INTRODUCTION

Philosophy of Protective Relaying

The role of protective relaying in electric-power-system design and operation is

explained by a brief examination of the over-all background. There are three aspects of a power

system that will serve the purposes of this examination. These aspects are; Normal operation,

Prevention of electrical failure, and Mitigation of the effects of electrical failure. The term

“normal operation” assumes no failures of equipment, no mistakes of personnel, nor “acts of

God.” It involves the minimum requirements for supplying the existing load and a certain

amount of anticipated future load. Some of the considerations are choice between hydro, steam,

or other sources of power, location of generating stations, transmission of power to the load,

study of the load characteristics and planning for its future growth, metering, voltage and

frequency regulation, system operation, and normal maintenance. The provisions for normal

operation involve the major expense for equipment and operation, but a system designed

according to this aspect alone could not possibly meet present-day requirements. Electrical

equipment failures would cause intolerable outages. There must be additional provisions to

minimize damage to equipment and interruptions to the service when failures occur. Two

recourses are open to incorporate features of design aimed at preventing failures, and second, to

include provisions for mitigating the effects of failure when it occurs.

Modern power-system design employs varying degrees of both recourses, as dictated by

the economics of any particular situation. Notable advances continue to be made toward greater

reliability. But also, increasingly greater reliance is being placed on electric power.

Consequently, even though the probability of failure is decreased, the tolerance of the possible

harm to the service is also decreased. But it is futile-or at least not economically justifiable-to try
to prevent failures completely. Sooner or later the law of diminishing returns makes itself felt.

Where this occurs will vary between systems and between parts of a system, but, when this point

is reached, further expenditure for failure prevention is discouraged. It is much more profitable,

then, to let some failures occur and to provide for mitigating their effects. The type of electrical

failure that causes greatest concern is the short circuit, or “fault” as it is usually called, but there

are other abnormal operating conditions peculiar to certain elements of the system that also

require attention. Some of the features of design and operation aimed at preventing electrical

failure are:

A. Provision of adequate insulation.

B. Coordination of insulation strength with the capabilities of lightning arresters.

C. Use of overhead ground wires and low tower-footing resistance.

D. Design for mechanical strength to reduce exposure, and to minimize the likelihood of

failure causable by animals, birds, insects, dirt, sleet, etc.

E. Proper operation and maintenance practices.

Some of the features of design and operation for mitigating the effects of failure are:

A. Features that mitigate the immediate effects of an electrical failure.

1. Design to limit the magnitude of short-circuit current.

a. By avoiding too large concentrations of generating capacity.

b. By using current-limiting impedance.

currents.

3. Time-delay undervoltage devices on circuit breakers to prevent dropping loads

during momentary voltage dips.

4. Ground-fault neutralizers (Petersen coils).

B. Features for promptly disconnecting the faulty element.

1. Protective relaying.

2. Circuit breakers with sufficient interrupting capacity.

3. Fuses.

C. Features that mitigate the loss of the faulty element.

1. Alternate circuits.

2. Reserve generator and transformer capacity.

3. Automatic reclosing.

D. Features that operate throughout the period from the inception of the fault until after

its removal, to maintain voltage and stability.

1. Automatic voltage regulation.

2. Stability characteristics of generators.

E. Means for observing the electiveness of the foregoing features.

1. Automatic oscillographs.
 2. Efficient human observation and record keeping.

F. Frequent surveys as system changes or additions are made, to be sure that the

foregoing features are still adequate.

Thus, protective relaying is one of several features of system design concerned with

minimizing damage to equipment and interruptions to service when electrical failures occur.

When we say that relays “protect,” we mean that, together with other equipment, the relays help

to minimize damage and improve service. It will be evident that all the mitigation features are

dependent on one another for successfully minimizing the effects of failure. Therefore, the

capabilities and the application requirements of protective-relaying equipment should be

considered concurrently with the other features. This statement is emphasized because there is

sometimes a tendency to think of the protective-relaying equipment after all other design

considerations are irrevocably settled. Within economic limits, an electric power system should

be designed so that it can be adequately protected.

FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING

The function of protective relaying is to cause the prompt removal from service of any

element of a power system when it suffers a short circuit, or when it starts to operate in any

abnormal manner that might cause damage or otherwise interfere with the effective operation of

the rest of the system. The relaying equipment is aided in this task by circuit breakers that are

capable of disconnecting the faulty element when they are called upon to do so by the relaying

equipment.

Circuit breakers are generally located so that each generator, transformer, bus,

transmission line, etc., can be completely disconnected from the rest of the system. These circuit
breakers must have sufficient capacity so that they can carry momentarily the maximum short-

circuit current that can flow through them, and then interrupt this current; they must also

withstand closing in on such a short circuit and then interrupting it according to certain

prescribed standards.

Fusing is employed where protective relays and circuit breakers are not economically

justifiable.

Although the principal function of protective relaying is to mitigate the effects of short

circuits, other abnormal operating conditions arise that also require the services of protective

relaying. This is particularly true of generators and motors.

A secondary function of protective relaying is to provide indication of the location and

type of failure. Such data not only assist in expediting repair but also, by comparison with human

observation and automatic oscillograph records, they provide means for analyzing the

effectiveness of the fault-prevention and mitigation features including the protective relaying

itself.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING

There are two groups of such equipment–one of which is called “primary” relaying, and

the other “back-up” relaying. Primary relaying is the first line of defense, whereas back-up

relaying functions only when primary relaying fails.

Primary Relaying
 Figure 1 illustrates primary relaying. The first observation is that circuit breakers are

located in the connections to each power element. This provision makes it possible to disconnect

only a faulty element. Occasionally, a breaker between two adjacent elements may be omitted, in

which event both elements must be disconnected for a failure in either one.

The second observation is that, without at this time knowing how it is accomplished, a

separate zone of protection is established around each system element. The significance of this is

that any failure occurring within a given zone will cause the “tripping” (i.e., opening) of all

circuit breakers within that zone, and only those breakers.

zones overlap, more breakers will be tripped than the minimum necessary to disconnect the

faulty element. But, if there were no overlap, a failure in a region between zones would not lie in

either zone, and therefore no breakers would be tripped. The overlap is the lesser of the two

evils. The extent of the overlap is relatively small, and the probability of failure in this region is

low; consequently, the tripping of too many breakers will be quite infrequent.

Finally, it will be observed that adjacent protective zones of Fig. 1 overlap around a

circuit breaker. This is the preferred practice because, for failures anywhere except in the overlap

region, the minimum number of circuit breakers need to be tripped. When it becomes desirable

for economic or space-saving reasons to overlap on one side of a breaker, as is frequently true in

metal-clad switchgear the relaying equipment of the zone that overlaps the breaker must be

arranged to trip not only the breakers within its zone but also one or more breakers of the

adjacent zone, in order to completely disconnect certain faults. This is illustrated in Fig. 2, where

it can be seen that, for a short circuit at X, the circuit breakers of zone B, including breaker C,

will be tripped; but, since the short circuit is outside zone A, the relaying equipment of zone B

must also trip certain breakers in zone A if that is necessary to interrupt the flow of short circuit

current from zone A to the fault. This is not a disadvantage for a fault at X, but the same breakers

in zone A will be tripped unnecessarily for other faults in zone B to the right of breaker C.

Whether this unnecessary tripping is objectionable will depend on the particular application.
Backup Relaying

Back-up relaying is employed only for protection against short circuits. Because short

circuits are the preponderant type of power failure, there are more opportunities for failure in

short primary relaying. Experience has shown that back-up relaying for other than short circuits

is not economically justifiable.

A clear understanding of the possible causes of primary-relaying failure is necessary for a

better appreciation of the practices involved in back-up relaying. When we say that primary

relaying may fail, we mean that any of several things may happen to prevent primary relaying

from causing the disconnection of a power-system fault. Primary relaying may fail because of

failure in any of the following:

A. Current or voltage supply to the relays.

B. D-c tripping-voltage supply.

C. Protective relays.

D. Tripping circuit or breaker mechanism.

E. Circuit breaker.

It is highly desirable that back-up relaying be arranged so that anything that might cause

primary relaying to fail will not also cause failure of back-up relaying. It will be evident that this

requirement is completely satisfied only if the back-up relays are located so that they do not

employ or control anything in common with the primary relays that are to be backed up. So far

as possible, the practice is to locate the back-up relays at a different station. Consider, for
example, the back-up relaying for the transmission line section EF of Fig. 3. The back-up relays

for this line section are normally arranged to trip breakers A, B, I, and J. Should breaker E fail to

trip for a fault on the line section EF, breakers A and B are tripped; breakers A and B and their

associated back-up equipment, being physically apart from the equipment that has failed, are not

likely to be simultaneously affected as might be the case if breakers C and D were chosen

instead.

The back-up relays at locations A, B, and F provide back-up protection if bus faults occur

at station K. Also, the back-up relays at A and F provide back-up protection for faults in the line

DB. In other words, the zone of protection of back-up relaying extends in one direction from the

location of any back-up relay and at least overlaps each adjacent system element. Where adjacent

line sections are of different length, the back-up relays must overreach some line sections more

than others in order to provide back-up protection for the longest line.

A given set of back-up relays will provide incidental back-up protection of sorts for faults

in the circuit whose breaker the back-up relays control. For example, the back-up relays that trip

breaker A of Fig. 3 may also act as back-up for faults in the line section AC. However, this

duplication of protection is only an incidental benefit and is not to be relied on to the exclusion

of a conventional back-up arrangement when such arrangement is possible; to differentiate

between the two, this type might be called “duplicate primary relaying.”
 A second function of back-up relaying is often to provide primary protection when the

primary-relaying equipment is out of service for maintenance or repair.

It is perhaps evident that, when back-up relaying functions, a larger part of the system is

disconnected than when primary relaying operates correctly. This is inevitable if back-up

relaying is to be made independent of those factors that might cause primary relaying to fail.

However, it emphasizes the importance of the second requirement of back-up relaying, that it

must operate with sufficient time delay so that primary relaying will be given enough time to

function if it is able to. In other words, when a short circuit occurs, both primary relaying and

back-up relaying will normally start to operate, but primary relaying is expected to trip the

necessary breakers to remove the short-circuited element from the system, and back-up relaying

will then reset without having had time to complete its function. When a given set of relays

provides back-up protection for several adjacent system elements, the slowest primary relaying

of any of those adjacent elements will determine the necessary time delay of the given back-up

relays.

For many applications, it is impossible to abide by the principle of complete segregation

of the back-up relays. Then one tries to supply the back-up relays from sources other than those

that supply the primary relays of the system element in question, and to trip other breakers. This

can usually be accomplished; however, the same tripping battery may be employed in common,

to save money and because it is considered only a minor risk. This subject will be treated in more

detail in Chapter 14.

In extreme cases, it may even be impossible to provide any back-up protection; in such

cases, greater emphasis is placed on the need for better maintenance. In fact, even with complete

back-up relaying, there is still much to be gained by proper maintenance. When primary relaying
fails, even though back-up relaying functions properly, the service will generally suffer more or

less. Consequently, back-up relaying is not a proper substitute for good maintenance.

Protection against other Abnormal Conditions

Protective relaying for other than short circuits is included in the category of primary

relaying. However, since the abnormal conditions requiring protection are different for each

system element, no universal overlapping arrangement of relaying is used as in short protection.

Instead, each system element is independently provided with whatever relaying is required, and

this relaying is arranged to trip the necessary circuit breakers which may in some cases be

different from those tripped by the short-circuit relaying. As previously mentioned, back-up

relaying is not employed because experience has not shown it to be economically justifiable.

Frequently, however, back-up relaying for short circuits will function when other abnormal

conditions occur that produce abnormal currents or voltages, and back-up protection of sorts is

thereby incidentally provided.

FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING

Sensitivity, Selectivity, and Speed

“Sensitivity,” “selectivity” and “speed” are terms commonly used to describe the

functional characteristics of any protective-relaying equipment. All of them are implied in the

foregoing considerations of primary and back-up relaying. Any relaying equipment must be

sufficiently sensitive so that it will operate reliably, when required, under the actual condition

that produces the least operating tendency. It must be able to select between those conditions for

which prompt operation is required and those for which no operation, or time-delay operation, is
required. And it must operate at the required speed. How well any protective-relaying equipment

fulfills each of these requirements must be known for each application.

The ultimate goal of protective relaying is to disconnect a faulty system element as

quickly as possible. Sensitivity and selectivity are essential to assure that the proper circuit

breakers will be tripped, but speed is the “pay-off.” The benefits to be gained from speed will be

considered later.

Reliability

That protective-relaying equipment must be reliable is a basic requirement. When

protective relaying fails to function properly, the allied mitigation features are largely ineffective.

Therefore, it is essential that protective-relaying equipment be inherently reliable, and that its

application, installation, and maintenance be such as to assure that its maximum capabilities will

be realized.

Inherent reliability is a matter of design based on long experience, and is much too

extensive and detailed a subject to do justice to here. Other things being equal, simplicity and

robustness contribute to reliability, but they are not of themselves the complete solution.

Workmanship must be taken into account also. Contact pressure is an important measure of

reliability, but the contact materials and the provisions for preventing contact contamination are

fully as important. These are but a few of the many design considerations that could be

mentioned.

The proper application of protective-relaying equipment involves the proper choice not

only of relay equipment but also of the associated apparatus. For example, lack of suitable
sources of current and voltage for energizing the relays may compromise, if not jeopardize, the

protection.

Contrasted with most of the other elements of an electric power system, protective

relaying stands idle most of the time. Some types of relaying equipment may have to function

only once in several years. Transmission-line relays have to operate most frequently, but even

they may operate only several times per year. This lack of frequent exercising of the relays and

their associated equipment must be compensated for in other ways to be sure that the relaying

equipment will be operable when its turn comes.

Many electric utilities provide their test and maintenance personnel with a manual that

experienced people in the organization have prepared and that is kept up to date as new types of

relays are purchased. Such a manual specifies minimum test and maintenance procedure that

experience has shown to be desirable. The manual is prepared in part from manufacturers’

publications and in part from the utility’s experience. As a consequence of standardized

techniques, the results of periodic tests can be compared to detect changes or deterioration in the

relays and their associated devices. Testers are encouraged to make other tests as they see fit so

long as they make the tests required by the manual. If a better testing technique is devised, it is

incorporated into the manual. Some organizations include information on the purpose of the

relays, to give their people better appreciation of the importance of their work. Courses may be

given, also. Such activity is highly recommended. Unless a person is thoroughly acquainted with

relay testing and maintenance, he can do more harm than good, and he might better leave the

equipment alone.
 In some cases, actual field tests are made after installation and after careful preliminary

testing of the individual relays. These field tests provide an excellent means for checking the

over-all operation of all equipment involved.

Careful maintenance and record keeping, not only of tests during maintenance but also of

relay operation during actual service, are the best assurance that the relaying equipment is in

proper condition. Field testing is the best-known way of checking the equipment prior to putting

it in service, but conditions may arise in actual service that were not anticipated in the tests. The

best assurance that the relays are properly applied and adjusted is a record of correct operation

through a sufficiently long period to include the various operating conditions that can exist. It is

assuring not only when a particular relaying equipment trips the proper breakers when it should

for a given fault but also when other relaying equipment properly refrain from tripping.

PROBABILITY OF FAILURE

Protective practices are based on the probability of failure to the extent that present-day

practices are the result of years of experience in which the frequency of failure undoubtedly has

played a part. However, the probability of failure seldom if ever enters directly into the choice of

a particular type of relaying equipment except when, for one reason or another, one finds it most

difficult to apply the type that otherwise would be used. In any event, the probability of failure

should be considered only together with the consequences of failure should it occur. It has been

said that the justification for a given practice equals the likelihood of trouble times the cost of the

trouble. Regardless of the probability of failure, no portion of a system should be entirely

without protection, even if it is only back-up relaying.

PROTECTIVE RELAYING VERSUS A STATION OPERATOR

attendants. This is the case for protection against abnormal conditions that develop slowly

enough for an operator to have time to correct the situation before any harmful consequences

develop. Sometimes, an alert and skillful operator can thereby avoid having to remove from

service an important piece of equipment when its removal might be embarrassing; if protective

relaying is used in such a situation, it is merely to sound an alarm. To some extent, the

preference of relying on an operator has a background of some unfortunate experience with

protective relaying whereby improper relay operation caused embarrassment; such an attitude is

understandable, but it cannot be supported logically. Where quick and accurate action is required

for the protection of important equipment, it is unwise to rely on an operator. Moreover, when

trouble occurs, the operator usually has other things to do for which he is better fitted.

UNDESIRED TRIPPING VERSUS FAILURE TO TRIP WHEN DESIRED

Regardless of the rules of good relaying practice, one will occasionally have to choose

which rule may be broken with the least embarrassment. When one must choose between the

chances of undesired or unnecessary tripping and failure to trip when tripping is desired, the best

practice is generally to choose the former. Experience has shown that, where major system

shutdowns have resulted from one or the other, the failure to trip–or excessive delay in tripping-

has been by far the worst offender.

THE EVALUATION OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING

Although a modern power system could not operate without protective relaying, this does

not make it priceless. As in all good engineering, economics plays a large part. Although the

protection engineer can usually justify expenditures for protective relaying on the basis of
standard practice, circumstances may alter such concepts, and it often becomes necessary to

evaluate the benefits to be gained. It is generally not a question of whether protective relaying

can be justified, but of how far one should go toward investing in the best relaying available.

Like all other parts of a power system, protective relaying should be evaluated on the

basis of its contribution to the best economically possible service to the customers. The

contribution of protective relaying is to help the rest of the power system to function as

efficiently and as effectively as possible in the face of trouble. How protective relaying does this

is as follows. By minimizing damage when failures occur, protective relaying minimizes:

A. The cost of repairing the damage.

B. The likelihood that the trouble may spread and involve other equipment.

C. The time that the equipment is out of service.

D. The loss in revenue and the strained public relations while the equipment is out of

service.

By expediting the equipment’s return to service, protective relaying helps to minimize the

amount of equipment reserve required, since there is less likelihood of another failure before the

first failure can be repaired.

The ability of protective relaying to permit fuller use of the system capacity is forcefully

illustrated by system stability. Figure 4 shows how the speed of protective relaying influences

the amount of power that can be transmitted without loss of synchronism when short circuits

occur. More load can be carried over an existing system by speeding up the protective relaying.

This has been shown to be a relatively inexpensive way to increase the transient stability limit.
Where stability is a problem, protective relaying can often be evaluated against the cost of

constructing additional transmission lines or switching stations.

Other circumstances will be shown later in which certain types of protective-relaying

equipment can permit savings in circuit breakers and transmission lines.

The quality of the protective-relaying equipment can affect engineering expense in

applying the relaying equipment itself. Equipment that can still operate properly when future

changes are made in a system or its operation will save much future engineering and other

related expense.

One should not conclude that the justifiable expense for a given protective-relaying

equipment is necessarily proportional to the value or importance of the system element to be

directly protected. A failure in that system element may affect the ability of the entire system to

render service, and therefore that relaying equipment is actually protecting the service of the

entire system. Some of the most serious shutdowns have been caused by consequential effects
growing out of an original failure in relatively unimportant equipment that was not properly

protected.

HOW PROTECTIVE RELAYS OPERATE

This fascinating part of the story of protective relaying will be told in much more detail

later. But, in order to round out this general consideration of relaying and to prepare for what is

yet to come, some explanation is in order here.

All relays used for short-circuit protection, and many other types also, operate by virtue of the

current and/or voltage supplied to them by current and voltage transformers connected in various

combinations to the system element that is to be protected. Through individual or relative

changes in these two quantities, failures signal their presence, type, and location to the protective

relays. For every type and location of failure, there is some distinctive difference in these

quantities, and there are various types of protective-relaying equipment available, each of which

is designed to recognize a particular difference and to operate in response to it.

More possible differences exist in these quantities than one might suspect. Differences in each

quantity are possible in one or more of the following:

A. Magnitude.

B. Frequency.

C. Phase angle.

D. Duration.

E. Rate of change.

F. Direction or order of change.

Then, when both voltage and current are considered in combination, or relative to similar

quantities at different locations, one can begin to realize the resources available for

discriminatory purposes. It is a fortunate circumstance that, although Nature in her contrary way

has imposed the burden of electric-power-system failure, she has at the same time provided us

with a means for combat.

REFERENCES

1. “Power System Fault Control,” AIEE Committee Report, AIEE Trans., 70 (1951), pp. 410-

417. 2. “Protective Relay Modernization Program Releases Latent Transmission Capacity,” by

M. F. Hebb, Jr., and J. T. Logan, AIEE District Conference Paper 55-354. “Plan System and

Relaying Together,” Elec. World, July 25, 1955, p. 86.

3. “Standards for Power Circuit Breakers,” Publ. SG4-1954, National Electrical Manufacturers

Association, 155 East 44th St., New York 17, N. Y. “Interrupting Rating Factors for Reclosing

Service on Power Circuit Breakers,” Publ. C37.7-1952, American Standards Association, Inc.,

70 East 45th St., New York 17, N. Y.

4. Power System Stability, Vol. II, by S. B. Crary, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1947.

5. “Costs Study of 69- to 345-Kv Overhead Power-Transmission Systems,” by J. G. Holm, AIEE

Trans., 63 (1944), pp. 406- 422.

No. 9 (Sept., 1940), pp. 370-373.

“Principles and Practices of Relaying in the United States,” by E. L. Harder and W. E. Marter,

AIEE Trans., 67, Part II (1948), pp. 1005-1022. Discussions, pp. 1022-1023.

“Principles of High-Speed Relaying,” by W. A. Lewis, Westinghouse Engineer, 3 (Aug., 1943),

pp. 131-134.