2003 2 Eng

SPRING 2003
IN THIS ISSUE:
▼▼▼
From Simulator to Reality

Fall Back on Your Training
The Power of a Bad Attitude
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 ...................................................Expect It When You Least Expect it!!

2.......................................“Demon XX….Press Your Transmit Switch.”
4 ...............................................................From Simulator to Reality…. Directorate of Flight Safety
Director of Flight Safety
Col R.E.K. Harder
5 ...................................DISTRACTION — Is Your Mind on Your Job?
Editor
Capt T.C. Newman
6 ...................................................................Fall Back on Your Training
Art Direction
DGPA–Creative Services
8 ..............................................................Has Anyone Seen my Glasses?
Translation
10............................................................................Frequency Separation Coordinator
Official Languages
11.................................................................The Power of a Bad Attitude Printer

Beauregard Printers
Ottawa, Ontario
14.................................................................................Food For Thought
The Canadian Forces
16.........................................................................Get The Mission Done! Flight Safety Magazine
Flight Comment is produced 4 times a
18 .........................................................................Pride vs. Apprehension year by the Directorate of Flight Safety.
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19 ............................................................On The Technician’s Shoulders official policy and unless otherwise
stated should not be construed as
regulations, orders or directives.
20 ....................................................................................No Fault Found!
Contributions, comments and criticism
are welcome; the promotion of flight
22..................................................................It’s Not All Fun And Games safety is best served by disseminating
ideas and on–the–job experience.
23......................................................................................Get Home-ITIS Send submissions to:
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24...........................................................................From The Investigator Editor, Flight Comment
Directorate of Flight Safety
NDHQ/Chief of the Air Staff
25 ..............................................................................Maintainer’s Corner 4210 Labelle Street
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ISSN 0015–3702
A–JS–000–006/JP–000
EXPECT IT
WHEN YOU LEAST EXPECT IT!!
e had just completed an Air decided to leave his position to go In hindsight, there were certainly
W Mobile Exercise to upgrade
one of the pilots from co-pilot to
help with the Omega. a lot of events that led to this acci-
dent; crew resource management,
So, here I was, flying a Twin Huey at
aircraft captain (AC). The flying complacency, inattention…to name
fifteen feet, with everybody else in
had been flawless, the weather was but a few. As well, those wires had
the aircraft looking inside, down at
beautiful, and it was a great day for no identification features such as
the console. I was just about to say,
flying. And, it was Friday afternoon! orange balls, etc. It was interesting
“Hey guys, we don’t need the stupid
After refuelling, I performed the to note that other aircrew came
Omega, so start to look out!” when,
take-off from the left seat, with my afterwards and said that they had
“WHAM,” the right windshield was
co-pilot in the right, the flight engi- just missed those wires on several
shattered. I immediately figured
neer (FE) at the right cargo door, occasions, but had done nothing
that it must be wires. I identified a
and an on-the-job training (OJT) about it.
landing spot approximately 1/4 mile
pilot in the jump seat, between the
ahead, and landed the aircraft. Lessons learned? A lot. Flying needs
two pilots. Just after the take-off, the
Inspecting the aircraft after shut your constant attention. Manage
OJT pilot asked if he could program
down, we could see that the wires your crew. See a hazardous situa-
the Omega on-board computer. I
had hit the right windshield, went tion? Report it. Don’t forget — the
told him to go ahead. A short while
up to the wire strike protection worst things always happen when
later, he started experiencing some
system (WSPS), and were cut. you least expect it. ◆
difficulties with it, and the co-pilot
We could also tell where the wires Captain Daoust
started to help him. The co-pilot
had hit the right side of the fuselage
had no luck either, so the FE
as well as the blades.
Flight Comment, no 2, 2003 1

DEMON
I t sounds amusing, but it highlights
a very real need for effective
communication between ATC and
the flight deck. The story goes
something like this….
There we were, on a pilot training
oil pressure gauges just in time to
see the quantity and pressure fall to
zero — so much for an easy transit.
An emergency was declared with
Vancouver Centre and they imme-
diately offered us Vancouver
X
X
was that we had lost one of our four
engines. The weather in Comox was
mission, tasked with transporting a International or Victoria airport — about 500’ scattered, 700’ overcast
couple of passengers from Comox imagine, either one, and us without with good visibility and we weren’t
to Navy Air Station Whidbey Island a slot time! After assessing the vari- worried — just like the simulator,
— no problem, right? Just as we ables, the Aircraft Commander nothing to it.
passed over Victoria and prepared decided Comox would be the most Vancouver Centre handed us over
for descent into Whidbey, the low appropriate destination, and, with to the Comox Terminal Controller
oil pressure light on the #4 engine no further ado, Vancouver Centre about 40 nm east of the aerodrome
illuminated. We looked up at the cleared us there direct. About this where we asked if they’d received
time we started to feel pretty impor- our status from Vancouver. When
tant; after all, ATC was offering us the controller said “yes” we were
the world and all that was wrong ready to complete a textbook recov-
ery. We proceeded to discus the
events of the day, the state of the
nation and other esoteric topics that
required our attention. The transi-
tion and descent into Comox went
without anything significant hap-
pening; we were still IMC when we
hit mid-field downwind, but the
controllers were looking after us
just fine.
It was about the 11-mile downwind
point when a discussion started to
go around the cockpit as to when
we’d receive our base leg turn. At
12 miles we were starting to think
about giving them a nudge when we
were given our sequence. “Demon
XX, you’re #2 behind Dash-8 traffic
8 miles final” said the controller in
a calm, reassuring voice.
2 Flight Comment, no 2, 2003

X…
“Huh? Number 2? Doesn’t he know need to get this airplane on the proactive role in monitoring what
we’ve declared an emergency…? ground as soon as possible.” ATC the controller was doing with them?
Doesn’t he know we need to be Thinking — “Another Aurora with Probably, because when it comes
handled with kid gloves?” Comments an engine out. They haven’t asked right down to it, the pilot is respon-
began to fly around the cockpit. for priority handling, so it can’t be sible for everything that happens to
We landed the aircraft and made too serious an emergency. We’ll get his aircraft and timely query could
a beeline for the nearest telephone. him on the ground in a reasonable have averted this whole incident.
Obviously this controller needed a amount of time without causing
Press Your Transmit Switch.

quick lesson in controlling, and undo delay to other traffic.” Is either The importance of effective two-
who better to give it to him than a of these assumptions wrong? way communication cannot be
pilot. Well, after a brief discussion Yes…and No. given enough priority. It’s not an
with him, I’d learned a thing or two. easy topic — we try to structure
We couldn’t function without
flight and the rules associated with
One of the most powerful tools assumptions — they are reasonable
it as much as possible, but personal
Cockpit Resource Management has attempts to fill in gaps in our
technique, human error and envi-
given us is a more thorough under- understanding of a situation,
ronmental factors will be things
standing of the importance of com- but they should be reserved for
that we will never control. They can
munication. Something we forgot is instances where further clarification
only be overcome through effective
that ATC is a member of the team isn’t an option. In this case, there
communication — a skill which
that is responsible for the “safe, was plenty of time available to both
requires continuous and vigilant
orderly, and expeditious flow of aircrew and ATC, neither availed
effort to master. The decision to
traffic” through the skies. They may themselves of the opportunity.
sequence a civilian carrier ahead of
be removed from the aircraft, but While we had passed on the
our aircraft was based on the con-
they play as integral a role as any required information to Vancouver
trollers supposition that he would
member of the crew. What ATC for- Centre when the emergency was
not be unduly extending our flight
got was that an emergency requires initially declared, we had not done
time — a decision he probably
a higher level of attention to detail this with Comox Terminal on han-
wouldn’t have made if he’d asked us
than your everyday traffic move- dover. We found out after replaying
if we could extend our downwind
ment, because the aircrew may be the terminal tapes that Vancouver
to be sequenced second. Likewise, if
distracted by other things going on had told the terminal controller of
we’d been more closely monitoring
in the aircraft. The communication the nature or our emergency and
our situation we might have queried
between the aircraft and Comox that we’d requested priority han-
why we were being extended with-
ATC was limited to our initial con- dling, but that it hadn’t been passed
out having received sequencing.
tact on handover when we said: to the controller working the arrival
The last time a Maritime Patrol
“Did Vancouver tell you we declared station. Should he have made fur-
Aircraft was lost was in the late
an emergency?” ther inquiries of us to help clarify
1970’s during a three-engine emer-
the emergency in his mind — prob-
You can make a number of assump- gency. With the last accident such a
ably, especially if he was going to
tions on both sides of the fence distant memory, and flying such a
make assumptions as to the urgency
from a statement like that…Pilot reliable, redundant aircraft, it is easy
of our situation — the pilot is the
Thinking — “Ah, good, he knows to allow the spectre of complacency
only one in a position to assess that.
how serious our situation is, and to influence our actions. ◆
Should the pilots have taken a more
we’ll get the priority handling we

From Simulator to
REALITY…
I n 1988, I had the pleasure of
being assigned to 421 Squadron
at CFB Baden as a mission planner
for the CF-18 flight simulator. My
commanding officer (CO) gave
me the task of developing a series
of missions for CF-18 pilots that
would provide them the opportu-
nity to review checklists and proce-
dures specific to the simulated
mission. The missions were to
be designed around a number
of possible systems failures that
could happen during a sortie.
The CO pointed out that the
best way for me to have a realistic
understanding of the procedures
was for me to experience them Of course my response was an kind quite difficult. Even though
myself — first in the simulator and immediate “yes” and Bob filled me the job of being the “backseater”
secondly (and more importantly) in on the details. He told me that was extremely hard and sometimes
by doing some actual cockpit time. my role was to lock up the other frustrating, the experience was
One morning, after logging over aircraft with the radar as well as be unforgettable.
thirty simulator hours and learning the second pair of eyes. At 1000
We were actually holding our own
as much as I possibly could about hours, we proceeded to the runway
against the other two jets until there
the aircraft’s systems, another for take-off. By 1015, we were air-
was an unnatural shudder through-
Captain (let’s call him Bob) borne and at 20,000 feet. As Bob
out the entire aircraft. Immediately,
approached me from my squadron. completed his systems check and
Bob asked me if I had inadvertently
He smiled and said, “It’s a beautiful confirmed that I was ready, we
handled the throttle control in the
day… are you ready?” Bob explained waited for the other two CF-18’s to
rear and my response was negative.
that we were going to be doing an arrive. They joined us a few minutes
As Bob was checking all the systems,
Air Combat Maneuver (ACM) mis- later and the mission was on. Trying
he called over the radio “knock it
sion with a two-ship versus a single- to be the second pair of eyes as well
off, knock it off ” and informed the
ship (2 V 1) scenario, and we were as locking up targets while pulling
others that we were experiencing
going to be the single-ship aircraft. between three to five times the
a runaway throttle with the right
This was my fourth backseat ride weight of gravity (3–5 G’s) was
engine. After attempting to correct
but my first ACM mission, and incredibly difficult. Under the
the problem without success, the
I was looking forward to some G-force, your head and arms
engine had to be shut down and we
cranking and banking. become three to five times heavier,
had to return to base immediately.
thus making movement of any

DISTRACTION
— Is Your Mind on Your Job?
Many years ago, I was posted right-hand engine of the air-
to a unit and was working craft I had “B” checked earlier
within the Aircraft Servicing in the morning. The pilot had
Section. On one particular discovered it while carrying out
sunny morning, there were sev- his pre-flight inspection.
eral before-flight (“B”) checks
Well, you could have knocked
to be carried out on the flight
me over with a feather! I con-
line. I was assigned an aircraft
sidered myself a perfectionist.
by the Servicing Desk NCO and
How did I fail to install the oil
proceeded out to conduct my
cap after checking the oil level?
inspection. I was considered
Then it came to me — that was
one of the more experienced
the exact time that I left my air-
technicians and, quite often,
craft to investigate the problem
my expertise was called upon
for my fellow worker. I must
to answer questions or to verify
have forgotten to put the cap
a problem discovered on the
back on. Clearly, I was not
aircraft. This morning would
focused on the task at hand.
be no different.
Had the pilot not found the
I was in the final stages of cap off and had the aircraft
completing the “B” check with gone flying, who knows what
only the right-hand engine might have happened!
compartment to finish, when
As soon as the aircraft was turned I learned a valuable lesson from
one of the technicians asked
that. Now, I always keep my
back towards Baden, Bob began to me to look at something on
mind on the task at hand and
brief me on ejection procedures just his aircraft. I explained that I
I always recheck the work area
in case the conditions worsened. It would be there in a minute,
thoroughly prior to closing out.
was then that the seriousness of the once I had completed my
So…is your mind on your job? ◆
situation came to light and made inspection. However, he was
very worried that his aircraft MWO Neal
me extremely happy that I had
would not be ready to launch
reviewed in great detail what
on time, so, sensing the
actions were required in the event
urgency in his voice, I decided
of an ejection. A short time later, to come down off my aircraft
while under escort of the other and look at his problem. I
CF-18’s, we were on final approach then returned to complete
and the aircraft landed without my inspection. As I knew that
further problems. This experience I was pretty much finished,
reinforced the importance of being less the final closeout, I took
prepared. It also taught me that any a quick look around and then
type of mission can take a turn for closed the engine door and
the worse and if I am ready for any- proceeded into the line shack
thing, I will have the confidence to to sign out the inspection.
deal with the situation with a calm Later on, I was called into my
set of eyes. ◆ supervisor’s office to explain
to him why the engine oil cap
Captain Phillips
was found not installed on the

FALL BACK ON YOUR

TRAINING
W hile employed as a forecaster/
briefer at sea, I had an experi-
Surface Temperature (SST) analysis
chart. The significance of this chart
the southern tip of a tongue of cold
water, with warmer water to our
ence that reinforced my faith in our to aviation is that fog tends to form south, southwest, and northeast.
training system. One morning, we in the same areas where the cooler
As I put my thoughts together, I
left very early to sail to the area waters are found. This advection
remembered a comment made by
south of Halifax. By early evening, type fog is formed in this marine
an instructor during the marine
we had stopped as we neared what region when surface winds draw
portion of my forecasting course
would be our operational area for warm moist air from over the Gulf
about the reliability of the SST
the next few days. The forecast was Stream waters northward, towards
charts for the prediction of fog.
good and no significant weather the cool waters associated with the
Armed with this knowledge, I rec-
was expected to move into our area Labrador Current.
ommended that the ship stay on its
during our deployment period.
I had no sooner completed plotting present course, heading towards the
The Helicopter Air Detachment the ship’s position and track on the depicted warmer water area. I had
(Hel Air Det) on board had a chart and taking a weather observa- figured that the ship should transit
scheduled launch and I briefed the tion, when the ship’s piping system into this area fairly quickly. With
aircrew on the expected weather sounded “emergency flying stations.” the concurrence of the command
conditions for their flight. My fore- I quickly reported to the operations staff, the ship maintained its course.
cast was for the existing favourable room, with my trusty weather charts The SACO then contacted the Sea
weather conditions to persist in in hand, where the ship’s air control King, which was operating out
our operating area. At launch time, officer (SACO) was briefing the ahead of the ship, to confirm
the ship’s weather observation was operations staff that the pilot had weather conditions at the proposed
reporting some patchy low cloud declared an emergency. The Sea rendezvous point. As it turned out,
and good visibility with a light wind King was experiencing mechanical the ship steamed out of the fog
that had shifted southerly during troubles and would be headed bank to good conditions within
the day. Not long after the Sea Kings back to the ship for a recovery. minutes. The ship turned into the
had departed, the ship entered an I went up to the bridge to brief the wind just as the helicopter came
area of fog, where we saw the visi- Commanding Officer (CO) and the into sight and the recovery went
bility rapidly decrease to near zero. senior Air Officer on the expected without incident.
As the ship continued on a south- weather conditions for the recovery.
I learned several lessons that day.
westerly course, I consulted with the The ship was still in an area of fog,
Firstly, when in doubt, remember
Officer of the Watch to determine with visibilities fluctuating between
to fall back on the training that you
the latitude and longitude where zero and 1/4 of a mile. We had to
have received. Secondly, remember
the ship had entered the fog and find better weather conditions in
that “this airport” changes latitude
to confirm the ship’s planned track a hurry! The options were quickly
and longitude along with the ship.
for the next couple of hours. I had narrowed down to heading back
Therefore, as a ship’s forecaster, one
to start thinking about the ship’s northeast to the last area where the
must be very conscious of not only
weather for the scheduled Sea King ship had good visibility, (an option
the waters the ship is currently
recovery at the end of its mission, that was now over thirty minutes
operating in but also, of the envi-
in just over an hour. away), or continuing on our present
ronment to where it is heading. ◆
course, heading towards warmer
After gathering this data, it was
waters which appeared just ahead
back to the weather office to plot
on the SST chart. The chart indi-
those positions on the latest Sea
cated that the ship had just entered

Has Anyone Seen my
GLASSES?
T here are old pilots and there
are bold pilots…but there
at TGIF during my initial pilot
training, I cleverly determined that
has permitted me to gracefully age
into the rank of Master Captain
are no old, bold pilots. It’s a good I stood a good chance of collecting Pilot!
aphorism to remember. Pass me my pension if I flew Her Majesty’s
My first “near gotcha experience”
my cane…and I’ll tell you how it aerodynes in a conservative fashion.
involved a routine three plus two
worked for me. Having feet of clay, I have, neverthe-
formation take-off from Yorkton,
less, slipped on more than one
Having witnessed a number of Manitoba. Flying the redoubtable
occasion in that regard, but two dis-
“missing man” formations for fel- Musketeer, we had completed our
tinct instances come to mind where
low pilots and having also enjoyed airshow the previous day and were
the process of flying conservatively
the “I learned about flying” stories to proceed that morning back to

Portage. We had managed to Musketeers crash landing into to my dismay, quickly lost power!
secure a stay of absence from the the forests and fields surrounding As I ran through the checklist to try
Commandant for one extra day Yorkton. to regain power, I discovered that I
to remain overnight in the exotic could barely maintain level flight.
My second close call involved an
locale of Yorkton, but we definitely An ejection twenty miles off-shore
“indoctrination” low level naviga-
had to be back at the Canadian in frigid Lake Nippissing, with no
tion trip in the T-33 for a new,
Forces Flying Training School dedicated Search and Rescue (SAR)
electronically enhanced navigator
(3CFFTS) later that day. resources at North Bay, would have
(EWO) on 414 Squadron in North
been ugly!
After an uneventful start-up and Bay. It was a beautiful fall day; we
completion of our usual run-up had great weather, beautiful scenery Again, the long and short of the
checks, we proceeded to the runway, and the cool fall temperatures gave story is that I limped back to the
applied power against brakes and the lungs of that old T-Bird a bit of base, had my engine flame out on
commenced our take-off roll. performance — what could be finer final and then was told that I was
However, my engine just didn’t than flying Mr. Lockheed’s trusty on fire as I touched down! The
seem to be responding quite right Silver Steed? Now, perhaps I should emergency egress was unremark-
and, although I was maintaining remark that some of our pilots able; they secured the fire and the
formation, it seemed a bit sluggish. would have really put the aircraft navigator bought me a beer — isn’t
I announced that I was aborting. through its paces, pulling 4–5 times life wonderful? Well Orville, here’s
The lead quickly thereafter called the weight of gravity (G’s) in the the rest of the story…
an abort for the whole formation turns, aggressively correcting to
The partial power resulted from
as well, and we all taxied back to track or altitude and perhaps even
a disconnect between the manual
the ramp. There were lots of reasons taking special glee in breaking in a
high-pressure cock and the cable
(and pressures) for the team lead new EWO. However, most of the
which connected it to the fuel valve
to continue back to Portage, but older guys (age greater than the age
at the engine. As the aircraft experi-
he chose not to leave and instead of the aircraft) tended to be smooth
enced G forces above 1G, the fuel
waited for my technical crewman and deliberate in their flying, treat-
valve and cable were moved unre-
and I to finish some rudimentary ing the old plane (and their older
strained by the cockpit lever into
trouble-shooting on our misbehav- bodies) with a bit more dignity.
a semi-closed position, thereby
ing engine. Commencing a number For myself, pulling a lot of G, flying
reducing the fuel flow to the engine.
of high-power engine runs, the low level and getting sick — well,
It couldn’t be reopened in flight
engine began to run noticeably that was just dumb. Who wants to
and, in fact, would be closed tighter
rougher and began to seriously work harder, sweat more, and have
by more G. If I had been aggressive
deteriorate in performance. By this to smell vomit for an hour?
in my flying earlier in the mission,
time, some of the other waiting
I briefed the new EWO that I was I would have probably flamed out
planes were also experiencing rough
not going to “yank and bank” my the engine at low level somewhere
running engines. The long and short
way around this trip. I told him to in the middle of the Canadian
of the story is that some clever fault
“relax, put your feet up and see if Shield — probably over a very cold
analysis by our crewmen determined
you can get me home without the lake, and probably no one would
that we had been refuelled with
bad guys shooting us down.” I also have hear my “Mayday.”
contaminated aviation gas (avgas.)
mentioned that I wanted to use
Although I was the first aircraft to Flying smoothly and conservatively,
small, but smooth, corrections to
abort, my aircraft was not the worst listening to those little voices that
track and altitude. The mission was
of the water-contaminated planes. If say “whoa” instead of “giddy-up”
scenic and comfortable; the EWO
not for my “conservative old man’s” isn’t such a bad thing. After all, after
was clever and timely in calling the
call to abort (based only on a “this two decades, I’m still doing what
required corrections and, too soon,
doesn’t feel right” sensation) and an I love to do…flying conservatively!
we reached our target — a small
equally very conservative call by the Now…has anyone seen my
island in the middle of Lake
team leader to hold the team on the glasses? ◆
Nippissing. As I commenced a 2G
ground; there would have been five Captain LaPalm
pull-up from 500 feet, the engine,

FREQUENCY
overshoot and, after verifying my
airspeed, I looked out and saw the
tow plane turning in front of me.
I immediately did a full-power,
low-level right turn to avoid the
SEPARATION aircraft. I called my intentions and

elected to do a tight 360-degree
turn and return for landing. On
final once again, I looked out to
s I looked up from my airspeed allowing the gliders to land closer to
A indicator, I saw the top of a tow
plane crossing my flight path, with a
the hangar. As I completed a right
turn onto final, I noticed that there
find the traffic when I noticed the
tow plane completing its turn to
final about 50 feet above and
200-foot towrope trailing behind it. was a tow plane completing a left slightly behind me. The tow pilot
That’s how what was supposed to be turn onto final for the grass strip had switched frequencies after I
a routine test flight became a flight west of the field. This aircraft was called my intentions, and still was
that tested me! on gliding frequency. On the grass not aware or informed of my posi-
strip waiting to cross the active tion or what had happened. I did a
It was near the end of a flying day
runway, and now on normal field low-level overshoot and re-entered
and the weather could not have
frequency, was another tow plane the circuit. I still was not aware that
been better. The aircraft that I was
— tow plane #2. Tow plane #1, who gliders were crossing the active run-
to fly had just been completely
was on final, called tow plane #2 way and I wonder to this day, if that
overhauled and it needed a test
and asked him to get out of the way. tow plane had not turned in front
flight before it could be released to
Because tow plane #2 was not on of me, if I would have hit that glider.
service. On the west side of the field
gliding frequency, it did not hear the
was extensive glider training doing That day there were plenty of com-
request. Seeing that there was no
left-hand circuits. On the east side munication devices and resources
response from the tow plane in the
of the field was the normal circuit available. Still, there was a major
landing area, the pilot of the aircraft
pattern consisting of a few local communication breakdown, which
on final elected to overshoot.
aircraft doing right-hand circuits. almost resulted in a mid-air colli-
An air traffic advisory, which only At that particular moment, a glider sion. I hear formation flying can be
operated during gliding operations, was now crossing the departure exciting and fun but, until I receive
was monitoring three separate path of the overshooting tow plane. proper training and practice, I hope
frequencies: ground, gliding, and With nowhere to go, and not know- that in the future I do not see an
normal communication frequency ing that I was behind him on final aircraft that close again. ◆
for the airport. and at the same altitude, the pilot
turned right. I was just starting my Captain Gielas
I departed the airport using normal
communications and I proceeded to
a safe area north of the field for the ABC on 121.7
test flight. After completing all of We are on
the upper air work, I returned to final approach
the airfield to do a few circuits. I
entered the circuit on the east side
of the field, called the down-wind,
and stated that I would be doing an
overshoot once I reached the button BXC on 126.7
We are in
of the runway. At this time of day the overshoot
the gliding operation was shutting
down, and they were starting their
hangar runs on the separate gliding
frequency. This involves gliders BISON 48
crossing the active runway on their on 128.4
We are downwind
base leg and turning final on the
east side of the active runway,

The Power of a
BAD
ATTITUDE
A N O P E R AT I O N A L R A N T
homas Edison, in an effort of co-workers be dealt with by using statement, I began to realize that
T to discredit his competition,
the Westinghouse Co. (it had devel-
a more positive form of bad atti-
tudes? Instead of trying to contain
there are no bad attitudes. There are
only badly used attitudes. I’m going
oped alternating current when he and subdue bad attitudes by giving to postulate a new hypothesis that
was selling direct current), would PDM courses, I say we look at the I’ll call “Bad Macho-Good Macho.”
hold public demonstrations show- possibility of rechanneling these
casing the dangers of AC. He once so-called bad attitudes toward the Bad Macho —
publicly electrocuted an elephant cause of flight safety and continued Good Macho:
to illustrate his point. Needless to say, survival. Here are the alleged bad
Machismo requires that you prove
and to the mortification of elephants attitudes that fuel poor decision-
your superiority. Proving your
everywhere, AC went on to become making:
superiority is not in itself such a
the worldwide current of choice. It • Macho bad thing, when done for the right
occurs to me that AC is very much
• Anti-Authoritative reasons. Misguided machismo,
like the “hazardous personality pro-
• Invulnerable however, will cause you to make bad
files” referred to in Pilot Decision-
• Impulsive choices in order to beat the compe-
Making (PDM) courses. PDM
• Resignation tition — and your competition is
maintains that we all share these
anyone else who would dare hold a
hazardous attitudes. Because we all I remember one PDM course pilot’s licence. In order to be recog-
share these bad attitudes, I would where, as several pilots sat looking nized as the “best of the best,” mis-
consider it self-evident that the atti- at the inventory of bad attitudes, a guided machismo will cause pilots
tudes themselves are a product of the somewhat crusty Transport Canada to over-torque power trains, hover
evolutionary process, and therefore inspector said: “Except for resigna- around in the fog at gross weights,
needed for our continued survival. tion, that’s pretty much what you’re keep flying helicopters that should
Evolutionarily speaking, there must looking for when you hire a pilot.” be grounded, and lie about how
be some occasions when a bad atti- Afterwards, I remember thinking long it really took to move a slung
tude is needed. For example, how that he was wrong. Without resig- load. (This is the only business I
do you survive working for a com- nation, most pilots could not cope know of where people lie to make
pany, or a customer, with a poor with payday. But as a result of his less money.)
safety culture? Can the bad attitude
Excessive
Operational Anti-authority
Outlook
Airshow
Syndrome
Invulnerability
JUST
Complacency
SAY Impulsiveness
Emotional
Jet lag
NO! Machismo
Excessive Deference
Co-Pilot/Apprentice
Resignation “Take a Look” Syndrome
Syndrome
The ultimate result of “bad” macho remind him that the extra money in the parking lot of the local police
is that these people actually take required to fix bent helicopters usu- station. Naturally, he was arrested;
pride in how much they can “get ally comes out of the salary budget. through due process he was rehabili-
away with.” The truly insidious When macho man launches into tated and returned to society.
thing about macho-man attitude the fog, don’t follow him like some
I do not approve of what he did;
is how contagious it is. Introducing teething little puppy dog. In fact,
but unlike the helicopter pilots who
as little as one macho man to the take the time to publicly attack his
revel in anti-authoritative behaviour,
flight line can set off a maelstrom of decision and even go as far as com-
this guy did not exhibit his anti-
alpha male behaviour that normally pleting an incident report on him.
authoritative streak a thousand
results in hotter hot-ends, bent and You get the idea. This company is
miles away from the nearest author-
broken skid gear, belly hooks ripped your town, and these morons have
ity figure. Let’s face it — the remote
from the aircraft, and power trains got to go. It’s as easy as that.
nature of our work makes rule-
that make more metal than Alcan.
breaking as easy as shooting fish in a
When it reaches these levels, we’re On Authority: barrel. The big anti-authoritative act
way past cute anecdotes. We need
During a PDM course, you will is usually just a cover for sucking up
a hero.
learn that anti-authoritative behav- to the customer.
I’m talking John Wayne here. iour is described as a “don’t tell me”
So stop being a brown-noser! When
We need a guy who will stand tall attitude. Personally, I think that
the “client” wants you to fly over-
against the bandito horde that’s anti-authoritative behaviour in our
grossed, or carry passengers with
riding wildly down the company’s business is just a cover. Many years
slung loads, or fly in near zero/zero
main street. You can be that man. ago, a semi-drunk acquaintance of
weather, or exceed duty times, or
The company lunchroom will be mine provided me with a fine
land in unsafe confined areas, or
the first showdown. When macho example of true anti-authoritative
fly after dark, and makes all sorts
man publicly brags about how behaviour. He took a hammer to
of other “time-saving” requests,
heavy the load was, publicly the roof lights of six police cruisers
“just say no.”
Impulsiveness: and behaviours are always responded The external or internal pressures
to in kind. In fact, I know pilots that propelled you toward the crash
The framers of any decision-making who were penalized for it. But, that site will recede to invisibility like the
course would like you to stop and was them, and it can’t happen to waters of the great flood. Resign
think before you do something rash. you. After all, what could go wrong? yourself to the fact that you will be
I say that the road to hell is paved I mean, what are they gonna do, left alone with your thoughts, guilt
and curbed with “deep thought.” fire me? Now I know that the PDM and memories, and ultimately
I personally believe that an over- courses warn about the dangers of unable to do a damned thing to
whelming majority of helicopter such invulnerable thinking. In fact, change any of it. ◆
accidents start during the quiet the pretty little mantra that I’m
pre-slumber moments of the Dennis Venturi
required to chant whenever I feel
evening. As you lay in your bunk Reprinted with kind permission of:
invulnerable is that “it can happen “Helicopters” Magazine,
thinking thoughts like “my buddy’s to me.” This is true until it comes Oct/Nov/Dec 2002
getting that A-Star endorsement. time to say no to the customer
He flies over-grossed in any kind of or operations manager. On these
weather. The customer and the boss occasions, you can’t indulge such
love him. If I don’t change, I’ll be on DFS Note: When I read this
negativism.
this R44 forever.” The industry needs article, I knew I had to pass it
a fast-acting solution to these kinds Your primary duty as a pilot is the on to all of you, the people of
of thoughts. So what do we do? safety of your aircraft and its occu- our Air Force who have the
pants — even if it costs you your biggest impact on how safely
The premise of “just say no” is the job. If it is so easy to hover fifty we operate. I briefed you all on
conditioned positive response. In miles along a creek in zero/zero these bad attitudes last year —
other words, we just impulsively do conditions embracing the belief I called them “hazardous atti-
the right thing. Well, if we expect our of immortality, and still live up to tudes” and took most of them
children to look a biker in the eye these obligations, why is it so hard from a book by Tony Kern
and “just say no” to that bag of weed, to believe that your career will not called “Flight Discipline.”
then saying no to pushy customers, end if you do the right thing in Our list was more extensive,
or operations managers, or even our- spite of personal, operational, including: Excessive
selves, should be just afternoon tea. or customer pressures? Operational Outlook,
So in the interest of flight safety,
Anti-authority, Impulsiveness,
whenever you feel any pressure, Resignation: Complacency, Emotional Jet
whatever its source, just say no.
I believe in the power of the indi- Lag, “Take a Look” Syndrome,
Try it: you’ll see how easy it is. vidual to make a difference. So in Machismo, Invulnerability,
For example, the customer says: that, PDM courses and I agree. Resignation, “Airshow”
“The other pilot always carries this By the daily choices you make, Syndrome, and Excessive
amount; I figure you will too.” You you influence everything you touch. Deference Co-pilot/Apprentice
say “no.” The operations manager However, there is a time and place Syndrome. Note that all of the
says, “you will be on standby at the for resignation. We pilots had better five identified by this author
hangar all day, and on call all night.” resign ourselves of a few realities are on our list too. I would
You say “no.” The little voice in your and embrace them. certainly continue to recom-
head says, “I gotta impress every- mend that as many of you as
body.” Reply to yourself: “No, I don’t.” Specifically, it is the pilot who lives possible read Mr Kern’s book.
Pretty soon, doing the right thing will on the leading edge of an accident Meanwhile, enjoy this article,
become as impulsive as breathing, or incident. Within minutes of the and think about the attitudes
consequences be damned. aluminium hitting the ground, of those around you as well as
armies of pundits will assess every- your own, and look for ways
Invulnerability: thing you did and conclude that to prevent those attitudes
they would have done it differently from causing or increasing the
By this point, you may well be won- and, naturally, better. If someone probability of an accident.
dering about my sanity. Well, get in dies, the lives of loved ones are
line. I’m not, however, crazy enough forever and unchangeably altered.
to believe that professional actions

Food For
THOUGHT
A recent flight safety discussion
and some questionable things
are going to do, and why you are
going to do it, and it also forces
in the planning stage of the sortie.
This, too, is a sacred time. People
I have seen about the airfield have you to evaluate the possible risks must not be discussing project-
prompted me to make a couple of involved. We have all been lulled related issues, scheduling problems,
points about the test flight business into a false sense of security at times etc with the aircrew at the ops desk,
that I feel need to be made to every- because the flight is just another unless it relates specifically to the
one involved in any kind of flight routine mission. But…this is a flight about to take place. If it is that
operation. Firstly, I think we all killer! You don’t have to micro-plan important, then the flight should be
realize the state of the Air Force every mission, but you must plan. cancelled. Period. Having experi-
from both an experience level and Define the scope of the sortie and enced this problem myself at the
from a manning level. Secondly, tailor the amount of planning to ops desk numerous times, I know
I think we all appreciate the high the type of sortie to be flown. that when I step out the door to the
tasking level because of the myriad Always include objectives to be aircraft, my mind will NOT be on
new programs on the go and, lastly, accomplished. “Going flying” isn’t the mission. Engineers, schedulers,
I think we all appreciate the CF good enough, nor is “being safe” project officers, friends, and every-
tradition of wanting to make things or “having fun.” Pick some specific body else — please leave the pilots
happen because we really want to things to be accomplished. If you alone at the ops desk.
get the job done. cannot do this, then you shouldn’t
Third — fly the plan. Execute
be flying. Making it up as you go is
In other words, we are undermanned what you have already planned and
not acceptable. As a minimum, you
and inexperienced, but we’ve got an briefed. Ad hoc maneuvers are not
should be putting on the “flying
enormous task load and we want to acceptable.
hat” thirty minutes prior to step.
get the job done because that’s just
This means that once you put on Fourth — debrief the sortie. Every
the way we are. Every year at the
the flying hat you are either delay- sortie must be debriefed to find
Directorate of Flight Safety (DFS)
ing or canceling if something else lessons learned. The execution of
briefing, we are asked to identify
pops up and needs to be addressed. the mission must be measured
where the next accident will hap-
This time needs to be considered against the planned and briefed
pen. The following recommenda-
sacred and must be respected by objectives. The objectives are the
tion is a practical way to try and
everyone, which means no work standards to which you are going to
mitigate the worst from happening
discussions during this time. measure the sortie’s outcome. There
in the CF in general. Apply this not
are always things to learn and to get
only for test flights but also for every Second — brief prior to every
anything out of out of your sortie
mission. Naturally, there is a differ- mission. Briefing forces you to
this must happen. It requires per-
ence between test flights and other focus on the mission at hand by
sonal honesty about ones capability
kinds of flying, but the mindset is getting you out of the office, away
to be able to come away with any-
essentially the same. from your e-mail, telephone, and
thing meaningful. This, too, is
other project-related distractions.
Hopefully, you’ll find the following sacred time and must be respected
How thoroughly you brief the sortie
advice a practical refresher with by everyone.
depends entirely upon the mission
some additional bits of my personal
to be flown. Always brief a contin- Five — support each other. If
experience added. Take it or leave it!
gency (i.e. “what-if ”) plan. The pre- things “just don’t look right,” bring
First — plan every sortie. Planning
flight step brief is the last element them up and discuss them. If you
forces you to run through what you

see other squadrons doing some- Points (a) to (c) above are often the involved in the sortie. If you can’t
thing that doesn’t look right, ask case, while (d) may occasionally be afford the time because you are too
the questions. If ATC or mainte- the case, but only you will know. If busy, then something has to go. I
nance is doing something that is we don’t support each other in the think we are all at the limit of doing
raising your eyebrows, then sort out CF then we can’t be surprised when more with less. Serious mistakes are
the problem. It is the duty of the bad things happen. being made. If we continue down
skilled flyers to help the less knowl- this path, the worst will happen.
In summary, this isn’t about apply-
edgeable aircrew get to a higher
ing some artificial management- Food for thought! ◆
experience state. It is also the duty
developed process. This isn’t about Captain Roberts
of the less experienced crew to ask
writing everything up as a flight
meaningful questions in an effort to
safety incident. This is about using
become better qualified. How many
your experience to do the right DFS Responds: I thank you
pilots look at the other aircraft at
thing. This is about planning the Capt Roberts for your insightful
the hold short position for flap
mission, flying the plan, and learn- article — this appeared in a
positions, oil/fuel leaks, etc? How
ing some things along the way. local AETE forum and we asked
many look at the gear position on
That’s what proficiency is for. It is you if we could reprint it in
the landing aircraft? I suspect that
also about understanding that the Flight Comment because it
too often we:
flight begins at least thirty minutes applies everywhere. Our air
a Assume things are under control prior to step time and ends approxi- force is working through a
because “they must know what
mately thirty minute after sign in. period of low experience levels,
they are doing!!”
A typical 1.5-hour sortie is going to reduced opportunity for train-
b. Don’t have time to check things
take at least three hours out of the ing, and high activity rates;
out or get involved;
aircrew’s day and will frequently be I am convinced that virtually
c. Are unaware because our minds
more. This is not just for the pilot everything that can be done by
are elsewhere and we’re not
looking; and either — this is for ALL aircrew our senior leadership is being
d. Don’t really care. done, but that is not enough.
We need people to live the kind
of professionalism and disci-
pline this article urges. That,
CH
ORT EA combined with effective risk
SUPP OTHER management at the tactical
level, and a real focus on learn-
ing and mentoring will get us
The F THE through this period and leave us

DEBRIE OR the stronger for it. I am encour-
S TIE
aged by your attitude — it sets
“Flight
a good example for us all!
FLY THE PLAN Colonel Harder

DFS
Safety BRIEF PRIOR TO

EVERY MISSION
Hat”
PLAN EVERY
SORTIE

Get The
Mission Done!
I t started out as your typical
Mobile Repair Party (MRP).
spinning the winds got us in with
some gas in reserve, but not much,
arrive at our destination before they
closed. A quick call was made back
An F-18 had broken down in the and only if we filed at flight level to the squadron and, ten minutes
southern United States and a T-33 (FL) 370. The second leg was much later, I was told to go to a different
aircraft was tasked to transport the shorter and fuel was not a huge USAF base as they stayed open
technician, parts, and tools down concern. 24 hours and were only one hour’s
south. In this case, though, the F-18 drive from the broken jet. After
With the parts loaded into the jet,
pilot was badly needed back home re-filing our flight plan, we strapped
the technician was strapped in and
to meet an operational tasking and back into the Lockheed torture seat
rapidly briefed on the trip, his
time was tight. An MRP had already and blasted off into the inky dark-
equipment, emergency procedures,
been sent, but, during the course of ness for points south. We finally
and the intercom system. The start,
repairing the snag, another problem landed and shut down at 2330 local
taxi, and takeoff went smoothly, but
was found that required a different and were met by our somewhat
not long into the trip I realized that
load of tools and parts, as well as a irate and frustrated F-18 pilot.
the headwinds were slightly worse
different technician. The original
than forecasted, and the gas situa- On the way to our quarters, my
technician did not have the qualifi-
tion, while still legal, was getting passenger was told that he was to
cations or experience to repair the
uncomfortable. As a result, we meet the other technician at the jet
second snag. The unit requesting
requested and got FL410. Those of at 0400 local so that the F-18 could
the MRP was going through the
you with T-33 experience know that be ground run at 0700 local and
typical confusion and hysteria try-
this is not a comfortable altitude, airborne by 0900 local. I was happy
ing to locate and package the parts,
and, with the cabin heat full hot, not to be in his shoes. At 2am my
find a qualified technician with a
but still shivering from the cold, the head finally hit the pillow and
current high altitude indoctrination
cabin altitude was right on 25,000 stayed there until being awoken
course (HAI) and get him a seat
feet. I tried chatting with my pas- by the sound of an F-18 departing
check. By the time everything
senger several times, and he was just before noon. I met up with the
arrived at the T-33, it was early
polite but not very talkative. Not two techs and my squadron mate
afternoon, and, yours truly had
a big problem, as I was finding it for a late lunch and then we set off
been waiting for several hours, only
hard to chat as well due to the cold. for home.
knowing that he was “launching the
Almost three hours later, an eternity
minute that the parts and tech Late in the evening, after three hops
on the 45-year old seat cushion,
arrive.” As the trip would involve and several airsickness bags from
we landed for a gas and go.
two hops and the destination air- my passenger, we arrived back home.
port closed at 2130 local, I was anx- While the jet was getting re-fuelled, My passenger almost had to be car-
ious to launch. The weather at both my passenger and I ducked out for ried from the jet due to exhaustion
the destination and the intermedi- some dinner (about 1930 local) and lack of sleep. I just chalked it
ate stop was VFR, but enroute and, it was then, he told me that up to fatigue, lack of sleep, the
weather was forecast to be relatively he had been airsick for most of discomforts of flying, and the
poor with storms and low ceilings. the ride. No wonder he wasn’t very airsickness.
This was well below the limits of talkative!! By the time we’d finished
The following afternoon, I was
the questionable TACAN and ADF at McDonald’s and returned to
flying a clear-hood proficiency trip
equipment in the T-33. As a result, Transient Servicing, it was painfully
with another squadron pilot (new
the first leg was quite long and apparent that we weren’t going to
to T-33’s) in the trunk. When he

We tend to get compla-
cent when it comes to
military passengers, but
we jet-drivers can’t forget that
we’re flying high-performance
queried me about the “press-to-test” What did I take away from this? The aircraft with complex systems. As
function on the regulator, a flag same problems and “gotcha’s” we’ve aircrew, we’re extremely familiar
tripped in my head. This was the all heard about: rushed tasks; pres- with the ALSE systems and their
same aircraft I’d flown down south. sures to complete the mission; hur- function and pitfalls. Our passen-
The regulator seemed to be work- ried briefings; and a passenger unfa- gers, on the other hand, can run
ing, but he wasn’t getting a lot of miliar with the aircraft and its ALSE the gamut from very experienced
pressure in the mask on the “press- systems. Luckily, the cloth outer to nil experience and a great deal
to-test.” As we were at low altitude, covering on the hose kept the rub- of apprehension. It’s our job to not
it wasn’t a concern, but we had the ber parts together, and provided only get the mission done, but to
ALSE techs look at it once we my passenger with enough oxygen. ensure that the passengers are ade-
landed. Sure enough, the cloth Had the hose failed entirely halfway quately briefed. Passengers should
outer covering of the oxygen hose through the first leg of my trip, we be assured that they can talk to the
was intact, but the inner rubber would have been in a very bad way. pilot, especially if they’re taking off
hose had split. An immediate call The weather beneath us was com- the mask to throw up. If they are
was placed to the F-18 squadron pletely unsuitable for a TACAN or off oxygen, at high cabin altitudes,
and the Flight surgeon was notified. ADF approach (the AUP T-33’s are the pilots need to know about it.
Luckily nothing appeared amiss finally getting an ILS, but we didn’t Unfortunately, most passengers try
with my intrepid passenger, but I’m have one) and we didn’t have the to hide the fact that they are sick,
sure he harbours some ill feeling gas to descend and make it to the either due to embarrassment, fear of
towards my antique jet. I don’t good weather. The thought of an disturbing the pilot, or both. My hat
expect we’ll find him volunteering emergency descent into thunder- is off to the technician that I carried
for an MRP anytime soon. In fact, storms, low ceilings, and extremely south. Despite the lack of sleep and
his HAI expires soon and the last poor visibility with a hypoxic pas- obvious physiological problems, he
comment I heard from him was senger for a TACAN approach at an was able to complete his job and get
that he’d not be renewing it! unfamiliar airfield is something I’m the mission done. ◆
glad I was lucky enough to avoid. Captain Sherwood

Pride vs.
Apprehension
uring my first operational apprehension was that it was diffi-
D tour of duty as an Air Traffic
Controller in Comox, it was very
cult to control traffic while trying to
brief a tour group at the same time.
me that a tour group, which was
originally scheduled to arrive at the
tower for a briefing at 1500 hours,
common to have tour groups visit Performing ATC duties requires one was now delayed until 1630 hours.
the control tower to get a briefing hundred percent concentration on Realizing that the CC would not be
on ATC operations and to view the the part of the controller so that the available to conduct the briefing
spectacular scenery of the Comox situational awareness of the traffic because he finished work at 1600
Valley. As an “ab initio” controller in picture can be maintained at all hours and, despite my apprehen-
the tower, I was leery to give briefings times. Distractions can lead to sion, my pride prevented me from
to tours while on active controlling omissions, which can result in asking the CC to stay late at work.
duties without the aid of my super- mistakes and may cause a flight Therefore, even though only the
visor to either give the briefing or safety incident to occur. Air Traffic Control Assistant and
to sign on duty to relieve me so I myself were on duty and the flying
One afternoon while working, the
could conduct the briefing. My schedule indicated that there were
CC (Chief Controller) informed
two pilot training flights to
depart at 1600 hours for
local circuits, I did not
IFR flight means
that you fly only using object to the tour group
the instruments in arriving later.
IFR FLIGHT — Of course
your cockpit. we know what IFR flight is When the tour group
but where is our arrived at the tower, there
You are LANDING CLEARANCE?
was a Buffalo and an
clear Aurora flying VFR circuits
to land.
and an American P3-Orion
inbound for landing in ten
Why is she minutes. Five minutes after
telling us that commencing the briefing,
we’re clear
to land? the PAR controller advised
me that the Orion was at
ten miles final to runway 11
for a full stop. I informed
the PAR controller to
advise me when the Orion
was four miles from land-
ing. Meanwhile, I recom-
menced the briefing and
was explaining the differ-
ence between the tower and

terminal operations when Red
Seven, a fire truck, requested On The Technician’s Shoulders
permission to proceed from the
fire hall along the ramp across the 15 Air Maintenance Squadron an aircraft. The brush was
button of runway 11. It would take (AMS) Moose Jaw was in the discovered missing by the next
the fire truck approximately thirty process of getting ready for crew and they found it in the
seconds to reach the runway. I the NATO Flying Training aircraft that I had been work-
Centre (NFTC) to take over ing on. I had not only left the
authorized the request and contin-
flight training. It had been tool in the plane, but I had
ued on with the briefing without
a long day, as usual, with also failed to thoroughly check
having verified the latest position of too many jobs to do and not the pouch upon returning to
the Orion. Less than twenty seconds enough people to carry them the tool board.
later, the PAR controller reported out. I was working on a snag
the Orion at four miles final and I received extra duties for this
that required changing the
error, but it was a very strong
requested landing clearance. After VORTAC relay and acciden-
lesson for me in other ways as
doing a quick visual check of the tally dropped a plastic spacer
well. I learned that even
runway and not seeing any obstruc- under the IFF tray. I had
though manpower is short
tions on the runway, I issued land- just taken the long-handled
and pressure is on to do the
ing clearance to the PAR controller. brush from my tool pouch to
job, the ultimate responsibility
As soon as I gave the landing clear- remove the foreign object
lies on the technician’s shoul-
ance, the assistant, who was sitting (FOD) under the IFF tray when
ders. With reductions in man-
my supervisor came and asked
next to me, discreetly reminded me power all over the military
me to help tow in aircraft.
that the fire truck on the ramp had environment, more pressure is
This small distraction was all
clearance to cross the runway. I put on the people doing the
that was required for me to
immediately instructed the fire work. The fact that there are
screw up. I quickly finished
truck to hold short of the runway not more technical incidents
the job I was doing and put
on the ramp because of the aircraft or accidents speaks volumes
my tools away.
on the professionalism and
on final approach. The fire truck
The next day, I was called into hard work of the technicians
was able to comply with the request
the Sergeant’s office and was in the field. ◆
to hold short of the runway and the told that I had left a brush in
aircraft landed safely. Corporal Oddy
The lesson I learned was that I

allowed pride to overtake my appre-
hension of simultaneously conduct-
ing briefings while controlling.
During the briefing, I failed to keep
track of the entire picture of what
was happening and, therefore, the
distraction of conducting the brief-
ing took my complete attention
away from controlling. Excellent
teamwork was demonstrated on
behalf of the assistant in maintain-
ing situational awareness and advis-
ing me of my grievous error. This
certainly prevented a runway incur-
sion from happening. Flight safety
is definitely a team effort. Don’t
allow pride to force you into a situa-
tion that you don’t want to be in. ◆
Capt. Foley
Tool board in photo is NOT the one used by NFTC

NO
F !
s an avionics technician performing adjustments on the
ault
ound
snags came from one of the

A employed on the Griffon
helicopter, I was in charge of the
goggles. Periodically, goggles would
be returned for defects and adjust-
squadron’s flight engineer. It was
always the same snag, always the
squadron’s night vision goggles ments and, out of them, a good same goggle, always the same man
(NVG’s) maintenance program. percentage were diagnosed as and, after verification, always the
As such, it was my duty to repair “code 1/2.” To repair these prob- same verdict — “NO FAULT
and adjust the goggles in use by our lems, you only needed to provide FOUND!” After a period of a
flight crews for their night flying extra training and explanations month or so and three or four of
operations. While this side of my to the individual that stood 1/2” those reports, I made it a point to
work involved numerous tasks of behind the goggles when the defect meet the gentleman. I confronted
a routine nature, it nonetheless was noticed. This was a running him on the subject and told him
required a healthy dose of concen- joke amongst us. Looking back on it that his goggles met all of the para-
tration in order to attain a constant though, this situation made us treat meters of the test procedures. He
standard. some reported snags as trivial and was very polite and told me that
dampened our vigilance toward my test had to be wrong because
Since the test equipment required
actual problems with our test he could not attain the infinity
to perform the adjustment had to
equipment. focus adjustment and that the
be calibrated yearly, no thought
image always remained blurry.
ever crossed my mind that some- All of this went on for more than
The thought of suggesting a good
thing could go wrong while I was two years. One of those reoccurring
ophthalmologist crossed my mind

and my eyes must have betrayed me While I was far from convinced, time it passed and the tree line
because he immediately told me I made a point to come back that was sharply in focus. This alone
that he didn’t dream it and that it night, and check his theory for didn’t reassure me so I went on
was real. I asked him to give me a myself. After trying my best to find and verified two other sets, which
good example of this problems and an adjustment that would make both passed.
he took me out to the ramp. He the tree line come into sharp focus,
I had answered one question
then pointed at the tree line just I had to admit that there was really
and killed the doubt that got me
across the helicopter landing-pad something wrong with my test.
running for answers, but a bigger
and explained that he couldn’t find I immediately went back in and
question remained. Why were all
any settings that would permit him performed the infinity focus adjust-
the goggles passing the test on the
to view it sharply when doing his ment on the goggles in question.
test equipment and yet one failed
final pre-flight adjustments. I told To my surprise, they passed the test
to reach the actual “tree line” infin-
him that all of the goggles were without any problems. This alone
ity test? While I didn’t solve the
adjusted in the same way and he got my attention. Could it be true
problem on this particular pair
was the only one to come up with that all 27 sets of goggles could
of goggles, I did start to rethink
such a problem. Seeing that he was be out of calibration? To clear
my attitude when faced with
sincere in his description of the snag, my mind, I quickly carried out
reports of malfunctions. ◆
I promised to further investigate into the same procedure with a set that
his problem. I had just finished adjusting. This Sergeant Bolduc

It’s Not All
Fun&
B
Games!
rigadier General Proulx’s
retirement visit to 14 Wing
Greenwood would set in motion
drop pattern was selected, the
jumpers began a (then common)
ritual of betting on the prowess of
SAR Tech leader and myself were
next, and we were both thinking
that there was no way in hell that
an almost catastrophic chain of each others jumping skills. General a rookie was going to come out
events. This day, which was memo- Proulx, an excellent jumper by all the victor! There was very little
rable in more ways than one, accounts, was also in on the prize. talk between him and I as we had
included a parachuting incident Each jumper would buy the closest jumped together on many occa-
that has altered the mindset of jumper a beer at the gathering in sions, and there was no need, or so
many aircrew personnel to this the mess after hours. This practice we thought, to rehash, “same old,
day. It all started one sunny fostered events contributing to the same old!” Initially, both of us had
afternoon, when (now retired) incident. The winds were very light great separation in the air, but as
Brigadier General Proulx on the ground; all of the top Brass we descended towards the target
requested to participate in a para- were watching; the General would this separation diminished to
chute descent with the Search and be the first to jump; some of the almost nothing. With both of our
Rescue Technicians (SAR Techs). newest SAR Tech’s were included main canopies open and in full
As the General was still current in the jump; and, finally, the most control, we focused on the disk in
from his recent jumps in Trenton, senior jumpers were also part of the center of the Pea Gravel bowl.
the wheels were put in motion to the jump. To say that there was an There were very light winds, so
accommodate his request. incentive to do well would be an neither of us were concerned about
understatement. Although it had the other not making the necessary
We knew that the Wing
been briefed prior to the jump that adjustments to stay out of each
Commander and Wing Chief
the reason for the two man sticks other’s way. I set up in the normal
would both be observing this
was to provide each jumper with in-to-wind pattern, although this
historic occasion from the ground
an equal chance at landing in the was a moot point since there were
in the vicinity of the Pea Gravel
center of the bowl simultaneously, no winds. My partner, on the other
Bowl along with the SAR Tech
it was understood that they needed hand, elected to play to the camera
team leader. The jump took place
to maintain adequate separation that was on the ground, and come
from the ramp of a CC-130
in the air. in on a heading, which ended up
Hercules aircraft, at an altitude of
being 90° to mine. The accompany-
3000 feet above the ground. There Both the General’s stick and the
ing photos are worth a thousand
were three sticks of two jumpers, rookies’ stick went off without a
words and clearly demonstrate the
jumping to the pea bowl. The hitch, with one of the rookies land-
near catastrophic collision above
General would be the first out of ing within three feet of the center
the center of the Pea’s.
the aircraft. After the streamers disk in the Pea Bowl. The deputy
were dropped and an in-to-wind

Get Home-ITIS
It had been a long day and successfully, you could see the
even longer deployment that red end lights as we turned
1 one “possibly fatal” night.
Everyone wanted to go home
to taxi into the hangar.
Once we had landed there
to their own beds and their
was dead silence; not a word
families. We were almost
from the cockpit or even
there but, listening to the
from the tower to give us taxi
ATIS and the weather sequence
instructions. The first state-
for home, it looked like we
ment heard was from the
were going to spend another
A/C telling the first officer
night elsewhere. Our destina-
to relate to the tower that
tion was fogged in and the
the visibility was between
nearest alternate was only
1/2–1 mile. Knowing full well
ten minutes away; just a hop,
that this was false and that
skip, and not even a jump to
the tower would not believe
2 get home the next day.
him, the first officer elected
The first officer was very not to send this information.
timid and not sure of himself
There are many lessons to be
because the aircraft captain
learned from this incident.
(AC) was always on his back.
Firstly, everyone had the
At minimums, he was hesitant
“get home-itis” syndrome,
and the A/C called “Overshoot,
which can prove to be deadly.
I have control.” We were now
Secondly, the A/C had the
going in for our second and
attitude of “I have to prove
last attempt to land, and then
I can do it,” and therefore
3 it was off to our alternate.
This time, the A/C had control.
did, endangering the lives of
all the personnel on board.
Minimums were called and
Lastly, false information
the “contact, field in sight”
should never be passed
Target fixation and complacency call was never made, but we
because you could be jeopar-
with poor communication were were still on the approach. By
dizing the safety of another
that time, it was too late and
among some of the reasons that aircraft attempting to land
our speed was too slow to
this incident occurred. This cele- after you. Safety should be
overshoot so we had to land.
bration day almost ended in paramount at all times and
The aft observers noticed the
tragedy. When you concentrate someone’s attitude and desire
4000-foot markers and we still
on only one thing and are oblivious to go home should not cloud
hadn’t touched down. It was
to what may be happening around their judgement. ◆
only an 8000-foot runway
you, you are concocting a recipe for and, although we landed Capt. Tuck
disaster. Situational awareness is
key when flying a Ram Air Canopy,
S
as well as any CF aircraft. This is DISEAS TOM
MP rs
serious business…let’s keep our E: SY
ility
ib
a ea s
pp
it i
an
“get-home-IT is r th
head in the game! ◆ IS” 1 v eate reality
gr in
of
is one
RESCUE titude to prove
t ve it
WO Carignan 2 a “I ha can do
I false
pa ss
to
d e sire ion is present
3 t
rma
info

FROM THE INVESTIGATOR
Aircraft Accident Summary
TYPE: Sea King CH12401

LOCATION: 540 NM ESE of Halifax, NS
DATE: 27 February 2003
they contacted the flight deck and parts of the

T he aircraft was deployed on HMCS IROQUOIS.
The crew was preparing to launch for Destroyer
deck landing training and door gun practice.
blades were driven through the hangar doors
where members of the ship fire fighting team
During the launch sequence, the aircraft lost lift and HELAIRDET were monitoring the launch.
and fell heavily onto the deck; the right sponson The tail boom was severed at the pylon hinge
collapsed and the helicopter rolled over. All four and the tail rotor assembly came to rest on top
crew members egressed the helicopter under their of the Nulka rocket launcher located on the
own power. Two crew members sustained minor quarterdeck (aft and below the flight deck).
injuries and one ship’s member had his hand bro-
The ship came to Emergency Flying Stations
ken by rotor blade shrapnel that penetrated the
and damage control measures were initiated.
hangar door. The initial assessment of aircraft
The flight deck and quarterdeck were secured
damage is ‘A’ Category.
and the wreckage was chained in position for the
The ship was conducting a Replenishment-at-Sea transit to Halifax. DFS Investigators met the ship
(RAS) during the aircraft’s traverse from the hangar, in Halifax and coordinated the removal of the air-
blade spread and engine run-up. During the RAS, craft. The investigation is focused on the sudden
several witnesses stated that a wave broke over loss of lift. The aircraft’s power train was removed
the front of the helicopter fuselage. Prior to com- and sent for engineering evaluation. ◆
mencing the launch
sequence, HMCS IRO-
QUOIS completed the
RAS evolution and
broke away from HMCS
PRESERVER. Clearance
was received to launch
the helicopter. The
pilot pulled into a
20-foot hover over the
flight deck to confirm
aircraft performance
prior to departing to
the port side. Within
seconds the aircraft
descended rapidly
to the deck, landing
first on the tail wheel
and then the right
main landing gear.
As the right sponson
collapsed, the heli-
copter continued to
roll over onto its right
side. The main rotor
blades sheared off as

MAINTAINER’S CORNER
HAZARD REPORTS:
THE LITTLE-KNOWN PREVENTION TOOL
A large part of the Flight Safety (FS) program is prevention, and the Directorate of
Flight Safety (DFS) spends a lot of effort to familiarize the air force community with
current safety issues. You know about the yearly visit to your Wing or Base by the DFS
team. Your Wing/Base/Unit flight safety officer (W/B/UFSO) most likely gives briefings
on a regular basis as well, and you probably see the flight safety non-commissioned
member (FSNCM) around the workplace once in a while. There is one more tool in
our arsenal, though, and this tool is the “hazard report.”
The aim of the hazard report or navy personnel who are A hazard report should not be
is twofold. First, to warn the working on a Wing or flying used for problems that pose
air force community of a dan- units; ATC personnel; air cadets; no danger to aviation resources.
gerous condition and, second, etc. The common factor between Here are some examples of items
to correct the situation and all those people is the aviation that should not be reported
make it safe before the haz- element. In other words, anyone through the Flight Safety system.
ardous or dangerous conditions connected to air operations Although they are cause for con-
cause injury to personnel or that see a potential hazard cern, there are better means to
damage to aviation resources within the work place should address these problems.
such as aircraft, equipment, inform Flight Safety personnel,
• Disregard to a rule or proce-
vehicles or even buildings. preferably through the hazard
dure that is already in place
report form. and is considered to be valid,
The second point is self-explana-
tory but the first point needs to Now that we know who can adequate and realistic.
be discussed because it is not report a hazard, let’s define For example:
very clear. The usual way to warn what a particular situation or a ❍ Safety footwear has to be
the air force community of a potential hazard is. It could be worn when working in and
dangerous condition is through unsafe work habits, equipment around aircraft. If someone
the FS system and the Flight or clothing. It could also be disregards this rule, the
Safety Information System (FSIS) inadequate or unrealistic proce- hazard report will not
by means of the hazard report dures (technical orders, SOPs, solve the problem because
form. This report can be filled etc.) or unsafe conditions there are no problems with
out by anyone who is concerned (environmental, equipment, the rule itself, and person-
with a particular situation. When resources, etc.). Unsafe condi- nel are issued with the
I say anyone, I mean anyone! tions could include, for example, footwear they require to
This includes air force personnel the condition of the ramp in follow that rule. So, if
employed in and around aircraft, winter, an untidy shop environ- someone decides to wear
in shops or labs, in explosive ment or even the layout of a runners while working on
storage facilities, on ships or shop or lab. As you can see, the an aircraft, that person has
anywhere else connected to an range of possible hazards is to be dealt with by his or
air force environment; civilian quite wide, so it is only fair to her supervisor. It could be
personnel or contractors work- specify what does not constitute in the form of a friendly
ing on an airfield, in shops and a hazard.
labs, in third line facilities; army

reminder (we all have our ❍ Ramp not cleared of snow personnel need more informa-
moments, after all) but it and ice. In this case, the tion or if you want to receive
could also be through disci- Wing or base has a snow feedback on the hazard. Once
plinary or administrative and ice control (SNIC) plan the report is filled out, forward
actions, depending if the in place, and the snow is it to the FS Office. Once it has
person keeps on purposely cleared but maybe not reached FS personnel, here is
ignoring the rule. The fast enough to suit the how the hazard report should
point is that, in this case, unit. This could definitely be handled.
a hazard report will not cause safety problems,
Preferably, the hazard report
solve personnel problems. but the SNIC committee
should go to your unit FS
or even the general safety
❍ Protective covers have to Officer or NCM — but it can
committee may be better
be installed on aircraft. also go to the Wing or Base
equipped to deal with this
If personnel are aware of Flight Safety Officer — who will
type of situation.
this rule and choose not to then research the problem. If
install the covers, the prob- ❍ Garbage dumpsters or bins the hazard is valid, it will then
lem is the same as the one too full. In this case, dealing be determined if the problem
above. On the other hand, with the organization can be fixed at the unit. If it
if the person is not aware responsible for contracting can, an office of primary inter-
of this rule, the problem garbage disposal companies est (OPI) will be assigned to
is then with the training may be more effective, implement corrective actions,
provided to that person. In and quicker, than staffing the hazard information will be
that case, we verify if that a hazard report. entered in FSIS, and the origina-
person is the only one not tor will be advised of the solu-
Let’s be clear on a few points
aware of this requirement. tions. If it cannot be fixed at
here. I am not trying to tell
If yes, the training is work- the unit, it is normally entered
units not to enter hazard
ing, and there was proba- in the FSIS and the next level
reports in FSIS. However, I want
bly an oversight when that is notified, which is the Wing
to ensure that hazard reports
person received the train- or base Flight Safety office.
are used for the right reasons,
ing. Again, the hazard The same process applies here.
and that we do not bog down
report will not solve the If the Wing or Base cannot fix
our system with issues that
issue. The person has to be the problem, it is passed to
could be better solve by other
retrained, and again, this is 1 CAD FS, who is the next level
means or organizations. So, as
a personnel issue. However, up. If they cannot rectify the
mentioned above, once some-
if the majority of the peo- situation, it is then forwarded
one has identified a potential
ple at the unit are omitting to the next level, DFS. In most
hazard at the Wing or unit, FS
to install the protective cases, the hazard is fixed before
personnel have some work to
covers, the training has to DFS has to get involved.
do in order to deal with the
be re-evaluated to ensure
situation as quickly as possible. I must stress the fact that the
it is complete. If it is not,
The goal is to solve the problem hazard should be dealt with
this could become a flight
at the lowest possible level. The at the lowest possible level.
safety issue, and the prob-
flow chart below (Annex 3-4C-1 The reason is to avoid delays
lem has to be solved by
in the A-GA-135-001/AA-001) in rectifying a situation that
re-designing the training,
provides a summary of the could cause injuries, damages
if need be, and re-training
staffing of a hazard report. or worse.
personnel. As you can see,
some homework has to be The hazard report form can be There are a couple of other
done by flight safety per- found in the A-GA-135-001/AA- points I would like to mention
sonnel before the observa- 001, from your unit, Wing or as well. One concerns the OPI’s,
tion becomes a hazard Base Flight Safety Office, or on the other, the originators. The
report. More on that the DFS web site on the DIN at problem with the OPI’s is that,
subject later. http://airforce.dwan.dnd.ca/dfs/. often, they are not being
The report can be filled anony- informed that they have been
• Procedures are in place but
mously but it is suggested that assigned to fix the problem!
the organization responsible
you include your name and Just remember that entering the
to implement them is not
responding quickly enough. phone number in case FS information in FSIS does not

guarantee that the OPI will STAFFING HAZARD REPORTS
know that he or she has been
assigned to that task; FSIS is HAZARD RECEIVED BY UFSO
only available to a small number
of persons. So, to avoid delays, VERIFY VALIDITY
and bad surprises, whoever
assigns the OPI should contact YES NO
that person at the same time to
pass on all the pertinent infor- CAN IT BE RECTIFIED advise originator
mation. The other point, about AT UNIT of decision
the originators of hazard
reports, is that they should be YES
NO • INITIATE & MONITOR
kept in the loop every step of advise originator, CORRECTIVE ACTION
the way. I think when someone enter into FSIS, • COMPLETE FSIS FORMAT
notify next level • ADVISE ORIGINATOR
cares enough to enter a hazard
report, the Flight Safety organi-
zation owes it to that person
PASS TO WFSO (via FSIS)
to keep them informed of what
is being done to correct the VERIFY VALIDITY
hazardous condition. However,
originators have some responsi-
YES NO
bility in the process as well. If
you have not received any feed- CAN IT BE RECTIFIED • advise originator
back from the FS officer, you AT WING of decision
should go visit them and inquire • complete FSIS format
about the hazard report you
submitted. NO YES • INITIATE & MONITOR
advise originator, CORRECTIVE ACTION
In conclusion, the hazard report enter into FSIS, • COMPLETE FSIS FORMAT
notify next level • ADVISE ORIGINATOR
is one of the best tools available
to the air force community to
prevent accidents and incidents. PASS TO 1 CAD FS (via FSIS)
The only drawback is that,
often, it is misused by a person VERIFY VALIDITY
who thinks that once the haz-
ard has been identified and
YES NO
entered in FSIS, it will automati-
cally be fixed. I hope this article CAN IT BE RECTIFIED • advise originator
has cleared up those misconcep- AT 1 CAD of decision
tions, and I will leave you with • complete FSIS format
this quote taken from the
NO YES • INITIATE & MONITOR
endorsement of the CF Flight advise originator, CORRECTIVE ACTION
Safety program by the Chief of enter into FSIS, • COMPLETE FSIS FORMAT
Defence Staff, General Henault: notify next level • ADVISE ORIGINATOR
“Hazards that could decrease
operational effectiveness
PASS TO DFS (via FSIS)
through loss of personnel and
equipment must be recognized VERIFY VALIDITY
and positive action taken to
eliminate them.”1 ◆
YES NO
• INITIATE & MONITOR • advise originator

CORRECTIVE ACTION of decision
• COMPLETE FSIS FORMAT • complete FSIS format
• ADVISE ORIGINATOR
1 A-GA-135-001/AA-001

FOR PROFESSIONALISM
CORPORAL B.J. DIXON
After flying most of the night on a Search and

Rescue (SAR) mission, Corporal Dixon prepared to
go home to get some well-deserved sleep. While
walking past a Labrador helicopter, Corporal Dixon
stopped to talk with the flight engineer (FE), who
was completing the pre-flight inspection. As he
stood near the aft ramp, Corporal Dixon began
to scan the engine bay for irregularities. During
his scan of the engine bay and surrounding area,
Corporal Dixon noticed that the main engine fuel
line appeared chaffed. Corporal Dixon notified
the other FE and they inspected the area. Further
investigation confirmed that the engine fuel line
had been rubbing on an adjacent bulkhead, result-
ing in substantial wear of a critical aircraft compo-
nent. The consequences of a chafing fuel line going
uncorrected could have been catastrophic.
Corporal Dixon’s exemplary level of vigilance, partic-
ularly after a long duty day, is noteworthy. His pro-
fessionalism resulted in the discovery of a very serious
hazard that could have easily gone undetected. His
actions and attention to detail on this day exemplify
his level of commitment to flight safety. ◆
CORPORAL SYLVAIN GARCEAU
While carrying out a daily inspection on Hornet

#785, Corporal Garceau observed something amiss
underneath the aircraft. Even though not part of
his inspection, he noticed an unfamiliar shadow
when looking through a water drain on panel 36,
which is located underneath the aircraft. Unable to
determine exactly what this shadow was or what
caused it, Corporal Garceau immediately informed
his maintenance supervisor. In an attempt to inspect
the area and determine its nature, the centreline
tank and pylon were removed and panel 36 was
opened. Once panel 36 had been removed, they
found a tool (#3 tip) that had become lodged in
this area.
Corporal Garceau is an avionics technician working Corporal Garceau’s initiative enabled the recovery of
in first line maintenance (servicing) at 433 Tactical this tool, thus preventing it from migrating toward
Fighter Squadron. Following the 11 September 2001 other more critical areas of the aircraft. Without his
events, Corporal Garceau was assigned to the alert alertness and immediate reaction, this incident could
team operating at 8 Wing Trenton, Ontario. have deteriorated and become a very critical emer-
gency situation. The professionalism, vigilance and
the quick reaction of Corporal Garceau prevented
a serious incident, which could have had disastrous
consequences. ◆

FOR PROFESSIONALISM
CORPORAL STEVE LAWTON
In October 2001, Corporal Lawton was tasked to

carry out a before flight (“B”) check on Hercules
aircraft #314. During his check, he noticed that
the grease nipples on the lower scissors arm on
the nose landing gear were facing backwards and
that the upper and lower scissors were grooving
into each other.
Taking the initiative, he determined that the
lower gear torque arm was improperly installed.
Left undetected and uncorrected for too long,
this condition could have caused the nose-wheel
steering to fail. Loss of nose-wheel steering during
landing, take-off, or taxi could have resulted in a
serious aircraft incident or accident. The next day,
Corporal Lawton took it upon himself to conduct
a check of all aircraft on the ramp to ensure that
this was not a common problem and was, in fact,
only an isolated incident.
Corporal Lawton’s attention to detail during a
routine “B” check demonstrated his personal
commitment to flight safety, while his initiative
and motivation established his dedication and
professionalism. ◆
CORPORAL DONALD MARTIN
As Corporal Martin and his supervisors continued

their investigation, they discovered the control
rod, causing minor skin damage on the rudder,
had damaged the over-centre bracket on the vis-
cous damper. Although this was not part of the
bird nest inspection, had this situation gone unno-
ticed, it would have resulted in further damage to
the rudder. With the rudder being a major flight
control, this had the potential to become a serious
in-flight emergency.
One month later, Corporal Martin was again tasked
to carry out a bird nest inspection on the same air-
craft, Aurora #140115. On his own initiative, he
investigated the previous repair on the rudder vis-
cous damper and discovered that, once again, it had
been damaged. If not for Corporal Martin’s profes-
sionalism, this recurring snag might have been over-
On 30 May 2002, while conducting a bird nest check
looked, leading to a major flight safety incident.
on Aurora #140115, Corporal Martin discovered a
piece of metal inside the lower access panel of the Corporal Martin’s diligence and subsequent follow-
rudder. Unable to identify the origin of the foreign up resulted in the discovery of a serious unservice-
object damage (FOD), he immediately informed ability, which had the potential to develop into a
his supervisor and initiated a flight safety report, life-threatening accident. He is to be commended
resulting in the aircraft being quarantined and for his outstanding professionalism, alertness, and
the mission being flown by another aircraft. dedication. ◆

FOR PROFESSIONALISM
CORPORAL DON SANTIAGO

CORPORAL ANDREW WELDON
As the proper measuring equip-

ment for checking the tolerances
had not been provided to the
squadron, a visual check of move-
ment between the support plate
and swash plate was carried out.
Suspecting that something was
wrong during his visual check,
Corporal Santiago with the help
of Corporal Weldon, checked
their findings against other air-
craft on the squadron. Convinced
that they had found the problem
in the swashplate assembly, they
informed their supervisor of
their suspicions.
The Bell Helicopter technical
representative was called and
determined that the helicopter
was, indeed, unserviceable. A
local special investigation (SI)
revealed that an additional eleven
of fifteen aircraft on the squadron
were unserviceable for the same
reason. 408 Squadron has since
On 16 April 2002, Corporal Santiago and Corporal acquired a flexible cable dial indicator, which
Weldon of 408 Tactical Helicopter Squadron were allows for the measurement of this tolerance.
tasked to investigate a snag on Griffon #455. The
Through experience, attention to detail, and
helicopter had been written up for stiffness in the
professionalism, Corporal Santiago and Corporal
collective. Normal trouble-shooting procedures
Weldon were able to visually determine that the
were followed and, during hydraulic functional
collective stiffness had actually been caused by
tests, a “clunking”-type noise was noticed from
abnormally high wear rates of the gimbal ring.
the top of the aircraft. Further investigation con-
The wear resulted from the loosening of the
sisted of isolating the flight control actuators from
retaining screws and the movement of the gimbal
the swash plate assembly. Through this, they deter-
ring assembly bolts. Due to their expertise in trou-
mined that the noise and, perhaps the problem,
bleshooting, Corporal Santiago and Corporal
was to be found in the area of the swash plate.
Weldon have improved maintenance practices
and inspection procedures for this part of the
helicopter at the squadron level and, thus,
prevented the potential for serious flight
safety incidents relating to this issue. ◆

FOR PROFESSIONALISM
MASTER CORPORAL GEORGE ABBOTT

CORPORAL TONY EAGLES
On 26 August 2002, while replacing a cracked

rib in the vertical stabilizer section of Griffon
CH-146493, Master Corporal Abbott and Corporal
Eagles noticed that tension was applied to the rib
on installation in the vertical stabilizer structure.
Intrigued by this condition, further investigation
revealed that the row of rivets on the aircraft skin
was misaligned, causing the rib to twist and was
likely the cause of the failure of the initial rib.
Inspection of remaining squadron assets revealed
that all helicopters had the same manufacturing
flaw, meaning that the same row of rivets was mis-
aligned. Director Aerospace Equipment Program
Management (Transport & Helicopters) (DAEPM
(TH)) was advised and approved the skin repair
proposed by Master Corporal Abbott and Corporal
Eagles. DAEPM (TH) drafted a complete list of all
materials and manpower requirements for use.
Through their dedication and professionalism,
Master Corporal Abbott and Corporal Eagles were
able to investigate and develop a repair plan that
will relieve undue stress to the vertical stabilizer.
Their exemplary technical skills will reduce operat-
ing costs and enhance the operational capability
of the Griffon fleet. ◆
CORPORAL LEROY WARD
Corporal Ward is a 14 Air Maintenance Squadron

aircraft structure (ACS) technician. On the morning
th
of April 9 , 2002, while attached to the 413
Squadron periodic maintenance team, Corporal
Ward was working in the vicinity of #14 hangar.
As Labrador #303 taxied from the start-up spot on
the ramp for its rotor blade tracking functional
test flight, Corporal Ward noticed a grounding
cable swinging freely from its sponson. Fearing
that the aircraft would depart with this potentially
hazardous situation, Corporal Ward quickly notified
the maintenance crew of the problem. The main-
tenance crew contacted Operations, who quickly
relayed the message to the aircrew.
The helicopter stopped and the flight engineer
removed the cable, rectifying the situation. There
is no doubt that Corporal Ward’s quick thinking,
coupled with his positive action, prevented a
possible catastrophic failure. ◆

FOR PROFESSIONALISM
MASTER CORPORAL MIKE NEILSON
(125,500 lbs), the tail section measured thirty-four

feet and five inches from the floor. So as to provide
further details, he also measured the height of
another Aurora with normal operating equipment
and a fuel load of only 28,000 pounds. This was
also slightly over thirty-four feet from the floor.
Master Corporal Neilson was concerned that, when
applying brakes to stop during aircraft towing, the
aircraft bounces slightly and, depending on the
AUW, the tail could come in contact with the
beam. In addition, restrictions would have to be
imposed to common aircraft maintenance activities
such as jacking or weight and balance checks.
Master Corporal Neilson initiated a hazard report
to cover all safety aspects and to prevent the con-
tractor from proceeding with the installation of
On 18 April 2002, Master Corporal Neilson reported similar systems in Bay #7 and #9 before an investi-
to the Maintenance Control Office (MCO) that the gation was carried out and the situation clarified.
recently installed Fall Arrestor System beam in Bay Master Corporal Neilson’s exceptional attention
#6, appeared to be too low for an aircraft to be to details and immediate actions most certainly
towed in safely. The beam was suspended right prevented potential ground accidents, personnel
above the centreline of the aircraft parking spot injuries, or major damages to equipment.
and, once in position, the aircraft would have Furthermore, he prevented similar installations,
travelled approximately ten feet along the beam. thus eliminating extended safety hazards. As
Using a Sky Jack to measure the distances between such, he saved both time and dollars to the CF
the height of the beam compared to the height of and to the contractor, who was able to modify
an Aurora tail section, he discovered that the beam the remaining arrestor systems prior to start.
was suspended at thirty-five feet from the floor Master Corporal Neilson is to be commended
surface. At the all-up weight (AUW) of the Aurora for his diligence and keen sense of awareness. ◆
CORPORAL NORM HARPER
revealed that the clamps holding the two

hydraulic lines were installed backwards.
Although hindered by high noise level and
extreme heat, he discovered a 6-millimeter chafe
in a hydraulic manifold steel line. The hydraulic
line feeds the #1 hydraulic heat exchanger and,
had this wear gone undetected and the line had
ruptured, the #1 hydraulic system would have
drained. The subsequent lack of hydraulic fluid
would have certainly caused a catastrophic
hydraulic system failure and, potentially,
a disastrous in-flight emergency.
Corporal Harper’s diligence in the difficult condi-
While performing a before flight (“B”) systems tions and his commendable extra effort undoubt-
check on an Aurora aircraft, Corporal Harper edly averted an aircraft incident and contributed
noted an abnormality in the routing of a braided to our ongoing safe mission accomplishment.
hydraulic line. He immediately lowered himself into Without a doubt, the perseverance and expertise
the hydraulic service centre in an effort to detect demonstrated by Corporal Harper prevented a
the source of the problem. Further investigation potential disaster. ◆

FOR PROFESSIONALISM
SERGEANT JACK NEWBERY
In July 2001, Sergeant Newbery was conducting a

pre-flight check on Hercules #305 in preparation
for a post-periodic inspection test flight. While
conducting his walk-around, Sergeant Newbery
noticed a foreign object (FOD) between the left
elevator and the elevator trim tab. Closer inspec-
tion showed the item to be a castellated nut rest-
ing between the inboard edge of the left elevator
trim tab and the elevator itself. This extremely small,
yet very dangerous, object could easily, and under-
standably, have been overlooked until it caused
the elevator to jam. Only a very professional and
discerning eye could have noticed this item.
Sergeant Newbery’s meticulous attention to detail
in the performance of his duties is commendable.
His diligence and thoroughness clearly prevented
a possible jamming of the elevator during the test
flight, which could have resulted in the loss of a
Hercules aircraft and its crew. ◆
MASTER CORPORAL LEE RIVET

CORPORAL JOHN BURKE
Rivet to do a ground crank of the

engine, so he could confirm that the line
was not merely leaking under pressure.
While cranking the engine, both techni-
cians noticed an unusual sound coming
from the engine area. Initially thinking
that they had a starter problem, further
investigation revealed metal filings on
the magnetic chip detector for the
wheelcase assembly. The aircraft was
declared unserviceable and an engine
change was carried out. Due to the
nature of the problem, the noise could
only be heard during a ground crank
and would not have been heard during
a normal engine start-up.
In the event the wheelcase assembly
failed, it would have led to the loss
On 03 June 2002, while performing a before-flight of several pressurized systems that are driven by
(“B”) check on T-Bird aircraft #610, Corporal Burke it. A loss of those systems would have presented a
noticed that the main hydraulic pressure quick dis- serious in-flight emergency. The excellent initiative
connect was leaking fluid. The normal fix for this of Corporal Burke and Master Corporal Rivet to go
problem is to simply tighten the line until the static the extra step to confirm the fix for the hydraulic
leak is stopped. Not content with this procedure, leak avoided the potential for an in-flight failure
Corporal Burke elected to ask Master Corporal of the wheelcase assembly. ◆

GOOD SHOW
CORPORAL KEVIN DUNBAR
On 10 July 2001, Corporal Dunbar was tasked

to conduct the cargo compartment area periodic
inspection on Hercules #323. While removing a
miscellaneous safety systems equipment card prior
to commencing the cargo compartment inspection,
Corporal Dunbar noticed what he thought was an
abnormality in the appearance of the overhead FS
880 bulkhead.
To ensure the bulkhead’s integrity, he carried
out a more detailed manual inspection, where
he found that the bulkhead flexed excessively.
Determined to find the cause of this abnormality,
Corporal Dunbar removed the insulation blankets
and discovered a fractured aircraft rib and former.
Normally, during this type of inspection, the insula-
tion blankets in this area are not removed. He
immediately took action to cordon off the area,
preventing any further damage to the Hercules
by any unnecessary structural loading.
Corporal Dunbar then alerted his supervisor to
the situation and to the possible flight safety
implications. This damage, if undetected, could have
resulted in a failure of the airframe’s tail section
during flight. Due to Corporal Dunbar’s insistence,
8 Air Maintenance Squadron carried out an imme-
diate local survey. This inspection revealed other
aircraft with similar cracks and structural damage.
Corporal Dunbar displayed outstanding motivation
and attention to detail and should be commended
for his diligence and initiative while maintaining
flight safety as an integral aspect of his daily duties.
His experience and personal motivation, while
conducting a routine inspection, permitted him
to recognize and deal with a potential fleet-wide
aircraft structural problem. His perseverance in
this situation may well have averted an incident
or accident with its subsequent loss of resources. ◆

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SPRING 2003

From Simulator to Reality

1 ...................................................Expect It When You Least Expect it!!

11.................................................................The Power of a Bad Attitude Printer

Flight Comment, no 2, 2003 1

2 Flight Comment, no 2, 2003

Press Your Transmit Switch.

Flight Comment, no 2, 2003 3

4 Flight Comment, no 2, 2003

Flight Comment, no 2, 2003 5

6 Flight Comment, no 2, 2003

Flight Comment, no 2, 2003 7

8 Flight Comment, no 2, 2003

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SEPARATION aircraft. I called my intentions and

10 Flight Comment, no 2, 2003

Flight Comment, no 2, 2003 13

14 Flight Comment, no 2, 2003

The F THE through this period and leave us

FLY THE PLAN Colonel Harder

Safety BRIEF PRIOR TO

Flight Comment, no 2, 2003 15

16 Flight Comment, no 2, 2003

Flight Comment, no 2, 2003 17

18 Flight Comment, no 2, 2003

The lesson I learned was that I

Tool board in photo is NOT the one used by NFTC

Flight Comment, no 2, 2003 19

snags came from one of the

20 Flight Comment, no 2, 2003

Flight Comment, no 2, 2003 21

22 Flight Comment, no 2, 2003

Flight Comment, no 2, 2003 23

TYPE: Sea King CH12401

they contacted the flight deck and parts of the

24 Flight Comment, no 2, 2003

Flight Comment, no 2, 2003 25

26 Flight Comment, no 2, 2003

• INITIATE & MONITOR • advise originator

Flight Comment, no 2, 2003 27

CORPORAL B.J. DIXON

After flying most of the night on a Search and

CORPORAL SYLVAIN GARCEAU

While carrying out a daily inspection on Hornet

28 Flight Comment, no 2, 2003

CORPORAL STEVE LAWTON

In October 2001, Corporal Lawton was tasked to

CORPORAL DONALD MARTIN

As Corporal Martin and his supervisors continued

Flight Comment, no 2, 2003 29

CORPORAL DON SANTIAGO

As the proper measuring equip-

30 Flight Comment, no 2, 2003

MASTER CORPORAL GEORGE ABBOTT

On 26 August 2002, while replacing a cracked

CORPORAL LEROY WARD

Corporal Ward is a 14 Air Maintenance Squadron

Flight Comment, no 2, 2003 31