G.R. No.

L-36610 June 18, 1976

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and DIRECTOR
OF LANDS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMADO B. REYES, as Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Bataan, Branch II, and
ELISEO PALATINO, respondents.

FACTS
On September 6, 1972, the herein private
respondent Eliseo Palatino filed with the respondent
court an application for registration of title under the
Land Registration Law, of a parcel of land situated in
Bataan Province.
Notice of initial hearing was duly issued by the
Commissioner of Land Registration.
However, respondent trial court issued an order of
general default against all persons, including herein
petitioner the Director of Lands, for the failure of
anyone, including the said Director of Lands or his
representative, to appear and oppose the
application.
Consequently, notice of this order of general default
was received by petitioners.
On January 5, 1973, respondent court issued its order
granting the application for registration. Notice of the
order was received by herein petitioners.
Petitioners filed with the trial court a motion to life
order of general default and for reconsideration of
the order on the ground that adjudicating the lot
applied for by the applicant, respondent Palatino, is
without basis in fact because the applicant could not
have possessed the land applied for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the application for the
reason that the land was originally part of the United
States Military Reservation reserved by the then
Governor General under Proclamation No. 10 dated
February 16, 1925 and it was only on June 10, 1967
that the President of the Philippines by Proclamation
No. 210-B revoked Proclamation No. 10 and declared
such portion of the area therein embraced including
the land applied for, as are classified as alienable
and disposable, opened for disposition under the
provisions of the Public Land Act.
Trial court denied the petitioners' motion to lift the
order of general default and for reconsideration of
the order.
ISSUE
Whether petitioners contention is tenable

RULING
The Court had reviewed the records of this case and
it is convinced that certain essential requisites of

procedural law were not complied with by the herein

petitioners. There was a failure to perfect an appeal
and consequently this failure had the effect of
rendering final and executory the judgment or final
order of the trial court. This fact certainly deprives
the appellate court, the Court, of jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal. By actual reckoning of time, it
will be seen that the period for filing and perfecting
an appeal had been past overdue. Petitioners herein
have procrastinated too long on their rights and on
the duties imposed on them that the Court is now
prevented from extending to them the relief they are
now seeking. Through inexcusable neglect and
laches, the Government lost its case Section 13 of
the aforecited Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is crystal
clear in its language and tenor: Where the notice of
appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal is not filed
within the period so prescribed, the appeal shall be
dismissed.

The decision or final order granting the registration of

the parcel of land applied for by herein private
respondent Eliseo Palatino, having become final and
executory, there now remains only the issuance of
the decree and the certificate of title over the
property. Thus, the Court declares, following its timehonored dictum: After a decision has become final,
the prevailing party becomes entitled as a matter of
right to its execution; that it becomes merely the
ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ of
execution.
Should petitioners duly establish by competent
evidence these allegations, they may then raise the
crucial question whether the private respondent and
his predecessors-in-interest may be deemed to have
validly and legally commenced occupation of the
land and physically occupied the same en concepto
de dueo for thirty years or more to entitle them to
registration under section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act a question which cannot be resolved now in view
of the finding that there is without jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal since the decision or final order
granting registrations has long become final and
executory.

G.R. No. L-37682 March 29, 1974

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by
the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO SAMSON ANIMAS, in his capacity
as Judge of CFI South Cotabato, Branch I,
General Santos City, ISAGANI DU TIMBOL and
the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF GENERAL SANTOS
CITY, respondent.

FACTS
The land covered by the free patent and title in
question was originally applied for by Precila Soria,
who transferred her rights to the land and its

improvements to defendant Isagani Du Timbol. On

December 12, 1969, free Patent No. V-466102 was
issued by the President of the Philippines for the land
in question, and on July 20, 1970, after transmittal of
the patent to the Register of Deeds of General Santos
City, Original Certificate of Title was issued in the
name of defendant.
On August 5, 1971, the Republic of the Philippines, at
the instance of the Bureau of Forestry, filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato to
declare subject free patent and OCT in the name of
the defendant null and void ab initio and to order the
reversion of the land in question to the mass of
public domain on the ground that the land covered
thereby is a forest or timber land which is not
disposable under the Public Land Act. In the
reclassification of the public lands in the vicinity
where the land in question is situated made by the
Bureau of Forestry on March 7, 1958, the said land
was plotted on Bureau of Forestry map.
The application for free patent by defendant was filed
on June 3, 1969, or more than eleven years
thereafter, thus, alleging that said patent and title
were obtained fraudulently as Du Timbol never
occupied and cultivated the land applied for.
The respondent court dismissed the complaint on the
ground that Certificate of Title based on the patent
had became indefeasible in view of the lapse of the
one-year period prescribed under Section 38 of the
Land Registration Act for review of a decree of title
on the ground of fraud.
ISSUE
Whether the patent and title issued to Du Timbol is
null and void.
RULING
Yes. The area covered by the patent and title is not
disposable public land, it being a part of the forest
zone, hence the patent and title thereto are null and
void.
The defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title
issued pursuant to a free patent does not lie against
the state in an action for reversion of the land
covered thereby when such land is a part of a public
forest or of a forest reservation. As a general rule,
timber or forest lands are not alienable or disposable.
Although the Director of Lands has jurisdiction over
public lands classified as agricultural under the
constitution, or alienable or disposable under the
Public Land Act, and is charged with the
administration of all laws relative thereto, mineral
and timber lands are beyond his jurisdiction. It is the
Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction and authority
over the demarcation, protection, management,
reproduction, occupancy and use of all public forests
and forest reservations and over the granting of
licenses for the taking of products therefrom,
including stone and earth.
The area in question is a forest or timber land, hence
it is clearly established by the certification made by
the Bureau of Forest Development that it is within
the portion of the area which was reverted to the

category of forest land and approved by the

President.
When the defendant Isagani Du Timbol filed his
application for free patent over the land in question,
the area in question was not a disposable or
alienable public land but a public forest. Titles issued
to private parties by the Bureau of Lands when the
land covered thereby is not disposable public land
but forest land are void ab initio.
The complaint alleges that applicant Isagani Du
Timbol was never in possession of the property prior
to his filing the application, contrary to the provisions
of law that the applicant must have been in
possession or cultivation thereof for at least 30
years. After diligent search of the Acting Chief of the
Survey-Party, alleged circumstances are indicative of
fraud in the filing of the application and obtaining
title to the land, and if proven would override
respondent Judge's order dismissing the case without
hearing. The misrepresentations of the applicant that
he had been occupying and cultivating the land and
residing thereon are sufficient grounds to nullify the
grant of the patent and title under the Public Land
Law.
A certificate of title that is void may be ordered
cancelled. A title will be considered void if it is
procured through fraud, as when a person applies for
registration of the land under his name although the
property belongs to another.

G.R. No. L-9865 December 24, 1915

VERGO D. TUFEXIS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FRANCISCO OLAGUERA and THE MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL OF GUINOBATAN, represented by its
president, Agapito Paulate, defendants-appellees.

FACTS
It was alleged that on September 30, 1911, plaintiff
acquired at a public sale held in execution of a
judgment rendered against Ricardo Pardo y Pujol, a
piece of property situated in the municipality of
Guinobatan, consisting of a frame building of strong
materials with a galvanized-iron roof, erected on a
parcel of land belonging to that municipality and
intended for a public market. The plaintiff also
acquired at the sale all the right, interest, title, and
participation in the said property that appertained or
might appertain to Pardo y Pujol. The said building
was constructed by virtue of a concession granted by
the former Spanish government to Ricardo Pardo y
Cabaas, father of the judgment debtor.
On January 2, 1912, the said building was totally
destroyed by an accidental fire. For several months
thereafter the municipal council of Guinobatan
negotiated with plaintiff for the purchase of his rights
in the said concession but such could not be brought
to a conclusion because the municipal council had
allegedly acted deceitfully, fraudulently, and in bad
faith for the sole purpose of beguiling, deceiving, and

prejudicing plaintiff in order to prevent him from

exercising his right to reconstruct the burned market
building and utilize it in accordance with the terms of
the said concession. The defendant municipal council
with the other defendant, Francisco Olaguera, had
authorized the latter to take possession of all the
land and to occupy the same with booths or stores
for the sale of groceries and other merchandise, for
billiard tables, and other analogous.
The plaintiff proposed to construct another public
market building on the same land, but that the
defendants had prevented him from using the land
and reconstructing thereon the said public market
building, and refused to recognize plaintiff's right and
to vacate the land that had been occupied by the
burned edifice.
After filing a petition before the CFI of Albay, the
provincial fiscal alleged as a ground for the demurrer
that in no part of the instrument of concession did it
appear that the privilege granted to the father of the
judgment debtor had likewise been granted to his
successors or assignees, and that therefore such
rights and actions could not be conveyed to nor be
acquired by any other person. It was alleged that the
building was completely destroyed by fire and that if
plaintiff's right to the possession of the land was
conditioned by the existence thereon of the said
market building, such right had terminated by the
disappearance of the building.
ISSUE
Whether a the subject building on land belonging to
the municipality of Guinobatan which was intended
for a public market, by virtue of a concession could
be attached and sold for the payment of a certain
debt owed by Ricardo Pardo y Pujol to a third person
who had obtained a final judgment.
RULING
No. The land on which the building was erected and
which is referred to in the foregoing articles of the
concession granted by the Government of the former
sovereignty belongs to the municipality of
Guinobatan. Although the building was constructed
at the expense and with the money of the grantee,
Ricardo Pardo y Cabaas, it is, nevertheless, the
property of the state or of the said municipality, and
was temporarily transferred to the grantee, Pardo y
Cabaas, in order that he might enjoy the usufruct of
its floor space for forty years, but on the termination
of this period the said right of usufruct was to
cease and the building was to belong finally
and absolutely to the state or the municipality
in representation thereof.
For these reasons, there is no question that the
building and the land, on which it was erected, since
they did not belong to the grantee, nor do they
belong to his son and heir, Ricardo Pardo y Pujol,
could not be attached or sold for the payment of a
debt contracted by the latter. The concession
granted by the former Spanish Government is
personal and transferable only by inheritance, and in
no manner could it be conveyed as a special
personal privilege to another and a third person.
Ricardo Pardo y Pujol is bound to pay his debts and
his property can be attached on petition of his

creditors. However, his personal privilege of usufruct

in the floor space of the public market building of
Guinobatan cannot be attached like any ordinary
right, because that would mean that a person who
has contracted with the state to furnish a service of a
public character would be substituted, for another
person who took no part in the contract, and that the
regular course of a public service would be disturbed
by the more or less legal action of the creditors of a
grantee, to the prejudice of the state and the public
interests.
It is indeed true that the building erected out of the
private funds of the grantee, however, judging from
the agreement between him and the Government
authorities, he was granted the right to usufruct in
the floor space of the said building in order that,
during the period of forty years, he might reimburse
himself for and collect the value of the building
constructed by him.
So, if neither the land nor the building in question
belongs to Pardo y Pujol, it is evident that they could
not be attached or sold at public auction to satisfy his
debt and, consequently, the attachment and sale of
the said Government property executed on petition
of the creditor of the said Pardo y Pujol are
notoriously illegal, null and void, and the acquisition
of the property by plaintiff confers upon him no right
whatever based on the said concession.
The usufruct of the floor space of the public market
of Guinobatan, granted to Ricardo Pardo y Pujol's
father was not subject to attachment on account of
its being of a public character. The only right to which
the creditor was entitled was to petition for the
attachment of the income and proceeds obtained
from the use of the floor space of the market, but he
did not avail himself of this right. Therefore, the order
of dismissal appealed is in accordance with law and
the merits of the case.
G.R. No. L-6098

August 12, 1911

THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALDECOA AND COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

FACTS
The Attorney-General filed a written complaint in the
CFI of Surigao against the firm of Aldecoa & Co.,
alleging that the defendant, a mercantile
copartnership company with a branch office in
Surigao, continues to operate as such mercantile
copartnership company under the name of Aldecoa &
Co.,; that the said defendant, knowing that it had no
title or right whatever to two adjoining parcels of
land has been occupying them illegally for the past
seventeen years, more or less, having constructed on
the land a wharf, located along the railroad, and built
warehouses of light material for the storage of coal
all for its exclusive use and benefit. These lands,
situated in Surigao, belonged to the late Spanish
Government in the Philippines and are now the
property of the Government of the United States and
were placed under the control of the Insular
Government

Since the year 1901, the defendant has been

requested repeatedly by the Attorney-General, in
representation of the Insular Government, to
recognize the latter's right of dominion over the
same and to deliver to it the said property, and that,
by reason of such demands, Aldecoa & Co. agreed to
return the land, but that later, after several delays, it
concluded by persisting in its attempt illegally to
continue occupying the said land and refused to
return it to the Insular Government.
The defendant alleged that it held and possessed, as
owner, and had full and absolute dominion over, the
lands claimed by the plaintiff.
CFI rendered judgment and found that the land in
question was public land and belonged to the State,
and ordered the defendant to return it to the plaintiff.
ISSUE
Whether the subject lands as claimed by the
defendant is a part of the public dominion.
RULING
Yes. It is incontrovertible that the land in question is
of the public domain and belongs to the State,
inasmuch as at the present time it is partly shore
land and in part, was such formerly, and now is land
formed by the action of the sea.
On the supposition that Aldecoa & Co. commenced to
occupy the land and shore herein concerned, prior to
the enforcement of the Civil Code in these Islands, it
is unquestionable that the issue must be determined
in accordance with the provisions of the Law of
Waters of August 3, 1866, inasmuch as the shores, as
well as the lands united thereto by the accretions
and alluvium deposits produced by the action of the
sea, are of the public use and domain.
All this said land, together with the adjacent shore,
belongs to the public domain and is intended for
public uses. Thus, the defendant, in construction on
the two aforementioned parcels of land a retaining
wall, a pier or wharf, a railway, and warehouses for
the storage of coal, for its exclusive use and benefit,
did all this without due and competent authority and
has been illegally occupying the land since 1901.

Aldecoa & Co. endeavored to prove that the land,

consisting of the two united parcels, belonged to
them in fee simple, on account of their having begun
to occupy it through a verbal permit from the then
politico-military governor of Surigao. The said permit
was a verbal authorization to occupy the land on
condition that the defendant should later on prepare
title deeds thereto, and that this authorization was
granted for the purpose of furnishing facilities to, and
benefiting the merchants of Surigao, in view of the
backward condition of things in those regions at the
time. It is certain, however, that Aldecoa & Co. did
not obtain or solicit permission from the Government
to establish themselves there and erect thereon their
buildings and works, nor did they endeavor to obtain
any title of ownership to the said land.
Defendant has not proven that it obtained for itself,
in conformity with the provisions of the said Law of
Waters.
The Civil Code, which went into effect in these
Islands on December 7, 1889, confirms the provisions
of the said Law of Waters. The shores and the lands
reclaimed from the sea, while they continue to be
devoted to public uses and no grant whatever has
been made of any portion of them to private persons,
remain a part of the public domain and are for public
uses, and, until they are converted into patrimonial
property of the State. Inasmuch as, being dedicated
to the public uses, they are not subject of commerce
among men, in accordance with the provision of the
Civil Code.
The record does not disclose that Aldecoa & Co. had
obtained from the Spanish Government of the
Philippines the requisite authorization legally to
occupy the said two parcels of land of which they
now claim to be the owners. Wherefore, the
occupation or possession which the allege they hold
is a mere detainer that can merit from the law no
protection such as is afforded only to the person
legally in possession.