individu-
als who work on it find it advantageous to develop classifications and categories
that they can use to structure and systematize the phenomena. This type of
knowledge is somewhat more general and often more abstract than the knowl-
edge of terminology and specific facts. Each subject matter has a set of categories
that are used to discover new elements as weil as to deal with them once they
are discovered. Classifications and categories differ from terminology and facts
in that they form the connecting links between and among specific elements.
When one is writing or analyzing a story, for example, the major categories
include plot, character, and setting. Note that plot as a category is substantially
different from the plot of this story. When the concern is plot as a category, the
key question is What makes a plot a plot? The category "plot" is defined by
what all specific plots have in common. In contrast, when the concem is the
plot of a particular story, the key question is What is the plot of this story?-
knowledge of specific details and elements (Ab).
Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish knowledge of classifications and cate-
gories (Ba) from Fachlal knowledge (A). To complicate matters further, basic
classifications and categories can be placed into larger, more comprehensive
classifications and categories. In mathematics, for example, whole numbers,
integers, and fractions can be placed into the category rational numbers. Each
larger category moves us away from the concrete specifics and into the realm
of the abstract.
For the purposes of our Taxonomy, several characteristics are useful in dis-
tinguishing the subtypes of knowledge. Classifications and categories are
largely the result of agreement and convenience, whereas knowledge of spe-
cific details stems more directly from observation, experimentation, and dis-
covery. Knowledge of classifications and categories is commonly a reflection of how
experts in the field think and attack problems, whereas knowledge of which
specific details become important is derived from the results of such thought
and problem solving.
Knowledge of classifications and categories is an im.portant aspect of develop-
ing expertise in an academic discipline. Proper classification of information
and experience into appropriate categories is a classic sign of learning and
development. Moreover, recent cognitive research on conceptual change
and understanding suggests that student learning can be constrained by
so Section II The Revised Taxonomy Structure

misclassification of information into inappropriate categories. For example,

Chi and her colleagues (see Chi, 1992; Chi, Slotta, and deLeeuw, 1994; Slotta,
Chi, and Joram, 1995) suggest that students may have difficulty understand-
ing basic science concepts such as heat, light, force, and electricity when they
classify these concepts as material substances rather than as processes. Once
concepts are classified as substances or objects, students invoke a whole
range of characteristics and properties of "objects." As a result, students try to
apply these object-lilce characteristics to what are better described in scientific
terms as processes. The naive categorization of these concepts as substances
does not match the more scientifically accurate categorization of them as
processes.
The categorization of heat, light, force, and electricity as substances
becomes the basis for an implicit theory of how these processes are supposed
to operate and leads to systematic misconceptions about the nature of the
processes. This implicit theory, in turn, makes it difficult for students to
develop the appropriate scientific understanding. Accordingly, learning the
appropriate classification and category system can reflect a "conceptual
change" and result in a more appropriate understanding of the concepts than
just learning their definitions (as would be the case in the Factual knowledge
category).
For several reasons, it seems lilcely that students will have greater diffi-
culty learning knowledge of classifications and categories than Factual knowledge.
First, many of the classifications and categories students encounter represent
relatively arbitrary and even artificial forms of knowledge that are meaning-
ful only to experts who recognize their value as tools and techniques in their
work. Second, students may be able to operate in their daily life without
knowing the appropriate subject matter classifications and categories to the
level of precision expected by experts in the field. Third, knowledge of classifi-
cations and categories requires that students mal<e connections among specific
content elements (i.e., terminology and facts). Finally, as classifications and
categories are combined to form larger dassifications and categories, learn-
ing becomes more abstract. Nevertheless, the student is expected to know
these classifications and categories and to know when they are appropriate
or useful in dealing with subject matter content. As the student begins
to work with a subject matter within an academic discipline and leams how
to use the tools, the value of these classifications and categories becomes
apparent.

IEXAMPLES OF KNOWLEDGI! OF CLASSIFICATIONS AND CATEGORIES

• Knowledge of the variety of types of literature

• Knowledge of the various forms of business ownership
• Knowledge of the parts of sentences (e.g., nouns, verbs, adjectives)
• Knowledge of different kinds of psychological problems
• Knowledge of the different periods of geologic time
 Chapter 4 The Knowledge Dimension st

BB, KNOWL.:.EDGE OF PRINCIPLES AND GENERALIZATIONS

As mentioned earlier, principles and generalizations are composed of classifi-

cations and categories. Principles and generalizations tend to dominate an aca-
demic discipline and are used to study phenomena or solve problems in the
discipline. One of the hallmarks of a subject matter expert is the ability to rec-
ognize meaningful patterns (e.g., generalizations) and activate the relevant
krtowledge of these pattems with little cognitive effort (Bransford, Brown, and
Cocking, 1999).
Subtype Bb includes knowledge of particular abstractions that summarize
observations of phenomena. These abstractions have the greatest value in de,,
ß':~ing, pred~':~g, e~:pl~g, or d~~~~~_g_ th~_m.ost.app:i:opziate an4 rele~
Y@_! a~tion or d~ction to be taken. Principles and generalizations bring
together large numbers of specific facts and events, d~ri~ the processes and
interrelationships among these specific details (thus forming classifications
and categories), and, furthermore, describe the processes and interrelation-
ships among the classifications and categories. In this way, they enable the
expert to begin to organize the whole in a parsi.monious and coherent manner.
Principles and generalizations tend to be broad ideas that may be difficult
for students to understand because students may not be thoroughly ac-
quainted with the phenomena they are intended to summarize and organize. If
students do get to know the principles and generalizations, however, they have
a means for relating and organizing a great deal of subject matter. As a result,
they should have more insight into the subject matter as weil as better memory
of it.

EXAMPLl!S OF KNOWLEDGE OF PRINCIPLES AND GENERALIZATIONS

• Knowledge of major generalizations about particular cultures

• Knowledge of the fundamental Iaws of physics
• I<nowledge of the principles of chemistry that are relevant to life processes
and health
• I<nowledge of the implications of American foreign trade policies for the
international economy and international good will
• Knowledge of the major principles involved in leaming
• Knowledge of the princip]es of federalism
• Knowledge of the principles that govem rudi.mentary arithmetic opera-
tions (e.g., the commutative principle, the associative principle)

Be, KNOWLEDGE OF THEORIES, MODELS, AND STRUCTURES

~ubtype Be includes knowledge of principles and generalizations together

with their interrelationships that present a clear, rounded, and system.ic view
of a complex phenomenon, problem, or subject matter. These are the most ab-
stract formulations. They can show the interrelationships and organization of a
52 Section II The Revised Taxonomy Structure

great range of specific details, classifications and categories, and principles and
generalizations. This subtype, Be, differs from Bb in its emphasis on a set of
principles and generalizations related in some way to form a theory, model, or
structure. The principles and generalizations in subtype Bb do not need to be
related in any meaningful way.
Subtype Be includes knowledge of the different paradigms, epistemolo-
gies, theories, and models that different disciplines use to describe, under-
stand, explain, and predict phenomena. Disciplines have different paradigms
and epistemologies for structuring inquiry, and students should come to know
these different ways of conceptualizing and organizing subject matter and ar-
eas of research within the subject matter. In biology, for example, knowledge of
the theory of evolution and how to think in evolutionary terms to explain dif-
ferent biological phenomena is an important aspect of this subtype of Concep-
tual knowledge. Similarly, behavioral, cognitive, and social constructivist theo-
ries in psychology make different epistemological assumptions and reflect
different perspectives on human behavior. An expert in a discipline knows not
only the different disciplinary theories, models, and structures but also their
relative strengths and weaknesses and can think "within" one of them as well
as "outside" any of them.

EXAMPLES OF KNOWLEDGE OF THEORIE&, MODELS, AND STRUCTURES

• Knowledge of the interrelationships among chemical principles as the

basis for chemical theories
• Knowledge of the overall structure of Congress (i.e., organization, functions)
• Knowledge of the basic structural organization of the local city government
• Knowledge of a relatively complete formulation of the theory of evolution
• Knowledge of the theory of plate tectonics
• Knowledge of genetic models (e.g., DNA)

C. PROCEDURAL KNOWLEDGE
Procedural knowledge is the "knowledge of how" to do something. The "some-
thing" might range from completing fairly routine exercises to solving novel
problems. Procedural knowledge often takes the form of a series or sequence of
steps to be followed. lt includes knowledge of skills, algorithms, techniques,
and methods, collectively known as procedures (Alexander, Schallert, and
Hare, 1991; Anderson, 1983; deJong and Ferguson-Hessler, 1996; Dochy and
Alexander, 1995). Procedural knowledge also includes knowledge of the criteria
used to determine when to use various procedures. In fact, as Bransford,
Brown, and Cocking (1999) noted, not only do experts have a great deal of
knowledge about their subject matter, but their knowledge is "conditionalized"
so that they know when and where to use it.
Whereas Factual knowledge and Conceptual knowledge represent the "what"
of knowledge, procedural knowledge concerns the "how." In other words, Pro-
cedural knowledge reflects knowledge of different "processes," whereas Factual
 Chapter 4 The I<nowledge Dimension S3

knowledge and Conceptual knowledge deal with what might be termed "prod-
ucts." lt is important to note that Procedural knowledge represents only the
knowledge of these procedures; their actual use is discussed in Chapter 5.
In contrast to Metacognitive knowledge (which includes knowledge of more
general strategies that cut across subject matters or academic disciplines), Pro-
cedural knowledge is specific or germane to particular subject matters or aca-
demic disciplines. Accordingly, we reserve the term Procedural knowledge for the
knowledge of skills, algorithms, techniques, and methods that are subject spe-
cific or discipline specific. In mathematics, for example, there are algorithms
for performing long division, solving quadratic equations, and establishing the
congruence of triangles. In science, there are general methods for designing
and performing experiments. In social studies, there are procedures for read-
ing maps, estimating the age of physical artifacts, and collecting historical data.
In language arts, there are procedures for spelling words in English and for
generating grammatically correct sentences. Because of the subject-specific na-
ture of these procedures, knowledge of them also reflects specific disciplinary
knowledge or specific disciplinary ways of thinking in contrast to general
strategies for problem solving that can be applied across many disciplines.

CA. KNOWLEDGE OF SUBJECT•SPECIFIC SKILLS AND ALGORITHMS

As we mentioned, Procedural knowledge can be expressed as a series or sequence

of steps, collectively .known as a procedure. Sometimes the steps are followed
in a fixed order; at other tim.es decisions must be made about which step to per-
form next. Similarly, sometimes the end result is fixed (e.g., there is a single
prespecified answer); in other cases it is not. Although the process may be ei-
ther fixed or more open, the end result is generally considered fixed in this sub-
type of knowledge. A common example is knowledge of algorithms used with
mathematics exercises. The procedure for multiplying fractions in arithmetic,
when applied, generally results in a fixed answer (barring computational mis-
takes, of course).
Although the concem here is with Procedural knowledge, the result of using
Procedural knowledge is often Factual knowledge or Conceptual knowledge. For
example, the algorithm for the addition of whole numbers that we use to add
2 and 2 is Procedural knowledge; the answer 4 is simply Factual knowledge. Once
again, the emphasis here is on the student's knowledge of the procedure rather·
than on his or her ability to use it.

EXAMPLES OF KNOWLEDGE OF SUBJECT-SPEC:IFJC SKILLS

AND ALGORJTHMS

• I<nowledge of the skills used in painting with watercolors

• I<nowledge of the skills used to determine word meaning based on struc-
tural analysis
• Knowledge of the various algorithms for solving quadratic equati.ons
• I<nowledge of the skills involved in performing the high jump
54 Section II The Revised Taxonomy Structure

Ce. KNOWLEDGE OF SUB.IECT•SPECIFIC TECHNIQUES AND METHODS

In contrast with specific skills and algorithrns that usually end in a fixed result,
some procedures do not lead to a single predetermined answer or solution. We
can follow the general scientific method in a somewhat sequential manner to
design a study, for example, but the resulting experimental design can vary
greatly depending on a host of factors. In this subtype, Cb, of Procedural knowl-
edge, then, the result is more open and not fixed, in contrast to subtype Ca,
Knowledge of skills and algarithms.
Knowledge of subject-specific techniques and methods includes knowledge that
is largely the result of consensus, agreement, or disciplinary norms rather than
knowledge that is more directly an outcome of observation, experimentation,
or discovery. This subtype of knowledge generally reflects how experts in the
field or discipline think and attack problems rather than the results of such
thought or problem solving. For example, knowledge of the general scientific
method and how to apply it to different situations, including social situations
and policy problems, reflects a "scientific" way of thinking. Another example
is the "mathematization" of problems not originally presented as mathematics
problems. For example, the simple problern of choosing a checkout line in a
grocery store can be made into a mathematical problem that draws on mathe-
matical knowledge and procedures (e.g., number of people in each line, num-
ber of items per person).

EXAMPLES OF KNOWLEDGE OF SUBJECT-SPECIFIC TECHNIQUES

AND METHODS

• Knowledge of research methods relevant to the social sciences

• Knowledge of the techniques used by scientists in seeking solutions to
problems
• I<nowledge of the methods for evaluating health concepts
• I<nowledge of various methods of literary criticisrn

CC. KNOWLEDGE OF CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHEN TO USE

APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES

In addition to knowing subject-specific procedures, students are expected to

know when to use them, which often involves knowing the ways they have
been used in the past. Such knowledge is nearly always of a historical or ency-
clopedic type. Though simpler and perhaps less functional than the ability to
actually use the procedures, knowledge of when to use appropriate procedures
is an important prelude to their proper use. Thus, before engaging in an in-
quiry, students may be expected to know the methods and techniques that
have been used in similar inquiries. At a later stage in the inquiry, they may be
expected to show relationships between the methods and techniques they ac-
tually employed and the method.s employed by others.
Here again is a systematization that is used by subject matter experts as
they attack problems in their field. Experts know when and where to apply
 Chapter 4 The Knowledge Dimension SB

their knowledge. They have criteria that help them make decisions about when
and where to use different types of subject-specific procedural knowledge; that
is, their knowledge is "conditionalized," in that they know the conditions un-
der which the procedures are tobe applied (Chi, Feltovich, and Glaser, 1981).
For example, in solving a physics problem, an expert can recognize the type of
physics problem and apply the appropriate procedure (e.g., a problem that in-
volves Newton's second law, F = ma). Students therefore may be expected to
make use of the criteria as weil as have knowledge of them.
The ways in which the criteria are used in actual problem situations is dis-
cussed in Chapter 5. Here, we refer only to knowledge of criteria for determining
when to use appropriate procedures. The criteria vary markedly from subject mat-
ter to subject matter. Initially, they are likely to appear complex and ·abstract to
students; they acquire meaning as they are related to concrete situations and
problems.

EXAMPLES OF KNOWLEDGE OF CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHEN

TO USE APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES

• Knowledge of the criteria for determining which of several types of essays

to write (e.g., expository, persuasive)
• I<nowledge of the criteria for determining which method to use in solving
algebraic equations
• I<nowledge of the critena for determining which statistical procedure to
use with data collected in a particular experiment
• Knowledge of the criteria for determining which technique to apply to
create a desired effect in a particular watercolor painting

D. METACOGNITIVE KNOWLEDGE
Metacognitive knowledge is knowledge about cognition in general as weil as
awareness of and knowledge about one's own cognition. One of the hallmarks
of theory and research on leaming since the publication of the original Hand-
book is the emphasis on making students more aware of and responsible for
their own knowledge and thought. This change cuts across different theoretical
approaches to leaming and development from neo-Piagetian models, to cogni-
tive and information processing models, to Vygotskian and cultural or situated
learning models. Regardless of their theoretical perspective, researchers gener-
ally agree that with development students will become more aware of their
own thinking as well as more knowledgeable about cognition in general, and
as they act on this awareness they will tend to learn better (Bransford, Brown,
and Cocking, 1999). The labels for this general developmental trend vary from
theory to theory but include metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive aware-
ness, self-awareness, self-reflection, and self-regulation.
As we mentioned earlier, an important distinction in the field is between
knowledge of cognition and the monitoring, control, and regulation of cog-
nition (e.g., Bransford, Brown, and Cocking, 1999; Brown, Bransford, Ferrara,
56 Section II The Revised Taxonomy Structure

and Campione, 1983; Flavell, 1979; Paris and Winograd, 1990; Pintrich,
Wolters, and Baxter, in press; Schneiderand Pressley, 1997; Zimmerman and
Schunk, 1998). Recognizing this distinction, in this chapter we describe only
students' knowledge of various aspects of cognition, not the actual monitor-
ing, control, and regulation of their cognition. In the way that the other types
of knowledge described in this chapter are acted upon in some way by the
cognitive processes described in Chapter 5, the same is true of Metacognitive
knowledge.
In Flavell's (1979) classic article on metacognition, he suggested that
metacognition included knowledge of strategy, task, and person variables. We
have represented this general framework in our categories by including stu-
dents' knowledge of general strategies for learning and thinking (strategic
knowledge) and thei.r knowledge of cognitive tasks as well as when and why to
use these different strategies (knowledge about cognitive tasks). Finally, wein-
clude knowledge about the self (the person variable) in relation to both cogni-
tive and motivational components of performance (self-knowledge).

DA. STRATEGIC KNOWLEDGE

Strategie knowledge is knowledge of the general strategies for learning, thinking,

and problem solving. The strategies in this subtype can be used across many
different tasks and subject matters, rather than being most useful for one par-
ticular type of task in one specific subject area (e.g., solving a quadratic equa-
tion or applying Ohm's law).
This subtype, Da, includes knowledge of the variety of strategies that stu-
dents might use to memorize material, extract meaning from text, or com-
prehend what they hear in classrooms or read in books and other course mate-
rials. The !arge number of different learning strategies can be grouped into
three general categories: rehearsal, elaboration, and organizational (Weinstein
and Mayer, 1986). Rehearsal strategies involve repeating words or terms tobe
recalled over and over to oneself; they are generally not the most effective
strategies for deeper levels of learning and comprehension. In contrast, elabo-
ra tion strategies include the use of various mnemonics for memory tasks as
well as techniques such as summarizing, paraphrasing, and selecting the main
idea from texts. Elaboration strategies foster deeper processing of the material
tobe learned and result in better comprehension and learning than do rehearsal
strategies. Organizational strategies include various forms of outlining, draw-
ing "cognitive maps" or concept mapping, and note taking; students transform
the material from one form to another. Organizational strategies usually result
in better comprehension and learning than do rehearsal strategies.
In addition to these general leaming strategies, students can have knowl-
edge of various metacognitive strategies that are useful in planning, monitor-
ing, and regulating their cognition. Students can eventually use these strategies
to plan their cognition (e.g., set subgoals), monitor their cognition (e.g., ask
themselves questions as they read a piece of text, check their answer to a math
problem), and regulate their cognition (e.g., re-read something they don't un-
derstand, go back and "repair'' their calculating mistake in a math problem).
 Chapter 4 The Knowledge Dimension 57

Again, in this category we refer to students' knowledge of these various strate-

gies, not their actual use.
Finally, this subtype, Da, includes general strategies for problem solving
and thinking (Baron, 1994; Nickerson, Perkins, and Smith, 1985; Sternberg,
1985). These strategies represent the various general heuristics students can use
to solve problems, particul~ly ill-defined problems that have no definitive so-
lution method. Examples of heuristics are means-ends analysis and working
backward from the desired goal state. In addition to problem-solving strate-
gies, there are general strategies for deductive and inductive thinking, includ-
ing evaluating the validity of different logical statements, avoiding circularity
in arguments, making appropriate inferences from different sources of data,
and drawing on appropriate samples to make inferences (i.e., avoiding the
availability heuristic-making decisions from convenient instead of represen-
tative symbols).

EXAMPLES OF STRATEGIC KNOWLEDGE

• I<nowledge that rehearsal of information is one way to retain the

information
• I<nowledge of various mnemonic strategies for memory (e.g., the use of
acronyms such as Roy G Biv for the colors of the spectrum.)
• I<nowledge of various elaboration strategies such as paraphrasing and
summarizing
• Knowledge of various organizational strategies such as outlining or
diagramming ·
• I<nowledge of planning strategies such as setting goals for reading
• Knowledge of comprehension-monitoring strategies such as self-testing or
self-questioning
• Knowledge of means-ends analysis as a heuristic for solving an ill-defined
problem
• Knowledge of the availability heuristic and the problems of failing to sam-
ple in an unbiased manner

Da. KNOWLEDGE ABOUT COGNITIVE TASKS, INCLUDING CDNTEXTUAL AND

CONDITIONAL KNOWLEDGE

In addition to knowledge about various strategies, individuals accumulate

knowledge about cognitive tasks. In his traditional division of Metacognitive
knowledge, Flavell (1979) incluqed knowledge that different cognitive tasks can
be more or less difficult, may make differential demands on the cognitive sys-
tem, and may require different cognitive strategies. For example, a recall task is
more difficult than a recognition task. The recall task requires the person to
search memory actively and retrieve the relevant information, whereas the
recognition task requires only that the person discriminate among alternatives
and select the correct or most appropriate answer.
SB Section II The Revised Taxonomy Structure

As students develop knowledge of different leaming and thinking strate-

gies, this knowledge reflects both what general strategies to use and how to use
them. As with Procedural knowledge, however, this knowledge may not be suffi-
cient for expertise in learning. Students also need to develop the conditional
knowledge for these general cognitive strategies; in other words, they need to
develop some knowledge about the when and why of using these strategies
appropriately (Paris, Lipson, and Wixson, 1983). All these different strategies
may not be appropriate for all situations, and the leamer must develop some
knowledge of the different conditions and tasks for which the different strate-
gies are most appropriate. Conditional knowledge refers to knowledge of the
situations in which students may use Metacognitive knowledge. In contrast, Pro-
cedural knowledge refers to knowledge of the situations in which students may
use subject-specific skills, algorithms, techniques, and methods.
If one thinks of strategies as cognitive "tools" that help students construct
understanding, then different cognitive tasks require different tools, just as a
carpenter uses different tools for performing all the tasks that go into building
a hause. Of course, one tool, such as a hammer, can be used in many different
ways for different tasks, but this is not necessarily the most adaptive use of a
hammer, particularly if other tools are better suited to some of the tas.ks. In the
same way, certain general learning and thinking strategies are better suited to
different tasks. For example, if one confronts a novel problem that is il1 defined,
then general problem-solving heuristics may be useful. In contrast, if one con-
fronts a physics problem about the second law of thermodynamics, then more
specific Procedural knowledge is more useful and adaptive. An important aspect
of learning about strategies is the conditional knowledge of when and why to
use them appropriately.
Another important aspect of conditional knowledge is the local situational
and general social, conventional, and cultural norms for using different strate-
gies. For example, a teacher may encourage the use of a certain strategy for
monitoring reading comprehension. A student who knows that strategy is bet-
ter able to meet the dem.ands of this teacher 's classroom. In the same manner,
different cultures and subcultures may have norms for the use of different
strategies and ways of thinking about problems. Again, knowing these norms
can help students adapt to the demands of the culture in terms of solving the
problem. For example, the strategies used in a classroom learning situation may
not be the most appropriate ones to use in a work setting. Knowledge of the dif-
ferent situations and the cultural norms regarding the use of different strategies
within those situations is an important aspect of Metacognitive knowledge.

EXAMPLES OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT COGNITIVE TASKS, INCLUDING

CONTEXTUAL AND CONDITIONAL KNOWLEDGE

• Knowledge that recall tasks (i.e., short-answer items) generally make

more demands on the individual's memory system than recognition tas.ks
(i.e., multiple-choice items)
• Knowledge that a primary source book may be more difficult to under-
stand than a general textbook or popular book
 Chapter 4 The Knowledge Dimension 59

• Knowledge that a simple memorization task (e.g., remembering a phone

number) may require only rehearsal
• Knowledge that elaboration strategies like summarizing and paraphrasing
can result in deeper levels of comprehension
• Knowledge that general problem-solving heuristics may be most useful
when the individual lad<s relevant subject- or task-specific knowledge or
in the absence of specific Procedural knowledge
• Knowledge of the local and general social, conventional, and cultural
norms for how, when, and why to use different strategies

Dc.SEL~KNOWLEDGE

Along with knowledge of different strategies and cognitive tasks, Flavell (1979)
proposed that self-knowledge was an important component of metacognition. In
his model self-knowledge includes knowledge of one's strengths and weak-
nesses in relation to cognition and learning. For example, students who know
they generally do better on rnultiple-choice tests than on essay tests have some
self-knowledge about their test-taking skills. This knowledge may be useful to
students as they study for the two different types of tests. In addition, one hall-
mark of experts is that they know when they do not know something and they
then have some general strategies for finding the needed and appropriate in-
formation. Self-awareness of the breadth and depth of one's own knowledge
base is an important aspect of self-knowledge. Finally, students need tobe
aware of the different types of general strategies they are likely to rely on in dif-
ferent situations. An awareness that one tends to overrely on a particular strat-
egy, when there may be other more adaptive strategies for the task, could lead
to a change in strategy use.
In addition to knowledge of one's general cognition, individuals have be-
liefs about their motivation. Motivation is a complicated and confusing area,
with many models and theories available. Although motivational beliefs are
usually not considered in cognitive models, a fairly substantial body of litera-
ture is emerging that shows important links between students' motivational
beliefs and their cognition and learning (Snow, Corno, and Jackson, 1996; Pin-
trich and Schrauben, 1992; Pintrich and Schunk, 1996).
A consensus has emerged, however, around general social cognitive models
of motivation that propose three sets of motivational beliefs (Pintrich and
Schunk, 1996). Because these beliefs are social cognitive in nature, they fit into a
taxonomy of knowledge. The first set consists of self-efficacy beliefs, that is, stu-
dents' judgments of their capability to accomplish a specific task. The second set
includes beliefs about the goals or reasons students have for pursuing a specific
task (e.g., leaming vs. getting a good grade}. The third set contains value and
interest beliefs, which represent students' perceptions of their personal interest
(liking) for a task as well as their judgments of how important and useful the
task is to them. Just as students need to develop self-knowledge and awareness
about their own knowledge and cognition, they also need to develop self-
knowledge and awareness about their own motivation. Again, awareness of
eo Section II The Revised Taxonomy Structure

these different motivational beliefs may enable leamers to monitor and regulate
their behavior in leaming situati.ons in a more adaptive manner.
Self-knowledge is an important aspect of Metacognitive knowledge, but the
accuracy of self-knowledge seems tobe most crucial for learning. We are not
advocating that teachers try to boost students' "self-esteem" (a completely dif-
ferent construct from self-knowledge) by providing students with positive but
false, inaccurate, and misleading feedback about their academic strengths and
weaknesses. It is much more important for students to have accurate percep-
tions and judgments of their knowledge base and expertise than to have 'in-
flated and inaccurate self-knowledge (Pintrich and Schunk, 1996). If students are
not aware they do not know some aspect of Factual knowledge or Conceptual
knowledge or that they don't know how to do something (Procedural knowledge),
it is unlikely they will make any effort to leam the new material. A hallinark of
experts is that they know what they know and what they do not know, and
they do not have inflated or false impressions of their actual knowledge and
abilities. Accordingly, we emphasize the need for teachers to help students
make accurate assessments of their seif-knowledge and not attempt to inflate stu-
dents' academic self-esteem.

EXAMPLES OF SELF-KNOWL.EDGE

• Knowledge that one is knowledgeable in some areas but not in others

• Knowledge that one tends to rely on one type of "cognitive tool" (strategy)
in certain situations
• Knowledge of one's capabilities to perform a parti.cular task that are accu-
rate, not inflated (e.g., overconfident)
• Knowledge of one's goals for performing a task
• Knowledge of one's personal interest in a task
• I<nowledge of one's judgments about the relative uti.lity value of a task

ASSESSING OBJECTIVES INV0LVING METAC0GNITIVE KN0WLEDGE

The assessment of objectives for Factual knowledge, Conceptual knowledge, and
Procedural knowledge is discussed in the next chapter because all objectives are
some combination of the I<nowledge and Cognitive Process dimensions. Ac-
cordingly, it makes no sense to discuss assessment of the knowledge categories
without also considering how the knowledge is to be used with the different
cognitive processes. Because Metacognitive knowledge is not discussed in much
detail in the next chapter, however, a word about the assessment of Metacogni-
tive knowledge is warranted here.
The assessment of objectives that relate to Metacognitive knowledge is unique
because the objectives require a different perspective on what constitutes a "cor-
rect" answer. Unless the verb in the objective is associated with the cognitive
process Create, most assessment tasks for objectives that relate to Factual knowl-
edge, Conceptual knowledge, and Procedural knowledge have a "correct" answer.
Moreover, this answer is the same for all students. For example, for an objective
 O,apter 4 The Knowledge Dimension 81

that involves remembering factual knowledge, the date on which Lincoln delivered
the Gettysburg Address is the same for all students. For objectives that involve
Metacognitive knowledge, in contrast, there may be important individual
differences and perspectives on the IIcorrect" answer. Further, each of the three
subtypes of Metacogn.itive knowledge may require a different perspective on
the II correct" answer.
For the first subtype, strategic knowledge, some knowledge about general
strategies may be "correct.'' For exam.ple, if students are asked to simply recall
some information about general strategies for memory (e.g., the use of
acronyms), then there is in fact a correct answer. On the other hand, if students
are asked to apply this knowledge to a new situation, then there may be many
possible ways for them to use acronyms to help them remember the important
infonnation.
The other two subtypes of Metacogn.itive knowledge provide even more pos-
sibilities for individual differences to emerge in assessment. The subtype per-
taining to cognitive tasks does include some knowledge that calls for a correct
answer. For example, it is a truism that recognition tasks are easier than recall
tasks, so a question about this relationship does have a correct answer. On the
other hand, there are many different conditions, situations, contexts, and cul-
tures that change the way general cognitive strategies can be applied. lt is diffi-
cult to specify a correct answer to an assessment task without some knowledge
of these different conditions and contexts.
Finally, assessing self-knowledge presents even more possibilities for indi-
vidual differences. Within this subtype it is assumed that individual students
vary in their knowledge and motivation. Moreover, how does one determine
"correct" answers for self-knowledge? Self-knowledge may even be faulty
(e.g., a student believes that he does best on tests if he eats pepperoni pizza the
night before), and there should be occasions to correct these faulty and super-
stitious beliefs. Perhaps the best way of assessing self-knowledge, however, is
by helping students become more aware and conscious of their own beliefs,
helping them determine the feasibility of these beliefs in light of what currently
is known about learning, and helping them learn how to monitor and evaluate
these beliefs.
lt is difficult to assess Metacognitive knowledge usjng simple paper-and-
pencil measures (Pintrich, Wolter, and Baxter, in press). Consequently, objec-
tives that relate to Metacognitive knowledge may be best assessed in the context
of classroom activities and discussions of various strategies. Certainly, courses
designed to teach students general strategies for leaming and thinking (e.g.,
classes on leaming strategies, thinking skills, study skills) engage students in
leaming about all three aspects of Metacognitive knowledge. Students can leam
about general strategies as weil as how other students use strategies. They then
can compare their own strategies with those used by other students. Moreover,
dass discussions in any course, not just strategy courses, that focus on the is-
sues of learning and thinking can help students become aware of their own
Metacognitive knowledge. As teachers listen to students talk about their strate-
gies in these discussions, have conversations with students individually, or
review student journals about their own learning, teachers may gain some
62 Section II The Revised Taxonomy Structure

understanding of their students' Metacognitive krwwledge. We have much to

learn about the best ways to assess Metacognitive knowledge, but given its im-
portance in leaming, it seems timely to continue our efforts in this area.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter we identified and described four types of knowledge: Factual,

Conceptual, Procedural, and Metacognitive. Fachial knowledge and Conceptual knowl-
edge are most similar in that they involve the knowledge of "what," although
Conceptual knowledge is a deeper, more organized, integrated, and systemic
knowledge than just knowledge of terminology and isolated facts. Procedural
knowledge is the knowledge of "how" to do something. These three categories
were all represented in the original Taxonomy. Reflecting recent cognitive science
and cognitive psychological research on the importance of metacognition, we
have added a fourth category: Metacognitive krwwledge. In simplest terms,
Metacognitive knowledge is knowledge about cognition.
Although the importance of differentiating among these four types of
knowledge may be apparent after reading this chapter, the next chapter rein-
forces this view. In Chapter 5 we show how different types of knowledge tend
tobe associated with certain types of cognitive processes. The differentiation of
these knowledge types is further explicated in the discussion of the vignettes
and their analysis in Chapters 8-13.