G.R. No.

137887 February 28, 2000

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
DAMIAN ERMITAÑO DE GUZMAN, DEOGRACIAS ERMITAÑO DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA
ERMITAÑO DE GUZMAN, ALICIA ERMITAÑO DE GUZMAN, SALVADOR ERMITAÑO DE
GUZMAN, DOMINGA ERMITAÑO, NATIVIDAD ENCARNACION, MELBA E. TORRES, FLORA
MANALO, SOCORRO DELA ROSA, JOSE ERMITAÑO, ESMERANDO ERMITAÑO, TRICOM
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and FILOMENO ERMITAÑO, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay, Branch 18, in LRC Cases No. TG-362 and TG-
396.2

The facts are simple:

Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title were filed by Norma Almanzor and private
respondent Salvador De Guzman over parcels of land located in Silang, Cavite. After trial on the
merits, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent De Guzman, to wit —

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by this Court as follows:

(1) In LRC Case No. TG-362, this Court hereby denies the application for registration of the
parcels of land mentioned therein by applicant Norma R. Almanzor for lack of factual and
legal bases;

(2) In LRC Case No. 396, this Court hereby approves the petition for registration and thus
places under the operation of Act 141, Act 946 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan Psu-67537-Amd-2 and containing an
area of 308,638 square meters, as supported by its technical descriptions now forming parts
of the records of these cases, in addition to other proofs adduced in the names of petitioners
Damian Ermitaño De Guzman, Deogracias Ermitaño De Guzman, Zenaida Ermitaño De
Guzman, Alicia Ermitaño De Guzman and Salvador De Guzman, all married, of legal age
and with residence and postal addresses at Magallanes Street, Carmona, Cavite, subject to
the claims of oppositors Dominga Ermitaño, Natividad Encarnacion, Melba E. Torres, Flora
Manalo, Socorro de la Rosa, Jose Ermitaño and Esmeranso Ermitaño under an instrument
entitled "Waiver of Rights with Conformity" the terms and conditions of which are hereby
ordered by this Court to be annotated at the back of the certificates of title to be issued to the
petitioners pursuant to the judgment of this Court.

SO ORDERED.3

As earlier mentioned, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, said judgment was affirmed and the petition
for registration of private respondents over the subject parcels of land was approved.

Hence, the instant Petition, anchored upon the following assignments of error —

I
 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DE GUZMANS HAVE NOT
SUBMITTED PROOF OF THEIR FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR POSSESSION IN THE MANNER
AND FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED BY LAW TO JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION OF
AN IMPERFECT TITLE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE DE GUZMANS HAVE NOT
OVERTHROWN THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LANDS ARE PORTIONS OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.4

We find merit in the instant Petition.

It is not disputed that the subject parcels of land were released as agricultural land only in
19655 while the petition for confirmation of imperfect title was filed by private respondents only in
1991.6 Thus the period of occupancy of the subject parcels of land from 1965 until the time the
application was filed in 1991 was only twenty six (26) years, four (4) years short of the required thirty
(30) year period possession requirement under Sec. 14, P.D. 29 and R.A. No. 6940.

In finding that private respondents' possession of the subject property complied with law, the Court
of Appeals reasoned out that —

(W)hile it is true that the land became alienable and disposable only in December, 1965,
however, records indicate that as early as 1928, Pedro Ermitaño, appellees' predecessor-in-
interest, was already in possession of the property, cultivating it and planting various crops
thereon. It follows that appellees' possession as of the time of the filing of the petition in 1991
when tacked to Pedro Ermitaño's possession is 63 years or more than the required 30 years
period of possession. The land, which is agricultural, has been converted to private property.7

We disagree.

The Court of Appeals' consideration of the period of possession prior to the time the subject land
was released as agricultural is in direct contravention of the pronouncement in Almeda vs. Court of
Appeals,8 to wit —

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the private respondents had not qualified for a
grant under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act because their possession of the land while
it was still inalienable forest land, or before it was declared alienable and disposable land of
the public domain on January 13, 1968, could not ripen into private ownership, and should
be excluded from the computation of the 30-year open and continuous possession in
concept of owner required under Section 48(b) of Com. Act 141. It accords with our ruling
in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, Ibarra Bishar, et al., 178 SCRA 708, that:

Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable lands of the public domain, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs. Director of
Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689;
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679).
 Thus possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership
(Vamo vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 17
Phil. 410 [1960]). A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to
register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648;
Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals,
129 SCRA 689 [1984]). (emphasis ours)

So, too, is the Court of Appeals' reliance on the case of Director of Land Management vs. Court of
Appeals9 misplaced. There, while the period of possession of the applicant's predecessor-in-interest
was tacked to his own possession to comply with the required thirty year period possession
requirement, the land involved therein was not forest land but alienable public land. On the other
hand, in the case before us, the property subject of private respondents' application was only
declared alienable in 1965. Prior to such date, the same was forest land incapable of private
appropriation. It was not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, could not
convert it into private property, (unless) and until such lands were reclassified and considered
disposable and alienable. 10

In summary, therefore, prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1965, any occupation or
possession thereon cannot be considered in the counting of the thirty year possession requirement.
This is in accord with the ruling in Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, (supra), and because the rules on
the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain. 11

While we acknowledge the Court of Appeals' finding that private respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject land for sixty three (63) years at the
time of the application of their petition, our hands are tied by the applicable laws and jurisprudence in
giving practical relief to them. The fact remains that from the time the subject land was declared
alienable until the time of their application, private respondents' occupation thereof was only twenty
six (26) years. We cannot consider their thirty seven (37) years of possession prior to the release of
the land as alienable because absent the fact of declassification prior to the possession and
cultivation in good faith by petitioner, the property occupied by him remained classified as forest or
timberland, which he could not have acquired by prescription. Further, jurisprudence is replete with
cases which reiterate that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and
possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private property. Possession of the land
by private respondents, whether spanning decades or centuries, could never ripen into ownership.
This Court is constrained to abide by the latin maxim "(d)ura lex, sed lex". 12

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED and the February 26, 1998 decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48785 as well as that of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 38, in
LRC Case No. TG-396 are both REVERSED. Judgment is rendered dismissing LRC Case No. 396
for failure of the applicants therein to comply with the thirty year occupancy and possessory
requirements of law for confirmation of imperfect title. No pronouncement as to costs. 1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 195097 August 13, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MARLON MEDIDA, Respondent.
VELASCO, JR.,J.,*

VILLARAMA, JR.,**

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This resolves the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) to assail the Decision dated December 16, 20 I 0 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
1

CV No. 01870, entitled Marlon Medida, Petitioner-appellee, v. Republic of the Philippines,

Oppositor-appellant.

On October 22, 2004, herein respondent Marlon Medida (Medida) filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Argao, Cebu a petition for registration of title over two parcels of land situated in Poblacion,
Boljoon, Cebu, identified as Lot Nos. 817 and 597 of Boljoon Cad. 1049-D and measuring 5,972 and
533 square meters, respectively. The petition was docketed as LRA Case No. AL-31 and raffled to
Branch 26 of the RTC, Argao, Cebu.

The initial hearing on the petition was conducted on September 22, 2005, with the attendance of the
public prosecutor. The RTC delegated the reception of evidence to its Clerk of Court. Before the
court, Medida testified that he purchased the subject properties in February 1997 from one Eufemia
Romero (Romero), who had previously obtained the lots from Nabor Derama (Derama). At the time
of the lots’ purchase by Medida, the properties were covered by Tax Declaration No. 08774 under
the name of Romero. Medida started occupying the properties in 1997, and had since then declared
the properties for tax purposes under his name. 2

Also among the witnesses presented during the proceedings a quo were Asuncion Derama
Binagatan (Binagatan) and Engineer Rafaela A. Belleza (Engr. Belleza).

Binagatan, daughter of Derama, testified that her father had inherited the subject properties from his
uncle, one Florencio Villareal, who possessed the lots even prior to the Second World War. She
presented the old Tax Declaration No. 08590 under the name of her father and covering the subject
properties.3

Engr. Belleza, the Chief of the Technical Services of the Land Management Services – Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VII, testified that the lots’ survey conducted
by Geodetic Engineer Jose V. Dumaguing (Engr. Dumaguing) was approved by their office. Per the
Advance Survey Plans for Lot Nos. 817 and 597 identified by Engr. Belleza, the subject properties
4 5

had already been declared alienable and disposable portions of the public domain.

On June 21, 2006, the trial court ruled in favor of Medida via a Decision with dispositive portion that
6

reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the petitioner to have sufficient title proper for registration, the petition is
hereby GRANTED and judgment is hereby rendered confirming the title of petitioner Marlon D.
Medida, married to Patricia F. Medida, over the following parcels of land:

1. A parcel of land, Lot 817, Cad. 1049-D, under AP-07-003683, situated in Barangay Poblacion,
Municipality of Boljoon, Province of Cebu, containing an area of FIVE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
SEVENTY-TWO (5,972) SQUARE METERS; and
2. A parcel of land, Lot 597, Cad. 1049-D, under AP 07-003653, situated in Barangay Poblacion,
Municipality of Boljoon, Province of Cebu, containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE
(533) SQUARE METERS.

IT IS SO DECIDED. 7

Unsatisfied with the decision of the RTC, petitioner Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed an appeal before the CA based on a lone assignment of error, to wit:

The trial court erred in granting appellee’s petition for registration because the subject lands were
not occupied and possessed for the period required by law. 8

In support of its appeal, the OSG argued that it was only from the subject lands’ date of alienability
and disposability that the reckoning of the thirty (30)-year statutory requirement of possession should
begin. Based on the Advance Survey Plans submitted by the respondent, Lot Nos. 817 and 597
were declared alienable and disposable in 1987 and 1980, respectively. The OSG then argued that
9

Medida’s possession of the properties prior to 1987 and 1980, as the case may be, should not be
credited as part of the period of possession required from him as an applicant for land registration.

On December 16, 2010, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the appeal. It ruled that
10

the doctrine invoked by the OSG had been abandoned by recent jurisprudence. The appellate court
emphasized that the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No.
1529 (P.D. No. 1529), otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, now merely requires
the property for registration to be already declared alienable and disposable at the time that the
application for registration of title is filed in court. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the Decision
dated June 21, 2006, rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Laoang Northern Argao,
Cebu, in LRA Case No. AL-31 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 11

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. The Republic invokes in its petition a lone ground, to wit:

THE COURT OF APPEALS’ CONCLUSION THAT THE SUBJECT LANDS ARE PART OF THE
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE PORTION OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IS WITHOUT BASIS. 12

Citing jurisprudence on the matter, the Republic argues that the alienable and disposable character
of the subject parcels of land has not been sufficiently proved by the mere presentation of the
surveyor’s notations on the Advance Survey Plans for Lot Nos. 817 and 597. Petitioner Republic
claims that such requirement must be established by the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action,
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.

In his Comment, Medida maintains that he has sufficiently proved that the subject properties have
13

been declared alienable and disposable. To further support this assertion, he submitted with his
Comment the following certifications issued by the DENR-Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of Argao, Cebu: (1) the Certification dated June 22, 2011 which states
14

that the parcel of land described as Lot No. 817, Cad/Pls 1049-D, C-1 located at Poblacion, Boljoon,
Cebu with an area of 5,972 square meters is within the alienable and disposable area, Proj. No. 59-
A, L.C. Map No. 3280, certified on August 6, 1987, as verified by actual ground verification; and (2)
the Certification dated July 5, 2011 which states that the parcel of land described as Lot No. 597,
15

Cad/Pls 1049-D, C-1 located at Poblacion, Boljoon, Cebu with an area of 533 square meters is
within the alienable and disposable area, Proj. No. 59 L.C. Map No. 2876, certified on January 11,
1980, as verified by actual ground verification.

Medida also seeks the petition’s denial on the ground that it raises a question of fact, which is not
allowed in petitions for review under Rule 45. Medida further argues that the OSG is bound
conclusively by its declaration before the CA that the subject parcels of land have been declared
alienable and disposable.

Prescinding from the foregoing, the main issue for this Court’s resolution is: whether or not the CA
erred in ruling that the parcels of land subject of the application for registration are part of the
alienable and disposable portions of the public domain.

The petition is meritorious.

First, we address Medida’s argument that the present petition raises a question of fact which is
beyond the coverage of a petition for review on certiorari. The distinction between a "question of law"
and a "question of fact" is settled. There is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as
to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and which does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a
"question of fact" when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn
therefrom is correct, is a question of law.
16

Judging by the arguments that are raised by the OSG in its petition, the issue delves on the alleged
insufficiency of the documents presented by the respondent to support the CA’s conclusion that the
subject parcels of land have been validly declared alienable and disposable. In Republic v. Ve g
a, we explained that when a petitioner seeks the review of a lower court’s ruling based on the
17

evidence presented, without delving into their probative value but only on their sufficiency to support
the legal conclusions made, then a question of law is raised. We explained:

The Petition raises a question of law, and not a question of fact. Petitioner Republic simply takes
issue against the conclusions made by the trial and the appellate courts regarding the nature and
character of the subject parcel of land, based on the evidence presented. When petitioner asks for a
review of the decisions made by a lower court based on the evidence presented, without delving into
their probative value but simply on their sufficiency to support the legal conclusions made, then a
question of law is raised.

xxxx

Petitioner Republic is not calling for an examination of the probative value or truthfulness of the
evidence presented, x x x. It, however, questions whether the evidence on record is sufficient to
support the lower court's conclusion that the subject land is alienable and disposable. Otherwise
stated, considering the evidence presented by respondents Vegas in the proceedings below, were
the trial and the appellate courts justified under the law and jurisprudence in their findings on the
nature and character of the subject land? Undoubtedly, this is a pure question of law, which calls for
a resolution of what is the correct and applicable law to a given set of facts. (Emphasis ours)
18

The issue in the present petition has been limited by the Republic, as it merely concerns the merit of
notations in survey plans to prove that the properties sought to be registered have been declared
alienable and disposable. Similar to the Vega case, the contest rests on the matter of sufficiency of
evidence, an issue on a conclusion that was made by the appellate court without necessarily raising
an attack on the authenticity of the documents that were presented in the proceedings before the
RTC. The issue being invoked by the Republic to support its petition is then a question of law, a
matter that is within the purview of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

We now resolve the petition’s substantial issue. Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in
our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any
asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified
or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part
of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.
19

On this requirement of proof to establish that a land has become alienable and disposable, the
respondent argues that the Advance Survey Plans that were prepared by Engr. Dumaguing and
20

approved by the DENR-Land Management Bureau, providing notations that the lots indicated therein
are within the alienable and disposable properties of the State, should suffice. We disagree.

As the rule now stands, an applicant must prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable and disposable by establishing the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. In a line of cases, we have
21

ruled that mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties’
alienable and disposable character. Our ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Tri-Plus
Corporation is particularly instructive:
22

It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law
is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable
and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or
statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for
are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was
certified by the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the
technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with
the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from
the proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable
and disposable. (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
23

Clearly, even the testimony of Engr. Belleza fails to satisfy the required proof. Before us, Medida
attempts to remedy the deficiency in his application by submitting the Certifications of the CENRO of
24

Argao, Cebu, attached to his Comment to further substantiate his claim that the subject properties
were already declared alienable and disposable. Unfortunately for the respondent, the said CENRO
Certifications remain inadequate to support his intended purpose.

In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., this Court explained that a Provincial Environment and Natural
25

Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO certification, by itself, fails to prove the alienable and
disposable character of a parcel of land. We ruled:

It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the
land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable. Respondents failed to do so because the certifications presented by
respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. (Emphasis ours)
26

We further explained why a CENRO or PENRO certification cannot be considered prima

facie evidence of the facts stated therein:

Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as
follows:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.

Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested
by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official
repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as
alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication of the DENR
Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.

Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

"Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. – Documents consisting of entries in public records made
in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to
their execution and of the date of the latter."

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class
of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications
do not reflect "entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such
as entries made by the Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ship’s
logbook. The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original
official records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records of
public documents. x x x. (Citations omitted and italics ours)
27

The present rule on the matter then requires that an application for original registration be
accompanied by: (1) CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. Medida failed in this respect. The records only include CENRO Certifications on the subject
28

properties’ alienability and disposability, but not a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by its legal custodian.

Furthermore, even the CENRO Certifications filed before this Court deserve scant consideration
since these were not presented during the trial. The genuineness and due execution of these
documents had not been duly proven in the manner required by law. 29

In view of the failure of the respondent to establish by sufficient proof that the subject parcels of land
had been classified as part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, his application
for registration of title should be denied.

There is even no merit in the petitioner’s argument that the Republic is bound by an alleged judicial
admission on the subject properties’ alienability and disposability, when the latter included the
following statement in its Brief filed before the CA:
30

The Advance Survey Plan clearly shows that the Lot No. 817 and Lot No. 597, albeit alienable and
disposable land, were declared only as such in 1987 and 1980, respectively. (Citation omitted)
31

Said statement cannot be construed as an admission on the alienable and disposable character of
the subject properties, as the Republic merely cited the contents of the Advance Survey Plans to lay
its basis in saying that Medida had not satisfied the required number of years of possession.
Furthermore, the afore-quoted statement should not be interpreted in isolation or taken out of
context, as the statements prior to the alleged judicial admission in fact provide:

Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conversion of such
patrimony. The same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, anyone who applies for registration of
ownership over a parcel of land has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought
to be registered forms part of the public domain.

Such burden was not discharged in the present case. x x x. (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
32

This Court also holds that the alienability and disposability of land are not among the matters that
can be established by mere admissions, or even the agreement of parties. The law and
jurisprudence provide stringent requirements to prove such fact. Our Constitution, no less,
33

embodies the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the
source of any asserted right to ownership of land. The courts are then empowered, as we are duty-
bound, to ensure that such ownership of the State is duly protected by the proper observance by
parties of the rules and requirements on land registration.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition IS GRANTED. The Decision dated December 16,
20 I 0 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01870 is hereby SET ASIDE. The application for
registration filed by Marlon Medida is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

[ G.R. No. 198629. April 05, 2022 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. EFREN S. BUENAVENTURA,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

GAERLAN, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 dated October 24, 2011 filed by the
Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing
the Decision2 dated September 13, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93753,
which affirmed the Decision3 dated June 29, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo,
Rizal, Branch 77, granting respondent Efren S. Buenaventura's (Buenaventura) application for land
registration.

The facts are as follows:

On January 11, 2008, Buenaventura filed a Petition4 before the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal,
applying for the original registration of title of Lot No. 1788, Cad. 674 (the subject property). In his
petition, Buenaventura alleged that:

1. He purchased the subject property from Lorenzo Habagat as evinced by a Deed of

Absolute Sale dated August 4, 1993 (Deed of Sale);

2. The subject property is situated on P. Sandoval St., Burgos, Rodriguez, Rizal;

3. The subject property has a market value of ₱229,900.00 per the Declaration of Real
Property under Property Index No. 021-08-002;

4. The subject property is declared for assessment under his name;

5. To his knowledge, the subject property is not mortgaged nor encumbered;

6. The subject property is exclusively occupied by him;

7. The subject property is alienable and disposable; and

8. He has been religiously paying the real property taxes thereon.5

On June 16, 2008, the Republic, through the OSG, filed an Opposition,6 praying for the denial of
Buenaventura's application for original registration of title.

During trial, Buenaventura presented himself and the following witnesses: (1) Ferdinand
Encarnacion (Encarnacion) from the Docket Section of the Land Registration Authority (LRA); (2)
Loriza Aldeano (Aldeano), an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR)-Region IV-A City Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO); and (3) Engr.
Marilou Daga (Engr. Daga) from the Projection Section of the LRA.7
 Buenaventura testified that he is the owner of the subject property which he bought from
Lorenzo Habagat in 1993 by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale.8 He also stated that the subject
property consists of 209 square meters, and is surveyed and classified as a residential lot.
Buenaventura explained that previously, the subject property measured 220 square meters, but the
same was reduced because of a road widening project. Further, Buenaventura testified that he
constructed a house thereon and lived there, but the house is now being rented out. Finally,
Buenaventura averred that as early as 1949, or even before the execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale, he has been paying real property taxes on the subject property.9

Encarnacion testified that as an employee of the Docket Section of the LRA, he is in charge of
safekeeping of records in their office. He then verified that a survey plan of the subject property has
been submitted to their office, and that the same is not covered by any cadastral record or title.10

Meanwhile, Aldeano stated that she is the Records Officer of the CENRO of the DENR-Region
IV-A, and as part of her duties, she is responsible to keep on file the records of their office. She
likewise identified a Certification dated January 18, 2008 signed by Flordelino M. Rey, Officer-In-
Charge-CENRO, which states that the subject property is within the alienable and disposable zone
and is not covered by any other application for registration of title.11

Lastly, Engr. Daga testified that she is the Chief of the Projection Section of the DENR, and that
as part of her duties, she is tasked to supervise the ocular inspection of lands, and verify surveys
and certifications. She further testified that upon review of the original plan of the subject property,
there were no overlapping of lots nor double issuance of title involving the subject property 12

The RTC Ruling

After trial, the RTC issued its Decision13 dated June 29, 2009, which granted Buenaventura's
application, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the Applicant has established sufficiently and satisfactorily
his ownership in fee simple of the property applied for and is thus declared its true and absolute
owner in fee simple.

The Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal is hereby ordered to cause the registration of the
property described as Plan Ap-04-007060, Lot 1788, Cad. 674, Montalban Cadastre, situated at P.
Sandoval Street, Burgos, Rodriguez, Rizal, in the name of Applicant, EFREN S. BUENAVENTURA,
with reservation that the same shall be subject of easement for public use, if necessary, and once
this Decision becomes final and executory, a decree of registration shall be issued and thereafter,
the original certificate of title.

SO ORDERED.14

The Republic, through the OSG, assailed the said Decision15 and filed an appeal before the CA
based on the following grounds:

First, the RTC erred in granting the application for original registration of Lot No. 1788, Cad. 674
despite the absence of proof that the subject land is alienable and disposable.16

Second, the RTC erred in granting the application for registration despite Buenaventura's failure
to prove his possession and ownership of the subject property.17
 The Ruling of the CA

On September 13, 2011, the CA promulgated its Decision,18 dismissing the Republic's appeal,
thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision dated June 29, 2009 of the RTC,
Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal in L.R.C. Case No. N-326 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.19

In affirming the RTC's Decision,20 the CA ruled that the certification issued by the CENRO is
sufficient to establish that the subject property is considered alienable and disposable.21 The CA
likewise held that Buenaventura was able to establish his right to have the subject property
registered since: (1) he purchased the subject property from its previous owner; (2) he has occupied
it openly, continuously, notoriously, and exclusively in the concept of an owner; (3) he has declared
the subject property for taxation purposes under his name; and (4) he built a house thereon, lived
there for a while, and later rented it out to someone else.22

The Instant Petition

Undeterred by the adverse ruling of the CA, the Republic, through the OSG, filed the instant
petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following issue:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW

WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE SUBJECT LAND IS
SUSCEPTIBLE OF REGISTRATION UNDER THE PROPERTY
REGISTRATION DECREE DESPITE ABSENCE OF
INCONTROVERTIBLE PROOF THAT RESPONDENT IS
ENTITLED TO A CONFIRMATION OF TITLE.23

In the petition, the Republic cited several cases where the Court clarified that a certification from
the CENRO is insufficient to establish that a particular property is part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, since apart from such certification, a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of
the official records must likewise be presented.24

In this case, the Republic emphasized that Buenaventura failed to present the original
classification of the DENR Secretary and only submitted the certification issued by the CENRO.
Considering that such certification is not enough to prove that the subject property is considered
alienable and disposable land, the Republic argued that the subject property cannot be registered.25

Furthermore, the Republic alleged that Buenaventura likewise failed to establish his ownership
and possession of the subject property since the Deed of Absolute Sale did not contain any technical
description of the subject property, and the property covered by the same consists of 220 square
meters, while the subject property only consists of 209 square meters.26

Finally, the Republic contended that Buenaventura failed to present any credible piece of
evidence to demonstrate that he and his predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property.27
 On March 7, 2012, Buenaventura filed his Comment/Opposition (To the Petition for Review
on Certiorari),28 where he argued that he was able to sufficiently establish that the subject property
forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain since the certification issued by
the CENRO is sufficient to establish the legal requirements for land registration. Moreover,
Buenaventura stated that the CA correctly ruled that he and his predecessor-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property.29

On June 13, 2012, the Republic, through the OSG, filed its Reply,30 where it was reiterated that
a certification issued by the CENRO is not enough for purposes of land registration, considering that
case law is clear that apart from such certification, an applicant must likewise present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary in order to prove that the land has been
released as alienable and disposable.31

The Court's Ruling

Land registration is governed by Section 14 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, which provides:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing
laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession
or accretion under the existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.

Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for
the original registration of the land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption expire
during the pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in
the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the
proceedings.

A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by
him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust. (Emphasis supplied)

Applying the foregoing, applicants whose circumstances fall under Section 14(1) must establish
the following: first, that the applicant and his or her predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; second, that it is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and third, that the subject land
 forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain.32 Each element must be
proven, otherwise, the application for registration should be denied.33

Notably, on September 1, 2021, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 11573, entitled An Act Improving the
Confirmation Process for Imperfect Land Titles, Amending For The Purpose Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended, otherwise known as "The Public Land Act," and Presidential Decree No. 1529, as
amended, otherwise known as the "Property Registration Decree" took effect. Among the changes
that R.A. No. 11573 introduced is the amendment of Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529, to wit:

SECTION 6. Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file at any time, in the proper Regional
Trial Court in the province where the land is located, an application for registration of title to land, not
exceeding twelve (12) hectares, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain not covered by existing certificates of title or patents under
a bona fide claim of ownership for at least twenty (20) years immediately preceding the filing
of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure.
They shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under this section.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned riverbeds by right of accession or
accretion under the provisions of existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.

Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for
the original registration of the land: Provided, however, That should the period for redemption expire
during the pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in
the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the
proceedings.

A trustee on behalf of the principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by
the trustee, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, under R.A. No. 11573, the period of possession is shortened since instead of requiring the
applicants to establish their possession from "June 12, 1945, or earlier," the amendment introduced
by R.A. No. 11573 only requires proof of possession for "at least twenty (20) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure."

In this case, it must be recalled that both the RTC and the CA found that Buenaventura was able
to sufficiently establish his possession over the subject property. Pertinently, it must be stressed that
the findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are deemed final and conclusive, and
may no longer be reviewed on appeal. As held in Givero v. Givero:34
 The restriction of the review to questions of law emanates from the Court's not being
a trier of facts. As such, the Court cannot determine factual issues in appeals taken
from the lower courts. As the consequence of the restriction, the Court accords
high respect, if not conclusive effect, to the findings of fact by the RTC, when
affirmed by the CA, x x x.35 (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted)

That findings of fact of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, are binding upon the Court is
reiterated in Dacanay v. People,36 thus:

[I]t is settled that the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses
and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said
findings are accorded respect, if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were
affirmed by the appellate court. When the findings of the trial court have been affirmed by the
appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court. x x x.37 (Emphasis
supplied; citation omitted)

Thus, it is evident that the RTC and the CA's finding that Buenaventura sufficiently established
his possession over the subject property is binding upon this Court. In other words, the only
remaining issue to be resolved is whether Buenaventura was able to prove that the subject property
forms part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain to warrant its registration
thereof.

To recall, in order to satisfy the requirement of showing that the subject property forms part of
the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, Buenaventura presented the certification
issued by the CENRO, stating that the subject property is alienable and disposable land. On the
other hand, the Republic argued that such certification, in itself, is not enough to prove that the
subject property is alienable and disposable land, since the same should be accompanied by an
official publication of the DENR Secretary's issuance declaring the said land alienable and
disposable.

On this note, the Court deems it worthy to discuss that at the time material to this case, the
prevailing doctrine is that a CENRO certification is not enough to establish that a piece of land is
alienable and disposable.38 In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.39 (T.A.N. Properties), this Court
categorically held that a certification from the CENRO is insufficient to prove that a piece of land is
alienable and disposable, to wit:

Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved
the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area
per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so
because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the
land is alienable and disposable.40 (Emphasis supplied)

Meanwhile, in Republic v. San Mateo41 (San Mateo), this Court expressly stated that both
certification from the CENRO and the approval of the DENR Secretary are required to establish that
a piece of land is alienable and disposable:
 Clearly, therefore, a CENRO certification that a certain property is alienable, without the
corresponding proof that the DENR Secretary had approved such certification, is insufficient to
support a petition for registration of land. Both certification and approval are required to be
presented as proofs that the land is alienable. Otherwise, the petition must be denied.42

The requirement of presenting both the certification from the CENRO and the approval of the
DENR Secretary in land registration cases has been thoroughly explained in Republic v. Spouses
Go43 (Spouses Go):

The 1987 Constitution declares that the State owns all public lands. Public lands are classified
into agricultural, mineral, timber or forest, and national parks. Of these four (4) types of public lands,
only agricultural lands may be alienated. Article XII, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution provide:

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated x x x.

Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law
according to the uses [to] which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall
be limited to agricultural lands x x x.

Thus, an applicant has the burden of proving that the public land has been classified as
alienable and disposable. To do this, the applicant must show a positive act from the government
declassifying the land from the public domain and converting it into an alienable and disposable
land. "[T]he exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the
Executive Department." In Victoria v. Republic:

To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and
a legislative act or statute. The applicant may secure a certification from the government that the
lands applied for are alienable and disposable, but the certification must show that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the pub[l]ic domain
as alienable and disposable[.] x x x

Section X(1) of the DENR Administrative Order No. 1998-24 and Section IX(1) of DENR
Administrative Order No. 2000-11 affirm that the DENR Secretary is the approving authority for
"[l]and classification and release of lands of the public domain as alienable and
disposable." Section 4.6 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2007-20 defines land classification as
follows:

Land classification is the process of demarcating, segregating, delimiting and establishing the
best category, kind, and uses of public lands. Article XII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines provides that lands of the public domain are to be classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks.

These provisions, read with Victoria v. Republic, establish the rule that before an inalienable
land of the public domain becomes private land, the DENR Secretary must first approve the
land classification into an agricultural land and release it as alienable and disposable. The
DENR Secretary's official acts "may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy."

The CENRO or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer will then conduct a
survey to verify that the land for original registration falls within the DENR Secretary-approved
alienable and disposable zone.

The CENRO certification is issued only to verify the DENR Secretary issuance through a
survey. "Thus, the CENRO Certification should have been accompanied by an official
publication of the DENR Secretary's issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable." A
CENRO certification, by itself, is insufficient to prove the alienability and disposability of land
sought to be registered. In Republic v. Lualhati:

'[I]t has been repeatedly ruled that certifications issued by the CENRO, or specialists of the
DENR, as well as Survey Plans prepared by the DENR containing annotations that the subject lots
are alienable, do not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the
property sought to be registered belongs to the inalienable public domain. Rather, this Court
stressed the importance of proving alienability by presenting a copy of the original
classification of the land approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records.44 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Thus, as explained in the above-cited cases, in applications for original registration of title, the
applicant must present: (1) a certification from the CENRO; and (2) a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of
the official records, in order to establish that the land is indeed alienable and disposable. Therefore,
based on this rule, it is clear that Buenaventura failed to establish that the subject property has been
classified as alienable or disposable land. Although Buenaventura was able to present the
Certification from the CENRO, such certification is insufficient to prove that the land sought to be
registered is alienable and disposable. Without the DENR Secretary's issuance declaring the subject
property as alienable and disposable, the land remains part of the public domain, and thus, cannot
be registered under Buenaventura's name.

Despite the foregoing disquisition, however, it is worthy to reiterate that with the enactment of
R.A. No. 11573, certain amendments to P.D. No. 1529 were introduced. Apart from the shortening of
the period to 20 years, as discussed above, R.A. No. 11573 likewise provides that a DENR
certification is sufficient proof to establish the status of land as alienable and disposable, to wit:

SECTION 7. Proof that the Land is Alienable and Disposable. — For purposes of judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles filed under Presidential Decree No. 1529, a duly signed certification
by a duly designated DENR geodetic engineer that the land is part of alienable and
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain is sufficient proof that the land is
alienable. Said certification shall be imprinted in the approved survey plan submitted by the
applicant in the land registration court. The imprinted certification in the plan shall contain a
sworn statement by the geodetic engineer that the land is within the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain and shall state the applicable Forestry Administrative Order,
DENR Administrative Order, Executive Order, Proclamations and the Land Classification
Project Map Number covering the subject land.

Should there be no available copy of the Forestry Administrative Order, Executive Order or
Proclamation, it is sufficient that the Land Classification (LC) Map Number, Project Number,
and date of release indicated in the land classification map be stated in the sworn statement
declaring that said land classification map is existing in the inventory of LC Map records of
the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) and is being used by the
DENR as land classification map. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Clearly, R.A. No. 11573 effectively superseded the requirements in T.A.N. Properties, San
Mateo, and Spouses Go, as discussed above. Thus, as the rule now stands, the presentation of a
certification signed by the designated DENR geodetic engineer, stating that the land forms part of
the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain, shall be deemed sufficient proof that the
same is alienable and disposable.

In fact, in the recent case of Republic v. Pasig Rizal, Co., Inc.45 (Pasig Rizal, Co.) which
involves facts similar to the instant case, the Court sitting En Banc, exhaustively discussed the effect
of the enactment of R.A. No. 11573 vis-à-vis the sufficiency of a DENR certification in proving that a
certain parcel of land is alienable and disposable, to wit:

Hence, at present, the presentation of the approved survey plan bearing a certification
signed by a duly designated DENR geodetic engineer stating that the land subject of the
application for registration forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain shall be sufficient proof of its classification as such, provided that the
certification bears references to: (i) the relevant issuance (e.g., Forestry Administrative Order,
DENR Administrative Order, Executive Order, or Proclamation); and (ii) the LC Map number
covering the subject land.

In the absence of a copy of the relevant issuance classifying the subject land as alienable
and disposable, the certification of the DENR geodetic engineer must state: (i) the LC Map
number; (ii) the Project Number; and (iii) the date of release indicated in the LC Map; and (iv)
the fact that the LC Map forms part of the records of the National Mapping and Resource
Information Authority (NAMRIA) and is therefore being used by DENR as such.46 (Emphasis
supplied)

In the same case, the Court also discussed that such certification must be properly
authenticated by the DENR geodetic engineer, thus:

In addition, the DENR geodetic engineer must be presented as witness for proper
authentication of the certification so presented. The Court's ruling in Republic v. Galeno lends
guidance:

In Republic v. Medida, the Court held that certifications of the Regional

Technical Director, DENR cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein, holding that:

Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers,
whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last

wills and testaments; and
 (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein.

Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in

Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy x x x.

Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. — Documents

consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a
third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the
date of the latter.

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications

[do] not fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first
sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in
public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such as
entries made by the Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in
the ship's logbook. The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated
reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government office.
The certifications are not even records of public documents. x x x

As such, sans the testimonies of Acevedo, Caballero, and the other public
officers who issued respondent's documentary evidence to confirm the veracity of its
contents, the same are bereft of probative value and cannot, by their mere issuance,
prove the facts stated therein. At best, they may be considered only as prima
facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but do not
constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

Like certifications issued by the CENROs, Regional Technical Directors,

and other authorized officials of the DENR with respect to land classification
status, certifications of similar import issued by DENR geodetic engineers do
not fall within the class of public documents contemplated under Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court. Accordingly, their authentication in accordance with said
rule is necessary.47 (Emphasis supplied)

Simply put, apart from complying with the requirements set forth in Section 7 of R.A. No. 11573
(i.e., the statements with respect to the relevant issuance, and LC Map Number, among others), the
DENR geodetic engineer must also be presented as a witness for the proper authentication of such
certification. Undoubtedly, these requirements must be satisfied before any certification is
considered sufficient proof that a parcel of land is alienable and disposable.

In this regard, it must also be noted that while R.A. No. 11573 was not yet in effect at the time
material, to the case, the Court, in Pasig Rizal, Co. also held that R.A. No. 11573, particularly
Sections 6 and 7 thereof, may be retroactively applied because of its curative nature:
 As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
However, this rule is subject to certain recognized exceptions, as when the statute in question is
curative in nature, or creates new rights, thus:

As a general rule, laws have no retroactive effect. But there are certain
recognized exceptions, such as when they are remedial or procedural in nature. This
Court explained this exception in the following language:

It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws

shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But
there are settled exceptions to this general rule such as when the
statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES
NEW RIGHTS. 1a⍵⍴h!1

In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court shed light on the nature of

statutes that may be deemed curative and may therefore be applied retroactively
notwithstanding the absence of an express provision to this effect:

According to Tolentino, curative statutes are those which

undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial
or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private
deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their
intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or
failure to comply with some technical requirement. They operate on
conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in
operation. Agpalo, on the other hand, says that curative
statutes are "healing acts x x x curing defects and adding to
the means of enforcing existing obligations x x x (and ) are
intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing
laws, and curb certain evils x x x By their very nature, curative
statutes are retroactive x x x (and) reach back to past events to
correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective
attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose
the parties intended." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In Nunga, Jr. v. Nunga III, the Court further clarified that while a law creating new rights may be
given retroactive effect, this can only be done if the new right does not prejudice or impair any
vested rights.

On this basis, the Court finds that RA 11573, particularly Section 6 (amending Section 14 of PD
1529) and Section 7 (prescribing the required proof of land classification status), may operate
retroactively to cover applications for land registration pending as of September 1, 2021 or the date
when RA 11573 took effect.

To be sure, the curative nature of RA 11573 can easily be discerned from its declared purpose,
that is, "to simplify, update and harmonize similar and related provisions of land laws in order to
simplify and remove ambiguity in its interpretation and implementation. x x x"48

Given all the foregoing, it is abundantly clear that, contrary to the assertions of the Republic, a
DENR certification is sufficient to establish that a parcel of land forms part of the alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain.
 WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated October 24, 2011 is DENIED in part.
The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence on the subject property's
land classification status based on the parameters set forth in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 11573.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 186639 February 5, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
EMMANUEL C. CORTEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
1

annul and set aside the Decision dated February 17, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
2

CV No. 87505. The CA affirmed the Decision dated February 7, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
3

(RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 68, in LRC Case No. N-11496.

The Facts

On February 28, 2003, respondent Emmanuel C. Cortez (Cortez) filed with the RTC an
application for judicial confirmation of title over a parcel of land located at Barangay (Poblacion)
4

Aguho, P. Herrera Street, Pateros, Metro Manila. The said parcel of land has an area of 110 square
meters and more particularly described as Lot No. 2697-B of the Pateros Cadastre. In support of his
application, Cortez submitted, inter alia, the following documents: (1) tax declarations for various
years from 1966 until 2005; (2) survey plan of the property, with the annotation that the property is
classified as alienable and disposable; (3) technical description of the property, with a certification
issued by a geodetic engineer; (4) tax clearance certificate; (5) extrajudicial settlement of estate
dated March 21, 1998, conveying the subject property to Cortez; and (6) escritura de particion
extrajudicial dated July 19, 1946, allocating the subject property to Felicisima Cotas – Cortez’
mother.

As there was no opposition, the RTC issued an Order of General Default and Cortez was allowed to
present his evidence ex-parte.

Cortez claimed that the subject parcel of land is a portion of Lot No. 2697, which was declared for
taxation purposes in the name of his mother. He alleged that Lot No. 2697 was inherited by his
mother from her parents in 1946; that, on March 21, 1998, after his parents died, he and his siblings
executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate over the properties of their deceased parents and
one of the properties allocated to him was the subject property. He alleged that the subject property
had been in the possession of his family since time immemorial; that the subject parcel of land is not
part of the reservation of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and is, in
fact, classified as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD).

Cortez likewise adduced in evidence the testimony of Ernesto Santos, who testified that he has
known the family of Cortez for over sixty (60) years and that Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the subject property since he came to know them.
On February 7, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision, which granted Cortez’ application for
5

registration, viz:

WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious, the Court DECLARES, CONFIRMS, and
ORDERS the registration of the applicant’s title thereto.

As soon as this Decision shall have become final and after payment of the required fees, let the
corresponding Decrees be issued in the name of the applicant, Emmanuel C. Cortez.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General, Land Registration
Authority, Land Management Bureau, and the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.

SO ORDERED. 6

In granting Cortez’ application for registration of title to the subject property, the RTC made the
following ratiocinations:

From the foregoing, the Court finds that there is sufficient basis to grant the relief prayed for. It
having been established by competent evidence that the possession of the land being applied for by
the applicant and his predecessor-in-interest have been in open, actual, uninterrupted, and adverse
possession, under claim of title and in the concept of owners, all within the time prescribed by law,
the title of the applicant should be and must be AFFIRMED and CONFIRMED. 7

The Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
appealed to the CA, alleging that the RTC erred in granting the application for registration despite
the failure of Cortez to comply with the requirements for original registration of title. The petitioner
pointed out that, although Cortez declared that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in
possession of the subject parcel of land since time immemorial, no document was ever presented
that would establish his predecessors-in-interest’s possession of the same during the period
required by law. That petitioner claimed that Cortez’ assertion that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, adverse, and continuous possession of the subject property for more than
thirty (30) years does not constitute well-neigh incontrovertible evidence required in land registration
cases; that it is a mere claim, which should not have been given weight by the RTC.

Further, the petitioner alleged that there was no certification from any government agency that the
subject property had already been declared alienable and disposable. As such, the petitioner claims,
Cortez’ possession of the subject property, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or
possessory rights.

On February 17, 2009, the CA, by way of the assailed Decision, dismissed the petitioner’s appeal
8

and affirmed the RTC Decision dated February 7, 2006. The CA ruled that Cortez was able to prove
that the subject property was indeed alienable and disposable, as evidenced by the
declaration/notation from the BFD.

Further, the CA found that Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
and exclusive possession of the subject property for more than 30 years, which, under Section 14(2)
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 , sufficed to convert it to private property. Thus:
9

It has been settled that properties classified as alienable and disposable land may be converted into
private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30 years. Such
property now falls within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2) of PD 1529, over
which title by prescription can be acquired. Thus, under the second paragraph of Section 14 of PD
1529, those who are in possession of alienable and disposable land, and whose possession has
been characterized as open, continuous and exclusive for 30 years or more, may have the right to
register their title to such land despite the fact that their possession of the land commenced only
after 12 June 1945. x x x

xxxx

While it is significant to note that applicant-appellee’s possession of the subject property can be
traced from his mother’s possession of the same, the records, indeed, show that his possession of
the subject property, following Section 14(2) [of PD 1529], is to be reckoned from January 3, 1968,
when the subject property was declared alienable and disposable and not way back in 1946, the
year when he inherited the same from his mother. At any rate, at the time the application for
registration was filed in 2003, there was already sufficient compliance with the requirement of
possession. His possession of the subject property has been characterized as open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of an owner. (Citations omitted)
10

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue

The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision
dated February 7, 2006, which granted the application for registration filed by Cortez.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, the Court notes that the RTC did not cite any specific provision of law under which
authority Cortez’ application for registration of title to the subject property was granted. In granting
the application for registration, the RTC merely stated that "the possession of the land being applied
for by [Cortez] and his predecessor-in-interest have been in open, actual, uninterrupted, and adverse
possession, under claim of title and in the concept of owners, all within the time prescribed by
law[.]" On the other hand, the CA assumed that Cortez’ application for registration was based on
11

Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. Nevertheless, Cortez, in the application for registration he filed with
the RTC, proffered that should the subject property not be registrable under Section 14(2) of P.D.
No. 1529, it could still be registered under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No.
141), or the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No.
12

1529. Thus, the Court deems it proper to discuss Cortez’ application for registration of title to the
subject property vis-à-vis the provisions of Section 14(1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529.

Applicants for original registration of title to land must establish compliance with the provisions of
Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529, which pertinently provides that:

Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
 lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision
of existing laws.

xxxx

After a careful scrutiny of the records of this case, the Court finds that Cortez failed to comply with
the legal requirements for the registration of the subject property under Section 14(1) and (2) of P.D.
No. 1529.

Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to
public land acquired under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by P.D. No. 1073. "Under
Section 14(1) [of P.D. No. 1529], applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish first,
that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second,
that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier." 13

The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property forms part of
the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, Cortez adduced in evidence a survey plan
Csd-00-000633 (conversion-subdivision plan of Lot 2697, MCadm 594-D, Pateros Cadastral
14

Mapping) prepared by Geodetic Engineer Oscar B. Fernandez and certified by the Lands
Management Bureau of the DENR. The said survey plan contained the following annotation:

This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Project No. 29, classified as alienable & disposable by the
Bureau of Forest Development on Jan. 3, 1968.

However, Cortez’ reliance on the foregoing annotation in the survey plan is amiss; it does not
constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the subject property remains
part of the inalienable public domain. In Republic of the Philippines v. Tri-Plus Corporation, the
15

Court clarified that, the applicant must at the very least submit a certification from the proper
government agency stating that the parcel of land subject of the application for registration is indeed
alienable and disposable, viz:

It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law
is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable
and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or
statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for
are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was
certified by the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the
technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with
the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from
the proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable
and disposable. (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
16
Similarly, in Republic v. Roche, the Court declared that:
17

Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In
this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land classification status
issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and
disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or
PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts
must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified as alienable
or disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the survey map and technical
description of the land which bears no information regarding the land’s classification. She did not
bother to establish the status of the land by any certification from the appropriate government
agency. Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all requisites for registration of title under
Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529. (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
18

The annotation in the survey plan presented by Cortez is not the kind of evidence required by law as
proof that the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Cortez failed to present a certification from the proper government agency as to the classification of
the subject property. Cortez likewise failed to present any evidence showing that the DENR
Secretary had indeed classified the subject property as alienable and disposable. Having failed to
present any incontrovertible evidence, Cortez’ claim that the subject property forms part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain must fail.

Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that Cortez likewise failed to establish the
same. Cortez failed to present any evidence to prove that he and his predecessors-in-interest have
1âwphi1

been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
property since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Cortez was only able to present oral and documentary
evidence of his and his mother’s ownership and possession of the subject property since 1946, the
year in which his mother supposedly inherited the same.

Other than his bare claim that his family possessed the subject property since time immemorial,
Cortez failed to present any evidence to show that he and his predecessors-in-interest indeed
possessed the subject property prior to 1946; it is a mere claim and not factual proof of possession.
"It is a rule that general statements that are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of
possession are unavailing and cannot suffice. An applicant in a land registration case cannot just
harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the application but must impress thereto the facts and
circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership and possession of the land." 19

Further, the earliest tax declaration presented by Cortez was only in 1966. Cortez failed to explain
why, despite his claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
subject property since time immemorial, it was only in 1966 that his predecessors-in-interest started
to declare the same for purposes of taxation.

That Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property for
fifty-seven (57) years at the time he filed his application for registration in 2003 would likewise not
entitle him to registration thereof under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 sanctions the original registration of lands acquired by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws. "As Section 14(2) [of P.D. No. 1529] categorically provides,
only private properties may be acquired thru prescription and under Articles 420 and 421 of the Civil
Code, only those properties, which are not for public use, public service or intended for the
development of national wealth, are considered private." 20

In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, the Court however clarified that lands of the public domain
21

that are patrimonial in character are susceptible to acquisitive prescription and, accordingly, eligible
for registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, viz:

The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by private
persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states that "[a]ll things
which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription," and that property of the State
or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription."

There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under the Civil
Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117, requires possession in
1âwphi1

good faith and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10)
years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial property of
the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose such
a rule. At the same time, there are indispensable requisites–good faith and just title. The
ascertainment of good faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article
1127 of the Civil Code, provisions that more or less speak for themselves. (Citation omitted and
22

emphasis ours)

The Court nevertheless emphasized that there must be an official declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for the development
of national wealth before it can be acquired by prescription; that a mere declaration by government
officials that a land of the public domain is already alienable and disposable would not suffice for
purposes of registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The Court further stressed that the
period of acquisitive prescription would only begin to run from the time that the State officially
declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for
the development of national wealth. Thus:

Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or any duly
authorized government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the public domain. Would
such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property
of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and
disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things
within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides
that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription.

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial
property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those
property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as
the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains
property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth."
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is
no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article
420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and
disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run.
Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law. (Emphasis supplied)
23

In Republic v. Rizalvo, the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in Malabanan, viz:
24

On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration because his claim
of ownership and possession over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is
jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for purposes of acquiring
ownership and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the
moment the State expressly declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. x x x. (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
25

Accordingly, although lands of the public domain that are considered patrimonial may be acquired by
prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, before acquisitive prescription could commence,
the property sought to be registered must not only be classified as alienable and disposable; it must
also be declared by the State that it is no longer intended for public use, public service or the
development of the national wealth. Thus, absent an express declaration by the State, the land
remains to be property of public dominion. 26

The Court finds no evidence of any official declaration from the state attesting to the patrimonial
character of the subject property. Cortez failed to prove that acquisitive prescription has begun to run
against the State, much less that he has acquired title to the subject property by virtue thereof. It is
of no moment that Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject
property for 57 years at the time he applied for the registration of title thereto. "[l]t is not the
notorious, exclusive and uninterrupted possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable
public land for the mandated periods that converts it to patrimonial. The indispensability of an official
declaration that the property is now held by the State in its private capacity or placed within the
commerce of man for prescription to have any effect against the State cannot be overemphasized. " 27

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated February 17, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87505, which affirmed
the Decision dated February 7, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68, in LRC
Case No. N-11496, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Application for Registration of
Emmanuel C. Cortez in LRC Case No. N-11496 is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.