LTD 1

REP. OF THE PHILS vs. CA, et al.

[G.R. No. 127245.January 30, 2001] EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JAN 30 2001.

G.R. No. 127245(Republic of the Philippines vs. CA, et al.)

G.R. No. 127022 (Firestone Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA, et al.)

Before us are (1) two (2) motions for reconsideration of our decision dated September 2, 1999
filed by petitioner Republic in G. R. No. 127245 and by petitioners Firestone Ceramics, et al. in
G. R. No. 127022, (2) private respondent Peltan's motion to dismiss dated September 15, 2000.

We shall first rule on the procedural issue. Private respondent Peltan filed a motion to dismiss
alleging that the Republic's petition was filed one day late, thus the judgment appealed from has
become final and executory. We find the same to be unmeritorious since it is already too late to
raise the issue at this stage of the proceedings and we rule that justice will be best served if
these cases will be decided on their merits rather than on mere technicality.

We now consider the merits of these cases.

(1) G.R. No. 127245

In G. R. No. 127245, petitioner Republic moved for reconsideration on the following grounds:

I. THE RULE ON RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY TO THE INSTANT CASES;

II. ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT RES JUDICATA MAY BE

APPLIED, THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE WHICH IS HIGHER AND MORE
COMPELLING THAN RES JUDICATA WARRANTS THE EXEMPTION OF THIS
CASE FROM THE RULE OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS;
III. THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION IS THAT UNLESS CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE, UNCLASSIFIED LANDS
ARE NOT ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE; AND
IV. IF THE DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER 2, 1999 OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT IS NOT RECONSIDERED PETITIONER STANDS TO
LOSE VAST TRACK (SIC) OF PRIME LAND NOW VALUED AT ABOUT
P27,892,900,000.00.

Petitioner Republic submits that the decisions of this Court in Margolles et al. vs. CA 1 230
SCRA 97., Peltan Development Corporation et. al. vs. CA 2 270 SCRA 83., and Goldenrod, Inc.
vs. CA 3 August 10, 1994 resolution.do not constitute a bar to the present case based on the rule
of res judicata, as the said cases pertained to the superiority of conflicting titles of the parties
therein whereas the present case resolves on the validity of the judgment covering a vast parcel
of land rendered at the time when the land was still forest land; that the subject matter of the
present case is the entire parcel of land covered by OCT No. 4216 with an area of 996,175
square meters, whereas the cited Margolles case involved only a 188,254 square meter portion
of the land covered by OCT No. 4216. Petitioner insists that it was not a party in the Margolles
case and that its cause of action in the present case is based on the inalienability and
indisposability of the subject land and consequent lack of jurisdiction of the land registration
court over the same. Thus there is no identity of parties or of subject matter, or of cause of
action that would justify application of the rule of res judicata.

Petitioner Republic further contends that land not classified as alienable and disposable remain
so and it is the private claimant who bears the burden of showing that the Executive Department
has in fact classified the land as disposable and alienable; that under the regalian doctrine, all
lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State, thus, whatever title issued before such classification is considered null and void ab
 LTD 2

initio. It contends that during the oral argument, the Solicitor General stated that initially it is the
government which has the burden of proof to show that the title of the Spouses Gana is invalid
or not legal but the burden is shifted to private respondents once the government has
established the fact that the title was issued before the land had been declared as alienable and
disposable; that since the land covered by OCT No. 4216 was still part of the unclassified forest
land in 1927, the then CFI of Rizal sitting as a land registration court, which took cognizance of
the land registration case and all the proceedings conducted therein including but not limited to
the issuance of the published notice of initial hearing in the 1927 issue of the Official Gazette
were invalid, that land registration courts at the time the Ganas filed their application, had no
power nor authority to determine whether the land applied for was forest or agricultural land
subject of registration since the authority to classify lands was then vested in the Director of
Lands as provided in Act Nos. 926 (1903) and 2874 (1919).

Petitioner Republic also claims that private respondents' reliance on Section 45 of Act No. 2874
at this final stage of the proceedings, which only indicates that the Gana spouses instituted their
application for land registration on confirmation of imperfect title supposedly grounded on their
alleged "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation" is fraught with
untenable implications since OCT No. 4216 was not evidenced by any judicial record, decision
or decree; thus private respondents invocation of "private rights" is hearsay and self serving.

On the other hand, private respondents Margolles et al and Peltan argue that this case must be
decided on the basis of the law and jurisprudence in force during 1927-1929 covering the time
when the application for registration was filed in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406)
and when OCT No. 4216 was issued; that it is not correct to say that no valid torrens title to land
can be obtained by individuals and entities in a land registration case unless the land was
previously covered by an executive proclamation declaring the land as alienable and
disposable. Respondents claim that property that was already privately owned or under private
ownership at the time the Spanish crown ceded sovereignty over the Philippine Islands to the
United States remained private property, even if the owner had not obtained a muniment of title
to his property; thus, such person who has held the property under color of title may institute a
land registration case to have the property brought under the torrens system and have a title
issue in his name; that even assuming that a particular piece of property was not yet privately
owned when the Spanish crown ceded sovereignty, private individuals or entities who held
"agricultural public land" openly, continuously, exclusively and notoriously, in the concept of
owners "for a period of ten years next preceding the twenty-sixth day of July 1904 were
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a "government grant"
and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land, 4 Section
54 (6) Act No. 926 of the Philippine Commission otherwise known as the Public Land Act.as a
qualified possessor of "agricultural public land"; that there was no requirement under Act No.
926 that the land subject of a government grant must have been previously declared as
alienable and disposable by the Governor General. Respondents claim that it was under Act No.
2874 that the Governor General was given for the first time the authority upon recommendation
of the Secretary of Agriculture to classify lands of public domain into alienable and disposable,
timber and mineral, and to transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of
their government and disposition. 5 Section 6 Act No. 2874.Respondents submit that under Act
No. 2974 just as in Act No. 926, such power of the Governor General did not affect lands that
may have already become "private property" or have become impressed with a "private right
authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law" 6 Section 8 Act No. 2874.and the
fact that such properties were not previously covered by a declaration by the Governor General
that these lands are alienable and disposable does not affect the validity of the titles of the
owners, e. g. the friar lands, the Hacienda de San Pedro Macati, the Tuason Entail, the
Hacienda de Maricaban, Hacienda de Navotas, the Piedad Estate, which were issued before
World II. The ownership of these parties who owned property during the Spanish regime was
not affected by Act No. 926 or Act No. 2874, which referred only to public lands. They further
contend that under the laws and jurisprudence in force at the time the proceedings in LRC Case
No. 678 (GLRO Record No. 30406) were conducted, and insofar as the confirmation of
imperfect titles is concerned, the determination of whether land is "agricultural public land"
susceptible of registration in the name of a private party, or "forest land" which is not susceptible
of private ownership, is a question of fact that the land registration court has the power and/or
jurisdiction to determine on the basis of the judicially prescribed or formulated test i.e., whether
the land is "more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for
agricultural purposes?".
 LTD 3

We resolve to deny the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner's arguments have been squarely discussed and were duly considered in our decision
and we reiterate that the Court of Appeals did not err in denying the petition to annul judgment
in view of the decision of this Court in the Margolles case. Petitioner's contention that it was
never a party to the Margolles case is not decisive of the issue. We have stated that absolute
identity of parties is not required but only substantial identity of parties for the application of the
rule on res judicata. We agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that although petitioner
was not a party in the Margolles case, its claim in the instant case and that of the losing parties
in the Margolles case raised exactly the same argument and relied on the same evidence to
justify invalidation of OCT No. 4216, namely, that said title supposedly covers unclassified
public land (forest land) so that the CFI of Rizal, sitting as a land registration court in 1929, did
not acquire jurisdiction to adjudicate the subject property in favor of the original applicants, the
Gana spouses. Such a shared identity of interest as shown by the identity of the relief sought by
one person in a prior case and the second person in the subsequent case, i. e., to declare the
nullity of OCT No. 4216, is sufficient to make them "privy in law" 7 Valencia vs. RTC of Quezon
City, 184 SCRA 80; Comilang vs. Buendia, 21 486; Santos vs. Gabriel, 45 SCRA 289; Widows
and Orphans Associations v. CA, 212 SCRA 360.for purposes of the operation of the rule on
res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment.

����������� The main argument of petitioner Republic in seeking annulment of the

decision of the then CFI of Rizal sitting as a land registration court in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO
Record No. 30406) was that the court did not have jurisdiction over the case because the
property subject matter thereof was "forest land" since at the time the land registration case was
filed in 1927, the Governor-General had not issued a proclamation declaring the subject
property as alienable and disposable.

Since the petitioner is assailing the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court which rendered
the judgment in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406) that became the basis for the
issuance of OCT No. 4216 seventy (70) years ago relies on the very same evidence (FAO 4-
1141 [1968] implementing LC Map No. 2623 Project No. 13-A), (namely land classification
maps), that was judicially determined by this Court as insufficient to conclusively establish the
actual classification of the land in 1929 and to overcome the overwhelming documentary
evidence adduced to support the validity of OCT No. 4216, we are compelled to affirm the
dismissal of the petition to annul the judgment which resulted in the issuance of OCT No. 4216.

We are not unmindful of the long settled rule that a presumption lies in favor of state ownership
and it is the individual who claims that the land is alienable and disposable who must present
clear, positive and absolute evidence to over the presumption of state ownership. While it may
be true that an applicant for original registration of a parcel of land bears the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of public domain,
compliance with this burden should be proven in the original proceedings instituted by the Gana
spouses in 1927, and must be legally presumed to have been satisfied as a decree was issued
in favor of the petitioners-spouses. Thus where a petition is filed to annul the said judgment on
the ground that it is fatally void, the burden of proving the nullity rests with the petitioner.

In Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals 8 189 SCRA
792.this Court emphasized "that in an action to annul a judgment, the burden of proving the
judgment's nullity rests upon the petitioner, and the petitioner must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the judgment is fatally defective." 9 In that case, the petitioner
contended in the proceedings filed by the Republic in the Court of Appeals, that when the
decree in favor of De Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the parcels of land were still
part of the inalienable public forests.However, petitioner's case rested solely on land
classification maps drawn several years after the issuance of the decree in 1912 which maps
fail to conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in 1912 and the years prior to
that.Before this Court, petitioner reiterated said contention and referred, for the first time, to a
1908 proclamation reserving the land in Zambales as a naval reservation and alleging that the
subject parcels of land are parts thereof.The Court held that these maps are insufficient to
overcome the legal presumption in favor of the decree's regularity.The Court held that land
classification maps drawn several years after the issuance of the decree in 1912 fail to
conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in 1912 and the years prior to that,
and are insufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of the decree's regularity.
 LTD 4

Respondents correctly posit that the court's jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at
the time of the filing of the action. 10 Moran, Comment on the Rules of Court, Vol. 1, 1995
edition, p. 55.Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined upon the
allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled or not to
recover upon the claim asserted therein, a matter that can be resolved only after and as a result
of the trial. 11 Ibid.It bears stress that what the petitioner sought to annul was the 1929 decision
of the land registration court which became the basis for the issuance of OCT No. 4216. The
law prevailing at the time the original land registration was sought, Act No. 2874 (1919) entitled
"An act to amend and compile the laws relative to lands of public domain, or better known as
"the Public Land Act" pertinently provides:

"Section 6. The Governor General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into-

(a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the
purposes of their government and disposition.

xxx

Section 8.Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which
have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have
not been reserved for public or quasi public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in
any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and
recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or
appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the Governor General may, for reasons of public
interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had their
boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their
concession or disposition until they are again declared open to concession or disposition by
proclamation duly published or by Act of the Legislature.

xxx

Section 11.Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows,
and not otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement

(2) By sale
(3) By lease.
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:
(a) By administrative legalization (free patent)
(b) By judicial legalization.

Section 45. The following described citizens of the Philippine Islands and the United States,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx������ xxx������ xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, except as against the
Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented
 LTD 5

by way of force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title, under the
provisions of this chapter."

We are inclined to agree with the respondents that it is legally doubtful if the authority of
the Governor General to declare lands as alienable and disposable would apply to lands that
have become private property or lands that have been impressed with a private right authorized
and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By express declaration of section 45 (b) of Act
2874 which is quoted above, those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public-domain under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an application with the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and these
applicants shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. When the land registration court
issued a decision for the issuance of a decree which was the basis of an original certificate of
title to the land, the court had already made a determination that the land was agricultural and
that the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive possession of the subject land
for the prescribed number of years. It was the land registration court which had the jurisdiction
to determine whether the land applied for was agricultural, forest or timber 12 In Ramos vs.
Director of Lands, 39 Phil 175, Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title
registered but opposition was entered by the Director of Lands on the ground that Ramos had
not acquired a good title from the Spanish government and by the Director of Forestry on the
ground that the first parcel was forest land. The trial court agreed with the oppositors and
excluded parcel no. 1. This Court reversed the judgment and ordered the lower court to register
parcel no.1 in the name of the applicant. It rationalized as follows:

'If in this instance we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it be noted that the government,
in the long run of cases, has its remedy. Forest reserves of public land can be established as
provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the government as to a particular
piece of property collide, if the government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a
forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not
more valuable for agriculture than forest purposes. Great considerations, it must be stated,
should and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who
speaks with authority on forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition on the part of the
Attorney General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop
the courts from giving title to the claimant." taking into account the proof or evidence in each
particular case. 13 Ankron vs. Government of Philippine Islands, 40 Phil 10.

Notably, petitioner Republic's petition for annulment of judgment in the respondent Court of
Appeals contended that the decree in favor of the Gana spouses was issued at the time when
the subject land was still forest land, (unfortunately no copy of the 1929 decision is available)
and rested its case solely on the land classification map No. 2623 Project 13-A which failed to
conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in 1929 or earlier. Moreover, FAO No.
4-1 141 signed by then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Arturo R. Tanco, Jr, on
January 3, 1968, which provides:

"1, Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1827 of the Revised

Administrative Code, (hereby declare as alienable or disposable and place the
same under the control of the Bureau of Lands for administration and disposition
in accordance with the Public Land Act, subject to private rights, if any there be
and to the conditions herein specified, the portions of the public domain situated
in the Municipalities of xxxxxxxx Las Pi�as Province of Rizal which are
designated and described as alienable or disposable on Bureau of Forestry Map
LC 2623 approved on January 3, 1968."

categorically avoided intrusion into existing private rights and this pronouncement necessarily
includes the issuance of OCT No. 4216 in 1929; "otherwise, certificates of title issued prior to
1968 could possibly be all nullified." 14 Margolles vs. CA, supra.

True, prescription does not run against the State. However, probably due to bureaucratic
constraints, vast tracts of land acquired by private parties in urbanized areas like the city of
 LTD 6

Manila and Quezon City were released from classification as forestland belatedly, or long after
their residential character as private property had become a matter of judicial notice. It appears
that the City of Manila was declassified as forest land only in 1955 15 Republic vs. Alano, CA-
G.R. SP No. 08376.and Quezon City only on October 24, 1989. 16 See Comment to Motion for
Reconsideration; p. 154, Rollo.As early as 1961, this Court stated that an attorney-at-law
"should have known that no property around the City of Manila or in Quezon City is as yet not
covered by torrens title". 17 Republic vs. Aricheta, 2 SCRA 469.In this case defendant claimed
that he was a possessor in good faith From petitioners-movants' own submission, 18 Reply, pp.
14-15, Rollo, pp. 835-836.a part of Las Pi�as comprising 1200 hectares was declared as
alienable and disposable on September 3, 1928, thus:

����������� "The map showing the area included in the 1200 hectares was
destroyed during the Second World War, and it was in view of the loss of the map
indicating the 1200 hectares that then Sec. Arturo Tanco issued FAO 4-1141 declaring
the entire Las Pi�as as well as part of the adjacent municipalities as alienable and
disposable on January 3, 1968."

The implication is that the 1968 order was meant to confirm or reiterate the earlier declaration
and serves to affirm that indeed parts of Las Pi�as, albeit the map indicating this area has
been lost, were already open to disposition to private claimants long before the issuance of FAO
4-1141. Since there are extant numerous titles covering various portions of Las Pi�as, 19
Attached to respondents' Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration is a list given by the
Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal of at least thirty three (33) original OCTs to lands in Las Pinas,
issued before World War II indicating that there are numerous titles other than OCT No. 4216
which covers parcels of land in Las Pinas, most of which were issued earlier than 1929.any
conflict or overlapping of titles should be litigated by the interested parties, as what happened in
the Margolles, Peltan and Goldenrod cases.

In sum, resurrecting the issue in Margolles will not only seriously undermine the principle of res
judicata, an old axiom of law, "dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age" 20 Carandang vs.
Venturaza, 133 SCRA 344.and a fundamental component in every jural system 21 Ibid.that
prohibits relitigation of questions already settled by final judgment of the court, in this case, the
highest court. Worse, considering that there are numerous certificates of titles now in the hands
of successors-in-interest of the original awardees of OCT No. 4216, it will imperil the rule on the
indefeasibility of titles which is a basic underpinning of the torrens system of land registration,
and which was precisely instituted to quiet title to land. Again, contrary to the submission of the
petitioner that the obtention of OCT No. 4216 has caused "property rights (to be) unsettled and
destabilized, and the integrity of the torrens system compromised", the relitigation of the
question on the validity and genuineness of OCT No. 4216 would open the floodgates or pave
the way for the assertion of numerous conflicting claims to 13,495 hectares of land in Rizal and
Cavite covered by FAO-4-1141 22 This covers an appropriate area of 13, 495,22 hectares,
situated in Taytay, Las Pinas, Muntinlupa, Paranaque, Taguig an Pateros, province of Rizal,
and in Bacoor and Imus, Province of Cavite.which were already titled prior to 1968.

Finally, the area covered by FAO-4-1141 is 13,495.22 hectares situated in six municipalities of
Rizal and two municipalities of Cavite. Pursuing the petitioner's theory that possession before
January 3, 1968 could not have ripened into ownership, the State would have to take action to
cause the reversion of the innumerable parcels of lands which were titled earlier than 1968. An
attempt at this time to single out OCT No. 4216 for cancellation and resurrect the contention that
it is spurious and irregularly obtained, despite the pronouncement of this Court positively and
categorically vindicating that very same title in three cases, betrays an unbecoming disregard
for the final judgment of the highest court and does not elicit sympathy. Indeed, it is time that the
validity of OCT No. 4216 is put to rest.

One final note, our reluctance to give overriding significance to the Republic's invocation of the
regalian doctrine stems from a consideration of the salient fact that we are here dealing with
land which although allegedly to be originally of the public domain was eventually, if belatedly,
released for disposition to private claimants. Thus the parties who have sought to assert their
own title in this case (by way of intervention) and in the cases of Peltan and Goldenrod (in
petitions to cancel title) are private parties who purportedly acquired subsequent certificates of
title to, or interests in, the same land. In short, the land in question has been the subject of
 LTD 7

overlapping or conflicting claims of private parties. Had the Republic's cause of action been one
to cause reversion to the State of public land illegally titled because it cannot be alienated at all,
e.g. military reservations, public parks, or other lands devoted to public use, and for that reason
absolutely insusceptible of private ownership, the government's plea would have compelled
concurrence. As it is, petitioners Firestone, et al., the losing parties in the Margolles case, have
asserted their "legal interest in the success of the instant Government's action" (Motion for
Reconsideration) to annul the 1929 judgment of the land court on the basis of its subsequent
title obtained in 1969 covering a portion of the property earlier titled in the name of the Gana
spouses.

Contrary to the Republic's posture in its initiatory and amended petition, the State does not
stand to be deprived of its patrimony, as the entire municipality of Las Pi�as has already been
declared as alienable and disposable and if there is any reversion to be caused in favor of the
Republic, the land recovered would not be for public use, but for eventual disposition to other
private persons. With the classification of the land in question as alienable and disposable in
1968, and in view of the failure of the State to institute reversion proceedings before 1968, any
action to cause the cancellation of subject title at this time should be subjected to assiduous
scrutiny in the light of the existence of numerous titles covering lands within the coverage of
FAO-4-1 141 which encompasses 13,495 hectares in Rizal and Cavite. In Vasquez vs. Giap
and Li Seng Giap and Sons 23 96 Phil. 447; See also Arsosa Vda. De Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113
SCRA 547., this Court upheld the title of an alien who subsequently became a naturalized
Filipino before the State commenced escheat proceedings on the ground that the "State is
deemed to have waived its right to escheat the real property and the title of the alien thereto
becomes lawful and valid as of the date of its conveyance or transfer to him". The court
rationalized that "if the ban on aliens from acquiring lands is to preserve the nation's lands for
future generations of Filipinos, that aim would not be thwarted by making lawful the acquisition
of real estate by aliens who become naturalized citizens before the State commences forfeiture
proceedings." By parity of reasoning, even assuming that it was convincingly established that
the subject land was indeed still classified as forest land at the time of the registration
proceedings in 1929, the fact that the same was eventually released or classified as alienable
and disposable should stay the hand of the Government in bringing an action to question the
title issued by a court of land registration, an action which is in rem, considering that the same
basic issue was already resolved with finality by this Court. Indeed, to annul existing torrens
titles derived from OCT No. 4216 which was issued seventy years ago, only to enable the
government to dispose anew the lands covered thereby to new or subsequent applicants would
betray a subservience to technicality that will not be in the public interest nor serve our declared
national land policies any useful purpose. This is a simple matter of equity and good sense.

(2)G.R. No. 127022

In G. R. No. 127022, petitioners Firestone Ceramics, et al. filed their motion for reconsideration
with the following assigned errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

HEREIN PETITIONERS' TITLES (DERIVED FROM OCT No. A-S-47) BEING
ADVERSE TO OCT NO. 4216, WERE DECLARED "AS NULL AND VOID" BY
THE DECISION RENDERED IN G.R. NO. 109490 (MARGOLLES CASE).
II. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PETITIONERS, AS MOVANTS-INTERVENORS IN THE CASE BELOW, "HAVE
NO MORE LEGAL INTEREST
IN THE MATTER IN LITIGATION" OVERLOOKING IN THE PROCESS, THAT
PETITIONERS' LEGAL INTEREST THERETO IS BASICALLY ANCHORED IN
THE SUCCESS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PRESENT ACTION.
III.THE HONORABLE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT PETITIONERS' TITLES LOST IN G.R. NO. 109490 (MARGOLLES CASE),
"MAY NO LONGER BE REVIVED REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF THE
MAIN PETITION OF THE PETITIONER REPUBLIC", EVEN AS THE OBJECT OF
PETITIONERS' INTERVENTION IS TO AVOID MULTIPLICITY OF SUIT,
LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.
 LTD 8

IV.������ THIS HON. COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING

THAT THE PETITION FILED BY PETITIONERS IN THE INSTANT
CONSOLIDATED CASE "ARE BARRED BY THE DECISIONS IN THE
MARGOLLES AND PELTAN CASES".

Petitioners Firestone Ceramics, et al., contend that there was nothing in the three (3) cases
cited in our decision which declared petitioners' titles as null and void although petitioners' titles
were, in effect, set aside in the Margolles case on the ground of superiority of titles. They further
allege that their intervention is based on their legal interest in the success of the government's
action which is of direct and material character because <="" span=""> "either gain or lose" by
the direct operation and effect of the judgment. They also contend that in the event that the
government succeeds and the mother title as well as the derivative titles of the private
respondents are voided, the Margolles group had no valid cause to litigate upon the issue of
superiority of title in G. R. No. 109490 and petitioners' derivative titles become the only title to
the extent of the 188,424 square meters; that the intended revival of petitioners supposed
nullified titles in the instant proceedings, by way of intervention, is imperative in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits, otherwise, without said intervention, petitioners will have no other recourse
but to commence an entirely new action for the recovery of the subject land or possibly to
institute an action to reopen the Margolles case thereby incurring unnecessary waste of time,
money and effort while, in the meantime, the voided titles of the private respondents will have to
be reverted and consolidated in the name of the Republic to the extreme prejudice of
petitioners.

����������� We cannot sustain the above arguments which are a mere rehash of
the arguments raised in their petition , and which we have already passed upon in our decision.
Moreover, Firestone Ceramics, et al., were the private respondents in G. R. No. 109490
(Margolles case), which filed a complaint for annulment of titles, recovery of possession, and
quieting of titles against Patrocinio Margolles et al. (private respondents in present petition).
What petitioners Firestone Ceramics, et al. sought to annul in that case was OCT No. 4216.
With the ruling of this Court upholding the validity of OCT No. 4216 the necessary consequence
of such decision would be the nullification of the titles adverse to OCT No. 4216. There is no
question that intervention is only collateral or ancillary to the main action. Hence it has been
held that final dismissal of the principal action results in the dismissal of said ancillary action.
We find no reason to dwell on the other issues raised in view of the fact that we are dismissing
the principal action of petitioner Republic.

WHEREFORE, respondent Peltan's motion to dismiss is DENIED. The motions for

reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic and petitioners Firestone Ceramics et al. are
DENIED for lack of merit with FINALITY.