Wood 2002

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 2002 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
2002, Vol. 83, No. 6, 1281–1297 0022-3514/02/$5.00 DOI: 10.1037//0022-3514.83.6.1281
Habits in Everyday Life: Thought, Emotion, and Action
Wendy Wood and Jeffrey M. Quinn Deborah A. Kashy

Texas A&M University Michigan State University
To illustrate the differing thoughts and emotions involved in guiding habitual and nonhabitual behavior, 2
diary studies were conducted in which participants provided hourly reports of their ongoing experiences.
When participants were engaged in habitual behavior, defined as behavior that had been performed
almost daily in stable contexts, they were likely to think about issues unrelated to their behavior,
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
presumably because they did not have to consciously guide their actions. When engaged in nonhabitual
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
behavior, or actions performed less often or in shifting contexts, participants’ thoughts tended to
correspond to their behavior, suggesting that thought was necessary to guide action. Furthermore, the
self-regulatory benefits of habits were apparent in the lesser feelings of stress associated with habitual
than nonhabitual behavior.
In this research we address the relation between ongoing Research on the organization of memory systems is consistent
thought, emotion, and everyday action. In the standard predictive with the idea that behavior can be generated through multiple
models in social psychology, behavior is a product of a series of processes. For example, neuropsychological studies of memory
cognitive and affective events, typically preceded most closely by have examined patients with brain lesions that yield selective
conscious intentions to perform the act (Ajzen, 1987; Eagly & memory impairment or have used functional neuroimaging tech-
Chaiken, 1993; Gollwitzer, 1999; although see Greve, 2001). niques to examine activation of brain regions during performance
Intentions can be generated through thoughtful deliberation or of behavioral tasks (see reviews by Schacter, 1992, 1995). In this
relatively superficial processes. Research that has measured peo- research, noncognitive habit and skill memory have been linked to
ple’s intentions and then behavior has provided strong support for a complex of specific brain systems involving the basal ganglia,
these models (see meta-analytic reviews by Armitage & Conner, cerebellum, and motor neocortex (Gabrieli, 1998; Squire, Knowl-
2001; Randall & Wolff, 1994; Sheppard, Hartwick, & Warshaw, ton, & Musen, 1993). These differ from the systems associated
1988). with priming and other forms of nonconscious memory and from
However, not all behaviors are preceded by conscious inten- the systems involved in declarative, conscious memory for facts
tions. Only minimal, sporadic thought is required to initiate, im- and events. In addition, a number of studies of memory perfor-
plement, and terminate actions that in the past have been repeated mance have supported a dual-process model in which habitual
in stable contexts. Such actions reflect habits, and Ouellette and patterns and conscious recollection contribute independently to
Wood (1998) demonstrated that specific intentions to perform memory performance (e.g., Caldwell & Masson, 2001; Hay &
repeated behaviors are not good predictors of such acts. Instead, Jacoby, 1996; Jacoby, Yonelinas, & Jennings, 1997). In sum,
habit performance reflects the routine repetition of past acts that is research on behavior prediction and on memory systems has
cued by stable features of the environment. In this view, the distinguished habitual responses from more thoughtful modes of
disposition or tendency to perform habitual behaviors is implicit, it behavior generation.
is expressed through the performance itself, and it may not be Despite the emerging evidence for habitual patterns of respond-
reflected in people’s thoughts or reported intentions. Thus, predic- ing, social psychological models of habit are in the early stages of
tive models of behavior indicate that action can emerge from development. In part, this is because of the often-noted problem of
conscious intentions or from implicit guides developed through how to construct appropriate measures of habit (Eagly & Chaiken,
past performance. 1993; Verplanken & Aarts, 1999). The standard measure is the
frequency with which a behavior has been performed in the past.
Wendy Wood and Jeffrey M. Quinn, Department of Psychology, Texas Although past performance frequency appears to be an effective
A&M University; Deborah A. Kashy, Department of Psychology, Michi- predictor of future behavior, this relation is not necessarily infor-
gan State University. mative about habits. Ajzen (2002) elaborated on these concerns in
The second study served as Jeffrey M. Quinn’s master’s thesis, under his critique of the behavior prediction research that has demon-
the direction of Wendy Wood. This research was supported by National strated the effects of past behavior on future behavior. In his view,
Institute of Mental Health Grant 1R01MH619000-01 awarded to Wendy
the residual effect of past behavior on future behavior emerges to
Wood. We thank Aysun Bursali for her thoughtful suggestions concerning
the extent that intentions are weakly formed, poorly specified, or
the project and Roy Baumeister for his comments on an earlier version of
this article. unrealistic. Thus, past behavior effects emerge to the extent that
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Wendy the true predictors of behavior are not accurately captured in
Wood, Department of Psychology, Texas A&M University, College Sta- self-reports of intention. Although it is reasonable to suppose that
tion, Texas 77843. E-mail: [email protected] stronger intentions are better predictors of behavior than weaker
1281
1282 WOOD, QUINN, AND KASHY
ones, this explanation does not account for the mounting evidence learning and stimulus generalization have addressed the question
of the systematic, independent effects of past behavior on future of what makes features of stimuli and contexts interchangeable for
behavior. That is, past behavior is the primary predictor of future learning and performance (e.g., Bouton, Nelson, & Rosas, 1999;
behavior when habits have developed through past repetition in Proctor & Dutta, 1993). For our purposes, contexts are stable to the
stable contexts, whereas intentions are the primarily predictor extent that they present the same contextual cues integral to
when behaviors are relatively novel or performed in unstable performing the response and to the extent that they are similarly
contexts (Albarracin, Kumkale, & Johnson, 2002; Ferguson & conducive to fulfilling an actor’s goals. As Barker and Schoggen
Bibby, 2002; Ouellette & Wood, 1998; Verplanken, Aarts, van (1978) noted in their analysis of the genotype of behavior settings,
Knippenberg, & Moonen, 1998). This pattern of findings is con- contexts may vary in superficial attributes but be stable in the
sistent with the view that behavior can be guided by automatic features supporting performance. Unstable contexts are ones in
processes outside of conscious awareness as well as through more which shifts in the supporting environment implicate alternate
thoughtful processing modes.1 goals or challenge the smooth initiation, execution, and termina-
Past studies demonstrating the differential impact of habits and tion of practiced responses. Because of the importance of context
intentions have largely focused on behavior prediction, and they stability to automatic responding, we define habits as behaviors
yield limited evidence of the cognitive processes associated with that are repeated in stable contexts.
behavior performance. To provide a basis for further development How do stable environmental events cue behavior? In classic
of psychological theorizing and measurement of habits, the present learning theories, features of the environment directly cue well-
research offers a descriptive view of the nature and functioning of practiced behavior through stimulus–response linkages (e.g., Hull,
repeated behaviors in everyday life. Consistent with Rozin’s 1943; Spence, 1956). However, more recent models of cognitive
(2001) call for more descriptive research in social psychology, we processing outline how external events mobilize action by auto-
evaluate habits as they are naturally “situated in the structure of matically triggering behavioral goals or intentions, which then can
social life” (p. 13). We used a diary methodology to assess peo- be implemented with minimal thought (e.g., Bargh & Ferguson,
ple’s thoughts and emotions while performing habitual behaviors. 2000; Heckhausen & Beckmann, 1990). In the next section, we
Our basic analytic strategy was to compare these with people’s consider how thought might be implicated in environmentally
thoughts and emotions during performance of nonhabits. We could triggered action.
then evaluate whether behaviors that have been performed fre-
quently in the past, especially frequent behaviors in stable con- Thought and Habitual Behavior
texts, are appropriately defined as habits in the sense that they can
be performed with minimal explicit thought. The present investi- Popular culture contains a variety of images of the extent to
gation also estimated the incidence of habitual behaviors in every- which people’s thoughts correspond to their ongoing behavior.
day life. Given that conscious self-regulation of judgments and
behavior requires some effort (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, 1
Although Ajzen (2002) concluded that “empirical tests of the habitu-
& Tice, 1998; Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 2000), we expected
ation hypothesis have so far met with little success,” (p. 107), his analysis
to find that people often rely on habits as an efficient, nontaxing was based on the bivariate correlations between past behavior, intention,
mode of initiating and controlling daily activities. Finally, we and future behavior. Specifically, he noted that Ouellette and Wood (1998)
examined whether the habitual versus nonhabitual mode of behav- found that past behavior and intention were both correlated with future
ior performance is linked to emotional experience, especially to behavior, and that these correlations emerged in domains and contexts in
self-regulatory emotions of stress and perceived control. which habits were likely to develop as well as ones in which they were not.
Yet, these bivariate correlations are not an appropriate test of the habitu-
ation perspective. Past behavior is often highly correlated with intention,
Automaticity and Conditioning of Repeated Acts presumably because people reason from their typical behavior and report
in Stable Contexts intentions that correspond to what they usually do. A more informative test
is provided by analyses that have examined the independent predictive
Habitual behaviors typically emerge from repeated actions in
power of intention and past behavior. Although Ajzen (2002) neglected to
stable contexts. This repetition can reflect people’s attempts to mention these findings, they reveal the expected pattern—past behavior
achieve some goal or people’s unintentional reactions, when they tends to emerge as the primary predictor when habits have developed,
are unaware of what has been learned (Squire et al., 1993). whereas intention is the primary predictor when habits are unlikely to have
Repetition of a behavior in a given setting promotes automaticity developed (Ferguson & Bibby, 2002; Ouellette & Wood, 1998; Verplanken
because the cognitive processing that initiates and controls the et al., 1998). Thus, models that examined the unique impact of past
response comes to be performed quickly, in parallel with other behavior and intention provided evidence of the relatively automatic pro-
activities, and with the allocation of minimal focal attention (e.g., cesses guiding habits.
2
Posner & Snyder, 1975). In the present work, we focus on one of Several additional constructs can be distinguished from habit. Scripts
the defining features of automatic, environmentally triggered ac- are cognitive structures representing people’s understanding of stereotyped
tion, that being people’s awareness of action.2 sequences of action in well-known situations (Schank & Abelson, 1977).
As Abelson (1981) noted, “the difference between a script and a habit is
Stable contexts facilitate this propensity to perform repeated
that a script is a knowledge structure, not just a response program” (p. 722).
behaviors with minimal cognitive monitoring. Although no situa- In addition, Langer (1989a, 1989b) cautioned against equating the con-
tion ever completely maps onto earlier experiences, responses struct of mindlessness with habits. Although both involve relatively effort-
proceed quickly without limiting processing capacity to the extent less, invariant behavior, habits are more closely linked to behavioral
that the current environment is similar to the one in which the response. In contrast, mindlessness reflects a general mental state of the
behavior was performed in the past. Research on transfer of organism as a whole (Langer, 1989b).
HABITS IN EVERYDAY LIFE 1283
These range from a Walter Mitty-ish detachment from daily ac- thus had established habits, were found to have short response
tivities (Thurber, 1942) to the ideal in some Eastern religions of latencies to rate behavioral intentions (e.g., to ride a bike) when
thoughtful awareness of all behaviors. Some psychological analy- relevant goals were primed (e.g., go to the store). However, be-
ses also imply a close correspondence between thought and action. cause Aarts and Dijksterhuis did not measure behavior, it is un-
For example, James’s (1890) analysis of ideomotor action sug- clear whether their findings are relevant to the cognitive mecha-
gested that cognitive representations of action function as tem- nisms that guide action. In sum, past research has demonstrated
plates for subsequent overt behavior. In this approach, an action is that primed goals can affect behavior independently of conscious
generated from thought of the act (see also Bargh & Ferguson, intentions, but it remains to be demonstrated that habitual behavior
2000). Similarly, Vallacher and Wegner’s (1987, 1989) action can be generated without conscious awareness of intentions to
identification theory links actions to people’s understanding of initiate and/or perform the act.
what they are doing. Although this perspective is primarily con- In the present research, we anticipate that people engaged in
cerned with the conditions under which people understand their habitual actions do not consciously access habit intentions, either
actions in terms of mechanistic performance details versus broader because they do not need to do so in order to repeat well-learned
goals and identities, a central assumption is that “well-learned, intentional responses or because the behavior was not intended to
automated acts are performed with a representation of the act in begin with and perhaps became well-learned as a byproduct of
mind, just as difficult unfamiliar acts are” (Vallacher & Wegner, some other action sequence (see, e.g., Lippa & Goldstone’s, 2001,
1987, p. 9). In addition, the idea that intentional behavior emerges demonstration of the acquisition of unintended responses through
from thought informs Wegner’s (2002) notion of the empirical association). Instead, we anticipate that people often think about
will, in which intentional behavior is demonstrated from causal things other than their behavior during habit performance. How-
relations between people’s conscious psychological states and ever, we also recognize that situational factors can sometimes
their subsequent actions. focus people on their habitual behavior. For example, people may
Other perspectives allow for greater variability in the extent to self-consciously think about what they are doing when others are
which thought corresponds to action. As Heckhausen and Beck- present and they are concerned about these others’ evaluations.
mann (1990) noted, the relation between attention and ongoing Thus, our estimate of behavior-relevant thought may be affected
activity is likely to vary with the mode being used to guide by factors in addition to the habitual or nonhabitual mode of
behavior. With novel activities or activities in unfamiliar contexts, guiding behavior.
the uncertainties associated with performance require that people The naturally-occurring correspondence between people’s
continuously attend to and evaluate new information as it is thought and behavior also may vary across behavioral domain. For
presented in order to respond appropriately. In contrast, habitual our college student participants, a number of everyday behaviors
action does not require continuous attention to behavior or the inherently require deliberation to generate an appropriate response,
circumstances in which it occurs. For frequently performed behav- and these include studying, talking with others, taking notes during
iors, specific intentions become implicit as individual behaviors lectures, and reading. Some thought about these complex behav-
come to be incorporated into sequences of multiple actions and as iors is necessary because each enactment contains considerable
intentions come to be specified at high levels of abstraction (Ouel- novel information. To achieve behavior-relevant goals, people
lette & Wood, 1998; Wegner & Bargh, 1998). People are then must constantly tailor their behavior to events as they unfold (e.g.,
freed-up to orient their thoughts toward unrelated concerns. In- Did they understand the prior paragraph?; Is their interaction
triguing neurological evidence that habits are stored as larger partner responding as desired?). But even with these behaviors, we
action sequences rather than discrete acts was provided by Jog, anticipate that frequent performance of the act and stability of the
Kubota, Connolly, Hillegaart, and Graybiel’s (1999) study of the context will reduce the amount of thought necessary for perfor-
sensorimotor striatum of rats during learning of a maze. Because mance. This suggests that habits will be associated with less
neuronal responses after successful acquisition emphasized the behavior-relevant thought than nonhabits, regardless of whether
beginning and the end of the learned procedure, these authors the behavior is one in which some deliberation is necessary for
concluded that an action template was developed for the behav- effective performance.
ioral unit as a whole (i.e., the full maze), and this was triggered by
specific contexts at the start and the end of the maze. Emotion and Habitual Behavior
Variability in the extent to which thought corresponds to action
is also suggested by Bargh’s (1990) auto-motive model of how The mode of behavior performance has implications for emo-
goal structures guide behavior. In this view, purposive actions can tional experience as well as for the contents of consciousness.
be elicited by directly thinking about relevant goals or, when Although there is little research evidence on the relation between
actions are well-practiced and automatic, by the environment trig- mode of performance and emotion, several theoretical perspectives
gering the relevant goal structures and these structures guiding provide a basis for anticipating that habitual behaviors are associ-
behavior without conscious awareness. Some support for this ated with less intense emotions than nonhabitual behaviors. Ac-
model was provided by the finding that goals experimentally cording to one of Frijda’s (1988) laws of emotion, “continued
primed outside of awareness affected behavior independently of pleasures wear off; continued hardships lose their poignancy” (p.
reported intentions (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & 353). From this perspective, people are likely to adapt psycholog-
Trötschel, 2001, Study 2). These findings contrast with Aarts and ically and physiologically to the emotion-inducing aspects of re-
Dijksterhuis’s (2000) demonstration that intentions for habitual peated actions in a way that reduces emotional intensity. In addi-
behavior are highly accessible to consciousness. Specifically, peo- tion, the anticipation of lesser intensity emotions associated with
ple who had performed an act relatively frequently in the past, and habits can be derived from Mandler’s (1975) theory of mind and
emotion. In this view, emotions arise when the interruption of ple’s thoughts corresponded to their actions. That is, less cor-
one’s plans and organized behavior sequences generates arousal respondence should emerge when behaviors have been per-
(i.e., of the autonomic nervous system) and initiates an interpre- formed frequently in the past in stable contexts, and thus habits
tation of the interruption that implicates particular emotions. Be- have developed, than when behaviors have been performed less
cause infrequently performed behaviors and behaviors in unstable often or in unstable contexts, and thus habits have not devel-
contexts are plausibly more likely than habitual behaviors to oped. We also anticipated that participants would report lower
encounter difficulties and interference, nonhabitual behaviors are intensity emotions during performance of habits than nonhabits,
more likely to be associated with emotions. Finally, from the given that habituation occurs to repeated behaviors (Frijda,
perspective of Carver and Scheier’s (1998, 1999) cybernetic model 1988), that habits are likely to be associated with few arousal-
of self-regulation, emotions emerge from discrepancies between inducing interruptions (Mandler, 1975), and that people may
one’s behavior or related outcomes and one’s goals and self- not be aware of emotion-inducing discrepancies between habit-
standards. Specifically, emotions emerge from changes in the rate ual behaviors and personal goals. Because habits require little
at which one’s behavior and outcomes are meeting or failing to behavior-relevant thought, people are likely to report that any
meet self-goals. To extend these ideas to include mode of perfor- emotions experienced during habit performance emerged from
mance, it seems plausible that people will be more attentive to their thoughts rather than from their behaviors. In addition, the
discrepancies when deliberating about behavior than when acting self-regulatory advantages of habits should be apparent in lower
habitually. In sum, a variety of theoretical perspectives provide the levels of stress and burnout when performing behaviors habit-
basis for anticipating that people are less likely to experience ually rather than with awareness.
intense emotions when engaged in habitual than nonhabitual As a secondary focus of the research, we examined participants’
behavior. interpretations of habitual and nonhabitual behavior. On the one
One implication of the limited emotional responses associated with hand, given the low intensity emotions and the minimal cognitive
habitual behavior is that when people do experience emotions during monitoring associated with habit performance, these behaviors
habit performance, these emotions are likely to be linked to their may not strongly implicate the self and instead may be explained
thoughts rather than to their behavior. Because habit performance in terms of external factors such as situational constraints. Alter-
requires minimal explicit thought, people are able to entertain unre- natively, reasoning from Bargh et al.’s (2001) assumption that the
lated concerns, and the intruding thoughts may themselves be highly goals and associated behaviors that become automated through
emotionally charged. Thus, when performing behaviors habitually, frequent selection are likely to reflect individuals’ guiding values,
people are likely to report that their emotions are associated with what habitual behaviors may be especially self-defining and participants
they are thinking about—which will often be unrelated to their ac- may report that they reflect personal attributes, desires, and
tions. This tendency for thoughts and not behaviors to elicit emotions preferences.
should be less evident for nonhabitual behaviors. Also, given our correlational design, a number of alternate
Habitual performance of behavior also has specific implications interpretations exist for any findings. First, we considered the
for emotions associated with self-regulation and control. Given possibility that the predicted relations might be obtained spu-
that deliberation about even a single behavior can induce self- riously as a result of some third factor rather than the mode of
control deficits (Baumeister et al., 1998, 2000; Muraven & behavior performance. To address this issue, we selected sev-
Baumeister, 2000), performance of nonhabits may be associated eral behaviors that, according to participants’ diary responses,
with lowered feelings of control compared with habits. Specifi- were sometimes performed habitually and sometimes nonhab-
cally, the deliberation involved in the initiation and performance of itually. We then tested our hypotheses within these behavioral
nonhabits may induce self-regulatory strains evident in partici- domains, and in this way were able to hold constant many of the
pants’ feelings of stress, loss of control, and helplessness. Habit extraneous factors that might vary with domain. A second
performance does not require deliberation and thus is not likely to concern is whether the diary method can illuminate the causal
elicit the same control deficits. In addition, given that burnout and ordering between thought, emotion, and behavior. We discuss
work stress have been linked to the pressure of jobs that require the benefits and limitations of the diary method in the General
simultaneous performance of multiple tasks (Leiter & Maslach, Discussion.
2001; Nelson, Quick, & Simmons, 2001), feelings of stress might The two studies in this article overlap considerably in their
emerge when participants perform multiple behaviors simulta- designs and results, and for this reason we present them jointly. In
neously, especially when these are nonhabitual and require con- the first study, participants reported on a single behavior at each
scious decision making. hourly diary assessment. The second study included more partic-
ipants, a longer recording period, and allowed reports of multiple
The Present Research simultaneous thoughts and behaviors. Because people are likely to
be most aware of actions that require attention and control, reports
The present investigation consists of two self-report diary limited to a single behavior at each assessment might underesti-
studies that yielded online appraisal of the thoughts and emo- mate the incidence of habits.
tions associated with performance of habitual and nonhabitual
behaviors. Participants in this research were signaled with a Method
watch alarm each hour to report on their behaviors, thoughts,
and emotions. Participants
We anticipated that the habitual or nonhabitual mode of Study 1. A total of 70 undergraduate students (35 women
behavior performance would be reflected in how closely peo- and 35 men) at Texas A&M University participated in partial fulfill-
ment of a requirement in their introductory psychology course. The data Diary thoughts. Participants reported their thoughts by answering the
from an additional 19 participants were excluded from the analyses open-ended question, “What were you thinking about during this activity?”
either because they failed to complete the form correctly or they Space was provided for participants to write a short description of a single
completed it retrospectively. thought (Study 1) or multiple thoughts (Study 2).
Study 2. A total of 209 undergraduate students (131 women and 78 Correspondence between diary thoughts and behaviors. Two indepen-
men) at Texas A&M University participated in partial fulfillment of a dent raters coded the diaries for whether participants were thinking
requirement in their introductory psychology course. The data from an about the behavior in which they were engaged at each recording
additional 16 participants were excluded from the analyses because they period. Thoughts were classified as corresponding with behavior
either failed to complete the form correctly or they completed it when they involved the specific actions being performed (e.g., when
retrospectively. eating, “about how good the bread was”) or implicated abstract goals
and outcomes that related in some way to the actions being performed
(e.g., “how I need to start eating more healthy so I can get back in the
Procedure
shape I was during summer”). Thus, we judged that participants’
The studies were conducted in three phases: an introductory session, a thoughts corresponded to their behavior when the thoughts reflected
either specific, relatively low-level instrumental intentions or more
recording period of 1 day (Study 1) or 2 days (Study 2), and a follow-up

session in which participants provided additional information about the abstract, higher level intentions. This was done to capture the more
behaviors they listed in the diary. abstract thoughts reflecting high levels of intention and goal specifica-
Phase 1: Introductory session. In groups of approximately 40, partic- tion that may direct habitual performance (Heckhausen & Beckmann,
ipants attended an introductory meeting for a study investigating the 1990; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). Thoughts and behaviors were clas-
behaviors people perform in their daily lives. Participants were told that sified as not corresponding when they were clearly about unrelated
they would be tracking their behaviors, thoughts, and emotions. Observa- issues (e.g., thinking about an upcoming math test while driving home).
tions were to be recorded once per hour while participants were awake. Because participants in Study 2 were allowed to report multiple simul-
Participants received a wristwatch programmed to chime on the hour to cue taneous behaviors and multiple concurrent thoughts, correspondence
them to complete the diary. was coded at the level of the individual behavior, rather than at the level
Participants received copies of the diary forms and examples of correct of the hourly entry. Raters agreed on 84% of behaviors in Study 1 and
entries. To ensure accuracy in completing the diary, participants were 89% of behaviors in Study 2. Disagreements were resolved through
instructed to make their hourly entries while the events occurred. To discussion.
encourage completion of the diary, participants rated their implementation Behavior complexity. Two independent raters categorized all behav-
intentions on a questionnaire, identified the best day(s) to complete the iors as (a) complex, meaning those that required responses tailored to
diary, and described how they would remember to complete the form each new information as it emerged during performance; or (b) less complex,
hour (Gollwitzer, 1999). In addition, participants signed a “contract” indi- meaning those that could be performed effectively with minimal mod-
cating their commitment to complete the data collection. Participants then ification to new information. The most common examples of complex
scheduled a follow-up session and were excused.3 or difficult activities appearing in participants’ diaries included behav-
Phase 2: Diary records. Participants carried the diary forms with iors related to academic achievement (e.g., studying, listening to lec-
them, recording their behaviors, thoughts, and emotions once per hour (see tures), extended interactions with other people (i.e., conversations, as
diary measures below). opposed to brief, routinized greetings), creative endeavors (e.g., com-
Phase 3: Follow-up session. Participants attended a follow-up session posing a letter or essay), and challenging games or competitions (e.g.,
in small groups to provide additional information about their diary entries sports, cards). Examples of less complex behaviors included driving,
(see follow-up questionnaire below). Upon completion, participants re- cooking, and paying bills. Raters agreed on 88% of judgments in
ceived their experimental credit and indicated whether they had reported Study 1 and 93% in Study 2. Disagreements were resolved through
the events listed in the diary as they occurred or retrospectively. Partici- discussion.
pants were then debriefed and excused. Diary emotion measures. Participants rated whether their emotions
varied from the day’s baseline level of emotion on a 5-point scale ranging
from much more negative to much more positive, with the midpoint
Measures
representing no change. Analyses on this raw valence scale yielded no
Diary behavior reports. Participants recorded the single behavior effects and we do not discuss them further. To form a 3-point scale
(Study 1) or all of the behaviors (Study 2) in which they were engaged at reflecting changes in emotional intensity regardless of valence, responses
the moment of the watch chime. For each behavior, participants rated: (a) were treated as deviations from the scale midpoint. The resulting change in
the frequency with which they had performed the behavior in the past emotional intensity scale ranged from 1 (no change from baseline) to 3
month, with response options 1 (monthly or less often), 2 (at least once a (much more positive/negative than baseline).
week), or 3 (just about every day); (b) the extent to which they performed
the behavior in the same physical location each time, from 1 (rarely) to 3
3
(usually); and (c) the involvement of other people in the behavior (others Participants also completed several individual difference measures
involved vs. others not involved). In Study 2, participants also rated: (a) the during the introductory session. These included the Need for Cognition
amount of attention normally required for successful performance, from 1 Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), the Need to Evaluate Scale (Jarvis
(almost no attention) to 4 (constant attention); (b) the degree of difficulty & Petty, 1996), the Affect Intensity Measure (Larsen, Diener, & Emmons,
of the behavior, from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very difficult); and (c) the 1986), the Personal Need for Structure (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993), and
importance of the behavior for achieving personal goals, from 1 (unimpor- additionally in Study 2, the Emotional Intensity Scale (Bachorowski &
tant) to 5 (highly important). Braaten, 1994) and Goldberg’s (1992) 100 Adjective Markers for the
In the analyses, habits were defined as behaviors participants reported Big 5. In Study 1, individual’s tendency to perform habits, reflected in the
performing “just about every day” and “usually in the same location.” proportion of habitual behaviors they reported, was marginally related to
Nonhabits were behaviors performed less often (i.e., once a week or their scores on need for cognition, r(62) ⫽ ⫺0.24, p ⫽ .06, and need to
monthly) and in less stable contexts (i.e., rarely or sometimes in the same evaluate, r(61) ⫽ ⫺0.22, p ⫽ .08. However, no relations between habitual
location). behavior and personality emerged in Study 2.
Participants reported on the source of their emotions by checking the classified diary entries in Study 2 into broad behavioral domains.
appropriate box to indicate whether the cause was their thoughts, their As shown in Table 3, the most commonly reported domains in
actions, or both. In Study 2, participants also reported on specific emotions students’ lives included studying and other school-related behav-
associated with self-regulatory challenges. They rated on 5-point scales,
iors, activities related to entertainment and news- and information-
ranging from 1 (very little or not at all) to 5 (extremely), the extent to which
gathering, social interaction, and eating and drinking. Of the do-
they felt stressed, fatigued, overwhelmed, tired, burned out, helpless, out of
control, weak, and bored. mains we identified, attending to hygiene and appearance and
Follow-up questionnaire to assess participants’ implicit theories. In sleeping and waking activities were most likely to be classified as
both studies, participants indicated with a response of yes or no whether habitual in the sense that they were performed frequently in stable
they considered each behavior to be a habit. They also indicated whether contexts.
the behavior reflects the kind of person they are (in Study 1 they answered
with yes or no and in Study 2 they answered on a 5-point response scale
ranging from not at all to a lot). Correspondence Between Thoughts and Behaviors
In Study 1, participants indicated whether performing each behavior
caused them to experience feelings of pride or shame (with a response of Examples of thoughts that did or did not correspond to actions
yes or no). We further explored self-related emotions in Study 2 by for some common behaviors listed in participants’ diaries are
instructing participants to rate their feelings about performing each behav- presented in Table 4. For the analyses, the diary design yielded a
ior using a 5-point scale, from 1 (very bad about myself) to 5 (very good
hierarchically nested data structure with participants’ hourly re-
about myself).
In Study 2, participants also rated a number of possible causes for
ports nested within individual participants. Because the hourly
their behavior. On 5-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (a lot), reports from an individual were not independent, we treated par-
they indicated the extent to which the behavior was performed because ticipants as the units of analysis. To do this, data were aggregated
of (a) dispositional factors (“because of something about you,” i.e., across each participant’s hourly reports, and analyses were con-
because “you like to do it”), (b) another person, (c) temporal factors ducted on participant-level data. Thus, to evaluate the relationship
(“because it was the right time to do it”), and (d) situational factors between mode of behavior performance (habitual vs. nonhabitual)
(“because of the situation you were in”). Also on the 5-point scale, and correspondence between thoughts and behaviors (correspond
participants indicated how much they had thought about the behavior
vs. do not correspond), the hourly reports for each participant were
before performing it.
aggregated by tallying the frequency of habitual behaviors for
which thought corresponded with the behavior and the frequency
Results and Discussion of habitual behaviors for which thought and behavior did not
As can be seen in Tables 1 and 2, between a third and a half of correspond. To generate participant-level percentage estimates,
all behaviors listed were classified as habits, given that they were these frequencies were divided by the total number of habitual
performed just about every day and usually in the same location. behaviors reported by the participant. The same procedure was
This estimate was greater in Study 2 (43%) than in Study 1 (35%), followed for nonhabitual behaviors. The four percentages yielded
␹2(1, N ⫽ 6,830) ⫽ 14.34, p ⬍ .01, consistent with our expectation by each participant (correspondence/habit, noncorrespondence/
that the procedure of listing multiple behaviors in Study 2 would habit, correspondence/nonhabit, noncorrespondence/nonhabit)
encourage participants to include more activities performed habit- were analyzed in a Mode of Performance (habit vs. nonhabit) ⫻
ually. To illustrate the kinds of activities participants listed, we Thought/Behavior Correspondence (thoughts did vs. did not cor-
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Assessed in Study 1
Variable M SD
Number of hourly diary entries per participant 9.58 3.12

On the basis of the experimenter’s rating, the proportion of behaviors classified as:
habitual (performed almost daily, usually in same location) .35 .19
corresponding with thoughts .61 .19
On the basis of participants’ ratings of each behavior, the proportion of behaviors in which:
other people were involved .49 .18
any emotions were caused by actions .43 .24
any emotions were caused by thoughts .35 .21
pride was experienced .20 .22
shame was experienced .03 .06
Participants’ ratings of:
frequency of past performance 2.23 0.36
stability of context 2.55 0.34
intensity of emotions 1.86 0.42
Note. Proportions were computed for each participant and the mean value that is reported in the table was
calculated across participants in the sample. Ratings of frequency of past performance and stability of context
were obtained on scales ranging from 1 to 3, with higher numbers indicating greater frequency or stability.
Emotional intensity ratings are reported on a scale ranging from 1 (no change in emotion from baseline for the
day) to 3 (much more negative or positive than baseline).
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Assessed in Study 2
Variable M SD
Number of hourly diary entries per participant 20.74 5.47

Number of behaviors total reported per participant 30.12 10.84
Number of behaviors per hourly entry 1.46 0.37
Number of thoughts per hourly entry 1.08 0.23
On the basis of the experimenter’s rating, the proportion of behaviors classified as:
corresponding with thoughts .53 .16
habitual (performed almost daily, usually in same location) .43 .19
On the basis of participants’ ratings of each behavior, the proportion of behaviors in which:
other people were involved .44 .16
any emotions were caused by actions .56 .21
any emotions were caused by thoughts .33 .19
Participants’ ratings of:

frequency of past behavior performance 2.49 0.22

stability of context 2.57 0.23
attention required 2.27 0.38
behavior difficulty 1.94 0.38
importance of behavior for personal goals 2.47 0.63
intensity of emotions 1.82 0.31
loss of control 1.56 0.52
fatigue/lack of interest 2.03 0.63
amount of thought required before performance 2.19 0.56
attribution of behavior to internal causes 2.61 0.60
attribution of behavior to another person 2.08 0.65
attribution of behavior to the situation 3.17 0.87
attribution of behavior to time 3.25 0.77
Note. Proportions were computed for each participant and the mean value that is reported in the table was
calculated across participants in the sample. Ratings of frequency of past performance and stability of context
were obtained on scales ranging from 1 to 3, with higher numbers indicating greater frequency or stability.
Ratings of attention, difficulty, importance, and prior thought were obtained on scales ranging from 1 to 5, with
higher numbers reflecting greater amounts of the attribute. Emotional intensity ratings are reported on a scale
ranging from 1 (no change in emotion from baseline for the day) to 3 (much more negative or positive than
baseline). Loss of control and lack of interest are reported on scales ranging from 1 to 5, with higher numbers
indicating greater experience of each emotion. Attribution ratings were obtained on scales ranging from 1 to 5,
with higher numbers reflecting stronger attributions.
respond to behavior) repeated measures analysis of variance habitual behaviors allowed people to focus their attention away
(ANOVA) design.4 from their current behavior. The lower levels of behavior-relevant
Study 1. The analyses yielded a significant interaction between thought associated with habits than nonhabits is an indicator of
mode of performance and correspondence, F(1, 63) ⫽ 48.63, MSE ⫽ greater automaticity in the guidance of habitual acts. The finding
.12, p ⬍ .001. Analyses of simple main effects indicated that, for that participants thought about habits about 40% of the time is
behaviors classified as habits, thoughts were more likely not to cor- consistent with the idea that this mode of behavior regulation is
respond with behaviors (M ⫽ 60%) than to correspond (M ⫽ 40%), best characterized by minimal or sporadic cognitive monitoring
t(62) ⫽ ⫺2.27, p ⬍ .05, whereas for nonhabitual behaviors, thoughts and not by the complete absence of thought (see Pashler, 1994).
were more likely to correspond with behaviors (M ⫽ 70%) than not Additional evidence of the extent to which behavior was guided by
to correspond (M ⫽ 29%), t(62) ⫽ 7.40, p ⬍ .001. explicit thought emerged in Study 2 from participants’ ratings of the
Study 2. The analyses yielded a significant main effect for
attention and thought required to perform each behavior and the
correspondence, F(1, 208) ⫽ 16.73, MSE ⫽ .09, p ⬍ .001 (Ms ⫽
difficulty of performance. Because these ratings represent continuous
56% and 44% for correspondence and noncorrespondence, respec-
dependent measures, they were analyzed with a multilevel regression
tively), and a significant interaction between mode of performance
and correspondence, F(1, 208) ⫽ 90.99, MSE ⫽ .06, p ⬍ .001. approach (Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998). In essence, a regression
Consistent with Study 1, simple effects comparisons revealed that equation was estimated for each participant to represent the relation-
during performance of habits, participants’ thoughts were more ship between a predictor (e.g., mode of performance) and an outcome
likely not to correspond with their behavior (51%) than to corre- measure (e.g., rated attention to behavior). In the analyses, the inter-
spond (44%), t(207) ⫽ ⫺2.52, p ⫽ .01, whereas for nonhabits,
thoughts and behaviors were more likely to correspond (60%) than
not to correspond (36%), t(207) ⫽ 9.99, p ⬍ .001. It should be 4
Because participants listed more nonhabitual than habitual behaviors,
noted that these percentages sum to less than 100% because we we calculated the percentage correspondence for habits and nonhabits
were unable to code some of the listed behaviors and thoughts. separately. Thus, our results reflect the percentage of each type of behavior
The thought– behavior correspondence findings across both that corresponds to thought, not the percentage of the total number of
studies are consistent with our prediction that performance of behaviors listed.
Table 3
Behaviors Frequently Listed in Participants’ Diaries: Study 2
% of all % entries
diary categorized
Type of behavior Examples of common entries entries as habits
School work Attending classes, studying, reading, doing homework and 32 32

assignments, taking notes, going to the library
Entertainment, news, Watching TV, listening to music, using the Internet, reading 14 54
& information the newspaper, going to movies/entertainment, playing
games
Social interaction Talking to friends, family, and others; face-to-face, on the 10 47

phone, via computer; reading/writing e-mail
Eating, drinking Eating, drinking (except alcohol), cooking or preparing food 7 46
Hygiene & Showering, washing hands, brushing teeth, dressing, putting 4 88

appearance on make-up
Transportation & Driving, riding a bike, taking a bus, walking to or from 4 58

travel some location
Going to Waking up, lying in bed, getting ready for bed, taking a nap 3 81
sleep/waking
Exercise Lifting weights, running, swimming, playing sports 1 44
Working Part-time or full-time jobs 1 55
Cleaning Doing laundry, washing dishes, cleaning dorm/apartment 1 21
Relaxing Resting, relaxing, sitting on the couch 1 48
Other Various behaviors appearing infrequently in participants’ 21 32

diaries
cepts and slopes from these equations were then aggregated to yield participants’ thoughts corresponded with behavior more for nonhabits
a mean intercept and slope across participants.5 than for habits when analyses were conducted within behavioral
The multilevel analyses conducted with mode of performance domain (see similar analysis in Ouellette & Wood, 1998).
(habit vs. nonhabit) as a dichotomous predictor at the behavior
level revealed that participants rated habits as less demanding of
attention than nonhabits, unstandardized regression coefficient,
B ⫽ ⫺0.44, SE ⫽ .04, t(193) ⫽ ⫺11.85, p ⬍ .001. Participants 5
It should be noted that in Study 2, the full three-level hierarchical
also reported that they thought less about their actions before design consisted of individual behaviors that were nested within hourly
performing habits in comparison with nonhabits, B ⫽ ⫺0.61, SE ⫽ diary entries and entries that were nested within persons. However, we
.04, t(199) ⫽ ⫺14.00, p ⬍ .001. In addition, habits were rated as treated the data as having two levels because of the relatively low number
being less difficult to perform than were nonhabits, B ⫽ ⫺0.47, SE of observations at the behavior level, with a mean of only 1.46 (SD ⫽ 0.37)
⫽ .04, t(188) ⫽ ⫺11.40, p ⬍ .001. These findings are consistent behaviors reported within each hourly diary entry. Thus, in most cases, the
with the thought– behavior correspondence results in indicating the behavior level did not differ from the hour level.
6
greater conscious processing required to guide nonhabit than habit To provide some evidence of the validity of our measure of thought–
performance. With frequent performance of behaviors in stable behavior correspondence, we examined whether it increased with factors that
contexts, aspects of the cognitive processes controlling perfor- should focus participants’ attention on what they are doing, especially whether
other people were present and involved in the behavior. In the presence of
mance appear to become automatic and relatively easy to execute.6
others, people may have a self-conscious concern with appearing appropriately
and with generating responses to ongoing interaction (Baumeister, 1984;
Controlling for Plausible Alternate Explanations Carver & Scheier, 1978). Indeed, the pattern of means indicated that the
presence of others increased the correspondence between thought and action,
Given the correlational design of this research, additional analyses although the effect emerged as significant only in Study 2. That is, in Study 2,
were necessary to verify that the obtained relations do not reflect some analysis on thought– behavior correspondence yielded a two-way interaction
artifactual difference between the behaviors classified as habits and between performance mode and correspondence, F(1, 208) ⫽ 90.42, MSE ⫽
those classified as nonhabits (e.g., habitual behaviors being inherently .02, p ⬍ .001, which revealed the expected pattern of greater behavior-relevant
easier to perform). To address this concern, we examined whether thought when others were present.
Table 4
Examples of Corresponding and Noncorresponding Thoughts and Behaviors
Behavior Example of corresponding thought Example of noncorresponding thought
Attending classes “I was getting the answer to my test “I’m really tired.”
back and was worried.”
Studying “Thinking about passing my test.” “That I would really like to go home.”
Watching television “I’m watching game shows so I am “I’m hungry.”

thinking about the answers.”
Eating “This dinner stinks.” “Thinking about my test again.”
Talking on the “I made an A on my test, and I was “About sleeping.”

telephone telling him how relieved I was. I

was happy just to talk to him.”
Working on the “Who e-mailed me?” “Excited about my friend coming to

computer visit.”
Reading “I was concentrating on the events “Getting ready to exercise.”

in the book.”
Listening to music “ . . . 80s music was so great.” “I was thinking I had to find a parking
place and I would be late for class.”
Driving “Not running over pedestrians that “I was thinking about all I had to
keep walking in front of me.” accomplish today.”
Exercising “That I’m dead tired, and I’ve only “Where I’d like to go for spring break.”
got a few more exercises left to
do.”
Cooking “I am so hungry. This smells good.” “‘Friends’ comes on in 30 minutes.”
We selected two behaviors from participants’ diaries in Study 2: Additional evidence that our results do not reflect some artifact
watching TV and driving. These behaviors were approximately of the behaviors classified as habits and nonhabits comes from the
equally often classified as habits (52%) and as nonhabits (48%) ratings of attention, thought, and performance difficulty for the
and were noted with sufficient frequency in the diaries to allow domains of watching TV and driving. Because these continuous
analyses to be performed solely on these domains (i.e., TV watch- ratings were performed for each behavior, we conducted multilevel
ing: n ⫽ 614; driving: n ⫽ 83). Because the variables were regression analyses on behavior ratings within participants, with
categorical and independent at the level of individual participants, mode of behavior performance as the predictor. Consistent with
we conducted Mode of Performance (habit vs. nonhabit) ⫻ Cor- the findings from the full sample of behaviors, participants re-
respondence (thoughts do vs. do not correspond with behavior) ported less attention and less thought when they were watching TV
repeated measures ANOVAs on the aggregated percentage esti- and driving in a habitual manner than in a nonhabitual one, B ⫽
mates for each individual (percentage of habits/correspond, habits/ ⫺0.18, SE ⫽ .07, t(102) ⫽ ⫺2.50, p ⬍ .05; B ⫽ ⫺0.32, SE ⫽ .08,
not correspond, nonhabits/correspond, nonhabits/not correspond). t(124) ⫽ ⫺4.09, p ⬍ .001, for attention and thought, respectively.
A marginal main effect for correspondence, F(1, 79) ⫽ 3.27, Analyses on rated performance difficulty, although yielding a
MSE ⫽ .27, p ⬍ .10 (Ms ⫽ 41% and 59% for correspond and do trend in the same direction, did not reach significance (t ⬍ 1.5).
not correspond, respectively) was qualified by the predicted inter- These findings provide additional reassurance that the minimal
action between performance mode and correspondence, F(1, cognitive monitoring associated with frequently performed behav-
79) ⫽ 18.33, MSE ⫽ .26, p ⬍ .001. Simple effects tests showed iors in stable contexts reflects mode of performance and not other
that participants’ thoughts were more likely not to correspond factors.
(64%) than to correspond to their behaviors (28%) when they
performed the behaviors habitually, t(127) ⫽ ⫺5.85, p ⬍ .001.
Habits and Emotion
When performing behavior in a nonhabitual manner, however,
only a slight trend emerged for thoughts to correspond (49%) Study 1. Two strategies were used to evaluate whether habits
rather than not correspond (46%, t ⬍ 1). These findings indicate were associated with lesser intensity emotional experiences. The
that the overall relation between mode of performance and the first approach evaluated this relation at the level of participants’
extent to which participants think about the activity when perform- mean ratings. We computed correlations between the aggregated
ing it is not due to some confounding feature of the behaviors we percentage of each participant’s behaviors that were habitual and
classified as habitual or nonhabitual. each participant’s overall mean ratings of emotional intensity. As
we anticipated, the greater the percentage of participants’ behav- As anticipated, analyses revealed that performance of habits
iors that were habitual, the less likely they were to report increases simultaneously with other behaviors was not associated with in-
in the intensity of their emotions, r(64) ⫽ ⫺.25, p ⬍ .05. The creased emotional intensity. That is, emotional intensity did not
second approach evaluated the relationship between mode of per- increase with the performance of multiple rather than single habits
formance and ratings of emotional intensity at the level of the diary (t ⬍ 1), or with the performance of combinations of habits and
entry by calculating correlations across entries for each participant. nonhabits rather than only nonhabits (t ⬍ 1.5).
The mean correlation aggregated across participants yielded no In summary, behaviors performed habitually were associated
effect (t ⬍ 1), which is perhaps understandable given that partic- with lesser change in emotional intensity than behaviors performed
ipants provided on average less than 10 diary entries. nonhabitually. This effect might arise from habituation processes,
Study 2. Because each hourly diary entry included one or more given that emotional intensity generally decreases with increasing
behaviors but only one rating of the intensity of change in partic- exposure to a stimulus (Frijda, 1988). It also might emerge because
ipants’ emotional state, we could not identify which behavior was performance of habits is associated with few arousal-inducing
associated with the rated emotion. Thus, analyses of the habit- interruptions that form the basis for emotional experiences
(Mandler, 1975). And this effect also is consistent with our rea-
emotion relationship were conducted at the level of the diary entry

rather than at the level of the individual behavior. For these soning from Carver and Scheier’s (1999) theory of self-control, in
purposes, each diary entry was classified as involving the perfor- that people may not be aware of emotion-inducing discrepancies
mance of (a) a single habitual behavior (26% of behavior entries), between behaviors and personal goals when they perform behav-
(b) a single nonhabitual behavior (37% of entries), (c) multiple iors habitually.
behaviors, all of which were habits (10% of entries), (d) multiple
behaviors, all of which were nonhabits (15% of entries), (e) only Source of Emotion
one nonhabit and one or more habits (11% of entries), and (f) two Study 1. To evaluate whether the source of participants’ emo-
or more nonhabits and one or more habits (2% of entries). tions varied with the mode of behavior performance, we aggre-
We examined whether nonhabits were associated with more gated these dichotomous variables to yield percentage data that
intense changes in emotion than habits by computing a multilevel were independent at the level of the individual, following the
regression model. A dichotomous predictor was formed to repre- strategy used to analyze thought– behavior correspondence. A
sent diary entries in which participants reported only habits versus Source of Emotions (actions vs. thoughts) ⫻ Mode of Performance
diary entries with at least one nonhabit (i.e., from the entry (habit vs. nonhabit) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a mar-
classifications given in the prior paragraph, this represents a com- ginally significant interaction, F(1, 57) ⫽ 3.62, MSE ⫽ .16, p ⫽
parison between a ⫹ c vs. b ⫹ d ⫹ e ⫹ f). Consistent with .06. Simple main effect analyses revealed that when performing
expectations, less intense emotion change emerged in the habit- nonhabits, participants were more likely to identify the source of
only entries than in entries that included at least one nonhabit, B ⫽ their emotions to be their actions (43%) rather than their thoughts
⫺0.09, SE ⫽ .02, t(206) ⫽ ⫺3.65, p ⬍ .001. The intercept of this (30%), t(56) ⫽ 2.16, p ⬍ .05. However, when performing habits,
regression model revealed that the mean emotional intensity while this pattern did not emerge, and instead participants showed a
performing at least one nonhabitual behavior was 1.85 on the nonsignificant tendency to identify the origin of their emotions as
3-point intensity scale ranging from no change to much more their thoughts (43%) more than their actions (36%, t ⬍ 1). These
positive/negative than baseline feelings. The regression coefficient percentages do not sum to 100 because some participants indicated
indicates that entries composed only of habits were rated .09 scale that their emotions stemmed from both thoughts and behaviors.
points lower in intensity than entries that included at least one Consistent with predictions, then, when compared with nonhabits,
nonhabit. participants’ emotions during habit performance were slightly
We conducted additional multilevel analyses to address a num- more likely to be associated with their thoughts than with the
ber of more specific questions concerning the relation between behavior itself.
emotion change and performance of habitual and nonhabitual Study 2. We first conducted analyses on diary entries that
behaviors. First, the intensity of emotional change was unrelated to reported only single behaviors. A Mode of Performance (habit vs.
a continuous numerical representation of the total number of nonhabit) ⫻ Source of Emotions (actions vs. thoughts) repeated
behaviors being performed simultaneously (t ⬍ 1).7 Thus, our measures ANOVA resulted in a significant main effect for source
findings concerning mode of behavior performance and emotional of emotions, F(1, 174) ⫽ 63.09, MSE ⫽ .26, p ⬍ .001 (Ms ⫽ 66%
intensity do not depend on the number of behaviors participants and 34% for actions and thoughts, respectively), and a significant
reported performing at a diary entry. interaction, F(1, 174) ⫽ 11.42, MSE ⫽ .12, p ⬍ .001. Although,
In addition, the performance of multiple nonhabits simulta- in general, participants were more likely to attribute their emotions
neously did not yield a greater increase in emotional intensity than to their actions, this tendency was more pronounced for nonhabits
performance of a single nonhabit. Specifically, emotional intensity (Ms ⫽ 65% and 29% for actions and thoughts, respectively),
did not increase with the performance of multiple rather than t(202) ⫽ 9.50, p ⬍ .001, than for habits (Ms ⫽ 59% and 37% for
single nonhabits (t ⬍ 1), or with the performance of combinations
of habits and nonhabits that involved only one nonhabit rather than 7
In the multilevel regression analysis, the number of behaviors per-
multiple nonhabits (t ⬍ 1). Thus, even though performing a single formed was centered on the grand mean prior to inclusion in the model.
nonhabitual behavior was associated with changes in emotional Because other predictors in these analyses were categorical, they were not
intensity, emotions did not shift further with the performance of centered because the value zero is meaningful and corresponds to one of
additional nonhabits. the levels of the categorical predictor.
actions and thoughts, respectively), t(175) ⫽ 4.09, p ⬍ .001. entries that included at least one nonhabit (M ⫽ 1.59). Lesser
Comparable results emerged in analyses on diary entries composed feelings of stress emerged with entries consisting only of habits,
of multiple behaviors in which all of the behaviors listed were B ⫽ ⫺0.08, SE ⫽ .02, t(198) ⫽ ⫺3.69, p ⬍ .001. These findings
either habits or nonhabits. suggest that the habitual mode of performance plays a role in the
In summary, across both studies the most frequently mentioned self-regulation of behavior in that habits are associated with lesser
source of emotion was participants’ behavior. This pattern did not experience of helplessness and stress than nonhabits.
hold as strongly for habits as nonhabits, and, as we had anticipated, We then examined whether the reduced stress emerged with the
participants mentioned their thoughts as an important source of performance of a single nonhabitual behavior or whether this
emotional experience when engaged in habitual behavior. These feeling characterized multiple nonhabits. That is, these analyses
findings are consistent with our expectation that habitual behaviors tested whether lowered stress emerged with the cognitive process-
themselves do not generate strong emotional responses, and emo- ing requirements of consciously guiding a single behavior or
tions during habit performance are likely to emerge from the whether it emerged with the additional processing demands of
thoughts that intrude during action, including reflections of past multitasking several consciously guided behaviors. A multilevel
and future experiences and the recognition of ongoing events regression model predicting stress from the raw number of non-
unrelated to behavior. habitual behaviors performed concurrently revealed that, as antic-

It is worth noting that the correlational nature of the present ipated, the larger the number of nonhabitual behaviors, the more
design generates some ambiguity in how best to interpret these participants felt stressed, B ⫽ 0.04, SE ⫽ .01, t(187) ⫽ 3.12, p ⬍
findings. Although we prefer to conclude that the source of emo- .01. However, examination of the mean ratings revealed that,
tion when performing habitual behaviors differs from that with compared with performance of habits (M ⫽ 1.51), performance of
nonhabitual behaviors, it could also be that the ratings of source of any nonhabitual behaviors reduced stress (Ms ⫽ 1.60 and 1.58 for
emotion reflect the different thought processes that guide habits diary entries with one nonhabit and entries with two or more
and nonhabits. For example, it could be that people identified as nonhabits, respectively). The comparison between single and mul-
the source of their emotion whatever they were attending to at that tiple nonhabits was not significant (t ⬍ 1). Thus, the decrement in
moment—when performing habits, this happened to be their stress emerged with the cognitive processing required to engage in
thoughts, but when performing nonhabits, this happened to be their a single nonhabitual behavior and did not reflect the deleterious
behavior. Regardless of the most appropriate account, participants’ effects of multitasking nonhabits.
identification of somewhat different sources of emotion for habits In summary, the analyses on self-regulatory emotions revealed
and nonhabits contributes to our thesis that the cognitive and an important advantage to the lesser emotional intensity associated
emotional processes that guide habit performance differ from those with habits than nonhabits. That is, the habitual performance mode
that guide nonhabits. was associated not only with lower intensity emotions overall, but
these effects were specifically reflected in lesser feelings of stress,
Habits and Self-Regulatory Emotions: Study 2 overload, and lack of control and did not extend to experiences of
fatigue and lack of interest. Furthermore, although we had antic-
A maximum likelihood factor analysis was performed on par- ipated that multitasking of several nonhabits might pose a partic-
ticipants’ hourly ratings of emotional experiences indicative of ular threat to self-regulation and thus be associated with the
self-regulatory challenges, and two factors emerged with eigen- greatest increase in stress, instead it appeared that the performance
values greater than one. The first factor reflected stress, and the of any single nonhabitual behavior increased stress.
items that loaded primarily on this factor were helpless (loading of
.86), out of control (.80), overwhelmed (.64), stressed (.53), and
Explanations for Behavior and Self-Related Emotions
weak (.49). The second factor concerned fatigue, and the items that
loaded primarily on this factor were fatigued (loading of .85), tired Study 1. To evaluate the extent to which participants’ postdi-
(.81), burned out (.59), and bored (.33). Mean ratings were calcu- ary questionnaire ratings of pride and shame varied with the mode
lated across the items that loaded heavily on each factor. of performance, we aggregated data for these dichotomous vari-
To evaluate the relations between stress, fatigue, and change in ables to yield percentage estimates that were independent at the
emotional intensity, we computed bivariate correlations within level of the individual (see comparable analysis on thought–
participants and then aggregated these across participants to yield behavior correspondence). A Pride (pride reported vs. not re-
mean correlations. As would be expected, feelings of stress and ported) ⫻ Mode of Performance (habit vs. nonhabit) repeated
fatigue were related to greater changes in emotional intensity, measures ANOVA yielded a significant main effect, F(1, 62) ⫽
r(199) ⫽ .26 and .21, ps ⬍ .001, for stress and fatigue, respec- 133.98, MSE ⫽ .17, p ⬍ .001, reflecting the overall low frequency
tively. No additional effects were obtained in any analysis on the of the experience of pride (20% of diary entries), and a significant
fatigue factor, and it will not be discussed further. interaction, F(1, 62) ⫽ 5.87, MSE ⫽ .10, p ⬍ .05. Simple effects
We conducted multilevel regression analyses to evaluate tests revealed that pride was unlikely when performing habits
whether the conscious direction of nonhabitual behavior was as- (Ms ⫽ 13% and 84% for pride and neutral feelings, respectively),
sociated with greater feelings of stress. Because mode of perfor- t(61) ⫽ 11.64, p ⬍ .001, but more likely with nonhabits (Ms ⫽
mance refers to the level of individual behavior listings and stress 23% and 74% for pride and neutral feelings, respectively),
was rated at the level of diary entries, the analyses were similar to t(61) ⫽ 7.17, p ⬍ .001. Analyses on participants’ feelings of
those outlined above for emotional intensity. Participant ratings of shame revealed only a main effect indicating that participants
stress were predicted from a dichotomous variable that compared rarely experienced this emotion (3% of diary entries), F(1, 62) ⫽
habit-only diary entries (M ⫽ 1.51 on the 5-point stress scale) with 2,351.88, MSE ⫽ .02, p ⬍ .001. The lesser pride participants
reported concerning habitual than nonhabitual behaviors suggests habitual behavior lack coherence because people do not rely on
that habits are relatively unimportant aspects of participants’ ideal them to guide behavior and thus rarely think about them. The
self-concepts. possibility that behavior can be determined by implicit as well as
Study 2. The relationship between mode of behavior perfor- explicit intentions has parallels to Wilson, Lindsey, and Schooler’s
mance and self-related emotions as reported in the postdiary ques- (2000) analysis of dual attitudes, in which people access and rely
tionnaire was evaluated with multilevel regression equations. on implicit attitudes except when motivated and able to override
Mode of performance (habit vs. nonhabit) was represented as a these with their explicit judgments.
dichotomous predictor at the behavior level, and emotion ratings
were continuous variables obtained for each behavior reported. Habits and Complex Behaviors
Overall, habits were not judged to contribute positively to the
self-concept. Compared with nonhabits, performance of habits was To evaluate the generality of the present framework across
more likely to lead to negative self-evaluations, B ⫽ ⫺0.14, SE ⫽ behavioral domains, we conducted analyses to examine whether
.03, t(195) ⫽ ⫺4.31, p ⬍ .001. Habits also were less likely than the correspondence between behavior and thought varied with
nonhabits to be considered important to attaining personal goals, behavioral complexity. Highly complex behaviors, such as study-
B ⫽ ⫺0.72, SE ⫽ .06, t(190) ⫽ ⫺12.86, p ⬍ .001, and were

ing and taking lecture notes, likely require more thoughtful guid-
judged less informative to others about the self, B ⫽ ⫺0.43, SE ⫽ ance to tailor responses to novel feedback from the environment
.04, t(194) ⫽ ⫺9.94, p ⬍ .001. These findings echo the effects for than less complex behaviors, such as cooking and exercising. For
pride in Study 1 in suggesting that frequently performed acts in the analyses, we aggregated the ratings to yield percentage data
stable contexts are not strong components of participants’ favor- that were independent at the level of the individual. These per-
able self-views. centages were analyzed in a Mode of Performance (habit vs.
To evaluate the relation between mode of performance and nonhabit) ⫻ Correspondence (thoughts and behavior did vs. did
participants’ causal attributions for each behavior as reported in not correspond) ⫻ Behavior Complexity (high vs. low) repeated
the postdiary questionnaire, we conducted multilevel regression measures ANOVA.
equations with performance mode (habit vs. nonhabit) as a dichot- Study 1. The three-way interaction between mode of perfor-
omous predictor at the behavior level. Overall, participants ex- mance, correspondence, and complexity was not significant (F ⬍
pressed less certainty about the causal factors responsible for 2), indicating that behavior complexity did not modify the relation
habitual than nonhabitual behavior. That is, habits were judged between performance mode and thought– behavior correspon-
(marginally) less likely than nonhabits to be performed for internal dence. However, all two-way interactions and main effects were
reasons, such as because the participant liked to do it, B ⫽ ⫺0.09, significant. The Mode of Performance ⫻ Correspondence interac-
SE ⫽ .05, t(191) ⫽ ⫺1.76, p ⬍ .10. Habits also were judged less tion, F(1, 63) ⫽ 47.10, MSE ⫽ .06, p ⬍ .001, revealed the standard
likely than nonhabits to be performed because of such external pattern obtained in the overall analysis. The Complexity ⫻ Cor-
reasons as the influence of other individuals, B ⫽ ⫺0.73, SE ⫽ respondence interaction, F(1, 63) ⫽ 53.61, MSE ⫽ .08, p ⬍ .001,
.05, t(193) ⫽ ⫺14.61, p ⬍ .001, and the influence of situational yielded a pattern consistent with our prediction that people are
factors, B ⫽ ⫺0.42, SE ⫽ .05, t(194) ⫽ ⫺8.26, p ⬍ .001. The more likely to think about their behavior when performing com-
relatively low attribution ratings for habitual behavior are consis- plex actions. Specifically, for complex behaviors, participants’
tent with the notion that participants are not thinking about what thoughts were more likely to correspond to their behavior (M ⫽
they are doing during habit performance and thus are unaware of 83%) than to not correspond (M ⫽ 16%), t(61) ⫽ 11.65, p ⬍ .001,
the factors responsible for their habits. whereas for simpler behaviors, thoughts were more likely not to
In summary, habitual behaviors proved to be, at best, unrelated correspond (M ⫽ 55%) than to correspond (M ⫽ 44%), t(62) ⫽
to participants’ self-concepts and, at worst, associated with nega- ⫺1.68, p ⬍ .10. The significant Mode of Performance ⫻ Com-
tive aspects of the self. Participants’ relatively unfavorable slant on plexity interaction, F(1, 63) ⫽ 59.99, MSE ⫽ .06, p ⬍ .001,
habitual behaviors emerged in the low levels of pride they ex- revealed that habits were more likely to be low in complexity
pressed concerning such acts, the association between such behav- (M ⫽ 79%) than high in complexity (M ⫽ 21%), t(62) ⫽ ⫺8.57,
iors and negative self-evaluations, and the relative unimportance of p ⬍ .001, whereas nonhabits did not demonstrate an effect (Ms ⫽
these behaviors for attaining personal goals. One interpretation of 54% and 46% for high and low complexity, respectively, t ⬍ 1.5).
participants’ negative spin on habitual behavior is that it reflects Study 2. The results of the analyses above were highly similar
the dissociation between the implicit intentions that guide habits to those from Study 1. A nonsignificant three-way interaction (F ⬍
and participants’ explicit intentions and goals. Indeed, habits were 1) emerged in conjunction with significant two-way interactions
judged to be relatively uninformative about the self and were given between mode of performance and correspondence, F(1,
uniformly low attribution ratings, suggesting that participants were 208) ⫽ 84.80, MSE ⫽ .03, p ⬍ .001, complexity and correspon-
uncertain about the causes for such behaviors. As Ouellette and dence, F(1, 208) ⫽ 207.51, MSE ⫽ .03, p ⬍ .001, and mode of
Wood (1998) speculated, the intentions that initially directed hab- performance and complexity, F(1, 208) ⫽ 121.50, MSE ⫽ .03, p ⬍
its can become implicit as behavior becomes more automatic, and .001. Because the patterns of means comprising the interactions
performance of such acts often continues even when they conflict were essentially identical to the first study, they will not be
with conscious desires. The dissociation between habitual behavior presented in detail.
and explicit cognitive judgments is illustrated in Trafimow’s As we had anticipated, both studies revealed that the complexity
(2000) finding that intentions for habitual behavior tend not to be of behavior affected the extent to which participants thought about
well-integrated with other aspects of conscious reasoning (e.g., their actions while performing them. Greater thought was devoted
attitudes, subjective norms). Presumably, these judgments about to complex behaviors (e.g., studying, conversing with others),
presumably because these required tailoring responses to ongoing performance of behavior. Participants were less likely to think
input, than to less complex behaviors (e.g., exercising, cooking). about their behavior when performing habits, defined as repeated
Although we had suspected that behavioral complexity might acts in stable contexts, than when performing nonhabits, defined as
interact with mode of performance to predict thought about be- relatively novel acts and acts in variable contexts. Specifically,
havior, such an effect did not emerge in either study. Instead, it participants’ thoughts wandered from their behavior during habit
seems that greater thought is required to perform less complex performance about 50%– 60% of the time. We assume that thought
behaviors as well as more complex ones when the behaviors are about behavior-irrelevant factors is an indicator of the limited,
performed infrequently or in unstable contexts than when per- sporadic conscious processing required by habit performance. Of
formed frequently in stable ones. Thus, it appears that the effects course, behavior-relevant thought is only one indicator of auto-
of behavior complexity on behavior-relevant thought were rela- matic behavior, and we did not evaluate other indicators such as
tively independent from mode of performance, and that the rela- the ability to multitask with minimal performance interference or
tions between mode of behavior performance and extent of the ability to perform tasks efficiently. However, we see no reason
behavior-relevant thought were robust across behavioral domains. to assume that these other indicators of automaticity would have
yielded highly divergent findings from the ones we report.
Implicit Theories of Habit: Study 2 In addition, we were able to estimate the percentage of all of
participants’ actions that were performed with seemingly minimal
As a secondary focus of this research, we examined participants’
conscious guidance. Our participants performed almost 50% of
implicit theories about habitual behavior. After completing the
their behaviors without thinking about them. This estimate is
diary measures, participants identified whether they considered
considerably lower than prior speculations, which placed the per-
each behavior they listed to be a habit. The analysis examined the
centage of behaviors in daily life that are performed in a nonde-
extent to which the participants’ categorizations of their own
liberative, relatively thoughtless manner at around 95% (see Bargh
behaviors as habits could be accounted for by other features of the
& Chartrand, 1999). It could be argued that our estimate is a lower
behavior (e.g., frequency of performance). Specifically, we used
bound to the incidence of nonthoughtful behavior, given that our
hierarchical linear modeling to evaluate the extent to which vari-
sample was comprised of college students who may spend greater
ability in habit judgments could be predicted by these other at-
portions of their day in thought, study, and novel activities than
tributes of behavior. This analysis was conducted using the statis-
other individuals. However, even the present estimate renders a
tical package HLM Version 5 (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, &
picture of people as relatively detached from their ongoing activ-
Congdon, 2001), which includes an option for modeling categor-
ity—at least half of the time.
ical outcome measures.
Thought about behavior was varied and addressed specific in-
The analysis revealed that participants were more likely to label
strumental intentions about how to do something (e.g., “what
behaviors as habits to the extent that the behaviors had been
lipstick color am I going to wear?”), subjective reactions to the
performed frequently in the past, t(204) ⫽ 19.82, p ⬍ .001, had
performance (e.g., “how boring and pointless what we are doing
been performed in stable contexts, t(204) ⫽ 3.71, p ⬍ .001, did not
is”), outcomes of the behavior (e.g., “we better win”), aspects of
require much thought to perform, t(204) ⫽ 14.33, p ⬍ .001, were
the context that might facilitate or hinder performance (e.g., “I was
low in complexity, t(204) ⫽ ⫺2.23, p ⬍ .001, and were explained
thinking that I need to write faster to keep up with the notes”),
in terms of external causes rather than internal ones, t(204) ⫽ 6.46,
self-related thoughts (e.g., “that I am mathematically inept”), and
p ⬍ .001. In this model, the following proved not to be significant
simple descriptions (“driving”). Our estimate of behavior-relevant
when entered simultaneously with the above predictors: changes in
thought thus included specific, lower level concrete details as well
the intensity of emotional experience, whether thoughts corre-
as higher level, more abstract goals (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987).
sponded to behavior, the presence of other people, ratings of
We coded all of these types of thoughts as corresponding to
attention required by a behavior, and the difficulty in performing
behavior because we assumed that they all can contribute to
the behavior. It appears, then, that our participants’ definitions of
conscious guidance of action.
habits relied on our frequency and stability criteria, but in addition
Although we have emphasized the occasions on which partici-
took into account the complexity of the behavior, the thought
pants did not think about their behavior, the finding that partici-
required for performance, and the perceived causes of the act.
pants thought about habits about 40% of the time suggests that the
Given our reliance on self-reports, readers may wonder whether
habitual mode of behavior regulation is best characterized by
participants’ theories about habitual behavior affected their re-
minimal or sporadic cognitive monitoring and not by the complete
sponses in the diaries. To minimize this possibility, we did not
absence of thought. Yet, it is also likely that the present study
inform participants until the debriefing that the study concerned
provides a somewhat inflated estimate of the thoughtful processing
habits. Also, participants rated whether behaviors were habitual
guiding behavior. One reason is that the measure of thought was
only at the end of the study, after they had completed all diary
sufficiently global that it may not have captured automaticity when
measures. Thus, we envision that diary responses were generated
it emerged in only the initiation, execution, or termination of a
through a relatively simple process in which participants were
response. Participants may have indicated thinking about their
actively engaged in their everyday activities and they reported on
behavior when any of these aspects of performance required de-
their immediate experiences when cued by the watch.
liberation. In addition, it is worth noting that thoughts were as-
sessed immediately following actions in the diaries. Thus, consis-
General Discussion
tency and saliency pressures may have encouraged participants to
Our findings demonstrate the differing thought processes and focus on their actions when reporting their thoughts. Finally, in
emotional experiences associated with habitual and nonhabitual natural settings a number of factors in addition to the mode of
processing guiding behavior are likely to increase thought– toring for effective performance (e.g., studying, conversing with
behavior correspondence. As we explained in Footnote 6, the others) were performed with less behavior-relevant thought, and
presence of others increased correspondence, presumably as a presumably greater automaticity, given frequent practice in stable
result of increased self-consciousness. Thus, it may be that the contexts. Thus, the habitual performance mode is not only relevant
present study overestimates the extent to which thought was in- to simple actions such as typing, driving, and cooking, but is also
volved in guiding behavior, especially habitual behavior. useful for understanding the guidance of complex behaviors that
are tailored to ongoing input. It may be that, with practice, people
Multiple Processes Guiding Behavior form expectations about the general form and content of this input
and develop standard patterns of response that reduce the amount
The present results contribute to the developing evidence that of thought required for actions. This is perhaps illustrated in the
action emerges from multiple systems that guide behavior. As we stereotypic interaction between long-married couples at breakfast,
noted in the introduction to this article, predictive models of in which a conversation can be maintained despite the inattention
behavior, neuropsychological evidence of brain activation, and of one partner who has learned to respond appropriately to pauses
cognitive analyses of memory performance all converge in sug- while reading the newspaper or being otherwise engaged.
gesting that behavior can be guided by habitual processes in the

case of well-learned behaviors or by more explicit processes in the Habitual Behavior and Emotional Response
case of novel behaviors or ones performed in difficult, shifting
contexts. The mode of behavior performance proved to have implications
The present results illuminate several aspects of this multiple for emotional experiences. Overall, habitual behavior was associ-
system model. First, they are relevant to the question of how to ated with lesser intensity emotions than nonhabits. Also, partici-
measure habits. The differing content of thoughts during perfor- pants were especially likely to identify their thoughts rather than
mance of well-practiced behavior in stable contexts versus less their behavior as the source of emotions when engaged in habits.
practiced behavior or behavior in unstable contexts provides some This general pattern in which habit-related emotions are low in
validation for the traditional definition of habits in terms of be- intensity and elicited by thoughts could have implications for
havior frequency (e.g., Triandis, 1977). Although in some accounts broader lifestyle patterns. We speculate that people whose lives are
the predictive effects of frequent past behavior emerge in part characterized by large proportions of habitual behavior can find
because past behavior reflects intentions, perceived control, and that their emotional experiences become dull and subdued over
other factors (Ajzen, 2002), our findings suggest that people are time. Much like Thurber’s (1942) character, Walter Mitty, they
not necessarily thinking about intentions or these other predictors may find that their own ruminations and fantasies are the primary
of behavior during habit performance. Thus, the limited thought source of their emotions rather than their immediate behavioral
about habitual behavior is consistent with the idea that frequently experiences.
performed acts in stable contexts are habitual in the sense that they It is also worth noting that the mode of behavior performance
are guided by relatively automatic processes that involve minimal did not affect all emotions in the same manner. Although we had
thought. anticipated that habituation would increase ratings of fatigue and
In addition, the limited thought associated with habit provides boredom, these experiences did not vary with behavior mode. Yet,
insight into the psychological mechanisms through which habitual self-related emotions did vary with the mode of behavior perfor-
tendencies guide behavior. Specifically, our findings imply a mi- mance. Specifically, participants experienced lesser pride and
nor role for conscious intentions. Our findings cast doubt on the worse feelings about the self associated with habitual than nonha-
idea that habitual behavior is guided by conscious intentions that bitual behavior. This effect seems to be part of a broader pattern in
are automatically activated when behavior-relevant goals are sa- which habits were not judged to be especially self-relevant. Habits
lient (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Ajzen, 2002). Although people were considered relatively uninformative about the self, relatively
may be able to report on their intentions when directly requested in unimportant to attaining personal goals, and the causal mecha-
experimental contexts, in daily life habitual behavior is apparently nisms responsible for them were not readily apparent to partici-
guided by implicit processes that operate outside of conscious pants. These effects may reflect the overall tendency for habitual
awareness. These implicit processes may include intentions that behaviors to be viewed as imposed and not freely chosen (see
are incorporated into broad sequences of action that are cued by Wegner & Wenzlaff, 1996). In daily life, the disconnection be-
stable environmental conditions. Such intentions are not easily tween habitual behavior and the self has a number of implications.
accessed by standard self-report procedures but instead are ex- For example, if people do not see themselves as especially respon-
pressed in behavior. Given that the focus of the present study was sible for their habits, they may not believe that they have sufficient
not on behavior prediction, we did not measure intention or other efficacy to change such acts. Also, goals achieved through routin-
components of planned behavior. Yet, the limited evidence for ized activity may not be a strong source of pride. Thus, healthy
thought about habitual behavior suggests that these components as lifestyle decisions that become routinized as part of one’s daily
assessed explicitly in the standard behavior prediction study may behavior may not yield a sense of personal accomplishment be-
not provide much insight into the factors guiding habits in every- cause the behavior does not appear to be volitional.
day contexts. Another noteworthy aspect of the emotion findings is the lesser
Our findings also provided reassuring evidence of the generality stress, burnout, and feeling of being out of control that participants
of a dual-mode model of guiding behavior. That is, the distinction experienced when engaged in habitual than nonhabitual behaviors.
between explicit and habitual guides to behavior held across be- Their feelings of stress increased with the deliberation involved in
havioral domains. Even complex acts that required online moni- a single nonhabitual behavior, but did not increase further when
participants were performing multiple nonhabits simultaneously. other kinds of important thoughtful activities such as rumination of
This finding echoes Baumeister et al.’s (1998) laboratory research past events and planning for future activities. Another important
indicating that the act of decision making about a single behavior advantage of habits is their association with reduced stress and
can deplete self-control mechanisms and impair subsequent acts of greater feelings of control. In daily life, habit performance is not
self-regulation such as decision making and performance. From likely to deplete self-regulatory resources in the same way as
this perspective, the stress-reducing benefits of the muted emo- deliberative behavior and this may allow people to conserve reg-
tional experiences associated with habit performance emerged ulatory strength for important decisions.
because habits do not drain self-control resources to the same Yet, these potential benefits of habitual acts co-occur with clear
extent as nonhabits. In general, the lesser stress associated with disadvantages of automating behavior. Other research has already
habits than nonhabits provides an initial framework to develop a begun to suggest some of the disadvantages of automaticity. For
social psychological perspective on the role of habit in the every- example, when judgments become automatic, people may react on
day self-regulation of behavior. the basis of past experience and be less responsive to small
changes in the relevant stimuli (e.g., Fazio, Ledbetter, & Towles-
Schwen, 2000). Repetition of behavior may continue even when
Diary Data Collection Methods in Social Cognition

the behavior is no longer the most appropriate, effective response.

We used a signal-contingent diary method to provide a new A vivid example of this possibility was provided by Ferguson and
perspective on the much researched question of the processes and Bibby’s (2002) habitual blood donors, who were apparently unde-
consequences associated with habitual versus explicit guides to terred in their future willingness to donate when other donors
behavior (and related distinctions between conscious vs. noncon- fainted in their presence. In contrast, occasional donors contributed
scious, automatic vs. controlled processes). Although diary meth- less in the future when fellow donors suffered in this manner. In
ods do not appear to have been mined extensively by researchers the present study, another potential disadvantage of habits emerged
in attitudes and social cognition (see Rozin’s, 2001, analysis of the in the subdued emotions and lesser pride people experienced when
articles appearing in the Attitudes and Social Cognition section of performing behaviors habitually. Habit performance seems to have
the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology), they have been an insulating quality that reduces the immediacy of emotional
used effectively to track the naturally occurring prevalence of a experience. Other disadvantages are apparent in the findings that
variety of social and personality phenomena and their fluctuations people viewed habits to be relatively uninformative about the self,
with natural events (see Reis & Gable, 2000; Stone, Shiffman, & unimportant in attaining personal goals, and associated with rela-
DeVries, 1999). These data collection techniques also have been tively negative self-evaluations. It may be that, when people do not
used in ecological studies of memory in everyday life (Neisser & think about their behavior, their acts reflect implicit intentions that
Libby, 2000). Contemporaneous reports are especially useful to do not necessarily represent their current goals and plans. In
study habitual behavior because they can minimize the biases general, these varying benefits and costs of automating behavior
associated with retrospection that emerge when people have not highlight the importance of strategically using habits in daily life
attended to the behavior of interest (Reis & Gable, 2000; Stone, to accomplish tasks efficiently with minimal stress and yet still
Shiffman, & DeVries, 1999). maintain a sense of personal involvement and emotional engage-
Our diary studies of everyday experience are inherently corre- ment in ongoing activities.
lational and need to be combined with other methodologies to
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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 2002 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

2002, Vol. 83, No. 6, 1281–1297 0022-3514/02/$5.00 DOI: 10.1037//0022-3514.83.6.1281

Habits in Everyday Life: Thought, Emotion, and Action

Wendy Wood and Jeffrey M. Quinn Deborah A. Kashy

recording period of 1 day (Study 1) or 2 days (Study 2), and a follow-up

Number of hourly diary entries per participant 9.58 3.12

Number of hourly diary entries per participant 20.74 5.47

Participants’ ratings of:

frequency of past behavior performance 2.49 0.22

School work Attending classes, studying, reading, doing homework and 32 32

Social interaction Talking to friends, family, and others; face-to-face, on the 10 47

Eating, drinking Eating, drinking (except alcohol), cooking or preparing food 7 46

Hygiene & Showering, washing hands, brushing teeth, dressing, putting 4 88

Transportation & Driving, riding a bike, taking a bus, walking to or from 4 58

Exercise Lifting weights, running, swimming, playing sports 1 44

Working Part-time or full-time jobs 1 55

Cleaning Doing laundry, washing dishes, cleaning dorm/apartment 1 21

Relaxing Resting, relaxing, sitting on the couch 1 48

Other Various behaviors appearing infrequently in participants’ 21 32

Behavior Example of corresponding thought Example of noncorresponding thought

Watching television “I’m watching game shows so I am “I’m hungry.”

Eating “This dinner stinks.” “Thinking about my test again.”

Talking on the “I made an A on my test, and I was “About sleeping.”

telephone telling him how relieved I was. I

was happy just to talk to him.”

Working on the “Who e-mailed me?” “Excited about my friend coming to

Reading “I was concentrating on the events “Getting ready to exercise.”

Cooking “I am so hungry. This smells good.” “‘Friends’ comes on in 30 minutes.”

emotion relationship were conducted at the level of the diary entry

unrelated to behavior. habitual behaviors performed concurrently revealed that, as antic-

B ⫽ ⫺0.72, SE ⫽ .06, t(190) ⫽ ⫺12.86, p ⬍ .001, and were

gesting that behavior can be guided by habitual processes in the

Diary Data Collection Methods in Social Cognition

the behavior is no longer the most appropriate, effective response.

from the Midwest Psychological Field Station, 1947–1972 (pp. 229 –

244). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Erlbaum. Habit versus planned behaviour: A field experiment. British Journal of

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