International Studies in Sociology of Education

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Spheres of justice: The case of education

Anton Wesselingh

To cite this article: Anton Wesselingh (1997) Spheres of justice: The case of
education, International Studies in Sociology of Education, 7:2, 181-194, DOI:
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 Spheres of Justice
International Studies in Sociology of Education, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1997

Spheres of Justice:
the case of education
ANTON WESSELINGH
University of Nijmegen, Netherlands

ABSTRACT Social justice in education has not attracted much attention from
sociologists of education. In educational policy, considerations of social justice
in the distribution of educational provision have only been accepted as valid
arguments when meeting the demands of economic efficiency. Greater attention
is currently being drawn to social justice in education as demonstrated by the
debate on Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice (1983). The argument developed
in the present article is that criteria based on social justice should be carefully
considered. Such criteria can help clarify the problems of legitimation which are
confronting the government in at least the Netherlands and illustrate the need
for critical analysis of the actual educational policy of decentralisation and its
consequences. Some recent ideas on social justice in education from Dutch
sociologists are presented, followed by a short consideration of alternatives to
the dominant criterion of achievement in education. The ideas of Walzer (1983)
are then discussed in light of a number of insights from the sociology of
education.

Introduction
In the debate on a just distribution of social goods, sociologists of education
typically have little to say. More vocal in this discussion are (political)
philosophers who have been occupied with this question since Jean-Jacques
Rousseau (1775). Sociologists of education restrict themselves to primarily the
recording and analysis of statistics with regard to educational participation
and the utilisation of educational opportunities by various social groups.
Considerations of social justice can sometimes be seen in their writings but
certainly do not constitute the basis for their argumentation. Pleas such as
that of John Rawls (1971) for the use of general criteria for a just distribution
have produced a temporary upsurge in the discussion. In this time of changes
to post-industrial society, Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice (1983) is
currently attracting attention again. Just as in other countries, the Dutch
national government is conducting a policy of educational deregulation,
thereby expanding the autonomy of lower-level units like communities and
the schools themselves. There is more and more talk of ‘local policy’ with the
influence of the market in the public sector gaining greater and greater

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importance. This policy is not without its problems for the legitimation of the
role of government, problems that demand critical reflection and careful
analysis at the political and ideological level (Sleegers & Wesselingh, 1995,
1997).
In this article, I want to argue that sociological reflection on social justice
is also necessary with respect to the distribution of education. Relevant
material is available. One of the founding fathers of the sociology of education
in the Netherlands, Cor Vervoort (1920-1981), already in the early 1970s
published on the just distribution of education. The 10th anniversary of
Michael Walzer’s book was honoured in 1993 with a conference in
Amsterdam.[1] Walzer’s opinions with regard to justice in a number of
different spheres, including education, call for a critical analysis of the notion
of ‘local justice’ from a sociological perspective.
The article is built up as follows. Some sociological thoughts with regard
to the criteria currently in fashion for the distribution of the ‘educational
good’ will first be presented largely on the basis of Cor Vervoort. The possible
alternatives to the dominant criterion of ‘achievement’ will also be examined
and particularly the criteria of ‘need’ and ‘market’. Then, I will consider the
ideas of Walzer in light of what has been said about them in the sociology of
education. I will end with one or two concluding remarks.

Social Justice and the Distribution of Education

How Strong is the Solitary Criterion of Social Justice?
Considerations of social justice are applied in the distribution of virtually
every social good. This is so much the case that, in the eyes of some, social
justice simply has to be proclaimed (for example in political programmes) to
henceforth characterise the relations between people. In educational policy,
arguments derived from social justice played a role even before World War II
and were fought over by political parties, teachers’ unions, left-wing
intellectuals (Tawney, 1931) and ‘pedagogical entrepreneurs’ (de Vries,
1993a). For them, the phenomenon of unequal participation was indeed a
social problem, a phenomenon of social injustice. The weight of these
arguments or their ability to trigger a policy of just distribution and keep it
going remains to be seen, however, as other reasons, mostly economical, may
be of overriding importance.
This somewhat cynical observation is more or less common knowledge
in the sociology of education. The history of origins and development of the
research on equal opportunities in education, provides a clear example. Only
after 1945 did the first reports appear which would stimulate educational
policy to solve the problem of unequal participation of social classes. This
problem did not become an issue until the economic relevance of education
for the functioning of society gained importance after the Second World War.
A need for well-trained and qualified workers was created by the post-war
rebuilding of European societies, the explosive growth of science and

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technology, the booming economy of the welfare state being constructed and
the international competition caused by the Cold War. A well-known example
has been the so-called Sputnik effect in the United States. Economic theories
such as the human capital theory (Schulz, 1961), provided the scientific
foundation for a growing awareness that a policy should be developed to solve
the problem of unequal participation in education.
An example specifically from the Netherlands can also be provided. In
The Hidden Talent (van Heek et al, 1968), van Heek devotes a section to
‘justice and efficiency’ as motives for his research on the optimal exploitation
of talents in education and particularly the talents of the lower social classes.
In addition to the principle of justice (i.e. advocating maximum development
of the individual’s talents), there is a socio-economic necessity. In the words
of van Heek:
This is a matter of social efficiency: How can the – at various social levels and
positions – required number of qualified professionals be obtained, taking into
account the economic and social pace of development? The concept of optimal
development of talents has an individual as well as a social side (...) Justice for
the individual and social efficiency should be the collective basis for any policy
of moving up in education. (van Heek et al, 1968, pp. 4-5)
It does not take much effort to see that predominantly economic
considerations have prompted the rapid expansion of equal-opportunities
research. Opinions about the just provision of educational opportunities
combined with an economic need, have given the impetus to this research.
Without such an impetus, moreover, this kind of research would possibly
never – or only with great difficulty – have been initiated.
Only one conclusion is possible: considerations of social justice in the
distribution of education will only be accepted if they meet the demands of
social efficiency. In other words: These considerations are not powerful
enough on their own and can only in combination with economic argument
trigger a socially just educational policy.

The Traditional Distribution Model in Education

In 1975, the Dutch sociologist of education, Cor Vervoort raised the problem
of a just distribution of education in a publication that is still current. He
formulates the central question regarding equality and inequality within
society in terms of the character of the good to be distributed (the
distribuendum), the criteria for distribution and the legitimation of a
particular criterion (1975, p. 102). I will closely follow his argumentation
from here on.
The central sociological question in education is: Who gets what kind of
education and why? This question is preceded by: What is the nature of the
educational good? What are the characteristics of education as a good to be
distributed? The latter question is difficult to answer without taking the social

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context within which education functions into account. This is far from easy.
For a just distribution, it is not so much the description and definition of
education that are important; the social relevance of education is of major
importance. Such social relevance is nevertheless not uncontested and people
have clearly different opinions on the value and significance of education and
schooling for their lives.
How the good of ‘education’ should be characterised and whether it
should be regarded as a good to be distributed therefore depends on the
surrounding social structure and the functions of education within this
structure. This implies that – under certain social conditions – a completely
different interpretation of the good of ‘education’ is in principle possible and
may lead to a different distribution problem.
The question of ‘who gets what education and why?’ should, according
to Vervoort (1975), be viewed in light of the function of education as “the
primary, decisive and virtually unique social agency for the distribution of
social hierarchy, position and life chances of individuals” (Schelsky 1957, p.
18, translated from German). This function can also be seen in the content of
education and in the fact that:
Education as a good to be distributed gets the character of a good that provides
access to other goods: ‘The key-power of schooling’ (Idenburg, 1958) is based
on the fact that education serves as a criterion for the distribution of all kinds of
other material and immaterial goods. The consequence of this development is
an instrumentalisation of education:(...) it evolves into an outstanding
example of an instrument of mobility in a society where new qualification and
rapidly changing demands for qualifications create the space for moving up
and, to a lesser extent, moving down the social ladder. This is at least the idea;
the question of how education actually performs or is able to perform its role as
‘social agency of distribution’ for various social groups is of course not
answered. (Vervoort, 1975, p. 104)
If indeed education functions as a central mechanism for selection and
distribution, what then is the criterion? The most important criterion seems to
be the principle of achievement or merit. As generally acknowledged since the
traditional-bourgeois ideas of the Enlightenment, the only valid criterion for
determining who deserves which education is achievement. This tendency has
become quite prominent in the last decades and the increasing
meritocratisation of society – with reward according to personal achievement
as the main principle – is now generally accepted. Recent attempts in The
Netherlands to counter this principle by providing for example access to some
forms of university education at the basis of chance (drawing by lot) and not
achievement (selection), have been disputed over and over again.
Achievement as a criterion for selection stems from egalitarian principles and
is generally accepted in education as a just criterion:
The distribution model resulting from bourgeois-liberal thinking, distributing
material and immaterial goods according to individual achievement, is based

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on equality of opportunity: in the presupposed competition, everybody has – in

principle – equal opportunities to materialise one’s claims through one’s merits.
This model simultaneously functions as a principle of legitimation and justifies
social inequality: it sanctions forms of inequality that are the result of
individual achievement. (Vervoort, 1975, p. 106)
I will return to the legitimisation of the criterion of achievement for unequal
distribution when discussing Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice. By now we
know that this distribution model has led to serious forms of social inequality.
The assumption that in schools everybody has equal opportunities to perform
and thereby has a fair chance to take part in the subsequent competition on
the labour market, has proven to be a misconception. Using the principle of
achievement implies a formal equality of opportunities. Disrupting external
influences are nevertheless hard to eliminate, in part because there are socially
conditioned differences in the possibilities for meeting the demands imposed
by the achievement criterion. Education thus functions as an instrument for
the reproduction of social inequality and thereby reflects the irony of a
principle derived from egalitarian Enlightenment philosophy.

Alternatives to Achievement: needs? market?

If it is true that the bourgeois-liberal ideal of equal educational opportunities
actually reproduces social inequality, then a more satisfactory distribution
model should start from a different point of view, for example from the
principle of justice. Such an alternative is offered by John Rawls (1973). His
position implies that all social goods should be equally distributed unless there
are fundamental reasons to abandon this principle. One ‘good reason’ might
be that a deviation from this general concept of social justice and thus an
unequal distribution of the social good is for the benefit of all citizens (Rawls,
1973, p. 62). It is obviously not easy to derive an alternative distribution
model from this general principle of justice. The question is whether this is at
all possible. Like the principle of equal opportunities, the principle of
conditional equality does not take deviations from distributive social justice
into consideration and thus provides few clues for policy-making.
So the question remains whether there is a criterion for the distribution
of the good of education different from the achievement principle. We know
that the achievement model under certain social conditions will lead to
inequality, in part because capacities to achieve simply are not equally
distributed. Again it appears that a discussion about the relevance of the
criterion for the distribution of education is hardly possible without taking
into consideration education as such. A number of people nevertheless agree
with the achievement principle as the only fair distribution principle because,
in their opinion, successful education already implies a certain degree of
intellectual achievement. These people also tend to hold dominant and
monopolistic positions in society (Walzer, 1983, p. 10).

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In the case of education, it might be more useful to regard the good

from the perspective of the criterion, not from the good to be distributed (the
distribuendum). A more social democratic tradition stresses need as a primary
criterion for the distribution of social goods. Such a proposal to start from the
needs and interests of those who are being educated, sounds sympathetic but
is not very convincing. One basically passes the answer to the question ‘who
gets how much education and why?’ on to those who are involved. Only when
distribution problems arise there should be equal opportunities and in that
case chance should provide the decision:
... in principle, everybody’s right to learn is acknowledged and if there are
distribution problems, well, then we draw lots. (Vervoort, 1973, p. 108)
Of course, ‘drawing lots’ is an anathema to every right-minded meritocrat.
Because of the close relation between education and future social position
(the allocation function of education), achievement should automatically form
the basis for selection. Drawing lots represents a completely different view of
education in which distribution is not based on personal characteristics or
qualities but on equal rights to unequal opportunities.
A just distribution model may be a matter of expliciting the goals to be
realised by the distribution of educational provision. If we take the allocation
function of education or the goal of putting the right man or woman in the
right place as a starting point, then it is obvious that an achievement criterion
should be used. If the primary goal of education is to create opportunities for
individuals and groups to develop their own identities and well-being, then a
criterion based on needs and not achievement is implied (cf. Walzer’s criterion
‘need’, 1983, pp. 25-26).
Everybody knows, however, that the educational goal of identity
development has not been highly regarded since attempts to realise ‘the
ideology of self-development’ were rejected in the 1970s. Achievement
expressed in terms of acquired certificates and level of educational attainment,
has become the decisive criterion for the provision of opportunities in society,
not needs. Formulated by Geert de Vries: “Educational divisions are the
class-divisions of our time” (1993b, p. 4). By this, he referred to the classical
satire of Michael Young (1958) who described the period of 1870-2033 as an
era in which social selection based on intelligence eventually results in a fatal
dichotomy in English society. In the sociology of education it is now common
to speak of ‘meritocratisation’ in order to emphasise the fact that educational
opportunities are based on achievements and not such ascriptive
characteristics as race, class or gender. The pejorative character of Young’s
shrewd satire nevertheless seems to have been forgotten in praising the
progress of the meritocratisation of education.
A last alternative is presented by an increasing market orientation in
education. This alternative has manifested itself in the increased streamlining
of the curriculum (e.g. in the modularisation of educational provision) and
also in the administration and management of the school system. The

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administrative regime is changing: under the motto of increased effectiveness

and quality control, decentralisation, increased autonomy and privatisation
are occurring along with a looser system of regulation (deregulation). Gerald
Grace (1995) rightly points to the contradictions which the Conservative
reforms (a national curriculum, local management of schools, etc.) have
brought to English education in the 1980s:
All commentators have observed the contradictions arisen from policies which
constitute greater central state control of cultural and professional issues (e.g.,
the introduction of a national curriculum and a national code of assessment)
and policies which appear to facilitate decentralization and greater institutional
autonomy (e.g., the introduction of delegated budgets and of local management
of schools). (Grace, 1995, p. 18)
The question that now arises is whether the free choice in the educational
market constitutes a new distribution criterion. This is true in part but not
completely. In every society, there are matters and goods which simply cannot
be submitted to the laws of supply and demand. Education and schooling are
not commodities like any other and do not fall 100% under the rules of the
market.
It is absolutely clear that achievement or merit stands central in the
distribution of educational provision. A truly convincing alternative criterion
has not as yet been developed although many authors acknowledge the
importance of need in this respect. This means that we cannot speak of a
universal distribution model such as proposed by Rawls. A relativistic model
along the line of John Elster’s (1992) ‘local justice’ or Michael Walzer’s
‘spheres of justice’ appears to stand more of a chance as an alternative to
models based on achievement or merit alone.

On Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice and Education

Walzer on Education as a Sphere of Justice
Spheres of Justice, published in 1983, can be seen as a reaction to John Rawls’s
A Theory of Justice (1971). Before and after ‘Spheres’, Walzer published on
such different themes as Calvinism and puritanism and wrote a famous book
entitled Just and Unjust Wars (1977). Walzer’s political philosophy can be
characterised as a moral philosophy using an interpretative method. Michael
Walzer lectures at the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study.
In Spheres of Justice, Walzer’s objective is to provide an interpretation of
what we (better: Contemporary Americans) see as the essence of such
concepts as ‘equality’ and ‘justice’:
Another way of doing philosophy is to interpret to one’s fellow citizens the world
of meanings that we share. (1983, p. xiv)
In doing so, the philosopher interprets the existing and accepted rules,
traditions and shared ethics within a particular society. Walzer’s book is the

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result of his interpretation of a just society in the 20th century. He starts from
a practical and particularistic point of view: justice varies according to the
political setting, looks for its own forms and solutions and knows its own
‘sphere’. Societies show a variety of educational institutions, from elite to mass
education systems. Pluralism is indispensable; otherwise we simply lapse into
descriptions of simple equality. It is after all impossible to eliminate all
differences in our modern and complex society. The point is that the
distributing of social goods should not result in domination and monopoly, in
which certain groups take up a privileged position across all spheres:
Domination is ruled out only if social goods are distributed for distinct and
‘internal’ reasons. (1983, p. xiv)
A just society is a society where all of the social goods are kept within their
own spheres of justice. Walzer calls this complex equality. A multiplicity of
goods is distributed according to a multiplicity of procedures, criteria and
distribution institutions. There is neither a single decision point or a single set
of agents of distribution nor a single point of access. There has never been a
single set of interconnected criteria for all distributions. 1983, p. 3). Yet a fair
distribution is realised:
... distributions are patterned in accordance with shared conceptions of what
the goods are and what they are for. (1983, p. 7)
Ideally, this leads to a situation in which all members of society, nobody
excluded, are temporarily ruled and alternate ruling in different spheres. In a
recent paper, Walzer (1993) deals with the observed deviations from this ideal
image of inclusion in greater detail. He elaborates on his ‘theory of goods’ and
puts forth six propositions with the latter being most relevant here:
When meanings are distinct, distributions must be autonomous. Every social
good or set of goods constitutes, as it were, a distributive sphere within which
only certain criteria and arrangements are appropriate ). (… There is no single
standard. There are standards (roughly knowable even when they are also
controversial) for every social good and every distributive sphere in every
particular society (...). (1983, p. 10)
Violation of these standards will lead to domination and monopolies. This
should thus be resisted, and three distribution mechanisms which operate in
their own sphere may help to achieve this: free trade (market), merit and need.
Walzer briefly discusses each of these distribution mechanisms before dealing
with the various spheres of justice: Membership, Security and Welfare, Money
and Commodities, Office, Hard Work, Free Time, Education, Kinship and
Love, Divine Grace, Recognition and Political Power. He describes the
internal logic of each sphere of justice and then outlines the situation in the
United States and some current problems in the field. In the chapter on
education, for example, the function of education, the internal logic of the
system and its institutionalisation in school types, the job of a teacher and
problems of association and segregation are addressed. Public schools and

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vouchers, talent-tracking, integration and busing and neighbourhoods are also

dealt with in this chapter.
Walzer’s practical philosophy remarkably fits in with some current
theoretical trends in the sociology of education and recent developments in
educational policy. This is illustrated by his three mechanisms of distribution
that have been dealt with already in previous sections of this article. Some
questions nevertheless arise.

Three Comments
(a) Relative autonomy as a counterpart to reproduction? Walzer’s views on the
social functions of education are rather limited. Since Emile Durkheim, we
certainly have become familiar with education as an instrument for social
reproduction. This process is considerably more complex than the simple,
direct form of social reproduction sometimes proposed by neo-marxist
authors in the seventies and correctly rejected by Walzer (1983, p. 198).
Sociologists of education, however, have a different view of the reproductive
function of education. From their perspective, not only the economic
situation and the production process are important, but also the culture of
society and the transmission of culture via education in a rather subtle and
indirect way (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1970; Bourdieu, 1979; Wesselingh,
1985). In sociological theory of reproduction, school autonomy has a
remarkable role to play and should not be regarded as a counterpart to the
reproduction function. So the question remains whether increasing the
relative autonomy of the sphere of justice – which Walzer’s theory implies and
is also a tendency in current educational policy – will solve the problem of
unequal distribution in education. Pierre Bourdieu & Jean-Claude Passeron
(1970) note that when compared with other social spheres, schools quite
paradoxically are in a better position to perform their reproduction function
when appealing to their internal functions and logic and their relative
autonomy. Its relative autonomy enables the education system to operate
according to its own internal principles of knowledge transfer, selection and
evaluation, and thus legitimately to serve selective and reproductive functions:
... its relative autonomy enables it to serve external demands under the guise of
independence and neutrality, i.e. to conceal the social functions it performs and
so to perform them more effectively. (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977, English
edition, p. 178)
In this view, the increasing relative autonomy of the sphere of education is not
very likely to provide a counterpart to reproduction but forms a necessary
element of it. Every attempt to increase the autonomous sphere of education
with this end in view, can thus be questioned.[2]
(b) The key power of education and its own sphere. A second comment is on
Walzer’s attempt to outline a society without domination and subordination:

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My purpose in this book is to describe a society where no social good serves or

can serve as a means of domination. (1983, p. xiv)
Somewhat further on, we find a statement about the exclusion of domination
by distribution of all social goods on the basis of distinct and ‘internal’
reasons. No monopolies but pluralism. To quote Walzer again:
Every social good or set of goods constitutes a distributive sphere within which
only certain criteria and arrangements are appropriate. (1983, p. 10)
According to Walzer, thus, it is not the total absence of distribution and
domination which leads to a society with ‘complex equality’, but the
confinement of ‘social goods’ to their own autonomous sphere of justice.
None of these goods should or can function as a key or gateway to the
provision of other social goods.
Opinions on education vary a great deal as we know. There is
nevertheless general consensus on the role education as a distributor of
life-chances, as stated earlier in this article. Even those who do not want to
look upon education as an almost monopolistic institution for the distribution
of life opportunities have to admit that the role of education is quite
significant. The relation between the various social spheres is probably most
evident in the relation between the level of education attained, professional
career, social prestige and success. The ‘educational good’ (cf. Bourdieu’s
theory of educational and cultural capital) can be turned into other social
goods because school capital has a high exchange value on the market.
Nevertheless, as Walzer observes:
No social good ever entirely dominates the range of goods: no monopoly is ever
perfect. (1983, p. 11)
Given the key position of education in our current meritocratic society, the
sphere of education may deviate from the idea of ‘reticence’ of spheres and
the absence of dominant social goods. It seems to me that Walzer pays too
little attention to the vital role of education and that his call for increased
autonomy as the solution for domination, ignores this key role. Connected as
it is to the social context, modern education simply cannot be confined to its
own relatively autonomous sphere.
In his 1993 paper, Walzer addresses the observed deviation from the
ideal situation painted in Spheres of Justice. Exclusion and reproduction of
marginality are common practice and Walzer investigates the question of why
we are so far removed from the desired ‘complex equality’. He claims that the
transformation of social goods along secret routes outside the boundaries of
its own sphere and thus the occurrence of domination and exclusion, are
difficult to detect. He also refers to the previously cited Michael Young and
argues that the meritocratic phantom appears to be reviving itself in the form
of not only the unjust exclusion of individuals but also entire social groups of
mostly the same people. Walzer then argues that the spheres of welfare and

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education could be corrective, which seems to be an important addition to his

earlier views and more in line with my previous remarks.
(c) Walzer’s three distribution mechanisms. Walzer’s application of the three
distribution mechanisms (free market, merit and need) within the sphere of
education is interesting but not unproblematic. Walzer, himself, stresses the
limited nature of the three distribution criteria. They fit within the boundaries
of the educational sphere of justice and are seen as legitimate. He
conveniently makes a distinction between primary education of every student
and more specialised, professional education and schooling for a minority of
students. In my opinion different distribution mechanisms for each type of
schooling certainly may exist. For the general foundation of primary
education, ‘need’ is indeed an adequate and manageable criterion although it
primarily concerns a social rather than individual need. Primary education
forms the basis of modern citizenship, required in a democratic post-industrial
society. It is ‘simple equality’, based on the Aristotelian notion of citizens. As
Walzer puts it:
We can think of educational equality as a form of welfare provision, where all
children, conceived as future citizens, have the same need to know, and where
the ideal of membership is best served if they are all taught the same things
(...) Simple equality is connected to need: all future citizens need an education
(1983, p. 203) (...) The case is different, however, with regard to specialized
or professional training (...) Educating citizens is a kind of welfare provision
(...) specialized education is a kind of office. (1983, p. 209)
The real process of distributing the good of education actually starts when the
stage of primary education for all future citizens – in the Dutch situation, the
stage of basic secondary education – has been completed. Which selection
criteria should be applied when the criterion of ‘need’ has been met is still a
matter of discussion.
Walzer’s chapter on education concentrates mainly on achievement or
‘merit’ and does not discuss the two other distribution mechanisms, need and
free market, at length. This is a pity because market forces have become the
fashion in government policy and also with respect to the provision of
education. We have not heard the last about the pros and cons of this
development and unfortunately most sociologists of education remain silent
when the market issue is introduced. I believe, for a number of reasons, that
we should be extremely cautious in contracting out government tasks in the
field of education (cf. Lingard, 1993) and treating education like any other
market commodity. Educating people to be citizens should never be left over
to private initiative, let alone the mechanism of supply and demand. The
constitutional task of the government and the fact that almost all education in
the Netherlands is financed by public funds, should also play a role.
Considerations of social justice are easily pushed aside when market
mechanisms are allowed to determine the distribution of education, and

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Walzer’s plea for active governmental policy to defend the values of ‘complex
equality’ (1993, passim) should therefore be applauded.[3]

Concluding Remarks
Spheres of Justice makes clear that a discourse on the selection criteria for such
an important social good as education is now needed more than ever.
Reflection on this topic should not be left to politicians and policy-makers for
in that case considerations outside the sphere of justice will tend to dominate.
The changing discourses with regard to British and Dutch schooling can
illustrate this point. There has been a clear shift from social democratic
schooling in the 1970s to a ‘market democracy’ of schooling:
... which has created a language of ‘output’, ‘value added’ and ‘measurable
product’ and (...) an official discourse which has constituted the curriculum as
an entity to be ‘delivered’ and the parents and pupils as the ‘consumers’ of the
education product. (Grace, 1995, p. 40)
In a discourse with regard to social justice and education, the relationship
between education and social democracy should be in the centre of attention.
Amy Gutmann (1987) concludes that ‘political education’ should have moral
primacy over the purposes in a democratic society, in order to cultivate the
political skills and social commitments necessary for a just society (1987, p.
287). Her ‘democratic theory of education’ contains two principles –
non-repression and non-discrimination – and focuses:
... on what might be called ‘conscious social reproduction’ – the ways in which
citizens are or should be empowered to influence the education that in turn
shapes the political values, attitudes and modes of behaviour of future citizens.
(1987, p. 14)
Why focus on education? Clearly because education is that part of the public
domain which prepares citizens for participation in a democratic society and
should therefore be guaranteed. Social justice is thus at stake whenever the
just distribution of the possibilities to participate is threatened (Wesselingh,
1996).
Educational scientists and sociologists of education in particular, should
definitely be more concerned with issues of social justice and education. The
fact that this is not common practice calls for a truly interdisciplinary
approach within the educational sciences. Walzer’s model provides ample
material for a discourse on the distribution of education in a multicultural and
plural society, which is about to emerge in the Netherlands and which may
mark the end of the traditional nation state with its ideal of a national identity.

Correspondence
Anton Wesselingh, Department of Education Sciences, University of
Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9104, NL-6500 HE Nijmegen, Netherlands.

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 Spheres of Justice

Notes
[1] This conference provided not only the opportunity to confront Walzer’s position on
education with the prevailing opinions within the sociology of education; it also provided
the perfect occasion to determine to what extent a compilation of the views developed in
both disciplines might contribute to the issue of social justice in educational distribution
(Wesselingh, 1994).
[2] All the more so in light of recent disagreement over the tasks and functions of school and
the relevance of education for personal lives as revealed in a representative survey among the
Dutch population. People from different backgrounds have divergent opinions about the
significance of education (Van der Kley & Felling, 1989) and this clearly raises questions
about how to interpret Walzer’s ‘shared understanding of social goods’ (1983, p. xiv).
[3] Dennis Lawton (1977 and more recently Bob Connell (1992) have observed that the
debates on distributive justice in education generally take the content of education for
granted: “What the service is, is debated in a separate theatre – the theatre of curriculum
theory, teaching method and psychology of learning” (Connell 1992, p. 135). Connell then
develops the concept of curricular justice.

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