Consti 1 Atty. Asong 1E

FROM THE LECTURES AND SYLLABUS OF 1
ATTY. J.P. LEO F. ASONG UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Etymology: *Latin: Constitutio, from Constituere “establish or

GENERAL CONSIDERATION appoint”
Body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers

WHAT IS POLITICAL LAW? of sovereignty are habitually exercised (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations)
That branch of public law, which deals with the organization
and operations of the governmental organs of the State and A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the
defines the relations of the State with the inhabitants of its governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme,
territory. (People v. Perfecto) imperious, absolute, and unalterable except by the authority
from which it emanates. It has been defined as the
Public Law - refers to the relations between the individual and fundamental paramount law of the nation.
the government or the state
It is through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of
the government are established, limited, and defined, and by
which these powers are distributed among several
BRANCHES OF POLITICAL LAW
departments.
1. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION – It deals with the
organization and management of the different branches of It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of
the government government, assigns to the different departments their
respective powers and duties and establishes certain fixed
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – It deals with the guaranties of principles on which government is founded. (Manila Prince
the constitution to individual rights and the limitations on Hotel vs. GSIS)
governmental action
The basic and paramount law to which all other laws must
3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – It deals with the exercise of conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials
executive power in the making of rules and the decision of of the land, must defer. (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth
questions affecting private rights Commission)
4. THE LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS – It deals with
the governmental agencies for local government or for Testament to the living democracy in this jurisdiction, it
other special purpose contains the compendium of the guaranteed rights of
individuals… as well as powers granted to and restrictions
Note: Because of the complexities of our society now, the imposed on government officials and instrumentalities. It is
scope of political law became broader that lone unifying code, an inviolable authority that demands
utmost respect and obedience. (Genuino v Delima)
Example: International Law, Election Law.
“If it were to be asked. What is the most sacred duty and the
greatest source of our security in a Republic?” (Alexander
Hamilton) The answer would be, AN INVIOLABLE RESPECT
WHAT IS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW? FOR THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS- The first growing out of
the last. A sacred respect for the constitutional law is the vital
It designates the law embodied in the Constitution and the principle, the sustaining energy of a free government.
Legal Principles growing out of the interpretation and
application of its provisions by courts in specific cases.
CONSTITUTION: AS DEFINED
A Constitution is not the act of a government, but of a people
constituting a government… a thing antecedent to a 1. Purpose and Role
government; and a government is only the creature of a
constitution. (Thomas Paine) 1. Serves as the supreme or fundamental law.
A constitution is the charter creating the

It “is a body of rules resulting from the interpretation by a high government. It has the status of a supreme of
court of cases in which the validity, in relation to the fundamental law as it speaks for the entire people
constitutional instrument, of some act of government, has been from whom it derives its claim to obedience.
challenged.” (Bernas)
It is binding on all individual citizens and all
That written instrument enacted by the direct action of the organs of the government. lt is the law to which all
people by which the fundamental powers of the government other laws must conform and in accordance with
are established ,limited, and defined, and by which those which all private rights must be determined and all
powers are distributed among several departments for their public authority administered.
safe and useful exercise, for the benefit of the body politic
(Malcolm) It is the test of the legality of all governmental actions,
whether proceeding from the highest official or lowest
functionary.
Notes of Alapag III, Balahay, Cerbo, Dabi, Dubouzet, Egina, Embalsado, Matas,
Layague, Luna, Naragas, Ong, Paja, Patangan, Sango and Sardinia
I- Sanchez Roman 2020-2021
and thereby acquires a greater degree of

2. Establishes basic framework and underlying stability.
principles of government.
Note: In order to alter the content and provisions of a
The purpose of a constitution is to prescribe the rigid constitution, a procedure is stipulated which
permanent framework of the system of requires a specific legal/constitutional obstacle to be
government and to assign to the different overcome.
departments or branches their respective It does not necessarily follow that the constitution is
powers and duties, and to establish certain basic never amended or that in practice it is actually very
principles on which the government is founded.
difficult to alter. In reality,changes to a constitution are
driven by and dependent on the political will of the
3. Designed to preserve and protect the rights of
individuals against the arbitrary actions of those state.
in authority.
b) FLEXIBLE CONSTITUTION
Its function is not to legislate in detail but to set
limits on the otherwise unlimited power of the
It is one that can be changed by ordinary
legislature or government as a whole. It sets forth
legislation. It may be changed in the same
the basic rights of the people which the government
manner and through the same body that
must observe, respect and protect.
enacts ordinary legislation. Example: British
Constitution.
A constitution is not intended to provide merely for the It is one in which the content and principles of the
exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations constitution can be amended by the ordinary
for as long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate legislative process which is used to alter non-
sovereign. (Kida v. Senate) constitutional laws
To prescribe the permanent framework of a system of

government to assign to the several departments their 2. As to its adaption:
respective powers and duties, and to establish certain first
a) WRITTEN CONSTITUTION
principles on which the government is founded (11 Am. Jur
606)
It is one whose precepts are embodied in one
document or set of documents. The provisions
A constitution should be construed in the light of what is a
have been reduced to writing and embodied in
continuing instrument to govern not only the present but also
one or more instruments at a particular time.
the unfolding events of the indefinite future. (Kida v Senate)
b) UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION
It consists of rules which have not been

Rationale:
integrated into a single, concrete form but
1. order and stability are scattered in various sources, such as
statues of a fundamental character, judicial
2. legitimacy of the governmental institutions to mark a decisions, commentaries of publicists, customs
watershed and traditions, and certain common law
principles. (Cruz, Constitutional Law pp 4-5)
3. limit governmental power to affirm specific goals Such has not been committed to writing at
considered important for that society. (Ryan M any specific time but is the accumulated
Unlocking Constitutional and Administrative product of gradual political and legal
development.
Law)
2. Types/ Kinds 3. As to its enactment
1. In relation to the amendment process: a) ENACTED or CONVENTIONAL

CONSTITUTION
a) RIGID CONSTITUTION
It is enacted, formally struck off at a definitive
It is one that can be amended only by a formal time and place following a conscious or deliberate
and usually difficult process. This may not be effort taken by a constituent body or ruler;
amended except through a special process
distinct from and more involved than the method They have been also called conventional or
of changing ordinary laws. enacted because they are given definite form
by a steadily constituted body, the
It is supposed that by such a special procedure, constitutional convention, at a particular time
the constitution is rendered difficult to change
b) CUMULATIVE OR EVOLVED To strike down a law there must be clear showing that what
the fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the statute allows
It is the result of political evolution, not it to be done. (Macalintal, supra)
inaugurated at any specific time but
changing by accretion rather than by
systematic method.
PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
They are also known as cumulative or evolved
because they are not formulated at any definite
time but are rather the outcome of a political Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the
evolutionary process. legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and
one which operates no further than may be necessary to
effectuate the specific purpose of the law.
4. Others:
Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the
a) NORMATIVE
constitutionality and the burden of proof is on the party alleging
It adjusts to norms, those that function more that there is a clear and equivocal breach of the Constitution.
truly as prescriptive documents, such as the (Farinas v Executive Secretary)
Constitution of the United States, are called
normative constitutions. The Constitution is a dynamic process, although the principles
embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged.
b) NOMINAL Intended to stand for a great length of time to be progressive
and not static.
It is not yet fully operational. Constitutions
such as that of the former Soviet Union are called GENUINO v. DE LIMA (2018)
nominal constitutions. The Soviet Constitution FACTS:
claimed to guarantee Freedom of Speech, press,
and assembly, but in practice the Soviet On May 25, 2010, then Acting DOJ Secretary Alberto C. Agra
government continually repressed those who issued the assailed DOJ Circular No. 41, consolidating DOJ
sought to express those freedoms.
Circular Nos. 17 and 18, which will govern the issuance and
implementation of HDOs, WLOs, and ADOs. Section 10 of
c) SEMANTIC
DOJ Circular No. 41 expressly repealed all rules and
A Fundamental law for the perpetuation of power. regulations contained in DOJ Circular Nos. 17 and 18, as well
(“Pseudo-constitution”), enforced to formalize as all instructions, issuances or orders or parts thereof which
and legalize the monopoly of power in are inconsistent with its provisions.
authoritarianism or even totalitarianism.
After the expiration of GMA's term as President of the
Republic of the Philippines and her subsequent election as
Pampanga representative, criminal complaints were filed
DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL against her before the DOJ.
SUPREMACY
De Lima issued DOJ WLO No. 2011-422 dated August 9,
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or 2011 against GMA pursuant to her authority under DOJ
contract violates any norm of the constitution, that law or Circular No. 41. She also ordered for the inclusion of GMA's
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the name in the Bureau of Immigration (BI) watchlist.
executive branch or entered into by private persons for private Thereafter, the BI issued WLO No. ASM-11-237
purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. implementing De Lima's order.
Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount
and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every On September 6, 2011, De Lima issued DOJ Amended WLO
statute and contract.
No. 2011-422 against GMA to reflect her full name "Ma.
Gloria M. Macapagal-Arroyo" in the BI Watchlist. WLO No.
Thus, since the constitution is the fundamental, paramount,
2011-422, as amended, is valid for a period of 60 days, or
and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
until November 5, 2011, unless sooner terminated or
statute and contract.
otherwise extended. This was lifted in due course by De
Laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken Lima, in an Order dated November 14, 2011, following the
down for being unconstitutional. (Macalintal v Comelec) expiration of its validity.
To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law Meanwhile, on October 20, 2011, two criminal complaints
to the Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, for even if for Electoral Sabotage and Violation of the OEC were filed
a law is aimed at the attainment of some public good, no against GMA and her husband, Jose Miguel Arroyo (Miguel
infringement of constitutional rights is allowed. Arroyo), among others, with the DOJ-Commission on
Elections (DOJ-COMELEC) Joint Investigation Committee on
2004 and 2007 Election Fraud.
The guaranty of liberty does not, however, imply

In three separate letters, GMA requested for the issuance of unbridled license for an individual to do whatever
an ADO, pursuant to Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 41, so he pleases, for each is given an equal right to enjoy
that she may be able to seek medical attention from medical his liberties, with no one superior over another.
specialists abroad for her hypoparathyroidism and metabolic Hence, the enjoyment of one's liberties must not
bone mineral disorder. She mentioned six different countries infringe on anyone else's equal entitlement.
where she intends to undergo consultations and treatments:
United States of America, Germany, Singapore, Italy, Spain In this case, the right to travel is not absolute.
and Austria. She likewise undertook to return to the However, while it can be restricted, the only
Philippines, once her treatment abroad is completed, and permissible grounds for restriction are national
participate in the proceedings before the DOJ. security, public safety, and public health, which
grounds must at least be prescribed by an act of
To determine whether GMA's condition necessitates medical Congress. In only two instances can the right to
attention abroad, the Medical Abstract prepared by Dr. travel be validly impaired even without a statutory
Mirasol was referred to then Secretary of the Department of authorization. The first is when a court forbids the
Health, Dr. Enrique Ona (Dr. Ona) for his expert opinion as accused from leaving Philippine jurisdiction in
the chief government physician. On October 28, 2011, Dr. connection with a pending criminal case. The
Ona, accompanied by then Chairperson of the Civil Service second is when Congress, pursuant to its power of
Commission, Francisco Duque, visited GMA at her residence legislative inquiry, issues a subpoena or arrest
in La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City. Also present at the order against a person.
time of the visit were GMA's attending doctors who
explained her medical condition and the surgical operations The necessity for a legislative enactment expressly
conducted on her. After the visit, Dr. Ona noted that "Mrs. providing for a valid impairment of the right to
Arroyo is recuperating reasonably well after having travel finds basis in no less than the fundamental
undergone a series of three major operations." law of the land. Under Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution, the legislative power is vested in
On November 8, 2011, before the resolution of her Congress. Hence, only Congress, and no other
application for ADO, GMA filed the present petition to annul entity or office, may wield the power to make,
and set aside DOJ Circular No. 41 and WLOs issued against amend, or repeal laws.
her for allegedly being unconstitutional. A few hours
thereafter, Miguel Arroyo filed a separate petition likewise Accordingly, whenever confronted with provisions
assailing the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 41 and interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with
WLO No. 2011-573. law" or "as may be provided by law," the Court
turns to acts of Congress for a holistic constitutional
Also, on November 8, 2011, De Lima issued an Order, construction. To illustrate, in interpreting the
denying GMA's application for an ADO. clause "subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law" in relation to the right to
information, the Court held in Gonzales v. Narvasa
MAIN ISSUE: that it is Congress that will prescribe these
reasonable conditions upon the access to
1. Is DOJ Circular No. 41-10 constitutional? information.
No, it is unconstitutional. It violates the 2. Does the DOJ have the authority to issue DOJ
constitutional right to travel. Circular No. 41?
We begin by emphasizing that the Constitution is

the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of No, the issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 has no legal
the nation; it is deemed written in every statute basis.
and contract. If a law or an administrative rule
violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance To begin with, there is no law particularly providing
is null and void and has no effect. for the authority of the secretary of justice to curtail
the exercise of the right to travel, in the interest of
xxx The more precious gifts of democracy that the national security, public safety or public health. As
Constitution affords us are enumerated in the Bill it is, the only ground of the former DOJ Secretary
of Rights contained in Article III. In particular,
in restraining the petitioners, at that time, was the
Section 1 thereof provides:
pendency of the preliminary investigation of the
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, Joint DOJ-COMELEC Preliminary Investigation
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor Committee on the complaint for electoral sabotage
shall any person be denied the equal protection of against them.
the laws.
To be clear, DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is
not a legislative enactment which underwent the
scrutiny and concurrence of lawmakers, and there is no longer any actual case or controversy to
submitted to the President for approval. It is a resolve.
mere administrative issuance apparently designed
to carry out the provisions of an enabling law which To be clear, "an actual case or controversy involves
the former DOJ Secretary believed to be Executive a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims
Order (E.O.) No. 292, otherwise known as the susceptible of judicial resolution. It is definite and
"Administrative Code of 1987." concrete, touching the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interest; a real and
It is, however, important to stress that before there substantial controversy admitting of specific
can even be a valid administrative issuance, there relief." When the issues have been resolved or
must first be a showing that the delegation of when the circumstances from which the legal
legislative power is itself valid. It is valid only if controversy arose no longer exist, the case is
there is a law that (a) is complete in itself, setting rendered moot and academic. "A moot and
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, academic case is one that ceases to present a
or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
standard the limits of which are sufficiently events, so that a declaration thereon would be of
determinate and determinable to which the no practical use or value."
delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. However, in Prof. David vs. Pres. Macapagal-
Arroyo, the Court ruled that the "moot and
A painstaking examination of E.O. 292 being relied academic" principle is not a magical formula that
upon by the former DOJ Secretary will disclose that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving
they do not particularly vest the DOJ the authority a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot
to issue DOJ Circular No. 41 which effectively and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of
restricts the right to travel through the issuance of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character
WLOs and HDOs. It only shows that they are mere of the situation and the paramount public interest
general provisions designed to lay down the is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised
purposes of the enactment and the broad requires formulation of controlling principles to
enumeration of the powers and functions of the guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
DOJ. In no way can they be interpreted as a grant and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
of power to curtail a fundamental right as the evading review.
language of the provision itself does not lend to
that stretched construction. In the instant case, there are exceptional
circumstances that warrant the Court's exercise of
It is indisputable that the secretaries of its power of judicial review. The petitioners impute
government agencies have the power to the respondents of violating their constitutional
promulgate rules and regulations that will aid in the right to travel through the enforcement of DOJ
performance of their functions. This is adjunct to Circular No. 41. They claim that the issuance
the power of administrative agencies to execute unnecessarily places a restraint on the right to
laws and does not require the authority of a law. travel even in the absence of the grounds provided
This is, however, different from the delegated in the Constitution.
legislative power to promulgate rules of
government agencies. There is also no question that the instant petitions
involved a matter of public interest as the
Consistent with the foregoing, there must be an petitioners are not alone in this predicament and
enabling law from which DOJ Circular No. 41 must there can be several more in the future who may
derive its life. Unfortunately, all of the supposed be similarly situated. It is not far fetched that a
statutory authorities relied upon by the DOJ did not similar challenge to the constitutionality of DOJ
pass the completeness test and sufficient standard Circular No. 41 will recur considering the thousands
test. The DOJ miserably failed to establish the of names listed in the watch list of the DOJ, who
existence of the enabling law that will justify the may brave to question the supposed illegality of the
issuance of the questioned circular. issuance. Thus, it is in the interest of the public, as
well as for the education of the members of the
bench and the bar, that this Court takes up the
3. Is the case moot and academic? instant petitions and resolves the question on the
constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 41.
Yes, although the supervening events following the
filing of the instant petitions may seem moot, the
Court has still to render a decision on the
constitutional issues raised by the petitioners.
The respondents, however, claim that the instant

petitions have become moot and academic since
PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY 2. Constitution of Liberty
The series of proscriptions setting forth the fundamental

It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted
civil and political rights of the citizens and imposing
by local government units) enjoy the presumption of
limitations on the powers of government as a means
constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be
of securing the enjoyment of those rights. (Ex. Article III)
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely
a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict
3. Constitution of Sovereignty
with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt.
Where doubt exists, even if well-founded, there can be no The provisions pointing out the mode or procedure in
finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain. accordance with which formal changes in the
fundamental law may be brought about. (Ex. Art XVII)
The presumption of constitutionality is rooted in the respect
that the judiciary must accord to the legislature.
This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings

on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the
INTERPRETATION/
government to encroach upon the duties and powers of CONSTRUCTION
another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based
on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate
branch - the legislature. METHODS OF INTERPRETING THE
CONSTITUTION
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may
firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever
conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and
1. Plain Meaning Rule (Verba Legis)
has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the
purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare Whenever possible the words used in the constitution must
of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of the be given their ordinary meaning except when technical
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should terms are employed.
proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and
forbearance Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.
The presumption of constitutionality may, of course, be
challenged. Challenges, however, shall only be sustained upon One of the primary and basic rules in statutory
a clear and unequivocal showing of the bases for invalidating a construction is that where the words of a statute are clear,
law. plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of
ESSENTIAL QUALITIES OF A GOOD constitutional construction that the language employed in
CONSTITUTION the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed. As much as
possible, the words of the Constitution should be
1. BROAD – It provides for the organization of the entire
understood in the sense they have in common use. What
government and covers all persons and things within
it says according to the text of the provision to be
the territory of the State and also because it must be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of
comprehensive enough to provide for every contingency.
the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say.
2. BRIEF – It must confine itself to basic principles to be
implemented with legislative details more adjustable The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First,
to change and easier to amend. because it is assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the
3. DEFINITE/ CONCISE – It prevents ambiguity in its objective sought to be attained; and second, because
provisions which could result in confusion and divisiveness the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's
among the people. document but essentially that of the people, in
whose consciousness it should ever be present as an
important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
ESSENTIAL PARTS OF A GOOD WRITTEN
CONSTITUTION
2. The Constitution has to be Interpreted as a whole
1. Constitution of the Government (Ut magis valeat quam pereat)
Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and

The series of provisions outlining the organization of
"one section is not to be allowed to defeat another”
the government, enumerating its powers, laying
down certain rules relative to its administration and It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction
defining the electorate. (Ex. Art VI, VII, VIII and IX) that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated
from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be
brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate ORIGINALIST VS LIVING CONSTITUTION

the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on
a particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
1. Originalist-original
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be
It believes that the constitutional text ought to be
made to stand together.
given the original public meaning that it would have
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if had at the time it became a law.
practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction
which will render every word operative, rather than 2. Living Constitutionalist
one which may make the words idle and nugatory
It believes that the meaning of the constitutional text
changes over time, as social attitudes changes, even
without the adoption of a formal constitutional
3. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted amendment.
in accordance with the intent of its framers (Ratio
legis et anima) -the Constitution should be interpreted
as a whole
IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS OF CHIEF
Still, it is a basic principle in statutory construction that the JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE JR. –
law must be given a reasonable interpretation at all times. Unconstitutional
The Court may, in some instances, consider the spirit and
reason of a statute, where a literal meaning would
lead to absurdity, contradiction, or injustice, or The act of “initiating” means to file the complaint
would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers. and take initial action on it.
Applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of the
constitution may render its provisions meaningless and
lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation, or an injustice. FRANCISCO, JR. v. HOR (2003)
To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the FACTS:
principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law
itself, resort should be made to the rule that the spirit of The 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted
the law controls its letter. and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28,
Following the verba legis doctrine, a law must be applied
2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules1
exactly as worded if it is clear, plain and unequivocal.
approved by the 11th Congress.
Interpretation according to spirit: the words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
intent of the framers. Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to
The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner
be read according to its spirit or intent, for what is within
of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of
the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its
the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund
letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the
spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit differently, that (JDF)."
which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much
within the statute as if within the letter, and that which is On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed
within the letter of the statute is not within the statute an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint)
unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven
ought not to interpret and should not accept an Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the
interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
its legislators. crimes."
The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T.

4. Plain meaning is not found to be clear, resort to Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,
other aids (e.g. intrinsic/extrinsic aids) and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on
August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article
5. In case of conflict between the constitution and XI of the Constitution.
a Statute, the constitution always prevails.
6. If a law or administrative rule violates any The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003
norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in
and void and has no effect. form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003
for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee
7. In case of doubt, the provisions should be self- Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in
executing; mandatory rather than directory; plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article
and prospective rather than retroactive XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a
2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a
after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the
the second impeachment complaint was filed with the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the
Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative
C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. moments leading to the formulation of the articles
Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results the filing of the complaint and its referral to the
of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned Committee on Justice.
House Resolution.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule
This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and
"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed
least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in
Representatives. favor of impeachment or when the House reverses
a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the
The Petitioners contend that the filing of the second Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The
provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that language is recognition that initiation happened
"[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to
the same official more than once within a period of one postpone it to a time after actual initiation.
year."
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting
the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law.
MAIN ISSUE:
It is clear that the framers intended "initiation" to
1. Is the second impeachment complaint start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus
constitutional? curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained
that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to
Yes, it is unconstitutional. It violates the initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to
impeachment proceedings against the same settle and make it understood once and for all that
impeachable officer within a one-year period. the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts
with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-
The resolution of this issue hinges on the third of the House in a resolution of impeachment
interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to does not initiate the impeachment proceedings
statutory construction is, therefore, in order. which was already initiated by the filing of a verified
complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article
The sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the XI of the Constitution."
Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado,
agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner
proffered and explained by Constitutional Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas,
Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in
Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding,
arguments on the instant petitions held on however, that the filing must be accompanied by
November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act an action to set the complaint moving.
of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action
on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed
the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI Father Bernas explains that xxx before a decision
(3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a
complaint and take initial action on it. "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a
conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium,
to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is
commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle,
International Dictionary of the English Language and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in
concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the House and consists of several steps: (1) there
the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's is the filing of a verified complaint either by a
position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated Member of the House of Representatives or by a
during the oral arguments of the instant petitions private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House
on November 5, 2003 in this wise: of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing
of this complaint by the proper Committee which 2. Is Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules
may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) unconstitutional?
whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or
upholds the complaint, the resolution must be Yes, it is unconstitutional.
forwarded to the House for further processing; and
(4) there is the processing of the same complaint Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
by the House of Representatives which either Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are
affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the
overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one- House Committee on Justice that the verified
third of all the members. If at least one third of all complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in
the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or
Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice
Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not
an impeachment case." It is at this point that an sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or
impeachable public official is successfully endorsement before the Secretary-General of the
impeached. That is, he or she is successfully House of Representatives of a verified complaint or
charged with an impeachment "case" before the a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the
Senate as impeachment court. members of the House. These rules clearly
contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different
proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is meaning from filing and referral.
transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is
the end of the House proceeding and the beginning Respondent House of Representatives counters
of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and
the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the unequivocal that it and only it has the power to
House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it make and interpret its rules governing
by the Committee, because something prior to that impeachment. Its argument is premised on the
has already been done. The action of the House is assumption that Congress has absolute power to
already a further step in the proceeding, not its promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is
initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is misplaced.
initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is
filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The
action. This is the initiating step which triggers the Congress shall promulgate its rules on
series of steps that follow. impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose
of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to
says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be effectively carry out the purpose of this section."
initiated against the same official more than once Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very
within a period of one year," it means that no purpose of the Constitution which said rules were
second verified complaint may be accepted and intended to effectively carry out.
referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By
his explanation, this interpretation is founded on It is basic that all rules must not contravene the
the common understanding of the meaning of "to Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as
initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the alleged Congress had absolute rule making power,
Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary then it would by necessary implication have the
and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that power to alter or amend the meaning of the
ordinary people read ordinary meaning into Constitution without need of referendum.
ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they
ratify words as they understand it and not as
sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL BAR COUNCIL
To the argument that only the House of
Representatives as a body can initiate
CHAVEZ v. JBC (2013)
impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1)
says "The House of Representatives shall have the FACTS:
exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment," This is a misreading of said Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments
provision and is contrary to the principle of to the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan
reddendo singula singulis by equating activities, the members of the Constitutional Commission
"impeachment cases" with "impeachment saw it wise to create a separate, competent and independent
proceeding." body to recommend nominees to the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the

stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, and called In all these provisions, the bicameral nature of
it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). Congress was recognized and, clearly, the
corresponding adjustments were made as to how a
From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress matter would be handled and voted upon by its two
designated one (1) representative to sit in the JBC to act as Houses.
one of the ex-officio members. Pursuant to the constitutional
provision that Congress is entitled to one (1) representative, Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to
each House sent a representative to the JBC, not together, adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by sheer
but alternately or by rotation. inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a
bicameral form of the legislature, is not persuasive
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was enough. Respondents cannot just lean on plain
substantially altered. An eighth member was added to the oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them.
JBC as the two (2) representatives from Congress began It is very clear that the Framers were not keen on
sitting simultaneously in the JBC, with each having one-half adjusting the provision on congressional
(1/2) of a vote. representation in the JBC because it was not in the
exercise of its primary function – to legislate. JBC
In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the was created to support the executive power to
representatives from the Senate and the House of appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was
Representatives one full vote each. It has been the situation merely assigned a contributory non-legislative
since then. function.
The underlying reason for such a limited

MAIN ISSUE: participation can easily be discerned. Congress has
two (2) Houses xxx Whether in the exercise of its
1. Should the Congress have two legislative or its non-legislative functions such as
representatives in the JBC? inter alia, the power of appropriation, the
declaration of an existence of a state of war,
No, there should only be one representative canvassing of electoral returns for the President
from the Congress. and Vice-President, and impeachment the
dichotomy of each House must be acknowledged
In the interpretation of the constitutional and recognized considering the interplay between
provisions, the Court firmly relies on the basic these two Houses.
postulate that the Framers mean what they say.
The language used in the Constitution must be In all these instances, each House is
taken to have been deliberately chosen for a constitutionally granted with powers and functions
definite purpose. Every word employed in the peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration
Constitution must be interpreted to exude its to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and
deliberate intent which must be maintained 2) in consonance with the principle of checks and
inviolate against disobedience and defiance. What balances, as to the other branches of government.
the Constitution clearly says, according to its text,
compels acceptance and bars modification even by In checkered contrast, there is essentially no
the branch tasked to interpret it. interaction between the two Houses in their
participation in the JBC. No mechanism is required
For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the between the Senate and the House of
argument of plain oversight in order to justify Representatives in the screening and nomination of
constitutional construction. As stated in the July 17, judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC,
2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular letter the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding
"a" to describe "representative of Congress," the to the four (4) regular members, three (3)
Filipino people through the Framers intended that representatives from the major branches of
Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio
JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the Chairman (representing the Judicial Department),
Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so the Secretary of Justice (representing the
provided, as can be read in its other provisions. Executive Department), and a representative of the
Congress (representing the Legislative
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In
that several provisions were indeed adjusted as to so providing, the Framers simply gave recognition
be in tune with the shift to bicameralism. One to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest
example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as
that a tie in the presidential election shall be broken a major branch of government.
"by a majority of all the Members of both Houses
of the Congress, voting separately." The argument that a senator cannot represent a
xxx member of the House of Representatives in the JBC
and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any

member of Congress, whether from the Senate or
the House of Representatives, is constitutionally A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and
empowered to represent the entire Congress. It non-self-executing in another. (Manila Prince Hotel vs
may be a constricted constitutional authority, but it GSIS)
is not an absurdity.
Article XII Section 10 paragraph 2 – Is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete and which needs no further
From this score stems the conclusion that the lone
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
representative of Congress is entitled to one full
vote. This pronouncement effectively disallows the In the grant of rights, privileges,and concessions covering
scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2), national economy and patrimony, the state shall give
between two representatives of Congress. Not only preference to qualified Filipinos. (Self-executing, no
can this unsanctioned practice cause disorder in the legislation to put it into action)
voting process, it is clearly against the essence of
what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic Ubi jus ibi remendium.— where there is a right there is
and reasonable is the rule that what cannot be a remedy.
legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. To
permit or tolerate the splitting of one vote into two
or more is clearly a constitutional circumvention The legislature or congress may still enact legislation to:
that cannot be countenanced by the Court.
1. Facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by
Succinctly put, when the Constitution envisioned
the constitution;
one member of Congress sitting in the JBC, it is
2. Further the operation of such provision
sensible to presume that this representation carries
3. Prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement
with him one full vote.
4. Provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the
rights secured or the determination thereof
It is also an error for respondents to argue that the
5. Place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of
President, in effect, has more influence over the
the right
JBC simply because all of the regular members of
the JBC are his appointees. The principle of checks
and balances is still safeguarded because the
appointment of all the regular members of the JBC NON-SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS
is subject to a stringent process of confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments, which is A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those
composed of members of Congress. found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-
executing. A provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies a sufficient rule by means of
SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing.
A provision which is complete and becomes operative without
the aid of supplementary, or that which supplies a sufficient In case of doubt, the constitution should be considered self-
rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or executing rather than non-self-executing.
protected, is self-executing .No need to pass an enabling
Non-self-executing provisions:
legislation.
Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies)
The nature and extent of the right conferred, and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself and there is no ● Section 5 (Promotion of General Welfare)
language indicating that the subject is referred to the ● Section 11 (Personal Dignity)
legislature for action. ● Section 12 (Sanctity of Family Life)
● Section 13 (Vital Role of Youth in Nation Building)
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and ● Section 17 (Priority To Education, S And T)
extent of the right conferred and the liabilities imposed are ● Section 18 (Labor As A Primary Social Economic
fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined Force)
by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is
no language indicating that the subject is referred to the Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of
legislature for action. a policy and it is not a self-executing provision (Dual
Allegiance) - the legislature still has to enact the law on dual
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may
allegiance (AASJS v DATUMANONG)
still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly
granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a A provision that lays down a general principle is generally not
provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement,
self-executing.
provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights
secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable
safeguards around the exercise of the right.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS (1997)

FACTS:
3. Is the Filipino First Policy applicable?
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to
the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Yes, it is applicable.
Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell
through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm
outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder.
The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest
The winning bidder is to provide management expertise bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after
and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and it has negotiated and executed the necessary
financial support to strengthen the profitability and contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since
performance of the Manila Hotel. the "Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution
bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere
Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% the highest bidder will be declared the winning
of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its make the award yet, nor are they under obligation
hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in
P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to
abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning provisions of which are presumed to be known to all
bidder and the execution of the necessary contracts, the bidders and other interested parties.
petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September
1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional
Renong Berhad. In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as
petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules
Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be
match the bid of the Renong Berhad which respondent GSIS nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a
refused to accept. basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and
contracts must conform with the fundamental law of
the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose
MAIN ISSUE: their reason for being.
1. Does the Manila Hotel fall under the term In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the
national patrimony? highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant
of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
Yes. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding
term patrimony pertains to heritage. the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the
Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of
When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid
it refers not only to the natural resources of the of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino.
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to
used the term natural resources, but also to the the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Constitution. For, while this may neither be
expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding
Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living rules, the constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to be
testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened a perilous skirting of the basic law.
in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino,
Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then This Court does not discount the apprehension that
become the venue of various significant events this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the
which have shaped Philippine history. Constitution and laws of the Philippines are
understood to be always open to public scrutiny.
2. Who are qualified Filipinos? These are given factors which investors must
consider when venturing into business in a foreign
The term qualified Filipinos as used in our jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do
Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies
of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights
the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional and obligations under the Constitution and the laws
Commission. of the forum.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price supervision and regulation of educational
tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding institutions under Section 4(1), Article XIV.
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but
to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and Further, Section 6, Article XIV on the use of the
to execute the necessary agreements and Filipino language as a medium of instruction is also
documents to effect the sale in accordance not only not self-executory.
with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with
the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent
GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with 2. Is the K to 12 Law validly enacted?
petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the
latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm Yes, it was validly enacted.
clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
First, regional consultations was conducted by
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine DepEd pursuant DepEd Memorandum Nos. 38133
nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution and 98,134 series of 2011. The regional
not merely to be used as a guideline for future consultations, which aimed "to inform the public
legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it [and] to elicit their opinions, thoughts, and
be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of suggestions about the K to 12 program,"135 ran
the Constitution will never shun, under any from February to March 2011 and were participated
reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the in by students, parents, teachers and
majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to administrators, government representatives, and
defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the representatives from private schools and private
intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much sectors.
less undermine, the influx of foreign investments.
Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes The Philippine Congress also conducted regional
more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions public hearings between March 2011 to February
the preference for Filipinos whenever such 2012, wherein representatives from parents-
preference is ordained by the Constitution. teachers' organizations, business, public/private
school heads, civil society groups/non-government
organizations/private organizations and local
government officials and staffs were among the
participants.
COUNCIL OF TEACHERS AND STAFF v. SEC. OF
EDUCATION (2018)
Second, the enrolled bill doctrine applies in this
FACTS: case. Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing
of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate
These are consolidated petitions under Rule 65, assailing the President and the certification of the Secretaries of
constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 105332 (K to 12 both Houses of Congress that it was passed is
conclusive not only as to its provisions but also as
Law), RA No. 101573 (Kindergarten Education Act), and
to its due enactment.
related issuances of the Department of Education (DepEd),
Commission on Higher Education (CHED), Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) and Technical Education and The K to 12 Law was passed by the Senate and
House of Representatives on January 20, 2013,
Skills Development Authority (TESDA) implementing the K
to 12 Basic Education Program approved by the President on May 15, 2013, and,
after publication, took effect on June 8, 2013. Thus,
MAIN ISSUE: there is no doubt as to the formal validity of the K
to 12 Law.
1. Are Sections 1, 2 and 6, Article XIV of the
1987 Constitution self-executing provisions? Third, there is no undue delegation of legislative
power in the enactment of the K to 12 Law.
Section 1, Article XIV on the right of all citizens to
quality education is also not self-executory. The In determining whether or not a statute constitutes
provision "for the promotion of the right to 'quality an undue delegation of legislative power, the Court
has adopted two tests: the completeness test and
education' x x x [was] put in the Constitution as
moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the
enforceable rights." law must be complete in all its terms and conditions
when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to
The restrictions expressed in Section 4(2), Article
XIV only refer to ownership, control, and do is to enforce it. The sufficient standard test, on
administration of individual schools, and these do the other hand, mandates adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to determine the boundaries
not apply to the State’s exercise of reasonable
of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the delegate's

AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS
authority, announce the legislative policy and
identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.
PROPOSALS
Under the two tests, the K to 12 Law is complete in
1. By Congress
all essential terms and conditions and contains
sufficient parameters on the power delegated to
the DepEd, CHED and TESDA. The fact that the K SECTION 1, ARTICLE XVII
to 12 Law did not have any provision on labor does
not make said law incomplete. The purpose of Any amendment to, or revision of, this
permissible delegation to administrative agencies is Constitution may be proposed by:
for the latter to "implement the broad policies laid
down in a statute by 'filling in' the details which the (1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of
Congress may not have the opportunity or all its Members; or
competence to provide."
(2) A constitutional convention.
With the proliferation of specialized activities and
their attendant peculiar problems, the legislature
has found it necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies, who are supposed to be experts in the 2. By Constitutional Convention
particular fields assigned to them, the authority to
provide direct and efficacious solutions to these
SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVII
problems. This is effected by the promulgation of
supplementary regulations, such as the K to 12 IRR
The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its
jointly issued by the DepEd, CHED and TESDA and
Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a
the Joint Guidelines issued in coordination with
majority vote of all its Members, submit to the
DOLE, to address in detail labor and management
electorate the question of calling such a
rights relevant to implementation of the K to 12
convention.
Law.
3. Does the K to 12 Law violate the substantive

due process and equal protection clause? 3. By the People through Initiative
There is no conflict between the K to 12 Law

and right of due process of the students. SECTION 2, ARTICLE XVII
Here, the K to 12 Law does not offend the Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
substantive due process of petitioners. The assailed directly proposed by the people through initiative
law’s declaration of policy itself reveals that, upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
contrary to the claims of petitioners, the objectives total number of registered voters, of which every
of the law serve the interest of the public and not legislative district must be represented by at least
only of a particular class. three per centum of the registered voters therein.
No amendment under this section shall be
Furthermore, the means employed by the assailed authorized within five years following the
law are commensurate with its objectives. Again, ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than
the restructuring of the curriculum with the once every five years thereafter.
corresponding additional years in senior high
school were meant to improve the quality of basic The Congress shall provide for the implementation
education and to make the country’s graduates of the exercise of this right.
more competitive in the international arena.
Essence of People’s Initiative
1. People must author and thus sign the entire proposal.

No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
2. Proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the
proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express
their assent by signing such a complete proposal in a petition.
Full text of the proposed petition may either be: RULING:
● Written on the face of the petitioner attached to No, since the provision is not self-executory. Without
it. If so attached, petition must state the fact of implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus,
such attachment although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode
of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the
This is an assurance that every one of the several millions last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.
of signatories to the petition had seen the full text on the
proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of R.A.
physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove 6735 does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the
that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the Constitution. The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein
full text of the proposed amendments before signing. was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane
(Lambino, supra) nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to
initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws,
ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to
amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier,
Ratification And Date Of Effectivity initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to
AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly
SECTION 4, ARTICLE XVII propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only
Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
under section 1 (through Congress or a Constitutional
Convention) hereof shall be valid when ratified by a It is true that Section 3 of the Act defines initiative on
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite, which shall be amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of
held not earlier than sixty days nor later than Ninety the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 restates
Days after the approval of such amendment or revision. the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the
registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike
in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does
For Plebiscite: It should be held not earlier than 60 days not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the
nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among
Commission on Election of the sufficiency of the other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be
constitution. enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the
case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of
Ratification, the day when the votes are cast, date of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be
effectivity. amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO v. COMELEC initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to
FACTS: the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is
initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If
On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with the Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
Commission on Elections a petition to amend the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, to lift term limits of elective officials, by Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor,
People’s Initiative. considering that in the order of things, the primacy of
interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to
On 18 December 1996, Senator’s Miriam Defensor Santiago, directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more
Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special important than the initiative on national and local laws.
civil action for prohibition. One of their arguments is that the
people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of LAMBINO v. COMELEC
term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside FACTS:
the power of the people’s initiative.
On 15 February 2006 Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
They also argue that R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide any Aumentado along with other groups and individuals
subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in change the 1987 Constitution. The Lambino Group alleged
Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
that the matter of people’s initiative to amend the constituting at least twelve per centum of all registered
Constitution was left to some future law. voters, with each legislative district represented by at least
three per centum of its registered voters. The Lambino
ISSUES: Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had
verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
1. May the people directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through the system of The initiative petition seeks to change the 1987 Constitution
initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI and Sections 1-4 of
1987 Constitution? Article VII and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory
Provisions. These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral- Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of

Parliamentary form of government. government. The signature sheet does not show to the
people the draft of the proposed changes before they are
COMELEC denied the petition for lack of an enabling law asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature
governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the
COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative
Commission on Elections declaring RA 6735 inadequate to clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution.
MARMETO VS. COMELEC (2017)
ISSUES: FACTS:
Did the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

On January 21, 2013, Marmeto filed on behalf of the
in denying due course to the Lambino Group's
Muntinlupa People Power (MPP) a proposed ordinance with
petition?
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Muntinlupa. The proposal
sought the creation of a sectoral council and the
appropriation of the amount of ₱200 million for the livelihood
RULING:
programs and projects that would benefit the people of
Muntinlupa City.
No. It did not. The Lambino Group miserably failed to
comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for
conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need For failure of the Sanggunian Panlungsod to act on the
to revisit Santiago. proposition within 30 days from its filing, Marmeto filed a
petition for initiative with the same body to invoke the power
The framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of of initiative under the Republic Act (RA) No. 7160, otherwise
the proposed constitutional amendment" should be "ready known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC).
and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal.
The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is The secretary of Sanggunian Panlungsod of Muntinlupa
already a draft shown to them." The framers also wrote a letter dated June 11, 2013 to the COMELEC stating
"envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal that the proposal could not be acted upon by the Sanggunian
itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal because the City's budget for FY 2013 had already been
and pass it around for signature." enacted. Thus, the secretary claimed that a new
appropriation ordinance was needed to provide funds for the
This means two essential elements must be present. conduct of the initiative.
1. First, the people must author and thus sign the On July 31, 2013, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 13-
entire proposal. No agent or representative can 0904 setting aside Marmeto' s initiative petition because the
sign on their behalf. propositions therein were beyond the powers of the
2. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the Sanggunian Panglunsod to enact and were not in accordance
proposal must be embodied in a petition. with the provisions of existing laws and rules.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of

Accordingly, on December 2, 2013, Marmeto filed a second
the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who
proposed ordinance with the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a
Muntinlupa. Again, no favorable action was done by the
petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the
Sanggunian within 30 days from the filing of the proposal,
people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people
prompting Marmeto to file a second initiative petition with
sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
the Office of the City Election Officer on February 10, 2014.
amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either On April 1, 2014, Marmeto filed a Supplemental Petition to
written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so comply with the requirements of COMELEC Resolution No.
attached, the petition must state the fact of such 2300, which provided the Rules and Regulations Governing
attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative
several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the and Referendum on National and Local Laws.
full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time On July 22, 2014, the COMELEC issued the assailed
constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of Resolution No. 14- 0509 which effectively dismissed
signatories had seen the full text of the proposed Marmeto's second initiative petition for lack of budgetary
amendments before signing. allocation.
In the case at bar, the Lambino Group did not attach to their Disagreeing with Resolution No. 14-0509, Marmeto filed the
present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the present certiorari and mandamus petition contending that
people signed as their initiative petition. There is not a single the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the dismissed his second initiative petition.
signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes
is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question
whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-
PRIVATE organization and its members cannot be

ISSUE: considered as public officers who are burdened w/
responsibility for public funds and who may be held
administratively and criminally liable for the
W/N the denial by COMELEC of the initiative petition
imprudent use thereof.
was proper?
Therefore, given the circumstances above, COMELEC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
The COMELEC is mandated to enforce and administer the excess jurisdiction in dismissing the petition.
laws on local initiative and referendum. The Constitution
mandated the Congress to provide for a system of initiative
and referendum, whereby the people can directly propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part
thereof by the congress or local legislative body. In RATIFICATIONS
compliance, the congress enacted RA 6735 which provides
for a system of initiative and referendum on national and
1. In case amendments proposed by Congress or
local laws. To implement RA 6735, the COMELEC
Convention
promulgated Resolution No. 2300 which provided the rules
and regulations governing the conduct of initiatives. RA
6735 and the LGC (RA 7160) are the pertinent laws on local SECTION 4(1), ARTICLE XVII
initiative and referendum which the COMELEC is mandated
to enforce and administer under Article IX-C Section 2(1) of
Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution
the 1987 Constitution.
under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified
The COMELEC cannot defeat the exercise of the people’s by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which
original legislative power for lack of budgetary allocation for shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later
its conduct. In the FY 2014 GAA of the COMELEC includes a than ninety days after the approval of such
1.4B appropriation for the “conduct and supervision of amendment or revision.
elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites”. The term
election is comprehensive enough to include other kinds of
electoral exercises, including initiative elections. In addition,
the COMELEC was also given a 1.6B appropriation for the 2. In case of amendments proposed through
“management and supervision of elections and other initiative
electoral exercises”. The COMELEC, therefore, committed
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Marmeto’s second
initiative petition ON THE GROUND that there were no funds SECTION 4(2), ARTICLE XVII
allocated for the purpose.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be
The COMELEC has the power to review whether the valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast
propositions in an initiative petition are within the power of in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than
the concerned sanggunian to enact in pursuant to Sec sixty days nor later than ninety days after the
124(b) of the LGC. In Sec 127 of the LGC, the courts have certification by the Commission on Elections of the
authority to declare null and void any proposition approved sufficiency of the petition.
for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the
Sanggunian concerned to enact the said measure. However,
the power of the courts extends only to those approved
ordinances. 3. Plebiscite to be called by Congress and
supervised by COMELEC, but the initiative on
Marmeto’s propositions in his initiative petition are beyond the Constitution will be called by COMELEC
the powers of the Sanggunian Panglungsod ng Muntinlupa
to enact because of the ff. reasons:
a) The creation of a separate local legislative body is

STATE POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES
ultra vires. Under the LGC, local legislative power
w/in the city is to be exercised by the Sangguniang Declaration of Principles and State Policies is a statement of
Panlungsod, which shall be composed of elected the basic ideological principles and policies that underlie
district and sectoral representatives. The sectoral the Constitution. The provisions shed light on the meaning of
representative shall be limited to three members the other provisions of the Constitution and they are a guide
only. for all departments of the government in the
b) The sectoral council proposed function overlaps w/ implementation of the Constitution.
the Local Development Council.
In the 1987 Constitution, there was an attempt to distinguish
c) The LGC requires local government funds and
monies to be spent solely for public purposes, and principles from policies:
provides transparency and accountability measures
PRINCIPLES
to ensure this end. In the initiative petition, it is the
authority of the proposed sectoral council to utilize, These are binding rules which must be observed in
manage, and administer public funds as it sees fit. the conduct of government. Not all 6 principles are
Marmeto’s Muntinlupa People Power remains a self-executory.
POLICIES
POLICIES
Section 2 is divided into three parts:
These are guidelines for the orientation of the state.
Some policies already anchor justiciable rights. 1. Renunciation of War
In the case of KILOSBAYAN v. MORATO, it says that 2. Adoption of Principles of International Law
Sections 5, 12, 13 and 17 are mere "guidelines" which do 3. Adherence to a policy of peace, equality, justice,
not yet confer rights enforceable by the courts, but recognized
freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
Section 16 as a right conferring provision because it speaks
of "the right of the people."
Its counterpart under the 1935 Constitution is entitled, Renunciation of War:

“Declaration of Principles”
As a signatory of the UN Charter, the Philippines
adheres to Art.2(4) of said character: - “All members
VICENTE SINGCO (with regard to the 1935 shall refrain in their international relations from the
Constitution): threat or use of force against territorial integrity or
political independence of any State, or in any other
This portion might be called the basic political manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
creed of the nation. It lays down the policies that Nations.”
the government is bound to observe.
These provisions prescribe the fundamental

Adoption of Principles of International Law:
obligations of the government, particularly the
legislative and executive departments as its policy The provision accepts the dualist view of legal systems
determining organs. (domestic viz international law) - International law
becomes a part of the municipal law only if it is
It is incumbent on the people to demand fulfillment of
these government duties through the exercise of the incorporated into municipal law (Doctrine of
right of suffrage. Incorporation) - International law can be used by
Philippine courts to settle domestic disputes - Courts
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were have to determine generally accepted principles
not intended to be self-executing principles
ready for enforcement through the courts. Under the 1987 Constitution, International law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either by:
They were rather DIRECTIVES addressed to the
executive and to the legislature. 1. Transformation
2. Incorporation
Under the 1973 Constitution, the title was changed to (Pharmaceutical v. Duque, October 9, 2007)
“Declaration of Principles and State Policies”
TRANSFORMATION
The “principles” are binding rules which must be
observed in the conduct of government whereas The transformation method requires that an int’l law
“policies” are guidelines for the orientation of the state. be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.
These principles in Article II are not intended to
be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts.
DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION
They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the
exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the The incorporation method applies when, by mere
legislature in its enactment of laws (Tañada vs constitutional declaration, international law is deemed
Anagara, May 2, 1997) to have the force of domestic law.
Article II of the Constitution is entitled Declaration of

Principles and State Policies. By its very title, Article II is What about Treaties?
a statement of general ideological principles and
policies. It is not a source of enforceable rights. Treaties become part of the law of the land through
(BCDA v. COA, February 26, 2009) transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of
Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and the Constitution which provides that “no treaty or
republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people international agreement shall be valid and effective
and all government authority emanates from them. unless concurred in by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all
the members of the senate.” - Thus, treaties or
conventional international law must go through a supreme military leader. (Kulayan v. Tan, July 3,
process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be 2012)
transformed into municipal law that can be applied to
• Net effect of Article II, Section 3, when
domestic conflicts. (Pharmaceutical v Duque, October
read with Article VII, Section 18 is that
9, 2007)
a civilian President is the ceremonial,l
egal, and administrative head of the
armed forces. (Kulayan v. Tan, July
What are “generally accepted principles of
3,2012)
International law”?
• The constitution does not require that
president must be possessed of military
Norms of general customary international law which
training and talents, but as Commander-
are binding on all states.
in-chief, he has the power to direct
military operations and to determine
i.e., renunciation of war as an instrument of national
military strategy.
policy, the principle of sovereign immunity, a person’s
• Normally, he would be expected to
right to life, liberty and due process, and pacta sunt
delegate the actual command of the
servanda, among others. (Pharmaceutical v
armed forces to military experts; but the
Duque, October 9, 2007)
ultimate power is his. (Kulayan v. Tan,
July 3,2012)
Is “soft law” part of the customary international

law? Role of AFP: - The AFP’s role is to secure
the sovereignty of the state and the integrity
Soft law does not fall into any of the categories on the of the national territory. (Saguisag v. Ochoa,
international law set forth in Art. 38. Chapter III of the January 12,2016)
1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice.
Soft law is an expression of Non-binding norms, Prime Duty of the Government

principles, and practices that influence state behavior.
Certain declarations and resolutions of the UN General Section 4. The prime duty of the government is to serve and
Assembly fall under this category. The most notable is protect the people. The government may call upon the people
the UN Declaration of Human Rights. to defend the state and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens
(Pharmaceutical, 2007) may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render
personal, military, or civil service.
Conflict between International Law and To protect the state and its people must be carried
Municipal/Domestic Law: Domestic Sphere, with out earnestly and effectively throughout the whole
local court deciding territory of the Philippines in accordance with the
• If the conflict is with the Constitution: uphold constitutional provision on the national territory.
the Constitution (Sec. 5 (2)(a), Article VIII) -Int’l (Saguisag v. Ochoa, January 12, 2016)
sphere, with international tribunal deciding
Compulsory Service- The constitutional right of the
• International law is superior to municipal law
state to require all citizens to render personal and
military service necessarily includes not only private
citizens but also citizens who have retired from
Civilian Supremacy Clause
military service. (Parreño v. COA, June 7, 2007)
Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the
military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the
the people and the state. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of the
of the state and the integrity of the national territory. general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the
Two thoughts: people of the blessings of democracy.
1. Disapproval of military abuses Not self-executing– In Tondo Medical Center

Employees Association v. Court of Appeals (July 17,
2. Guardianship of State Sovereignty
2007), the Court held that Section 5 and 18, Article II
of the Constitution are not self-executing provisions.
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution mandates (BCDA v COA, February 26, 2009)
that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over
the military, making the civilian president the nation’s Campaign Against Illegal Drugs - Truly, the gov’t
campaign against illegal drugs is consistent with the unto God the things that are God’s. (Re: Letter of
constitutional policy of maintenance of peace and Tony Q. Valenciano, March 7, 2017)
order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State
the promotion of the general welfare.
is based on mutual respect.
Caveat: However, the constitution also ensures Generally, the state cannot meddle in the internal
protection of the fundamental rights and liberties of affairs of the church, much less questions its faith and
the citizens. - These sacred individual rights, fortified dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion
further under statutory law, should not be sacrificed and discriminate against the other.
for the sheer sake of convenience and expediency,
(People v. Sayson, November 17, 2019)
STATE POLICIES
In other words, by disregarding the constitution, the
war of illegal drugs becomes a self- defeating and self-
destructive enterprise. A battle waged against Section 7. The state shall pursue an independent foreign
illegal drugs that resorts to short cuts and policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount
tramples on the rights of the people is not a war consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity,
on drugs; it is a war against the people. (People national interest, and the right to self-determination.
v. Cardenas, September 11, 2019) (Saguisag v. Ochoa, January 12, 2016)
Foreign Affairs and The President - The role of the

Inviolability of the Principle of Separation of Church and
President in foreign affairs is qualified by the
the State
Constitution in that the Chief Executive must give
paramount importance to the sovereignty of the
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be
nation, the integrity of its territory, its interest, and
inviolable.
the right of the sovereign Filipino people to self-
determination. (Saguisag v Ochoa, January 12,
2016)
What “Church”?
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion Freedom from Nuclear Weapons
should ever be preferred over another, the
Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national
Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the
interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear
term “church” in its generic sense which refers to......
weapons and its territory. Note: The provision is not a ban on
a temple, a mosque, and Iglesia, or any other house
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy nor is it a ban on all
of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious
“nuclear capable vessels.” (Bernas)
organization. Thus, the “Church” means the religious
congregations collectively. (Imbong v. Ochoa, April Section 9. The state shall promote a just and dynamic social
28, 2014) order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the
nation and free the people from poverty through policies that
The constitutional “wall” between the church and the provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a
state, has been jurisprudentially recognized to stem rising standard of living ,and an improved quality of life for all.
from the country’s unfortunate collective experience
Section 10. The state shall promote social justice in all phases
when the two institutions are commingled into one
of national development.
entity, exercising both power and influence,
oftentimes to the detriment of the populace. (Re:
Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, March 7, 2017) What is Social Justice? -Social justice is “neither
communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the
RATIONALE: The rationale of the rule is summed up
equalization of social and economic forces by the state
in the familiar saying,” strong fences make good
so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
neighbors.”
conception may at least be approximated. - Social
The idea is to delineate the boundaries between the Justice means the promotion of welfare of all the
two institutions and, thus, avoid encroachments by people, the adoption by the government of measures
one against the other because of a misunderstanding calculated to insure economic stability of all the
of the limits of their respective exclusive jurisdictions. competent elements of society, through the
The demarcation line calls on the entities to render maintenance of a proper economic equilibrium in the
therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and interrelations of the member of the community
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures
legally justifiable. -or extra constitutionally, through sustained but that instance of implantation is not the
the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all point of beginning of life. It started earlier. (Imbong
gov’ts on the time honored principle of salus populi est v Ochoa, April 8, 2014)
suprema lex. (Calalang vs Williams, December 20,
1940)
Principle of No Abortion:
Salus populi est suprema lex = let the good of The clear unequivocal intent of the framers of the
the people be the supreme law 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn
from conception was to prevent the legislature from
The 1987 Constitution covers all phases-not only enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear
economic inequities-of national development but with that even the court cannot interpret it otherwise.
emphasis not just on socio-economic but also on (Imbong v Ochoa)
political and cultural inequities. (Bernas)
Time and again, we (SC) have ruled that the social Rearing of Children:
justice provisions of the constitution are not self-
executing principles ready for enforcement through Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
the courts. These are merely statements of principles articulates the state’s policy relative to the rights of
and policies. To give them effect, legislative parents in the rearing of their children. (Pimentel v.
enactment is required. (BFAR v COA, August 13, LEB, Sept 19, 2019)
2008)
As held in Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan
Personal Dignity and Human Rights (SPARK) vs Quezon city (August 8,2017) the right and
Section 11. The state values the dignity of every human duty of the parents to rear their children being a
person and guarantees full respect for human rights. (cf Art. natural and primary right connotes the parents’
XIII) - The concretization of this provision is found principally superior right over the state in the upbringing of their
in the Bill of Rights and in Article XIII, (Bernas) children. (Pimentel v. LEB, Sept 19, 2019)
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and Role of the State:
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother As parents patriae, the state has the inherent right
and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and and duty to aid parents in the moral development of
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth their children, and thus, assumes a supporting role for
for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall parents to fulfill their parental obligations. (SPARK vs
receive the support of the Government. Quezon City, August 8, 2017)
The Family – the description of the family as a basic Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in
social institution is an assertion that the family is nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical,
anterior to the state and is not a creature of the state. moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall
While the reference to the family as autonomous is inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism and
“meant to protect the family against the encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
instrumentalization by the state.” (Bernas)
Article II, Section 13 & Article XV Section 3 of the

“When is CONCEPTION reckoned?” constitution required the state to enhance children’s well-being
and to protect them from conditions prejudicial to or that may
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or undermine development - Fulfilling this mandate includes
understood under medical parlance, and more preventing discriminatory conditions and, especially,
importantly, following the intention of the Framers of dismantling mechanisms for discrimination that hide behind
the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a veneer of the legal apparatus (David v SET, Sept 20,2016)
zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new
human being commences at a scientifically well-
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-
defined moment of conception, that is, upon
building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the
fertilization.
law of women and men.
To repeat it is the court’s position that life begins at

fertilization, not at the implantation. When a fertilized This is our nation’s response to the increasing clamor
ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is of women worldwide for gender equality. - Justice
Flerida Ruth P. Romero, in her concurring opinion in express policy of the state. (Republic v Pagadian
Yasin v Sharia, expounded that if this constitutional City Timber, September 16, 2008)
provision means anything at all, “it signifies that
women , no less than men, shall enjoy the same rights
Intergenerational Responsibility
accorded by the law and this includes the freedom of
choice in the use of names upon marriage.” (Re:
In Oposa, we (SC) allowed the suit to be brought in
Petition to Use Maiden Name, July 18, 2006)
the name of generations yet unborn “based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
Active Application of Gender Equality the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
This constitutional provision provides a ore active concerned.”
application than the passive orientation of Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution does, which simply states
Writ of Kalikasan
that no person shall be denied the equal protection of
law.” (Racho v Tanaka, June 25, 2018)
The Writ of Kalikasan, categorized as a special civil
action and conceptualized as an extraordinary
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to remedy, covers environmental damage of such
health of the people and instill health consciousness among magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or
them. In Imbong v Ochoa, the SC declared that this provision property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
is self-executing. provinces. The Writ is available against an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or
private individual or entity.
Right to Health and Police Power
Traditionally, these provisions (Sec 15 and 16) Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science
articulate the doctrine that health and ecological and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism
concerns are proper purposes of regulation and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total
and,therefore,can be the basis of the state’s exercise human liberation and development.
of police power. Having constitutionally ordained
goals and principles are, per se, compelling state
The court in Basco v Pagcor 1991 ruled that Section
interests. (ISAAA v. Greenpeace SEA, December
17, Article II on giving priority to education,
8, 2015)
science,and technology,arts,culture,and sports, and
Section II Article XIV on educational values are non-
Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of self-executing. (COTEDCUP v DepEd Sec)
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social
economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and
In the landmark case of Oposa v Factoran Jr, we (SC) promote their welfare.
recognized the public right of citizens to a balanced
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
In the 1987 Constitution provisions on social justice
constitutional history is solemnly incorporated in the
and the protection of labor underscore the importance
fundamental law. (Arigo v Swift, Sept. 16, 2014)
and economic significance of labor.
We (SC) declared that the right to a balanced and

Article II Section 18 characterizes labor as a primary
healthful ecology need not be written in the
social economic force, and as such, the state is bound
constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and
to protect the rights of workers and promote their
political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist
welfare.
from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications. (Arigo v Swift, Sept. 16, 2014) Moreover, workers are entitled to security of tenure,
humane conditions of work, and a living wage. (PNB v
Padao, November 16,2011)
All Filipino citizens are entitled, by right, to a balanced
and healthful ecology as declared under Section 16,
Article II of the constitution. This right carries with it Note: Section 3, Article XIII, on the protection of
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the labor and security tenure was also declared by the
environment, particularly our diminishing forest court in Agabon v National Labor Relations
resources. To uphold and protect this right is an Commission (2004) as not self- executory. COTESCUP
v Deped Sec) indigenous cultural communities within the framework of

national unity and development.
Policy of a Filipino Controlled Economy Re-orientation of Policy
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and

independent national economy effectively controlled by The 1987 Constitution reorients the state toward
Filipinos. enabling indigenous peoples to maintain their identity.
- It declines articulating policies of the integration and
While Section 19 Article II of the 1987 Constitution
assimilation and transcends the 1973 Constitution’s
requires the development of a self- reliant and
undertaking to consider. Instead it commits to not
independent national economy effectively controlled
only recognize, but also promote “the rights of
by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy
indigenous cultural communities.” (Tawahig v
of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment.
Lapinid, March 10, 2019)
(Espina v Zamora, Sept 21, 2010)
The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or

interests from maneuvering our economic policies and The 1987 Constitution qualifies the state’s duty of
ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas “recognizing and promoting the rights of indigenous
of development. (Espina v Zamora, Sept. 21, cultural communities” as necessarily operating “within
2010) the framework of national unity development.” This
reference to national unity is as much an articulation
No Isolation Policy of an ideal as it is a legal formulation. (Tawahig v
Lapinid, March 10, 2019)
In other words, the Constitution did not intend to
pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut our foreign
investments, goods, and services in the development Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental,
of the Philippine economy. - While the constitution community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the
does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign welfare of the nation.
goods, services, and investments into the country, it Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of
does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an communication and information in nation-building.
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity
The Philippines recognizes the vital role of information
frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
and communication in nation building. - As a
(Tanada v Angara, May 2, 1997)
consequence, we have adopted a policy environment
that aspires for the full development of
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the
communications infrastructure to facilitate the flow of
private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides
information into,out of,and across the country. (DOTC
incentives to needed investments.
v Abecina, June 29, 2016)
Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural

Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
development and agrarian reform.
governments.
The 1987 Constitution mandates the just distribution
of all agricultural lands subject to the limits prescribed The autonomy of the LGUs does not contemplate the
by Congress. fragmentation of the Philippines into a collection of mini-states
or the creation of imperium in imperio (Mandanas v Ochoa, July
Under Article II, Section 21 the state shall promote 13,2018) - The grant of autonomy simply means that congress
comprehensive rural development and agrarian will allow the LGUs to perform certain functions and exercise
reform. - Article XIII, Section 4 provides that an certain powers in order not for them to be overly dependent on
agrarian reform program shall be carried out in the the National Government subject to the limitations that the
country (Salas v Cabungcal, March 29,2017) 1987 constitution or congress may impose. (Mandanas,supra)
Rural development encompasses a broad spectrum of

Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to
social, economic, human,cultural,political and even
opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties
industrial development- not just agricultural.
as may be defined by law.
(Bernas)
Privilege not Right - What is recognized is merely a

Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of
privilege to subject to limitations imposed by law. -
Section 26 neither bestows such a right nor elevates provided by law. (Province of North Cotabato v
the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. GRP, October 4, 2008)
(Pamatong vs COMELEC, April 13,2004)
PEOPLE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY

The equal access provision is a subsumed part of
Article II of the Constitution ,entitled “Declaration of
All governmental authority emanates from our people
Principles and State Policies.” The provisions under
(Diocese of Bacolod v. Comelec, January 21, 2015)
the article are generally considered not self-
executing, and there is no plausible reason for A republic is a representative government, a government run
according to different treatment to the “equal access” by and for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the
provision. (Pamatong v COMELEC) people govern themselves directly.
The essence of republicanism is representation and

renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of
On Political Dynasties: - the foregoing provision is public functionaries who derive their mandate from the
considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying people and act on their behalf serving for a limited period only,
phrase “as may be defined by law.” In this respect, after which they are replaced or retained, at the option of their
said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a principle. (Naval vs. COMELEC, July 28, 2014)
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies guidelines for legislative or executive action.
(Belgica v Ochoa, November 19, 2013)
OPOSA v. FACTORAN
FACTS:
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in
the public service and take positive and effective measures The principal petitioners are all minors duly represented and
against graft and corruption. joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an
additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.
(PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation
Learning how unbridled power could corrupt public
organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in
servants under the regime of a dictator, the framers
concerted action geared for the protection of our
put primacy on the integrity of public service by
environment and natural resources.
declaring it as a constitutional principles and a state
policy. (Ombudsman v Vergara, December 6, The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.
2017) Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His
substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the
Policy of Full Disclosure Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon
proper motion by the petitioners
Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of
Note: The State’s policy of full public interest and is the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit,
use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is
further subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for
law. (Sereno v Committee on Trade, Feb 1,2016)
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the
Full Disclosure and Right to Information: The preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
policy of full public disclosure enunciated in Section 28 impracticable to bring them all before the Court." They
complements the right of access to information on further asseverate that they represent their generation as
matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. well as generations yet unborn and assert that continued
deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of
The right to information Sec 7 Article III guarantees the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of
the right of the people to demand information, while environmental tragedies.
section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands. (Province of The petitioners alleged the respondent, Honorable Fulgencio
North Cotabato v GRP, October 4, 2008) S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) of continued
The complete and effective exercise of the right to approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to
information (Sec 7 Article III) necessitates that its numerous commercial logging companies to cut and
complementary provision on public disclosure derive deforest the remaining forests of the country. Petitioners
the same self- executory nature, subject only to request the defendant, his agents, representatives and
reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be other persons acting in his behalf to:
Conformably with the enunciated right to a

Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country; balanced and healthful ecology and the right to
and cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, health, as well as the other related provisions of
renewing or approving new timber license agreements. the Constitution concerning the conservation,
development and utilization of the country's natural
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental resources, then President Corazon C. Aquino
consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14
of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the
submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This act of Department of Environment and Natural Resources
defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment "shall be the primary government agency
of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the responsible for the conservation, management,
benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. development and proper use of the country's
Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the environment and natural resources, specifically
defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources,
defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the including those in reservation and watershed areas,
country. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the and lands of the public domain, as well as the
existing TLA’s to the continuing serious damage and licensing and regulation of all natural resources as
extreme prejudice of plaintiffs. may be provided for by law in order to ensure
equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on for the welfare of the present and future
the ground that the complaint had no cause of action against generations of Filipinos."
him and that it raises a political question.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is
MAIN ISSUE: as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate
and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O.
1. Is a specific legal right violated by the No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to
respondent Secretary for which any relief is protect and advance the said right. A denial or
provided by law? violation of that right by the other who has the
correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect
Yes. The complaint focuses on one specific the same gives rise to a cause of action.
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology which is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law under Section 2. Is the petitioner’s proposition to have all the
16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the
requisite hearing violates the requirements of
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology due process?
is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, No. The Timber License Agreement (TLA) is an
it does not follow that it is less important than any instrument by which the state regulates the
of the civil and political rights enumerated in the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the
latter. Such a right belongs to a different category end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a
of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than contract within the purview of the due process
self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be
and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever
advancement of which may even be said to predate dictated by public interest or public welfare as in
all governments and constitutions. this case. The granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property
As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not rights.
even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-
xxx impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the
exercise by the police power of the State, in the
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology interest of public health, safety, moral and general
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must
impairing the environment. yield to the police power of the State.
The said right implies, among many other things,

the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests. Without such forests, the
ecological or environmental balance would be
irreversibly disrupted.
TAÑADA v. ANGARA (1997) Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987
FACTS: Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are
merely statements of principles and policies. The
Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged
WTO as a founding member with the goal, as articulated by infringement of broad constitutional principles are
President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate, of sourced from basic considerations of due process
improving "Philippine access to foreign markets, especially and the lack of judicial authority to wade “into the
its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs uncharted ocean of social and economic policy
on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial making.”
products." The President also saw in the WTO the opening
of "new opportunities for the services sector, the reduction Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his concurring
of costs and uncertainty associated with exporting, and the opinion in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., explained these
attraction of more investments into the country." reasons as follows:
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines When substantive standards as general as ‘the
certified the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. right to a balanced and healthy ecology’ and ‘the
1083, a resolution entitled "Concurring in the Ratification of right to health’ are combined with remedial
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization." standards as broad ranging as ‘a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted jurisdiction,’ the result will be, it is respectfully
Resolution No. 97 which "Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted
that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ocean of social and economic policy making.
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization." At least in respect of the vast area of environmental
protection and management, our courts have no
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. It claim to special technical competence and
assails the WTO Agreement for violating the following experience and professional qualification.
mandate of the 1987 Constitution under Sec. 19, Article II
and Secs. 10, 12, Article XII. Where no specific, operable norms and standards
are shown to exist, then the policy making
departments—the legislative and executive
MAIN ISSUE: departments—must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms
1. Does the WTO Agreement and its 3 annexes and standards, and to implement them before the
contravene the 1987 Constitution? courts should intervene.
No, it does not. While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in

favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the
"declaration of principles and state policies." The need for business exchange with the rest of the
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and
is called the "basic political creed of the nation" by limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against
Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II foreign competition and trade practices that are
are not intended to be self-executing principles unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not
ready for enforcement through the courts. They are intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not
used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the shut out foreign investments, goods and services
exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the in the development of the Philippine economy.
legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the While the Constitution does not encourage the
leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
the principles and state policies enumerated in investments into the country, it does not prohibit
Article II and some sections of Article XII are not them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the
"self-executing provisions, the disregard of which basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on
can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They foreign competition that is unfair.
do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional
rights but guidelines for legislation." The constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and
independent national economy" does not
In the same light, we held in Basco v. Pagcor that necessarily rule out the entry, of foreign
broad constitutional principles need legislative investments, goods and services. It contemplates
enactments to implement them, thus: neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in
the international community."
On petitioners’ allegation that P.D. 1869 violates
Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of
THE DAVIDE AMENDMENT "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any
Constitution judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The
disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of
PAMATONG V. COMELEC (2004) action before the courts.
FACTS:
An inquiry into the intent of the framers produces the same
Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of determination that the provision is not self-executory. The
Candidacy for President on December 17, 2003. Respondent original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due read, "The State shall broaden opportunities to public office
course to petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy in its and prohibit public dynasties."Commissioner (now Chief
Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth an
amendment that changed the word "broaden" to the phrase
In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to "ensure equal access," and the substitution of the word
reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in "office" to "service."
violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities
for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State
1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified to enact positive measures that would accommodate as
candidates only to those who can afford to wage a many people as possible into public office. The approval of
nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political the "Davide amendment" indicates the design of the framers
parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired
indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the policy objective and not reflective of the imposition of a clear
electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign State burden.
people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly
erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired
among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is
the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence
president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since of legislation since its effective means and reach are not
he has numerous national organizations under his properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that
leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely
campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and open-ended Words and phrases such as "equal access,"
he has a platform of government. Petitioner likewise attacks "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to
the validity of the form for the Certificate of Candidacy countless interpretations owing to their inherent
prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the form impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the
does not provide clear and reasonable guidelines for framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous
determining the qualifications of candidates since it does not foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be
ask for the candidate’s bio-data and his program of sourced.
government.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to
Petitioner claims that the form does not provide clear opportunities to public office may be subjected to
and reasonable guidelines for determining the limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the
qualifications of candidates since it does not ask for the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions
candidate’s biodata and his program of government. of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated December 10, 2002
ISSUE: outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu
proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate
WON the COMELECs refusal of Pamatong’s request for of Candidacy.
presidential candidacy, along with the grounds for such
refusal violate the right to equal access to opportunities for As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without
public service. discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not
violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens
RULING: engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any
one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the
No, the "equal access" provision is a subsumed part case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt
of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under
the Article are generally considered not self-executing and Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the
there is no plausible reason for a different treatment to the constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 due process clause, equal protection clause, and prohibition
December 2003. Thus, their presumed validity stands and against involuntary servitude.
has to be accorded due weight.
ISSUE:
Clearly, therefore, petitioner’s reliance on the equal access
clause in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is Whether or not the RH Law violates the right to life of the
misplaced. unborn in violation of Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have
not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to RULING:
divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its
electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. The Court held that RH Law is constitutional except that
Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical there are some provisions that it held otherwise.
considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the
greater the number of candidates, the greater the
The Court first discussed that the term “conception” in
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the
Art. II, Sec. 12 of the Constitution means that life begins
increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for
at fertilization. It went back to the Records of the
the election. These practical difficulties should, of course,
Constitutional Convention wherein it appears that the
never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated
reason behind it is because a fertilized ovum is alive and is
electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should
already human. It also appears that the intent of the framers
be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever
is to provide equal protection to both the mother and the
necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not
unborn child. Thus, the framers intended to prohibit
merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that
Congress from enacting measures that would allow it to
erodes faith in our democratic institutions
determine when life begins. It is also apparent that the
framers did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
PRINCIPLES: unconstitutional, in facts, tubal ligation, condoms, and
vasectomy are not classified as abortifacients. A reading of
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II
RH Law shows that it is in line with the intent of the framers
of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and
State Policies." The provisions under the Article are and proscribes abortion. Moreover, the Court declared that
generally considered not self-executing and there is no the Filipino people in ‘imploring the aid of Almighty God’ in
plausible reason for a different treatment to the "equal the preamble manifested their spirituality innate in Filipino
access" provision. nature and consciousness as people, shaped by tradition and
historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble,
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence
may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest
specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found
principles of morality. The Framers, however, felt the need
in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code
to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not
encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa,
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance
candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have hence, the principle of separation of Church and State
not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. So,
divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its while the Court has no authority to rule on ecclesiastical
electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. matters, it has the authority to determine whether the RH
Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as

IMBONG V. OCHOA (2014)
unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to
FACTS:
medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal,
affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services,
Republic Act No. 10354, or the “Responsible
methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, the
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012” (RH
religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be
Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve.
Petitioners from various sectors of the society are
After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom
questioning the constitutionality of the RH Law on different
is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority
grounds. The grounds for assailing the RH bill is the violation
higher than the State.
of the right to life, right to health, freedom of religion and
right to free speech, right to privacy (marital privacy and
PRINCIPLE:
autonomy), freedom of expression and academic freedom,
ISSUE:
Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality - believes that with
respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of Whether or not the CTRM may be compelled to furnish
religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's Sereno et al (APMP) with a copy of the minutes of the May
favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups 23, 2005 meeting based on the constitutional right to
to exercise their religion without hindrance. information on matters of public concern and the State's
policy of full public disclosure.
SERENO V. COMMITTEE ON TRADE (2016)

RULING:
FACTS:
No. The constitutional guarantee of the right to information
The CTRM, an office under the NEDA, held a meeting in
on matters of public concern enunciated in Section 7 of
which it resolved to recommend to President Arroyo the
Article III of the 1987 Constitution complements the State's
lifting of the suspension of the tariff reduction schedule on
policy of full public disclosure in all transactions involving
petrochemicals and certain plastic products, thereby
public interest expressed in Section 28 of Article II of the
reducing the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT)
1987 Constitution. According to Legaspi v. Civil Service
rates on products covered by E.O No. 161 from 7% or 10%
Commission, the constitutional guarantee to information
to 5% starting July 2005.
"does not open every door to any and all information." It is
limited to matters of public concern and is subject to such
Paras, then the Chairman of the Association of limitations as may be provided by law. Likewise, the State's
Petrochemical Manufacturers of the Philippines (APMP), the policy of full public disclosure is restricted to transactions
main industry association in the petrochemical sector, wrote involving public interest and is further subject to reasonable
to the CTRM Secretariat, through Director Mendoza, to conditions prescribed by law.
request a copy of the minutes of the meeting held on May
23, 2005. Mendoza denied the request. The CTRM sent a
Two requisites must concur before the right to information
second letter as a response to the series of letter-requests
may be compelled by writ of mandamus. Firstly, the
from the APMP, stating that the meeting pertains to closed-
information sought must be in relation to matters of public
door cabinet meetings under Section 3 (c) of the IRR of
concern or public interest. And, secondly, it must not be
Republic Act 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical
exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional
Standards for Public Officials and Employees which is
guarantee.
one exception to the official information that needs to be
disclosed. Hence, CTRM believes that it is constrained not to
As to the first requisite, there is no rigid test in determining
provide the said minutes to the APMP.
whether or not a particular information is of public concern
or public interest. The Philippine petrochemical industry
Due to CTRM’s refusal to give the copy of the minutes of the
centers on the manufacture of plastic and other related
meeting, APMP through the petitioners, filed a petition for
materials and provides essential input requirements for the
mandamus in the RTC to compel the CTRM to provide the
agricultural and industrial sectors of the country. Thus, the
copy of the minutes and to grant access to the minutes.
position of the petrochemical industry as an essential
contributor to the overall growth of our country's
Meanwhile, President Arroyo signed E.O. No. 486, dated economy easily makes the information sought a
January 12, 2006, to lift the suspension of the tariff matter of public concern or interest.
reduction on petrochemical resins and other plastic products
under the ASEAN Free Trade Area - Common Effective
The second requisite is that the information requested must
Preferential Tariff (AFTA-CEPT) Scheme.
not be excluded by law from the constitutional guarantee.
In that regard, the Court has already declared that the
The CTRM claim exemption on the ground that the May 23, constitutional guarantee of the people's right to information
2005 meeting was classified as a closed-door Cabinet does not cover national security matters and intelligence
meeting by virtue of the committee's composition and the information, trade secrets and banking transactions and
nature of its mandate dealing with matters of foreign affairs, criminal matters. Equally excluded from coverage of the
trade and policy-making. They assert that the information constitutional guarantee are diplomatic correspondence,
withheld was within the scope of the exemption from closed-door Cabinet meeting and executive sessions of
disclosure because the CTRM meetings were directly related either house of Congress, as well as the internal
to the exercise of the sovereign prerogative of the President deliberations of the Supreme Court. CTRM’s claim of
as the Head of State in the conduct of foreign affairs and the exemption on the ground that the May 23, 2005
regulation of trade, as provided in Section 3 (a) of Rule IV meeting was classified as a closed-door Cabinet
of the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 6713. meeting being directly related to the exercise of the
sovereign prerogative of the President as the Head of
State in the conduct of foreign affairs and the
regulation of trade IS CORRECT. It is always necessary, and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
given the highly important and complex powers to fix tariff transactions involving public interest.
rates vested in the President, that the recommendations
submitted for the President's consideration be well-thought PRIVILEGED INFORMATION examples - national
out and well-deliberated. In Almonte v. Vasquez the Court security matters and intelligence information, trade secrets
has stressed the need for confidentiality and privacy, stating and banking transactions and criminal matters, diplomatic
thusly: "A President and those who assist him must be free correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meeting and executive
to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal
making decisions and to do so in a way many would be deliberations of the Supreme Court.
unwilling to express except privately." Without doubt,
therefore, ensuring and promoting the free exchange of
ideas among the members of the committee tasked to give
tariff recommendations to the President were truly FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
imperative.
RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. VALENCIANO (2017)

In case of denial of access to the information, it is the
government agency concerned that has the burden of FACTS:
showing that the information sought to be obtained is not a
A series of letters written by Valenciano and addressed to
matter of public concern, or that the same is exempted from
the Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno reporting that the
the coverage of the constitutional guarantee. We reiterate, basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City had
therefore, that the burden has been well discharged herein. been converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel,
complete with Catholic religious icons and other instruments
The claim of APMP (petitioners) that that the closed-door for religious activities. He believes that such practice
violated the constitutional provisions on the Separation of
Cabinet meeting exception, assuming that it’s established
Church and State and the constitutional prohibition against
by law or settled jurisprudence, could not be automatically
the appropriation of public money and property for the
applied to all the CTRM meetings because the CTRM was benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or any other system
different from the Cabinet inasmuch as two of its members, of religion. He further averred that the holding of masses at
namely, the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the basement of Hall of Justice showed that it tended to
the Chairman of the Tariff Commission, were not members favor the Catholic litigants; that the rehearsals and other
of the President's Cabinet IS NOT CORRECT. In Senate of activities caused great disturbance to the employees; and
that court functions are affected due to the masses that is
the Philippines v. Ermita, it was said that executive
being held from 12:00 to 1:15 in the afternoon.
privilege is properly invoked in relation to specific categories
of information, not to categories of persons. As such, the
ISSUE:
fact that some members of the committee were not part of
the President's Cabinet was of no moment. What should
Whether or not the holding of masses at the basement of
determine whether or not information was within the ambit
the Quezon City Hall of Justice violates the constitutional
of the exception from the people's right to access to
principle of separation of Church and State as well as the
information was not the composition of the body, but the
constitutional prohibition against appropriation of public
nature of the information sought to be accessed. A
money or property for the benefit of any sect, church,
different holding would only result to the unwanted situation
denomination, sectarian institution or system of religion.
wherein any concerned citizen, like the petitioner, invoking
the right to information on a matter of public concern and
RULING:
the State's policy of full public disclosure, could demand
information from any government agency under all
The holding of Religious Rituals in the Hall of Justice does
conditions whenever he felt aggrieved by the decision or
not amount to the union of Church and State. The 1987
recommendation of the latter.
constitution provides that the separation of Church and the
State shall be inviolable; if further provides that the free
Here, the need to ensure the protection of the privilege of
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
non-disclosure is necessary to allow the free exchange of
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
ideas among Government officials as well as to guarantee
allowed. Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the
the well-considered recommendation free from interference
Principle of separation of Church and State. In fact,
of the inquisitive public.
these two principles are in perfect harmony with each other.
The Roman Catholic express their worship through the holy
PRINCIPLES:
mass and to stop these would be tantamount to repressing
the right to the free exercise of their religion.
Article II of the 1987 Constitution, Section 28. Subject
to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
It is also the view of the Supreme Court that the holding of
Catholic masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of
Justice is not a case of establishment but merely

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE
ACCOMMODATION wherein the government recognize the
reality that some measures may not be imposed on a certain STATE
portion of the population for the reason that these measures
are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be
shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the POLICE POWER
public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or
prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional MAYNILAD V. SECRETARY (2019)
encroachment.
FACTS:
No appropriation of public money or property for the benefit

On April 2, 2009, the Regional Office of the DENR
of any Church. The constitution provides that “No public
Environmental Management Bureau-Region III (EMB-
money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or
RIII) filed a complaint before the DENR's Pollution
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
Adjudication Board (PAB) charging MWSS and its
support any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
concessionaires, Maynilad and Manila Water, with
institution, or system of religion, or any priest, preacher,
failure to provide, install, operate, and maintain
minister or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,
adequate Wastewater Treatment Facilities (WWTFs)
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
for sewerage system resulting in the degraded quality and
assigned to the armed forces, or any penal institution, or
beneficial use of the receiving bodies of water leading to
government orphanage or leprosarium.
Manila Bay, and which has directly forestalled the DENR's
mandate to implement the operational plan for the
The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the rehabilitation and restoration of Manila Bay and its river
appropriation is primarily intended for the furtherance of a tributaries.
particular church. The aforecited constitutional provision
“does not inhibit the use of public property for religious
On April 8 and 21, 2009, the Regional Directors of the DENR
purposes when the religious character of such use is merely
EMB--National Capital Region (NCR) and Region VI-A
incidental to a temporary use which is available
(RVI-A) also instituted their complaints before the PAB.
indiscriminately to the public in general. Thus, the basement
they, stated that the test results of water samples taken
of the Quezon City Hall of Justice has remained to be a public
from Manila Bay showed that the quality of water near
property devoted for public use because the holding of
the area has worsened without improvement in all
Catholic masses therein is a mere incidental consequence of
parameters. As a result, the SENR issued a Notice of
its primary purpose.
Violation (NOV). The NOV determined petitioners' violation
of Section 8 of the Clean Water Act, in that they have
not provided, installed, or maintained sufficient WWTFs and
sewerage connections satisfactory enough in quantity to
PRINCIPLES: meet the standards and objectives of the law,
notwithstanding court orders and the lapse of the five-year
Benevolent Neutrality/Accommodation period provided by the Clean Water Act.
Free Exercise Clause - The right to religious profession MWSS however, argued that they were compliant with the
and worship has a two-fold aspect - freedom to believe and law. Maynilad and Manila Water also asserted the supremacy
freedom to act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long of the Concession Agreements (Agreement/s) executed
as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The with MWSS containing service targets for water supply,
second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated sewerage, and sanitation within specific milestone periods
into external acts that affect the public welfare. spread over the twenty-five year concession period. They
sought refuge under Section 7 of the Clean Water Act
Non-Establishment Clause - The non-establishment which first requires the Department of Public Works and
clause reinforces the wall of separation between Church and Highways (DPWH) to prepare and effect a national program
State. It simply means that the State cannot set up a on sewerage and septage management to guide the
Church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, MWSS and/or its concessionaries in implementing the
or prefer one religion over another nor force nor influence a law. They also claimed other factors contributing to the
person to go to or remain away from church against his will continued pollution of Manila Bay and its river tributaries.
or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion; They likewise put forth their respective proposals, on-going
etc. The state cannot establish or sponsor an official religion. projects, and accomplishments relative to the performance
of their obligations under the Agreements.
In refutation, the Regional Directors of the DENR-EMB

maintained that the quantity of the WWTFs is
insufficient to meet the objectives of the law. conditions precedent for the implementation of Section 8
Petitioners' proffered "significant improvements" on thereof. They defend that the Order of the SENR finding
domestic wastewater management actually did not fall petitioners liable for violation of Section 8 of the Clean Water
within acceptable parameters, where the river tributaries Act were based on substantial evidence, and that the SENR
became heavily polluted, as evidenced by the results of the Order imposing a fine on petitioners for violation of Section
laboratory analysis and monthly monitoring of various river 8 of the Clean Water Act was based on a valid complaint or
systems conducted by the DENR-EMBs. There remains no charge. Specific to the Court of Appeals's dismissal of
connection of the existing sewage lines in the Cavite Area, Maynilad's appeal, respondents also assert that the assailed
and no sufficient STFs established in the San Juan area. Orders of the SENR had already attained finality.
The SENR ruled that the Clean Water Act, specifically, the MAIN ISSUES:
provisions on the five-year period to connect the existing
sewage lines, is mandatory, and the refusal of petitioners' 1. Did the petitioners violated Section 8 of the Clean
customers to connect to a sewage line is irrelevant to Water Act?
Section 8 of the law. The petitioners' failure to provide a
centralized sewerage system and connect all sewage lines is Yes, they violated Section 8 of the Clean Water Act.
a continuing unmitigated environmental pollution resulting Protruding from the basic tenet that water is a vital part of
in the release and discharge of untreated water into various human existence, this Court introduces the Public Trust
water areas and Manila Bay. Citing the Supreme Court ruling Doctrine. It aims to put an additional strain upon the duty
in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) v. of the water industry to comply with the laws and
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, strict compliance regulations of the land. A number of doctrines already
with the Clean Water Act is a necessary given, and the protect and sanctify public welfare and highlight the State's
five-year periodic review stipulated in the various roles relative thereto. Article XII, Section 2, of
Agreements between petitioners should have the 1987 Philippine Constitution elaborates on the
considered and factored in the requirements of the ownership of the State over the nation's natural resources
Clean Water Act. and its right and duty to regulate the same.
MWSS insists it did not violate the law. It argues, in The above constitutional provision is the embodiment of jura
essence, that its obligation under Section 8 of the Clean regalia, or the Regalian doctrine, which reserves to the State
Water Act has yet to accrue given the lack of required ownership of all natural resources. The vastness of this
coordination and cooperation by the lead and implementing patrimony precludes the State from managing the same
agencies under Section 7 of the law and non-compliance by entirely by itself. In the interest of quality and
the DPWH, DENR and LGUs with Sections 7 of the Clean efficiency, it thus outsources assistance from private
Water Act, specifically the preparation and establishment of entities, but this must be delimited and controlled for
a national program on sewerage and septage management. the protection of the general welfare. Then comes into
relevance police power, one of the inherent powers of the
Maynilad mainly anchors its arguments on our ruling in State. Hand-in-hand with police power in the promotion of
MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay which general welfare is the doctrine of parens patriae. It
ultimately ordered MWSS to construct the necessary WWTFs focuses on the role of the state as a "sovereign" and
in the areas of Metro Manila, Rizal and Cavite with a deadline expresses the inherent power and authority of the
for completion of the construction. It relied on Our following state to provide protection of the person and property
declarations in the said case: The MWSS shall submit to the of a person non sui juris.
Court on or before June 30, 2011 the list of areas in Metro
Manila, Rizal and Cavite that do not have the necessary In the framework of Public Trust Doctrine, a relationship is
wastewater treatment facilities. formed - "the [s]tate is the trustee, which manages specific
natural resources the trust principal - for the trust principal
Manila Water is steadfast in its position that it did not violate for the benefit of the current and future generations - the
Section 8 of the Clean Water Act, as Section 7, in relation to beneficiaries." xxx But with the birth of privatization of many
Section 8, of the Clean Water Act partakes of a condition basic utilities, including the supply of water, this has proved
precedent to Manila Water's fulfillment of its obligations to be quite challenging. The State is in a continuing battle
thereunder. Even if so obliged under Section 8, Manila Water against lurking evils that has afflicted even itself, such as
claims exemption from the "five-year timeline" for the excessive pursuit of profit rather than purely the public's
compliance. It also assails the fine imposed by the SENR for interest.
being excessive and confiscatory amounting to deprivation
of property without due process. These exigencies forced the public trust doctrine to evolve
from a mere principle to a resource management term and
Respondents disagree with petitioners' contention that the
conditions contained in Section 7 of the Clean Water Act are
tool flexible enough to adapt to changing social priorities and Under the Clean Water Act, it requires water utility
address the correlative and consequent dangers thereof. companies to provide for sewerage and septage
management services within five years of the law's passage.
The public is regarded as the beneficial owner of trust
resources, and courts can enforce the public trust For the purpose of section 8, the DOH, in coordination with
doctrine even against the government itself. other government agencies, shall formulate guidelines and
standards for the collection, treatment and disposal of
It is in this same manner that the right to distribute water sewage including guidelines for the establishment and
was granted by the State via utility franchises to Maynilad operation of centralized sewage treatment system.
and Manila Water, under express statutory regulation
through its delegated representative, the MWSS. The State Section 8 thus imposes the following obligations, dissected
conferred the franchise to these concessionaires, working as follows:
under the firm belief that they shall serve as protectors of
the public interest and the citizenry. In this regard, water 1. The setting of the obligation is prefaced by stating
rights must be secured to achieve optimal use of water a day certain for its complete performance-period
resources, its conservation, and its preservation for of within five years from effectivity of the Clean
allocative efficiency. Water Act.
2. The actors here are "the agenc[ies] vested to
For this purpose, water users who are subject to regulation provide water supply and sewerage facilities and/or
by the State or by its own franchise must obtain permits and concessionaires in Metro Manila and other highly
comply with the sanctions imposed on them. The enjoyment urbanized cities (HUCs)."
of these permits is not perpetual and require a continued 3. The prestation set by law is the "[connection of] the
demonstration of quality and good service. Water allocation existing sewage line found in all subdivisions,
decisions must coincide with a comprehensive water supply condominiums, commercial centers, hotels, sports
plan which reflects not only economic efficiency but also and recreational facilities, hospitals, market places,
environmental and health values. Henceforth, whenever public buildings, industrial complex and other
there are changing needs and circumstances, there must similar establishments including households to
also be proper re-allocation techniques. "[T]he state can available sewerage system."
re-evaluate prior allocations and must act to preserve
the right of present and future generations." "The idea In the performance of its obligation, petitioners must
that the state must manage water resources for the benefit coordinate with the Local Government Units (LGUs).
of present and future generations captures the idea of This is so given the requirement on LGUs to provide basic
sustainability and reflects our extended connection to those services and facilities, including the delivery of clean water,
who succeed us. and the policy endowing LGUs with local autonomy.
Via legislative act of police power, the enactment of the In addition, the law's provisos allow for a sewerage service
Clean Water Act thrusts the obligation onto the water charge by petitioners except for sources utilizing their own
concessionaires to provide for a proper sewerage and sewerage system which in all cases must comply with the
septage system that complies with environmental and requirements set forth in Section 8. The law likewise
health standards to protect present and future stipulates that the sewerage-septage management system,
generations. The magnitude of this law is highlighted by the guidelines and standards for collection, disposal and
the trust relationship among the State, concessionaires, treatment of sewage, and the establishment and operation
and water users, which must reflect a universal intangible of a centralized sewage treatment system, are to be
agreement that water is an ecological resource that needs undertaken by the concerned government agencies such as
to be protected for the welfare of the citizens. In essence, the DPWH and DOH. Nothing in Section 8, however, hinges
"[t]he public trust doctrine is based on the notion that petitioners' performance of its obligation on a future and
private individuals cannot fully own trust resources but can uncertain event, specifically, the performance of the
only hold them subject to a servitude on behalf of the obligation under Section 7. What is clear is that the
public." "States can accomplish this goal more efficiently obligation in Section 8 is demandable at once, upon
through statutory regulation" which was essentially done effectivity of the law, to be performed within a given
through the legislation of the Clean Water Act, and the period.
urgency and significance of which is now fortified by the
courts under the Public Trust Doctrine as clamored for by
the circumstances of this case.
OTHER ISSUES:
1. Is the compliance by DPWH to their obligations

under Section 7 of the Clean Water Act is a condition
precedent to petitioners' fulfillment of their Metro Manila and other highly urbanized cities (HUCs) as
obligations thereunder. defined in Republic Act No. 7160, in coordination with
LGUs, to connect the existing sewage line found in all
Section 7 is not a condition precedent to compliance subdivisions, condominiums, commercial centers, hotels,
with Section 8. The repeated use of the imperative word sports and recreational facilities, hospitals, market places,
shall in the provision has the invariable significance to public buildings, industrial complex and other similar
impose the enforcement of an obligation, especially where establishments including households to available sewerage
public interest is involved. As worded in all the amendments, system x x x" within five (5) years from effectivity of the
the obligation in Section 8 is commanding in nature, and it Clean Water Act or from May 6, 2004. The meat of this case
was not conditioned on the performance of the act under is the fact of delay by petitioners in complying with the
Section 7 or any other act. Read with the shortened mandate under Section 8, whereas the matter involved in
compliance period, the phraseology here plainly indicates MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay is the urgency
the legislative intent to make the statutory obligation of rehabilitation of Manila Bay. This piece of
absolutely mandatory for the party to assume and jurisprudence only scoffs and highlights at the fact of
undertake. We likewise note that the compliance period is petitioners' abject negligence in their role in local sanitation
still reckoned from the date of effectivity of the Act, not from and exposes its nefarious consequences - adequate
performance of the purported condition precedent in Section wastewater treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and
7. Cavite was found to be practically nonexistent which ended
in the decrepit conditions of Manila Bay, meriting the
In all, nothing in Sections 7 and 8 of the Clean Water Act or command to construct the same "at the earliest possible
its IRR states or, at the very least, implies that the former time."
is a condition precedent of the latter. From the foregoing, it
is apparent that the obligation imposed on petitioners The Court in MMDA was simply exercising its constitutional
by Section 8, as implemented by Rule 8 of DAO No. power and duty to interpret the law and resolve an actual
05-10, to connect the existing sewerage lines is case or controversy. While judicial decisions applying or
mandatory and unconditional. After the expiration of interpreting the law or the Constitution form part of the legal
the five-year compliance period, the obligatory force system of the Philippines, the Court does not dabble in
of Section 8 becomes immediate and can be enforced judicial legislation and is without power to amend or
against petitioners without subordination to the repeal Section 8 of the Clean Water Act.
happening of a future and uncertain event. Thus, the
terms of Section 8 are absolute.
PRINCIPLES:
2. Did the ruling in MMDA v. Concerned Residents of
Manila Bay supersedes the five-year compliance The public is regarded as the beneficial owner of trust
period stated in Section 8 of the Clean Water Act and resources, and courts can enforce the public trust doctrine
extended petitioners' compliance therewith until the even against the government itself.
year 2037?
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE - It aims to put an additional
No, MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay did strain upon the duty of the water industry to comply with
not repeal Section 8 of the Clean Water Act. MMDA v. the laws and regulations of the land.
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay declared the role and
responsibility of the MWSS, among other government THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE - is an exercise of the State's
agencies, in the long-standing and increasingly dire sanitary sovereign power as owner of lands of the public domain and
conditions of Manila Bay. In the said case, the Court ruled, of the patrimony of the nation. Sources of water form part
inter alia, that "[a]s mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the of this patrimony.
MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and maintain
the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in POLICE POWER (Gerochi v. Department of Energy) - is
Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest the power of the state to promote public welfare by
possible time," and that it shall "submit to the Court a restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. It
quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken x x is the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most
x". demanding of the three fundamental powers of the State.
The justification is found in the Latin maxim salus populi
An attempt to view this disposition in MMDA v. Concerned est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme
Residents of Manila Bay as an extension of the period of law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your
performance by petitioners of their obligations under Section property as not to injure the property of others).
8 of the Clean Water Act is a long shot. For one, Section 8
requires petitioners or "the agency vested to provide water PARENS PATRIAE - Under the doctrine, the state has the
supply and sewerage facilities and/or concessionaires in sovereign power of guardianship over persons of disability,
and in the execution of the doctrine the legislature is environmental protection: stewardship, communal
possessed of inherent power to provide protection to responsibility, and sustainability."
persons non sui juris and to make and enforce rules and
regulations as it deems proper for the management of their
property. Parens patriae means "father of his country", and
refers to the State as a last-ditch provider of protection to
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE
those unable to care and fend for themselves. It can be said STATE
that Filipino consumers have become such persons of
disability deserving protection by the State, as their welfare EMINENT DOMAIN
are being increasingly downplayed, endangered, and
overwhelmed by business pursuits.
Eminent Domain is the inherent power of a nation or a
sovereign state to take, or sanction the taking of, private
property for public use without the owner’s consent,
conditioned upon payment of just compensation.
REGALIAN DOCTRINE v. POLICE POWER v. PARENS
PATRIAE Eminent domain is a coercive measure on the part of the state
whereby private interests are impaired for the general welfare.
While the Regalian doctrine is state ownership over natural
resources, police power is state regulation through ARTICLE XII SECTION 18
legislation, and parens patriae is the default state
responsibility to look after the defenseless, there remains a The state may, in the interest of national welfare or defense,
establish and operate vital industries and, upon payment of
limbo on a flexible state policy bringing these doctrines into
just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and
a cohesive whole, enshrining the objects of public interest,
other private enterprises to be operated by the government.
and backing the security of the people, rights, and resources
from general neglect, private greed, and even from the own
excesses of the State. We fill this void through the Public
Trust Doctrine. ARTICLE XIII SECTION 4
The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform

The Public Trust Doctrine, while derived from English
program founded on the right of farmers and regular
common law and American jurisprudence, has firm farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively
Constitutional and statutory moorings in our jurisdiction. the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to
The doctrine speaks of an imposed duty upon the State and receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the
its representative of continuing supervision over the taking State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of
and use of appropriated water. Thus, "[p]arties who all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and
reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe,
acquired rights in trust property [only hold] these rights
taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
subject to the trust and, therefore, could assert no vested
considerations, and subject to the payment of just
right to use those rights in a manner harmful to the trust." compensation. In determining retention limits, the State
shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall
In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
Alpine County, a California Supreme Court decision,
worded the doctrine as that which - The state had the power
to reconsider past allocation decisions even though an
ARTICLE XII SECTION 9
agency had made those decisions after due consideration of
their effect on the public trust. This conclusion reflected the The State shall, by law, and for the common good,
view that water users could not acquire a vested property undertake, in cooperation with the public sector, a
right in the water itself; they merely obtained a usufructuary continuing program of urban land reform and housing which
right to the water. Academic literature further imparts that will make available at affordable cost decent housing and
"[p]art of this consciousness involves restoring the view of basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in
urban centers and resettlements areas. It shall also promote
public and state ownership of certain natural resources that
adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the
benefit all. [...]" The "doctrine further holds that certain implementation of such program the State shall respect the
natural resources belong to all and cannot be privately rights of small property owners.
owned or controlled because of their inherent importance to
each individual and society as a whole. A clear declaration
of public ownership, the doctrine reaffirms the superiority of
public rights over private rights for critical resources. It
impresses upon states the affirmative duties of a trustee to
manage these natural resources for the benefit of present
and future generations and embodies key principles of
CITY GOVERNMENT OF VALENZUELA v. ABACAN RULING/S:

(April 3, 2019)
YES, THE TRIAL COURT HAS COMPUTED THE PROPER
FACTS: JUST COMPENSATION.
The Spouses Abacan (Silvino and Remedios) are the Among the State’s inherent powers that need not be
registered owners of a parcel of land located on G. Lazaro expressly granted is eminent domain, which “enables it to
Street, Dalandanan, Valenzuela City. forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon
payment of just compensation to the owner.” The exercise
In September 9, 2009 letter, Valenzuela City formally of this power is limited by Article III, Section 9 of the
offered the Spouses Abacan to purchase their property at Constitution, which states that “private property shall not be
Php 481,200.00. However, the spouses rejected the offer. taken for public use without just compensation.”
Subsequently, City Ordinance No. 75, series of 2010 was Section 19 of the Local Government Code confers the power
enacted. This was authored by Mayor Gatchalian to initiate of eminent domain to local government units.
an expropriation proceeding over the subject property for
the construction of a public school building and appropriation Likewise, the procedure on the exercise of the power of
of the project’s funds. An expropriation proceeding was also eminent domain or expropriation is governed by Rule 67 of
filed before the RTC, represented by Mayor Gatchalian. the Rules of Court. As explained in National Power
Corporation v. Posada, the procedure goes two phases. The
The Spouses contended that the offer was way below the first phase determines the propriety of the action, while the
current Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuation. Later second phase determines the compensation to be paid to the
on, the Valenzuela City manifested that it issued a Land Bank landowner.
of the Philippines Check worth Php 72,180.00, under Section
19 of Republic Act No. 7160. The check was payable to the In this case, the parties agreed that only the issue of just
Spouses, representing around 15% of the total fair market compensation remains. In expropriation proceedings, just
value of the property based on current tax declarations compensation is “the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator.” It means that
The RTC then issued a Writ of Possession in Valenzuela City’s anything beyond that is more and anything short of that is
favor. It directed the Branch Sheriff to place the property in less than compensation.
the city government’s possession, but the Spouses still
contested as to the amount of just compensation. To compensate is to render something which is equal to that
taken or received. The word “just” is used to intensify the
Following Rule 67, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil meaning of the word “compensation;” to convey the idea
Procedure, the trial court appointed 3 Commissioners tasked that the equivalent to be rendered for the property taken
with determining the amount of just compensation due on shall be real, substantial, full, and ample. Just compensation
Valenzuela City. As a result, the Board of Commissioners set therefore means a fair and full equivalent for the loss
the just compensation in a total of Php 9,022,500.00. sustained.
This was assailed by Valenzuela City, insisting that the just The exercise of the power being necessary for the public
compensation must be based on the property’s fair market good, and all the property being held subject to its exercise
value per the tax declaration, which was Php 400.00 per when, and as the public good requires it, it would be unjust
square meter. to the public that it should be required to pay the owner
more than a fair indemnity of such loss. To arrive at this fair
However, the RTC directed the Valenzuela City to pay the indemnity, the interests of the public and of the owner and
Spouses Php 6,000.00 per square meter, or a total of Php all the circumstances of the particular appropriate should be
7,218,000.00 for the property. taken into consideration.
Subsequently, the Valenzuela City argues that the Court of In Manila Electric Company v. Pineda, the court held that
Appeals erred in considering only the Bureau of Internal where the issue is determining the amount of just
Revenue zonal valuation and the price of the property it had compensation in an expropriation suit, a trial before the
purchased in 2001 as sufficient basis to determine the commissioners is indispensable. This gives the parties the
amount of just compensation. According to the petitioner, opportunity to present evidence on the issue of just
the property in question is not a commercial lot, but a vacant compensation. As such, it is a substantial right that may not
or idle residential lot per Tax Declaration No. C-015-04245. be whimsically waived. HOWEVER, courts are not bound by
That the Court of Appeals disregarded this allegedly violates their findings.
the power bestowed upon local government units to
prescribe zoning classifications, as held in Republic of the The determination of just compensation remains a judicial
Philippines v. Far East Enterprises, lnc. function to be performed by courts. Courts may substitute
their estimate of the value, as long as it is supported by
ISSUE/S: evidence on record.
W/N the Valenzuela City should follow the computed In this case, petitioners were not able to substantiate their
compensation of the RTC (which was reinstated by the CA)? allegations with any evidence. Proof of its zoning
classification, the alleged tax declaration, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue zonal valuation, the Commissioner’s
Report, among other relevant documents, do not appear on The state and its political subdivisions are open to suit only
record despite having been repeatedly cited by petitioner. when they consent to it.
Thus, the finding of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
WHEN IS A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE INCORPORATED

OR UNINCORPORATED?
TAXATION
INCORPORATED
If charter provides that agency can sue and be sued,

the suit will lie, including one for the tort. The
STATE IMMUNITY/NON-SUABILITY provision in the charter constitutes express consent
OF THE STATE on the part of the state.
Its suability depends upon whether its own organic act

specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in
SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVI court.
The State may not be sued without its consent. Incorporated government agencies being juridical
persons having their own personality, which is
different and distinct from that of the state.
It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is
exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or Its test of suability is found in its charter. The simple
obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that rule is that it is suable if its charter says so, and this
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes is true regardless of the functions it is performing.
the law on which the right depends.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity can be understood UNINCORPORATED

either as:
1. Domestic An UNINCORPORATED government agency without a
2. International separate juridical personality of its own enjoys
immunity from suit because it is invested with an
inherent power of sovereignty.
As a Domestic Concept
It inquires into the principal functions of the agency.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is
given based on the justification given by Justice Homes that a. Governmental function- Immunity is
“there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes upheld. No suit without consent.
the law on which the right depends.” (Arigo v Swift citing
Kawanakoa v. Polybank) b. Proprietary function- Suit will lie. State
descends to the level of an individual. It has
PURPOSE not been upheld as its function was not in
pursuit of a necessary function of
The purpose behind this principle is to prevent the loss of government but was essentially a business
governmental efficiency as a result of the time and energy it
would require to defend itself against lawsuits. (City of
Bacolod v. Phuture, January 17, 2018) DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
The principle of state immunity from suit also rests on reasons The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
of public policy—that public service would be hindered, and the system of gov’t. It obtains not through express provision but
public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
subjected to lawsuits at the instance of every citizen and
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
consequently controlled in the uses and dispositions of the
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.
means required for the proper administration of the
government.
The maxim simply recognizes the three (3) co-equal and
The proscribed suit that the state covers takes on various forms independent ,albeit coordinate, branches of the government-
namely: the Legislative, the Executive ,and the Judiciary- has exclusive
● A suit against the Republic by name; prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence
● A suit against an unincorporated government agency;
and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into
● A suit against a government agency covered by a
charter with respect to the agency’s performance of the internal affairs of either branch. (Santiago v.
governmental functions; and Sandiganbayan, April 18, 2001)
● A suit that on its face is against a government officer,
but where the ultimate liability will fall on the The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of
government.
autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the

RULING/S
powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration
of these powers in any one branch from lording its power over YES, THEY MAY BE SUED BY THE SPOUSES RAMOS
the other branches or the citizenry. WITHOUT THE STATE’S CONSENT BECAUSE IT COMES
UNDER THE CATEGORY OF A PRIVATE PROPERTY.
To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by
co-equal branches of gov’t that are equally capable of However, the issue has become moot because of the
passage of Republic Act No. 9497, otherwise known as the
independent action in exercising their respective mandates.
Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008, rendering the
(Belciga v. Ochoa, November 13,2013) abolishment of the ATO.
Contrary to ATO’s conclusions, it was not merely the

PRINCIPLE OF CHECKS AND BALANCES collection of landing and parking fees which was declared as
proprietary in nature by the High Court in Teodoro, but
management and maintenance of airport operations as a
One department is given certain powers by which it may whole, as well.
definitely restrain the other from exceeding constitutional
authority. Thus, in the much later case of Civil Aeronautics
Administration vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court,
Example: Legislature enacts a law that is vetoed by the reiterating the pronouncements laid down in Teodoro,
President (executive) - In less esoteric terms, this means that declared that the CAA (predecessor of ATO) is an agency not
our three branches of gov’t, vis-à-vis each other, follow the rule immune from suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining
of trust the two but trust no one absolutely. (Lopez v Senate, to a private entity.
June 8, 2004)
The CAA comes under the category of a private entity.
Although not a body corporate it was created, like the
National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. RAMOS (FEBRUARY function of government, but to run what is essentially a
23, 2011) business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but
rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the
FACTS: travelling public. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far
from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may, more
Spouses Ramos discovered that a portion of their land than the construction of public roads, be undertaken by
registered under TCT No. T-58894 of the Baguio City land private concerns.
records with an area of 985 square meters, more or less,
was being used as part of the runway and running shoulder Republic Act No. 776 (Civil Aeronautics Act of the
of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air Philippines), subsequently enacted on June 20, 1952, did not
Transportation Office (ATO). alter the character of the CAA’s objectives under Exec. Order
365. The pertinent provisions cited in the Teodoro case,
After negotiations, the spouses agreed to convey the particularly Secs. 3 and 4 of Exec. Order 365, which led the
affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in consideration Court to consider the CAA in the category of a private entity
of the amount of ₱778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to were retained substantially in Republic Act 776, Sec. 32(24)
pay despite repeated verbal and written demands. and (25).
Thus, on April 29, 1998, the respondents filed an action for From the foregoing, it can be seen that the CAA is tasked
collection against the ATO and some of its officials in the with private or non-governmental functions which operate to
RTC. remove it from the purview of the rule on State immunity
from suit. For the correct rule as set forth in the Teodoro
In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as case states:
an affirmative defense the issuance of Proclamation No.
1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain ● Not all government entities, whether corporate or
parcels of land that included the respondents’ affected non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity
portion for use of the Loakan Airport. from suits is determined by the character of the
objects for which the entity was organized.
They asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain
the action without the State’s consent considering that the ● Suits against State agencies with relation to
deed of sale had been entered into in the performance of matters in which they have assumed to act in
governmental functions. private or non-governmental capacity, and various
suits against certain corporations created by the
ISSUE/S state for public purposes, but to engage in matters
partaking more of the nature of ordinary business
W/N the Air Transportation Office be sued without the State’s rather than functions of a governmental or political
consent? character, are not regarded as suits against the
state.
Hence, the CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical
character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the protection and
performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but conservation of the globally significant economic, biological,
was instead involved in the management and maintenance sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the
of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of
prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. present and future generations."
We further observe the doctrine of sovereign immunity Under the "no-take" policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is
cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for strictly regulated and many human activities are prohibited
compensation arising from the taking without just and penalized or fined, including fishing, gathering,
compensation and without the proper expropriation destroying, and disturbing the resources within the TRNP.
proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs’ property. The law likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area
Management Board (TPAMB) which shall be the sole policy
Lastly, the issue of whether or not the ATO could be sued making and permit-granting body of the TRNP.
without the State’s consent has been rendered moot by the
passage of Republic Act No. 9497, otherwise known as the The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine
Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008. countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012,
the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic
R.A. No. 9497 abolished the ATO. All powers, duties and clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial
rights vested by law and exercised by the ATO is hereby waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic
transferred to the Authority. Section 23 of R.A. No. 9497 Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment,
enumerates the corporate powers vested in the CAAP, maintenance, and crew liberty."
including the power to sue and be sued, to enter into
contracts of every class, kind and description, to construct, On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay
acquire, own, hold, operate, maintain, administer and lease for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January
personal and real properties, and to settle, under such terms 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship
and conditions most advantageous to it, any claim by or ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the
against it. Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan.
No cine was injured in the incident, and there have been no
reports of leaking fuel or oil.
ARIGO v. SWIFT (SEPTEMBER 16, 2014) On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice
Admiral Scott Swift, expressed regret for the incident in a
FACTS: press statement. Likewise, US Ambassador to the Philippines
Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a meeting at the Department of
The name "Tubbataha" came from the Samal (seafaring Foreign Affairs (DFA) on February 4, "reiterated his regrets
people of southern Philippines) language which means "long over the grounding incident and assured Foreign Affairs
reef exposed at low tide." Tubbataha is composed of two Secretary Albert F. del Rosario that the United States will
huge coral atolls - the north atoll and the south atoll - and provide appropriate compensation for damage to the reef
the Jessie Beazley Reef, a smaller coral structure about 20 caused by the ship."
kilometers north of the atolls. The reefs of Tubbataha and
Jessie Beazley are considered part of Cagayancillo, a remote By March 30, 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had
island municipality of Palawan. finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from
the coral reef.
In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by
virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued by President Corazon On April 17, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their
C. Aquino on August 11, 1988. Located in the middle of behalf and in representation of their respective
Central Sulu Sea, 150 kilometers southeast of Puerto sector/organization and others, including minors or
Princesa City, Tubbataha lies at the heart of the Coral generations yet unborn, filed the present petition against the
Triangle, the global center of marine biodiversity. above-named US and Philippine Respondents.
In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Petitioners cite the following violations committed by US
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) respondents under R.A. No. 10067: unauthorized entry
as a World Heritage Site. It was recognized as one of the (Section 19); non-payment of conservation fees (Section
Philippines' oldest ecosystems, containing excellent 21); obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section 30);
examples of pristine reefs and a high diversity of marine life. damages to the reef (Section 20); and destroying and
The 97,030-hectare protected marine park is also an disturbing resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore,
important habitat for internationally threatened and petitioners assail certain provisions of the Visiting Forces
endangered marine species. UNESCO cited Tubbataha's Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to NULLIFY FOR
outstanding universal value as an important and significant BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
natural habitat for in situ conservation of biological diversity;
an example representing significant on-going ecological and ISSUE/S:
biological processes; and an area of exceptional natural
beauty and aesthetic importance. W/N THE PETITIONER HAS A LEGAL STANDING TO FILE THE
CASE (sub-issue)
On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No.
10067, otherwise known as the "Tubbataha Reefs Natural W/N THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE US
RESPONDENTS (issue relevant to the topic)

The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa,
RULING/S: insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn, is
now enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen
AS TO THE ISSUE OF THE LEGAL STANDING OF THE suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in
PETITIONERS: the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal and
direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of
YES. THE COURT HELD THAT THERE IS NO DISPUTE ON nature."
THE LEGAL STANDING OF PETITIONERS TO FILE THE
PRESENT PETITION. AS TO THE COURT’S JURISDICTION OVER THE US
RESPONDENTS
Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on
a given question." Specifically, it is "a party's personal and NO. THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE IMMUNITY BARS THE
substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION BY THIS COURT OVER
sustain direct injury as a result" of the act being challenged, THE PERSONS OF RESPONDENTS.
and "calls for more than just a generalized grievance.”
However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the
this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the State,
ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution
interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the
controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a
significance to society, or of paramount public interest. State from being sued in the courts of another State without
the former's consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental
recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced and acts (Jure imperil") from private, commercial and proprietary
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our acts (Jure gestionis).
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law." We declared that the right to a balanced Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity
and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution extends only to acts Jure imperii. The restrictive application
for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance commercial activities or economic affairs.
with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state
environment. that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and
may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioner’s his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The
minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the
citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of government is removed the moment they are sued in their
environmental rights, they can do so in representation of individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the
their own and future generations, thus, petitioners minors public official acts without authority or in excess of the
assert that they represent their generation as well as powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity
they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done
for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his
personality to sue on behalf of the succeeding generations authority or jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)
can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had
expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew.
Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate
and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and while they were performing official military duties.
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of
resources to the end that their exploration, development and funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as against the US itself. The principle of State immunity
future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T.
right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this
the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation
of that right for the generations to come. (Emphasis of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef
supplied.) system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are entitled to
(UNCLOS). He explained that historically, warships enjoy these reliefs notwithstanding the completion of the removal
sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag of the USS Guardian from the coral reef. However, we are
State. Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this mindful of the fact that the US and Philippine governments
rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and both expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss the
regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through matter of compensation for the damage caused by the USS
the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea. Guardian. The US Embassy has also declared it is closely
coordinating with local scientists and experts in assessing
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not the extent of the damage and appropriate methods of
ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy the rehabilitation.
US considers itself bound by customary international rules
on the "traditional uses of the oceans" as codified in In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the
UNCLOS, as can be gleaned from previous declarations by Executive Branch on the matter of compensation and
former Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and the US judiciary rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels.
in the case of United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with
Ltd. another State in the context of common security interests
under the VFA. It is settled that "[t]he conduct of the foreign
The international law of the sea is generally defined as "a relations of our government is committed by the Constitution
body of treaty rules arid customary norms governing the to the executive and legislative "the political"--departments
uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the of the government, and the propriety of what may be done
exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch in the exercise of this... political power is not subject to
of public international law, regulating the relations of states judicial inquiry or decision."... we cannot grant the additional
with respect to the uses of the oceans." The UNCLOS is a reliefs prayed for in the petition to order a review of the VFA
multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on and to nullify certain immunity provisions thereof. The VFA
December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified was duly concurred by the Philippine Senate and has been
by the Philippines in 1984 but came into force on November recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and
16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th ratification. certified by the duly authorized representative of the United
States government. The VFA being a valid and binding
The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that agreement, the parties are required as a matter of
seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare clausum) and the international law to abide by its terms and provisions.
principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum). The
freedom to use the world's marine waters is one of the oldest
customary principles of international law. The UNCLOS gives
to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over CITY OF BACOLOD v. PHUTURE VISIONS (JANUARY
the different zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 17, 2018)
2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic
zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more FACTS:
or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where
the vessel is located. Phuture was incorporated in 2004. In May 2005, its Articles
of Incorporation (AOI) was amended to, among others,
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is include the operation of lotto betting stations and/or other
concerned, the Coastal State exercises sovereignty, subject gaming outlets as one of its secondary purposes.
to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such
sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea Eventually, it applied with the Philippine Amusement and
as well as to its bed and subsoil. Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) for an authority to operate
bingo games at the SM City Bacolod Mall (SM Bacolod), as
But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the well as with SM Prime Holdings (SM Prime) for the lease of
UNCLOS, as in this case, the US? a space in the said building.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present Phuture was issued a provisional Grant of Authority (GOA)
controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said treaty on December 5, 2006 by PAGCOR, subject to compliance
upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of with certain requirements, and received an Award Notice
Coastal States while navigating the latter's territorial sea, from SM Prime on January 10, 2007.
the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea
immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Thereafter, Phuture processed, completed and submitted to
Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by the Permits and Licensing Division of the City Mayor of
their warships or any other government vessel operated for Bacolod City its Application for Permit to Engage in Business,
non-commercial purposes under Article 31. Trade or Occupation to operate bingo games at SM Bacolod
and paid the fees therefor. It was then issued a claim slip for
We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting its permit on February 19, 2007, which was to be claimed on
that this petition has become moot in the sense that the City of Bacolod vs. Phuture Visions Co., Inc., 851 SCRA 324,
salvage operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had G.R. No. 190289 January 17, 2018
already been accomplished when petitioners sought
recourse from this Court. But insofar as the directives to Phuture commenced bingo operations at SM Bacolod on
Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral March 2, 2007, prior to the issuance of the actual hard copy
reef structure and marine habitat adversely affected by the of the mayor's permit.
relayed to them and thus, at around 6:00 a.m. on March 3,

However, at around 6:10 a.m. of March 3, 2007, respondent 2007, the Composite Enforcement Unit under the Office of
learned that its bingo outlet was padlocked by agents of the the City Legal Officer implemented the Closure Order.
Office of the City Legal Officer and that a copy of a Closure
Order dated March 2, 2007 was posted at the entrance of Petitioners contended that the claim slip so heavily relied
the bingo outlet. upon by respondent was a mere oversight or human error of
the City Government's employee who processed the same,
Phuture claimed that the closure of its bingo outlet at SM who was likewise duped by the tampered entries that
Bacolod is tainted with malice and bad faith and that respondent's application was for a permit for bingo
petitioners did not have the legal authority to shut down said operations when, in tn1th, it was only for the renewal of a
bingo operations, especially since PAGCOR itself had already previously-issued permit albeit for a different line of
issued a provisional GOA in its favor. business, i.e., "professional services, band/entertainment
services."
On March 7, 2007, the RTC conducted a summary hearing
to determine the sufficiency of the form and substance of the
application for the issuance of a temporary mandatory order ISSUE/S:
and/or preliminary mandatory injunction to remove the
padlock installed at respondent's place of business at SM W/N THE PETITIONER CAN BE MADE LIABLE TO PAY
Bacolod and allow it to conduct unhampered bingo RESPONDENT DAMAGES
operations. In the course of the summary hearing,
specifically on March 9, 2007, petitioners released in open W/N THE PETITIONERS HAVE GIVEN THEIR CONSENT TO BE
court to respondent's counsel the hard copy of the Mayor's SUED (issue relevant to the topic)
Permit dated February 19, 2007 which indicated the kind of
business allowed is "Professional Services, RULING/S:
Band/Entertainment Services."
AS TO THE ISSUE OF THE PETITIONER’S CONSENT
Phuture's counsel, however, refused to receive the same,
protesting that it was not the Mayor's Permit which NO. PETITIONERS HAVE NOT GIVEN THEIR CONSENT
respondent had applied for. TO BE SUED.
On January 10, 2007, Phuture applied for the renewal of its The principle of immunity from suit is embodied in Section
mayor's permit with "professional services, 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which states
band/entertainment services" as its declared line of that “[t]he State cannot be sued without its consent.” The
business, providing the address of the business as "RH purpose behind this principle is to prevent the loss of
Building, 26 Lacson Street, Barangay 5" instead of SM governmental efficiency as a result of the time and energy it
Bacolod where respondent's bingo operations was located. would require to defend itself against lawsuits.
Upon submission of the requirements on February 19, 2007 The State and its political subdivisions are open to suit only
and while the application was being processed, Phuture was when they consent to it.
issued a "claim slip" for it to claim the actual mayor's permit
on March 16, 2007 if the requirements were found to be in Consent may be expressed or implied, such as when the
order. government exercises its proprietary functions, or where
such is embodied in a general or special law.
However, petitioners found discrepancies in Phuture's
submitted requirements, wherein the application form was In the present case, respondents sued petitioners for the
notarized earlier than the amendment of its AOI to reflect latter’s refusal to issue a mayor’s permit for bingo operations
the company's primary purpose for bingo operations. Aside and for closing its business on account of the lack of such
from this, respondents failed to pay the necessary permit permit. However, while the authority of city mayors to issue
fee/assessment fee under the applicable tax ordinances of or grant licenses and business permits is granted by the
the City of Bacolod. Local Government Code (LGC), which also vests local
government units with corporate powers, one of which is the
Also, without waiting for the release of the mayor's permit, power to sue and be sued, this Court held that the power to
respondents started the operation of its bingo outlet at SM issue or grant licenses and business permits is not an
Bacolod. This prompted the former City Legal Officer, Atty. exercise of the government’s proprietary function. Instead,
Allan Zamora, to issue a Closure Order dated March 2, 2007, it is in an exercise of the police power of the State, ergo a
pursuant to City Tax Ordinance No. 93- 001, Series of 1993, governmental act.
which declares unlawful for any person to operate any
business in the City of Bacolod without first obtaining a No consent to be sued and be liable for damages can thus
permit therefor from the City Mayor and paying the be implied from the mere conferment and exercise of the
necessary permit fee and other charges to the City power to issue business permits and licenses. Accordingly,
Treasurer. there is merit in petitioners’ argument that they cannot be
sued by respondent since the City’s consent had not been
The Closure Order was presented by petitioners' secured for this purpose. This is notwithstanding petitioners’
representative to respondent's lawyers to negotiate a failure to raise this exculpatory defense at the first instance
possible peaceful solution before its implementation. before the trial court or even before the appellate court.
However, the respondent simply ignored the information
As this Court has repeatedly held, waiver of immunity from regulated, but may also very well be revoked or closed down
suit, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly when public interests so require.
inferred. Moreover, it deserves mentioning that the City of
Bacolod as a government agency or instrumentality cannot In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the principle that injury
be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials alone does not give respondent the right to recover
or agents. Estoppel does not also lie against the government damages, but it must also have a right of action for the legal
or any of its agencies arising from unauthorized or illegal wrong inflicted by petitioners. In order that the law will give
acts of public officers. Hence, we cannot hold petitioners redress for an act causing damage, there must be damnum
estopped from invoking their immunity from suit on account et injuria that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful.
of having raised it only for the first time on appeal.
Petitioners, in ordering the closure of respondent’s bingo

operations, were exercising their duty to implement laws and
ordinances which include the local government’s authority to
issue licenses and permits for business operations in the city. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FETALVERO
This authority is granted to them as a delegated exercise of (FEBRUARY 4, 2019)
the police power of the State. It must be emphasized that
the nature of bingo operations is a form of gambling; thus, FACTS:
its operation is a mere privilege which could not only be
regulated, but may also very well be revoked or closed down Fetalvero owned a 2,787-square meter parcel of land in
when public interests so require. Iligan City, Lanao del Norte. The lot was covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-25,233 (a.f.).
AS TO THE LIABILITY OF THE PETITIONERS TO PAY
RESPONDENT DAMAGES In 1999, the Department of Public Works and Highways,
Region X took 569 square meters from Fetalvero's property
NO. PETITIONERS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES. to be used in its flood control project.
Based on the observations made by the trial court, it appears Fetalvero stated that the project's construction on that
that respondent had no clear and unmistakable legal right to portion of land rendered the remaining part useless, so he
operate its bingo operations at the onset. Respondent failed demanded payment for the entire area at P15,000.00 per
to establish that it had duly applied for the proper permit for square meter.
bingo operations with the Office of the Mayor and, instead,
merely relied on the questionable claim stub to support its However, under Presidential Administrative Order No. 50,
claim. series of 1999, the just compensation Fetalvero was entitled
to was only P2,500.00 per square meter, or a total of
The trial court also found that the application form submitted P1,422,500.00, plus 10% thereof. The rate was based on the
by respondent pertained to a renewal of respondent's Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuation in 1999, when
business for "Professional Services, Band/Entertainment the property was taken. Despite negotiations, the parties
Services" located at "RH Bldg., 26th Lacson St." and not at failed to agree on the amount of just compensation.
SM Bacolod. These factual findings by the trial court belie
respondent's claim that it had the right to operate its bingo Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of
operations at SM Bacolod. the Solicitor General, filed before the Regional Trial Court a
Complaint for expropriation against Fetalvero. It prayed "for
Certainly, respondent's claim that it had applied for a license the determination and payment of the just compensation
for bingo operations is questionable since, as it had admitted and the entry of a judgment of condemnation of the 569
in its Petition for Mandamus and Damages, the primary square meters portion of [Fetalvero's] property."... the
purpose in its AOI was only amended to reflect bingo parties entered into a Compromise Agreement.
operations on February 14, 2007 or more than a month after
it had supposedly applied for a license for bingo operations Fetalvero filed before the trial court a motion to approve the
with the Office of the Mayor. Compromise Agreement and for the issuance of judgment.
It is settled that a judicial admission is binding on the person Office of the Solicitor General replied that the government
who makes it, and absent any showing that it was made cannot be bound by the Compromise Agreement since it was
through palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can not submitted to its office for review, which is a condition
offset such admission. This admission clearly casts doubt on under the deputation letter and the Notice of Appearance.
respondent's so-called right to operate its business of bingo Thus, it was improper for the Department of Public Works
operations. and Highways to directly submit the Compromise Agreement
to the trial court for judgment. Further, the Compromise
Petitioners, in ordering the closure of respondent's bingo Agreement failed to state how it arrived at the just
operations, were exercising their duty to implement laws and compensation of P9,500.00 per square meter.
ordinances which include the local government's authority to
issue licenses and permits for business operations in the city. Republic opposed the Motion, arguing that since the
This authority is granted to them as a delegated exercise of Compromise Agreement was not legally binding, "it cannot
the police power of the State. It must be emphasized that be the subject of a valid writ of execution or garnishment."
the nature of bingo operations is a form of gambling; thus, Moreover, the government still owns its funds and properties
its operation is a mere privilege which could not only be that were in official depositaries; thus, these cannot be
garnished or levied. and this Court already settled that petitioner is bound by the
Compromise Agreement, respondent is legally entitled to his
ISSUE/S: money claim. However, he still has to go through the
appropriate procedure for making a claim against the
W/N THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT IS VOID SINCE THE Government.
AMOUNT OF JUST COMPENSATION IS ALLEGEDLY GROSSLY
DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT In Atty. Roxas v. Republic Real Estate Corporation, this Court
elaborated on the proper process of raising money claims
W/N GOVERNMENT FUNDS MAY BE SEIZED UNDER A WRIT against the government. In that case, the trial court issued
OF EXECUTION OR A WRIT OF GARNISHMENT IN a writ of execution over the government funds for payment
SATISFACTION OF COURT JUDGMENTS. of land reclaimed by Republic Real Estate Corporation.
RULING/S: The case is premature. The money claim against the

Republic should have been first brought before the
NO. THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT IS NOT VOID. Commission on Audit.
This Court notes that for almost 20 years now, petitioner had All money claims against the Government must first be filed
been enjoying the use of respondent's property without with the Commission on Audit which must act upon it within
paying the full amount of just compensation under the sixty days. Rejection of the claim will authorize the claimant
Compromise Agreement. Respondent had been deprived of to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and
his property for almost two (2) decades. In keeping with in effect sue the State thereby. Public funds may not be
substantial justice, this Court imposes the payment of legal disbursed absent an appropriation of law or other specific
interest on the remaining just compensation due to statutory authority. Commonwealth Act No. 327, as
respondent. amended by Presidential Decree No. 1445, requires that all
money claims against the government must first be filed
NO. THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT GOVERNMENT FUNDS before the Commission on Audit, which, in turn, must act
CANNOT BE SEIZED BY VIRTUE OF WRITS OF upon them within 60 days.
EXECUTION OR GARNISHMENT.
Only when the Commission on Audit rejects the claim can
In the case at bar, respondent failed to show that he first the claimant elevate the matter to this Court on certiorari
raised his claim before the Commission on Audit. Without and, in effect, sue the state.
this necessary procedural step, respondent's money claim
cannot be entertained by the courts through a writ of C[ommission] o[n] A[udit] which has primary jurisdiction to
execution. examine, audit and settle "all debts and claims of any sort"
due from or owing the Government or any of its subdivisions,
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to agencies and instrumentalities, including government-
be sued by private parties either by general or special law, owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries[.]
it may limit claimant's action "only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the Republic Real Estate Corporation's procedural shortcut must
power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, be rejected. Any allowance or disallowance of its money
since government funds and properties may not be seized claims is for the Commission on Audit to decide, subject only
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such to [Republic Real Estate Corporation's] remedy of appeal via
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public a petition for certiorari before this Court.
policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by
the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The Here, as in Atty. Roxas, respondent failed to show that he
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot first raised his claim before the Commission on Audit.
be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of Without this necessary procedural step, respondent's money
public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as claim cannot be entertained by the courts through a writ of
appropriated by law. execution.
Simply put, "no money can be taken out of the treasury Under Article III, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution,
without an appropriation." Here, the trial court already found "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without
that: just compensation." This Court notes that for almost 20
years now, petitioner had been enjoying the use of
● There is an appropriation intended by law for respondent's property without paying the full amount of just
payment of road-rights-of-way. Defendant compensation under the Compromise Agreement.
[respondent here] even called the attention of the Respondent had been deprived of his property for almost two
court of the existence of SAA-SR 2009-05-001538 (2) decades. In keeping with substantial justice, this Court
of the DPWH Main and/or Regional Office imposes the payment of legal interest on the remaining just
appertaining to the fund intended for payment of compensation due to respondent. Consistent with this
the road-rights-of-way. Court's ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames, this Court imposes
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from
Even petitioner admitted in its Memorandum "the approval the time of taking until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%)
of allocation for payment of road right of way projects within per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid.[94]Thus,
Region 10 under SAA-SR 2009-001538[.]" Since there is an respondent's money claim under the Compromise
existing appropriation for the payment of just compensation, Agreement should be adjusted to reflect the interest rates
imposed by this Court. injunction, then President Estrada resigned from office.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is PARTLY To recover their alleged incurred expenses under the
GRANTED. contract, respondents formally demanded from the
MMDA the amount of P20,123,190.00 as reasonable
reimbursement, claiming that they spent said amount
until they were forced to stop their operations due to
the TROs.
MMDA v. D.M. CONSUNJI INC. (FEBRUARY 20, 2019)
When respondents' claim for reimbursement was addressed
FACTS:
to MMDA's legal service, then MMDA consultant, Atty.
Vincent S. Tagoc, opined that respondents may be
MMDA, in coordination with the Greater Metro Manila Solid
compensated based on the principle of quantum
Waste Management Committee, conducted a selection meruit. Notably, in his Opinion dated 28 March 2001, Atty.
process for the development and operation by a private Tagoc opined that the benefit which allegedly incurred to the
entity of a new sanitary landfill for the next 25 years government, particularly the MMDA, must be considered in
under the Build-Operate-Own (BOO) scheme. The facility applying said principle, he observed that the records failed
was intended to replace the San Mateo landfill after it was to show any benefit derived by the MMDA from respondents'
performance.
closed on 31 December 2000.
The process, however, was stymied by legal actions filed by

QUANTUM MERUIT
some concerned sectors of the society, particularly, those
groups in the affected area. MMDA was thus restrained from
[Latin, As much as is deserved.] In the law of contracts, a
proceeding with the new sanitary landfill project.
doctrine by which the law infers a promise to pay a
reasonable amount for labor and materials furnished, even
In the meantime, MMDA and the Metro Manila mayors
in the absence of a specific legally enforceable
agreed to choose the interim waste disposal site
agreement between the parties.
(controlled dump site) and the possible
contractor/proponent therefor for a period of two (2) years.
On June 13, 2001, Atty. Tagoc noted that while respondents
To implement this interim project, then MMDA Chairman
were able to unload Metro Manila of 5,449.80 tons of
Jejomar C. Binay (Binay) endorsed the matter to the
garbage, they nevertheless brought back the same to Metro
Presidential Committee on Flagship Programs and Projects
Manila. Thus, respondents tossed back the same problem to
for favorable recommendation. The matter was then
Metro Manila, and to that extent, Metro Manila suffered
endorsed for approval by the Committee, through its then
damages. He concluded that full payment for the amount
Chairman Roberto N. Aventajado, to the Office of the
claimed was improper. When the recommendation of the
President. MMDA's request was approved by then President
Solid Waste Management Office was sent to the Office of
Joseph E. Estrada. The project was then opened for public
then MMDA Chairman Bayani F. Fernando for his approval,
bidding and was awarded to respondents as winning joint
the latter rejected the same citing the following
bidders.
reasons: (1) MMDA is not obliged to pay for mobilization
expenses; (2) Stipulation No. 13 of the negotiated contract
Respondents proposed the construction of an integrated
solid waste management facility/sanitary landfill in Barangay states that failure to perform the terms of the agreement
Semirara, Semirara Island, Caluya, Antique. This would due to mass/court actions shall not give rise to any claim by
entail the ferrying out of garbage from a temporary transfer any party against each other; and (3) Stipulation No. 16 of
station in Pier 18 Vitas, Tondo, Manila to a pre-arranged site the negotiated contract requires the approval of the
in the northernmost part of Semirara Island. President of the Philippines. Without the President's
signature, the contract is invalid and ineffective. On
Consequently, the parties executed a contract denominated September 12, 2007 a civil case was filed for claim of sum
as "Contract for the Development, Operation and of money based on quantum meruit with damages against
Maintenance of Interim Integrated Waste Management MMDA. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 07-942.
Facility for Metropolitan Manila" on 4 January 2001. Respondents prayed for (1) P19,920,936.17 representing
Thereafter, then MMDA Chairman Binay allegedly expenses incurred for the partial execution of the project
instructed respondents to proceed with the with 6% legal interest; (2) attorney's fees; and (3) expenses
preparation of the transfer station in Vitas and the of litigation. The MMDA averred that the contract involves a
landfill site in Semirara although the contract had not project under the BOO scheme for which the approval of the
yet been approved and signed by then President Estrada. President of the Philippines is required pursuant to
paragraph (d), Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7718.
Two temporary restraining orders (TROs) were issued by the Corollarily, paragraph 16 of the negotiated contract
Regional Trial Court, Antique placing the operation on hold. provides that it shall be valid, binding and effective
Pending hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
upon approval by the President pursuant to existing It ruled that "Based on the admissions in the pleadings and
laws. Since the negotiated contract was not signed and documents attached, we find that the issues presented by
approved by the President, it isn’t effective and binding. the complaint and the answer can be resolved within the
Furthermore, the validity of the negotiated contract is four corners of said pleadings without need to conduct
dependent upon the fulfillment of the conditions further hearings." [Pacific Rehouse Corporation v. EIB
stated in the Notice of Award dated 21 December 2000 Securities, Inc.]
which includes the submission of proof of social
acceptability of the project from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources under paragraph 7.9
thereof. Respondents allegedly failed to comply with such W/N the COA has primary jurisdiction over the
condition. Moreover, paragraph 13 of the negotiated contract present case.
provides that the failure to carry out, observe and/or
perform any of the terms of the contract caused by or arising YES. Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended
from mass actions and/or court actions shall not give rise by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, it is the
to any claim by one party against the other. Assuming COA which has primary jurisdiction over money claims
arguendo that the claim for reimbursement may be against government agencies and instrumentalities.
recognized under the principle of quantum meruit, the direct
enforcement of liability against MMDA would violate the law
because (1) disbursement of public funds must be PD. 1445 SECTION 26. General jurisdiction.
covered by a corresponding appropriation as required The authority and powers of the Commission shall extend to
by law; and (2) the present case is a suit against the and comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures,
State which has not given its consent to be sued. systems and controls, the keeping of the general accounts
Accordingly, the remedy of the respondents is allegedly to of the Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining
file their money claim with the Commission on Audit thereto for a period of ten years, the examination and
(COA) as prescribed under Act No. 3083 and inspection of the books, records, and papers relating to those
Commonwealth Act No. 327. The determination of State accounts; and the audit and settlement of the accounts of all
liability, and the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction persons respecting funds or property received or held by
thereof must be pursued in accordance with the rules and them in an accountable capacity, as well as the examination,
procedures laid down in Presidential Decree No. 1445. audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due
from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions,
On 1 February 2008, respondents filed a Reply. Respondents agencies and instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction extends
alleged that MMDA was in bad faith when it denied to all government-owned or controlled corporations,
paragraph 10 of the Complaint which was their basis including their subsidiaries, and other self-governing boards,
in acting upon the explicit instruction of the MMDA commissions, or agencies of the Government, and as herein
Chairman. Respondents claimed that MMDA was aware of prescribed, including non-governmental entities subsidized
the services they rendered prior to the approval of the by the government, those funded by donations through the
contract in light of its admission in paragraph 16. The government, those required to pay levies or government
defenses raised by MMDA based on contract are share, and those for which the government has put up a
irrelevant because respondents' cause of action is counterpart fund or those partly funded by the government.
based on quantum meruit. Respondents countered that
upon the final determination by the trial court of MMDA's Pursuant to its rule-making authority conferred by the 1987
liability to them, they would file their claims with the COA. Constitution and existing laws, the COA promulgated the
Respondents stressed that MMDA is a public 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on
corporation created under Presidential Decree No. 824 Audit. Section 1 of Rule II specifically enumerated those
which can sue and be sued. matters falling under COA's exclusive jurisdiction, which
include "money claims due from or owing to any government
ISSUE/S:
agency." Section 1 of Rule VIII further provides:
W/N judgment on the pleadings is proper;
W/N DMCI and R-II Builders are entitled to recover the RULE II SECTION 1. Original Jurisdiction - The
expenses they incurred based on quantum meruit; Commission Proper shall have original jurisdiction
W/N the COA has primary jurisdiction over the present case. over:
a) money claim against the Government; b)

RULING/S: request for concurrence in the hiring of legal
retainers by government agency; c) write off of
YES. The judgement on the pleadings is proper. unliquidated cash advances and dormant accounts
receivable in amounts exceeding one million pesos
(P1,000,000.00); d) request for relief from it entered into a Contract of Works for the
accountability for loses due to acts of man, i.e. Rehabilitation of Electrical Facilities of PTRI Main
theft, robbery, arson, etc, in amounts in excess of Building and Three Pilot Plants (Subject Contract)
Five Million pesos (P5,000,000.00). with PTRI for the rehabilitation of the latter's
electrical facilities in its main building and in three of
There is also no dispute that respondents are claiming its pilot plants. According to E.A. Ramirez, on February 28,
from MMDA the total amount of P19,920,936.17 2012, a notice to proceed was issued by PTRI, as it
representing expenses allegedly incurred for the partial immediately moved into the project site to carry out its
execution of the interim waste management project for obligation under the said Subject Contract.
Metro Manila. Since what is involved is a specific money
claim against a government agency, it is clearly within E.A. Ramirez alleged that soon thereafter, or in the
the jurisdiction of the COA. afternoon of March 13, 2012, Diaz, the consultant of the
subject project, requested for a meeting with Ramirez.
During the meeting, Diaz allegedly told Ramirez that the
former had been tasked by PTRI to demand P500,000.00
W/N DMCI and R-II Builders are entitled to recover from the latter as purportedly the standard amount "for the
the expenses they incurred based on quantum meruit boys." In exchange for the said amount, Diaz said that they
would make things easier for E.A. Ramirez to finish or
YES. COA issued Resolution No. 86-58,32 dated 15 complete the project. E.A. Ramirez did not give in to the
November 1986, which expresses its Policy on the demand, explaining that E.A. Ramirez's bid for the project
Recovery by Government Contractors on the Basis of was in fact competitive and above board. Diaz did not budge,
Quantum Meruit. proposing instead that they come up with a variation order
until they would have realized the said amount of
P500,000.00.
The first Whereas clause explicitly recognizes the existence
of money claims against the government on the ground of E.A. Ramirez then requested for a First Progress Billing
quantum meruit, to wit: ending April 10, 2012. However, PTRI refused to act on the
request, citing the absence of test results which, according
WHEREAS, in the adjudication of claims arising from to E.A. Ramirez, was not even a billing requirement at that
void government contracts, the issue that is time.
sometimes presented to the Commission on Audit
for resolution is whether or not recovery against the In order to collect under the first progress billing, PTRI
government under such contracts may be allowed hastened to complete the test results. However, during a
on the basis of the quantum meruit principle[.] coordination meeting held on May 8, 2012, Diaz
disapproved the test results, along with other
submittals made by E.A. Ramirez. According to the
The Court of Appeals found that respondents are entitled latter, Diaz thumbed down the results because he (referring
to reimbursement. It ruled that they have the right to be to Diaz) and other representatives of PTRI were absent
compensated for the partial execution of the project applying during the conduct of the said test. Accusing PTRI of acting
the principle of quantum meruit. The Court of Appeals held in bad faith in terminating the contract, E.A Ramirez
that "even granting for the sake of argument that the filed its Complaint, praying that PTRI, et al. be made to pay
contract was invalid, payment should have been allowed jointly and solidarily the amount of P1,957,025.85 in
based on the principle of 'quantum meruit.' It should be actual damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages,
noted that the services rendered by the [respondents] were P250,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 as
neither denied nor rejected by the government. attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
PTRI, et al., through the OSG, filed a Motion to Dismiss,

invoking the privilege of state immunity from suit. They
PHILIPPINE TEXTILE RESEARCH INSTITUTE v.
asserted that PTRI is an agency of the Department of
COURT OF APPEALS (OCTOBER 9, 2019)
Science and Technology (DOST) and thus cannot be sued
without the consent of the State. PTRI alleged that the
FACTS: immunity extended to the impleaded employees of PTRI
since they were sued while they were performing
official or governmental functions.
On February 11, 2013, E.A. Ramirez filed before the RTC a
Complaint for Breach of Contract with Damages (Complaint) PTRI contended that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over
against PTRI and a number of its employees. the subject matter of the case. They asserted that under
Sections 34, 35, and 36 of Republic Act No. (R.A.)
In the said complaint, E.A. Ramirez, a construction company 9285, the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission (CIAC) has original and exclusive
engaged in electrical works, alleged that sometime in 2012,
jurisdiction over construction disputes under certain
conditions, and that such conditions were applicable to the be made between one which is executed in the exercise of
instant case. PTRI, et al. maintained that referral of the its sovereign functions and another which is done in its
dispute to the CIAC had been stipulated under Article I, proprietary capacity.
Section 1.2 of the Subject Contract executed by the parties,
which provides that the relevant provisions of R.A. 9285 and In the instant case, not only did PTRI descend to the level of
its revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) would a contracting party by entering into the subject contract,
govern the agreement. under the subject Contract itself, which contemplated a
situation wherein legal action may arise from the execution
of the agreement and incorporating provisions on the
ISSUE/S: procedures to be undertaken in settling legal disputes, PTRI
W/N PTRI, et al. are immune from suit; and also manifested unequivocally its consent to be
W/N the RTC has jurisdiction to hear B.A. Ramirez's subjected to suit with respect to disputes arising from
Complaint the subject Contract. Further, the subject Contract was
clearly not executed in the exercise of PTRI's governmental
RULING/S: function of aiding the textile industry. The subject Contract
dealt solely with the rehabilitation works of the electrical
facilities of PTRI's buildings.
STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
a. In the assailed Decision, the CA concurs with the In any case, the Court has held that the State's immunity
assertion of PTRI, et al. that they are immune from from suit may be shelved when the Court is convinced that
suit owing to the rule that the State and its its stubborn observance will lead to the subversion of the
instrumentalities enjoy immunity from suit. ends of justice. Likewise, the doctrine of governmental
b. The Court disagrees. PTRI, et al. is not immune immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
from suit. perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.
Therefore, the CA's holding that PTRl, et al. are covered by
Under Article XVI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, the the rule on the State's immunity from suit is erroneous.
State may not be sued without its consent.
W/N the RTC has jurisdiction to hear B.A. Ramirez's

E.O. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code,
Complaint.
identified the PTRI as an institute of the DOST. Under the
Administrative Code, the PTRI has the mandate of
NO. The court ruled that when a dispute arises from a
conducting applied research and development for the textile
construction contract, the CIAC has exclusive and
industry sector, undertaking the transfer of completed
original jurisdiction.
researches to end-users or via linkage units of other
government agencies, and undertake technical services and
provide training programs. The PTRI enjoys immunity
from suit. Further, the employees of PTRI acting in their
THE JURISDICTION OF CIAC
official capacity likewise enjoy this immunity from suit, as
"public officials may not be sued for acts done in the
Nevertheless, while the Court holds that PTRI, et al. are not
performance of their official functions or within the scope of
immune from suit, the Court finds itself in agreement with
their authority." The rule on State immunity from suit is
the CA when it held that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to
not absolute. The State may be sued with its consent. The
hear E.A. Ramirez's Complaint. Under E.O. 1008,31
State's consent to be sued may be given either expressly or
otherwise known as the Construction Industry Arbitration
impliedly.
Law, the CIAC was established in order to further the law's
stated policy of expeditiously settling disputes in the
It is not disputed that PTRI entered into a Contract of Works
for the Rehabilitation of Electrical Facilities of PTRI Main construction industry.
Building and Three Pilot Plants with B.A. Ramirez. It is
likewise not disputed that the cause of action of E.A. The Court has ruled that when a dispute arises from a
Ramirez's Complaint is the alleged breach of the subject construction contract, the CIAC has exclusive and original
Contract. In other words, PTRI is being sued upon a jurisdiction.
claim involving liability arising from a contract.
Hence, the general law on the waiver of immunity
Under Section 4 of E.O. 1008, the CIAC shall have
from suit finds application. Furthermore, there is
implied consent on the part of the State to be original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising
subjected to suit when the State enters into a from, or connected with, contracts entered into by parties
contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to involved in construction in the Philippines, whether the
have descended to the level of the other contracting party dispute arises before or after the completion of the contract,
and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. or after the abandonment or breach thereof. The provision
However, not all contracts entered into by the government
further states that the CIAC acquires jurisdiction when the
operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still
parties to a dispute agree to submit the same to voluntary
arbitration. The provision also states that the jurisdiction of parties agree to undergo arbitration to settle
CIAC includes, but is not limited to, violation of specifications disputes, the CIAC shall have original and exclusive
for materials and workmanship; violation of the terms of jurisdiction. The aforesaid provision of the subject Contract
agreement; interpretation and/or application of contractual excludes all other courts of equal or competent jurisdiction.
time and delays; maintenance and defects; payment, However, it must be emphasized that, in the case at hand,
default of employer or contractor and changes in contract the CIAC and the RTC are not of equal jurisdiction. Because
cost. the parties agreed that disputes within the competence of
CIAC shall be referred thereto in accordance with R.A. 9184
There are two acts which may vest the CIAC with jurisdiction and the General Conditions of Contract, the jurisdiction of
over a construction dispute: the CIAC is original and exclusive.
a. The presence of an arbitration clause in a
construction contract, and Hence, Section 6.3 in the subject Contract does not
b. The agreement by the parties to submit the dispute militate in any way against the CIAC's original and
to the CIAC. exclusive jurisdiction over the construction dispute
between E.A. Ramirez and PTRI, et al. In sum, the CA
Hence, the CIAC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over did not commit any reversible error in dismissing Civil
construction disputes in construction projects in the Case No. 73790-TG because the RTC lacked
Philippines provided the parties have agreed to submit such jurisdiction to hear the same. The CIAC has original and
disputes to arbitration, whether through the presence of an exclusive jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide legal disputes
arbitration clause in the contract or when the parties agree arising from the subject Contract.
in some other manner to submit the dispute before the
CIAC. The Court has held that "the bare fact that the parties
incorporated an arbitration clause in their contract is
sufficient to vest the CIAC with jurisdiction over any
construction controversy or claim between the parties. The THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE
rule is explicit that the CIAC has jurisdiction notwithstanding
any reference made to another arbitral body." The CIAC is
already vested with jurisdiction the moment both WHAT IS A STATE?
parties agreed to incorporate an arbitration clause in
their agreement. It is a community of persons more or less numerous occupying
a definite portion of territory completely free of external control
and possessing an organized government to which a great body
E.A. Ramirez does not dispute that under Section 1.2 of of inhabitants render habitual obedience.
the subject Contract, the parties expressly agreed
that the agreement is governed by R.A. 9184 and its A community of persons sufficient in number and capable of
revised IRR, considering that the subject Contract maintaining the continued existence of the community and held
together by a common bond of law.
was awarded to E.A. Ramirez by way of competitive
public bidding. The said law unequivocally states that
"disputes that are within the competence of the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission to resolve shall be referred Elements of a State
thereto. The process of arbitration shall be incorporated as
1. People – inhabitants of the State
a provision in the contract that will be executed pursuant to
the provisions of this Act." The word people is used in at least three senses
when we talk about the Constitution:
E.A. Ramirez argues that the parties expressly agreed in the 1. People as Inhabitants
subject Contract to settle all legal disputes by filing actions 2. People as Citizens
before the proper courts of Taguig City. E.A. Ramirez places 3. People as Electors
much emphasis on Section 6.3 of the subject Contract which
states:
6.3 In the event of a legal action from the “People” as inhabitants
execution of the Contract, the parties hereto agree
that the venue for the action shall be settled and/or Article XIII, Section 1. The Congress shall give highest
litigated in the proper courts of the City of Taguig, priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance
the right of all the people to human dignity ,reduce social,
Metro Manila, to the exclusion of all other courts of
economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural
equal or competent jurisdiction. inequities by equitable diffusing wealth and political power for
the common good.
To reiterate, under E.O. 1008 and R.A. 9285, which are laws
that are read into every contract covered thereby, once the Article II, Section 15. The State shall protect and promote
the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.
Article II, Section 16. The State shall protect and advance Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Article III, Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty
any purpose shall be inviolable. B. “People” as Citizens by the other contracting State.
Preamble –“We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the

aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society 2. Territory – fix portion of the surface of the earth
and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and inhabited by the people of the State
aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop
3. Sovereignty – the supreme and uncontrollable power
our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the
inherent in any State
blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law
and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and The supreme power of the state by which the state is
peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.” governed. It is the possession of sovereign power.
Article II, Section 1. - The Philippines is a democratic and KINDS OF SOVEREIGNTY:

republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them. 1. Legal – power to issue final commands or
make laws
Article II, Section 4- The prime duty of the Government is to 2. Political – sum total of all the influences,
serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon legal and non-legal, which lie behind the law
the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, 3. Internal – supreme power over emitting
all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, within its territory
4. External – known as independent
to render personal, military, or civil service.
Article III, Section 7 - The right of the people to information
on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to 4. Government – agency where the will of the State is
express and realize.
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy That institution or aggregate of institutions by which
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such an independent society makes and carries out those
limitations as may be provided by law (Bill of Rights] rules of action which are necessary to enable men to
live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the
people forming that society by those who possess the
power or authority of prescribing them. (UNITED
“People” as Electors
STATES vs DORR)
Article VII ,Section 4 - The President and the Vice-President
Government is the aggregate of authorities
shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six
which rule a society.
years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of Government of the Philippines is the corporate
the same date six years thereafter. The President shall not be governmental entity through which the functions of
eligible for any reelection. No person who has succeeded as government are exercised throughout the Philippines,
including, save as the contrary appears from the
President and has served as such for more than four years shall
context, the various arms through which political
be qualified for election to the same office at any time. No Vice-
authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether
President shall serve for more than two successive terms. pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial,
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the forms of local government. (ADMINISTRATIVE
service for the full term for which he was elected. Unless CODE OF 1987)
otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President
and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT
Article XVI, Section 2. The Congress may, by law, adopt a
new name for the country, a national anthem, or a national 1. Traditional Functions or Constituent
seal, which shall all be truly reflective and symbolic of the Functions constitute the very bonds of
ideals, history, and traditions of the people. Such law shall take society and are therefore compulsory.
effect only upon its ratification by the people in a national
1. The keeping of order and providing for
referendum.
the protection and property from
violence and robbery. The fixing of the
Article XVIII, Section 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the
legal relations between man, wife and TERRITORY

between parents and children.
2. The regulation of the holding
transmission or interchange of property ARTICLE I
3. The determination of contract rights
THE NATIONAL TERRITORY
between individuals.
4. The definition and punishment of crime.
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago,
5. The administration of justice in civil
case. with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all
6. The determination of political duties, other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty
privileges, and relations of citizens or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial
7. Dealings of the state with foreign powers domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil,
the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters
2. Ministerial Functions are those around, between, and connecting the islands of the
undertaken to advance and general archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions,
interests of society, such as public form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
works, public charity, and regulation of
trade and industry. These functions are
merely optional.
The definition of national territory found in the Constitution
Note: The enumeration of the functions went through three phases.
cannot be static. In PVTA vs. CIR, the Court
noted that the distinction between the two 1. 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention
functions had become blurred. 2. Deliberations of the 1972 Constitutional
Convention
3. Deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
DE JURE AND DE FACTO GOVERNMENT Commission
1. A de jure government has rightful title but Between 1972 and 1986, the Philippines became party to the
no power or control, either because this has 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.
been withdrawn from it or because it has not
yet entered into the exercise thereof. A constitution is a municipal law. As such, it is binding only
within the territorial limits of the sovereignty
2. A de facto government is a government of promulgating the constitution.
fact, it actually exercises power or control but
without legal title. Ex. Election Laws For purposes of actual exercise of sovereignty, it is
important for the sovereign state to know the extent of the
territory over which it can legitimately exercise jurisdiction.
Kinds of de facto government:
For purposes of settling international conflict, a legal
1. That takes possession or control of, or instrument purporting to set out the territorial limits of the
usurps, by force or by the voice of the state must be supported by some recognized principle of
majority, the rightful legal government international law. Neither does a constitutional definition of
and maintains itself against the will of territory have the effect of legitimizing a territorial claim not
the latter; [government de facto in a founded on some legal right protected by international law.
proper legal sense]. Ex. Government of
England under the Commonwealth Thus, Philippine constitutionalism accepts the principle that
2. That which is established by the invading it is not the Constitution which definitely fixes the extent
forces of an enemy who occupy a of Philippine territory.
territory in the course of war. Ex.
Tampico, Mexico occupied by American 1934-1935 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
troops during the war with Mexico
3. That established an independent
government by the inhabitants of a SEC. 1, ARTICLE I, 1935 CONSTITUTION
country who rise in insurrection against
the parent state. States by the Treaty of Paris concluded between the United
States and Spain on the tenth day of December, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, the limits of which are set forth
in Article III of said treaty, together with all the islands in
the treaty concluded at Washington, between the United
States and Spain on the seventh day of November, nineteen
hundred, and in the treaty concluded between the United
States and Great Britain on the second day of January,
nineteen hundred and thirty, and all territory over which the
present Government of the Philippine Islands exercises
jurisdiction.
It corrected the error with respect to the Island of Sibutu and

The article thus gave us four points of reference for the Cagayan de Sulu.
determination of Philippine territory:
1. Treaty of Paris 3. Treaty between United States and Great Britain
ART. 3, TREATY OF PARIS TREATY BETWEEN US AND GREAT BRITAIN

(December 10, 1898) (February 2, 1930)
Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as ARTICLE I

the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands
lying within the following line: It is hereby agreed and declared that the line separating the
islands belonging to the Philippine Archipelago on the one
XXX hand and the islands belonging to the State of North Borneo
which is under British protection on the other hand shall be
The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty and is hereby established as follows:
million dollars ($20,000,000) within three months
after the exchange of the ratifications of the present From the point of intersection of the parallel of four degrees
treaty. forty-five minutes (4°45′) north latitude and the meridian of
longitude one hundred twenty degrees (120° 0) east of
Greenwich, (being a point on the boundary defined by the
Spain ceded to the United States “the archipelago known as Treaty between the United States of America and Spain
the Philippine Islands, and comprehending islands lying within” signed at Paris, December 10, 1898), a line due south along
the line drawn by the technical description of the same article.
the meridian of longitude one hundred twenty degrees (120°
0′) east of Greenwich to its point of intersection with the
The technical description however left some doubt about the
inclusion within the ceded territory of the Batanes Islands to parallel of four degrees twenty-three minutes (4° 23) north
the north and of the Islands of Mangsee Isalnds. latitude;
To remove the doubt, the 1935 Constitution added the clause xxx thence in a straight line approximately 300° 56′ true (N
“all territory over which the present government of the 59° 4′ W) through the Mangsee Channel between Mangsee
Philippine Islands exercises jurisdiction.” Great Reef and Mangsee Islands to the intersection of the
parallel of seven degrees forty minutes (7° 40′) north
latitude and the meridian of longitude one hundred
2. Treaty of Washington seventeen degrees (117° 0′) east of Greenwich, the latter
point being on the boundary defined by the Treaty between
the United States of America and Spain signed at Paris,
TREATY OF WASHINGTON
December 10, 1898.
(November 7, 1900)
Spain relinquishes to the United States all title and claim of The jurisdiction over the Turtle and Mangsee Islands
title, which she may have had at the time of the conclusion were clarified by the convention.
of the Treaty of Peace of Paris, to any and all islands
belonging to the Philippine Archipelago, lying outside the 4. All territory over which the present Government of the
lines described in Article III of that Treaty and particularly Philippine Islands exercises jurisdiction
to the islands of Cagayan, Sulu and Sibutu and their
dependencies, and agrees that all such islands shall be
comprehended in the cession of the Archipelago as fully as
if they had been expressly included within those lines. 1972 CONSTITUTION CONVENTION
The United States, in consideration of this relinquishment, ARTICLE I, 1972 CONSTITUTION

will pay to Spain the sum of one hundred thousand dollars
($100,000) within six months after the exchange of the The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago,
ratifications of the present treaty. with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all
other territories belonging to the Philippines by historic right
The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the or legal title, including the territorial sea, the air space, the
United States, by and with the advice and consent of the subsoil, the sea-bed, the insular shelves, and the other
Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty the Queen Regent of submarine areas over which the Philippines has sovereignty
Spain, after approval by the Cortes of the Kingdom, and the or jurisdiction. The waters around, between and connecting
ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington as soon as the islands of the archipelago, irrespective of their breadth
possible.
and dimensions, from part of the internal waters of the
Philippines.
This may be divided into three groups: sovereignty over its territorial sea subject to the right of
innocent passage by other states.
1. Philippine Archipelago
An archipelago may defined depending on one’s utilitarian INNOCENT PASSAGE:

preference, either as a cluster of islands forming a
territorial unity, or as a unit of water studded with islands. It is understood as passage not prejudicial to the interests
The Committees preference was for the second definition. of the coastal state nor contrary to recognized principles
of international law.
Thus, the answer given by Article I as to what or where is
the Philippine archipelago simply made reference to all The traditional length of the territorial waters measured
the islands and waters embraced therein. It gave no seawards, according to the canon-shot rule formulated
point of reference that could delineate the exact location in 1702, was 3 miles. However, modern law now
of these islands and waters. recognizes 12 n.m.
The delineation of the extent of the Philippine archipelago

must be understood in the context of the modifications Methods of Determining Bases
made both by the Treaty of Washington and of the
Convention of January 2, 1930, in order to include the 1. Normal Baseline Method – the breadth of the
Islands of Sibutu and of Cagayan de Sulu and the Turtle territorial sea is measured from the low-water line,
and Mangsee Islands. following the indentations of the coast
Although the intent of the Convention was to secure the 2. Straight Baseline Method – instead of the baseline
inclusion of the Batanes group, the definition of the following the sinuosities of the coast, it is drawn as
archipelago did not include the Batanes group. In straight lines connecting appropriate points on the
literal terms, it would come under the phrase “all other coast, without departing to any appreciable extent
territories belonging to the Philippines.” from the general direction of the coast.
The draft of the 1973 Constitution contained the clause

2. All other territories belonging to the Philippines by “all the waters beyond the outermost islands of the
historic right or legal title archipelago within the boundaries set forth in the
treaties and convention mentioned in Section 1
It will be recalled that the last clause of Article I of the hereof compromise the territorial sea of the
1935 Constitution was intended to ensure the Philippines” which referred to those found in Article I of
inclusion of the Batanes Islands within the Philippine the 1935 Constitution. This proposed provision
territory. represented the official conventions and it is found under:
Thus, this clause under the 1973 Constitution is a carry- 1. RA 3046 (June 17, 1961)
over from the 1935 Constitution. Both drafts of the 1973 2. RA 5466 (March 8, 1986)
Constitution contained a clause intended to cover the
Batanes Islands, which certainly formed part of the
Philippine territory, and all other territories over which the
Philippines might have a claim both then and in the future. Internal Waters
Likewise, this clause was inserted in answer to the clamor It consist of all parts of the sea landwards from the
to protect and ensure Philippine claim to territories baseline as well as inland rivers and lakes. All of them are
not covered by prior treaties. The intent was to avoid subject to the sovereignty of the state to the same extent
forfeiture of these claims by their omission from the that the land domain is. Unlike territorial waters, they are
constitutional definition. not subject to right of innocent passage by other
states.
Briefly, then, the clause covered Batanes. It covered
Sabah, which the Philippines had filed a former claim
based on a legal title perfected in 1962. It covered the The airspace, sub-soil, seabed, the insular shelves,
Marianas Islands and Freedom Land (Spratly Islands in the and the other submarine areas
South China Sea), which the Philippines might acquire in
the future through accepted international modes of
acquisition. While sovereignty is claimed over the air-space, sub-soil,
sea-bed, the insular or continental shelves and other
submarine areas, the physical extent of these areas and
3. Philippine waters, air-space, and submarine areas the degree of control claimed over these areas where left
undefined. This indeterminate stance was preserved in the
final 1973 version which simply claimed, “the airspace, the
Territorial Seas sub-soil, the sea-bed, the insular shelves other submarine
areas” as part of Philippine territory. Determination, in
It consists of a marginal belt of maritime waters adjacent other words, was left to other modes than by constitutional
to the base lines extending 12 n.m. outward. Outside the precept.
territorial sea are the high seas. A state exercises
NICOLAS v. ROMULO (2009) MAIN ISSUE:

FACTS:
1. Is the Visiting Forces Agreement void and
Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a unconstitutional?
member of the United States Armed Forces. He was charged
with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, No. The Court has already resolved in favor of the
petitioner Suzette S. Nicolas. constitutionality of the VFA in Bayan v. Zamora.
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between

the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, 2. Is the presence of US Armed Forces in
entered into on February 10, 1998, the United States, at its Philippine territory pursuant to the VFA
request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending allowed "under a treaty duly concurred in by
the proceedings. the Senate xxx and recognized as a treaty by
the other contracting State"?
During the trial, which was transferred from the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Zambales to the RTC of Makati for Yes, it is allowed for two reasons.
security reasons, the United States Government faithfully
complied with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith to First, as held in Bayan v. Zamora, the VFA was duly
the trial court every time his presence was required. concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been
recognized as a treaty by the United States as
On December 4, 2006, the RTC of Makati, following the end attested and certified by the duly authorized
of the trial, rendered its Decision, finding defendant Smith representative of the United States government.
guilty. As a result, the Makati court ordered Smith detained
at the Makati jail until further orders. The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice
and consent of the United States Senate does not
On December 29, 2006, however, defendant Smith was detract from its status as a binding international
taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law agreement or treaty recognized by the said State.
enforcement agents, purportedly acting under orders of the For this is a matter of internal United States law.
Department of the Interior and Local Government, and
brought to a facility for detention under the control of the Second, it has to do with the relation between the
United States government, provided for under new VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of
agreements between the Philippines and the United States, August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was
referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December signed and duly ratified with the concurrence of
19, 2006 which states: both the Philippine Senate and the United States
Senate.
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America agree that, in The VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to
accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed provide for the joint RP-US military exercises, is
between our two nations, Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-
United States Marine Corps, be returned to U.S. military US Military Defense Treaty
custody at the U.S. Embassy in Manila.
Accordingly, as an implementing agreement of the
and the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 22, 2006 RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, it was not necessary
which states: to submit the VFA to the US Senate for advice and
consent, but merely to the US Congress under the
The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Case–Zablocki Act within 60 days of its ratification.
Philippines and the Embassy of the United States of America It is for this reason that the US has certified that it
agree that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement recognizes the VFA as a binding international
signed between the two nations, upon transfer of Lance agreement
Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps, from
the Makati City Jail, he will be detained at the first floor, As a result, the situation involved is not one in
Rowe (JUSMAG) Building, U.S. Embassy Compound in a which the power of this Court to adopt rules of
room of approximately 10 x 12 square feet. He will be procedure is curtailed or violated, but rather one in
guarded round the clock by U.S. military personnel. The which, as is normally encountered around the
Philippine police and jail authorities, under the direct world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of
supervision of the Philippine Department of Interior and one State do not extend or apply – except to the
Local Government (DILG) will have access to the place of extent agreed upon – to subjects of another State
detention to ensure the United States is in compliance with due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity
the terms of the VFA. given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed
forces.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such

agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction
or some aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine
in relation to long-recognized subjects of such resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
immunity like Heads of State, diplomats and
members of the armed forces contingents of a
foreign State allowed to enter another State’s ISSUE:
territory. On the contrary, the Constitution states
that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted 1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring
principles of international law as part of the law of this suit; and
the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2). 2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are
the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality
Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court of RA 9522.
finds that there is a different treatment when it
comes to detention as against custody. The RULING:
moment the accused has to be detained, e.g., after
conviction, the rule that governs is the following
provision of the VFA: (1) MAGALLONA, et al. possess locus standi to bring this suit
as citizens and
3. Should the Philippines have custody of (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper
defendant L/CPL Smith? remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the
merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.
No.
PETITION IS DISMISSED
On the Threshold Issues Petitioners Possess Locus

Standi as Citizens
MAGALLONA VS. ERMITA (August 16, 2011)

Their locus standi as citizens with
FACTS: constitutionally sufficient interest in the
resolution of the merits of the case which
undoubtedly raises issues of national
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) significance necessitating urgent resolution.
demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA
archipelagic State. This law followed the framing of the 9522, it is understandably difficult to find
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone other litigants possessing "a more direct
in 1958 (UNCLOS I), codifying, among others, the sovereign and specific interest" to bring the suit,
right of States parties over their "territorial sea," thus satisfying one of the requirements
for granting citizenship standing.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA
9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition Are Proper
prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant Remedies to Test the Constitutionality of Statutes
with the terms of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) which the Philippines Court exercises its constitutional power of
ratified on 27 February 1984. Among others, UNCLOS judicial review, however, we have, by
III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and
baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to
the deadline for the filing of application for the extended test the constitutionality of statutes. The
continental shelf. Complying with these requirements, statute sought to be reviewed here is one such
RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the law
location of some basepoints around the Philippine
archipelago and classified adjacent territories,
RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional, RA 9522 is a
namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the
Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime
Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose
Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Delineate Philippine Territory
Petitioners (MAGALLONA) assail the constitutionality of RA

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the
9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522
acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a
reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the
multilateral treaty regulating, among others,
reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation
sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the
of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms
territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the
of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties, and (2) RA 9522
baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles
opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to
from the baselines], exclusive economic zone
maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining
[200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and
Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening
continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.
UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-
long negotiations among United Nations measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental
members to codify norms regulating the shelf.
conduct of States in the world’s oceans and
submarine areas, recognizing coastal and Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for
archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
limited span of waters and submarine lands III) States parties to delimit with precision the extent of
along their coasts. their maritime zones and continental shelves. RA 9522
increased the Philippines’ total maritime space by
RA 9522’s Use of the Framework of Regime of Islands 145,216 square nautical miles.
to Determine the Maritime Zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent with the The recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago and the
Philippines’ Claim of Sovereignty Over these Areas waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity
prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ under UNCLOS III. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis
claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, maritime space—the exclusive economic zone—in waters
Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and the previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new
Scarborough Shoal as "‘Regime[s] of Islands’ rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources
under the Republic of the Philippines found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles. UNCLOS III,
36 however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of
consistent with Article 121" of UNCLOS III
other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial
manifests the Philippine State’s responsible sea before UNCLOS III.
observance of its pacta sunt servanda
obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121
of UNCLOS III, any "naturally formed area of The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for
land, surrounded by water, which is above the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied
water at high tide," such as portions of the in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized
KIG, qualifies under the category of "regime of delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones
islands," whose islands generate their own and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step
applicable maritime zones. on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime
zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national
interest.
Statutory Claim Over Sabah under RA 5446 Retained
Section 2 of RA 9522 commits to text the Philippines’
Section 2 of RA 5446, continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG
and the Scarborough Shoal:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial
sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the
without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and
of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands"
situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article
the Philippines has acquired dominion and 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
sovereignty. (UNCLOS):
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not Incompatible with the a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under
Constitution’s Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
Delineation of Internal Waters b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough

Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for
the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the
in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago,
delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines
and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step would have committed a breach of two provisions of
on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that
zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any
interest. appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires
that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100
nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total
number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical
Additional Information:
miles.
Baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) Although the Philippines has consistently claimed
States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their sovereignty over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for
coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or several decades, these outlying areas are located at an
contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the
Philippine archipelago, such that any straight baseline loped against Philippine public vessels or aircrafts operating in the
around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably West Philippine Sea.
"depart to an appreciable extent from the general Article 18 Section 25 (1) the presence of foreign military
configuration of the archipelago." bases, troops, or facilities should be allowed by a treaty; (2)
the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Philippine
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the Senate and, when Congress so requires, such treaty should
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision to be ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the Filipino
classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "‘Regime[s] people in a national referendum held for that purpose; and
of Islands’ under the Republic of the Philippines consistent
(3) such treaty should be recognized as a treaty by the other
with Article 121" of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine
contracting party.
State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda
The VFA expressly allowed the importation into the
obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS
III, any "naturally formed area of land, surrounded by Philippines of reasonable quantities of personal baggage,
water, which is above water at high tide," such as portions personal effects, and other property for the personal use of
of the KIG, qualifies under the category of "regime of United States personnel. The VFA likewise expressly allowed
islands," whose islands generate their own applicable the entry into the Philippines of (1) aircraft operated by or
maritime zones. for the United States armed forces upon approval of the
Government of the Philippines in accordance with
procedures stipulated in implementing arrangements; and
(2) vessels operated by or for the United States armed
SAGUISAG v. OCHOA (January 12, 2016) forces upon approval of the Government of the Philippines,
in accordance with international custom and practice and
FACTS:
such agreed implementing arrangements as necessary. The
VFA also provided for the jurisdiction over criminal and
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago,
disciplinary cases over United States personnel with respect
with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all
to offences committed within the Philippines. The VFA
other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty
further stated that the same shall remain in force until the
or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial
expiration of 180 days from the date on which either party
domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the
gives the other party notice in writing that it desires to
subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The
terminate the agreement.
waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the
Under the EDCA, the Philippines by mutual agreement with
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions,
the United States, shall provide the United States forces the
form part of the internal waters of the Philippines
access and use of portions of Philippine territory These
portions of Philippine territory that will be made available to
Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave abuse
the US are called “Agreed Locations,” which is a new concept
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
defined under Article II(4) of the EDCA as: 4. “Agreed
when they entered into EDCA with the U.S., claiming that
Locations” means facilities and areas that are provided by
the instrument violated multiple constitutional provisions.
the Government of the Philippines through the AFP and that
China seized Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines, which
the United States forces, United States contractors, and
could offer no armed resistance to Chinese naval forces. The
others as mutually agreed, shall have the right to access and
Scarborough Shoal seizure finally made the Philippine
use pursuant to this Agreement.
Government realize that there was an absolute need to deter
China’s creeping invasion of Philippine islands, rocks and
The duty to protect the territory and the citizens of the
reefs in the West Philippine Sea.
Philippines, the power to call upon the people to defend the
State, and the President as Commander-in-Chief
The Philippines will lose 381,000 square kilometers of its
The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect
EEZ in the West Philippine Sea, a maritime space larger than
the people. The Government may call upon the people to
the total Philippine land area of 300,000 square kilometers.
defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens
China’s 9-dashed lines claim encroaches on all the
may be required, under conditions provided by law, to
traditional fishing grounds of Filipino fishermen in the South
render personal military or civil service.
China Sea.
The duty to protect the State and its people must be carried
The Philippine “national territory” refers to areas over which
out earnestly and effectively throughout the whole territory
the Philippines has “sovereignty or jurisdiction.” The
of the Philippines in accordance with the constitutional
Constitution mandates: “The State shall protect the nation’s
provision on national territory. Hence, the President of the
marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
Philippines, as the sole repository of executive power, is the
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
guardian of the Philippine archipelago, including all the
exclusively to Filipino citizens.”
islands and waters embraced therein and all other territories
over which it has sovereignty or jurisdiction. These
EDCA was born, to give much needed teeth to the MDT as a
territories consist of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial
deterrent to further Chinese aggression in the West
domains; including its territorial sea, the seabed, the
Philippine Sea. Without the EDCA, the MDT remains a
subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas; and
toothless paper tiger. With the EDCA, the MDT acquires a
the waters around, between, and connecting the islands of
real and ready firepower to deter any armed aggression
the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions.
RULING:
To carry out this important duty, the President is equipped
with authority over the Armed Forces of the Philippines The plain meaning of the Constitution prohibits the entry of
(AFP), which is the protector of the people and the state. foreign military bases, troops or facilities, except by way of
The AFP's role is to secure the sovereignty of the State and a treaty concurred in by the Senate - a clear limitation on
the integrity of the national territory. In addition, the the President's dual role as defender of the State and as sole
Executive is constitutionally empowered to maintain peace authority in foreign relations.
and order; protect life, liberty, and property; and promote
the general welfare. (Section 21 of the provisions on the Executive Department:
"No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
In recognition of these powers, Congress has specified that effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
the President must oversee, ensure, and reinforce our Members of the Senate.")
defensive capabilities against external and internal threats
and, in the same vein, ensure that the country is adequately
(SECTION 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement
prepared for all national and local emergencies arising from
between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
natural and man-made disasters.
States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the
The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the
EDCA authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to
Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a
and conduct activities within certain "Agreed Locations" in
majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
the country. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the
referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a
executive's understanding that to do so was no longer
treaty by the other contracting State.)
necessary. Accordingly, the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) and the U.S. Embassy exchanged diplomatic notes
This means that both provisions must be read as additional
confirming the completion of all necessary internal
limitations to the President's overarching executive function
requirements for the agreement to enter into force in the
in matters of defense and foreign relations.
two countries.
According to the Philippine government, the conclusion of EXCEPTION:

EDCA was the result of intensive and comprehensive
negotiations in the course of almost two years. After eight The President, however, may enter into an executive
rounds of negotiations, the Secretary of National Defense agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, if
and the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines signed the (a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of
agreement on 28 April 2014. President Benigno S. Aquino foreign military bases, troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely
III ratified EDCA on 6 June 2014. The OSG clarified during aims to implement an existing law or treaty.
the oral arguments that the Philippine and the U.S.
governments had yet to agree formally on the specific sites Executive agreements may cover the matter of foreign
of the Agreed Locations mentioned in the agreement. Two military forces if it merely involves detail adjustments.
petitions for certiorari were thereafter filed before us
assailing the constitutionality of EDCA. They primarily argue • In light of this constitutional duty, it
that it should have been in the form of a treaty concurred in is the President's prerogative to do
by the Senate, not an executive agreement. On 10 whatever is legal and necessary for
November 2015, months after the oral arguments were Philippine defense interests. It is no
concluded and the parties ordered to file their respective coincidence that the constitutional
memoranda, the Senators adopted Senate Resolution No. provision on the faithful execution
(SR) 105. The resolution expresses the "strong sense" of the clause was followed by that on the
Senators that for EDCA to become valid and effective, it President's commander-in-chief
powers, which are specifically
must first be transmitted to the Senate for deliberation and
granted during extraordinary events
concurrence.
of lawless violence, invasion, or
rebellion. And this duty of defending
MAIN ISSUE: the country is unceasing, even in
times when there is no state of
1. Does the provisions under EDCA consistent lawlesss violence, invasion, or
with the Constitution, as well as with existing rebellion. At such times, the
laws and treaties? President has full powers to ensure
2. Whether the President may enter into an the faithful execution of the laws.
executive agreement on foreign military • Although the Chief Executive wields
bases, troops, or facilities the exclusive authority to conduct our
foreign relations, this power must still
be exercised within the context and
the parameters... set by the
Constitution, as well as by existing
domestic and international laws.
There are constitutional provisions equipment, vehicles, vessels, and

that restrict or limit the President's aircraft to be brought into the
prerogative in concluding country. Articles VII and VIII of the
international agreements, such as VFA contemplates that U.S.
those that involve the following: equipment, materials, supplies, and
• The policy of freedom from nuclear other property are imported into or
weapons within Philippine territory acquired in the Philippines... by or on
• The fixing of tariff rates, import and behalf of the U.S. Armed Forces; as
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage are vehicles, vessels, and aircraft
dues, and other duties or imposts, operated by or for U.S. forces in
which must be pursuant to the connection with activities under the
authority granted by Congress[222] VFA. These provisions likewise
• The grant of any tax exemption, provide for the waiver of the specific
which must be pursuant to a law duties, taxes, charges, and fees that
concurred in by a majority of all the correspond to the equipment.
Members of Congress[223] • Both the VFA and EDCA ensure
• The contracting or guaranteeing, on Philippine jurisdiction in all instances
behalf of the Philippines, of foreign contemplated by both agreements,
loans that must be previously except for those outlined by the VFA
concurred in by the Monetary in Articles III-VI. In the VFA, taxes
Board[224] are clearly waived whereas in EDCA,
• The authorization of the presence of taxes are assumed by the
foreign military bases, troops, or government
facilities in the country must be in the
form of a treaty duly concurred in by EDCA states in its Preamble the "understanding for the
the Senate.[225] United States not to establish a permanent military presence
• For agreements that do not fall under or base in the territory of the Philippines." It likewise states
paragraph 5, the concurrence of the
the recognition that "all United States access to and use of
Senate is required, should the form of
facilities and areas will be at the invitation of the Philippines
the government chosen be a treaty.
and with full respect for the Philippine Constitution and
Philippine laws."
It is evident that the constitutional restriction refers solely
to the initial entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are The sensitivity of EDCA provisions to the laws of the
thereafter subject only to the limitations provided by the Philippines must be seen in light of Philippine sovereignty
rest of the Constitution and Philippine law, and not to the and jurisdiction over the Agreed Locations.
Section 25 requirement of validity through a treaty.
Sovereignty is the possession of sovereign power, while
In light of the President's choice to enter into EDCA in the jurisdiction is the conferment by law of power and authority
form of an executive agreement, respondents carry the to apply the law. Article I of the 1987 Constitution states:
burden of proving that it is a mere implementation of
existing laws and treaties concurred in by the Senate. The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago,
with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all
other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty
or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial
domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the
C. Whether the provisions under EDCA are consistent
subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The
with the Constitution, as well as with existing laws
waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the
and treaties
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions,
form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose, and
framework of the MDT and the VFA
From the text of EDCA, Agreed Locations are territories of
the Philippines that the U.S. forces are allowed to access and
• These permanent facilities, while built use. By withholding ownership of these areas and retaining
by U.S. forces, are to be owned by
unrestricted access to them, the government asserts
the Philippines once constructed.
sovereignty over its territory. That sovereignty exists so
Even the VFA allowed construction for
the benefit of U.S. forces during their long as the Filipino people exist.
temporary visits.
• EDCA allows the prepositioning of The Philippines retains primary responsibility for security
military material, which can include with respect to the Agreed Locations. Hence, Philippine law
various types of warships, fighter remains in force therein, and it cannot be said that
planes, bombers, and vessels, as well jurisdiction has been transferred to the U.S. Even the
as land and amphibious vehicles and previously discussed necessary measures for operational
their corresponding ammunition. VFA
clearly allows the same kind of
control and defense over U.S. forces must be coordinated forces are allowed to undertake construction activities in,
with Philippine authorities. and make alterations and improvements to, the agreed
locations, facilities, or areas. As in EDCA, the host states
Jurisprudence bears out the fact that even under the former retain ownership and jurisdiction over the said bases.
legal regime of the MBA, Philippine laws continue to be in
force within the bases. The difference between then and now Concerns on national security problems that arise from
is that EDCA retains the primary jurisdiction of the foreign military equipment being present in the Philippines
Philippines over the security of the Agreed Locations, an must likewise be contextualized. Most significantly, the VFA
important provision that gives it actual control over those already authorizes the presence of U.S. military equipment
locations. Previously, it was the provost marshal of the U.S. in the country. Article VII of the VFA already authorizes the
who kept the peace and enforced Philippine law in the bases. U.S. to import into or acquire in the Philippines "equipment,
In this instance, Philippine forces act as peace officers, in materials, supplies, and other property" that will be used "in
stark contrast to the 1947 MBA provisions on jurisdiction. connection with activities" contemplated therein. The same
section also recognizes that "[t]itle to such property shall
EDCA provisions on the Agreed Locations do not impair or remain" with the US and that they have the discretion to
threaten the national security and territorial integrity of the "remove such property from the Philippines at any time."
Philippines.
There is nothing novel in the EDCA provision on the
This Court acknowledged in Bayan v. Zamora that the prepositioning and storing of "defense equipment, supplies,
evolution of technology has essentially rendered the prior and materiel," since these are sanctioned in the VFA. In fact,
notion of permanent military bases obsolete. the two countries have already entered into various
implementing agreements in the past that are comparable
Moreover, military bases established within the territory of to the present one. The Balikatan 02-1 Terms of Reference
another state is no longer viable because of the alternatives mentioned in Lim v. Executive Secretary specifically
offered by new means and weapons of warfare such as recognizes that Philippine and U.S. forces may share x x x
nuclear weapons, guided missiles as well as huge sea in the use of their resources, equipment and other assets."
vessels that can stay afloat in the sea even for months and Both the 2002 and 2007 Mutual Logistics Support
years without returning to their home country. These Agreements speak of the provision of support and services,
military warships are actually used as substitutes for a land- including the construction and use of temporary structures
home base not only of military aircraft but also of military incident to operations support" and "storage services' '
personnel and facilities. Besides, vessels are mobile as during approved activities. These logistic supplies, support,
compared to a land-based military headquarters.414 and services include the "temporary use of x x x nonlethal
items of military equipment which are not designated as
significant military equipment on the U.S. Munitions List,
The VFA serves as the basis for the entry of U.S. troops in a
during an approved activity." Those activities include
limited scope. It does not allow, for instance, the re-
"combined exercises and training, operations and other
establishment of the Subic military base or the Clark Air
deployments" and "cooperative efforts, such as
Field as U.S. military reservations. In this context, therefore,
humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and rescue
this Court has interpreted the restrictions on foreign bases,
operations, and maritime anti-pollution operations'' within
troops, or facilities as three independent restrictions. In
or outside Philippine territory. Under EDCA, the equipment,
accord with this interpretation, each restriction must have
supplies, and materiel that will be prepositioned at Agreed
its own qualification.
Locations include "humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief equipment, supplies, and materiel." Nuclear weapons
Under international law, EDCA does not provide a legal basis
are specifically excluded from the material that will be
for a justified attack on the Philippines.
prepositioned.
There is ample legal protection for the Philippines under

Thus, we find no reason for EDCA to be declared
international law that would ensure its territorial integrity
unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines' legal
and national security in the event an Agreed Location is
regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to
subjected to attack. As EDCA stands, it does not create the
the government's continued policy to enhance our military
situation so feared by petitioners - one in which the
capability in the face of various military and humanitarian
Philippines, while not participating in an armed conflict,
issues that may arise.
would be legitimately targeted by an enemy of the U.S.
Evidently, the concept of giving foreign troops access to

"agreed" locations, areas, or facilities within the military
base of another sovereign state is nothing new on the a. The Archipelagic Doctrine
international plane. In fact, this arrangement has been used
as the framework for several defense cooperation The basic concept of an archipelago is that body of
agreements. In all of these arrangements, the host state water studded with islands, or the islands surrounded
grants U.S. forces access to their military bases. That access with water, is viewed as a unity of islands and waters
is without rental or similar costs to the U.S. Further, U.S. together forming one unit.
The main purpose of the archipelagic doctrine is to provisions of applicable laws including, without
protect the territorial interests of an archipelago. limitation, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known
According to the doctrine, even these bodies of water as the Local Government Code of 1991, as
within the baseline, regardless of breadth, form part amended.
of the archipelago and are thus considered as internal
Waters. Section 4. This Act, together with the geographic
coordinates and the chart and maps indicating the
The Philippine Government adopted the archipelagic aforesaid baselines, shall be deposited and
doctrine as a national policy to safeguard its territorial
registered with the Secretary General of the United
integrity and of its sovereign right to explore and
Nations.
exploit, convert and manage its marine resources.
Thus, the archipelagic doctrine has a two-fold
Section 5. The National Mapping and Resource
purpose: (1) Economic reasons; (2) National Security.
Information Authority (NAMRIA) shall forthwith
The archipelagic doctrine is the principle that it is an
produce and publish charts and maps of the
integrated unit; everything within it comprises the
archipelago. appropriate scale clearly representing the
delineation of basepoints and baselines as set forth
in this Act.
b. The Philippine Archipelago Section 6. The amount necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act shall be provided in a
RA 9552 supplemental budyet or included in the General
(March 3, 2009) Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into
law.
Section 7. If any portion or provision of this Act is

AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS declared unconstitutional or invalid the other
OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AS AMENDED portions or provisions hereof which are not affected
BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.
ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Section 8. The provisions of Republic Act No.
3046, as amended by Republic Act No. 5446, and
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of all other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress issuances inconsistent with this Act are hereby
assembled:: amended or modified accordingly.
Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3046, Section 9. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15)
entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the days following its publication in the Official
Territorial Sea of the Philippines", as amended by Gazette or in any two (2) newspaper of general
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5446, is hereby circulation.
amended to read as follows:
Section 1. The baselines of the Philippines

archipelago are hereby defined and described
specifically as follows: UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
XXX United Nations Convention on the Law of the sea

(UNCLOS) (consists of 16 parts)
Section 2. The baseline in the following areas over
which the Philippines likewise exercises
It is a multilateral treaty opened for signature on
sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica
"Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United
It was ratified by Philippines in 1984 and came into
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea force on Nov 16, 1994 upon submission of the 60th
(UNCLOS): ratification
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under
NOTE: UNCLOS has nothing to do with the acquisition
Presidential Decree No. 1596; and
or loss of territory.
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough
Shoal. It regulates sea-use rights over maritime zones like
territorial waters (12 NM from baselines), contiguous
Section 3. This Act affirms that the Republic of the zones (24 NM), exclusive economic zone (200NM) and
Philippines has dominion, sovereignty and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits
jurisdiction over all portions of the national
territory as defined in the Constitution and by Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS
but governed by laws on international law.
Some important concepts found in the living, waters superjacent- to seabed, and economic
Convention are: exploration such as production of energy from water,
currents, winds (exploitation)
1. Archipelago
2. Archipelagic state
3. Archipelagic wears
4. Baseline
Jurisdiction as provided by UNCLOS with regard to:
5. Sovereignty over territorial waters
6. Archipelagic waters
7. Insular shelf a) establishment and use of artificial islands,
installations and structures
b) maritime scientific research
c) protection and preservation of the marine
Archipelago environment
It is a group of islands, including parts of islands, Enforcement of law and regulations of the coastal state
interconnecting waters and other natural features which are so
closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural (ART. 73) -The coastal state may, in the exercise of
features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political its sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and
entity, or which historically have been regarded as such. manage the living resources in the EEZ, take such
measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and
Archipelagic state judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure
compliance with the laws and regulations in
It refers to a State constituted wholly by one or more conformity with this Convention
archipelagos and may include other islands.
Continental Shelf
Art. 47. It follows a straight baseline method, joining
the outermost points of the outermost islands and
drying reefs (Art. 77) – Coastal state exercises over the
continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring it and exploiting its natural resources
Article 47 (3). The drawing of such baseline shall not
depart to any appreciable extent from general
configuration of the archipelago -The rights referred to in paragraph 1 are exclusive in
a sense that if the coastal State does not explore the
continental shelf, no one may undertake these
Baseline Laws
activities without the express consent of the State.
To mark out specific basepoints along their coasts

The high seas (Art. 87)
from which baselines are drawn either straight or
contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to
measure breadth of maritime zones and continental Are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked
shelf It comprises:
UNCLOS gives the State sovereign rights over different • Freedom of navigations
zones • Freedom of overflight
• Freedom to lay submarine cables and
pipelines subject to Part VI
a) Internal waters • Freedom to construct artificial islands
b) Territorial sea- extend to air space as well as and other installations permitted under
to its bed and subsoil, full sovereignty
international law, subject to Part IV
c) Contiguous zone • Freedom of fishing, subject to conditions
d) Exclusive economic zones
laid down in Sec 2.
e) High seas • • Freedom of scientific research, subject
to Parts VI and XIII
Contiguous zone
The Area (Art. 137)
State may exercise control to:
No state shall claim or exercise sovereignty over any
a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, part of the Area or its resources, nor shall any State
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations or natural or judicial person appropriate any part
b) Punish infringement of above laws and thereof. No such claims or exercise of sovereignty nor
regulations committed within its territory such appropriation shall be recognized.
Exclusive economic zones
Rights for exploring, exploiting, conserving and

managing natural resources whether living, non-
Regime of Islands (Art. 121) Annex VII to the Convention, which include a procedure to
form a tribunal even in the absence of one party.
Kalayaan Group and Scarborough belong to this
classification Tribunal’s Decisions on the Merits of the Ph Claims:
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, Issues:

surrounded by water which is above water at high tide
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial a) The 9-dash line and China’s claim to
sea, contiguous zone, EEZ and continental shelf of an historic rights in the maritime area of
island are determined in accordance with its the South China Sea
provisions of this Convention applicable to other land b) The Status of Feature in the South
territory. China Sea
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or c) Chinese Activities in the South China
economic life of their own shall have no EEZ or Sea
continental shelf d) Aggravation of the Dispute between
parties
e) Future conduct of the Parties
Treaty setting Philippines, Indonesia EEZ boundary

enters into force
RULING
An agreement delineating the boundary between the
overlapping EEZ of the Philippines and Indonesia The 9-dash line and China’s claim to historic rights
officially entered into force following the exchange by
the two countries’ foreign ministers of the instruments
The Tribunal found that China’s claim to resources was
of ratification in a special ceremony held on Aug 1,
incompatible with the detailed allocation of rights and
2019 in Bangkok
maritime zones in the Convention and concluded that, to the
extent China had historic rights to resources in the waters
Archipelagic Doctrine (Embodied in Art, 1 of 1987 of the South China Sea, such rights were extinguished by
Constitution) the entry into force of the Convention to the extent they
were incompatible with the Convention’s system of maritime
This articulates the archipelagic doctrine of National zones
territory based on the principle that an archipelago,
which consists of a number of islands separated by The Status of Feature in the South China Sea
bodies of water, should be treated as one integral unit.
• The Tribunal agreed with the PH that Scarborough Shoal,
Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef, Hughes
Reef, Mischief Reed, and Second Thomas Shoal were
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHINA (2016)
submerged at high time in their natural condition.
This arbitration concerned the role of historic rights and the • However, the Tribunal disagreed with the PH regarding the
source of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, the status of Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef and concluded that
status of certain maritime features and the maritime both are high tide features.
entitlements they are capable of generating, and the
lawfulness of certain actions by China that were alleged by • The Tribunal concluded that all of the high-tide features
the PH to violate the Convention. in the Spratly Islands (Itu Aba, Thitu, West York, Spratly,
North-East Cay, South-West Cay) are legally “rocks” that do
In light of limitations on compulsory dispute settlement not generate an EEZ or continental shelf
under the Convention, the Tribunal has emphasized that it
does not rule on any question of sovereignty over land • They also held that the Convention does not provide for a
territory and does not delimit any boundary between group of islands such as Spratly Islands to generate
Parties. maritime zones collectively as a unit
Ruling of Tribunal on its Jurisdiction (July 12, 2016) • Having found that none of the features claimed by China
was capable of generating EEZ, the Tribunal found that it
The Tribunal noted that both parties, PH and China are could- without delimiting a boundary- declare that certain
parties to the Convention and that the Convention does not sea areas are within the EEZ of the PH, because those areas
permit a State to except itself generally from the mechanism are not overlapped by any possible entitlement of China
for the resolution of disputes set out in the Convention Chinese
So, the Tribunal held that China’s non-participation does not Activities in the South China Sea
deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction and that the Tribunal had
been properly constituted pursuant to the provisions of • The Tribunal found that China’s recent large scale land
reclamation and construction of artificial islands at seven
features in the Spratly Islands has caused severe harm to ● It goes without saying the both Parties are obliged
the coral reef environment and that China has violated its to resolve their disputes peacefully and to comply
obligation under Art, 192 and 194 of the Convention to with the Convention and this Award in good faith.
preserve and protect the marine environment with respect
to fragile ecosystems and habitat of depleted, threatened or
endangered species.
• Tribunal also found that Chinese fisherman have engaged

in the harvesting of endangered sea turtles, coral, and giant PEOPLE
clams on a substantial scale using methods that inflict
severe damage to the coral reef environment Citizenship
• Also, Chinese authorities were aware of these activities It is a personal and more or less permanent
and failed to fulfill their due diligence obligations under the membership in a political community. It denotes
Convention to stop them possession within that particular political community
of full civil and political rights subject to special
• The Tribunal concluded that the Convention is clear in disqualifications such as minority. Reciprocally, it
allocating sovereign rights to the Philippines with respect to imposes the duty of allegiance to the political
sea areas in the EEZ community.
Citizenship is a legal device denoting political

The Tribunal found China had:
affiliation. It is the “right to have rights. It also entails
obligations to the political community of which one is
● Interfered with the PH petroleum exploration at part. Citizenship, therefore is the intimately tied with
Reed bank the notion that loyalty is owed to the state,
● Purported to prohibit fishing by Philippine vessels considering the benefits and protection provided by it.
within the PH EEZ [David v SET]
● Protected and failed to prevent Chinese fishermen
from fishing within the Philippine EEZ at Mischief
Reef and Second Thomas Shoal , Reed Bank Modes of Acquiring Citizenship
● Constructed installations and artificial islands at
Mischief Reef without the authorization of the Modern law recognizes three distinct modes of acquiring
Philippines citizenship:
● The Tribunal therefore concluded that China had
violated Ph sovereign rights with respect to its EEZ 1. Jus sanguinis – acquisition of citizenship on the basis
and continental shelf of blood relationship
Aggravation of the Dispute between parties 2. Jus soli – acquisition of citizenship on the basis of
place of birth
The Tribunal noted that China has:
3. Naturalization – the legal act of adopting an alien
and clothing him with the privilege of a native born-
● Built a large artificial island on Mischief Reef
citizen.
● Caused permanent, irreparable harm to the coral
reef ecosystem
The Philippine law follows the rule of jus sanguinis.
● Permanently destroyed evidence of the natural
condition of the features in question
The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political
rights, that is, the right to participate in government
The Tribunal concluded that China has violated its principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public
obligations to refrain from aggravating or extending the office, and the right to petition the government for redress of
Parties’ disputes during the pendency of the settlement grievances.
process
Future conduct of the Parties Who are Citizens of the Philippines?
● The Tribunal considered that the root of the Summary of the historical development of the concept of
disputes at issue in this arbitration lies not in any “citizenship” in the Philippines:
intention on the part of China or the PH to infringe
on the legal rights of the other, but rather in ● Under the Spanish, the native inhabitants of the Philippine
fundamentally different understandings of their Islands were identified not as citizens but as “Spanish
respective rights under the Convention in the subjects”.
waters of the South China Sea. ● The term “citizens of the Philippine Islands” first
● The Tribunal recalled that it is a fundamental appeared in legislation in the Philippine Organic Act,
principle of international law that bad faith is not otherwise known as the Philippine Bill of 1902: [David v
presumed and noted that Art, 11 of Annex VII SET]
provides that the “award….shall be complied with ● The Jones Law [Philippine Autonomy Act] 1916 provided
by the parties to the dispute.” that a native born inhabitant of the Philippine Islands was
deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of April 11, UNDER THE 1935 CONSTITUTION
1899 if he or she was
1. A subject of Spain on April11, 1899 SEC. 1, ARTICLE IV

2. Residing in the Philippines on said date, and
3. Since the date, not a citizen of some other The following are citizens of the Philippines:
country”. [David v SET]
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution.
PHILIPPINE BILL OF 1902
2. Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents
who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been
SECTION 4 elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to 3. Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh
day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then 4. Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
resided in the Philippine Islands, and their children born and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens citizenship.
of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have 5. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain signed at Paris This was adopted on November 15, 1935.
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
It adopted the principle of jus sanguinis as an absolute
rule. However, there is nothing neither in the 1935 nor in
This provision of the Philippine Bill is an act of mass the 1973 or 1987 Constitution to prevent the legislature
naturalization. It implements Article IX of the Treaty from adopting the principle of jus soli or any of its features
of Paris. as supplementary law on citizenship.
For the first time, it creates the category of Filipino Under Sec. 1(3), the child of a Filipino father, whether
Citizen. Prior to the Philippine Bill, there were only born in the Philippines or abroad, was a Filipino citizen at
Spanish subjects. the moment of birth.
It includes: Under Sec. 1(1), it pertains to the following:
1. Persons born in the Philippines 1. The children of those who became Filipino citizens
2. Persons born in Spain under the Philippine Bill, provided they had not
3. All other inhabitants of the Philippines provided lost their citizenship prior to November 15, 1935.
that they were subjects of Spain and residents of
the Philippines on April 11, 1899, the date of 2. Those who became Filipino citizens under the
exchange of ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Naturalization Law (Act. 2927) enacted on
March 26, 1920, provided they had not lost their
Not included, however, were those who had elected to citizenship by November 15, 1935.
preserve their allegiance to the crown of Spain in
accordance with the Treaty of Peace between United 3. Children who were minors at the time of the
States and Spain. naturalization of their parents under
paragraph 3, if dwelling in the Philippines, and
The Treaty of Paris allowed the Peninsular Spaniards children born in the Philippines subsequent to the
residing in the Philippines to preserve their allegiance naturalization of their parents (Act. 3448),
to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of provided they had not lost their citizenship by
record, within a year from the date of exchange of November 15, 1935.
ratification of the treaty (April 11, 1998), by a
declaration of their decision to preserve such 4. Foreign women married to citizens of the
allegiance. Philippines who may have acquired Philippine
citizenship under Act. 3448, provided they had
not lost their citizenship by November 15, 1935.
5. Those who were citizens of the Philippines by

principle of res judicata, that is, those who were
individually declared to be citizens of the
Philippines by a final court decision even if on the
mistaken application of the principle of jus soli.
AT PRESENT: 1987 CONSTITUTION
UNDER THE 1973 CONSTITUTION

SECTION 1, ARTICLE IV
SEC. 1, ARTICLE III The following are citizens of the Philippines:
The following are citizens of the Philippines: 1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution;
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution. 2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines. 3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
3. Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to reaching the age of majority; and
the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five. 4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
This should not be read as having the effect of curing any

It took effect on January 17, 1973. defect in the acquisition of citizenship under the 1935 or
1973 Constitutions.
It preserved the principle of jus sanguinis as the basic
foundation of citizenship and expanded its application by If a person’s citizenship was subject to judicial
placing the Filipino woman on the same level as the male challenge under the old law, it remains subject to
in matters of citizenship. challenge under the new law– whether or not the judicial
challenge had been commenced prior to the effectivity
Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines, even if the of the new Constitution.
father is an alien, are Filipino citizens. To come under this
expanded rule, however, it is essential that the mother must During the deliberations, it is a settled rule that the
be Filipina at the time of the birth of the child. principle of jus sanguinis applies only to natural filiation
and not to filiation by adoption.
This provision is NOT RETROACTIVE. It applies only to those
born of a Filipina mother on or after the effectivity of the Likewise, it is a settled rule that only legitimate children
1973 Constitution. follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate
children are under the parental authority of the
The right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the mother and follow her nationality, not that of the
1973 Constitution when it provided that those who elect illegitimate father.
Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five are citizens of Moreover, an illegitimate child of a Filipino father and an
the Philippines. [Republic v. Sagun, February 15, 2012] alien mother is Filipino, if paternity is clear. This was
the case of Fernando Poe Jr. Needless to say, the child
Under the 1973 constitution definition, there were two might also have the citizenship of the mother, in
categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered which case the child might have dual-citizenship.
natural-born:
Note: Section 1(2) [Article IV] does not require one’s

1. Those who were naturalized and parents to be natural-born Filipino citizens.
2. Those born before January 17, 1973, and of Filipino It does not even require them to conform to traditional
mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority conceptions of what is indigenously or ethically
elected Philippine citizenship. [Bengson v. HRET, Filipino. One or both parents can, therefore, be
May 7, 2001] ethically foreign. [David v. SET, September 20,
2016]
RETROACTIVE EFFECT
The court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 as

applying not only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those
who, having born of Filipino mothers, elected
citizenship before that date. The provision in
Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position
which discriminates against Filipino women. [Co v. American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S.
HRET, July 30, 1991]. citizenship.”
The present Constitution now considers [s] those born Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the
of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship mayor of the City of Makati.
upon reaching the majority age as natural-born This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the
[Bengson v. HRET, May 7, 2001] aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare
private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice
MERCADO v. MANZANO (1999) mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that – The
FACTS: COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that: A. Under
Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent 1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the
Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the age of majority when he was already 37 years old; and, 2.
City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely)
was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were as registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of
follows: Eduardo B. Manzano - 103,853; Ernesto S. 1992, 1995 and 1998. B. Manzano is qualified to run for and
Mercado- 100,894; Gabriel V. Daza III- 54,275. or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in of the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet
view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the
certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run
was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of
Makati.
In its resolution, the Second Division of the COMELEC
granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation MAIN ISSUE:
of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the
ground that he is a dual citizen. WON private respondent Manzano possesses dual
COMELEC said: The petition is based on the ground that the citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being
respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a
natural-born Filipino citizen. Respondent admitted that he is RULING:
registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration
under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being
alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in sought under §40 of the Local Government Code of 1991
1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as “disqualified from
in the United States, San Francisco, California, on running for any elective local position: (d) Those with dual
September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen citizenship.” This provision is incorporated in the Charter of
under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an the City of Makati.
American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as
Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words,
the Solicitor General, who sides with him in this case,
he holds dual citizenship. Under Section 40(d) of the Local
contends that through §40(d) of the Local Government
Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are
Code, Congress has “command[ed] in explicit terms the
disqualified from running for any elective local position.
ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold
local elective office.”
The COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution reversing the
ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual
qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
May 11, 1998 elections: “He was also a natural born Filipino concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by
his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. the said states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV)
At the age of six, his parents brought him to the Philippines of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of
using an American passport as travel document. His parents citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship. Dual
also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of allegiance refers to the situation in which a person
Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or
registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the
United States.It is an undisputed fact that when respondent With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the
attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a Constitution provides: “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical
voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.” Dual
which effectively renounced his US citizenship under allegiance is not dual citizenship. Dual allegiance is larger
and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him,
which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. that he holds an American passport to travel to the United
States on April 22, 1997, can be considered simply as the
The phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and assertion of his American nationality before the termination
in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to of his American citizenship.
“dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
to strict process with respect to the termination of their immigrant of another country; that he will defend and
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true
if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the
with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different American citizenship and anything which he may have said
states. Dual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us before as a dual citizen.
because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of
other countries. Private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines,
when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in
they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the citizenship. His declarations will be taken upon the faith that
foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he
effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. This is similar betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring
to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
renounce “all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, appropriate proceedings.
potentate, state, or sovereignty” of which at the time he is
a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of
naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. The
TECSON v. COMELEC (2004)
determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully
complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies FACTS:
within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our
courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe,
legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his
or should interfere with its operation and application. certificate of candidacy for the position of President under
the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party. In his
Private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be
Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be
the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the
Philippines and of the United States. However, the G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier,
COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections:
elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent
Victorino X. Fornier initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition
“effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American
docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on
law,” so that now he is solely a Philippine national.
Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the
respondent renounced his American citizenship, the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his
COMELEC must have in mind §349 of the Immigration and certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born
Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that “A Filipino citizen when in truth his parents were foreigners; his
person who is a national of the United States, whether by mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father,
birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo
(e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting that Allan F. Poe was a
participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
sovereignty over foreign territory.” To be sure this provision citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an
was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in alien mother. He based the allegation of the illegitimate birth
Afroyim v. Rusk as beyond the power given to the U.S. of FPJ on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a
Congress to regulate foreign relations. prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his
marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior
However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only
his present post, private respondent elected Philippine a year after the birth of respondent.
citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship.
Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21,
Jurisdiction of Court in GR No. 161434 & 161634 qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the
Philippines.
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to
have the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJ’s "Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by
certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto
material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) against the President or Vice-President. An election protest
before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked these shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for
provisions of Omnibus Election Code – quo warranto shall not include an election protest.
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a "Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate
certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may received the second or third highest number of votes may
be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any contest the election of the President or the Vice-President,
material representation contained therein as required under as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk
Section 74 hereof is false" – of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days
after the proclamation of the winner."
"Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on
Elections. In addition to the powers and functions conferred The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the
upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the
all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-
of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections" President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined
as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes
Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such
authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-
deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate
candidate. who would have received either the second or third highest
number of votes could file an election protest.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 642 in an action Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C.
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G.
Procedure. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R.
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
No. 161824 was aptly elevated to and could well be taken
cognizance of by the Court. A contrary view could be a gross
denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully
informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or Citizenship issue
should be elected to occupy the highest government post in
the land. Aristotle: "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the holding of an office.
Jurisdiction of Court in G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the
161634 constituency of the "State," which he described as being
composed of such persons who would be adequate in
Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. number to achieve a self-sufficient existence.
161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the 18th century: Civil citizenship - which established the rights
jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property,
No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take personal liberty and justice.
on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The
Constitutional provision cited reads: 19th century: Include political citizenship, which
encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge political power.
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may 20th century: Development of social citizenship, which laid
promulgate its rules for the purpose." emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being
and social security.
Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the The Local Setting - from Spanish Times to the Present
Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would reads -
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the
"Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and subjects." In church records, the natives were called 'indios',
denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago.
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this 5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954,
jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out with the Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens.
-
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to
"(a) Persons born in Spanish territory, establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino
citizen?
"(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they
were born outside of Spain, Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo
Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly,
"(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof
of their contents.
"(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become
domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy." The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he
died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San
Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo
Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the
The case of FPJ
Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial
August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no
Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - existing record about such fact in the Records Management
naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis28 – and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to
had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the
could qualify a person to being a "natural-born" citizen of same period. In his death certificate, the residence of
the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the
(1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound
Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of
Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood residence of a person at the time of his death was also his
relationship would now become the primary basis of residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the
citizenship by birth. Records Management and Archives Office would have had
complete records of all residents of the Philippines from
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to 1898 to 1902.
indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ
was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Proof of Paternity and Filiation Under Civil Law
Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth
Petitioner submits that in establishing filiation (relationship
of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his
or civil status of the child to the father [or mother]) or
death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a
paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the
resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the
child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an
time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of
illegitimate son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules
birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was
under civil law must be used.
born on 17 May 1915 to an Español father, Lorenzo Pou, and
a mestiza Español mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the
petitioner was an "uncertified" copy of a supposed certificate Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to
of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took
on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or
Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on paternity. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was
16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative
was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a
Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years record of birth, a will, or a public document. Complementary
old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law
of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 expressing in Section 5 thereof:
to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to
Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and "In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be
married. signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or
only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case,
The only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document
of certainty from the documents would be that: the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the
child, or to give therein any information by which such father
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley; could be identified."
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each
other on 16 September, 1940; prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity,
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the
father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same must be shown by evidence other than such act or
useless as being an authoritative document of recognition. declaration.
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley
parties, nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit
F. Poe found. There being no will apparently executed, or at 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts
least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship
Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition remained with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his
to be "some other public document." children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one
family.
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the
acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an Petitioner’s Argument for Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping
well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a
the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship
child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child.
private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie
any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage
of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent
general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an
provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, illegitimate child. The documentary evidence introduced by
such provisions must be taken in the context of private no less than FPJ himself, consisting of a birth certificate of
relations, the domain of civil law. FPJ and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ
was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against American mother who were married to each other a year
illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents
the Spanish family and property laws. These distinctions would make FPJ an illegitimate child.
between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the
Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived (Jurisprudence about rules governing illegitimate child) xxx
when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking
our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit
should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the
impede or impinge on the domain of political law. illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the
assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining parental authority and had the duty to support her
his citizenship status should thus be deemed independent illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice
from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for or discriminate against him.
civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions
on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not The fact of the matter – perhaps the most significant
have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and consideration – is that the 1935 Constitution, the
family relations. fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of
birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides - is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the
Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines
"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe
pedigree of another person related to him by birth or conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none
marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred provided.
before the controversy, and the relationship between the
two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word `pedigree’ includes relationship,
family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when CONCLUSION:
and the places where these facts occurred, and the names
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review,
of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824,
intimately connected with pedigree."
filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the
the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of
pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA
must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification of
question, (d) declaration must be made before the respondent FPJ from running for the position of President in
controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention that
the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question FPJ has committed material representation in his certificate
of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural
citizen of the Philippines. born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar for voting purposes.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and
prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second
161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in district of Northern Samar was held.
the latter’s capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a
presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the Among the candidates who vied for the position of
Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court representative in the second legislative district of Northern
can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co
are held. and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave
representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it
is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not
The petitioners filed election protests against the private
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
respondent premised on the following grounds:
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan
1. Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the
F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
Philippines; and
affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
2. Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino
Northern Samar.
citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the
Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for
the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old,
the private respondent.
Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870,
when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on
Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in
November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET
1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well
in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo
Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization"
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship
(of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his
ISSUE:
son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen
first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers
RULING:
are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate. Yes. Petitions are dismissed.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's
conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te
the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would established his residence in the municipality of Laoang,
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a
relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial
Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before administration.
the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to
the parties to present their position and evidence, and to The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was
prove whether or not there has been material born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the
vs. COMELEC,48 must not only be material, but also province of Samar.
deliberate and willful.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside
community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values
and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the
CO v. HRET (1991) years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino,
Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got
FACTS:
married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong
aside and reversal of a decision of the House of who was born in 1948.
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens
decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
the vicissitudes of life in Samar. act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the
meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as
in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship
family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been
application for naturalization on February 15, 1954. born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in question was enacted to correct the
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and
Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a
Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and
the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship.
Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred
the status of a natural-born
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of
Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of
was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private the Constitution accords natural born status to children born
respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his elementary of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect
education in the province of Samar. citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing
other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the
local populace were concerned. unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not
only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had
After completing his elementary education, the private
been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9)
respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila
years old. He could not have divined when he came of age
in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended
Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969
passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment electing citizenship in spite of his already having been a
opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked citizen since 1957.In 1969, election through a sworn
for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary
Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine
the hardware business of his family in Manila. years old.
In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a formal and an informal process.
natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the
In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of
Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the
the right of suffrage and the participation in election
unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis
exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared
citizenship
Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born
Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of The private respondent did more than merely exercise his
the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the
amending the article on this subject. Philippines.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a
read: naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the
oath of citizenship.
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
stripping respondent’s father of his citizenship after his
the adoption of the Constitution;
death. An attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the through a direct action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the
Philippines; Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to
respondent’s father as null and void would run against the
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, principle of due process because he has already been laid to
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend
majority; and himself? A dead man cannot speak.
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of
citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our function is to determine
whether or not the HRET committed abuse of authority in On the contrary, the documents presented by the private
the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the respondent traces respondent fall under the exceptions to the best evidence
his natural born citizenship through his mother, not through rule.
the citizenship of his father.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as the originals of the Committee Report No. 12, the minutes
having committed manifest grave abuse of discretion. The of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional Convention
same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been held on November 28, 1972 cannot be found.
decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the
Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the In proving the inability to produce, the law does not require
Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough
brother of the respondent, was declared and accepted as a that it be shown that after a bona fide diligent search, the
natural born citizen by both bodies. same cannot be found.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's Since the execution of the document and the inability to
declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen? produce were adequately established, the contents of the
questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the by the recollection of witnesses.
Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of
April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their children
born subsequent thereto were conferred the status of a
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE:
Filipino citizen.
The petitioners question the residence qualification of
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish
respondent Ong.
subject?
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence"
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who
under the Constitution. The term "residence" has been
were considered Spanish Subjects, viz:
understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards: previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.
1. Persons born in Spanish territory. The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent
owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore,
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though be a resident of said place is misplaced.
they were born out of Spain.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers. the private respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his
parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to
4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired the laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof (as a
domicile in any town in the Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied) co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in
the names of his parents.
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual
residence. This domicile, once established is considered to Even assuming that the private respondent does not own
continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case of De
established. (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not
Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949]) required that a person should have a house in order to
establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he,
should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that
nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines. The fact
of a friend or relative.
that he died in China, during one of his visits in said country,
was of no moment. This will not change the fact that he It has also been settled that absence from residence to
already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a
pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had become a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not
Spanish subject. constitute loss of residence.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that

document presented to prove it were not in compliance with
the best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the BENGSON III v. HRET (2001)
private respondent failed to present the original of the FACTS:
documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the
transcript of the proceedings of the body which the aforesaid The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in
resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was view of the constitutional requirement that “no person shall
predicated. be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen.” Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents.
In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes
an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation
his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing when the court is satisfied that during the intervening
for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has
Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has
his citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or not been convicted of any offense or violation of
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act
country.” prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any
Government announced policies.14
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of
Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however
U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No.
U.S. Marine Corps. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by a former citizen:
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for 1. By naturalization,
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost 2. By repatriation, and
Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting 3. By direct act of Congress.
Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States
(1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those
of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He who lost their citizenship due to:
won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for
1. Desertion of the armed forces;
reelection.
2. Services in the armed forces of the allied forces in
World War II;
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
3. Service in the Armed Forces of the United States at
Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not
any other time,
qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a 4. Marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 5. Political economic necessity
of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo In Angat v. Republic, we held:
warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative
in the said election. xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA
Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire
Petitioner then would file a petition for certiorari assailing Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a
the decisions of the HRET. petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to
ISSUE:
register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his
WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon [Italics in the original.25
his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
RULING: nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
Petition was dismissed. naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring natural-born Filipino.
citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the
natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two
categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those
"are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without born before January 17, 1973,38 of Filipino mothers who,
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine
citezenship."10 citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered
natural-born obviously because they were not Filipino at
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine
become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally
citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the
under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the
effectively of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not
Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former considered natural-born because they also had to perform
Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No.
an act to perfect their Philippines citizenship.
530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he
possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the R.A. No. 2630 provides:
disqualification13 provided by law to become a Filipino
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by travel dates confirmed that Tambunting acquired American
rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2
Forces of the United States, or after separation from the December 2000.
Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place Tambunting’s contentions:
where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said
oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not
citizenship. make any misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy.
To refute Cordora’s claim that Tambunting is not a natural-
The present Constitution, however, now consider those born born Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth
of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 certificate which showed that he was born of a Filipino mother
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon and an American father. Tambunting further denied that he
reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining was naturalized as an American citizen. The certificate of
who re natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a citizenship conferred by the US government after
sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in Tambunting’s father petitioned him through INS Form I-130
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be (Petition for Relative) merely confirmed Tambunting’s
deemed natural-born citizens." citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambunting also took
an oath of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the
Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship
Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.
of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the
aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he
Philippines since birth. Tambunting has imbibed the Filipino
acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears
culture, has spoken the Filipino language, and has been
stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover,
educated in Filipino schools. Tambunting maintained that
or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
proof of his loyalty and devotion to the Philippines was shown
citizenship.
by his service as councilor of Parañaque.
To refute Cordora’s claim that the number of years of

CORDORA v. COMELEC and TAMBUNTING (2009) residency stated in Tambunting’s certificates of candidacy is
FACTS: false because Tambunting lost his residency because of his
In EO Case No. 05-17, Cordora accused Tambunting of an naturalization as an American citizen, Tambunting contended
election offense for violating Section 74 in relation to Section that the residency requirement is not the same as citizenship.
262 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Cordero’s contentions:
ISSUE: Whether Tambunting knowingly made untruthful
Cordora asserted that Tambunting made false assertions in statements in his certificates of candidacy that he was a
the following items: Filipino citizen.
That Annex A [Tambunting’s Certificate of Candidacy for the

2001 elections] and Annex B [Tambunting’s Certificate of RULING:
Candidacy for the 2004 elections] state, among others, as
follows, particularly Nos. 6, 9 and 12 thereof: Tambunting’s Dual Citizenship
1. No. 6 – I am a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen Tambunting claims that because of his parents’ differing
2. No. 9 – No. of years of Residence before May 14, citizenships, he is both Filipino and American by birth. Cordora
2001. insists that Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen.
3. 36 in the Philippines and 25 in the Constituency
where I seek to be elected; Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the
4. No. 12 – I am ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to be circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for
elected. Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire
American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130
Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for only served to confirm the American citizenship which
local public office because Tambunting lacked the required Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the
citizenship and residency requirements. Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained
two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American.
Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of However, the same certification showed nine other trips where
Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting
claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate
on 16 December 2000 and upon departure from the of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that
Philippines on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these
Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from The rulings in Manzano and Valles stated that dual citizenship
running for public office. is different from dual allegiance both by cause and, for those
desiring to run for public office, by effect. Dual citizenship is
In Mercado v. Manzano, dual citizenship is not a ground for involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent
disqualification from running for any elective local position. application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former states. Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the for a person with dual citizenship who seeks public office to
different laws of two or more states, a person is file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For allegiance contained therein. Dual allegiance, on the other
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose hand, is brought about by the individual’s active participation
parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle in the naturalization process. Ruling in AASJS states that,
of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized
jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary citizen of another country is allowed to retain his Filipino
act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of
Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s
of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship: foreign citizenship.
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign Twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and
countries which follow the principle of jus soli; executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship Section 5(3)
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire
fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective public office
are citizens of that country; in the Philippines shall "meet the qualifications for holding
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s such public office as required by the Constitution and existing
country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act laws and, at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy,
or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship. citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath" aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225.
Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen
of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did
given the constitutional provisions on citizenship. not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another
country. Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in apply to him.
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, Tambunting’s residency.
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the
volition. residency requirement because of Tambunting’s naturalization
as an American.
In including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se Cordora’s reasoning fails because Tambunting is not a
but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to naturalized American. Moreover, residency, for the purpose of
their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, election laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of residing
the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in in a fixed place and the intention to return there permanently,
R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to "dual and is not dependent upon citizenship.
allegiance." Persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, Conclusion: Tambunting sufficiently proved his innocence of
who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect the charge filed against him. Tambunting is eligible for the
to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual office which he sought to be elected and fulfilled the citizenship
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their and residency requirements prescribed by law.
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. DE GUZMAN v. COMELEC (2009)
FACTS:
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports,
one belonging to the country of his or her father and one Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent Angelina DG.
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a Dela Cruz were candidates for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva
situation disqualify the person to run for a local government Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections. On April 3, 2007, private
position? respondent filed against petitioner a petition for
disqualification (SPA No. 07-211), alleging that petitioner is
not a citizen of the Philippines, but an immigrant and De Guzman's motion for reconsideration solely on the
resident of the United States of America. ground that the same was rendered moot because he lost to
private respondent.
De Guzman admitted that he was a naturalized American.
However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual 2) Anent the second issue, we find that petitioner is
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), disqualified from running for public office in view of his
otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re- failure to renounce his American citizenship.
Acquisition Act of 2003. He took his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006. He argued R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and
that, having re-acquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born
to exercise full civil and political rights. As such, he is citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason
qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and
2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
Dela Cruz won as vice mayor. De Guzman filed an election effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country.
protest on grounds of irregularities and massive cheating. The law provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired
The case was filed before Branch 31 of the Regional Trial or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath
Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija (Election Protest No. 07-01). of allegiance.
Meanwhile, in SPA No. 07-211, the COMELEC First Division
rendered its June 15, 2007 Resolution disqualifying De De Guzman falls under the first category, being a natural-
Guzman. born citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship upon his
naturalization as an American citizen. In the instant case,
De Guzman filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was there is no question that petitioner re-acquired his Philippine
dismissed by the COMELEC En Banc for having been citizenship after taking the oath of allegiance on September
rendered moot in view of private respondent's victory. 6, 2006.
Thereafter, the trial court in Election Protest No. 07-01
rendered a Decision, dated November 26, 2007, declaring However, it must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes
petitioner as the winner for the Vice-Mayoralty position. an additional requirement on those who wish to seek
elective public office, as follows:
Respondent’s Contentions:
That the passage of R.A. No. 9225 effectively abandoned the Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those
Court's rulings in Frivaldo and Mercado; that the current law who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship under this Act
requires a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
foreign citizenship; and that petitioner, having failed to attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws
renounce his American citizenship, remains a dual citizen of the Philippines and the following conditions:
and is therefore disqualified from running for an elective xxx
public position under Section 40 of RA No. 7160, otherwise (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
ISSUE: time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
1) Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer
dismissing petitioner's motion for reconsideration for being an oath.
moot; and
2) Whether petitioner is disqualified from running for vice- The filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto
mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under
for having failed to renounce his American citizenship in R.A. No. 9225. The rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and
accordance with R.A. No. 9225. Mercado are not applicable to the instant case because R.A.
No. 9225 provides for more requirements.
RULING:
In Japzan vs COMELEC: for a natural born Filipino, who
1) In this case, the pendency of petitioner's election protest reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship under
assailing the results of the election did not render moot the Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must:
motion for reconsideration which he filed assailing his (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
disqualification. Stated otherwise, the issue of petitioner's required by the Constitution and existing laws; and
citizenship did not become moot; the resolution of the issue (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
remained relevant because it could significantly affect the foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to
outcome of the election protest. Philippine citizenship is an administer an oath.
indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. It
bears stressing that the RTC later ruled in favor of De In Jacot vs Dal: The law categorically requires persons
Guzman in the election protest and declared him the winner. seeking elective public office, who either retained their
In view thereof, a definitive ruling on the issue of De Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a
Guzman's citizenship was clearly necessary. Hence, the personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer
an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the

she intends in good faith to become a citizen of the
certificate of candidacy.
Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels or sovereignty, and particularly to China; and that she will
natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens reside continuously in the Philippines from the time of the
of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their filing of her Petition up to the time of her naturalization.
Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking After all the jurisdictional requirements mandated by
elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally Section 97 of CA 473had been complied with, the Office of
execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Motion to Dismiss8 on
foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged
in a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade.
or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
Finding the grounds relied upon by the OSG to be
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said
Motion.9 Thereafter, the hearing for the reception of
The oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Azucena’s evidence was then set on May 18, 2004.10
Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the one
contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not Neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought appeared on the day of the hearing. Hence, Azucena’s
under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to counsel moved that the evidence be presented ex-parte,
emphasize that the said oath of allegiance is a general which the RTC granted. Accordingly, the RTC designated its
requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Clerk of Court as Commissioner to receive Azucena’s
evidence.11 During the November 5, 2004 ex-parte hearing,
Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign
no representative from the OSG appeared despite due
citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have
notice.12
retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic
Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28,
their special circumstance of having more than one 1941 to Chinese parents,13 Azucena has never departed the
citizenship. Philippines since birth. She has resided in Malangas,
Zamboanga del Sur from 1941-1942; in Margosatubig,
Conclusion: De Guzman’s Oath of Allegiance and Certificate Zamboanga del Sur from 1942-1968; in Bogo City for nine
of Candidacy did not comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. months; in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur from 1969-1972; in
9225 which further requires those seeking elective public Talisayan, Misamis Oriental from 1972-1976; and, in
Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur, thereafter, up to the
office in the Philippines to make a personal and sworn
filing of her Petition.
renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to
renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and
disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Chavacano. Her primary, secondary, and tertiary education
Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections. were taken in Philippine schools,i.e., Margosatubig Central
Elementary School in 1955,14 Margosatubig Academy
in1959,15 and the Ateneo de Zamboanga in
1963,16 graduating with a degree in Bachelor of Science in
REPUBLIC v. BATUIGAS (2013)
Education. She then practiced her teaching profession at the
Pax High School for five years, in the Marian Academy in Ipil
FACTS: for two years, and in Talisayan High School in Misamis
Oriental for another two years.
On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for
Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago
Batuigas18 (Santiago), a natural-born Filipino citizen.19 They
Azucena alleged in her Petition that she believes in the have five children, namely Cynthia, Brenda, Aileen, Dennis
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; that she Emmanuel, and Edsel James. All of them studied in
has conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable Philippine public and private schools and are all
manner during the period of her stay in the Philippines, as professionals, three of whom are now working abroad.
well as in her relations with the constituted Government and
with the community in which she is living; that she has After her stint in Talisayan High School, Azucena and her
mingled socially with the Filipinos and has evinced a sincere husband, as conjugal partners, engaged in the retail
desire to learn and embrace their customs, traditions, and business of and later on in milling/distributing rice, corn, and
ideals; that she has all the qualifications required under copra. As proof of their income, Azucena submitted their
Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in joint annual tax returns and balance sheets from 2000-
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (CA473);6 that she 2002and from 2004-2005. The business name and the
is not opposed to organized government nor is affiliated with business permits issued to the spouses’ store, ‘Azucena’s
any association or group of persons that uphold and teach General Merchandising,’ are registered in Santiago’s
doctrines opposing all organized governments; that she is name, and he is also the National Food Authority licensee
not defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of for their rice and corn business.25 During their marital union,
violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success the Batuigas spouses bought parcels of land in Barrio
and predominance of men’s ideas; that she is neither a Lombog, Margosatubig.26
polygamist nor believes in polygamy; that the nation of
which she is a subject is not at war with the Philippines; that
To prove that she has no criminal record, Azucena submitted lucrative business and maintain a decent existence. The
clearances issued by the Philippine National Police of Supreme Court, in recent decisions, adopted a higher
Zamboanga del Sur Provincial Office and by the National standard in determining whether a petitioner for Philippine
Bureau of Investigation.27 She also presented her Health citizenship has a lucrative trade or profession that would
Examination Record28 declaring her as physically and qualify him/her for admission to Philippine citizenship and to
mentally fit. which petitioner has successfully convinced this Court of her
ability to provide for herself and avoid becoming a public
To further support Azucena’s Petition, Santiago and charge or a financial burden to her community.
witnesses Eufemio Miniao and Irineo Alfaro testified.
Thus, the instant Petition wherein the OSG recapitulates the
RTC granted the petition. same arguments it raised before the CA, i.e., the alleged
failure of Azucena to meet the income and public hearing
The OSG then appealed the RTC judgment to the requirements of CA 473.
CA,33 contending that Azucena failed to comply with the
income requirement under CA 473. The OSG maintained
that Azucena is not allowed under the Retail Trade Law
(Republic Act No. 1180) to engage directly or indirectly in ISSUE:
the retail trade. Hence, she cannot possibly meet the income
requirement. And even if she is allowed, her business is not WON Azucena met the income and public hearing
a "lucrative trade" within the contemplation of the law or requirements.
that which has an appreciable margin of income over
expenses in order to provide for adequate support in the
event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work. The
OSG likewise disputed Azucena’s claim that she owns real RULING:
property because aliens are precluded from owning lands in
the country. The Petition lacks merit.
The OSG further asserted that the ex-parte proceeding Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine
before the commissioner is not a "public hearing" as ex- citizenship through either judicial naturalization under CA
parte hearings are usually done in chambers, without the 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No.
public in attendance. It claimed that the State was denied 9139 (the "Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"). A
its day in court because the RTC, during the May 18, 2004 third option, called derivative naturalization, which is
initial hearing, immediately allowed the proceeding to be available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is
conducted ex-parte without even giving the State ample found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:
opportunity to be present.
"any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
Azucena countered that although she is a teacher by citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully
profession, she had to quit to help in the retail business of naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines."
her husband, and they were able to send all their children to
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to
school.34 It is highly unlikely that she will become a public
Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine
charge as she and her spouse have enough savings and
citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that
could even be given sufficient support by their children. She
they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the
contended that the definition of "lucrative trade/income"
time of their marriage nor do they have to submit
should not be strictly applied to her. Being the wife and
themselves to judicial naturalization. Copying from similar
following Filipino tradition, she should not be treated like
laws in the United States which has since been amended,
male applicants for naturalization who are required to have
the Philippine legislature retained Section 15 of CA 473,
their own "lucrative trade."
which then reflects its intent to confer Filipino citizenship to
Azucena denied that the hearing for her Petition was not the alien wife thru derivative naturalization.
made public, as the hearing before the Clerk of Court was
The OSG has filed this instant Petition on the ground that
conducted in the court’s session hall. Besides, the OSG
Azucena does not have the qualification required in no. 4 of
cannot claim that it was denied its day in court as notices
Section 2 of CA 473 as she does not have any lucrative
have always been sent to it. Hence, its failure to attend is
income, and that the proceeding in the lower court was not
not the fault of the RTC.
in the nature of a public hearing. The OSG had the
Ruling of the Court of Appeals opportunity to contest the qualifications of Azucena during
the initial hearing scheduled on May 18, 2004.However, the
In dismissing the OSG’s appeal,35 the CA found that OSG or the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor failed to
Azucena’s financial condition permits her and her family to appear in said hearing, prompting the lower court to order
live with reasonable comfort in accordance with the ex parte presentation of evidence before the Clerk of Court
prevailing standard of living and consistent with the on November 5, 2004. The OSG was also notified of the ex
demands of human dignity. It said: parte proceeding, but despite notice, again failed to appear.
The OSG had raised this same issue at the CA and was
Considering the present high cost of living, which cost of denied for the reasons stated in its Decision. We find no
living tends to increase rather than decrease, and the low reason to disturb the findings of the CA on this issue. Neither
purchasing power of the Philippine currency, petitioner- should this issue further delay the grant of Philippine
appellee, together with her Filipino husband, nonetheless, citizenship to a woman who was born and lived all her life,
was able to send all her children to college, pursue a in the Philippines, and devoted all her life to the care of her
Filipino family. She has more than demonstrated, under and this Court will not stand in the way of making her a part
judicial scrutiny, her being a qualified Philippine citizen. On of a truly Filipino family.
the second issue, we also affirm the findings of the CA that
since the government who has an interest in, and the only
one who can contest, the citizenship of a person, was duly
notified through the OSG and the Provincial Prosecutor’s POE-LLAMANZARES v. COMELEC (2016)
office, the proceedings have complied with the public
FACTS
hearing requirement under CA 473.
No. 4, Section 2 of CA 473 provides as qualification to Petitioner instituted the present petitions for certiorari to
become a Philippine citizen: assail the 2 COMELEC resolutions on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion. The COMELEC cases filed against Mary
4. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less Grace Natividad Poe-Llamanzares were granted and resulted
than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have in the cancellation of her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation. May 9, 2016 presidency. The cases were:
Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually GR. No. 221697 by Estrella Elamparo
exercised her profession before she had to quit her teaching ● Material misinterpretation in her COC as a natural-
job to assume her family duties and take on her role as joint born citizen and resident for 10 years and 11
provider, together with her husband, in order to support her months
family. Together, husband and wife were able to raise all ● Int’l law does not confer natural-born Filipino status
their five children, provided them with education, and have on foundlings; Lost her statues when became
all become professionals and responsible citizens of this naturalized American citizen (natural-born
country. Certainly, this is proof enough of both husband and citizenship must be continued from birth); Failed to
wife’s lucrative trade. Azucena herself is a professional and reestablish her domicile
can resume teaching at anytime. Her profession never
leaves her, and this is more than sufficient guarantee that GR. No. 221698 by Fransisco S. Tatad, Antonio P. Contreras,
she will not be a charge to the only country she has known and Amado D. Valdez (3 separate petitions).
since birth. Tatad
● Disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective Rules of Procedure alleging that petitioner lacks the
of extending the citizenship privilege to an alien wife is to requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for
maintain a unity of allegiance among family members, thus: the Presidency; foundlings were not expressly
included in the categories of citizens in the 1935
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to
of family unity and identity that a husband should be a exclude them; the burden lies on petitioner to
citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment prove that she is a natural-born citizen;
of one should be different from that of the other. Thus, it international conventions and treaties are not self-
cannot be that the husband’s interests in property and executory and that local legislations are necessary
business activities reserved by law to citizens should not in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed
form part of the conjugal partnership and be denied to the by the Philippines; no standard state practice that
wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own efforts automatically confers natural-born status to
but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests. foundlings
Only in rare instances should the identity of husband and ● Believes the PH adheres to the principle of jus
wife be refused recognition, and we submit that in respect sanguinis (blood relationship is determinative of
of our citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances the natural-born status)
where the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in ● Petitioner not comply with the 10 year residency;
Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law.43 lack of intention to leave US
Contreras
We are not unmindful of precedents to the effect that there
● Not possess 10 year residency; made false entry in
is no proceeding authorized by the law or by the Rules of
her COC
Court, for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an
● Petitioner's physical presence in the country before
individual.44 "Such judicial declaration of citizenship cannot
that date could not be valid evidence of
even be decreed pursuant to an alternative prayer therefor
reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she
in a naturalization proceeding."45
was then living here as an American citizen, she
This case however is not a Petition for judicial declaration of was governed by the PH immigration laws.
Philippine citizenship but rather a Petition for judicial Valdez
naturalization under CA 473. In the first, the petitioner ● Repatriation (return to own country) did not bestow
believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare or her status as natural born citizen; Own admission
confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In the second, the in her COC for senator as resident of 6 years and 6
petitioner acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks judicial months
approval to acquire the privilege of becoming a Philippine
citizen based on requirements required under CA Who is Grace Poe?
473.Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial
scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that privilege, Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was
found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church
of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar on September 3,
1968. Edgardo turned over custody over the infant to his
relatives, Emiliano Militar and his wife. On September 6, 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
1968, Emiliano registered petitioner as a foundling with the 2003. In its July 18, 2006 Order, the Bureau of Immigration
Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo ). (BI) declared that petitioner is deemed to have reacquired
her Philippine citizenship. She thereafter secured a
When petitioner was five years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Philippine passport.
Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora On October 6, 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III
Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption in appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and
the MTC. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). Before
petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of
"Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America
Natividad Sonora Poe." However, it was only on May 4, 2006 and Renunciation of American Citizenship". From then on,
that the OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the petitioner stopped using her American passport.
the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.
On December 9, 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to
Although petitioner initially enrolled in the University of the petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United
Philippines, she opted to continue her studies abroad and States" effective October 21, 2010.
left for the United States of America in 1988. Petitioner
graduated in 1991 from Boston College where she earned On October 2, 2012, petitioner filed with the COMELEC her
her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies. Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013
Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to
On July 27, 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Llamanzares, the question "Period of residence in the Philippines before
a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., in San Juan May 13, 2013." Having obtained the highest number of
City. Desirous of being with her husband who was then votes, she was proclaimed Senator on May 16, 2013.
based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days
after the wedding ceremony or on July 29, 1991. On October 15, 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the
Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In her COC, the
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to a son in April petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that
1992. Two daughters followed in July 1998 and June 2004, her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May
both born in the Philippines. 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
counted from May 24, 2005. This triggered the filing of
On October 18, 2001, petitioner became a naturalized several petitions in the Comelec against her.
American citizen. She obtained a U.S. Passport in December
2001. ISSUES
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion in the
On April 8, 2004, petitioner came back to the Philippines to previous resolutions of the COMELEC?
support her father's candidacy for President in the May 2004
elections. She returned to the U.S. on July 8, 2004. RULING
On December 13, 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Yes, there was a grave abuse of discretion in the
Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating resolutions of COMELEC. It is the fact of residence, not a
medical condition. Her father slipped into a coma and statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be
eventually expired. The petitioner returned to the US on decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
February 3, 2005 satisfied the constitutions residency qualification
requirement." The COMELEC ought to have looked at the
Petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside evidence presented and seen if the petitioner was telling the
permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had
of 2005. The couple began preparing for their resettlement the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that the
including notification of their children's schools that they will 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated the
be transferring to Philippine schools for the next semester; pertinent period of residency.
coordination with property movers for the relocation of their
household goods to the Philippines. As early as 2004, 1. COMELEC cannot decide the qualification or
petitioner already quit her job in the U.S. lack of the candidate.
Petitioner came home to the Philippines on May 24, 2005. The COMELEC does not have authority to determine the
Her three children immediately followed while her husband qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must
was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an
as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there. In authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior
the second half of 2005, she and her husband purchased a determination of qualification may be by statute, by
condominium unit at One Wilson Place Condominium in San executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or
Juan City. tribunal.
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a lot in
Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where they built their family If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding
home and continue to reside up to the present. Her children that he or she is suffering from a disqualification "provided
of school age also began attending Philippine private by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of
schools. candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of
false representations regarding his or her qualifications,
On July 7, 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not
the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act No. qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure
by which the falsity of the representation can be found. The (3) The process is certainly not analogous to
only exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine
of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one
confessions. Such are bases equivalent to prior decisions born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the
against which the falsity of representation can be 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
determined.
Foundlings under International Law
2. Blood relationship of Filipino parents was (a) UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR (binding as treaties)
undemonstrable but it could be derived from Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.
the circumstantial evidence. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
The Solicitor General offered official statistics that from 1965 transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
to 1975 which shows that the statistical probability that any requires that an international law be transformed into a
child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as
Filipino is 99.83 %. Petitioner also presented census local legislation. On the other hand, generally accepted
statistics for Iloilo Province showing that 99.62 % of the principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation
population were Filipinos. clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land
even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of
petitioner's parents are the fact that she was abandoned as The Philippines is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of
an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also Human Rights ("UDHR"). The Philippines has also ratified the
has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). In 1986,
straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face. the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
3. To deny full Filipino citizenship to all
foundlings and render them stateless is The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to
discriminatory. Domestic laws on adoption obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and
also support the principle that foundlings are ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality
Filipinos. must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished
by the application of our present naturalization laws,
Foundlings as PH citizens Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No.
The Court finds no intent or language permitting 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least
discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all three eighteen ( 18) years old.
Constitutions (1935, 1973, 1987) guarantee the basic right
to equal protection of the laws. (b) 1930 Hague Convention and 1961 UN Convention
on the Reduction of Statelessness (binding as
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that generally accepted principles of international law) →
foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague
adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is
adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. rational and reasonable and consistent with the }us
Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of
will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the
Domestic adoption laws, i.e. R.A. No. 8043[Inter-Country presumption that their parents are nationals of the
Adoption] and R.A. No. 8552 [Domestic Adoption], all Philippines.
expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include foundlings
as among Filipino children who may be adopted. Generally accepted principles of international law include
international custom as evidence of a general practice
Foundlings enjoy natural-born status accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by
Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those civilized nations. International customary rules are accepted
who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having as binding as a result from the combination of two elements:
to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine (a) the established, widespread, and consistent practice on
citizenship." the part of States; and (b) a psychological element known
as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
It has been argued that the process to determine that the necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the
child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence
certificate are “acts to acquire or perfect Philippine of a rule of law requiring it.
citizenship” which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino
at best. This is erroneous: The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified
by the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of
(1) "Having to perform an act" means that the act international law. (1) The first is Article 14 of the 1930
must be personally done by the citizen. In this Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the
instance, the determination of foundling status is done Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is
not by the child but by the authorities. presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth"
(2) The second is Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations
(2) The object of the process is the determination of Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness under which
the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country
the child. where he is found.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague

Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal place of residence and establishing a new one and definite
Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) of which acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words,
effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. there must basically be animus manendi coupled with
Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time;
15(1) of the UDHR. the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
(c) It is a generally accepted principle of international actual.
law to presume foundlings as having been born of
nationals of the country in which the foundling is The evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken
found together leads to no other conclusion that she decided to
permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house,
Petitioner's evidence shows that at least 60 countries have taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from
passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizens, and the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the
42 of those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. It was abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess
also pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from
(or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens. These U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and
circumstances, including the practice of jus sanguinis permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually re-
countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of established her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing
international law to presume foundlings as having been born T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying
of nationals of the country in which the foundling is found. property here, constructing a residence here, returning to
the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual
to this generally accepted principle of international law. In application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her
particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the
Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In years, it is clear that when the petitioner returned on 24 May
all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who 2005 it was for good.
could be adopted.
DAVID v. SET (2016)

4. The evidence presented by the petitioner to FACTS
prove her 10 year residence is convincing that
there is intention to stay in the PH.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) promulgated its
Decision finding Senator Poe to be a natural-born citizen
In answer to the requested information of "Period of
and, therefore, qualified to hold office as Senator. Motion for
Residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 9,
2016," petitioner put in "10 years 11 months" which reconsideration was denied. Hence, David filed the present
according to her pleadings corresponds to a beginning date Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S.
Who is Rizalito Y. David (Petitioner)?
(a) Repatriation - Grace Poe’s Recovery of her original David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections,
nationality filed before the SET a Petition for Quo Warranto.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost Who is Senator Poe?
his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a Senator Poe is a foundling whose biological parents are
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at the Parish
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine Church of Jaro, Iloilo. Edgardo Militar found her outside the
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a church and turned her over to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar.
natural-born Filipino. (see Bengson Ill v. HRET). Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar that the infant was found on September 6, 1968.
COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be The Local Civil Registrar issued a Certificate of Live
continuous was already rejected in Bengson Ill v. HRET Birth/Foundling Certificate.
where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the
time of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a In 1974, the Court granted the Petition for Adoption of
citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (aka Fernando
thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (aka Susan Roces). The
perfect" one's citizenship. Decision ordered the change in name from Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
(b) Grace Poe re-established her residency in the Poe.
Philippines as early as May 24, 2005
There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: In 1986, Senator Poe became a registered voter in
(a) residence or bodily presence in a new locality Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila when she turned 18
(b) an intention to remain there years old. In 1988, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
(c) an intention to abandon the old domicile issued her a Philippine passport. She went to the United
States in 1988 to obtain her college degree. She married reading of the Constitution, one that proceeds from an intent
Teodoro Llamanzares, both an American and Filipino to give life to all the aspirations of all its provisions.
national since birth, in San Juan, Manila.
The SET was confronted with a novel legal question: the
In 1991, Senator Poe returned to the United States and she citizenship status of children whose biological parents are
lived with her husband and children. Senator Poe was unknown, considering that the Constitution, in Article IV,
naturalized and granted American citizenship on October 18, Section 1(2) explicitly makes reference to one's father or
2001. She was subsequently given a United States passport. mother. Acting within this void, the SET was only asked to
make a reasonable interpretation of the law while heedfully
Her father, Fernando Poe, Jr., ran for President in the 2004 considering the established personal circumstances of the
elections but lost. He eventually slipped into a coma and private respondent. It arrived at conclusions in a manner in
passed away. Senator Poe resigned from work in the United keeping with the degree of proof required in proceedings
States and decided to return to the Philippines in 2005. On before a quasi-judicial body: not absolute certainty, not
July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to the proof beyond reasonable doubt or preponderance of
Republic of the Philippines. She also filed a Petition for evidence, but "substantial evidence, or that amount of
Retention and/or Re-acquisition of Philippine Citizenship relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
through Republic Act No. 9225 which was granted by the adequate to justify a conclusion.“
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.
However, between 2006 and 2009, Senator Poe made Written in the constitution are:
several trips to the United States using her US Passport. She
used her US passport "after having taken her Oath of a. Electoral Tribunal as the sole judge of election
Allegiance to the Republic on 07 July 2006, but not after she contests relating to the election, returns, and
has formally renounced her American citizenship on 20 qualifications of the elective officials falling
October 2010." within the scope of their powers.
In 2010, President Aquino appointed Senator Poe as The Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET), along with the House
Chairperson of the MTRCB. On October 20, 2010, Senator of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), is a creation
Poe executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to of Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue
the United States of America and Renunciation of American of such provision, the Constitution segregates from all other
Citizenship. judicial and quasi-judicial bodies (particularly, courts and
the Commission on Elections) the power to rule on contests
When Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
Elections, she won and was declared as Senator-elect on members of the Senate (as well as of the House of
May 16, 2013. David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Representatives). These powers are granted to a separate
Senatorial Elections, filed before the SET a Petition for Quo and distinct constitutional organ.
Warranto.
The 1935 Constitution similarly created an Electoral
Commission, independent from the National Assembly. The
MAIN ISSUE: 1973 Constitution did away with these electoral tribunals,
1. Whether or not the Senate Electoral Tribunal but they have since been restored by the 1987 Constitution.
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing The electoral tribunal shall be the "sole" judge. Exclusive,
petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto based on its original jurisdiction over contests relating to the election,
finding that private respondent is a natural-born returns, and qualifications of the elective officials falling
Filipino citizen, qualified to hold a seat as Senator within the scope of their powers is, thus, vested in these
under Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution. electoral tribunals. It is only before them that post-election
challenges against the election, returns, and qualifications
OTHER ISSUE: of Senators and Representatives (as well as of the President
and the Vice-President, in the case of the Presidential
1. How did the court decide on “Senator Poe is a Electoral Tribunal) may be initiated.
natural born-citizen”?
2. Who has the burden of proof in quo warranto b. Judgments of electoral tribunals are not
proceedings? beyond the scope of judicial review
3. When did Grace Poe reacquired her natural-born
Fililpino citizenship? The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope
4. Is Senator Grace Poe eligible to run for public of any review. Article VI, Section 17's stipulation of electoral
office? tribunals' being the "sole" judge must be read in harmony
with Article VIII, Section l's express statement that "judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice ... to
RULING determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
1. No, SET did not act with grave abuse of discretion. part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Judicial review is, therefore, still possible.
We find no basis for concluding that the SET acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion In Robles vs. HRET, the Court has explained that while the
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The SET's judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference,
conclusions are in keeping with a faithful and exhaustive the Court may do so, however, but only "in the exercise of
this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, ... upon
a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution evidence. Although the Revised Rules on Evidence's sole
was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with mention of circumstantial evidence is in reference to criminal
grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing [Morrero vs. proceedings, this Court has nevertheless sustained the use
Bocar], upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and of circumstantial evidence in other proceedings.
improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes
a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of Senator Poe was found as a newborn infant outside the
a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on September 3, 1968. In 1968,
grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for Iloilo, as did most-if not all-Philippine provinces, had a
such abuse.“ predominantly Filipino population. Senator Poe is described
as having "brown almond shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge,
This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate straight black hair and an oval-shaped face." She stands at
Electoral Tribunals not in the exercise of its appellate 5 feet and 2 inches tall. These circumstances are substantial
jurisdiction. Our review is limited to a determination of evidence justifying an inference that her biological parents
whether there has been an error in jurisdiction, not were Filipino. Her abandonment at a Catholic Church is more
an error in judgment. or less consistent with how a Filipino who, in 1968, lived in
a predominantly religious and Catholic environment, would
2. The court decided on the Natural Born Citizenship have behaved.
of Grace Poe through considering the definition
written in the Constitution and circumstantial Further, in 1968, there was no international airport in Jaro,
evidence that proved her parentage. Iloilo. The absence of an international airport in Jaro, Iloilo
precludes the possibility of a foreigner mother, along with a
a. Grace Poe is a natural born-citizen because foreigner father, swiftly and surreptitiously coming in and
she never had to do anything to consummate out of Jaro, Iloilo just to give birth and leave her offspring
this status. By definition, she is a natural there. Though proof of ethnicity is unnecessary, her physical
born-citizen. Though subsequently naturalized, features nonetheless attest to it.
she reacquired her natural-born status upon
satisfying the requirement of Republic Act No. The Solicitor General underscored how it is statistically more
9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office as probable that Senator Poe was born a Filipino citizen rather
Senator of the Republic. than as a foreigner. Out of the 900,165 recorded births in
the Philippines in 1968, only 1,595 or 0.18% newborns were
Accordingly, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino foreigners. This translates to roughly 99.8% probability that
citizens: natural born and naturalized. A natural-born citizen Senator Poe was born a Filipino citizen.
is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is a citizen of
the Philippines "from birth without having to perform any act 3. Burden of proof in quo warranto proceedings falls
to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship." By necessary on the petitioner to show that respondent is ineligible
implication, a naturalized citizen is one who is not natural- for the office.
born.
In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof
Petitioner's restrictive reliance on Section 1 and the need to necessarily falls on the party who brings the action and who
establish bloodline is- misplaced. Between Article IV, Section alleges that the respondent is ineligible for the office
1(2), which petitioner harps on, and Section 2, it is Section involved in the controversy. In proceedings before quasi-
2 that is on point. To determine whether Senator Poe is a judicial bodies such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the
natural-born citizen, we must look into whether she had to requisite quantum of proof is substantial evidence. This
do anything to perfect her citizenship. In view of Bengson, burden was petitioner's discharge. Once the petitioner
this calls for an inquiry into whether she underwent the makes a prima facie case, the burden of evidence shifts to
naturalization process to become a Filipino. She did not. the respondent.
Section 1(2) stipulates that to be a citizen, either one's Petitioner's claim that the burden of evidence shifted to
father or one's mother must be a Filipino citizen. Section private respondent upon a mere showing that she is a
1(2) does not require one's parents to be natural-born foundling is a serious error. Petitioner invites this Court to
Filipino citizens. It does not even require them to conform establish a jurisprudential presumption that all newborns
to traditional conceptions of what is indigenously or who have been abandoned in rural areas in the Philippines
ethnically Filipino. One or both parents can, therefore, be are not Filipinos. His emphasis on private respondent's
ethnically foreign. There is no need, as petitioner insists, for supposed burden to prove the circumstances of her birth
a pure Filipino bloodline. places upon her an impossible condition.
b. Circumstantial evidence to prove parentage Private respondent's admitted status as a foundling does not
establish a prima facie case in favor of petitioner. While it
Proving Senator Poe's biological parentage is now practically does establish that the identities of private respondent's
impossible. To begin with, she was abandoned as a newborn biological parents are not known, it does not automatically
infant. She was abandoned almost half a century ago. Even mean that neither her father nor her mother is a Filipino.
the identification of individuals against whom DNA evidence The most that petitioner had in his favor was doubt. A taint
may be tested is improbable, and by sheer economic cost, of doubt, however, is by no means substantial evidence
prohibitive. establishing a prima facie case and shifting the burden of
evidence to private respondents.
However, our evidentiary rules admit of alternative means
for Senator Poe to establish her parentage. In lieu of direct Further, as discussed above, the Constitution sustains a
evidence, facts may be proven through circumstantial presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are
born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother Election of Philippine Citizenship
and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof
otherwise. Under Article IV, Section 1 (2 ), any such
countervailing proof must show that both-not just one-of a UNDER THE 1935 CONSTITUTION
foundling's biological parents are not Filipino citizens.
Sec. 1(4) was supplemented by Commonwealth Act
No. 625 which prescribes the procedure for making the
election.
4. Senator Poe re-acquired natural-born Filipino
citizenship when she complied with the requisites of For a child to benefit from the 1935 Constitution, it is
RA 9225. sufficient that the mother be a Filipino citizen, either by
birth or by naturalization, at the time of her
Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was in effect when marriage.
Senator Poe was naturalized an American citizen on October
18, 2001, provided in Section 1(1) that "[a] Filipino citizen Assuming that the mother lost her Philippine
may lose his citizenship ... by naturalization in a foreign citizenship by marriage but subsequently reacquired it
country." Thus, she lost her Philippine citizenship when she during the minority of the child, it is still necessary for
was naturalized as an American citizen. However, on July 7, the child to make the election if he wishes to become
2006, she took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the a Filipino citizen.
Philippines under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225. Three
(3) days later, July 10, 2006, she filed before the Bureau of Under Sec. 1 of CA 625 (enacted on June 7, 1941), it
Immigration and Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition of provides that the election must be expressed in a
her Philippine citizenship. statement sworn before any officer authorized to
administer oaths and filed with the nearest civil
This reacquisition works to restore natural-born status as registry and accompanied by an oath of allegiance to
though it was never lost at all. the Philippine Constitution.
Note: Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory

5. Yes, Senator Poe has complied with all of the requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to
requirements under RA 9225. legitimate children [Republic v. Chule Y. Lim, January
13, 2004]
Natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere
and wish to run for elective public office must comply with
all of the following requirements: Register as an Alien
(1) Taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This No election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted
affects the retention or reacquisition of one's status as a for registration under C.A No. 625 unless the party
natural-born Filipino. This also enables the enjoyment of full exercising the right of election has complied with the
civil and political rights, subject to all attendant liabilities requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In
and responsibilities under existing laws, provided the other words, he should first be required to register
solemnities recited in Section 5 of RA 9225 are satisfied. as an alien. [Republic v. Sagun, February 15,
2012]
On July 7, 2006, she took the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Pertinently, the person electing Philippine citizenship
is required to file a petition with the [Bureau of
(2) Compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Immigration] for the cancellation of his alien
Constitution, RA 9189, otherwise known as the Overseas certificate of registration based on his aforesaid
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing laws. This election of Philippine citizenship and said Office will
is to facilitate the exercise of the right of suffrage; that is, initially decide, based on the evidence presented the
to allow for voting in elections. validity or invalidity of said election
On August 31, 2006, she became a registered voter of Afterwards, the same is elevated to the [Department
Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan. of Justice] for the final determination and review.
[Republic v. Sagun]
(3) Making a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath. This, along with satisfying INFORMAL ELECTION:
the other qualification requirements under relevant laws,
makes one eligible for elective public office Before June 1, 1947, there was no fixed procedure
for election. For purposes of proof of election before
On October 20, 2010, she executed an Affidavit of such date, the Court has accepted such acts as
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America participating in elections and campaigning for a
and Renunciation of American Citizenship. candidate as an adequate form of election.
The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to

mean that the election should be made generally
within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. In Dy Cuenco v. Secretary of Justice, the
Supreme Court cited with approval the ruling of the c. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued
Secretary of Justice to the effect that three years is by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that Ching was
the reasonable period within which the child elected as a member of the Sangguniang
must make the election. After such period, the right Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992
is lost. synchronized elections.
However, justifiable circumstances, such as when COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 625 “An Act Providing for the
the person concerned has always considered himself Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship
as a Filipino citizen, may justify the extension of the shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino
three-year period. Citizen.”
UNDER THE 1973 CONSTITUTION ISSUE

1. Whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within
Section 2 allowed the Filipina who marries an alien to a "reasonable time”.
retain her original citizenship and which by Section 1(2)
allowed the child to follow the citizenship of his Filipino RULING
mother, a child born under the 1973 Constitution of a 1. We hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine
Filipino mother would not have to make the election in citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that
order to acquire Philippine Citizenship. lapsed from the time he reached the age of
majority until he finally expressed his intention to
However, this provision is not retroactive. It does not apply elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond
for legitimate children born of Filipino mothers under the the contemplation of the requirement of electing
1935 Constitution, who by reason of minority had not yet "upon reaching the age of majority."
exercised their option when the 1973 Constitution took
effect. SIDE NOTES:
Likewise, there can be no right to elect Philippine

One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only
citizenship for children born under the 1973 Constitution
an inchoate right to such citizenship.
whose Filipino mothers have lost their original citizenship
by marriage under the 1935 Constitution or who after
marriage to an alien under the 1973 Constitution lost their Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the
Philippine citizenship by voluntary act or omission. citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and
an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless,
upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship. (APPLIED FOR CHING)
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE

The 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election
PHILIPPINE BAR v. VICENTE D. CHING (1999)
of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having
FACTS
a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of
• Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the
citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution.
spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and
Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in
Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. For 1935 Constitution the age of majority then commenced
Since his birth, Ching has resided in the upon reaching twenty-one (21) years.
Philippines.
• completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Pronouncements of the Department of State of the United
Louis University in Baguio City, Ching passed the States Government to the effect that the election should be
BAR. made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of
• Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has been
already thirty-five (35) years old when he interpreted to mean that the election should be made within
complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 three (3) years from reaching the age of majority
on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years
after he had reached the age of majority.
Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, (3 YEAR PERIOD FLEXIBLE)
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY CHING for proof of (extended to 7 Years)
citizenship:
PERIOD MAY BE EXTENDED FOR THIS REASON: when the
a. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.
Board of Accountancy of the Professional (Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice)
Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a
certified public accountant;
b. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in
Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the election exercises constitute a positive act of election of
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Philippine citizenship (In Re: Florencio Mallare)
Union showing that Ching is a registered voter
of the said place; and The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a
requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For
those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there surname which she has been using ever since
are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. she can remember.
Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public
office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during
2.1 In this case, the Republic has not shown that
election time, running for public office, and other categorical
the Yu family in China would probably be
acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations
prejudiced or be the object of future mischief.
for these persons. (In Re: Florencio Mallare)
In respondent’s case, the change in the surname
that she has been using for 40 years would even
avoid confusion to her community in general.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIM (2004)
FACTS
SIDE NOTES:
• Chule Y. Lim was born on October 29, 1954 in
Buru-an, Iligan City. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in
• Her father and mother never got married. election exercises constitute a positive act of election of
• She seeks to correct both her Kauswagan and Philippine citizenship.
Iligan City records of birth have four erroneous
entries Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the
o surname "Yu" was misspelled as "Yo". procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
o her father’s name in her birth record was registry.
written as "Yo Diu To (Co Tian)" when it
should have been "Yu Dio To (Co Tian).
o nationality was entered as Chinese when • Proceedings under said rule may either be
it should have been Filipino summary or adversary in nature. If the correction
o she was a legitimate child sought to be made in the civil register is clerical,
• She has been using "Yu" in all her school records then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If
and in her marriage certificate. the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship
• Placida Anto, respondent’s mother, testified or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial,
that she is a Filipino citizen as her parents were and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
both Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she
and her daughter’s father were never married An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one
because the latter had a prior subsisting where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all
marriage contracted in China. relevant facts have been fully and properly developed,
• No record of marriage between Placida Anto where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the present. demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence
• She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental has been thoroughly weighed and considered
when she was 18 years old.
We take it that the Republic’s failure to cite this

ISSUES error(respondent’s recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court to effect what indisputably are substantial corrections
1. Whether Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 and changes in entries in the civil register. ) amounts to a
Constitution and Section 1 of Commonwealth recognition that this case properly falls under Rule
Act No. 625 applies to this case 108 of the Revised Rules of Court considering that the
2. Whether respondent is allowed to use father’s proceeding can be appropriately classified as adversarial.
surname despite being illegitimate
MA v. FERNANDEZ (2010)
RULING
FACTS:
1. These do not apply in the case of respondent
who was concededly an illegitimate child,
considering that her Chinese father and Filipino Balgamelo Cabiling Ma (Balgamelo), Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr.
mother were never married. As such, she was not (Felix, Jr.), Valeriano Cabiling Ma (Valeriano), Lechi Ann Ma
required to comply with said constitutional and (Lechi Ann), Arceli Ma (Arceli), Nicolas Ma (Nicolas), and
statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. Isidro Ma (Isidro) are the children of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, a
By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina.
mother, respondent automatically became a
Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Petitioners Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born
Filipino since birth without having to elect
under aegis of the 1935 Philippine Constitution in the years
Filipino citizenship when she reached the age
1948, 1951, and 1957, respectively
of majority.
2. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to
use her father’s surname. What it did allow was All raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country
the correction of her father’s misspelled for almost sixty (60) years; they spent their whole lives,
studied and received their primary and secondary education
in the country; they do not speak nor understand the
Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan, and do not The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a
know any relative of their father; they have not even century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the
traveled abroad; and they have already raised their Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of
respective families in the Philippines. the election of Philippine citizenship.
Their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of The failure to register the election in the civil registry should
Immigration their Alien Certificates of Registration not defeat the election and resultingly negate the permanent
fact that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking
Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they requirements may still be complied with subject to the
claimed Philippine citizenship in accordance with Section imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any.
1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution. The documents they submitted supporting their allegations
that they have already registered with the civil registry,
On 15 August 1969, Felix, Jr. executed his affidavit of although belatedly, should be examined for validation
election of Philippine citizenship and took his oath of purposes by the appropriate agency, in this case, the Bureau
allegiance before then Judge Jose L. Gonzalez, Municipal of Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the
Judge, Surigao, Surigao del Norte. On 14 January 1972, administrative orders and other issuances of the Bureau of
Balgamelo did the same before Atty. Patrocinio C. Filoteo, Immigration and the Department of Justice shall be
Notary Public, Surigao City, Surigao del Norte. In 1978, complied with within a reasonable time.
Valeriano took his oath of allegiance before then Judge
Salvador C. Sering, City Court of Surigao City, the fact of The reason behind the modification of the 1935 rule on
which the latter attested to in his Affidavit of 7 March 2005 citizenship was a recognition of the fact that it reflected a
certain male chauvinism, and it was for the purpose of
Petitioners, failed to have the necessary documents remedying that this proposed provision was put in. The idea
registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of was that we should not penalize the mother of a child simply
Commonwealth Act No. 625. because she fell in love with a foreigner
On 27 July 2005 or more than thirty (30) years after they Petitioners are given ninety (90) days from notice within
elected Philippine citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. which to COMPLY with the requirements of the Bureau of
have the necessary documents registered in the civil Immigration embodied in its Judgment of 2 February 2005.
registry. On the other hand, there is no showing that
Valeriano complied with the registration requirement. OTHER ISSUE:
All of them are registered voters of Barangay Washington, Whether the ACR presented by the petitioners are no longer
Precinct No. 0015A since June 1997. (Certifications issued valid on account of the new requirement to present an E-
by Office of the City Election Officer) series ACR.
Petitioners should not be expected to secure E-series ACR

because it would be inconsistent with the election of
MAIN ISSUE: citizenship and its constructive registration through their
acts made public, among others, their exercise of suffrage,
election as public official, and continued and uninterrupted
1. Whether the Petitioners lost the right to elect
stay in the Philippines since birth. The failure to register as
Philippine Citizenship.
aliens is, obviously, consistent with petitioners’ election of
Philippine citizenship.
We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the
right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and
they should be allowed to complete the statutory
requirements for such election. REPUBLIC v. SAGUN (2012)
FACTS:
What purpose is registration?
Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a
Registration refers to any entry made in the books of the Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She
registry, including both registration in its ordinary and strict was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect
sense, and cancellation, annotation, and even the marginal Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In
notes. In strict acceptation, it pertains to the entry made in 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex
the registry which records solemnly and permanently the Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance4 to the Republic
right of ownership and other real rights. For the purpose of of the Philippines. Said document was notarized by Atty.
notification. The confirmation of the existence of a fact. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not recorded
Registration is the confirmation of election as such election. and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
(In the case)
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine citizenship. Additionally, her oath of allegiance
Philippine passport. Her application was denied due to the which was not registered with the nearest local civil registry
citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on was executed when she was already 33 years old or 12 years
her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine after she reached the age of majority. Accordingly, it was
citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration made beyond the period allowed by law.
of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the
Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate In her Comment, respondent avers that notwithstanding her
the same on her birth certificate. failure to formally elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority, she has in fact effectively elected Filipino
In her petition, respondent averred that she was raised as a citizenship by her performance of positive acts, among
Filipino, speaks Ilocano and Tagalog fluently and attended which is the exercise of the right of suffrage. She claims that
local schools in Baguio City, including Holy Family Academy she had voted and participated in all local and national
and the Saint Louis University. Respondent claimed that elections from the time she was of legal age. She also insists
despite her part-Chinese ancestry, she always thought of that she is a Filipino citizen despite the fact that her
herself as a Filipino. She is a registered voter of Precinct No. "election" of Philippine citizenship was delayed and
0419A of Barangay Manuel A. Roxas in Baguio City and had unregistered.
voted in local and national elections as shown in the Voter
Certification5 issued by Atty. Maribelle Uminga of the In reply, petitioner argues that the special circumstances
Commission on Elections of Baguio City. invoked by respondent, like her continuous and
She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, her having been
effectively elected Philippine citizenship and such fact should educated in schools in the country, her choice of staying
be annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle her to here despite the naturalization of her parents as American
the issuance of a Philippine passport. citizens, and her being a registered voter, cannot confer on
her Philippine citizenship as the law specifically provides the
On August 7, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
entered its appearance as counsel for the Republic of the election.
Philippines and authorized the City Prosecutor of Baguio City
to appear in the above mentioned case.6 However, no MAIN ISSUE:
comment was filed by the City Prosecutor.
(1) Whether respondent’s petition for declaration of
After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered the election of Philippine citizenship is sanctioned by the
assailed Decision on April 3, 2009 granting the petition and Rules of Court and jurisprudence;
declaring respondent a Filipino citizen.
The petition is meritorious.
Contending that the lower court erred in so ruling,
petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed the instant This Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding
recourse via a petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner established by law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration
argues that respondent’s petition before the RTC was of the citizenship of an individual. There is no specific
improper on two counts: for one, law and jurisprudence legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding
clearly contemplate no judicial action or proceeding for the to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. This
declaration of Philippine citizenship; and for another, the was our ruling in Yung Uan Chu v. Republic citing the early
pleaded registration of the oath of allegiance with the local case of Tan v. Republic of the Philippines, where we clearly
civil registry and its annotation on respondent’s birth stated:
certificate are the ministerial duties of the registrar; hence,
they require no court order. Petitioner asserts that Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the
respondent’s petition before the trial court seeking a judicial judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts
declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies,
undeniably entails a determination and consequent which imply a given right, legally demandable and
declaration of her status as a Filipino citizen which is not enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a
allowed under our legal system. Petitioner also argues that remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of
if respondent’s intention in filing the petition is ultimately to right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of
have her oath of allegiance registered with the local civil the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and
registry and annotated on her birth certificate, then she does make a pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise,
not have to resort to court proceedings. such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. x x x
Petitioner further argues that even assuming that Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific
respondent’s action is sanctioned, the trial court erred in declaration of respondent’s Filipino citizenship as such
finding respondent as having duly elected Philippine pronouncement was not within the court’s competence.
citizenship since her purported election was not in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and was As to the propriety of respondent’s petition seeking a judicial
not made within a "reasonable time." Petitioner points out declaration of election of Philippine citizenship, it is
that while respondent executed an oath of allegiance before imperative that we determine whether respondent is
a notary public, there was no affidavit of her election of required under the law to make an election and if so,
whether she has complied with the procedural requirements the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
in the election of Philippine citizenship. Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing
governing charter was the 1935 Constitution, which declares Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under
as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the
upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil
1935 Constitution reads: registry.
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxxx Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be
accepted for registration under C.A. No. 625 unless the party
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, exercising the right of election has complied with the
upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In other
citizenship. words, he should first be required to register as an alien.
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the Pertinently, the person electing Philippine citizenship is
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and required to file a petition with the Commission of
an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration)
upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration
Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship based on his aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship and
was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided said Office will initially decide, based on the evidence
that "[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the presented the validity or invalidity of said election.
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and Afterwards, the same is elevated to the Ministry (now
thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this Department) of Justice for final determination and review.
recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the
1987 Constitution which states that "[t]hose born before It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or
January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the
citizens. It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and courts. The special proceeding provided under Section 2,
1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction
citizenship should not be understood as having a curative of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested
effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for party to file an action for cancellation or correction of entry
those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of
a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the
remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if respondent.
the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the
effectivity of the new Constitution. Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural
infirmity, still the trial court’s conclusion that respondent
Being a legitimate child, respondent’s citizenship followed duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the
that of her father who is Chinese, unless upon reaching the records indisputably show that respondent failed to comply
age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a with the legal requirements for a valid election. Specifically,
settled rule that only legitimate children follow the respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her
citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary
under the parental authority of the mother and follow her evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of
nationality. An illegitimate child of Filipina need not perform alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12
any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges years after she reached the age of majority, which was
attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even
becomes a citizen himself.21 But in the case of respondent, assuming arguendo that respondent’s oath of allegiance
for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time after
validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age respondent attained the age of majority and was not
of majority. registered with the nearest civil registry as required under
Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The phrase "reasonable time" has
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625,22 enacted pursuant to been interpreted to mean that the election should be made
Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of
the procedure that should be followed in order to make a majority. Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation
valid election of Philippine citizenship, to wit: proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to
register with the nearest local civil registry.
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with subsection (4), [S]ection 1, Article IV, of Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly
the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any and effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent
officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the
the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act
of election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically a. President

lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by b. Vice-president
election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and c. Senator
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts d. Member of the House of the Representatives;
showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the e. Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate
court;
place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent
f. Chairperson and Commissioners of the Civil Service
cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court
Commission;
to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly, she g. Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission
has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. As we held on Elections;
in Ching, the prescribed procedure in electing Philippine h. Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission
citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking on Audit;
process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an i. Ombudsman and his or her deputies;
affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, j. Board of Governors of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas;
file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to and
comply with the foregoing requirements, respondent’s k. Chairperson and Members of the Commission of
petition before the trial court must be denied. Human Rights. [David v. SET]
Foundlings are natural-born

Natural-born Citizens
The presumption that all foundlings found in the
Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father
SEC. 2, ARTICLE IV or a Filipino mother( and are thus natural-born,
unless there is substantial proof otherwise) arises
when one reads the Constitution as a whole, so as to
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
“effectuate [its] whole purpose”. [David v. SET]
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who
Though the matter is settled by interpretation
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), exclusively within the confines of constitutional text,
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. the presumption that foundlings are natural-born
citizens of the Philippines (unless substantial evidence
of the foreign citizenship of both the foundling’s
parents is presented) is validated by…a parallel
Under the 1935 Constitution, it was never definitely settled consideration or contemporaneous construction of the
whether a child of a Filipina mother who elected Philippine Constitution with acts of Congress, international
citizenship upon reaching majority was a natural-born Filipino. instruments in force in the Philippines, as well as acts
of executive organs such as the Bureau of
A liberal view, however, held that he was. This view is anchored Immigration, Civil Registrars, and the President of the
on the argument that the election retroacts to the moment of Philippines. [David v. SET]
birth since it was birth which gave the child the potential to
make the election. Naturalized Citizens
Likewise, with the addition of the second sentence by the 1987 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing
Constitution, it definitely settled the issue. The purpose of the him with the rights that belong to a natural born citizen.
addition is to equalize the status of those born of Filipina
parents before January 17, 1973 with those born of Filipina It is considered not a matter of right, but one of privilege of
parents on or after such date. the most discriminating, as well as delicate and exacting
nature, affecting as it does, public interest of the highest order
and it may be enjoyed only under the precise condition
“From birth” prescribed by law therefor.
In Bengson III v. HRET the phrase “from birth” was It may obtained through a general law of naturalization applied
clarified to mean at the time of birth: a person who at through a judicial process or through a special act passed
the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, by the legislature (or by the President in the exercise of
is a natural-born citizen thereof.” [Poe-Llamanzares special legislative power if granted by the Constitution).
v. COMELEC, March 8, 2016]
Who are naturalized citizens?

“Having to perform any act”
It means that the act must be personally done by the “Former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a
citizen. [Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, March 8, rigid procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient
2016] evidence to prove that they possessed all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications
Offices under the 1987 Constitution exclusive to natural- provided by law in order to become Filipino citizens.”
born citizens: [David v. SET]
Not a right but a privilege JUDICIAL NATURALIZATION
Naturalization is not a right, but one of privilege of the

most discriminating, as well as delicate and exacting SEC. 2, COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 473
nature, affecting, as it does, public interest of the
highest order, and which may be enjoyed only under Qualifications. – Subject to section four of this Act, any
the precise conditions prescribed by law therefor. person having the following qualifications may become a
[Republic v. Karbasi] citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:
Matter of Grace First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on
the day of the hearing of the petition;
The opportunity of a foreigner to become a citizen by
naturalization is a mere matter of grace, favour or Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a
privilege extended to him by the State; applicant does continuous period of not less than ten years;
not possess any natural, inherent, existing or vested
right admitted to Philippine citizenship. [Republic v. Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in
Go Pei Hung, April 4,2018] the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and
must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable
Strictly construed manner during the entire period of his residence in the
Philippines in his relation with the constituted government
Naturalization law should be rigidly enforced and as well as with the community in which he is living.
strictly construed in favour of the government and
against the applicant. [Republic v. Kerry Lao Ong, Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth
June 18, 2012; Republic v. Huang Te Fu, March 18, not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or
2015] must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation;
Who has the burden of proof?
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish
In naturalization proceedings, the burden of proof is and any one of the principal Philippine languages; and
upon the applicant to show full and complete
compliance with the requirements of the law. Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school
[Republic v. Li Ching Chung, March 20, 2013]
age, in any of the public schools or private schools
recognized by the Office of Private Education1 of the
Modes for Naturalization Philippines, where the Philippine history, government and
civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school
Under current and existing laws, there are three ways curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the
by which an alien may become a citizen by Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition
naturalization:
for naturalization as Philippine citizen.
a) Administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A

No. 9139 It prescribes requirements of age, residence, moral character
b) Judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A No. and political belief, real property or lucrative occupation,
473 as amended; and language, and education of children.
c) Legislative naturalization in the form of a law
enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine The procedural requirements include the following steps:
citizenship to an alien. [So v. Republic]
1. Declaration of intention
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire 2. Filing of intention
Philippine citizenship through either judicial 3. Hearing and initial judgment
naturalization under CA 473 or administrative 4. Period of probation
naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 5. Rehearing and Final judgment
(“Administrative Naturalization Act of 2001”).
The applicant is allowed to take the oath of citizenship only
after satisfying the court that he has passed the probation
A third option, called derivative naturalization, which
requirements.
is available to alien women married to Filipino
husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473 The grant of citizenship to a parent also extends citizenship
[Republic v. Batuigas, October 7, 2013] to minor children under parental authority.
The rule on the citizenship of the wife upon the naturalization

of the husband is a little more involved. The law interprets that
she becomes a Filipino citizen, provided she shows, in an
administrative procedure for the cancellation of her
alien certificate of registration, that she has none of the
disqualification found under the law.
Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization, the instruction of children of persons of a

application must show substantial and formal compliance with particular nationality or race, in any of the
the law. [Republic v. Karbasi] branches of education or industry for a
period of not less than two years;
To repeat, strict compliance with all statutory requirements is 5. Having been born in the Philippines.
necessary before an applicant may acquire Philippine
citizenship by naturalization. The absence of even a single Who are Disqualified? (Sec.4 )
requirement is fatal to an application for naturalization.
(Republic v. Go Pei Hung) In other words, an applicant must a) Persons opposed to organized government or
comply with the jurisdictional requirements. affiliated with any association or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines
Establish his or her possession of the qualifications and none opposing all organized governments;
of the disqualifications enumerated under the law; and b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity
or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
Present at least two (2) character witnesses to support his assassination for the success and
allegations. [Republic v. Karbasi] predominance of their ideas;
c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of
polygamy;
d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral
turpitude.
Economic Qualification e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or
incurable contagious disease;
“Some known lucrative trade, profession, or f) Persons, who during the period of their
lawful occupation residence in the Philippines, have not
mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who
It must be shown that the employment gives one an have not evicted a sincere desire to learn and
income such that there is an appreciable margin of his embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals
income over his expenses as to be able to provide for of the Filipinos;
an adequate support in the event of unemployment, g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the
sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one’s United States and the Philippines are at war,
becoming the object of charity or a public charge.” during the period of such war;
[Republic v. Kerry Lao Ong, June 18, 2012] h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other
than the United States whose laws do not
grant Filipinos the right to become
Moreover, it has been held that in determining the
existence of a lucrative income, the courts should naturalized citizens or subjects thereof
consider only the applicant’s income; his or her [reciprocity].
spouses income should not be included in the
assessment. The spouses additional income is Declaration of Intention (Sec.5)
immaterial [Republic v. Kerry Lao Ong, June 18,
2012; Republic v. Huang Te Fu, March 18, 2015 One year prior to the filing of his petition for admission
to Philippine citizenship, the applicant for Philippine
The economic qualification for naturalization may be citizenship shall file with the Bureau of Justice [OSG]
seen to embody the objective of ensuring that the a declaration under oath that is bona fide his intention
petitioner would not become a public charge or an to become a citizen of the Philippines.
economic burden upon society.
Such declaration shall set forth the:
a) Name, age , occupation, personal description, place

Special Qualifications (Sec.3) of birth, last foreign residence and allegiance, the
date of arrival, the name, the name of the vessel or
aircraft in which he came to the Philippines at the
The ten years of continuous residence required under
the second condition of the last preceding section time of making the declaration;
b) A certificate showing the date, place and manner of
shall be understood as reduced to five years for any
his arrival [Certificate of Arrival];
petitioner having any of the following qualifications:
1. Having honourably held office under the Certificate of Arrival

Government of the Philippines or under that
of any of the provinces, cities, municipalities, In Republic v. Judge De la Rosa, this court held that
or political subdivisions thereof; the failure to attach a copy of the applicant’s
2. Having established a new industry or certificate of arrival to the petition as required by
introduced a useful invention in the Section 7 CA 473 is fatal to an applicant’s petition for
Philippines; naturalization.
3. Being married to a Filipino woman;
4. Having been engaged as a teacher in the It proves that the applicant’s entry to the country
Philippines in a public or recognized private was no illegal- that he was documented alien whose
school not established for the exclusive arrival and presence in the country is in good faith
and with evident intention to submit to and abide by schools recognized by the Government and not limited
the laws of the [Republic. Republic v. Go Pei Hung] to any race or nationality.
4. The same shall be understood applicable with
c. A statement that he has enrolled his minor children. respect to the widow and minor children of an alien
If any, in any of the public schools or private schools who has declared his intention to become a citizen of
recognized by the Office of Private Education of the the Philippines, and dies before he is actually
Philippines, now the Department of Education, where naturalized.
Philippine History, government, and civics are taught 5. The only exception to the mandatory filing of a
or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during declaration of intention is specifically stated in Section
the entire period of residence in the Philippines 6 of CA No. 473 [Republic v. Li Ching Chung]
required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for
naturalization as Philippine citizen; and Petition for Citizenship (Sec. 7)
d. Two photographs of himself. Any persons desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall
file with the competent court, a petition in triplicate,
“One year prior to the filing of his petition” accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner, settling
forth his:
The period is designed to give the government ample
time to screen and examine the qualifications of an 1. Name and surname;
applicant and to measure the latter’s good intention 2. His present and former places of residence
and sincerity of purpose. [Republic v. Li Ching Chung, 3. His occupation
March 20, 2013] 4. The place and date of his birth
5. Whether single or married and the father of children,
As held in Tan v. Republic, the period of one year the name, age, birthplace, and residence of the wife
required therein is the time fixed for the State to make and of the each of the children;
inquiries as to the qualifications of the applicant. If 6. The approximate date of his or her arrival in the
this period is not given to it, the State will have no Philippines, the name of the port of debarkation, and
sufficient opportunity to investigate the qualifications if he remembers it, the name of the ship on which he
of the applicants and gather evidence thereon. came;
[Republic v. Li Ching Chung, March 20, 2013] 7. A declaration that he has the qualifications required
by this Act, specifying the same, and that he is not
disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of
Stated otherwise, the waiting period will unmask the
this Act;
true intentions of those who seek Philippine
8. That he has complied with the requirements of section
citizenship for selfish reasons alone, such as, but not
five of this Act; and
limited to, those who are merely interested in
9. That he will reside continuously in the Philippines from
protecting their wealth, as distinguished from those
the date of filing of the petition up to the time of his
who have truly come to love the Philippines and its
admission to Philippine citizenship.
culture and who wish to become genuine partners in
10. The petition must be signed by the applicant in his
nation buildeing. [Republic v. Li Ching Chung,
own handwriting and be supported by the affidavit of
March 20, 2013]
at least two credible persons, stating that they are
citizens of the Philippines and personally know the
The law is explicit that the declaration of intention petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the
must be filled one year prior to the filing of the petition period of time required by this Act and a person of
for naturalization. good repute and morally irreproachable, and the said
petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications
Republic v. Go Bon Lee likewise decreed that necessary to become a citizen of the Philippine and is
substantial compliance with the requirement is not in any way disqualified under the provision of this
inadequate. [Republic v. Li Ching Chung, March Act.
20, 2013] 11. The petition shall set forth the names and post-office
addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may
Persons exempt requirement to make a declaration of desire to introduce at the hearing of the case.
intention (Sec. 6) 12. The certificate of arrival, and the declaration of
intention must be made part of the petition.
1. Person born in the Philippines and have received their
primary and secondary education in public schools or
those recognized by the Government and not limited
to any race or nationality, and Credible Persons
2. Those who have resided continuously in the
Philippines for a period of thirty (30) years or more In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the
before filing their application, may be naturalized applicant to prove not only his own good moral
without having to make a declaration of intention character but also the good moral character of his or
upon complying with the other requirements of this her witnesses, who must be credible persons. [So v.
Act. Republic]
3. To such requirements shall be added that which
establishes that the applicant has given primary and
secondary education to all his children in the public
Character Witnesses · The names of the witnesses whom the

petitioner proposes to introduce in support of
In Ong v. Republic of the Philippines (1958), the Court his petition, and
listed the requirements for character witnesses, · The date of hearing of the petition, which
namely: hearing shall not be held until after six months
from the date of the last publication of the
1. That they are citizen of the Philippines; notice.
2. That they are “credible persons”,
3. That they personally know the petitioner; Publication requisites
4. That they personally know him to be a resident of the
Philippines for the period of time required by law; To be a valid publication, the following requisites must
5. That they personally know him to be a person of good concur:
repute;
6. That they personally know him to be morally
1. The petition and notice of hearing must be
irreproachable;
published;
7. That he has, in their opinion all the qualifications
2. The publication must be once a week for
necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines; and
three consecutive weeks; and
8. That he “is not in any way disqualified under the
3. The publication must be in the Official
provisions” of the Naturalization Law.
Gazette and in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province where the
The law, in effect, requires that the character witnesses be applicant resides. [Republic v. Hong, March
not mere ordinary acquaintances of the applicant, but 24, 2006]
possessed of such intimate knowledge of the latter as to
be competent to testify of their personal knowledge; and
Publication of the petition for naturalization is the
that they have each one of the requisite qualifications and
primordial step in naturalization proceedings.
none of the statutory disqualifications. [Go v. Republic,
July 2, 2014]
Its purpose is to apprise the public of the pendency of
the petition so that those who may know of any legal
What must be credible is not the declaration made but the
objection to it may come forward with the information
person making it. in order to determine the fitness of petitioner for
Philippine citizenship. [In Re: Petition for
This implies that such person must have a good standing Admission as Citizen of the Republic of the
in the community; that he is known to be honest and Philippines, Annie, Hoy Bian So v. Republic,
upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; September 27, 2017]
and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a
good warranty of the applicant’s worthiness. [So v.
Republic]
Non-compliance with Sec. 9 is fatal

Competent Court (Sec.8)
In Gan Tsitung v. Republic (1965), the Court held that

The Court of First Instance [RTC] of the province in
non-compliance with Section 9 of CA 473, relative to
which the petitioner has resided at least one year
the publication of the notice once a week for three
immediately preceding the filing of the petition shall consecutive weeks is fatal for it impairs the very root
have exclusive original jurisdiction to have hear the
or foundation of the authority to decide the case,
petition. regardless of whether the one to blame is the clerk of
court or the petitioner or his counsel. [Republic v.
Publication Hong, March 24,2006
Sec. 9. Notification and appearance Immediately upon This doctrine equally applies to the determination of
the filing of a petition, it shall be the duty of the clerk the sufficiency of the contents of the notice of hearing
of the court to publish the same at the petitioner’s or the petition itself because an incomplete notice or
expense, once a week for three consecutive weeks, in petition even if published, is no publication at all.
the Official Gazette, and in one of the newspapers of
general circulation in the province where the
Thus, in Sy v. Republic, it was held that the
petitioner resides, and to have copies of said petition requirement under Section 9 that the copy of the
and a general notice of the hearing posted in a public
petition to be posted and published should be a
and conspicuous place in his office or in the building textual or verbatim restatement of the petition filed,
where said office is located. is jurisdictional, [Republic v. Hong. March 24, 2006]
· Setting forth in such notice

· The name, the birthplace and residence of the
petitioner, the date and place of his arrival in
the Philippines,
Failure to state detail is fatal Philippine citizen, unless within one year after
reaching the age of majority, he fails to register
In the same vein, the failure to state all the required himself as a Philippine citizen at the [American
details in the notice of hearing, like the name of Consulate] of the country where he resides, and to
applicant’s witnesses constitutes a fatal defect. take the necessary oath of allegiance.
The publication of the affidavit of said witnesses did A necessary implication of the above provision is that
not cure the omission of their names in the notice of children born within the Philippines after the naturalization
hearing. [Republic v. Hong, March 24, 2006] of their parent are unqualifiedly citizens of the country.
This implications holds true even if the naturalized parent
is purely of foreign blood.
Decision Executory after 2 years
Moreover, because of they do not need to perform any act

No petition for Philippine citizenship shall be heard by
to acquire Philippine citizenship, they must be considered
the courts until after six (6) months from the
natural-born citizen be definition. [CJ Sereno,
publication of the application required by law, nor
Concurring Opinion, Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC]
shall any decision granting the application become
executory until after two (2) years from its
promulgation and after the court, on proper hearing, Like foundlings, these groups are not expressly
with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his mentioned in the Constitution. However, by implication of
representative, law, they are considered natural-born citizens despite the
absence of a single drop of Filipino blood in them.
Satisfied and so finds, that during the intervening time
the applicant has From this fact, one can draw no other conclusion: that the
natural-born classification has nothing to do with bloodline
or birthright. [CJ Sereno, Concurring Opinion, Poe-
1. Not left the Philippines
Llamanzares v. COMELEC]
2. Has dedicated himself continuously to a
lawful calling or profession,
3. Has not been convicted of any offense or Cancellation OF Naturalization Certificate Issued (Sec.
violation of Government promulgated rules, 18)
4. Or committed any act prejudicial to the
interest of the nation or contrary to any Upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the
Government announced policies. [Sec. 1, RA Solicitor-General or his representative, or by the proper
530] provincial fiscal, the competent judge may cancel the
naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the
After the finding mentioned in section I RA 530, the order of Civil Registrar.
the court granting citizenship shall be registered and the oath
provided by existing laws shall be taken by the applicant, 1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was
whereupon, and not before, he will be entitled to all the obtained fraudulently or illegally
privileges of a Filipino citizen. [Section 2, R.A. 530] 2. If the person naturalized shall, within five (5) years
next following the issuance of said naturalization
certificate, return to his native country or to some
foreign country and establish his permanent residence
there:
Effect of the Naturalization on Wife and Children (Sec.
3. Provided: that the fact of the person naturalized
15)
remaining for more than one year in his native country
or the country of his former nationality, or two years
1. Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married in any other foreign country, shall be considered as
to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself prima facie evidence of his intention of taking up his
be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the permanent residence in the same;
Philippines. 4. If the petition on an invalid declaration of intention;
2. Minor children of persons naturalized under this law 5. If it is shown that minor children of the person
who have been born in the Philippines shall be naturalized failed to graduate from a public or private
considered citizens thereof. high schools recognized by the Office of Private
3. A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history,
Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the government, and civics are taught as part of the
parent, shall automatically become a Philippine school curriculum, through the fault of their parents
citizen, and either by neglecting to support them or by transferring
4. A foreign-born minor child, who is not in the them to another school or schools. A certified copy of
Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall the decree cancelling the naturalization certificate
be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his shall be forwarded by the clerk of the Court to the
minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Justice.
the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he 6. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed
will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after himself to be used as a dummy requiring Philippine
becoming of age. citizenship as a requisite for the exercise, use or
5. A child born outside of the Philippines after the enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege.
neutralization of his parent, shall be considered a
R.A. 9139 (The Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000) was

enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the process
Distinction between C.A 473 v. R.A 9139 of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical
and more encouraging.
C.A No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws-
the former [C.A] 473 covers all aliens regardless of class while
the latter [R.A. No. 9139 ] covers native-born aliens ho lived It likewise addresses the concerns of degree holders who, by
reason of lack citizenship requirement, cannot practice their
here in the Philippines all their lives. [So v. Republic]
profession, thus promoting “brain gain” for the Philippines [So
v. Republic]
Aside from judicial naturalization, there is now administrative
naturalization. The matter is handled through the Special For native-born aliens
Committee on Naturalization chaired by the Solicitor
General. R.A. 9139 covers native-born aliens who lived here in
the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other
country and all along thought that they were Filipinos;
ADMINISTRATIVE NATURALIZATION who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the
Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions.
[So v. Republic]
SEC. 3, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9139
It must be stressed that R.A. No. 9139 applies only to
Qualifications. - Subject to the provisions of the
aliens who were born in the Philippines and have been
succeeding section, any person desiring to avail of the residing here.
benefits of this Act must meet the following qualifications:
One of the qualifications set forth in R.A No. 9139 is
(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines and that the applicant was born in the Philippines and
residing therein since birth; should have been residing herein since birth. Thus,
one who was born here but left the country, though
(b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years resided for more than ten (10) years from the filing of
of age, at the time of filing of his/her petition; the application is also disqualified. [So v. Republic]
(c) The applicant must be of good moral character and What the legislature had in mind was merely to
believes in the underlying principles of the Constitution, and prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine
must have conducted himself/herself in a proper and citizenship which may be availed of by native born
irreproachable manner during his/her entire period of aliens.
residence in the Philippines in his relation with the duly
constituted government as well as with the community in The only implication is that, a native born alien has
which he/she is living; the choice to apply for judicial or administrative
naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications
(d) The applicant must have received his/her primary and and disqualifications. [So v. Republic]
secondary education in any public school or private
educational institution dully recognized by the Department Who has jurisdiction?
of Education, Culture and Sports, where Philippine history,
government and civics are taught and prescribed as part of The special Committee on Naturalization with
the school curriculum and where enrollment is not limited to
any race or nationality: Provided, That should he/she have 1. The Solicitor-General as chairman
minor children of school age, he/she must have enrolled 2. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, or his representative,
them in similar schools; and
3. The National Security Adviser, as members,
(e) The applicant must have a known trade, business, 4. With the power to approve, deny or reject applications
for naturalization a provided in this Act. [Sec.6]
profession or lawful occupation, from which he/she derives
income sufficient for his/her support and if he/she is married
and/or has dependents, also that of his/her family: Disqualifications (Sec.4)
Provided, however, That this shall not apply to applicants
who are college degree holders but are unable to practice a) Persons opposed to organized government or
their profession because they are disqualified to do so by affiliated with any association or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines
reason of their citizenship;
opposing all organized governments;
b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity
(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
Filipino or any of the dialects of the Philippines; and assassination for the success and
predominance of their ideas;
(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of
evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, polygamy;
traditions and ideals of the Filipino people. d) Those convicted of crimes involving moral
turpitude.
e) Those suffering from mental alienation or premises, and shall, within thirty (30) days from the
incurable contagious disease; receipt of the petition, submit to the Committee a
f) Persons, who during the period of their report stating whether or not petitioner has any
residence in the Philippines, have not derogatory record on file or any such relevant and
mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who material information which might be adverse to
have not evicted a sincere desire to learn and petitioner’s application for citizenship.
embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals
of the Filipinos; and If petition is wanting
g) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country
whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to
If the petition is found by the Committee to be wanting in
be naturalized citizens or subjects thereof
substance and form, the petition shall be dismissed without
[reciprocity].
prejudice. [Sec. 7]
Petition for Citizenship (Sec. 9)

Approval or Disapproval of the Petition (Sec.8)
Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship

Within sixty (60) days from receipt of the report of
under this Act shall file the Special Committee on
the agencies which were furnished a copy of the
Naturalization created under Section 6 hereof, a
petition or the date of the last publication of the
petition of five (5) copies legibly typed and signed,
petition, whichever comes in late, the Committee shall
thumbmarked and verified by him/her, with the
consider and review all relevant and material
latter’s passport-sized photograph attached to each
information it has received pertaining to the petition
copy of the petition, and setting fort the following:
and, may, for the purpose call the petitioner for
interview to ascertain his/her identity, the authenticity
a. The petitioner’s Name and surname, and any of the petition and it annexes, and to determine the
other name he/she has used or by which truthfulness of the statements and declarations made
he/she is known; in the petition and its annexes.
b. The petitioner’s present and former places of
residence;
If the Committee shall have received any information
c. The petitioner’s place and date of birth, the
adverse to the petition, the Committee shall allow the
names, citizenship of his/her parents and
petitioner to answer, explain or refute the
their residences;
information.
d. That petitioner’s trade, business, profession
or occupation, and if married, also that of
his/her spouse; Thereafter, if the Committee believes, in view of the
e. Whether the petitioner is single or married or facts before it, that the petitioner has all the
his/her marriage is annulled. If married, qualifications and none of the disqualifications
petitioner shall state the date and place of required for the Philippine citizenship under this Act,
his/her marriage, and the name, date of it shall approve the petition and henceforth, notify the
birth, birthplace, citizenship and residence of petitioner of the fact of such approval. Otherwise, the
his/her spouse; and if his marriage is Committee shall disapprove the same.
annulled, the date of decree of annulment of
marriage and the court which granted the Decree of Naturalization and Naturalization Processing
same; Fee (Sec.9)
Determination of Sufficiency of Petition Within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the notice
of the approval of his/her petition, the applicant shall
Within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the pay to the Committee a naturalization fee of one
petition, the Committee shall determine whether the hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) payable as
petition is complete in form and in substance. follows: fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) upon taking
the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, forthwith, a certificate of naturalization
If such petition is complete, the Committee shall
shall be issued.
immediately publish pertinent portions of the petition
indicating the name, qualifications and other personal
circumstances of the applicant, once a week for three Within sixty (60) days from the issuance of the
(3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general certificate, the petitioner shall take an oath of
circulation, and have copies of the petition posted in allegiance in the proper form upon proof of payment
any public or conspicuous area. of the required naturalization processing fee and
certificate of naturalization.
The Committee shall immediately furnish the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Bureau of Should the applicant fail to take abovementioned
Immigration (BI), the civil registrar of the petitioner’s oath of allegiance within said period of time, the
place of residence and the National Bureau of approval of the petition shall be deemed abandoned.
Investigation (NBI) copies the petition and its
supporting documents. These agencies shall have
copies of the petition posted in any public or
conspicuous area in their buildings, offices and Status of Alien Wife and Minor Children (Sec. 11)
After the approval of the petition from administrative Step 3: Filling of the Petition for Naturalization (Note:
naturalization and cancellation of applicant’s alien Petitioner [applicant] must be present during the filing
certificate of registration, applicant’s alien lawful wife as his/her picture will be taken).
and minor children may file a petition for cancellation
of their alien certificates of registration with the Step 4: Assignment (by raffle) of the petition to the
Committee subject to the payment. NRO (Naturalization Review Officer) who is an Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) lawyer.
Status of Alien Husband and Minor Children (Sec. 12)
Step 5: evaluation proper by the NRO.
If the applicant is a married woman, the approval of
her petition for administrative naturalization will not Step 6: Submission by the petitioner of additional
benefit her alien husband but her minor children may requirements/ documents, if required by NRO/Special
file a petition for cancellation of their certificates of Committee on Naturalization (SCN Committee).
registration with the BI subject to the requirements of
existing laws.
Step 7: Evaluation by the NRO of the additional
requirements/ documents, submitted by the
Cancellation of the Certificate of Naturalization (Sec. 13) petitioner.
f. If it finds that the naturalized person or his Step 8: Submission by the petitioner of additional
duly authorized representative made any requirements/documents, if required by the NRO/
false statement or misinterpretation or Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN
committed any violation of law, rules and Committee), if the additional requirements/
regulations in connection with the petition for documents which had just been submitted are still
naturalization, or if he otherwise obtains insufficient/ not compliant with the additional
Philippine citizenship fraudulently or illegally, documents required to be submitted.
the certificate of naturalization shall be
cancelled.
Step 9: After all requirements/documents have been
g. If the naturalized person or his wife, or any
strictly complied with and submitted by petitioner, the
of his minor children who acquire Filipino
dispatching/ transmittal of copies of the petition to
citizenship by virtue of his naturalization
other government agencies for posting, background
shall within five (5) years next following the
and record checking of the petitioner would be follow.
grant of Philippine citizenship, establish
The petition is also raffled and assigned to an
permanent residence in a foreign country,
accredited newspaper publishing company for
that individual’s certificate of naturalization
publication (note: it is the petitioner who will directly
or acquired citizenship shall be cancelled or
coordinates with the newspaper company.)
revoked:
Step 10: Waiting time for the said government

Provided, that the fact of such person’s remaining for
agencies to submit their reports regarding the
more than 1 year in his country of origin, or two (2)
petition, including the Affidavit of Publication of the
years in any foreign country, shall be considered
newspaper company.
prima facie evidence of intent to permanently reside
therein;
Step 11: Evaluation time by the NRO if the reports
received from various government agencies about the
c. If the naturalized person or his wife or child
petitioner.
with acquire citizenship allows himself or
herself to be used as a dummy in violation of
any constitutional or legal provision requiring Step 12: Submission by the petitioner of additional
Philippine citizenship as a condition for the requirements/documents, if required by the NRO/
exercise , use or enjoyment of right, SCN Committee.
franchise or privilege, the certificate of
naturalization or acquired citizenship shall be Step 13: After all reports have been collated, the
cancelled or revoked; and petitioner is scheduled for a written exam and
d. If the naturalized person or his wife or child interview, including his/her character witnesses
with acquire citizenship commits any act (note: the character witnesses will be interviewed by
inimical to national security, the certificate of the NRO and may be required to answer a
naturalization or acquired citizenship shall be questionnaire about petitioner.)
cancelled or revoked.
Step 14: Submission by the petitioner of additional
Administrative Naturalization Process requirements/ documents, if required by the
NRO/SRN Committee.
Step 1: Acquiring and Filling-up Petition/ Application
Form (with list of requirements). Step 15: The NRO will prepare an Evaluation Report
and forward the same to the SCN Committee for
Step 2: Pre-evaluation of petition and the deliberation.
documentary requirements.
Step 16: Submission by the petitioner of additional children must be

requirements/documents, required by the SCN enrolled in similar
Committee. schools.
Must be able to Must be able to
Step 17: After the deliberation, all petitioners whose
speak and write read, write, and
petitions for administrative naturalization were
approved by the SCN Committee would attend the 1.English or speak
oath-taking ceremonies. LANGUAGE Spanish 1.Filipino
2. Any principal 2. any PH dialect
Step 18: Cancellation of the petitioner’s ACR/I-Card PH language
with the Bureau of Immigration. Must have
mingled with
Filipinos and
evinced desire to
Judicial (CA Administrative OTHERS learn and
473) (R.A. 9139) embrace customs
and traditions of
Not less than Not less than 18
Filipinos.
21(now 18 under years of age, at
R.A 6809) years the TIME of
of age at the FILING of the
AGE DATE of petition.
LEGISLATIVE NATURALIZATION
HEARING of the
petition
In the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine
citizenship to an alien. [So. V. Republic, January 29, 2007]
Continuous Born in RP and DERIVATIVE NATURALIZATION

RESIDENCY residence in RP residing in RP
of not less than since birth Under this provision (Sec. 15, C.A 473), foreign women who
10 years are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto
Philippine citizens and it is either necessary for them to prove
1.Good moral 1.Good moral that they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the
character character time of their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves
2.Believes in the 2.Believes in the to judicial naturalization. [Republic v. Batuigas]
CHARACTER principles of the principles of the
Constitution Constitution Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
1.Must own real Must have a subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship
of her husband the moment he takes his oath s Filipino citizen,
estate in RP known trade,
provided that she does not suffer from any of the
worth P5, 000.00 business, disqualifications under said Section 4. [Republic v.
or profession or Batuigas].
PROPERTY/ 2.Must have lawful occupation
PROFESSION some lucrative from which he
trade, profession derives income Procedure
or lawful sufficient to
occupation support his family 1. The alien woman must file a petition for the
His minor Must have cancellation of her alien certificate of registration
children must be received his alleging, among other things, that she is married to a
Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from
enrolled in a primary and
acquiring her husband’s citizenship pursuant to
school where PH secondary Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.
history, civics education from 2. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be
and government DECS recognized accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the
are taught and school RP history, petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that
prescribed as civics and the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups
disqualified by the cited Section from becoming
part of the government are
naturalized Filipino citizen. The Bureau of Immigration
EDUCATION curriculum taught and conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates
prescribed s part its order or decision granting or denying the petition.
of the curriculum [Republic v. Batuigas citing Mo Ya Lim]
and his minor
REPUBLIC v. LI CHI CHUNG (2013) the Manila Times, a newspaper of general circulation, on
May 30, 2008, June 6, 2008 and June 13, 2008.
FACTS:
Thereafter, respondent filed the Motion for Early Setting
praying that the hearing be moved from April 3, 2009 to July
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
31, 2008 so he could acquire real estate properties. The OSG
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by the Republic of the
filed its Opposition, dated August 6, 2008, arguing that the
Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), challenges the June 30, 2011 Decision of the said motion for early setting was a "clear violation of Section
1, RA 530, which provides that hearing on the petition
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93374, which
should be held not earlier than six (6) months from the date
affirmed the June 3, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 49, Manila (RTC), granting the petition for of last publication of the notice." The opposition was already
late as the RTC, in its July 31, 2008 Order, denied
naturalization of respondent Li Ching Chung (respondent).
respondent’s motion and decreed that since the last
publication in the newspaper of general circulation was on
On August 22, 2007, respondent, otherwise known as
June 13, 2008, the earliest setting could only be scheduled
Bernabe Luna Li or Stephen Lee Keng, a Chinese national,
six (6) months later or on December 15, 2008.
filed his Declaration of Intention to Become a Citizen of the
Philippines before the OSG.
On December 15, 2008, the OSG reiterated, in open court,
its opposition to the early setting of the hearing and other
On March 12, 2008 or almost seven months after filing his
grounds that would merit the dismissal of the petition.
declaration of intention, respondent filed his Petition for
Accordingly, the RTC ordered the suspension of the judicial
Naturalization before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.
proceedings until all the requirements of the statute of
08-118905. On April 5, 2008, respondent filed his Amended
limitation would be completed.
Petition for Naturalization, wherein he alleged that he was
born on November 29, 1963 in Fujian Province, People’s
The OSG filed a motion to dismiss, but the RTC denied the
Republic of China, which granted the same privilege of
same in its Order, dated March 10, 2009, and reinstated the
naturalization to Filipinos; that he came to the Philippines
on March 15, 1988 via Philippine Airlines Flight PR 311 original hearing date on April 3, 2009, as previously
indicated in the notice.
landing at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport; that on
November 19, 1989, he married Cindy Sze Mei Ngar, a
British national, with whom he had four (4) children, all born Thereafter, respondent testified and presented two
in Manila; that he had been continuously and permanently character witnesses, Emelita V. Roleda and Gaudencio
residing in the country since his arrival and is currently a Abalayan Manimtim, who personally knew him since 1984
resident of Manila with prior residence in Malabon; that he and 1998, respectively, to vouch that he was a person of
could speak and write in English and Tagalog; that he was good moral character and had conducted himself in a proper
entitled to the benefit of Section 3 of Commonwealth Act and irreproachable manner during his period of residency in
(CA) No. 473 reducing to five (5) years the requirement the country.
under Section 2 of ten years of continuous residence,
because he knew English and Filipino having obtained his On June 3, 2009, the RTC granted respondent’s application
education from St. Stephen’s High School of Manila; and for naturalization as a Filipino citizen.
that he had successfully established a trading general
merchandise business operating under the name of "VS However, pursuant to Section 1 of Republic Act No. 530, this
Marketing Corporation." As an entrepreneur, he derives Decision shall not become executory until after two (2) years
income more than sufficient to be able to buy a from its promulgation and after the Court, on proper
condominium unit and vehicles, send his children to private hearing, with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his
schools and adequately provide for his family. representative, is satisfied, and so finds, that during the
intervening time the applicant has: (1) not left the
In support of his application, he attached his barangay Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself continuously to a
certificate, police clearance, alien certification of lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of
registration, immigration certificate of residence, marriage any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules;
contract, authenticated birth certificates of his children, (4) or committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the
affidavits of his character witnesses, passport, 2006 annual nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.
income tax return, declaration of intention to become a
citizen of the Philippines and a certification from the Bureau As soon as this decision shall have become executory, as
of Immigration with a list of his travel records from January provided under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 530, the Clerk
30, 1994. of Court of this Branch is hereby directed to issue to the
Petitioner a Naturalization Certificate, after the Petitioner
Consequently, the petition was set for initial hearing on April shall have subscribed to an Oath, in accordance with Section
3, 2009 and its notice was posted in a conspicuous place at 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 472, as amended.
the Manila City Hall and was published in the Official Gazette
on June 30, 2008, July 7, 2008 and July 14, 2008, and in
The Local Civil Registrar of the City of Manila is, likewise naturalization as Philippine citizen. Each declarant must
directed to register the Naturalization Certificate in the furnish two photographs of himself.
proper Civil Registry.
The period is designed to give the government ample time
The OSG appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The OSG to screen and examine the qualifications of an applicant and
argues that "the petition for naturalization should not be to measure the latter’s good intention and sincerity of
granted in view of its patent jurisdictional infirmities, purpose. Stated otherwise, the waiting period will unmask
particularly because: 1) petition for naturalization was filed the true intentions of those who seek Philippine citizenship
within the one (1) year proscribed period from the filing of for selfish reasons alone, such as, but not limited to, those
declaration of intention; 2) no certificate of arrival, which is who are merely interested in protecting their wealth, as
indispensable to the validity of the Declaration of Intention, distinguished from those who have truly come to love the
was attached to the petition; and 3) respondent’s failure to Philippines and its culture and who wish to become genuine
comply with the publication and posting requirements set partners in nation building.
under CA 473." In particular, the OSG points out that the
publication and posting requirements were not strictly The law is explicit that the declaration of intention must be
followed, specifically citing that: "(a) the hearing of the filed one year prior to the filing of the petition for
petition on 15 December 2008 was set ahead of the naturalization.
scheduled date of hearing on 3 April 2009; (b) the order
moving the date of hearing (Order dated 31 July 2008) was The only exception to the mandatory filing of a declaration
not published; and, (c) the petition was heard within six (6) of intention is specifically stated in Section 6 of CA No. 473,
months (15 December 2008) from the last publication (on to wit:
14 July 2008)."
Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a
MAIN ISSUE: declaration of intention. – Persons born in the Philippines
and have received their primary and secondary education in
Whether the respondent should be admitted as a Filipino public schools or those recognized by the Government and
citizen despite his undisputed failure to comply with the not limited to any race or nationality, and those who have
requirements provided for in CA No. 473, as amended – resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty
which are mandatory and jurisdictional in character – years or more before filing their application, may be
particularly: (i) the filing of his petition for naturalization naturalized without having to make a declaration of
within the one (1) year proscribed period from the date he intention upon complying with the other requirements of this
filed his declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen; Act. To such requirements shall be added that which
(ii) the failure to attach to the petition his certificate of establishes that the applicant has given primary and
arrival; and (iii) the failure to comply with the publication secondary education to all his children in the public schools
and posting requirements prescribed by CA No. 473. or in private schools recognized by the Government and not
limited to any race or nationality. The same shall be
The petition is meritorious. understood applicable with respect to the widow and minor
children of an alien who has declared his intention to become
Section 5 of CA No. 473, as amended, expressly states: a citizen of the Philippines, and dies before he is actually
naturalized.
Section 5. Declaration of intention. – One year prior to the
filing of his petition for admission to Philippine citizenship, Unquestionably, respondent does not fall into the category
the applicant for Philippine citizenship shall file with the of such exempt individuals that would excuse him from filing
Bureau of Justice (now Office of the Solicitor General) a a declaration of intention one year prior to the filing of a
declaration under oath that it is bona fide his intention to petition for naturalization. Contrary to the CA finding,
become a citizen of the Philippines. Such declaration shall respondent’s premature filing of his petition for
set forth name, age, occupation, personal description, place naturalization before the expiration of the one-year period
of birth, last foreign residence and allegiance, the date of is fatal.
arrival, the name of the vessel or aircraft, if any, in which
he came to the Philippines, and the place of residence in the In naturalization proceedings, the burden of proof is upon
Philippines at the time of making the declaration. No the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the
declaration shall be valid until lawful entry for permanent requirements of the law. The opportunity of a foreigner to
residence has been established and a certificate showing the become a citizen by naturalization is a mere matter of grace,
date, place, and manner of his arrival has been issued. The favor or privilege extended to him by the State; the
declarant must also state that he has enrolled his minor applicant does not possess any natural, inherent, existing or
children, if any, in any of the public schools or private vested right to be admitted to Philippine citizenship. The
schools recognized by the Office of Private Education of the only right that a foreigner has, to be given the chance to
Philippines, where Philippine history, government, and civics become a Filipino citizen, is that which the statute confers
are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, upon him; and to acquire such right, he must strictly comply
during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines with all the statutory conditions and requirements. The
required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for absence of one jurisdictional requirement is fatal to the
petition as this necessarily results in the dismissal or or sovereignty, and particularly to China; and that she will
severance of the naturalization process. reside continuously in the Philippines from the time of the
filing of her Petition up to the time of her naturalization.
Hence, all other issues need not be discussed further as
respondent failed to strictly follow the requirement After all the jurisdictional requirements mandated by
mandated by the statute. Section 9 of CA 473 had been complied with, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Motion to Dismiss on the
It should be emphasized that "a naturalization proceeding is ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in
so infused with public interest that it has been differently a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade.
categorized and given special treatment. x x x Unlike in Finding the grounds relied upon by the OSG to be
ordinary judicial contest, the granting of a petition for evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said Motion.
naturalization does not preclude the reopening of that case Thereafter, the hearing for the reception of Azucena’s
and giving the government another opportunity to present evidence was then set on May 18, 2004.
new evidence. A decision or order granting citizenship will
not even constitute res judicata to any matter or reason Neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
supporting a subsequent judgment cancelling the appeared on the day of the hearing. Hence, Azucena’s
certification of naturalization already granted, on the ground counsel moved that the evidence be presented ex-parte,
that it had been illegally or fraudulently procured. For the which the RTC granted. Accordingly, the RTC designated its
same reason, issues even if not raised in the lower court Clerk of Court as Commissioner to receive Azucena’s
may be entertained on appeal. As the matters brought to evidence. During the November 5, 2004 ex-parte hearing,
the attention of this Court x x x involve facts contained in no representative from the OSG appeared despite due
the disputed decision of the lower court and admitted by the notice.
parties in their pleadings, the present proceeding may be
considered adequate for the purpose of determining the Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28,
correctness or incorrectness of said decision, in the light of 1941 to Chinese parents, Azucena has never departed the
the law and extant jurisprudence." Philippines since birth. She has resided in Malangas,
Zamboanga del Sur from 1941-1942; in Margosatubig,
Ultimately, respondent failed to prove full and complete Zamboanga del Sur from 1942-1968; in Bogo City for nine
compliance with the requirements of the Naturalization Law. months; in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur from 1969-1972; in
As such, his petition for naturalization must be denied Talisayan, Misamis Oriental from 1972-1976; and, in
without prejudice to his right to re-file his application. Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur, thereafter, up to the
filing of her Petition.
REPUBLIC v. BATUGAS (2013) Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and
Chavacano. Her primary, secondary, and tertiary education
FACTS: were taken in Philippine schools,i.e., Margosatubig Central
Elementary School in 1955, Margosatubig Academy in1959,
On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for and the Ateneo de Zamboanga in 1963, graduating with a
Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. degree in Bachelor of Science in Education. She then
practiced her teaching profession at the Pax High School for
Azucena alleged in her Petition that she believes in the five years, in the Marian Academy in Ipil for two years, and
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; that she in Talisayan High School in Misamis Oriental for another two
has conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable years.
manner during the period of her stay in the Philippines, as
well as in her relations with the constituted Government and In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago
with the community in which she is living; that she has Batuigas (Santiago),a natural-born Filipino citizen. They
mingled socially with the Filipinos and has evinced a sincere have five children, namely Cynthia, Brenda, Aileen, Dennis
desire to learn and embrace their customs, traditions, and Emmanuel, and Edsel James. All of them studied in
ideals; that she has all the qualifications required under Philippine public and private schools and are all
Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in professionals, three of whom are now working abroad.
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (CA473); that she
is not opposed to organized government nor is affiliated with After her stint in Talisayan High School, Azucena and her
any association or group of persons that uphold and teach husband, as conjugal partners, engaged in the retail
doctrines opposing all organized governments; that she is business of and later on in milling/distributing rice, corn, and
not defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of copra. As proof of their income, Azucena submitted their
violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success joint annual tax returns and balance sheets from 2000-2002
and predominance of men’s ideas; that she is neither a and from 2004-2005. The business name and the business
polygamist nor believes in polygamy; that the nation of permits issued to the spouses’ store, ‘Azucena’s General
which she is a subject is not at war with the Philippines; that Merchandising,’ are registered in Santiago’s name, and he is
she intends in good faith to become a citizen of the also the National Food Authority licensee for their rice and
Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all corn business. During their marital union, the Batuigas
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state
spouses bought parcels of land in Barrio Lombog, In dismissing the OSG’s appeal, the CA found that Azucena’s
Margosatubig. financial condition permits her and her family to live with
reasonable comfort in accordance with the prevailing
To prove that she has no criminal record, Azucena submitted standard of living and consistent with the demands of
clearances issued by the Philippine National Police of human dignity. It said:
Zamboanga del Sur Provincial Office and by the National
Bureau of Investigation. She also presented her Health Considering the present high cost of living, which cost of
Examination Record declaring her as physically and mentally living tends to increase rather than decrease, and the low
fit. purchasing power of the Philippine currency, petitioner-
appellee, together with her Filipino husband, nonetheless,
To further support Azucena’s Petition, Santiago and was able to send all her children to college, pursue a
witnesses Eufemio Miniao and Irineo Alfaro testified. lucrative business and maintain a decent existence. The
Supreme Court, in recent decisions, adopted a higher
RTC granted the petition. standard in determining whether a petitioner for Philippine
citizenship has a lucrative trade or profession that would
qualify him/her for admission to Philippine citizenship and to
The OSG then appealed the RTC judgment to the CA,
which petitioner has successfully convinced this Court of her
contending that Azucena failed to comply with the income
ability to provide for herself and avoid becoming a public
requirement under CA 473. The OSG maintained that
charge or a financial burden to her community.
Azucena is not allowed under the Retail Trade Law (Republic
Act No. 1180) to engage directly or indirectly in the retail
trade. Hence, she cannot possibly meet the income Thus, the instant Petition wherein the OSG recapitulates the
requirement. And even if she is allowed, her business is not same arguments it raised before the CA, i.e., the alleged
a "lucrative trade" within the contemplation of the law or failure of Azucena to meet the income and public hearing
that which has an appreciable margin of income over requirements of CA 473.
expenses in order to provide for adequate support in the
event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work. The MAIN ISSUE:
OSG likewise disputed Azucena’s claim that she owns real
property because aliens are precluded from owning lands in WON Azucena met the income and public hearing
the country. requirements.
The OSG further asserted that the ex-parte proceeding The Petition lacks merit.
before the commissioner is not a "public hearing" as ex-
parte hearings are usually done in chambers, without the Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine
public in attendance. It claimed that the State was denied citizenship through either judicial naturalization under CA
its day in court because the RTC, during the May 18, 2004 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No.
initial hearing, immediately allowed the proceeding to be 9139 (the "Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"). A
conducted ex-parte without even giving the State ample third option, called derivative naturalization, which is
opportunity to be present. available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is
found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:
Azucena countered that although she is a teacher by
profession, she had to quit to help in the retail business of "Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
her husband, and they were able to send all their children citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully
to school. It is highly unlikely that she will become a public naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines."
charge as she and her spouse have enough savings and
could even be given sufficient support by their children. She Under this provision, foreign women who are married to
contended that the definition of "lucrative trade/income" Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine
should not be strictly applied to her. Being the wife and citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that
following Filipino tradition, she should not be treated like they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the
male applicants for naturalization who are required to have time of their marriage nor do they have to submit
their own "lucrative trade." themselves to judicial naturalization. Copying from similar
laws in the United States which has since been amended,
Azucena denied that the hearing for her Petition was not the Philippine legislature retained Section 15 of CA 473,
made public, as the hearing before the Clerk of Court was which then reflects its intent to confer Filipino citizenship to
conducted in the court’s session hall. Besides, the OSG the alien wife thru derivative naturalization.
cannot claim that it was denied its day in court as notices
have always been sent to it. Hence, its failure to attend is The OSG has filed this instant Petition on the ground that
not the fault of the RTC. Azucena does not have the qualification required in no. 4 of
Section 2 of CA 473 as she does not have any lucrative
Ruling of the Court of Appeals income, and that the proceeding in the lower court was not
in the nature of a public hearing. The OSG had the
opportunity to contest the qualifications of Azucena during
the initial hearing scheduled on May 18, 2004. However, the We are not unmindful of precedents to the effect that there
OSG or the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor failed to is no proceeding authorized by the law or by the Rules of
appear in said hearing, prompting the lower court to order Court, for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an
ex parte presentation of evidence before the Clerk of Court individual. "Such judicial declaration of citizenship cannot
on November 5, 2004. The OSG was also notified of the ex even be decreed pursuant to an alternative prayer therefor
parte proceeding, but despite notice, again failed to appear. in a naturalization proceeding."
The OSG had raised this same issue at the CA and was
denied for the reasons stated in its Decision. We find no This case however is not a Petition for judicial declaration of
reason to disturb the findings of the CA on this issue. Neither Philippine citizenship but rather a Petition for judicial
should this issue further delay the grant of Philippine naturalization under CA 473. In the first, the petitioner
citizenship to a woman who was born and lived all her life, believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare
in the Philippines, and devoted all her life to the care of her or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In the second,
Filipino family. She has more than demonstrated, under the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks judicial
judicial scrutiny, her being a qualified Philippine citizen. On approval to acquire the privilege of becoming a Philippine
the second issue, we also affirm the findings of the CA that citizen based on requirements required under CA
since the government who has an interest in, and the only 473.Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial
one who can contest, the citizenship of a person, was duly scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that privilege,
notified through the OSG and the Provincial Prosecutor’s and this Court will not stand in the way of making her a part
office, the proceedings have complied with the public of a truly Filipino family.
hearing requirement under CA 473.
No. 4, Section 2 of CA 473 provides as qualification to REPUBLIC v. GO PEI HUNG (2018)

become a Philippine citizen:
FACTS:
4. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less December 3, 2007, respondent Go Pei Hung - a British
than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have subject and Hong Kong resident - filed a Petition for
known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation. Naturalization seeking Philippine citizenship. The case was
lodged before the RTC of Manila, Branch 16 and docketed as
Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually Naturalization Case No. 07-118391. RTC issued its July 21,
2010 Decision granting the respondent's petition for
exercised her profession before she had to quit her teaching
naturalization, pursuant to all the qualifications stated in
job to assume her family duties and take on her role as joint
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. It appeared that there
provider, together with her husband, in order to support her
is no impediment to the Court's nod of approval to
family. Together, husband and wife were able to raise all petitioner's supplication. He had presented at least two (2)
their five children, provided them with education, and have credible persons, stating that they are citizens of the
all become professionals and responsible citizens of this Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a
country. Certainly, this is proof enough of both husband and resident of the Philippines for the period of time required
wife’s lucrative trade. Azucena herself is a professional and (Section 7 of CA 473).
can resume teaching at anytime. Her profession never
leaves her, and this is more than sufficient guarantee that Under Republic Act 530, this decision granting the
she will not be a charge to the only country she has known application for naturalization shall not become final and
since birth. executory until after two (2) years from the promulgation of
the decision and after another hearing is conducted to
determine whether or not the applicant has complied with
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective the requirements of Section 1 of said law with the
of extending the citizenship privilege to an alien wife is to attendance of the Solicitor General or his authorized
maintain a unity of allegiance among family members, thus: representative:
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions -[has] not left the Philippines;
of family unity and identity that a husband should be a -has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or
citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment profession;
of one should be different from that of the other. Thus, it -has not been convicted of any offense or violation of
Government promulgated rules; and
cannot be that the husband’s interests in property and
-or committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the
business activities reserved by law to citizens should not
nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.
form part of the conjugal partnership and be denied to the
wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own efforts
but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner deserves to become a
Only in rare instances should the identity of husband and
Filipino citizen
wife be refused recognition, and we submit that in respect
of our citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances
RULING
where the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in
Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law.
NO. Respondent failed to file a declaration of intention and
to attach a certificate of his arrival in the Philippines
pursuant to Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law or d. By being a deserter of the armed forces
CA 473 requires, among others, that an applicant for
naturalization must attach a Certificate of Arrival to the
Petition for Naturalization. 2. Commonwealth Act 473
Respondent came to the country sometime in 1973; thus, This applies to naturalized citizenship.
he should have attached a Certificate of Arrival to his
Petition for Naturalization. This is mandatory as respondent Section 18 provides that a certificate of
must prove that he entered the country legally and not by naturalization may be canceled when:
unlawful means or any other manner that is not sanctioned
by law. a. Found to have been fraudulently or illegally
obtained
b. By permanent residence in the country of
In Republic v. Judge De la Rosa, this Court held that the
origin within five years from naturalization
failure to attach a copy of the applicant's certificate of arrival
c. When the petition is found to have been
to the petition as required by Section 7 of CA 473 is fatal to
made on an invalid declaration of intent
an applicant's petition for naturalization.
d. Upon failure to comply with the requirements
for the education of minor children
The Certificate of Arrival should prove that respondent's e. If the person allows himself to be a dummy
entry to the country is lawful. Without it, his Petition for for aliens
Naturalization is incomplete and must be denied outright.
The possession of an alien registration certificate
The Declaration of intention is entirely different from the unaccompanied by proof of performance of acts
Certificate of Arrival; the latter is just as important because whereby Philippine citizenship had been lost was not
it proves that the applicant's entry to the country was not adequate proof of loss of citizenship.
illegal - that he was a documented alien whose arrival and
presence in the country is in good faith and with evident In order that citizenship may be lost through
intention to submit to and abide by the laws of the Republic. renunciation, such renunciation must be express. The
mere application of an alien certificate of registration
In naturalization proceedings, the burden of proof is upon does not amount to renunciation.
the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the
requirements of the law. The opportunity of a foreigner to
become a citizen by naturalization is a mere matter of grace,
favor or privilege extended to him by the State; the RE-ACQUISITON OF CITIZENSHIP OR REPATRIATION
applicant does not possess any natural, inherent, existing or
vested right to be admitted to Philippine citizenship. Citizenship once lost may be reacquired either by
naturalization or by repatriation or by direct grant by law.
For women who have lost their citizenship through marriage to

aliens, and for natural born Filipinos, including their minor
children, as well as persons who have lost their citizenship on
Loss and Re-acquisition of Citizenship or Reparation
account of economic or political necessity, and who are not
disqualified, repatriation is accomplished by the taking the
SEC. 3, ARTICLE IV oath of allegiance to the Republic and registering in the
proper Civil Registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.
Processing of applications is done by the Special Committee on
Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the
Naturalization consisting of the Solicitor General as Chairman,
manner provided by law. an Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency.
Under RA 965 and RA 2630, those who lost citizenship by

LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP
serving in the United States could avail of repatriation simply
by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic and
There are two laws on loss of citizenship:
registering the same in the Local Civil Registry where one
resides or where one last resided.
1. Commonwealth Act No. 63
However, now under Republic Act No. 8171 only the
This applies to both natural-born and naturalized
following may be repatriated:
citizenship.
1. Women who lost citizenship by marriage
Section 1 provides, subject to stated exception, that
2. Those who lost citizenship for political or
citizenship is lost by naturalization in a foreign
economic reasons
country:
a. By express renunciation of citizenship

b. By oath of allegiance to a foreign country
c. By rendering service in the armed forces of a
foreign country
SEC. 2, R.A. NO. 8171 violation of California Penal Code, Section 243.4 (D). Hence,
he is now an undocumented and undesirable alien and may
Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath be summarily deported pursuant to Law and Intelligence
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and Instructions No. 53 issued by then Commissioner Miriam
registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau or Defensor Santiago to effect his deportation.
Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon
It is, thus, apparent that respondent has lost his privilege to
cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue remain in the country.
the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the
repatriated citizen. He filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order alleging that he was not afforded due process; that no
Under this statutory law, registration is an essential warrant of arrest for deportation may be issued by
element. immigration authorities before a final order of deportation is
made; that no notice of the cancellation of his passport was
Since repatriation is the reacquisition of lost citizenship and made by the U.S. Embassy; that he is entitled to admission
not the acquisition of a new citizenship, one who is repatriated or to a change of his immigration status as a non-quota
regains the level of his former citizenship. If he was immigrant because he is married to a Filipino citizen as
previously a natural-born Filipino citizen, upon repatriation he provided in Section 13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine
or she regains his or her natural born citizenship. Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines prior to his derivative naturalization
Meanwhile, jurisprudence provides that the effective date of a when he was seven years old due to the naturalization of his
grant of repatriation is reckoned on the date of application for father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968.
repatriation, not the date when repatriation is approved.
At the time Joevanie Tabasa filed said petition, he was
What may be gathered from these jurisprudence is that it already 35 years old.
values natural born citizenship highly and will facilitate giving
it back to its former possessor as to a prodigal son if it was On June 13, 1996, he also filed a Supplemental Petition
once lost. alleging that he had acquired Filipino citizenship by
repatriation in accordance with Republic Act No. 8171 (RA
Hence, Sec. 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 compels natural born 8171), and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he
Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign cannot be deported or detained by the Bureau of
country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine Immigration and Deportation. He theorizes that he could be
citizenship to take the oath of allegiance under Sec. 3 of repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-
R.A. No.9225, and for those seeking elective public offices in born Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by
the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and derivative naturalization when he was still a minor."
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous
to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as MAIN ISSUE: WON Tabasa validly reacquired
candidates in the Philippine election. Philippine citizenship under RA 8171.
TABASA v. COURT OF APPEALS (2006)

RULING
FACTS:
NO. RA 8171, "An Act Providing for the Repatriation of
Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine Citizenship
Philippines. In 1968, when he was seven years old, his by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos," was
father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of the enacted on October 23, 1995. It provides for the repatriation
United States and by derivative naturalization (citizenship of only two (2) classes of persons, viz:
derived from that of another as from a person who holds
citizenship by virtue of naturalization), he also acquired Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
American citizenship. marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost
their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on
He arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995, and was account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire
admitted as a "balikbayan" for one year. Thereafter, he was Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner
arrested and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of the provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as
Bureau of Immigration and Deporation on May 23, 1996, for amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a:
his return to the United States.
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated
He was accused of violating Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 1, with any association or group of persons who uphold and
Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code, which alleged that teach doctrines opposing organized government;
the U.S. Department of State has revoked Joevanie Arellano
Tabasa’s passport because he is the subject of an (2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety
outstanding federal warrant of arrest for violation of Section of violence, personal assault, or association for the
1073, "Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution," of Title 18 of predominance of their ideas;
the United States Code and one count of a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of California Penal Code, (3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
Section 12021(A)(1), and one count of sexual battery, in
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable of Filipinos that this measure is being proposed for approval
contagious diseases. by this body.
The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only Thus, assuming Tabasa is qualified under RA 8171, it is
to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account incumbent upon him to prove to the satisfaction of the SCN
of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children that the reason for his loss of citizenship was the decision of
of said natural-born Filipinos. If a parent who had renounced his parents to forfeit their Philippine citizenship for political
his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons or economic exigencies. He failed to undertake this crucial
later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation step, and thus, the sought relief is unsuccessful.
will also benefit his minor children according to the law.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that Tabasa was a

Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was still a minor, his
father was naturalized as an American citizen; and by
derivative naturalization, he acquired U.S. citizenship. He JACOT v. DAL (2008)
was no longer a minor at the time of his "repatriation" on
June 13, 1996 as he was already 35 years old. Therefore, FACTS:
he is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA
8171 as the privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who
are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition for Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who
repatriation. However, he can possibly reacquire Philippine became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December
citizenship by availing of the Citizenship Retention and Re- 1989.
acquisition Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9225) by simply
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship
Philippines.
under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the
He also failed to follow the procedure for reacquisition of Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act.
Philippine citizenship since he has to file his petition for
repatriation with the Special Committee on Naturalization He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of
(SCN), which was designated to process petitions for
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the
repatriation pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O.
No. 285) and not with the Court of Appeals. Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles,
California.
Even if Tabasa––now of legal age––can still apply for
repatriation under RA 8171, he nevertheless failed to prove The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of
that his parents relinquished their Philippine citizenship on
Approval of petitioner’s request, and on the same day,
account of political or economic necessity as provided for in
the law as he lost his Philippine citizenship by virtue of petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
operation of law. Under the Amended Rules and Regulations Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo.
Implementing RA 8171, the SCN requires a petitioner for
repatriation to set forth, among others, "the reason/s why On 27 September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued
petitioner lost his/her Filipino citizenship, whether by Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing
marriage in case of Filipino woman, or whether by political
petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines.
or economic necessity in case of [a] natural-born Filipino
citizen who lost his/her Filipino citizenship. In case of the
latter, such political or economic necessity should be Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his
specified." Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of the
Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin.
While it is true that renunciation of allegiance to one’s native
country is necessarily a political act, it does not follow that
the act is inevitably politically or economically motivated as On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for
there are other reasons why Filipinos relinquish their Disqualification before the COMELEC Provincial Office in
Philippine citizenship as illustrated by Congresswoman Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to
Andrea B. Domingo speech. renounce his US citizenship, as required under Section 5(2)
of Republic Act No. 9225.
In the speech of Congresswoman Domingo:
There are four types of Filipinos, the "economic refugees" Petitioner countered that his Oath of Allegiance to the
who go abroad to work because there is no work to be found Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG
in the country. Then we have the "political refugees" who and the oath contained in his Certificate of Candidacy
leave the country for fear of their lives because they are not
operated as an effective renunciation of his foreign
in consonance with the prevailing policy of government. The
third type is those who have committed crimes and would citizenship.
like to escape from the punishment of said crimes. Lastly,
we have those Filipinos who feel that they are not Filipinos, The 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held.
thereby seeking other citizenship elsewhere. The first two Petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the
have to leave the country not of choice, but rather out of position of Vice Mayor.
sacrifice to look for a better life, as well as for a safer abode
for themselves and their families. It is for these two types
officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with

COMELEC Second Division issued its Resolution disqualifying or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
the petitioner from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of
Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born
Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign
renunciation of his US citizenship.
country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section
The COMELEC Second Division explained that the 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally
9225 does not automatically bestow upon any person the execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
privilege to run for any elective public office. foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior
or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
It additionally ruled that the filing of a Certificate of
Candidacy cannot be considered as a renunciation of foreign
By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the
citizenship. Certificate of Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the
one contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does
Petitioner sought remedy from this Court via the present not constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought
Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225.
Revised Rules of Court, where he presented for the first time
an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United
PRINCIPLE/ DOCTRINE:
States and Any and All Foreign Citizenship" dated 7 February
2007. Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a
privilege granted by the State. This is mandated by
He executed an act of renunciation of his US citizenship, the 1987 Constitution under Section 3, Article IV,
separate from the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the which provides that citizenship may be lost or
Philippines he took before the Los Angeles PCG and his filing reacquired in the manner provided by law. The State
has the power to prescribe by law the qualifications,
of his Certificate of Candidacy.
procedure, and requirements for repatriation. It has
the power to determine if an applicant for repatriation
meets the requirements of the law for it is an inherent
power of the State to choose who will be its citizens,
ISSUE: and who can reacquire citizenship once it is lost. If the
applicant, fails to comply with said requirements, the
W/N petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in State is justified in rejecting the petition for
the 14 May 2007 local elections for his failure to make a repatriation
personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.
SOBEJANA v. COMELEC (2012)
RULING:
FACTS:
YES. Petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate for his failure
to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been
born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944.
His oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made
before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian
do not substantially comply with the requirement of a citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas
personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship Condon.
because these are distinct requirements to be complied with
for different purposes. On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural- Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225
born citizens of the Philippines, who are already naturalized otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of Acquisition Act of 2003."
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or
retain their Philippine citizenship. The application was approved and the petitioner took her
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the December 5, 2005.
Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is
nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs,
public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated
or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public Australian citizen.
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is to
Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. say that it is only for ceremonial purposes; it would also
accommodate a mere qualified or temporary allegiance from
She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 government officers when the Constitution and the
elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She legislature clearly demand otherwise.
obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed
as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May
13, 2010. MAQUILING v. COMELEC (2013)
FACTS:
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar,
Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M. Bautista, (private Rommel Arnado y Cagoco is a natural born Filipino citizen.
respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization
separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his
petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. Filipino citizenship. He applied for repatriation under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General
The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA and took the Oath
from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10,
dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his
any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as favor.
imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his
since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian foreign citizenship.
citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently
complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act After which on November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his
of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Australian citizenship. Norte claiming, among others, that he is eligible for the
office he seeks to be elected.
ISSUE: For purposes of determining the petitioner’s
eligibility to run for public office, W/N the "sworn On 28 April 2010, however, Linog C. Balua, another
renunciation of foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) of mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado
R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma requirement. and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal
mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte contending that
Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and
that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued
by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating
RULING: the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." To further
bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented
YES. Petitioner is disqualified from running for elective office in a computer-generated travel record dated 03 December
for failure to renounce her Australian citizenship in 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport
accordance with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines.
The petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship He likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of
when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name
Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she held
dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine. "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available
Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent travel
elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian records:
citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the
same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of
DATE OF Arrival: 01/12/2010
Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship
NATIONALITY: USA-AMERICAN
must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer
PASSPORT: 057782700
oath.
DATE OF Arrival: 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY: USA-AMERICAN
At the outset, it bears stressing that the Court’s duty to PASSPORT: 057782700
interpret the law according to its true intent is exercised only
when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning. The
language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. After Arnado was subsequently proclaimed as the winning
candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte he filed
The same meaning was emphasized in Jacot v. Dal, when his answer against Balua’s petition.
we held that Filipinos re-acquiring or retaining their
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 must explicitly The Comelec En Banc, however, reversed and set aside the
renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for
ruling of the First Division by holding that he embraced his
elective posts in the Philippines.
Philippine Citizenship by his renunciation of his US accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the
citizenship on April 3, 2009, as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and
with this, it is as though he never became a citizen of country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice
another country. It further held that the use of a US passport are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election
does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen or appointment to public office are required to renounce
prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust.
succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to "un- Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance
renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. to the Republic and to no other.
Casan Macode Maquiling, who received the second highest Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are
number of votes next to Arnado, filed the instant petition not considered at all in determining the winner of an
questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to election.
run for public office despite his continued use of a US
passport, and praying that he be proclaimed as the winner With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the
in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified candidates.
MAIN ISSUE: WON the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications
for public office. IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE
TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES (2012)
RULING:
FACTS:
YES. Qualifications for public office are continuing
requirements and must be possessed not only at the time
of appointment or election or assumption of office but Epifanio B. Muneses alleged that he became a member of
during the officer's entire tenure. the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 21,
1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he
Indeed, Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to became a citizen of the United States of America (USA) on
qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-
Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
question that after performing these twin requirements
Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as
required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the
a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the
became eligible to run for public office. Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law.
Attached to the petition were several documents in support
However, this legal presumption does not operate of his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit:
permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing
1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before
the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts Consul General Domingo P. Nolasco;
showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to 2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of
attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he same date;
continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the 3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of
country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 same date;
November 2009.
4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of
membership dues with the IBP;
The Court ruled that such act of using a foreign passport did
not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he 5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal
acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself Education (MCLE).
as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively
MAIN ISSUE: WON he may be readmitted to the practice
reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such
of law after availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225.
reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant
Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using
RULING: YES. The Court reiterated that Filipino
his US passport. In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and
a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of
April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used law. The loss thereof means termination of the
his American passport after renouncing his American membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage
citizenship. in the practice of law.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of However, under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed the portion where they built their house is public land and
to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking part of the salvage zone.
the oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease
re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, Application3 (MLA) over the subject land with the
remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law at the Community Environment and Natural Resources
is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application,
intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice. Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the
application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian
Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal
Court for the practice of law, the Office of the Bar Confidant complaint for falsification of public documents under Article
required the Muneses to submit the original or certified 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463)
true copies of the following documents in relation to his against the petitioner.
petition: ¹brÎ±rÃ¿
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship; under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225, (R.A. 9225)
as evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship); 075 issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines
(Toronto) on October 11, 2007.
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed
his application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine
Immigration;
citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO
5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP; officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino. He further
alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who
6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments misrepresented to him that the subject property was titled
of annual membership dues; land and they have the right and authority to convey the
same. The dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil
7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and and criminal suits between him and private respondent’s
family.
8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.
On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information
The OBC further required the him to update his and before his arrest, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for
compliance, particularly with the MCLE to which he Re-Determination of Probable Cause in the MTC.
complied and after all the requirements were satisfactorily Interpreting the provisions of the law relied upon by
complied with and finding that the he has met all the petitioner, the said court denied the motion, holding that
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those who became
membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the he foreign citizens during its effectivity, and those who lost
be allowed to resume his practice of law which was granted their Philippine citizenship before its enactment when the
by the Court subject to the condition that he shall re-take governing law was Commonwealth Act No. 63 (CA 63).
the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was
alleged and admitted to have been committed on April 12,
subject to the payment of appropriate fees.
2007 before he had reacquired his Philippine citizenship,
the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a
Canadian citizen.
Principle:
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a
A Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse
and later reacquires hi Philippine citizenship under RA of discretion on the part of the MTC. He asserted that the
March 22, 2011 Order disregarded the legal fiction that
9225, remains a member of the Philippine Bar.
once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had been
naturalized in another country re-acquires his citizenship
under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not
DAVID v. AGBAY (2015) to have been lost on account of said naturalization.
FACTS: He is now before us arguing that by supporting his
prosecution for falsification, the lower court has
In 1974, Renato M. David migrated to Canada where he disregarded the undisputed fact that he is a natural-born
became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their Filipino citizen, and that by re-acquiring the same status
retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the under R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal fiction "deemed not
Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600- to have lost" it at the time of his naturalization in Canada
square meter lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, and through the time when he was said to have falsely
Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential claimed Philippine citizenship. Likewise, by compelling him
to first return from his legal residence in Canada and to
house. However, in the year 2004, they came to know that
surrender or allow himself to be arrested under a warrant
for his alleged false claim to Philippine citizenship, the That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and
lower court has pre-empted his right through his wife and retention of Philippine citizenship was made clear in the
counsel to question the validity of the said warrant of arrest discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the
against him before the same is implemented, which is Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate
tantamount to a denial of due process. Bill No. 2130 held on August 18, 2003, where Senator
Franklin Drilon was responding to the query of
Representative Exequiel Javier.
MAIN ISSUE: May David be indicted for falsification for
representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate
Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of version is precisely retention and reacquisition. The
Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225? reacquisition will apply to those who lost their
Philippine citizenship by virtue of Commonwealth
Act 63. Upon the effectivity -- assuming that we can agree
RULING: on this, upon the effectivity of this new measure amending
Commonwealth Act 63, the Filipinos who lost their
Yes, David may be indicted for falsification. citizenship is deemed to have reacquired their Philippine
citizenship upon the effectivity of the act.
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention
and Re- acquisition Act of 2003," was signed into law by The second aspect is the retention of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Philippine citizenship applying to future
instances. So that’s the distinction.
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos
who have become citizens of another country shall be REP. JAVIER. Well, I’m just asking this question
deemed "not to have lost their Philippine citizenship," such because we are here making distinctions between
is qualified by the phrase "under the conditions of this Act." natural-born citizens. Because this is very
Section 3 lays down such conditions for two categories of important for certain government positions, ‘no,
natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second because natural-born citizens are only qualified
paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural- for a specific…
born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct.
naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-
acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second and under the law.
paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the to that later on. It’s one of the provisions, yes. But
same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for just for purposes of the explanation,
both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who Congressman Javier, that is our
became citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology conceptualization. Reacquired for those who
used is different, "re-acquired" for the first group, previously lost [Filipino citizenship] by
and "retain" for the second group. virtue of Commonwealth Act 63, and
retention for those in the future. (Emphasis
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural- supplied)
born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after
the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian
Section 3 is "Retention of Philippine Citizenship", the citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to
authors of the law intentionally employed the terms "re- the first category of natural- born Filipinos under the first
acquire" and "retain" to describe the legal effect of taking paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by
the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows
This is also evident from the title of the law using both re- dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine
acquisition and retention. citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner
they shall be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine at the time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss
citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of
naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of
which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in
declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who
the provision in the old law which takes away Philippine became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In
citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers
naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing dual Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost
citizenship, and also provides for the procedure for re- their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with
acquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such
of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 policy governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.
took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship
despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-
they took the oath of allegiance under the new law. acquisition and retention in R.A. 9225. He asserts that in
criminal cases, that interpretation of the law which favors
the accused is preferred because it is consistent with the
constitutional presumption of innocence, and in this case it the rule on succession should be followed. Arnado moved for
becomes more relevant when a seemingly difficult question reconsideration.
of law is expected to have been understood by the accused,
who is a non-lawyer, at the time of the commission of the
In the meantime, Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling),
alleged offense. These contentions have no merit.
another mayoralty candidate who garnered the second
Petitioner’s plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable highest number of votes, intervened in the case. He argued
to the accused is likewise misplaced. Courts adopt an that the Comelec First Division erred in applying the rule on
interpretation more favorable to the accused following the succession. However, the Comelec En Banc reversed the
time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed ruling of the Comelec First Division. It held that Arnado's use
strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the of his US passport did not operate to revert his status to
accused. R.A. 9225, however, is not a penal law. dual citizenship. The Comelec En Banc found merit in
Arnado's explanation that he continued to use his US
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a passport because he did not yet know that he had been
public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of issued a Philippine passport at the time of the relevant
the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still foreign trips. The Comelec En Banc further noted that, after
a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the receiving his Philippine passport, Arnado used the same for
time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization his subsequent trips.
in a foreign country was among those ways by which a
natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While Maquiling then sought recourse to this Court by filing a
he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six petition. Voting 10-5, this Court annulled and set aside the
months later, the falsification was already a consummated Comelec En Banc's February 2, 2011 Resolution, disqualified
act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his Arnado from running for elective position, and declared
dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did Maquiling as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public Del Norte in the May 10, 2010 elections.
document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
(NOTE: This part involves the 2013 elections; the

2010 elections case was stretched until 2013)
ARNADO v. COMELEC (2015)
FACTS: The following day, Capitan, Arnado's lone rival for the
mayoralty post, filed a Petition seeking to disqualify him
from running for municipal mayor of Kauswagan and/or to
Rommel Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his
cancel his CoC based on the ruling of this Court in Maquiling.
Philippine citizenship after he was naturalized as citizen of
Resolution of said petition was, however, overtaken by the
the United States of America (USA). Subsequently, and in
May 13, 2013 elections where Arnado garnered 8,902 votes
preparation for his plans to run for public office in the
(84% of the total votes cast) while Capitan obtained 1,707
Philippines, Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic
(16% of the total votes cast) votes only.
Act No. 9225 (RA 9225) before the Consul General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA. He took an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008 Unfazed, Capitan filed another Petition this time seeking to
and, on even date, an Order of Approval of Citizenship nullify Arnado's proclamation. On September 6, 2013, the
Retention and Re acquisition was issued in his favor. On April Comelec Second Division granted the petition and disqualify
3, 2009, Arnado executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his Arnado from running in the May 13, 2013 elections.
foreign citizenship. Following Maquiling, it ratiocinated that at the time he filed
his CoC on October 1, 2012, Arnado still failed to comply
with the requirement of RA 9225 of making a personal and
On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. While
Candidacy (CoC) for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan,
he executed the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the
Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 national and local
same was deemed withdrawn or recalled when he
elections.
subsequently traveled abroad using his US passport, as held
in Maquiling.
Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate,
however, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to
cancel his CoC on the ground, among others, that Arnado The Comelec Second Division also noted that Arnado failed
remained a US citizen because he continued to use his US to execute another Affidavit of Renunciation for purposes of
passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines after the May 13, 2013 elections.
executing aforesaid Affidavit of Renunciation.
Arnado garnered the highest number of votes for the MAIN ISSUE:
mayoralty post of Kauswagan and was proclaimed the 1. Has Arnado already satisfied the twin requirements
winning candidate. However, on October 5, 2010, the of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 at the time he filed his
Comelec First Division issued a Resolution holding that CoC for the May 13, 2013 election?
Arnado's continued use of his US passport effectively OTHER ISSUE:
negated his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Thus, he
was disqualified to run for public office for failure to comply 2. May popular vote cure the ineligibility of a
with the requirements of RA 9225. The Comelec First candidate?
Division accordingly nullified his proclamation and held that
RULNG: up to the time he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections, Arnado
had not cured the defect in his qualification.
1. No, Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin Maquiling, therefore, is binding on and applicable to this
requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225. case following the salutary doctrine of stare decisis et non
quieta movere, which means to adhere to precedents, and
Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person not to unsettle things which are established.
with "dual citizenship" is disqualified from running for any
elective local position. In Mercado v. Manzano, it was It may not be amiss to add that as early as 2010, the year
clarified that the phrase "dual citizenship" in said Section when Balua filed a petition to disqualify him, Arnado has
4(d) must be understood as referring to "dual gotten wind that the use of his US passport might pose a
allegiance.'' Subsequently, Congress enacted RA 9225 problem to his candidacy. In other words, when Arnado filed
allowing natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have his CoC on October 1, 2012, he was not totally unaware that
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their the use of his US passport after he had executed the
naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and Affidavit of Renunciation might have an impact on his
to enjoy full civil and political rights upon compliance with qualification and candidacy. In fact, at that
the requirements of the law. time, Maquiling had already reached this Court. But despite
the petitions filed against him questioning his qualification
They may now run for public office in the Philippines to run for public office in 2010, Arnado filed his CoC on
provided that they: (1) meet the qualifications for October 1, 2012 unmindful of any possible legal setbacks in
holding such public office as required by the his candidacy for the 2013 elections and without executing
Constitution and existing laws; and, (2) make a another Affidavit of Renunciation.
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenships before any public officer Consistent with our April 16, 2013 ruling in Maquiling,
authorized to administer an oath prior to or at the Arnado should be made to face the consequences of his
time of filing of their CoC. inaction since he could have remedied it at the time he filed
his CoC on October 1, 2012 or even before that. There is
In the case at bench, the Comelec Second Division, as no law prohibiting him from executing an Affidavit of
affirmed by the Comelec En Banc, ruled that Arnado failed Renunciation every election period if only to avert
to comply with the second requisite of Section 5 (2) of RA possible questions about his qualifications.
9225 because, as held in Maquiling v. Commission on
Elections, his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was In another note, the alleged November 30, 2009 Affidavit of
deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance cannot be given any
executing said affidavit. probative weight. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, the original or certified true copy thereof was not
The ruling in Maquiling is indeed novel in the sense that it presented. In addition, such crucial evidence sufficient to
was the first case dealing with the effect of the use of a alter the outcome of the case was never presented before
foreign passport on the qualification to run for public office the Comelec much less in the Maquiling case. Curiously, it
of a natural-born Filipino citizen who was naturalized abroad only surfaced for the first time in this petition.
and subsequently availed of the privileges under RA 9225.
It was settled in that case that the use of a foreign passport 2. No, landslide election victory cannot override
amounts to repudiation or recantation of the oath of eligibility requirements.
renunciation. Yet, despite the issue being novel and of first
impression, plus the fact that Arnado could not have divined In Maquiling, this Court emphasized that popular vote does
the possible adverse consequences of using his US passport, not cure the ineligibility of a candidate. Thus, while in this
the Court in Maquiling did not act with leniency or case Arnado won by landslide majority during the 2013
benevolence towards Arnado. elections, garnering 84% of the total votes cast, the same
"cannot override the constitutional and statutory
Voting 10-5, the Court ruled that matters dealing with requirements for qualifications and disqualifications."
qualifications for public elective office must be strictly
complied with. Otherwise stated, the Court in Maquiling did In Velasco v. Comelec, this Court pronounced that
not consider the novelty of the issue as to excuse Arnado election victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass
from strictly complying with the eligibility requirements to election eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain
run for public office or to simply allow him to correct the provisions of laws pertaining to elections will become
deficiency in his qualification by submitting another oath of toothless. One of which is Section 39 of the Local
renunciation. Thus, it is with more reason that in this Government Code of 1991, which specifies the basic positive
case, we should similarly require strict compliance qualifications of local government officials. If in Velasco the
with the qualifications to run for local elective office. Court ruled that popular vote cannot override the required
qualifications under Section 39, a fortiori, there is no reason
The circumstances surrounding the qualification of Arnado why the Court should not follow the same policy when it
to run for public office during the May 10, 2010 and May 13, comes to disqualifications enumerated under Section 40 of
2013 elections, to reiterate for emphasis, are the same. the same law.
After all, "[t]he qualifications set out in [Section 39] are

Arnado's use of his US passport in 2009 invalidated his oath
roughly half of the requirements for election to local public
of renunciation resulting in his disqualification to run for
offices. The other half is contained in the succeeding section
mayor of Kauswagan in the 2010 elections. Since then and
which lays down the circumstances that disqualify local Batanes despite being a Canadian citizen and a nonresident
candidates.” thereof.
Finally, this case is strikingly similar to the case of Lopez v.

Caballero argued that prior to the filing of his COC on
Comelec. In that case, petitioner Lopez was also a natural-
October 3, 2012, he took an Oath of Allegiance to the
born Filipino who lost his Philippine citizenship after he
Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul
became a naturalized US citizen. He later reacquired his
General in Toronto, Canada on September 13, 2012 and
Philippine citizenship by virtue of RA 9225. Thereafter, Lopez
became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to
filed his candidacy for Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225, otherwise known as
Dionisio, Iloilo held on October 29, 2007 without first making
the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.
a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
In spite of the fact that Lopez won in the elections, this Court
still affmned the Resolution of the Comelec disqualifying Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and
Lopez as a candidate for a local elective position for his executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public
failure to comply with the requirements of Section 5(2) of in Batanes on October 1, 2012 to conform with Section 5(2)
RA 9225. of RA No. 9225. He claimed that he did not lose his domicile
of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite becoming a Canadian
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his citizen as he merely left Uyugan temporarily to pursue a
oath and began to discharge the functions of Barangay brighter future for him and his family; and that he went back
Chairman, his victory cannot cure the defect of his to Uyugan during his vacation while working in Nigeria,
candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not California, and finally in Canada.
validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a
disqualification is not a matter of popularity. Resolution finding that petitioner made a material
misrepresentation in his COC when he declared that he is a
resident of Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes within one
PRINCIPLES: year prior to the election.
It found that while Caballero complied with the requirements

MAQUILING RULE of RA No. 9225 since he had taken his Oath of Allegiance to
the Philippines and had validly renounced his Canadian
The use of a foreign passport amounts to repudiation or citizenship, he failed to comply with the other requirements
recantation of the oath of renunciation. Matters dealing with provided under RA No. 9225 for those seeking elective
qualifications for public elective office must be strictly office, i.e., persons who renounced their foreign citizenship
complied with. must still comply with the one year residency requirement
provided for under Section 39 of the Local Government
Likewise, popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a Code. His naturalization as a Canadian citizen resulted in the
candidate. abandonment of his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes;
thus, having abandoned his domicile of origin, it is
incumbent upon him to prove that he was able to reestablish
STARE DECISIS ET NON QUIETA MOVERE his domicile in Uyugan for him to be eligible to run for
elective office in said locality which he failed to do.
When the court has once laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that Elections were subsequently held on May 13, 2013 and the
principle and apply it to all future cases where facts are election returns showed that petitioner won over private
substantially the same. It enjoins adherence to judicial respondent. On May 14, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed
precedents and bars relitigation of the same issue. Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes. However, on December 12,
2013, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a
Writ of Execution. Private respondent took his Oath of
Office on December 20, 2013, hence, petitioner filed this
case.
CABALLERO v. COMELEC (2015) Petitioner claims that he did not abandon his Philippine
FACTS: domicile. He argues that he was born and baptized in
Uyugan, Batanes; studied and had worked therein for a
couple of years, and had paid his community tax certificate;
Rogelio Batin Caballero and private respondent Jonathan and, that he was a registered voter and had exercised his
Enrique V. Nanud, Jr. were both candidates for the right of suffrage and even built his house therein. He also
mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province contends that he usually comes back to Uyugan, Batanes
of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections. during his vacations from work abroad, thus, his domicile
had not been lost. Petitioner avers that the requirement of
Nanud, Jr. filed a Petition to deny due course to or the law in fixing the residence qualification of a candidate
cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy alleging running for public office is not strictly on the period of
that the latter made a false representation when he declared residence in the place where he seeks to be elected but on
in his COC that he was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, the acquaintance by the candidate on his constituents' vital
needs for their common welfare; and that his nine months
of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior to his election is a time, eventually intends to return and remain
substantial compliance with the law. (animus manendi)."
MAIN ISSUE: A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at

1. Did Caballero abandoned his Philippine Domicile birth. It is usually the place where the child's
when he worked in several foreign countries for parents reside and continues until the same is
“greener pasture”? abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile
2. Did Caballero substantially complied with the of choice). It consists not only in the intention to
requirement of law on residency when he reside in a fixed place but also personal presence
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking oath of in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
allegiance to the Philippine government nine such intention.
months prior to his election on May 13, 2013?
Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born
Ruling: and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be
1. Yes, Caballero abandoned his domicile when said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan,
he worked in several foreign countries. Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and
became a Canadian citizen.
RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, declares In Coquilla v. COMELEC we ruled that
that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who naturalization in a foreign country may result in an
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country,
can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship This holds true in petitioner's case as permanent
under the conditions of the law. resident status in Canada is required for the
acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Hence,
The law does not provide for residency requirement petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in
for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine the Philippines and transferred his domicile of
citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan,
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada
on the current residence of the concerned natural- cannot be considered as waiver of such
born Filipino. abandonment.
RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of

residence. This is only logical and consistent with 2. No. Caballero’s retention of his Philippine
the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not
citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, automatically make him regain his residence
at the same time, both Philippine and foreign in Uyugan, Batanes.
citizenships, he may establish residence either in
the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he In Japzon v. COMELEC, wherein respondent Ty
is also a citizen. reacquired his Philippine citizenship under RA No.
9225 and run for Mayor of General Macarthur,
However, when a natural-born Filipino with Eastern Samar and whose residency in the said
dual citizenship seeks for an elective public place was put in issue, we had the occasion to
office, residency in the Philippines becomes state, thus:cralawJapzon’s reacquisition of his
material. Section 5(2) of FLA No. 9225 provides: Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
Those seeking elective public office in the 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his
Philippines shall meet the qualifications for residence/domicile. He could still retain his
holding such public office as required by the domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of regain his domicile in the Municipality of General
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all had the option to again establish his domicile in the
foreign citizenship before any public officer Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
authorized to administer an oath. Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile
Sec. 39 of the Republic Act No. 7160, which is of choice. The length of his residence therein shall
known as the Local Government Code of be determined from the time he made it his
1991, provides, among others, for the domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the
qualifications of an elective local official. It clearly time of his birth.
requires that the candidate must be a resident of
the place where he seeks to be elected at least one In this case, Caballero must still prove that after
year immediately preceding the election day. becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13,
2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his
The term "residence" is to be understood not in new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the
its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" time he made it as such.
or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal
residence, that is, "the place where a party actually The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to
or constructively has his permanent home, where present competent evidence to prove that he was
he, no matter where he may be found at any given able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a
period of one year immediately preceding the May
13, 2013 elections. It found that it was only after CHUA v. COMELEC (2016)
reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by virtue of RA What do this case seek to resolve?
No. 9225 on September 13, 2012 that petitioner Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the
can rightfully claim that he re-established his Commission on Elections Resolutions dated October 17,
domicile in Uyugan, Batanes, if such was 2013 and January 30, 2015
accompanied by physical presence thereat, coupled
with an actual intent to reestablish his domicile Why?
there. However, the period from September 13, The Commission on Elections annulled the "proclamation
2012 to May 12, 2013 was even less than the one of... Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua as Councilor for the
year residency required by law. Fourth District of Manila[,]" and directed the Board of
Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim Krystle Marie C.
Petitioner's argument that his nine (9) months of Bacani (Bacani) as Councilor for having garnered the next
actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes, prior to the May highest number of votes.
13, 2013 local elections is a substantial compliance
with the law, is not persuasive. FACTS:
October 3, 2012 - Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua (Chua)
filed her Certificate of Candidacy for Councilor for the Fourth
District of Manila during the May 13, 2013 National and Local
Elections
PRINCIPLE IN THIS CASE The Fourth District of Manila is entitled to six (6)
Naturalization in a foreign country may result in an seats in the Sangguniang Panlungsod
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. Frequent visits
to the old domicile in the Philippines during a vacation Chua garnered the sixth highest number of votes. May 15,
cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment of 2013 - She was proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers
someone’s new domicile in a foreign country.
Imelda E. Fragata (Fragata) - filed a Petition] captioned
as a "petition to declare [Chua] as a nuisance candidate"]
and "to deny due course and/or cancel [Chua's] Certificate
PRINCIPLE ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF ELECTIONS of Candidacy."
LAWS: When? On the date of Chua’s proclamation – May 15, 2013
In what capacity? She was allegedly a registered voter in
As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests
the Fourth District.
are to be liberally construed in order that the will of the
Claims? Chua was unqualified to run for Councilor on two
people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated
grounds:
by mere technical objections. Moreover, it is neither fair nor
(1) Chua was not a Filipino citizen, and
just to keep in office, for an indefinite period, one whose
(2) she was a permanent resident of the United States
right to it is uncertain and under suspicion. It is imperative
of America.
that his claim be immediately cleared, not only for the
benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest,
What were Fragata’s allegations?
which can only be achieved by brushing aside technicalities
It was stated in her petition that Chua:
of procedure that protract and delay the trial of an ordinary
1. Not a Filipino Citizen.
action.
2. Prior to the filing of her candidacy, [Chua] has been
living in the United States of America (USA) for at
least 33 years.
RESIDENCE
3. [Chua] is an immigrant and was validly issued a
It is to be understood not in its common acceptation as Green Card by the Government of the USA
referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to 4. She resided and continues to reside [in Georgia,
"domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a USA].
party actually or constructively has his permanent home, 5. [Chua] has been a Registered Professional Nurse in
where he, no matter where he may be found at any given the State of Georgia, USA since November 17,
time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus 1990.
manendi)." 6. [Chua's] Professional License in the USA is still to
expire in 31 January 2014.
DOMICILE She prayed that Chua "be disqualified as a candidate for the
position of councilor in the Fourth District of the City of
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It
Manila.
is usually the place where the child's parents reside and
continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new
Chua’s Defense:
domicile (domicile of choice). It consists not only in the
1. That she was a natural-born Filipino, born to
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
Filipino parents in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija.
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
2. With respect to her residency, Chua alleged that
such intention.
she had been residing in Sampaloc, Manila since
2008 and had more than complied with the one-
year period required to run for Councilor.
3. ALSO, Fragata’s petition was belatedly filed – disqualified to run for Councilor pursuant to Section 40 of
beyond 5 days from October 5, 2012, the last day the Local Government Code. Bacani was declared to have
of the filing of certificates of candidacy. the sixth highest number of votes.
4. beyond 25 days from October 3, 2012,[24] the
date Chua filed her Certificate of Candidacy. ARGUMENTS:
a. Proper remedy should have been quo Chua:
warranto (Sec. 253 of the OEC) 1. Fragata belatedly filed her Petition before the
Commission on Elections
Who intervened? should have been filed within five (5) days from the last
day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later
June 19, 2013 – Bacani, Motion to Intervene with than 25 days from the time of the filing of the certificate
Manifestation and Motion to Annul Proclamation; that she of candidacy assailed
likewise ran for Councilor in the Fourth District of Manila, Fragata filed the Petition on May 15, 2013, more than
and that after the canvassing of votes, she ranked seventh 25 days after Chua filed her Certificate of Candidacy on
among all the candidates, next to Chua; in case Chua be October 3, 2012
disqualified, she be proclaimed Councilor 2. should have respected the voice of the people
Allegations: Fragata, Bacani, Comelec:

1. Chua was a dual citizen 1. Fragata's Petition was a petition for disqualification
2. Order of BoI - Chua was allegedly naturalized as an assailing Chua's citizenship and status as a
American citizen on December 7, 1977. She was permanent resident in the United States
issued an American passport on July 14, 2006 2. Fragata filed on the date of Chua's proclamation,
3. Chua took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of was filed within the reglementary period
the Philippines on September 21, 2011. 3. Chua was a dual citizen at the time she filed her
Nonetheless, Chua allegedly continued on using her Certificate of Candidacy - ineligible to run for
American passport Councilor and was correctly considered a non-
a. October 16, 2012 Departure for the United candidate
States 4. Although Chua was already proclaimed, the will of
b. December 11, 2012 Arrival in the the people as expressed through the ballot cannot
Philippines cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
c. May 30, 2013 Departure for the United mistakenly believed that the candidate was
States qualified
4. Chua did not execute an oath of renunciation of her
American citizenship.
MAIN ISSUE:
Chua’s Defense: In Re Citizenship: WN Chua properly reacquired her
1. Motion was a belatedly filed petition to deny due citizenship, and thus, it cannot be a ground for her
course or cancel a certificate of candidacy, having disqualification
been filed after the day of the elections
2. Motion should not even be considered since she Case Issues:
was already proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers First, whether private respondent Imelda E. Fragata filed a
petition for disqualification or a petition to deny due course
Who resolved Fragata’s petition? or cancel certificate of candidacy; and
The Commission on Elections Second Division
It also allowed Bacani's Motion to Intervene (Why? If Second, whether the rule on succession under Section 45
disqualified, votes for Chua will not be counted, Bacani of the Local Government Code applies to this case.
would garner the sixth highest number of votes among the
qualified candidates) Ruling:
COMELEC ruled correctly.
As to the nature of Fragata’s Petition - it was one for
disqualification, regardless of the caption stating that it was On the first case issue:
a petition to declare Chua a nuisance candidate. Fragata timely filed her Petition before the Commission on
Elections. Under Rule 25, Section 3 of the Rules of Procedure
Fragata filed a petition for diaqualification (Rule 25, Section of the Commission, a petition for disqualification "shall be
3 of the Commission on Elections Rules of Procedure filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of
governs). candidacy, but not later that the date of proclamation."
Under the Rules, a petition for disqualification Private respondent Fragata filed her Petition on the date of
should be filed "any day after the last day for filing petitioner's proclamation on May 15, 2013.
of certificates of candidacy, but not later than the
date of the proclamation." Fragata filed the Petition Commission on Elections correctly admitted private
within this period, having filed it on the date of respondent Bacani's pleading-in-intervention.
Chua's proclamation on May 15, 2013.
On the second case issue:
Ruled in favor of Fragata and Bacani The Commission on Elections did not gravely abuse its
They found that Chua failed to take a sworn and personal discretion in disqualifying petitioner, annulling her
renunciation of her American citizenship required under proclamation, and subsequently proclaiming private
Section 5(2) of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition respondent Bacani as the duly elected Councilor for the
Act of 2003. the Commission held that Chua was Fourth District of Manila.
are void ab initio because they possess "a substantive

BACKGROUND OF CHUA [disqualifying circumstance] . . . [existing] prior to the filing
of their certificate of candidacy." Legally, they should not
1967 – Chua was born to Filipino parents which makes her even be considered candidates. The votes casted for them
a natural-born Filipino under the 1935 Constitution should be considered stray and should not be counted.
1977 – Chua became a naturalized American In cases of vacancies caused by those with void ab initio
Hence, she lost her Filipino citizenship pursuant to Section 1 certificates of candidacy, the person legally entitled to the
of Commonwealth Act No. 63. vacant position would be the candidate who garnered the
next highest number of votes among those eligible.
2011 - Chua took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of In this case, Bacani who is legally entitled to the position of
the Philippines, thus reacquiring her Filipino citizenship. Councilor, having garnered the sixth highest number of
votes among the eligible candidates.
However, up to the present, Chua failed to execute a sworn
and personal renunciation of her foreign citizenship Note. Elections are governed by rules that determine the
particularly required of those seeking elective public office. qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed
to participate as players. When there are participants who
Section 5(2) of the Citizenship Retention and Re- turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel
acquisition Act of 2003 is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of
the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in
SECTION 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those the rules to be eligible as candidate.
who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all CONCLUSION
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws Chua is a dual citizen correctly disqualified from running for
of the Philippines and the following conditions: the position of Councilor in the Fourth District of Manila
.... during the 2013 National and Local elections. With her dual
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines citizenship existing prior to the filing of the certificate of
shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as candidacy, her Certificate of Candidacy was voidab initio.
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the She was correctly considered a non-candidate. All votes
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a casted for her were stray, and the person legally entitled to
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign the position is private respondent Krystle Marie C. Bacani,
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer the candidate with the next highest number of votes among
an oath[.] the eligible candidates. The Commission on Elections did not
gravely abuse its discretion in annulling Chua's proclamation
NOTE: Petitioner cannot claim that she has renounced her and subsequently proclaiming private respondent Bacani.
American citizenship by taking the Oath of Allegiance. They
are separate requirements – the personal renunciation of Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DISMISSED.
foreign citizenship is an an additional requirement for
qualification to run for public office (Jacot v. Dal).
The oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of

Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the one TAN v. CRISOLOGO (2017)
contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not What must be resolved?
constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought Petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by petitioner Vivenne
under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. K. Tan - assailing the 20 April 2010 Decision and the 1
October 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals where It
The said oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all ruled that the RTC B95 of QC exercised grave abuse of
those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; disretion when it reversed the decision of the MeTC B37 of
while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional QC – to exclude Tan from the voter's list of Precinct 0853-A
requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired of Barangay Sto. Domingo, Quezon City.
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who
seek elective public posts, considering their special FACTS:
circumstance of having more than one citizenship 19 January 1993 – Tan was born to Filipino parents, became
a naturalized citizen of the United States of America.
THUS, 26 October 2009 - Tan applied to be registered as a voter in
Chua’s failure to execute a personal and sworn renunciation Quezon City; indicated that she was a Filipino Citizen by
of her American citizenship, petitioner was a dual citizen at birth
the time she filed her Certificate of Candidacy on October 3, It was approved by the Election Registration Board
2012. Under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, she (ERB) on 16 November 2009 making her a
was disqualified to run for Councilor in the Fourth District of registered voter of Precinct 0853-A, Sto. Domingo,
Manila during the 2013 National and Local Elections. Quezon City
On the argument that COMELEC violated Section 45(a)(l) of 30 November 2009 - Tan took an Oath of Allegiance to the
the Local Government Code Republic of the Philippines before a notary public in Makati
The rule on succession under Section 45, however, would City
not apply if the permanent vacancy was caused by one
whose certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. Specifically
with respect to dual citizens, their certificates of candidacy
1 December 2009 - petition before the Bureau of renounce her United States nationality together
Immigration (Bl) for the reacquisition of her Philippine with all rights and privileges and all duties and
citizenship; that she lost her Philippine citizenship when she allegiance and fidelity there unto pertaining before
became a naturalized American citizen; executed a sworn a notary public on December 1, 2009.
declaration renouncing her allegiance to the U.S.A.; BI With these acts of [Tan], she is deemed to have
confirmed her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship never lost her Filipino citizenship.
On the same day, Tan filed her Certificate of Candidacy

(CoC) for the 2010 National Elections to run as
congresswoman for the First District of Quezon City. Ruling of the CA
28 December 2009 - Vincent "Bing bong" Crisologo That the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
(Crisologo) filed a petition before the MeTC - seeking the amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in reversing
exclusion of Tan from the voter's list because: the decision of the MeTC
(1) she was not a Filipino citizen when she (1) The taking of the Oath of Allegiance is a condition
registered as a voter; and sine qua non for the reacquisition or retention of
(2) she failed to meet the residency requirement of Philippine citizenship by a naturalbom Filipino
the law. citizen who became a naturalized citizen of a
foreigncountry;
Defenses of Tan: (2) Section 2 of R.A. No. 9225,20 cannot be relied
(1) That she is a natural-born citizen having been born upon to declare that Tan never lost her Philippine
to Filipino parents on 1 April 1968 citizenship or that her reacquisition of such cured
(2) Although she was an American citizen on 19 the invalidity of her registration because the
January 1993, Tan claimed that since 1996 she had provision applies only to citizens of the Philippines
effectively renounced her American citizenship as at the time of the passage of R.A. No. 9225;
she had been continuously residing in the (3) R.A. No. 9225 contains no provision stating that it
Philippines. may be applied retroactively as regards natural-
found employment within the country and even set up a born citizens who became naturalized citizens .of a
school somewhere m Greenhills. foreign country prior to the effectivity of the said
law; and
Ruling of the MeTC (4) Tan must have first taken her Oath of Allegiance
before she can be validly registered as a voter
14 January 2010 - excluding Tan from the voter's list; that because R.A. No. 9225 itself says that individuals
she was not a Filipino citizen at the time that she registered with dual citizenships must comply with existing
as a voter laws for them to enjoy full civil and political rights.
If indeed she was a Filipino citizen on October 26, 2009, the
day she registered as a voter, she would not have been MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not Tan can be considered a
allowed to apply for Filipino citizenship as she was already a Philippine citizen at the time she registered as a voter.
Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
When she took her oath of allegiance on December 1, 2009,
she renounced any and all allegiance to the Government of A natural-born Filipino citizen who renounces his or her
the United States of America. This act is again a clear Philippine citizenship, effectively becomes a foreigner in the
showing that she was an American and not a Filipino citizen Philippines with no political right to participate in Philippine
at the time she registered as a voter on October 26, 2009. politics and governance.
Petition for her to be excluded as a voter is GRANTED. Right to Vote

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the
Ruling of the RTC Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law who are at
Reversed and Crisologo's petition was dismissed for lack of least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in
merit the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein
That Tan's questioned citizenship was cured they propose to vote for at least six months immediately
Tan upon registration as voter in the First District preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other
of Quezon City was still a naturalized American substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
Citizen. But her questioned citizenship was cured suffrage.
when [Tan] made the following acts:
1) She took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of in R.A. No. 8189
the Philippines on November 30, 2009; "[a]ll citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by
2) She filed a Petition for Reacquisition and/or law who are at least eighteen (18) years of age, and who
Retention of Philippine Citizenship under Republic shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year,
Act No. 9225 before the [BI]; and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least
3) On December 1, 2009, the [BI] has issued an six (6) months immediately preceding the election, may
Order granting the petition and ordering the register as a voter. "
issuance of a Certificate of Retention/Reacquisition
of Philippine Citizenship in favor of [Tan]; and Only Filipino citizens are qualified to vote and may be
4) Lastly, [Tan] executed a Sworn Declaration that included in the permanent list of voters. Thus, to be
she make a formal renunciation of her United registered a voter in the Philippines, the registrant
States nationality; that she absolutely and entirely
must be a citizen at the time he or she filed the

application. The plain meaning rule or verba legis is the most basic of all
statutory construction principles. When the words or
Tan filed her voter's registration application on 26 October language of a statute is clear, there may be no need to
2009, and that she only took her Oath of Allegiance to the interpret it in a manner different from what the word plainly
Republic of the Philippines on 30 November 2009, or more implies.
than a month after the ERB approved her application.
TAN’s ARGUMENTS: There is no conflict between the plain meaning rule and this
(1) her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through R.A. approach as the latter does not espouse going outside the
No. 9225 has a retroactive effect, such that a natural-born parameters of the statute. It merely adopts a broader
Filipino citizen is deemed never to have lost his or her approach towards the body of the law.
Filipino citizenship, and that
(2) the reacquisition cured any and all defects, assuming To harmonize, given the distinction between citizens who
any are existing, attendant during her registration as a have "reacquired" from those who "retained" Philippine
voter. citizenship,41 coupled with the legal effects of renunciation
of citizenship, Section 2 of R.A. No. 9225 cannot be used as
Under R.A. No. 9225, the reacquisition of Philippine basis for giving a retroactive application of the law. R.A. No.
citizenship requires only the taking of an oath of allegiance 9225 contains no provision stating that it may be applied
to the Republic of the Philippines. retroactively as regards natural-born citizens who became
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of naturalized citizens of a foreign country prior to the
law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of effectivity of the said law.
the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country Moreover, to consider that the reacquisition of
are deemed hereby to have reacquired Philippine citizenship Philippine citizenship retroacts to the date it was lost
upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: would result in an absurd scenario where a Filipino
I ____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that would still be considered a Philippine citizen when in
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of fact he had already renounced his citizenship.
the Philippines, and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept operation, unless the legislature intended to give them a
the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain retroactive effect.
true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this
obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental During the time Tan lost her Philippine citizenship, R.A. No.
reservation or purpose of evasion. 9225 was not yet enacted and the applicable law was still
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the Commonwealth Act No. 63.
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign Under this law, both the renunciation of Philippine
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking citizenship and the acquisition of a new citizenship
the aforesaid oath. in a foreign country through naturalization are
grounds to lose Philippine citizenship:
Tan’s Contentions: Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. - A Filipino
On the distinction between Filipino citizens who lost their citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways
Philippine citizenship prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 9225 and/or events:
and reacquired their citizenship under the same law from (1) By naturalization in a foreign country; (2) By express
those who lost their Philippine citizenship after R.A. No. renunciation of citizenship;
9225 was enacted and retained their citizenship xxx x
- this distinction does not substantially affect her
citizenship status because reacquiring or retaining CONCLUSION
Filipino citizenship has the same effect. Since the foregoing law was still effective when Tan became
an American citizen, the loss of her Philippine citizenship is
"[t]he renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath but a necessary consequence. As the applicable law at that
that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated time, Tan was presumed to know the legal effects of her
the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual choice to become a naturalized U.S. citizen. The loss of Tan's
renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment Philippine citizenship is reinforced by the fact that she
of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country voluntarily renounced her Philippine citizenship as a
which granted the citizenship." requirement to acquire U.S. citizenship.
All said, absent any legal basis for the retroactive application
Tan's act of acquiring U.S. citizenship had been a conscious of R.A. No. 9225, we agree with the CA that Tan was not a
and voluntary decision on her part. Filipino citizen at the time she registered as a voter and her
inclusion to the permanent voter's list is highly irregular.
Renunciation or the relinquishment of one's citizenship
requires a voluntary act for it to produce any legal effect. Petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
Tan took an Oath of Allegiance to the U.S.A. on 19 January

1993, prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on 29 August Marriage to an Alien Spouse
2003. If we were to effect as retroactive Tan's Philippine
citizenship to the date she lost her Philippine citizenship,
then the different use of the words "reacquire" and "retain" SEC. 4, ARTICLE IV
in R.A. No. 9225 would effectively be futile.
Such person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his
Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
citizenship, unless by their act or omission, they are
deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
Possible scenarios of dual citizenship
Under the 1987 provision, it makes no reference to sex unlike Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our
in the 1973 Constitution were it specifically directs to a Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of
female citizen of the Philippines, thus making the rule citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship.
applicable to both males and females on the chance that some
country might have a law which divests a foreign husband of
1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in
his citizenship.
foreign countries which follow the principle of jus
SEC. 1(7), COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63 soli.
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers
How citizenship may be lost.—A Filipino citizen may lose his and alien fathers if by the laws of their father’s
citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events: country;
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the
(7) In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner latter’s country the former are considered
if, by virtue of the law in force in her husband’s country, she citizens, unless by their act or omission they are
acquires his nationality. deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
[Mercado v. Manzano; Cordora v. COMELEC ,
February 19, 2009]
The 1973 Constitutional provision has repealed this
statutory law. The fact alone of marriage to an alien cannot
strip a Filipino woman of her Philippine citizenship. Only acts Dual Allegiance
and omissions, which under Article III, Section 4, Congress
may prescribe, constitute explicit or implicit renunciation of
citizenship. SEC. 5, ARTICLE IV
The 1973 provision, therefore, like Section 1(2), placed Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
the Filipino woman on the same level as the Filipino male. and shall be dealt with by law.
The provision, however, is prospective. It does not serve to

restore citizenship already lost by marriage under the old law. It is larger and more threatening than that of mere double
citizenship which is seldom intentional, and perhaps, never
insidious.
Dual Citizenship
It refers to that unsettled kind of allegiance of persons who are
It is often a function of the accident of marriage or of birth of already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be
foreign soil. bound by a second allegiance.
Since the universal rule is that the child follows the citizenship It refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
of the father, and since under Art. IV, Sec.1(2) the child also owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. Dual
follow the citizenship of the Filipino mother, and since under allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition. [Mercado v.
Sec. 4 the Filipino woman does not lose citizenship by marriage Manzano]
to an alien husband, it is clear that the Constitution allows for
the possibility of dual citizenship.
Congress has dealt with dual allegiance by allowing dual
If Philippine citizenship is acquired through naturalization, it is citizenship through R.A. 9225.
well within the power of Philippine law to require prior
renunciation of foreign nationality as a condition.
Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a
policy and is not a self-executing provision. [AASJS v.
By Sec. 3, it is well within the power of the legislature to make
Datumanong, May 11, 2007]
acquisition of foreign nationality a cause of loss of Philippine
citizenship, provided that the acquisition of a new citizenship is
not through marriage. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set
specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance
Dual citizenship arises when as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial
is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining
[Mercado v. Manzano]. Dual citizenship is voluntary. to dual allegiance. [AASJS v. Datumanong]
For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose

parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of
jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus
soli.
SEC. 3, REPUBLIC ACT 9225 (5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any
public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or
Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law extended to, those who:
to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country (a) are candidates for or are occupying any public
are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine office in the country of which they are naturalized
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to citizens; and/or
the Republic:
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-
"I _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) commissioned officers in the armed forces of the
that I will support and defend the Constitution of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of
the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will R.A. 9225: Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of
mental reservation or purpose of evasion." the State that all Philippine citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the conditions of this Act.
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the R.A. No. 9225 is a statute and has been described as such in
aforesaid oath. several cases.
They include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC where we

Although their civil and political rights are restored, there described it as an “abbreviated repatriation” process
are restrictions under Section 5 of the said law. that restores one’s Filipino citizenship.[Poe-
Llamanzares v. COMELEC, March 8,2016]
SEC. 5, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9225 General Policy
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities -

While Section 2 declares the general policy that
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Filipinos who have become citizens of another country
this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be shall be deemed “not to have lost their Philippine
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under citizenship,” such is qualified by the phrase “under the
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: conditions if this Act. [David v. Agbay, March 18,
2005]
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must
Meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the R.A. No. 9225 made natural-born Filipino’s status permanent
Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as and immutable despite naturalization as citizens of other
"The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other countries. [David v. SET]
existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall

meet the qualification for holding such public office as No Retroactive effect
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a R.A. No. 9225 contains no provision stating that it may be
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign applied retroactively as regards natural-born citizens who
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer became naturalized-born citizens who became naturalized
an oath; citizens of a foreign country prior to the effectivity of the said
law. [Tan v. Crisologo, November 8, 2017]
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and
swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Moreover, to consider that the reacquisition of Philippine
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their citizenship retroacts to the date it was lost would result in an
assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their absurd scenario where a Filipino would still be considered a
oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath; Philippine citizen when in fact he had already renounced his
citizenship. [Tan v. Crisologo]
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the
Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license In fact, correlating Sections 2 and 3 of the law would readily
or permit to engage in such practice; and reveal that only those falling under the second paragraph of
R.A No. 9225, ie., natural-born citizens who became
naturalized citizens of a foreign country after the effectivity
of the said law, shall be considered as to not have lost their
Philippine citizenship. [Tan v. Crisologo]
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship- any Derivative Citizenship

provision of law to te contrary withstanding, natural-born
citizens by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign Section 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child,
country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below 18 years of
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the age, those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity
Republic of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
“I, (name), solemnly swear that I renounce absolutely and Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to the (country shall enjoy full civil and political rights and subject to all
of citizenship), of which at this time I am a subject or citizen; attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines the Philippines and the following conditions:
and that I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
1. Those intending to exercise their right of
Commonwealth of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I
suffrage must meet the requirements under
recognize and accept the supreme authority of the United
Sec 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic
States of America in the Philippines and will maintain true faith
Act No. 9189, otherwise known “ The
and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003” and
myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
other existing laws;
evasion.“
Note: R.A 9225, in implicit acknowledgement that “duals” are

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid
R.A. 9189. [Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC, August 4, 2006]
oath.
Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both

Before and after effectivity
Philippine and foreign citizenship, he may establish residence
either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is
Note: the law thus makes a distinction between those also a citizen.
natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and
after the effectivity of R.A 9225. [David v. Agbay]
However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual-citizenship
seeks for an elective public office, residency in the Philippines
becomes material. [Caballero v. COMELEC, September 22,
2015]
NATURAL-BORN Filipinos naturalized in foreign
countries after R.A 9225
Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after Republic Act 9225 Requirements for Elective Officials
took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries “retain” that is,
keep their Philippine citizenship, although the effectivity of this
Section 5 (2). Those seeking elective public office in the
retention and the ability to exercise the rights and capacities
Philippines shall
attendant to this status are subject to certain solemnities (i.e.,
oath of allegiance and other requirements for specific rights
and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5). [David v. SET] 1. Meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and,
2. At the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation and any and
all foreign citizenship before any public officer
NATURAL-BORN Filipinos naturalized in foreign authorized to administer an oath;
countries before R.A 9225 3. Breaking down, the afore-quoted provision, for a
natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained hi
Those who became citizens of another country before the Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to
effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 “reacquire” their Philippine run for public office, he must:
citizenship and may exercise attendant rights and capacities,
also upon compliance with certain solemnities. [David v. SET] i. 1.meet the qualifications for holding
such public office as required by the
Oath required for both Constitution and existing laws; and
ii. make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenships before
The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories
any public officer authorized to
of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a
administer an oath. [De Guzman v.
foreign country, but the terminology used is different, “re-
COMELEC, June 19, 2009 citing Japzon
acquired” for the first group, and retain for the second group.
v. COMELEC]
[David v. Agbay]
Twin Requirements The ruling in Maquiling is indeed novel in the sense that it was
the first case dealing with the effect of the use of a foreign
In Japzon v. COMELEC, court held that Section 5(2) of R.A. No. passport on the qualification to run for public office of a natural-
9225 requires the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of born Filipino citizen who was naturalized abroad and
Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship subsequently availed of the privileges under R.A 9225.
[De Guzman v. COMELEC]
It was settled in that case that the use of a foreign passport
Requirements amounts to repudiation or recantation of the oath of
renunciation. [Arnado v. COMELEC]
First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This effects
the retention or reacquisition of one’s status as a natural-born
Filipino.
Requirements for Appointive officials
This also enables the enjoyment of full civil and political rights,
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under Sec. 5(3). Those appointed to any public office shall
existing laws, provided the solemnities recited in Section 5 of subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the
Republic Act No. 9225 are satisfied. [David v. SET] Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted
authorities prior to their assumption of office. Provided,
Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 that they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country
Constitution, Republic act 9189, otherwise known as the where they took that oath.
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing laws.
Professionals intending to practice in the Philippines
This is also to facilitate the exercise of the right of suffrage;
that is, to allow for voting in elections. [David v. SET] Sec. 5(4). Those intending to practice their
profession in the Philippines shall apply with the
Third, “making a personal and sworn renunciation of any all proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to such practice; and
administer oath.”
For Filipino lawyers
This, along with satisfying the other qualification requirements
under relevant laws, makes one eligible for elective public Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
office. [David v. SET] admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently
As explained in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, the privilege to engage in the practice of law.
this required, sworn renunciation is intended to complement
Article XI, Section 18 of the Constitution in that “public officers In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure
and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance terminates the privilege to practice law in the
at all times and public officer or employee who seeks to change Philippines. [Petition for Leave]
his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another
country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.” [David v. Not automatic
SET]
Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another
country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship
under R.A No. 9225, remains to be a member of the
Oath in COC – Renunciation Philippine Bar. [in re: Petition to Re-acquire the
Privilege to Practice Law in the Philippines, B.M. No.
The oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, 2112 July 24, 2012]
which is substantially similar to the one contained in Section
3of Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal and Although he is also deemed never to have terminated
sworn renunciation sought under Section 5 (2) of Republic Act his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic
No. 9225. [De Guzman v. COMELEC; Jacot v. DAL] right to resume law practice accrues. [Petition for
Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay]
Before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship

Use of foreign passport after renunciation pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he
must first secure this Court the authority to do so,
conditioned on:
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign
citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as
to one’s nationality and citizenship; a. The updating and payment in full of the
annual membership dues in the IBP;
b. The payment of professional tax;
It does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation
c. The completion of at least 36 credit hours of
but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one
mandatory continuing legal education; this is
to run for an elective position [Maquiling v. COMELEC, April 16,
specially significant to refresh the applicant/
2013]
petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and Not Absolute

update him of legal developments and
d. The retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will To be sure, the right of suffrage is not at all absolute.
not only remind him of his duties and Needless, to say, the exercise of the right to suffrage,
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to
of the Court, but also renew his pledge to existing substantive and procedural requirements
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other
Philippines. repositories of law. [AKBAYAN v. COMELEC, March
26, 2001]
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good
standing as a member of the Philippine bar[Petition Registration- indispensable precondition
for Leave, December 17, 2007]
A citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right
to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set
by fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register,
When not exercised at present, under the provisions of Republic Act No.
8189, otherwise known as the Voter’s Registration
Sec. 5 (5). The right to vote or be elected or Act of 1996.” [AKBAYAN v. COMELEC]
appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot
be exercised by, or extended, those who: Residency
1) Are candidates for or are occupying any SECTION 1 prescribes residency requirement as a
public office in the country of which they are general eligibility factor for the right to vote. [Nicolas-
naturalized citizens; and/or Lewis v. COMELEC, August 4, 2006].
2) Are in active service as commissioned or
non-commissioned officers in the armed Dissecting the provision, one must meet the following
forces of the country which they are qualification in order to exercise the right of suffrage:
naturalized citizens.
1. First he must be a Filipino citizen;
2. Second, he must not be disqualified by law; and
3. Third, he must have resided in the Philippines for at
least one (1) year and in the place wherein he
SUFFRAGE proposes to vote for at least six (6) months
immediately preceding the election. [KABATAAN v.
COMELEC, December 16, 2015]
ARTICLE V Franchised nature

SUFFRAGE
The second item more prominently reflects the
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the franchised nature of the right of suffrage.
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least
eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the The state may therefore regulate said right by
Philippines for at least one year, and in the place wherein imposing statutory disqualifications, with the
they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately restriction, however, that the same do not amount to,
preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other as per the second sentence of the provision, a “literacy
substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of property or other substantive requirement.”
suffrage.
Based on its genesis, it may be gleaned that the
Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing limitation is geared towards the elimination of
the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for irrelevant standards that are purely based on socio-
absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. economic considerations that have no bearing on the
right of a citizen to intelligently cast his vote and to
further the public good. [KABATAAN v. COMELEC]
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled
and the illiterates to vote without the assistance of other
persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for
existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well
may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot. as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the

disabled and the illiterates to vote without the
assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be
allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as
the Commission on Elections may promulgate to
protect the secrecy of the ballot.
Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a system It is the peculiar province of the legislature to
wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non- prescribe general rules for the government of society.
resident may, as an exception to the residency [Yazaki Torres v. CA, June 27,2006]
prescription in the preceding section (Section 1), be
allowed to vote. [Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC] Legislative has plenary power
Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and The Constitution, as the will of the people in their
R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law original, sovereign an unlimited capacity, has vested
with the passage of R.A. 9225 the irresistible this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The
conclusion is that “duals” may now exercise the right grant of legislative power to Congress is broad,
of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as general and comprehensive.
overseas absentee voters. [Nicolas-Lewis v.
COMELEC]
The legislative body possesses plenary power for all
purposes of civil government. [Ople v. Torres, July 23,
1998]
The overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003/2013 The power to make laws- legislative power-is vested
in Congress. Congress may not escape its duties and
R.A. No. 9189 (amended by R.A. 10590) was enacted responsibilities by delegating that power to any other
in obeisance to the mandate of the first paragraph of body or authority.
Section 2, Article V of the Constitution that Congress
shall provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional
abroad. anacostad void, on the principle that “delegate
potesta non potest delegari: - “delegated power may
It must be stressed that Section 2 does not provide not be delegated.” [Acosta v, Ochoa, Ochoa 15, 2019;
for the parameters of the exercise of legislative Chavez v. Romulo, June 9, 2004]
authority in enacting said law. [Macalintal v.
COMELEC, July 10, 2003] Bicameralism
R.A. 9189-Coverage The Philippines adheres to a bicameral form of

Congress.
Sec. 4 Sec. 3. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines
abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at 1) Senates
least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of 2) House of Representative
elections, may vote for president, vice-president,
senators and party-list representatives (as well as in
Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution recognizes
all national referenda and plebiscites- R.A. 10590)
the distinction between original and derivative
legislative power. [Marmeto v. COMELEC, September
5, 2017]
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT Original Legislative Power
Father Bernas explains that “in republican systems,

there are generally two kinds of legislative power,
SECTION1, ARTICLE VI
original and derivative.
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Original legislative power is possessed by the
sovereign people. [Garcia v. COMELEC, September
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the 30, 1994]
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Derivative Legislative Power
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
Derivative Legislative Power has been delegated by
by the provision on initiative and referendum. the sovereign people to such legislative bodies such
as Congress.
Considering that Derivative Legislative Power is

Legislative Power merely delegated by the sovereign people to its
elected representatives, it is deemed subordinate to
The legislative power has been described generally as the original power of the people. [Marmeto v.
the power to make, alter, and repeal laws. The COMELEC]
authority to amend, change, or modify a law is thus
part of such legislative power.
Limitation on Legislative Power As the President’s and the DENR Secretary’s

discretionary power to classify land as alienable and
1. Substantive Limitations disposable is merely delegated to them under CA No.
1) Express substantive Limitations 141 and PD No. 705, respectively, they may not
redelegate the same to another office or officer. [
§ Bill of Rights (Art.III) Dumov. Republic, June 6, 2018]
§ Secs. 25 and 28, Art. VI
Remember: What has once been delegated by
[appropriations and taxation]
§ Sec. 4 (3), Art. XIV (educational Congress can no longer be further delegated or
institutions) redelegated by the original delegate to another.
§ Sec. 9, Art. VI (public funds)
§ Sec 30, Art. VI (title royalty)
§ Sec. 31, Art. VI (initiative and What cannot be delegated?
referendum)
The powers which Congress is prohibited from
delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently
2) Implied substantive Limitations and exclusively, legislative. [ABAKADA v. Ermita,
September 1, 2005]
i. Prohibition against delegation of
legislative power
ii. Prohibition against passage of
irrepealable laws What is purely legislative power?
Purely legislative power, which can never be

2. Procedural Limitations
delegated, has been described as the authority to
1) Sec. 26, Art. VI [one title-one subject rule]
make a complete law- complete as to the time when
2) Sec 27, Art. VI [three readings and veto
it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be
power]
applicable- and to determine the expediency of its
enactment. [ABAKADA v. Ermita]
DELEGATION OF POWERS
Thus, the rule is that in order that a court may be
justified in holding a statute unconstitutional as a
Non-delegation of Legislative Power delegation of legislative power, it must appear that
the power involved is purely legislative in nature- that
Delegatus non potest delegari delegate potestas non is, one appertaining exclusively to the legislative
potest delagari Potestas delegate non delegari potest department. [ABAKADA v. Ermita]
(what has been delegated cannot be delegated)
What has once been delegated by Congress can no EXCEPTIONS

longer be further delegated or redelegated by the
original delegated to another, as expressed in the 1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President
Latin maxim Delegata potestas non potest delegari. under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
[In re: Application for Land Registration, June 6, Constitution;
2018] 2) Delegation of emergency powers to the
President under Section 23(2) of Article VI
Substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated of the Constitution;
3) Delegation to the people at large;
The rationale for the constitutional proscription is that 4) Delegation to local governments; and
“legislative discretion as to the substantive contents 5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
of the law cannot be delegated. [ Vivas v. Monetary
Board, August 7, 2013]
What can be Delegated? Licensing power
What can be delegated is the discretion to determine An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice
how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall permits the legislative body to delegate its licensing
be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a power to certain persons, municipal corporations,
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot towns, boards, councils, commissions,
be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the commissioners, auditors, bureaus and directors.
delegate. [Vivas v. Monetary Board]
Such licensing power includes the power to
Example promulgate necessary rules and regulations. [Chavez
v. Romulo, June 9, 2004]
The classification of lands of the public domain into
agricultural lands, as well as their further classification
into alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, is a legislative prerogative which may be
exercised through enactment of valid law.
License to possess firearms Delegation to the people at large
As an exception to non-delegation of legislative Section 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible,
power, Congress has historically delegated to the chief provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and
of the police force the power to approve or disapprove the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can
applications for license to possess or deal with directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject
firearms. [Acosta v. Ochoa, October 15, 2019] any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress
or local legislative body after the registration of a
Note: under R. A No. 6975, or Department of the petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of
Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, the the total number of registered voters, of which every
authority to issue licenses for the possession of legislative district must be represented by at least
firearms and explosives is now exclusively granted to three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
the Philippine National Police. [Acosta v. Ochoa]
[Art. VI; See also R.A 6735; COMELEC Resolution
10650 dated 31 January 2020]
Delegation of Tariff Powers to the President IN RE: PROPOSAL TO ENACT A NATIONAL

LEGISLATION ENTITLED “THE ABS-CBN
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to CORPORATION FRANCHISE ACT,” THROUGH
fix within specified limits, and subject to such PEOPLE’S INITIATIVE
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import, and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the National development program of Delegation to local governments
the Government. [Sec. 28 (2), Art. Art. VI]
(Local) governments may be allowed to legislate on
Delegation of Emergency Powers to the President purely local matters.
In times of war or other national emergency, the This is an exception which according to Rubi v.
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a Provincial Board (1919) is “sanctioned by immemorial
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it practice.” [Bernas
may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless LGU’s are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid
sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such delegation of legislative power from the national
powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof legislature; they are mere agents vested with what is
(Sec. 23 (2) Article VI). called the power of subordinate legislation. [Ferrer v.
Bautista, June 30, 2015]
Example: Bayanihan to Heal as One Act [R.A
No. 11469] The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or
substantially alter boundaries of provinces and cities,
An act declaring the existence of a national emergency municipalities or barangays is essentially legislative in
arising from the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID- nature.
19) situation and a national policy in connection
therewith, and authorizing the president of the The framers of the Constitution have, however,
republic of the Philippines for a limited period and allowed for delegation of such power in Sec. 10, Art.
subject to restrictions, to exercise powers necessary X of the Constitution as long as (1) criteria prescribe
and proper to carry out the declared national policy din LGC is met and (2) the creation, division, merger,
and for other purposes abolition or the substantial alteration of boundaries is
subject to approval by a majority vote in a plebiscite.
Sec.4. Authorized persons. - Pursuant to Article VI, [Umali v. COMELEC, April 22, 2014]
Section 23(2) of the Constitution, the President is
hereby authorized to exercise powers that are With the twin criteria of standard and plebiscite [Sec.
necessary and proper to carry out the declared 10, R.A 7160] satisfied, the delegation to LGU’s of the
national policy. The President shall have the power to power to create, divide, merge, abolish or
adopt the following temporary emergency measures substantially alter boundaries has become a
to respond to crisis brought by the pandemic. recognized exception to the doctrine of non-
delegation of legislative powers. [Umali v. COMELEC,
Likewise, legislative power was delegated to the April 22, 2014]
President under Sec. 453 of the LGC, which states:
Section 453 Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status.-

it shall be the duty of the President to declare a city Delegation to administrative bodies
as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it
shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life,
in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper delegation of legislative power to various specialized
application therefore and ratification in a plebiscite by administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to
the qualified voters therein. [See Umali v. COMELEC, this principle. [Gerochi v. DOE, July 11, 2007]
April 22, 2014]
Quasi-legislative power To determine completeness, all of the terms and

provisions of the law must leave nothing to the
Quasi-legislative power, otherwise known as the delegate except to implement it.
power of subordinate legislation, has been defined as
the authority delegated by the lawmaking body to the “What only can be delegated is not the discretion to
administrative body to adopt rules and regulations determine what the law shall be but the discretion to
intended to carry out the provisions of law and determine how the law shall be enforced.” [KMU v.
implement legislative policy. [ALFI v. Garin, April Aquino, April 2, 2019]
26,2017]
Example: R.A NO. 11479. AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND

PENALIZE TERRORISM, THEREBY REPEALING Sufficient Standard Test
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9372, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE “HUMAN SECURITY ACT OF 2007” Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient
standard when it provides adequate guidelines or
SECTION 1. Short ‘Title- This ac shall henceforth be limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of
known as The Anti- Terrorism Act of 2020” the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot. [Belgica v. Ochoa, November 19,
Section 54. Implementing Rules and Regulations- This 2013]
ATC and DOJ, with the active participation of police
and military institutions, shall promulgate the rules To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits
and regulations for the effective implementation of of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative
this Act within ninety (90) days after its effectivity. policy and identify the conditions under which it is to
They shall also ensure the full dissemination of such be implemented. [Belgica v. Ochoa]
rules and regulations to both Houses of Congress and
all officers and members of various law enforcement A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative
agencies. policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it.
Note: The rule-making power of a public
administrative body is a delegated legislative power, It indicates the circumstances under the legislative
which it may not use either to abridge the authority command is to be effected. [ABAKADA v. Ermita]
given it by Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge
Enforcement of a delegated power may only be
its power beyond the scope intended. [United BF
effected in conformity with a sufficient standard,
Homes v. BF Homes, July 14, 1999]
which is used “to map out the boundaries of the
In every case of permissible delegation, there must be delegate’s authority and thus prevent the delegation
a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid from running riot.”
only if the law
The law must contain the limitations or guidelines to
a) Is complete in itself, setting forth therein the determine the scope of authority of the delegate.
policy to be executed, carried out, or [KMU v. Aquino, April 2, 2019]
implemented by the delegate; and
b) Fixes a standard- the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate and determinable- to What are examples of sufficient standards?
which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. The Court had, in the past accepted as sufficient
standards the following: “interest of law and order;”
Tests of valid delegation adequate and efficient instruction;” “public interest;”
“justice equity;” “public convenience and welfare;”
In determining whether or not a statute constitutes
“simplicity, economy and efficiency;” “standardization
an undue delegation of legislative power, the Court
and regulation of medical education;” and “fair and
has adopted two tests:
equitable employment practices.” [Gerochi v. DOE,
The completeness test and the sufficient July 17, 2007]
standard test. [Council of Teachers v. Secretary of
Education, October 9, 2018]
Example- R.A 9335
Both test are intended to prevent a total transference
of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - it is the policy of the
allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and State to optimize the revenue-generation capability
exercise a power essentially legislative. and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
and the Bureau of Customs BOC) by providing for a
system of rewards and sanctions through the creation
Completeness test of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all for the purpose of encouraging their officials and
its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature employees to exceed their revenue targets.
such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing
he will have to do is to enforce it.
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following a. W/N RA 9335 lacks sufficient standard
as sufficient standards: “public interest”, “justice and
equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and NO. Two tests determine the validity of delegation of
“simplicity, economy and welfare.”
legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the
In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth
revenue-generation capability and collection of the therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest. implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient
[ABAKADA v. Purisima, 2008] standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations
Note: Congress does not abdicate its functions or in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s
unduly delegate power when it describes what job authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To
must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
of his authority; [ABAKADA v. Ermita] delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and
identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
ABAKADA v. PURISIMA (2008) RA 9335 passed both the completeness (in Sec 2 of
RA 9335) and sufficient standard (in Sec 4 and 7 of RA
FACTS: 9335) tests.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this b. W/N creation of congressional oversight
petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax committee violates the doctrine of separation of
reform legislation. powers.
By establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law Immaterial. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
"transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the
BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the
do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it
the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus
and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged
officials and employees to serve the people with utmost encroachment on the executive function of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. Limiting the implementing and enforcing the law may be
scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to considered moot and academic.
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
OTHER ISSUE:
There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to a. W/N there is an actual case or controversy
why such a system should not apply to officials and
employees of all other government agencies. Law unduly
NO. Aside from the general claim that the dispute has
delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President
ripened into a judicial controversy by the mere enactment
as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While
of the law even without any further overt act, petitioners
Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC
fail either to assert any specific and concrete legal
officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue
claim or to demonstrate any direct adverse effect of
collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law
the law on them. They are unable to show a personal
does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved.
stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to themselves.
Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to
On this account, their petition is procedurally infirm.
the President without sufficient standards.
This notwithstanding, public interest requires the resolution

It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic
of the constitutional issues raised by petitioners. The grave
and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC
nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the
personnel. Assailed the creation of a congressional oversight
presumption of constitutionality in favor of the law. And
committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of
where an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have
separation of powers. While the legislative function is
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but
deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment
in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional
oversight committee permits legislative participation in the
b. W/N RA 9335 Constitutional
implementation and enforcement of the law.
YES.
MAIN ISSUE:
Accountability of Public Officers (Sec 1 Art XI of the is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
Constitution) reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably
arbitrary.
Petitioners’ claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will
turn BIR and BOC officials and employees into "bounty
hunters and mercenaries" is not only without any factual d. W/N Sec 12 of RA 9335 on Joint Congressional
and legal basis; it is also purely speculative. Oversight Committee constitutional
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption NO. From the moment the law becomes effective, any
of constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a members to play any role in the implementation or
doubtful and equivocal one. To invalidate RA 9335 based on enforcement of the law violates the principle of
petitioners’ baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or
executive which approved it. its members to approve the implementing rules of a law
after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as
RA 9335 also establishes safeguards to ensure that the is a provision that allows Congress or its members to
reward will not be claimed if it will be either the fruit of overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the
“bounty hunting or mercenary activity” or the product of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the
irregular performance of official duties (Sec. 8 of RA 9335) law. Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should
be struck down as unconstitutional.
c. W/N limiting the scope of the system of rewards
and incentives only to officials and employees of the e. W/N the unconstitutionality of Sec 12 of RA 9335
BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee will render the entire law unconstitutional
of equal protection.
NO. The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the
NO. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid intention of the legislature to isolate and detach any
classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable invalid provision from the other provisions so that the
foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary. With respect latter may continue in force and effect. The valid portions
to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of can stand independently of the invalid section. Without
the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR Section 12, the remaining provisions still constitute a
and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the revenue- complete, intelligible and valid law which carries out the
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, legislative intent to optimize the revenue-generation
the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC by providing
logically pertain to the said agencies. for a system of rewards and sanctions through the Rewards
and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC Board.
because they have the common distinct primary
function of generating revenues for the national To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must
government through the collection of taxes, customs be published in full if their purpose is to enforce or
duties, fees and charges. implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The
IRR of RA 9335 were published on May 30, 2006 in two
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. newspapers of general circulation and became effective 15
They principally perform the special function of being the days thereafter. Until and unless the contrary is shown, the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of IRR are presumed valid and effective even without the
its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to
the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and
treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335
DOTR V. PHIL PETROLEUM SEA TRANSPORT (2018)
fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
FACTS:
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, this
Court declared: All that is required of a valid classification is
This case concerns the constitutionality of establishing
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
the "Oil Pollution Management Fund," under Section
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
22(a) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9483 and Section 1,
real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose
Rule of its Implementing Rules and Regulations
of the law; that it must not be limited to existing
(IRR), by imposing "ten centavos (10c) per liter for every
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. This Court has held that the standard
delivery or transshipment of oil made by tanker barges and Rule of its IRR. The petition was raffled off and heard by the
tanker haulers." Regional Trial Court, Branch 216, Quezon City (RTC).
In December 2005, a power barge ran aground off the Respondents argued that the obligation to contribute to the
coast of Antique, dumping 364,000 liters of bunker oil. OPMF solely imposed upon the owners and operators of
This oil spill severely polluted 40 kilometers of Antique's oil/petroleum tankers and barges violates their right to
coastline and decimated more than 230 hectares of pristine equal protection of the law. Further, Respondents argued
mangrove forest. Rehabilitation costs have been estimated that the ten-centavo (10c) impost is confiscatory and, thus,
at USD million. In August 11, 2006, a Petron-chartered violates their right to due process. Finally, respondents
single hull vessel carrying 2.1 million liters of oil sank argued that Section 22 (a) is a prohibited rider, and that the
in the Guimaras Strait, causing the Philippines' worst provision provides an undue delegation of legislative power.
oil spill. Dubbed an "ecological time bomb," the sunken
vessel leaked an estimated 100 to 200 liters of oil per hour, RTC’S RULING
while roughly 320 kilometres of coastline was covered in
thick sludge. Miles of coral reef and mangrove forests were The trial court held that there is no clear and valid reason
laid to waste and more than 1,100 hectares of marine as to why the oil/petroleum tankers and barges are being
sanctuaries and reserves were badly damaged. And with all treated differently from other vessels. RTC agreed with
fishing activities put to a halt, around 40,000 people were respondents that to be valid, all potential marine
affected. pollutants should be required to contribute to the OPMF.
With respect to the 10-centavo per liter imposition, the RTC
Recognizing the gravity and extent of the Guimaras oil spill, agreed with respondents that the amount is confiscatory
the lack of proper response strategy, the absence of the and that said amount will cripple, if not bankrupt, the
necessary equipment for containing, cleaning up, and respondents' businesses.
removing spilled oil, and the difficulty in pinning the liability
on oil companies, Congress was prompted to pass law As regards the allegation that Section 22 is a rider, the trial
implementing the International Convention on Civil court agreed. It held that based on the title, it is clear
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1969 Civil Liability that RA 9483 was enacted merely to implement the
Convention) and the International Convention on the provisions of the 1992 Civil Liability and the 1992
Establishment of an International Fund for Fund Conventions. The trial court noted that these
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (1992 Fund Conventions do not order the creation of an OPMF. RTC ruled
Convention). The 1969 Civil Liability Convention was later that the law does not set specific parameters to guide
amended by the 1992 Protocol (1992 Civil Liability the implementing agencies on how to determine the
Convention). amount of contribution for the succeeding years after the
first year of existence where the 10-centavo amount applies.
The legislative measure began as Senate Bill No. (SB)
2600 sponsored by then Senator Pia S. Cayetano. With In an Order dated July 25, 2016, the RTC granted the
sixteen (16) senators voting in favor, SB 2600 was sent to prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and
the House of Representatives where it was adopted as an enjoined the implementation of the assailed provision and
amendment to House Bill No. 4363. IRR.
June 2, 2007, RA 9483, entitled "An Act Providing For The MAIN ISSUE:
Implementation of the Provisions of the 1992 International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and the W/N Sec 22(a) of RA 9483 and Sec 1 Rule of its IRR, by
1992 International Convention on the Establishment of an imposing ten centavos per liter for every delivery or
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution transshipment of oil made by tanker barges and tanker
Damage, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for haulers constitutional.
Other Purposes" or simply the "Oil Pollution
Compensation Act of 2007," was signed into law. RULING:
Nine years later, or on April 12, 2016, the IRR of RA 9483 YES. The creation of the Oil Pollution Management
was promulgated, with Section 1, Rule thereof implementing Fund (OPMF) can be the subject of judicial inquiry
the questioned Section 22 of RA 9483
The issue presented is a justiciable question which allows
A month after the promulgation of the IRR, respondents the exercise by this Court of its judicial power and does not
filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief (with Prayer for involve political question. More importantly, violations of
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order the due process and the equal protection clauses of the 1987
and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction) under Rule 63, Constitution alleged by the respondents are well-recognized
contesting Section 22 (a) of RA 9483, as well as Section 1, grounds for a judicial inquiry into a legislative measure.
The petition for Declaratory Relief is not the proper The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution
remedy. allows classification. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions
To question the constitutionality of the subject issuances, which make for real differences, that it must be germane to
respondents should have invoked the expanded certiorari the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing
jurisdiction under Section of Article VIII of the 1987 conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each
Constitution. Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are member of the class. The Court has held that the standard
the proper remedies where an action of the legislative is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably
Constitution. Nevertheless, the need to finally resolve the arbitrary.
issues involved in this case far outweighs the rigid
application of the rules. First, the purpose of the subject legislation is the
implementation of the 1992 Civil Liability Convention and
the 1992 Fund Convention. Both Conventions only
The Court, thus, treats the petition filed by the respondents expressly cover "sea-going vessel and seaborne craft
before the court a quo as a petition for certiorari and of any type whatsoever constructed or adapted for the
prohibition. carriage of oil in bulk as cargo x x x."
Section 22(a) of RA 9483 creating the Oil Pollution Second, while all vessels, channels, and storage facilities
Management Fund is not proscribed rider that carry or store oil are capable of causing oil pollution,
this does not make them "similarly situated" within
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and the context of the equal protection clause. It is
titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to internationally well-recognized that oil tankers pose a
cripple or impede the power of legislation. It is sufficient if greater risk to the environment and to people. As matter of
the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the fact, these types of vessels have long been considered as
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without separate class and are being given a different treatment by
expressing each and every end and means necessary or various organizations.
convenient for the accomplishing of that object. It is by no
means essential that every end and means necessary The conferment on the OPMF Committee of the
or convenient for the accomplishment of the general authority to determine the rate of imposition for the
object should be either referred to or necessarily second year of its implementation onwards is not an
indicated by the title. All that can reasonably be required undue delegation of legislative power.
is that the title shall not be made to cover legislation
incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can For a valid delegation of power, the law delegating the power
be considered as having a necessary or proper connection. must pass the completeness and sufficient standard
test. The standard, as the Court has already stated, may
A review of the Conventions reveals that they do not only even be implied. Courts bend as far back as possible to
cover damage claims by affected individuals but also all sustain the constitutionality of laws which are assailed as
amounts encompassed by the term "pollution damage". The unduly delegating legislative powers. Even if the law does
Conventions, therefore, also cover damage to property, not expressly pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend
containment, clean-up, and rehabilitation. Thus, the policy over backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to
underpinning the establishment of the OPMF in spare the statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity.
Section 22(a) of RA 9483 and its IRR is wholly
consistent with the objectives of the conventions. by In authorizing the OPMF Committee in determining the rate
creating the OPMF, Congress sought to ensure that our of impost for the succeeding years, Congress in fact
enforcement agencies are capable of protecting our marine directed them to ensure that 90% of the funds that
wealth and preventing harm from being caused to the will be accumulated will be enough to finance the
people and their livelihood by reason of these unfortunate following: (1) emergency response measures for oil
events. With these, SC find that Section 22 is not a rider pollution cases; (2) clean-up operations for oil spill
but is an essential provision to attain the purpose of incidents; (3) research; (4) enforcement; and (5)
RA 9483. monitoring activities of the stated agencies in connection
with oil pollution.
The classification in Section 22 of RA 9483 and its IRR
does not violate the equal protection clause These parameters-the specified inclusions and exclusions,
and the share that the itemized activities shall have in the
OPMF, adequately meet the required standards that government's treasury. What Section 22 does is to
make a delegation of legislative power valid. regulate the conduct of the business of owners and
operators of oil tankers and barges by imposing upon them
What Section 22 vested in them is merely the authority to the duty to contribute to the protection of Philippine waters
fix the rate of the impost, taking into consideration which they directly use in the conduct of their trade, and
the parameters therein clearly stated. In other words, which they expose to risk of possibly irreparable destruction
this authority is actually limited by the sufficiency of the brought about by the spillage or leakage of the product that
Fund to meet the identified items. they carry and profit from. The 10 centavos is a valid
administrative charge or fee in the exercise of the
The rate of the impost for the succeeding years must not be State’s police power.
so low as to be insufficient to meet the budgetary needs of
the agencies for the items identified under Section 22. This
COUNCIL OF TEACHERS AND STAFF VS. SECRETARY
is so since the mandate of the law will not be fulfilled if the
OF EDUCATION (2018)
agencies' capacity for oil spill response is inadequate,
FACTS:
ineffective, or less than what is necessary for the declared
purpose. Conversely, it must also not be so high that the
Before the Court are consolidated petitions under Rule 65,
totality of the amount accumulated from the various sources
assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No.
gravely exceeds the financial requirements for said items.
10533 (K to 12 Law), RA No. 10157 (Kindergarten Education
Simply put, the sum of the amounts to be collected or
Act), and related issuances of the Department of Education
received from the various sources must not exceed
(DepEd), Commission on Higher Education (CHED),
the administrative costs and expenses of
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and Technical
implementing the activities.
Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA)
implementing the K to 12 Basic Education Program.
Moreover, Congress included the representatives from the
owners of tankers barges, tankers haulers, and ship hauling To be at par with international standards and in line with the
oil and/or petroleum products as part of the group tasked to country's commitment in EFA 2015, the Philippine Congress,
determine the rates for the following years. In so doing, on May 15, 2013, passed the K to 12 Law, which took effect
Congress not only valued their inputs but also gave them an on June 8, 2013.
avenue to protect their businesses by ensuring that the
effect of the imposition on the private sector would be On September 4, 2013, the K to 12 implementing rules and
factored in and not seen as mere recommendations. regulation (K to 12 IRR) were issued. As a result of the
tripartite consultations, DOLE, DepEd, TESDA and CHED
The imposition of the 10-centavo impost does not issued on May 30, 2014 the Joint Guidelines on the
violate the due process clause (Sec 1 Art III of the Implementation of the Labor and Management Component
Constitution) of Republic Act No. 10533 (Joint Guidelines).
In asserting that the 10-centavo per liter impost is PETITIONS

unconstitutional, respondents have the burden of proof to
convince this Court that indeed said imposition is arbitrary, Petition for Certiorari filed by Council for Teachers and
oppressive, excessive, and confiscatory, thereby violating Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines and
the constitutional proscription against deprivation of several other organizations duly organized under Philippine
property without due process of law. Respondents, however, laws, representing faculty and staff of colleges and
by providing nothing more than hypothetical universities in the Philippines, docketed as G.R. No. 216930
computations of their losses, failed to discharge this
burden. It would be improper to declare an imposition as Petition to Declare Republic Act No. 10533, otherwise
unlawful or unconstitutional on the basis of purely known as the "Enhanced Basic Education Act of 2013," as
hypothetical and unsubstantiated computations. Unconstitutional and/or Illegal filed by petitioners Antonio
"Sonny" Trillanes, Gary C. Alejano, and Francisco Ashley L.
The determination of whether a measure or charge is Acedillo, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers, and
confiscatory or not, within the purview of the due process members of Congress, docketed as G.R. No. 217752;
clause, will not solely depend on the amount that will be
accumulated therefrom. Other factors must likewise be Petition to Declare Unconstitutional, Null, Void, and
considered such as the purposes for which the fund will be Invalid Certain Provisions of R.A. No. 10533 And
used and the costs which said purposes entail, among Related Department of Education (DepEd) Implementing
others. Rules and Regulations, Guidelines or Orders filed by
petitioners Eduardo R. Alicias, Jr. and Aurelio P. Ramos, Jr.,
Most importantly, the impost provided in Section 22 is in their capacities as citizen, taxpayer, parent and educator,
not revenue-raising tax intended to supplement the docketed as G.R. No. 218045;
delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.

Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus filed The policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
by petitioner Richard Troy A. Colmenares in his capacity as the delegate must be set forth therein. The sufficient
citizen invoking strong public interest and transcendental standard test, on the other hand, mandates adequate
importance, petitioners Kathlea Francynn Gawani D. Yañgot guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
and several others, as a class, and on behalf of others who boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
stand to suffer direct injury as a result of the implementation delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard
of the K to 12 Basic Education Program, and petitioners Rene must specify the limits of the delegate's authority, announce
Luis Tadle and several others, in their capacities as the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which
taxpayers concerned that public funds are being illegally and it is to be implemented. The test results show that K to
improperly disbursed through the enforcement of the invalid 12 law is complete in all essential terms and
or unconstitutional laws and issuances, docketed as G.R. No. conditions and contains sufficient parameters on the
218098; power delegated to the DepEd, CHED and TESDA.
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, docketed as G.R. OTHER ISSUE:

No. 218123, filed by Antonio Tinio, et al., suing in their
capacities as taxpayers and concerned citizens W/N the court may exercise its power of judicial
review over the controversy
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus filed
by petitioners Spouses Ma. Dolores M. Brillantes and Severo YES. As enshrined in Article VIII Section 1, the court may
L. Brillantes and several others, as students, parents and exercise its power of judicial review provided the requisites
teachers, who stand to suffer direct injury from the K to 12 are complied. In the case at bar, the Court finds that
BEC and implementation of the two (2) additional years of petitioners have sufficient legal interest in the outcome of
high school, docketed as G.R. No. 218465; and the controversy. And, considering that the instant cases
involve issues on education, which under the Constitution
the State is mandated to promote and protect, the stringent
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Dr. requirement of direct and substantial interest may be
Bienvenido Lumbera and several others who are faculty and dispensed with, and the mere fact that petitioners are
staff of colleges and universities in the Philippines who stand concerned citizens asserting a public right, sufficiently
to suffer direct injury in the implementation of CMO No. 20 clothes them with legal standing to initiate the instant
and Congressman Antonio Tinio and other party-list petition.
representatives in their capacities as members of the
Congress, who are also collectively suing in their capacities W/N certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are
as taxpayers and concerned citizens, docketed as G.R. No. proper remedies to assail the laws and issuances
217451.
YES. it has long been judicially settled that under the Court's
On April 21, 2015, the Court issued a TRO in G.R. No. expanded jurisdiction, the writs of certiorari and prohibition
217451, enjoining the implementation of CMO No. 20 insofar are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and
only as it excluded from the curriculum for college the to review and/or prohibit or nullify, on the ground of grave
course Filipino and Panitikan as core courses. abuse of discretion, any act of any branch or instrumentality
of the government, even if the latter does not exercise
In G.R. Nos. 216930, 217752, 218045, 218098, 218923 and judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
218465, the Court denied petitioners' prayer for issuance
of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction on the W/N K to 12 law was duly enacted
implementation of the K to 12 Law, its implementing rules,
the Kindergarten Education Act, and other administrative YES. First, extensive discussions that involve various
issuances in relation thereto, for lack of merit. stakeholders were conducted. Second, the enrolled bill
doctrine is applied in this case, and that there is no doubt as
to the formal validity of the law.
MAIN ISSUE:
W/N K to 12 Law constitutes an undue delegation of

legislative power W/N DO No. 31 is valid and enforceable
NO. The law adequately provides the legislative policy that

YES. DO No. 31 did not add two (2) years to basic education
it seeks to implement. The completeness test and the
nor did it impose additional obligations to parents and
sufficient standard test were also conducted. Under the first
children. DO No. 31 is an administrative regulation
test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions
addressed to DepEd personnel providing for general
when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
guidelines on the implementation of a new curriculum for NO. The K to 12 Law does not violate substantive due
Grades 1 to 10 in preparation for the K to 12 basic education. process and equal protection of laws. the K to 12 Law does
not offend the substantive due process of petitioners. The
W/N K to 12 Law, K to 12 IRR, DO No. 31 and/or the assailed law's declaration of policy itself reveals that,
Joint Guidelines contravene provisions of the contrary to the claims of petitioners, the objectives of the
Philippine Constitution law serve the interest of the public and not only of a
particular class.
On non-self-executing provisions: Article XIV Sections
1, 2, 6 are not self-executing. The very terms of these The equal protection clause is directed principally against
provisions show that they are not judicially enforceable undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not
constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. In intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object
other words, the Kindergarten Education Act, the K to 12 to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to
Law and its related issuances cannot be nullified based operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely
solely on petitioners' bare allegations that they violate that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both
general provisions of the Constitution which are mere as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.
directives addressed to the executive and legislative
departments.
KMU VS. AQUINO (2019)

On making basic education compulsory: There is no
conflict between the K to 12 Law and related issuances and FACTS:
the Constitution when it made kindergarten and senior high
This Court is called to determine the validity of the Social
school compulsory. The Constitution is clear in making
elementary education compulsory; and the K to 12 Law and Security System premium hike, which took effect in
January 2014. The case also involves the application of
related issuances did not change this.
doctrines on judicial review, valid delegation of powers, and
On medium of instruction: It is thus clear from the the exercise of police power.
deliberations that it was never the intent of the framers of
the Constitution to use only Filipino and English as the This resolves a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
exclusive media of instruction. It is evident that Congress praying that a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
has the power to enact a law that designates Filipino as the preliminary injunction be issued to annul the Social Security
primary medium of instruction even in the regions but, in System premium hike.
the absence of such law, the regional languages may be
used as primary media of instruction. In April 19, 2013, the Social Security Commission issued
Resolution No. 262-s. 2013, which provided an increase
On the right to select a profession or course of study: in:
There is no conflict between the K to 12 Law and its IRR and a. the Social Security System members' contribution
the right of the senior high school students to choose their rate from 10.4% to 11%
profession or course of study. Petitioners have failed to show b. the maximum monthly salary credit from
that the State has imposed unfair and inequitable conditions P15,000.00 to P16,000.00.
for senior high schools to enroll in their chosen path.
The increase was made subject to the approval of the
On academic freedom: The Court does not agree with President of the Philippines. In a September 6, 2013
petitioners that their transfer to the secondary level, as Memorandum, the President approved the increase. On
provided by the K to 12 Law and the assailed issuances, September 20, 2013, the Social Security Commission issued
constitutes a violation of their academic freedom. Resolution No. 711-s. 2013, which approved, among others,
the increase in contribution rate and maximum
W/N CMO No. 20 violates constitutional provisions monthly salary credit.
and special laws provided herein.
On October 2, 2013, the Social Security System, through
NO. the constitutional provisions alleged by petitioners to President and Chief Executive Officer Emilio S. De Quiros,
be violated are non-self-executing provisions. As discussed Jr., issued Circular No. 2013-010,9 which provided the
in the case at bar, the framers of the Constitution, in revised schedule of contributions that would be in effect in
discussing Section 6 of Article XIV, explained that the use of January 2014.
Filipino as a medium of official communication is still subject
to provisions of law. Further, the court ruled that CMO No. Per the circular, the employer and the employee shall
20 did not violate RA No. 7104, RA No. 7356, and BP 232. equally shoulder the 0.6% increase in contributions.
W/N the K to 12 Law violates petitioners' right to substantive Thus, the employer would pay a contribution rate of 7.37%
due process and equal protection of the laws. (from 7.07%); the employee, 3.63% (from 3.33%).
On January 10, 2014, Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. filed this Petitioners pray that a temporary restraining order
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, questioning the and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued to stop
validity of the assailed issuances. the implementation of the increase in contributions.
They aver that stopping it is necessary to protect their
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION substantive rights and interests. They point out that their
earnings for food and other basic needs would be reduced
Maintaining that a majority of them are Social Security and allocated instead to defraying the amount needed for
System members directly affected by the premium hike, contributions.
petitioners assert having the requisite locus standi to file
the Petition. Citing David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, they further MAIN ISSUE:
argue that the other petitioners' legal personality arises
W/N the delegation of power to SS Commission valid
from the transcendental importance of the Petition's issues.
YES. What are needed for a valid delegation are:

Petitioners claim that the assailed issuances were issued per
1. the completeness of the statute making the
an unlawful delegation of power to respondent Social
delegation; and
Security Commission based on Republic Act No. 8282, or the
2. the presence of a sufficient standard.
Social Security Act.
Not only is the Social Security Act complete in its terms;

In particular, Section 1814 allegedly offers vague and
it also contains a sufficient standard for the Social
unclear standards, and are incomplete in its terms
Security Commission to fix the monthly contribution rate
and conditions. This provision, they claim, has allowed
and the minimum and maximum monthly salary credits
respondent Social Security Commission to fix contribution
(Sec. 18 and Sec 4(a) of the Social Security Act).
rates from time to time, subject to the President's approval.
Petitioners claim that the delegation of the power had no
It is evident from these provisions (Sec. 18 and Sec 4(a) of
adequate legal guidelines to map out the boundaries
the Social Security Act) that the legislature has vested the
of the delegate's authority.
necessary powers in the Social Security Commission
to fix the minimum and maximum amounts of monthly
Petitioners claim that the increase in contribution rate
salary credits and the contribution rate. The agency
violates Section 4(b)(2) of the Social Security Act,
does not have to do anything except implement the
which states that the "increases in benefits shall not
provisions based on the standards and limitations provided
require any increase in the rate of contribution[.]"
by law.
They argue that this proviso prohibits the increase in
contributions if there was no corresponding increase in
In fixing the contribution rate and the minimum and
benefits.
maximum amounts of monthly salary credits, the
legislature specified the factors that should be
Petitioners then argue that the increase in contributions
considered: "actuarial calculations and rate of benefits" as
is an invalid exercise of police power for not being
an additional limit to the Social Security Commission's rate
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the
fixing power under Section 18, the legislature required the
purpose sought, as well as for being unduly oppressive on
approval of the President of the Philippines.
the labor sector.
The Social Security Act clearly specifies the limitations and

According to them, the Social Security System can extend
identifies when and how the Social Security Commission will
actuarial life and decrease its unfunded liability without
fix the contribution rate and the monthly salary credits.
increasing the premiums they pay.
Petitioners further insist that the revised ratio of OTHER ISSUE:

contributions between employers and employees, per
the assailed issuances, is grossly unjust to the W/N the Court can exercise its power of judicial
working class and is beyond respondents' powers. review
They claim that for the purposes of justice and consistency,
respondents should have maintained the 70%-30% ratio in YES. Petitioners' allegations present violations of rights
the premium increase. Changing it, they add, is grossly provided for under the Constitution on the protection of
unfair and detrimental to employees. workers, and promotion of social justice. They likewise
assert that respondents Social Security Commission and
Petitioners further emphasize that the State is required to Social Security System acted beyond the scope of their
protect the rights of workers and promote their powers. However, petitioners failed to prove how the
welfare under the Constitution. assailed issuances violated workers' constitutional
rights such that it would warrant a judicial review. Here, since respondent Social Security Commission is set to
Petitioners cannot merely cite and rely on the Constitution issue new resolutions for the Social Security System
without specifying how these rights translate to being members' contributions, the issue on the assailed
legally entitled to a fixed amount and proportion of Social issuances' validity may be rendered moot. Nonetheless,
Security System contributions. all the discussed exceptions are present: (1) petitioners
raise violations of constitutional rights; (2) the situation is
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE of paramount public interest; (3) there is a need to guide
REMEDIES the bench, the bar, and the public on the power of
respondent Social Security Commission to increase the
In connection with acts of administrative agencies, contributions; and (4) the matter is capable of repetition yet
ripeness is ensured under the doctrine of exhaustion evading review, as it involves a question of law that can
of administrative remedies. Remedies within the recur. Thus, this Court may rule on this case.
agency's administrative process must be exhausted before
external remedies can be applied. The failure to exhaust Petitioners Joselito Ustarez, Salvador T. Carranza, Nenita
administrative remedies affects the ripeness to adjudicate Gonzaga, Prescila A. Maniquiz, Reden R. Alcantara, and
the constitutionality of a governmental act, which in turn Anakpawis Party-List Representative Fernando Hicap, for
affects the existence of the need for an actual case or himself, are Social Security System members who stand to
controversy for the courts to exercise their power of judicial suffer direct and material injury from the assailed issuances'
review. enforcement. They are, thus, clothed with legal
personality to assail the imposed increase in
In the case of administrative acts, ripeness manifests contribution rates and maximum monthly salary
itself through compliance with the doctrine of credit.
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Sections 4 and
5 of the Social Security Act are clear that the Social Security On the other hand, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno,
Commission has jurisdiction over any dispute arising from Anakpawis Party-List, Center for Trade Union and Human
the law regarding coverage, benefits, contributions, and Rights, and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang
penalties. Mayo Uno all failed to show how they will suffer direct
and material injury from the enforcement of the assailed
Here, nothing in the records shows that petitioners issuances.
filed a case before the Social Security Commission or
asked for a reconsideration of the assailed issuances. However, the assailed issuances set the new contribution
Moreover, petitioners did not even try to show that their rate and its date of effectivity. The increase in contributions
Petition falls under one (1) of the exceptions to the doctrine has been in effect since January 2014. As such, the issue of
of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus, petitioners the validity of increase in contributions is of transcendental
have prematurely invoked this Court's power of importance. The required legal standing for petitioners must
judicial review in violation of the doctrine of be relaxed.
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
It is worth noting that this issue affects millions of Filipinos
Notably, petitioners failed to abide by the principle of working here and abroad. A substantial portion of members'
primary administrative jurisdiction. Here, respondent salaries goes to the Social Security System fund. To delay
Social Security Commission qualifies as an administrative the resolution of such an important issue would be a great
tribunal, given sound administrative discretion requiring the disservice to this Court's duty enshrined in the Constitution.
special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate W/N the exercise of respondents SSS and SS
matters of fact. This is evident from the qualifications of its Commission’s power under the law valid
members and its powers and duties under Sections 3 and 4
of the Social Security Act. YES. an examination of the provision (Sec 4 of the SS Act)
and the assailed issuances reveals that the questioned
The Court has enumerated circumstances when it may still increase in contribution rate was not solely for the increase
rule on moot issues. In David: Courts will decide cases, in members' benefits, but also to extend actuarial life (Social
otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave Security Commission Resolution No. 262-s.2013).
violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public To be a valid exercise of police power, there must be a
interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue lawful subject and the power is exercised through lawful
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to means. The increases reflected in the issuances of
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the respondents are reasonably necessary to observe the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review. constitutional mandate of promoting social justice under the
Social Security Act. The public interest involved here refers
to the State's goal of establishing, developing, promoting,
and perfecting a sound and viable tax-exempt social security sports shooters, reloaders, gunsmithing, competitions, and
system. To achieve this, the Social Security System and the indentors, thereby exceeding its rule-making power granted
Social Security Commission are empowered to adjust from in Section 44 of Republic Act No. 10591;
time to time the contribution rate and the monthly salary
credits. Given the past increases since the inception of the (6) w/n the licensing fees charged under the Implementing
Rules and Regulations are too numerous and, therefore,
law, the contribution rate increase of 0.6% applied to the
unreasonable;
corresponding monthly salary credit does not scream of
unreasonableness or injustice.
(7) w/n the Chief of the Philippine National Police added
penal provisions in the Implementing Rules and Regulations,
Here, respondents were only complying with their thereby invalidly exercising a power exclusively vested in
duties under the Social Security Act when they issued Congress;
the assailed issuances. There is no showing that
respondents went beyond the powers under the law (8) w/n the Implementing Rules and Regulations was
that amounts to lack of or in excess of their drafted with the required consultation with the concerned
jurisdiction. Petitioners' claims are unsubstantiated and, sectors of society;
as such, merit no finding of grave abuse of discretion.
(9) w/n the Philippine National Police exceeded its authority
by centralizing firearms license applications and renewals at
its headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City and
ACOSTA VS. OCHOA (2020) outsourcing the delivery of firearms license cards to a
courier service;
FACTS:
(10) w/n Section 7.3 of the Implementing Rules and
Republic Act No. 10591, enacted on May 29, 2013, currently Regulations is void for omitting engineers as persons who
regulates the ownership, possession, carrying, manufacture, may apply for a permit to carry Firearm outside of residence
dealing in, and importation of firearms and ammunition in and, therefore, contrary to Section 7 of Republic Act No.
the country. It was enacted with the view of maintaining 10591;
peace and order and protecting the people from violence. 1
Its Implementing Rules and Regulations was promulgated
on December 7, 2013 pursuant to the rule-making power (11) w/n the requirement of a license to own and operate a
granted to the Chief of the Philippine National Police. firearm is a violation of petitioners' right to bear arms;
After the Implementing Rules and Regulations had become (12) w/n the requirement of a license to own and operate a
effective, the Philippine National Police centralized all Firearm is a valid exercise of police power and, therefore,
firearms licensing applications and renewals at its not violative of the right to due process;
headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City. The pro forma
application form for firearm registration, to be accomplished (13) w/n signing the Consent of Voluntary Presentation for
and signed by the applicant, contained a paragraph on the Inspection violates Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution
"Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection”. on the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures;
If the application is approved, the firearm license card is
delivered through Werfast Documentary Agency, a courier (14) w/n requiring a certification from the president of a
service, instead of having it picked up at Camp Crame or in recognized gun club or sports shooting association in order
the regional offices of the Philippine National Police. to obtain a Firearm license violates Article III, Section 8 of
the Constitution on the freedom of association
(1) w/n an actual case or controversy exists warranting this HELD:

Court's exercise of its power of judicial review under Article
VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution
(1) Acosta and Dela Paz, petitioners in G.R. No.
211559, did not allege actual facts in their Petition. As such,
(2) w/n petitioners have legal standing to file their they failed to bring an actual case or controversy before this
respective Petitions; Court. the Petition in G.R. No. 211559 alleges no actual facts
from which this Court can intelligently adjudicate the issues
(3) w/n petitioners' direct recourse to this Court was proper raised in it.
in light of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts;
Petitioners Acosta and Dela Paz assail the constitutionality
(4) w/n the 2013 Implementing Rules and Regulations of of Republic Act No. 10591 because it allegedly violated their
Republic Act No. 10591 is in the nature of an ex post facto right to bear arms, their right to property, and even the right
law by deeming as vacated all firearm licenses issued under to presumption of innocence by disqualifying from holding a
the old law, and compelling the re-application under the new forearm license those who have committed a crime involving
law under pain of prosecution for illegal possession of a Firearm. However, they did not show that their Firearm
firearms; licenses were revoked because of any of the provisions of
the law or its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
(5) w/n the Chief of the Philippine National Police made
additional and more restrictive regulations for gun clubs,
Implementing Rules. If the Implementing Rules and

Petitioners Acosta and Dela Paz also raise the issue of the Regulations were indeed in the nature of an ex post facto
omission of engineers from Section 7.3 of the Implementing law, then private individuals who possess Class-A light
Rules and Regulations as professionals who may apply for a weapons under the old law must be expressly punished
permit to carry firearms outside of residence, contrary to under the new law because the new law only allows them to
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10591. They also assail Section own and possess small arms. Yet, as expressly provided in
7.9 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations, which the law, existing license holders of Class-A light weapons
allegedly adversely affect members of a law enforcement may renew their licenses under the new law and
agency such as the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Implementing Rules.
Philippine National Police. Yet, they made no allegation that
they are engineers, or that when they applied for a permit (5) Republic Act No. 10591 sets forth a su4cient
to carry a Firearm outside of residence, they were denied standard found in Section 2. 110 It lays down the State
because of Section 7.3. Likewise, they did not allege that policy to "maintain peace and order and protect the people
they are members of a law enforcement agency. against violence" by providing "a comprehensive law
regulating the ownership, possession, carrying,
(2) Petitioners Acosta, Dela Paz, and PROGUN, manufacture, dealing in and importation of firearms,
however, have legal standing to file the present suit. As ammunition, or parts thereof[.]" As such, the Chief of the
individual firearm license holders, petitioners Acosta and Philippine National Police incorporated provisions in the
Dela Paz are the ones who stand to suffer direct injury Implementing Rules and Regulations to regulate the
should the inspection of their houses be required for firearm activities of gun clubs, sports shooters, reloaders,
registration. gunsmithing, competitions, and indentors, which are related
to the ownership, possession, and dealing in firearms.
Court finds petitioner PROGUN sufficiently clothed with legal
standing to bring on behalf of its individual members a suit (6) It can be said that Republic Act No. 10591 explicitly
to question a possible violation of their constitutional right states that "reasonable licensing fees" may be provided in
to unreasonable searches. The same cannot be said for the Implementing Rules. Except for petitioner PROGUN's
petitioners Guns and Ammo Dealers and PROGUN in G.R. assertion that the fees charged are numerous, there is no
No. 215634. To recall, they assail respondent Philippine showing how these fees imposed were unreasonable.
National Police's refusal to decentralize its offices and its
overregulation of gun-related establishments, as these acts (7) When it comes to the penal provisions, the text of
supposedly harm their business interests. Yet, there is no the Implementing Rules and Regulations is almost a carbon
showing of any hindrance to their members' ability to copy of the law from which it is based. If there is any
protect their own business interests. For these reasons, the discrepancy, it is in item (g), where the Implementing Rules
Petitions in G.R. 212570 and G.R. No. 215634 are omitted the acquisition or possession of ammunition for a
dismissible for lack of legal standing on the part of Class-A light weapon as a punishable act. Still, contrary to
petitioners Guns and Ammo Dealers and PROGUN. PROGUN's claim, the Philippine National Police placed no
additional penal provisions relating to firearms use in the
(3) Petitioners directly sought recourse from this Implementing Rules.
Court, in violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
However, on the alleged breach of the doctrine of hierarchy (8) The Court is inclined to believe respondent
of courts, suffice it to say that the doctrine is not an iron- Philippine National Police's assertion that the meetings on
clad dictum. In several instances where this Court was the drafting of the Implementing Rules were well-attended
confronted with cases of national interest and of serious by groups of gun dealers, private security agencies, and
implications, it never hesitated to set aside the rule and groups of gunsmiths and gun repair and customizing shops.
proceed with the judicial determination of the cases. The This was evidenced by the Attendance Sheets and Minutes
case at bar is of similar import as it involves the citizens' of the Stakeholders Hearing and Consultation attached to
right to bear arms. respondent Philippine National Police's Comment. The public
hearing on August 15, 2013 was even attended by petitioner
(4) Under Republic Act No. 10591, the authority to PROGUN, disproving its claim that no public consultations
issue firearms licenses and permits to carry them outside of and hearings were conducted in the drafting of the
residence remains with the Philippine National Police. Implementing Rules. The Implementing Rules was,
Section 44 specifically authorized the Chief of the Philippine therefore, promulgated after the conduct of public
National Police to promulgate the necessary rules and consultations, in compliance with Section 44 of Republic Act
regulations to effectively implement the law. No. 10591.
Still, to validly exercise their quasi-legislative (9) To this, it must be noted that the processing of
powers, administrative agencies must comply with two (2) Firearm license applications and renewals has already been
tests: (1) the completeness test; and (2) the su4cient decentralized to the Philippine National Police's regional and
standard test. The subsequent discussions will answer w/n other satellite offices. Therefore, the issue of whether the
the PNP validly exercised its quasi-legislative powers. centralization was grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Chief of the Philippine National Police has already been
rendered moot. It need not be discussed. The same can be
There is no such retroactive application mandated
said on the outsourcing of the Firearm license delivery to a
in the Implementing Rules and Regulations. On the contrary,
courier service. The outsourcing having already been
Firearm licenses to possess Class-A light weapons issued
discontinued, the issue is rendered moot.
before the passage of Republic Act No. 10591 are still
recognized both under Republic Act No. 10591 and its
qualifications for obtaining a license to own and possess

(10) It appears that the omission was inadvertent. At firearms under Republic Act No. 10591. Therefore, even with
any rate, engineers may still apply for a permit to carry on the new law, the exercise of the right to use a firearm, even
the basis of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10591. After all, for self-defense, is still subject to State regulation.
the provisions of a statute cannot be amended by an
implementing rule. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the right to
possess a Firearm were considered a property right, it is
(11) Petitioners mainly assail the constitutionality of doctrine that property rights are always subject to the
Republic Act No. 10591 and its Implementing Rules and State's police power, defined as the "authority to enact
Regulations on the ground that they violate their "right to legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
bear arms." The history of our laws, however, reveals that property in order to promote the general welfare."
we Filipinos have never had such constitutional right. The
bearing of arms in our jurisdiction was, and still is, a mere The Court likewise discussed the test to determine the
statutory privilege, heavily regulated by the State. validity of a police power measure: (1) "the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
No private person is bound to keep arms. Whether he does class, require the exercise of the police power"; and (2) "the
or not is entirely optional with himself, but if, for his own means employed are reasonably necessary for the
convenience or pleasure, he desires to possess arms, he accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
must do so upon such terms as the Government sees fit to upon individuals." Applying this test, the Court found that
impose, for the right to keep and bear arms is not secured the Philippine National Police Guidelines, which suspended
to him by law. the issuance of permits to carry firearms outside of
residence, was a valid police power measure. It held that
the interest of the general public was satisfied, since the
At present, the bearing of arms remains a "mere statutory
Guidelines was issued in response to the rise in high-profile
privilege, not a constitutional right." In the 2004 case of
crimes. As to the means employed to retain peace and order
Chavez, decided during the effectivity of the present
in society, this Court stated that the revocation of all permits
Constitution, the Court characterized the keeping and
to carry firearms outside of residence would make it difficult
bearing of arms as a "mere statutory creation." From our
for criminals to commit gun violence and victimize others.
first firearms law, Act No. 1780 (1907), to Act No. 2711
This Court, thus, deemed the regulation reasonable.
(1917), then Presidential Decree No. 1866 (1983), and
finally, under the current Republic Act No. 10591, any
person desiring to keep and bear arms must obtain a license Likewise, the prohibition on the transfer of firearms
from the State to avail of the privilege. ownership through succession is a valid exercise of police
power. The qualifications for acquiring a Firearm license
under Section 4 of the law are highly personal to the
(12) With the bearing of arms being a mere privilege
licensee. These qualifications may not be possessed by his
granted by the State, there could not have been a
or her relative or next of kin. It is, therefore, only correct
deprivation of petitioners' right to due process in requiring a
that the rights to own and possess a Firearm are non-
license for the possession of firearms. Article III, Section 1
transferrable by succession. At any rate, should he or she
of the Constitution is clear that only life, liberty, or property
be interested, the deceased's relative or next of kin may
is protected by the due process clause.
apply for a license to own and possess the deceased's
registered Firearm under Section 26 of Republic Act No.
It is settled that the license to possess a firearm is not 10591.
property. There is no vested right in the continued
ownership and possession of firearms. Like any other
As to the automatic revocation of license if the registered
license, the license to possess a Firearm is "neither a
firearm is used for the commission of crime: The commission
property nor a property right." As a mere "permit or
of the crime indicates the licensee's propensity for violence,
privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful," it does
which is contrary to the declared State policy of maintaining
not act as "a contract between the authority granting it and
peace and order and protecting the people from violence. In
the person to whom it is granted.”
such a case, the revocation of the license would be justified.
Being in the nature of a license, the permit to carry Firearm

(13) The Philippine National Police, in the pro forma
outside residence is neither a property nor a property right.
Individual Application for New Firearm Registration, included
A grantee of the permit does "not have a property interest
a paragraph indicating the Consent of Voluntary
in obtaining a license to carry a Firearm."
Presentation for Inspection, to be signed by the applicant. It
provides that the applicant agrees to voluntarily consent to
Further, Republic Act No. 10591 did not elevate the status the inspection of the Firearm at the residence indicated in
of the right to bear arms from a privilege to a full-fledged the application. In Petitioner’s view, this inspection is an
statutory right. A close examination of the declared State unreasonable search prohibited in Art III Sec 2 of the
policy in Sec 2 of Republic Act No. 10591 reveals that the Constitution and a violation of their right to privacy.
right to bear arms remains a mere privilege.
What constitutes a "reasonable search" depends on whether
Section 2 recognizes that the right to self-defense is a person has an "expectation of privacy, which society
provided as a justifying circumstance under the Revised regards as reasonable."
Penal Code. 143 However, this right to self-defense, if it is
to be done through the use of firearms, is granted to
A reduced expectation of privacy is the reason why the
"qualified citizens": those who have satisfied the
inspection of persons and their effects under routine
inspections, such as those done in airports, seaports, bus forma application form for Firearm registration is likewise
terminals, malls, and similar public places, does not require declared void and of no force and effect. As for the rest of
a search warrant. These routine inspections are considered the assailed provisions of Republic Act No. 10591 and the
reasonable searches, clearly done to ensure public safety. 2013 Implementing Rules and Regulations, petitioners
miserably failed to make a case for their unconstitutionality.
A reasonable search, however, is different from a
warrantless search. While a reasonable search arises from a
reduced expectation of privacy, a warrantless search, which
is presumed unreasonable, dispenses with a search warrant Prohibition against passage of Irrepealable Laws
for practical reasons. This is why a search incidental to a
● Irrepealable laws deprive succeeding legislatures of
lawful arrest, search of evidence in plain view, consented
the fundamental best senses carte blanche in crafting
search, and extensive search of moving private vehicle do
laws appropriate to the operative milieu. [City of
not require a search warrant.
Davao, v. RTC, August 18, 2005]
● Where the legislature, by its own act, attempts to limit
From all these, the Court holds that the inspection its power to amend or repeal laws, the Court has the
requirement under Republic Act No. 10591, as interpreted duty to strike down such act for interfering with the
by the Philippine National Police in the Implementing Rules, plenary powers of Congress. [Kida v. Senate,
CANNOT be considered a reasonable search. There is a February 28,2012]
legitimate, almost absolute, expectation of privacy in one's ● Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes
residence. ● Desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which
attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of
Still, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures its enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.
may be waived if it can be shown that the consent was Kida v. Senate, October 18,2011 citing City of Davao,
"unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, v. RTC]
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Signing the
Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection does not
result in a true and valid consented search.
THE SENATE
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 10591 provides that applicants
for Types 3 to 5 licenses "must comply with the inspection .
. . requirements." However, the law is silent as to the scope, SECTION 2, ARTICLE VI
frequency, and execution of the inspection. This means that
the Chief of the Philippine National Police is presumed to fill The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who
in these details in the Implementing Rules and Regulations. shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the
However, even the Implementing Rules is completely silent Philippines, as may be provided by law.
as to the parameters of the inspection. This renders
applicants for firearms licenses incapable of intelligently
waiving their right to the unreasonable search of their Note: senators are elected at large, that is senatorial
homes. candidates submit themselves to a vote of the entire national
electorate.
The Court finds that Section 9 of Republic Act No. 10591 and
its corresponding provision in the Implementing Rules are This manner of electing senators can only be changed by
unconstitutional for being violative of Article III, Section 2 constitutional amendment. [Bernas]
of the Constitution.
SECTION 3, ARTICLE VI
(14) Reading Section 4.10, this Court finds that nothing
No person shall be a senator unless he is a natural-born
in it compels a sports shooter applicant to join a gun club or
citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the election, at
sports shooting association. All that Section 4.10 provides is
least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a
that a person intending to apply as a sports shooter must
registered voter, resident of the Philippines for at 2 least
submit a certification from the president of a recognized gun
years immediately preceding the day of the election
club or sports shooting association that he or she is joining
the competition. The reason is that shooting competitions
are usually sponsored by gun clubs and sports associations 1. Natural-born citizen
which, in turn, must be duly registered with and accredited 2. At least 35 years old on the day of the election
in good standing by the Firearms and Explosives Office of 3. Able to read and write
the Philippine National Police. This certification ensures that 4. A registered voter
the extra ammunition is indeed granted to legitimate sports 5. Resident of the Philippines for at 2 least years
shooters, which is remarkably more than that allowed to an immediately preceding the day of the election
ordinary owner of a firearm.
In sum, the petitions are partly granted. Section 9.3 of the

2013 Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act On “Residence”
No. 10591 is unconstitutional. It is declared void for violating
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution on the right against When it comes to qualifications for running for public
unreasonable searches and seizures. Signing the Consent of office, residence is synonymous with domicile.
Voluntary Presentation for Inspection appearing in the pro
The term ‘residence’ as so used is synonymous with CHRONOLOGY

‘domicile’ which imports not only intention to reside in
a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, It must be remembered that the 24 Senators first elected under
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. 1987 Constitution on May 2, 1987 served only for five years
[Jalosjos v. COMELEC. February 26, 2013] ending on June 30, 1992.
The term “residence” is to be understood not in its 24 Senators UNTIL June 30, 1992.
common acceptation as referring to “dwellin” or
“habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal Of the Senators elected in 1992 the first twelve obtaining the
residence. [Caballero v. COMELEC, September 22, highest number of votes served for the full term of six years
2015] expiring in 1998, and the last served only three years and
ended in 1995.
After which, the twelve senator elected in 1995 shall serve the
What is Domicile? full term of six years or until 2001.
A place where a party actually or constructively has First 12- 6 years

his permanent home, where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends Last 12- 3 years (1995) 1992 elections
return and remain (“animus maninde”) [Caballero v.
12 Senators-1995 elections
COMELEC]
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at
birth. 12 Senators- 2001 elections
It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside 12 Senators- 2004 elections
and continues until the same is abandoned by
acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). 12 Senators-2007 elections
[Caballero v. COMELEC]
12 Senators- 2010 elections
New domicile-requisites
12 Senators- 2016 elections
1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality;
2. An intention to remain there (animus manendi); and 12 Senators- 2019 elections
3. An intention to abandon the old domicile (animus
non revertendi). [Poe-Llmanzeres v. COMELEC] 12 Senators- 2022 elections
In other words, there must basically be animus manendi

(intention to remain) coupled with animus non revertendi
(intention not to return)
Term vs. Tenure
animus manendi + animus non revertendi=
domicile The term means the time during the officer may
claim hold office as of right, and fixes the interval
after which the several incumbents shall succeed one
another.
The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall
commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on
the thirtieth (30th) day of June next following their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Tenure
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity Represents the term during which the incumbent
of his service of the full term for which he was elected. actually holds the office. The term of office is not
affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter
than the term of reasons within or beyond the power
First Senators elected under 1987 Constitution of the incumbent. [Gaminde v. COA, December 13,
2000]
Section 2. The Senators, members of the House of
Representatives, and the local officials first elected under this Q. Does the limitation on number of elections mean
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. that a Senator who has served two consecutive
terms must wait for six years before he can run
Of the Senator elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve again for the Senate?
obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve six years and
the remaining twelve for three years. [Art XVIII] A: A Senator can run again years three after the
expiration of his second term. [Bernas]
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Remember:
• Term of office: 3 years [contra 6 years for Senator]

• No Member of the House of Representatives shall
SECTION 6, ARTICLE VI serve for more than three consecutive terms.
[3+3+3=9]
No person shall be a member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Composition
Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least twenty
five years of age, able to read and write, and except the The House of Representatives shall be composed of
party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
of not less than one year the immediately preceding the day legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
of the election. cities, and Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
QUALIFICATIONS through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
1. Natural-born citizen
2. on the day of the election, is at least twenty five (25) [Section 5 (1), Art. VI]
years of age,
(THE 18TH CONGRESS IS COMPOSED OF 301
3. Able to read and write
REPRESENTATIVES)
4. except the party-list representatives. A registered
voter a registered voter in the district in which he
shall be elected, and
5. a resident thereof for a period of not less than one The House of Representatives shall be composed of:
(1) year the immediately preceding the day of the
election. a. District representatives and
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-list Nominees. No person b. Party-list representatives.

shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one (1) year the
Note: [From] Constitution’s point of view, it is the
immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and
party-list representative who are “elected” into
write, a bona fide member of the organization which seeks to
office, not their parties or organizations.
represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty five (25) years of age on the These representatives are elected, however, through
day of the election. [R.A 7941 (Party-list System Act)] that peculiar party-list system that the Constitution
authorized and that Congress by law established
where the voters cast their votes for theorganizations
Youth Sector Nominee or parties to which such party-list representatives
belong. [Abayon v. HRET, February 11, 2010]
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at
least twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) Once elected, both the district representatives and
years of age on the day of the election. the part-list representatives are treated in like
manner.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age
of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to They have the same deliberate rights, salaries and
continue in office until the expiration of his term. emoluments. They can participate in the making of
laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts
Example: COMELEC cancels Cardema’s Duterte Youth or sectors.
Nomination.
They are also subject to the same term limitation of
three years for a maximum of three consecutive
terms. [Abayon v. HRET]
Party-list representatives (source: congress.gov.ph)
The Members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless Sectoral Representatives
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth (30th) of
For three consecutive terms after the ratification of
June next following their election. No member of the House
the Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
of Representative shall serve more than three (3)
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
by law, by selection or election from the labor,
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors
was elected.
as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector.
Note: Under Section 7, Article XVIII of the allocation of party-list seats. [Banat v. COMELEC, July
Constitution, the appointment of sectoral 8, 2009]
representatives is vested upon the President until
otherwise provided by law, as follows:
SEMA VS COMELEC (2008)

FACTS:
SECTION 7, ARTICLE XVIII
These consolidated petitions seek to annul Resolution No.
Until the law is passed, the President may fill by 7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the Commission on Elections
appointment from a list of nominees by the
(COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative
respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral
representation in paragraph (1), Section 5 of the district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
Article VI in this Constitution.
On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM
Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces
under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim
250 Members Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight
Note: The initial total membership was arrived at
taking into consideration a national population of 55 municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.
million. [Bernas]
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s
The constitution allows the legislature to modify the
creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.
number of the members of the House of
Representatives. [Banat v. COMELEC]
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the
COMELEC promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution
“Unless otherwise fixed by law”

No. 7845 stating that Maguindanao’s first legislative district
As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment
Congress from increasing its membership by passing of MMA Act 201.
a law, [Mariano v. COMELEC]
Vested exclusively in Congress On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902,
subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past by renaming the legislative district in question as “Shariff
Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First
membership in the House of Representatives, and to
District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).”
reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively
in Congress. [Sema v. COMELEC, July 16, 2008]
In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14
This can be done through reapportionment resulting May 2007 elections for Representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan
in the creation of new districts or through the creation with Cotabato City," prayed for the nullification of COMELEC
of new provinces (since each province is entitled to at
Resolution No.7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of
least one district), or through the creation of cities
meriting one legislative district under Section 5 (3). the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema
[Bernas] contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one
representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of
The Legislature has the option to choose whether the the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
increase in the number of members of the House of
to the Constitution. Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC
Representatives is done by piecemeal legislation or by
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing
enactment of a law authorizing a general increase.
[Banat v. COMELEC, July 8, 2009] Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status quo in
Maguindanao’s first legislative district despite the
COMELEC’s earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845
designating Cotabato City as the lone component of
No Constitutional requirement for absolute proportional
representation in the allocation of party-list seats Maguindanao’s reapportioned first legislative district. Sema
further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the
[The] principle of proportional representation applies COMELEC usurped Congress’ power to create or reapportion
only to legislative districts, not to the party-list legislative districts.
system.
The allocation of seats under the party-list system is

governed by the last phrase of Section 5 (1), which
states that the party-list representatives shall be
“those who, as provided by law, xxx” giving the
legislature wide discretion in formulating the
MAIN ISSUE: reapportionment of legislative districts based on

the standards provided in this section.
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,
delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress
to create provinces, cities, municipalities and the power to increase, through a law, the allowable
barangays, is constitutional; and membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4)
empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes
by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones.
pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled Congress exercises these powers through a law that
to one representative in the House of Representatives Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional
without need of a national law creating a legislative or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership
district for such province. of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new
legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through
RULING: a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC,
we held that the "power of redistricting x x x is traditionally
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws,"
Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable and thus is vested exclusively in Congress.
membership in the House of Representatives, and to
reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power
Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides: to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical.
Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall allowable membership or in its incumbent membership
be composed of not more than two hundred through the creation of legislative districts must be
embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative
who shall be elected from legislative districts bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a
national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the membership of the superior legislative body.
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did
not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and
through a party-list system of registered the ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution provides:
national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and
subject to the provisions of this Constitution
xxxx
and national laws, the organic act of autonomous
regions shall provide for legislative powers
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and
over:
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each (1) Administrative organization;
province, shall have at least one representative. (2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Within three years following the return of every (4) Personal, family, and property relations;
census, the Congress shall make a
(5) Regional urban and rural planning
development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;

BAGABUYO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (2008)
(7) Educational policies;

FACTS:
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural
heritage; and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371 was sponsored by Cagayan de
Oro's then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by through House Bill No. 5859: "An Act Providing for the
law for the promotion of the general welfare of Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of
Cagayan De Oro."
the people of the region.

Under this law, it increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative
district from one to two. For the election of May 2007,
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as belonging to
authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to either the first or the second district, depending on their
create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress. place of residence. The constituents of each district would
elect their own representative to Congress as well as eight
members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod.
In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,
insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
On March 13, 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated
power to create provinces and cities, is void for being Resolution No. 7837 implementing R.A. No. 9371.
contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article
X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present petition
appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create against the COMELEC asking for the nullification of R.A. No.
provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds. On
cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, 10 April 2008, the petitioner amended the petition to include
a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article the following as respondents:
VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
· Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita
appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly
· The Secretary of the Department of Budget
cannot create a province without a legislative district
and Management;
because the Constitution mandates that every province shall · The Chairman of the Commission on Audit;
have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional · The Mayor and the members of the
Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cagayan de
the office of a district representative of Congress because Oro City; and
the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly · Its Board of Canvassers.
operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that He argued that the COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No.
9371 without providing for the rules, regulations and
MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and
guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite which is
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. indispensable for the division or conversion of a local
government unit.
He prayed for the issuance of an order directing the

respondents to cease and desist from implementing R.A. No.
9371 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, and to revert
instead to COMELEC Resolution No. 7801 which provided for
a single legislative district for Cagayan de Oro.
Since the Court did not grant the petitioner's prayer for a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction,
the May 14 National and Local Elections proceeded according
to R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837.
COMELEC, thru OSG argued that:
1) R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the

representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House
of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod
pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution;
2) The criteria established under Section 10,

Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when
there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or reapportionment of legislative districts based on

substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, the standards provided in this section.
city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no
such creation, division, merger, abolition or Separately from the legislative districts that legal
alteration of boundaries of a local government unit apportionment or reapportionment speaks of, are the local
took place; and government units (historically and generically referred to as
"municipal corporations") that the Constitution itself
3) R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change classified into provinces, cities, municipalities and
in Cagayan de Oros territory, population and barangays. In its strict and proper sense, a municipality
income classification; hence, no plebiscite is has been defined as "a body politic and corporate constituted
required. by the incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or town for
the purpose of local government thereof."
The creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of

MAIN ISSUE: boundary of local government units, i.e., of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays, are covered by the Article on
Local Government (Article X). Section 10 of this Article
1) Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the
provides:
legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City, or
does it involve the division and conversion of a local
government unit? No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in
It provides for the legislative reapportionment of
accordance with the criteria established in the local
Cagayan de Oro City.
government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law political unit directly affected.
Dictionary as the determination of the number of
representatives which a State, county or other subdivision
Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X, Section 10 of
may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats
the Constitution, the authority to act has been vested in the
in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the
Legislature. The Legislature undertakes the apportionment
drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population
and reapportionment of legislative districts, and likewise
and voting power among the districts.
acts on local government units by setting the standards for
their creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of
Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or boundaries and by actually creating, dividing, merging,
change in legislative districts brought about by changes in abolishing local government units and altering their
population and mandated by the constitutional requirement boundaries through legislation. Other than this, not much
of equality of representation commonality exists between the two provisions since they
are inherently different although they interface and relate
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution lays down the rules on with one another.
legislative apportionment under its Section 5 which
provides: The concern that leaps from the text of Article VI, Section 5
is political representation and the means to make a
Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall legislative district sufficiently represented so that the people
be composed of not more than two hundred fifty can be effectively heard. As above stated, the aim of
members unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall legislative apportionment is "to equalize population and
be elected from legislative districts apportioned voting power among districts." Hence, emphasis is given
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan to the number of people represented; the uniform and
Manila area in accordance with the number of their progressive ratio to be observed among the representative
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a districts; and accessibility and commonality of interests in
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as terms of each district being, as far as practicable,
provided by law, shall be elected through a party- continuous, compact and adjacent territory.
list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations. In terms of the people represented, every city with at least
250,000 people and every province (irrespective of
xxx population) is entitled to one representative. In this sense,
legislative districts, on the one hand, and provinces and
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as cities, on the other, relate and interface with each other. To
practicable, continuous, compact, and adjacent ensure continued adherence to the required standards of
territory. Each city with a population of at least two apportionment, Section 5(4) specifically mandates
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall reapportionment as soon as the given standards are met.
have at least one representative.
In contrast with the equal representation objective of Article
(4) Within three years following the return of every VI, Section 5, Article X, Section 10 expressly speaks of how
census, the Congress shall make a local government units may be "created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered." Its concern
is the commencement, the termination, and the modification people comprising the district; it merely delineates the areas
of local government units' corporate existence and territorial occupied by the people who will choose a representative in
coverage; and it speaks of two specific standards that must their national affairs. Unlike a province, which has a
be observed in implementing this concern, namely, the governor; a city or a municipality, which has a mayor; and
criteria established in the local government code and the a barangay, which has a punong barangay, a district does
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the not have its own chief executive. The role of the
political units directly affected. congressman that it elects is to ensure that the voice of the
people of the district is heard in Congress, not to oversee
Under the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) passed the affairs of the legislative district. Not being a corporate
in 1991, the criteria of income, population and land area are unit also signifies that it has no legal personality that must
specified as verifiable indicators of viability and capacity to be created or dissolved and has no capacity to act. Hence,
provide services. The division or merger of existing units there is no need for any plebiscite in the creation, dissolution
must comply with the same requirements (since a new local or any other similar action on a legislative district.
government unit will come into being), provided that a
division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area The local government units, on the other hand, are political
of the unit affected to less than the minimum requirement and corporate units. They are the territorial and political
prescribed in the Code. subdivisions of the state. They possess legal personality
on the authority of the Constitution and by action of the
A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Legislature. The Constitution defines them as entities that
Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite. Congress can, by law, create, divide, abolish, merge; or
The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly whose boundaries can be altered based on standards again
require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, established by both the Constitution and the Legislature. A
merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local local government unit's corporate existence begins upon the
government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement election and qualification of its chief executive and a
exists under the apportionment or reapportionment majority of the members of its Sanggunian.
provision. In Tobias v. Abalos, a case that arose from the
division of the congressional district formerly covering San As a political subdivision, a local government unit is an
Juan and Mandaluyong into separate districts, we confirmed "instrumentality of the state in carrying out the functions
this distinction and the fact that no plebiscite is needed in a of government." As a corporate entity with a distinct and
legislative reapportionment. The plebiscite issue came up separate juridical personality from the State, it exercises
because one was ordered and held for Mandaluyong in the special functions for the sole benefit of its constituents. It
course of its conversion into a highly urbanized city, while acts as "an agency of the community in the administration
none was held for San Juan. In explaining why this of local affairs" and the mediums through which the
happened, the Court ruled that no plebiscite was necessary people act in their corporate capacity on local concerns.
for San Juan because the objective of the plebiscite was the In light of these roles, the Constitution saw it fit to expressly
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as secure the consent of the people affected by the creation,
required by Article X, Section 10 the Local Government division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of
Code; the creation of a new legislative district only followed local government units through a plebiscite.
as a consequence. In other words, the apportionment alone
and by itself did not call for a plebiscite, so that none was These considerations clearly show the distinctions between
needed for San Juan where only a reapportionment took a legislative apportionment or reapportionment and the
place. division of a local government unit. Historically and by its
intrinsic nature, a legislative apportionment does not mean,
The need for a plebiscite under Article X, Section 10 and the and does not even imply, a division of a local government
lack of requirement for one under Article VI, Section 5 can unit where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the
best be appreciated by a consideration of the historical roots plebiscite requirement that applies to the division of a
of these two provisions, the nature of the concepts they province, city, municipality or barangay under the Local
embody and their areas of application. Under these Government Code should not apply to and be a requisite for
separate historical tracks, it can be seen that the holding of the validity of a legislative apportionment or
a plebiscite was never a requirement in legislative reapportionment.
apportionment or reapportionment. After it became
constitutionally entrenched, a plebiscite was also always
identified with the creation, division, merger, abolition and
alteration of boundaries of local government units, never
OTHER ISSUES:
with the concept of legislative apportionment.
1) Does R.A. No. 9371 violate the equality of

The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of
representation doctrine?
may, in a sense, be called a political unit because it is the
basis for the election of a member of the House of
Representatives and members of the local legislative body. No, it does not violate the equality representation
It is not, however, a political subdivision through which doctrine.
functions of government are carried out. It can more
appropriately be described as a representative unit that may R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a
or may not encompass the whole of a city or a province, but reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with
unlike the latter, it is not a corporate unit. Not being a
corporate unit, a district does not act for and in behalf of the
the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section to by Tomas P. Africa, Administrator of the National
5(4) of the Constitution. Statistics Office.
Under the wordings of its Section 1, no division of Cagayan The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information
de Oro City as a political and corporate entity takes place or about the actual population of Cagayan de Oro City.
is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a However, we take judicial notice of the August 2007 census
single unit and its administration is not divided along of the National Statistics Office which shows that barangays
territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and comprising Cagayan de Oro's first district have a total
intact; there is only the addition of another legislative population of 254,644, while the second district has 299,322
district and the delineation of the city into two districts for residents. Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the
purposes of representation in the House of Representatives. population sizes of the districts. The Constitution, however,
Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not come does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality
into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion as a standard in gauging equality of representation. In fact,
Cagayan de Oro City into two districts. for cities, all it asks is that "each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand shall have one
Admittedly, the legislative reapportionment carries effects representative," while ensuring representation for every
beyond the creation of another congressional district in the province regardless of the size of its population. To ensure
city by providing, as reflected in COMELEC Resolution No. quality representation through commonality of interests and
7837, for additional Sangguniang Panglunsod seats to be ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all
voted for along the lines of the congressional apportionment that the Constitution requires is that every legislative district
made. The effect on the Sangguniang Panglunsod, however, should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact,
is not directly traceable to R.A. No. 9371 but to another law and adjacent territory. Thus, the Constitution leaves the
- R.A. No. 6636 - whose Section 3 provides: local government units as they are found and does not
require their division, merger or transfer to satisfy the
numerical standard it imposes. Its requirements are
SECTION 3. Other Cities. - The provision of any law
satisfied despite some numerical disparity if the units are
to the contrary notwithstanding the City of Cebu,
contiguous, compact and adjacent as far as practicable.
City of Davao, and any other city with more than
one representative district shall have eight (8)
councilors for each district who shall be residents Even petitioner’s contention is backed up by proper proof,
thereof to be elected by the qualified voters we cannot question the division on the basis of the difference
therein, provided that the cities of Cagayan de Oro, in the barangays' levels of development or developmental
Zamboanga, Bacolod, Iloilo and other cities focus as these are not part of the constitutional standards
comprising a representative district shall have for legislative apportionment or reapportionment. What the
twelve (12) councilors each and all other cities shall components of the two districts of Cagayan de Oro would be
have ten (10) councilors each to be elected at large is a matter for the lawmakers to determine as a matter of
by the qualified voters of the said cities: Provided, policy.
That in no case shall the present number of
councilors according to their charters be reduced.
However, neither does this law have the effect of

dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two political
and corporate units and territories. Rather than divide ALDABA VS COMELEC (2010)
the city either territorially or as a corporate entity, the effect FACTS:
is merely to enhance voter representation by giving each
city voter more and greater say, both in Congress and in the Original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional
Sangguniang Panglunsod. Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591), creating a legislative
district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the
The petitioner argues that the distribution of the legislative minimum population requirement for the creation of a
districts is unequal. District 1 has only 93,719 registered legislative district in a city.
voters while District 2 has 127,071. District 1 is composed
mostly of rural barangays while District 2 is composed · On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law
mostly of urban barangays. Thus, R.A. No. 9371 violates the · At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591
principle of equality of representation.
were filed in Congress in 2007, namely,
House Bill No. 3162 (later converted to
A clarification must be made. The law clearly provides that
the basis for districting shall be the number of the House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No.
inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of 1986, the population of Malolos City was
registered voters therein. We settled this very same 223,069.
question in Herrera v. COMELEC when we interpreted a · House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated
provision in R.A. No. 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. certification issued by a Regional Director of
2313 that applied to the Province of Guimaras. We the National Statistics Office (NSO) that
categorically ruled that the basis for districting is the number
"the projected population of the
of inhabitants of the Province of Guimaras by municipality
based on the official 1995 Census of Population as certified Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by
the year 2010 using the population growth of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislative district of its
rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000." own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Who and why did they file? Constitution.
- Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and SIDE NOTES:

residents of Malolos City
- Because, RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to GROWTH RATE USED 3.78%
meet the minimum population threshold of
250,000 for a city to merit representation in Population in HOUSE BILL No. 3693 (175,291 as of May 1,
Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI 2000)
of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. -Projected Population according to the undated certification
(254,030 in 2010)
ISSUE
RULES ON CERTIFICATION
Whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least
250,000, whether actual or projected, for the purpose of • First, certifications on demographic
creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time projections can be issued only if such
for the 10 May 2010 elections. projections are declared official by the
National Statistics Coordination Board
RULING (NSCB).
• Second, certifications based on demographic
We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 projections can be issued only by the NSO
unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article Administrator or his designated certifying
VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance officer.
appended to the 1987 Constitution. • Third, intercensal population projections
must be as of the middle of every year.
Why?
Who issued EO 135? When?
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is
based on demographic projections, is without legal effect President Fidel V. Ramos on November 6,1993.
because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no
authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
void on its face because based on its own growth rate Constitution PROVIDES: Any province that may be created,
assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than or any city whose population may hereafter increase to
250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in
demographic projections cannot be made for the entire year. the immediately following election to at least one Member
In any event, a city whose population has increased to or such number of members as it may be entitled to on the
250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the
"immediately following election"7 after the attainment of the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article
250,000 population. VI of the Constitution.
Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the population The COMELEC also calls attention to the other
of Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in sources of Malolos City’s population indicators as of
2010. 2007 (2007 Census of Population – PMS 3 – Progress
Enumeration Report2) and as of 2008 (Certification of
The 2007 Census places the population of Malolos at the City of Malolos’ Water District, dated 31 July
223,069 as of 1 August 2007.9 Based on a growth rate of 2008,3 and Certification of the Liga ng Barangay,
3.78%, the population of Malolos will grow to only 248,365 dated 22 August 20084) which Congress allegedly used
as of 1 August 2010. Even if the growth rate is compounded in enacting Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591). The
yearly, the population of Malolos of 223,069 as of 1 August COMELEC extends its non-justiciability argument to
2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of 1 August 2010.10 these materials.
-no official record that the population of the City of Malolos THE COURT FINDS NO REASON TO GRANT THE MOTION
will be at least 250,000, actual or projected, prior to the 10
May 2010 elections, the immediately following election after
the supposed attainment of such population. Thus, the City
Nearly five decades ago, we already rejected claims of non- AQUINO III VS COMELEC (2010)
justiciability of an apportionment law alleged to violate the FACTS:
constitutional requirement of proportional representation:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65
The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a of the Rules of Court. Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon
C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification
judicial question, and not one which the court cannot
as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An
consider on the ground that it is a political question. Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and
Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
the mere impact of the suit upon the political situation does Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
not render it political instead of judicial. District From Such Reapportionment.”
Nor are the 2007 Census of Population – PMS 3 – Progress Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264,
Enumeration Report, the Certification of the City of Malolos’ and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal
Water District, dated 31 July 2008 and the Certification of Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October
the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008, reliable 2009 creating an additional legislative district for the
because none of them qualifies as authoritative population Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first
indicator under EO 135. The 2007 Census of Population – and second legislative districts of the province.
PMS 3 – Progress Enumeration Report merely contains
preliminary data on the population census of Bulacan which The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a
were subsequently adjusted to reflect actual population as population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4)
indicated in the 2007 Census results (showing Malolos City’s legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act
population at 223,069). No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur
were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative
Using Miranda’s own growth rate assumption of 3.78%, district for the province. Hence, the first district
Malolos City’s population as of 1 August 2010 will only be municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao,
249,333, below the constitutional threshold of 250,000 and San Fernando were combined with the second district
(using as base Malolos City’s population as of 1 August 2007 municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second
which is 223,069). legislative district.
Malolos City is entitled to representation in Congress only Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by
if, before the 10 May 2010 elections, it breaches the 250,000 Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit
population mark following the mandate in Section 3 of the constitutional standard that requires a minimum population
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of
a legislative district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000
The creation by RA 9591 of a legislative district for Malolos
minimum population standard. The provision reads:
City, carving the city from the former First Legislative
District, leaves the town of Bulacan isolated from the rest of
the geographic mass of that district.15 This contravenes the (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
requirement in Section 5(3), Article VI that each legislative practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.
district shall "comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
compact, and adjacent territory." thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
To adhere to the constitutional mandate, and thus maintain
fidelity to its purpose of ensuring efficient representation, The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic
the practicable alternative for Congress was to include the Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines
municipality of Bulacan in Malolos City’s legislative district. Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district
will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only
176,383.
That Miranda issued his Certification "by authority of the
NSO administrator" does not make the document reliable as
it neither makes Miranda the NSO Administrator’s ISSUE:
designated certifying officer nor cures the Certification of its
fatal defects for failing to use demographic projections and w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
estimates declared official by the NSCB or make the constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
projection as of the middle of 2010. legislative district in a province?
RULING: mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of

the province under the Local Government Code (LGC). The
plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502
We deny the petition.
negative votes. With the approval of the people from both
the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the
250,000 minimum population that must compose a interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of office
legislative district. on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007
synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new
set of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the
On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro,
phrase “each city with a population of at least two hundred Victor F. Bernal and Rene O. Medina, former political leaders
fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point to of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition for
no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the
population is only required for a city, but not for a constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the
province.26 petition on technical grounds. Their motion for
reconsideration was also denied.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Undaunted, petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the
Government Code on the creation of a province which, by Province of Surigao del Norte, filed another petition for
virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a certiorari8 seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being
legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat
Government Code states: as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an
illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the
people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial
Requisites for Creation. – territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich
resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to
less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of
Section 461 of the LGC, on both counts
1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
ISSUE:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000)
square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Whether or not the law creating Dinagat Province is valid.
Bureau; or
RULING:
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand
The Congress in recognizing the capacity and viability of
(250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Dinagat to become a full-fledged province enacted R.A. No.
Office. 9355 following the exemption from the land area
requirement, which, with respect to the creation of
Notably, the requirement of population is not an provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the
LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative
indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative
powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that
addition to the indispensable income requirement.
exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it
into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island
Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population Province of Dinagat.
sizes of the districts. The Constitution, however, does not
require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was
filed and favorably voted upon in both Chambers of
standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x. To
Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress
ensure quality representation through commonality of
definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate
interests and ease of access by the representative to the into the LGC that exemption from the land area
constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when
legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, it consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided only
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. in the LGC-IRR. Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was
amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.
What is more, the land area, while considered as an

NAVARRO VS ERMITA (2011) indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not
conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a
FACTS: province, taking into account its average annual income
ofP82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by
On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times
into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating the more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for
Province of Dinagat Islands). On December 3, 2006, the the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable.
Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the perspective, it is imperative to review and discuss the salient
May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances points in the case of Latasa v. [COMELEC]. The case involves
which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a the question of whether or not a municipal mayor, having
province, they must be seen from the perspective that been elected and had already served for three (3)
Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province. This consecutive terms, canrun as city mayor in light of the
Court should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity. conversion of the municipality to a city. In applying the
Consequently, before a law duly challenged is nullified, an three-term limit rule, the Court pointed out that the
unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with, the conversion of the municipality into a city did not convert the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, office of the municipal mayor into a local government post
must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no different from the office of the city mayor. The Court took
doubt in the mind of the Court. into account the following circumstances: (1) That the
territorial jurisdiction of [the] city was the same as that of
The provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations the municipality; (2) That the inhabitants were the same
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, group of voters who elected the municipal mayor for three
"The land area requirement shall not apply where the (3) consecutive terms; and (3) That the inhabitants were
proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," the same group of voters [over] whom he held power and
is declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An authority as their chief executive for nine years.
Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as
VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the ISSUE:
Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials
thereof are declared VALID. WON Naval violated the three term limit.
RULING:
NAVAL VS COMELEC (2014) Yes, thus the court denied the petition.
FACTS: Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno explained the character
of a republic is a representative government, a government
run by and for the people. It is not a pure democracy where
From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been
the people govern themselves directly. The essence of
elected and had served as a member of the Sanggunian,
republicanism is representation and renovation, the
Second District, Province of Camarines Sur. On October 12,
selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries
2009, the President approved Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716,8
who derive their mandate from the people and act on their
which reapportioned the legislative districts in Camarines
behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are
Sur Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old
replaced or retained, at the option of their principal.
Second District to form the present Third District. The
R.A.No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second Districtis to
present Second District is composed of the two remaining
be created, but the Third Districtis to be renamed. Verba
towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged with five towns from the
legis non est recedendum. The terms used in a legal
old First District.
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates
the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate
In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the that the framers mean what they say.
members of the Sanggunian, Third District. He served until The rationale behind reapportionment is the constitutional
2013. requirement to achieve equality of representation among
the districts. It is with this mindset that the Court should
In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anewand was re-elected as consider Naval’s argument anent having a new set of
Member of the Sanggunian, Third District. constituents electing him into office in 2010 and 2013.
Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the
Julia was likewise a SanggunianMember candidate from the three-term limit rule, does not undermine the right to equal
Third District in the 2013 elections. On October 29, 2012, representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur. With
he invoked Section 7810 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) or without him, the renamed Third District, which he labels
and filed beforethe COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due as a new set of constituents, would still be represented,
Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy11 of Naval. albeit by another eligible person.
Julia posited that Naval had fully served the entire Province
of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a member The required gap after three consecutive elections is
of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been significant. Thus, the rule cannot be taken with a grain of
elected from. The three-term limit rule’s application is more salt. Nothing less than its strict application is called for.
with reference to the same local elective post, and not
necessarily in connection with an identical territorial Ratio legis est anima.
jurisdiction. Allowing Naval to run as a Sanggunianmember
for the fourth time is violative of the inflexible three-term NOTE: SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. GARCIA ON
limit rule enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC, which ALTERNATIVE NO. 1
must be strictly construed.12
Mr. Garcia stated that he was advocating Alternative No. 1
COMELEC cancelled Naval's COC. on four grounds: 1) to prevent monopoly of political power
because the country’s history showed that prolonged stay in
The conditions for the application of the three-term limit rule public office could lead to the creation of entrenched
are present in the instant case as the records clearly preservesof political dynasties; 2) to broaden the choiceso
establish that [Naval] is running for the 4th time for the that more people could be enlisted to the cause of public
same government post. To put things in a proper service; 3) no one is indispensable in running the affairs of
the countryand that reliance on personalities would be

avoided; and 4) the disqualification from running for
reelection after three terms would create a reserve of
statesmen both in the local and national levels.
He added that the turnover in public office after nine years

would ensure the introduction of new ideas and approaches.
He stressed that public office would no longer be a preserve
of conservatism and tradition, and that public service would
no longer be limited to those directly holding public office,
but would also include consultative bodiesorganized by the
people. INQUIRY OF MR. REGALADO
In reply to Mr. Regalado’s query whether the three terms

need not be served consecutively, Mr. Garcia answered in
the affirmative.
MR. GARCIA’S RESPONSE TOMR. OPLE’S STATEMENTS
Public service is service to the people and not an opportunity

to accumulate political power, and that a prolonged stay in
public office brings about political dynasties or vested
interests. Regarding political parties, he stated that it will
encourage the constant renewal of blood in party leadership,
approach, style and ideas. He opined that this is very
healthy for a pluralist and multi-party democracy.
On the recognition of alternative forms of public service, Mr.

Garcia stressed that public service could be limited to public
office since many good leaders who were in the streets and
in jail fought against the dictatorship. He stressed that public
service would also mean belonging to consultative bodies or
people’s councils which brought about new forms of service
and leadership.
- END OF FIRST EXAM COVERAGE –

Consti 1 Atty. Asong 1E

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FROM THE LECTURES AND SYLLABUS OF 1

ATTY. J.P. LEO F. ASONG UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

Etymology: *Latin: Constitutio, from Constituere “establish or

Body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers

A constitution is the charter creating the

and thereby acquires a greater degree of

To prescribe the permanent framework of a system of

It consists of rules which have not been

2. Types/ Kinds 3. As to its enactment

1. In relation to the amendment process: a) ENACTED or CONVENTIONAL

The guaranty of liberty does not, however, imply

We begin by emphasizing that the Constitution is

The respondents, however, claim that the instant

PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY 2. Constitution of Liberty

The series of proscriptions setting forth the fundamental

This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings

Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and

brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate ORIGINALIST VS LIVING CONSTITUTION

The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T.

Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the

The underlying reason for such a limited

and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS (1997)

standard must specify the limits of the delegate's

3. Does the K to 12 Law violate the substantive

There is no conflict between the K to 12 Law

Essence of People’s Initiative

1. People must author and thus sign the entire proposal.

Full text of the proposed petition may either be: RULING:

Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral- Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of

Did the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

These essential elements are present only if the full text of

PRIVATE organization and its members cannot be

a) The creation of a separate local legislative body is

Its counterpart under the 1935 Constitution is entitled, Renunciation of War:

These provisions prescribe the fundamental

Article II of the Constitution is entitled Declaration of

Is “soft law” part of the customary international

Soft law is an expression of Non-binding norms, Prime Duty of the Government

1. Disapproval of military abuses Not self-executing– In Tondo Medical Center

Foreign Affairs and The President - The role of the

Article II, Section 13 & Article XV Section 3 of the

To repeat it is the court’s position that life begins at

We (SC) declared that the right to a balanced and

v Deped Sec) indigenous cultural communities within the framework of

Policy of a Filipino Controlled Economy Re-orientation of Policy

Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and

The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or

Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural

Rural development encompasses a broad spectrum of

Privilege not Right - What is recognized is merely a

PEOPLE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY

The essence of republicanism is representation and

Conformably with the enunciated right to a

The said right implies, among many other things,

No, it does not. While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as

SERENO V. COMMITTEE ON TRADE (2016)

RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. VALENCIANO (2017)