2003 3 Eng

SUMMER 2003
IN THIS ISSUE:
▼▼▼
How Well Do You Know Your Crew?

Try Not to Fry
Better Safe Than Sorry
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 ........................................................................................For the Birds?

2....................................................How Well Do You Know Your Crew?
4 ............................................................................A Long Day of Flying Directorate of Flight Safety
Director of Flight Safety
Col R.E.K. Harder
6........................................................................................Try Not to Fry
Editor
Capt T.C. Newman
8..................................................................................Eject! Eject! Eject!
Art Direction
DGPA–Creative Services
10............................................................Air Force Flight Safety Training
Translation
11 .............................................What Would You Do?…ever been there? Coordinator
Official Languages
12 ..............................................................................Maintainer’s Corner Printer

Beauregard Printers
A Lesson NOT Learned: Ottawa, Ontario
A Disaster Waiting to Happen
The Canadian Forces
14...................................Perishable Skill — Currency is Not Proficiency Flight Safety Magazine
Flight Comment is produced 4 times a
year by the Directorate of Flight Safety.
16 ......................................A Simple Slap on the Tank Wasn’t Sufficient! The contents do not necessarily reflect
official policy and unless otherwise
17 .............................................................When You Read…Do You See? stated should not be construed as
regulations, orders or directives.
18.................................................Did You Check All Those Cotter Pins? Contributions, comments and criticism
are welcome; the promotion of flight
20 ..........................................................................Better Safe Than Sorry safety is best served by disseminating
ideas and on–the–job experience.
Send submissions to:
22........................................................................Discovering Electricity!!
ATT:
Editor, Flight Comment
24 ..............................................Did I Grow Wiser from the Experience? Directorate of Flight Safety
NDHQ/Chief of the Air Staff
26 .....................................................Won’t need ‘em — take two secs … 4210 Labelle Street
Ottawa, Ontario Canada K1A 0K2
27..................................................................................A “Wake-Up” Call Telephone: (613) 995–7495
FAX: (613) 992–5187
28.................................................................................................Épilogue E–mail: [email protected]
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Publication or its contents may not
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approval.
“To contact DFS personnel on
an URGENT Flight Safety issue, an
investigator is available 24 hours
a day by dialing 1-888 WARN DFS
(927-6337). The DFS web page at
www.airforce.dnd.ca/dfs offers
other points of contact in the
DFS organization or write to
[email protected].”
ISSN 0015–3702
A–JS–000–006/JP–000
For the
Birds?
were all on, and I remember think-
ing that the herons couldn’t miss
seeing us.
Call it complacency, or expectancy,
but these two birds just kept filling
up the windscreen. Now I was
caught. There was no longer any
t was another gray day in the for other traffic and for birds. It’s a time to maneuver. I couldn’t make
I spring on the west coast. — lower
mainland, Langley airport, specifi-
good idea to note where the birds
are; our little planes don’t take too
any aggressive moves with a glider
in tow without seriously compro-
cally. I flew L-19 tow aircraft for the kindly to bird strikes. mising the glider pilot and passen-
Regional Cadet Air Operations — ger’s safety. Fortunately, the herons
About midway through the morning, did see our little formation at the
Lower Mainland Air Cadet Gliding
I was at about 500 feet and begin- last second, and they did what birds
Program, and we were about to
ning a climbing right turn with a normally do when they see trouble
embark on another day of familiar-
glider in tow, when I noticed two in the air — they dove for the
ization flying. The gliders were
herons slightly above and crossing ground. The rest of the flight was
untied and the daily inspections
in front of me about a quarter of a uneventful, and the day’s operation
(DI’s) were done. The gliders were
mile away. I continued the climbing carried on.
pushed out to the field while I did
turn and thought that they’d see
the DI’s on the Birddog, and taxied I didn’t even report the incident;
our two airplanes and move away.
out for the launch. nothing happened, so there was
After all, our airplanes were bigger
Away we went; the first series of than they were, and one of them nothing to report, right? Hindsight
launches went well and I began to was very noisy, too. I was also using being what it is, I now know that I
settle into the routine of towing, all the lights on the airplane as per should have said something to the
releasing, descending, approaching, Standard Operating Procedures flight commander, or whoever was
and landing at nine to ten-minute (SOP’s). My navigation lights, pulse the flight safety officer that day.
intervals. It was busy but there was lights, strobe lights, and beacon Someone could learn from my
always time to look out the window experience…or would they just say
that it was “for the birds?” ◆
Lieutenant Kerry
Flight Comment, no 3, 2003 1

How Well Do You
KNOW YOURhe highlight of my career was provided proper remedial training. arduous conditions; and I thought
T the time I spent as a Tactical
Helicopter (Tac Hel) Flight
In order to periodically verify the
standard within the flight, I preferred
they knew me. This particularly
applied to one person that had
Commander. The flying was excel- to fly with all members, however, a arrived in my flight at the same
lent and the people I worked with shortage of experienced pilots often time I did. Over two years, he had
were very professional, although forced me to concentrate on the become an excellent pilot and a
some required prodding now and weaker first officers, depending responsible, professional officer.
then. However, I soon discovered on the more competent aircrew Indeed, he was one of the many
that it is not necessarily the people to cultivate their own abilities members of my unit that I depended
that you think require attention without my immediate supervision. on to carry out his tasks with mini-
that will eventually surprise you. Occasionally, one would have diffi- mal supervision and guaranteed
culty with an Instrument Rating good results. Indeed, he did not dis-
When I introduced myself to my
Test (IRT) or a check-ride, but these appoint me for the entire month we
new flight, I laid out the ground
problems were usually quickly recti- had been deployed to CFB Gagetown
rules for performance. I had high
fied and the embarrassment was to support both 438 and 430
expectations and was particularly
sufficient to provide the impetus Squadrons on a field exercise.
attentive for the need to abide by
to seek a higher personal standard. I was proud of how we had
regulations and flight discipline.
performed during the exercise.
Some, I’m sure, felt I was rather After some time, I developed con-
pedantic, as I had little tolerance siderable confidence in my subordi-
for pilots that did not strive to fly nates. I had seen many mature
to the best of their abilities or were while they progressed from second
ignorant of orders governing air pilot to aircraft captain. I had come
operations. If I noted deficiencies, to know many of them quite well
I personally took an interest in the over time, having served together
individual, ensuring that the most on various deployments under very
qualified member of the flight
2 Flight Comment, no 3, 2003

CREW
It had been a very long four weeks
and we were all tired of living in the
field. Everyone continued to perform
well, but it was evident that it was
time to leave and all were anxious.
Assuming that there was no way
anyone would ever dream of break-
ing the rule prohibiting an overflight
of the camp, I directed departure
preparations with the normal brief-
ings and flight planning, concen-
trating on salient details. We were
to leave in sections in order to avoid
?
was approaching fast and low. I
turned just in time to see it fly over
the camp and turn sharply on the
departure path. I knew who it was.
How could he do this potentially
dangerous and very unsafe act,
knowing how I felt about flying
by the rules?
At first you could have knocked my
eyes off with a stick, however, my
shock soon turned to anger. Yet,
my anger was easily subordinated
by the rage of the 430 Squadron
flypast since the exercise was now
over, not thinking that it was a
serious breach of flight discipline.
Needless to say, my discipline was
swift and effective.
The individual in question never
did get a last flight before taking
his release as part of the Canadian
Forces reduction plan (FRP). It had
been his farewell flight, albeit some-
what premature. It just goes to show
that some things may be worth
repeating, even if you don’t think
congesting some of the smaller Commanding Officer (CO). He was them necessary. Maybe your people
airports where we would have to absolutely livid and was certain that don’t know you as well as you think
stop for fuel. As the first section this undisciplined act was a direct they do and it is likely you don’t
departed and the second began to result of my supervisory skills, or know them any better. They just
start their aircraft, it seemed to be lack thereof. I soon departed, still might surprise you! ◆
turning out to be a beautiful day affected by the incident. I was dis- Major Vogan
for flying. The wind was calm and appointed in the pilot’s behaviour
the sun was shining. It was almost and the CO’s opinion of me. When
tranquil until I heard the thunder- I caught up to the individual at the
ing blades of a Twin Huey. Without next stop, the individual was some-
even seeing it, I could tell unmistak- what surprised at my irritation.
ably from the sound that the aircraft He assumed it was okay to do the

A
O n November 1987, while based
out of 413 Rescue Squadron in
Summerside, Prince Edward Island,
our Buffalo crew was tasked to
respond to an air medical evacua-
tion (med-evac) to Bathurst, New
Brunswick. We were to transfer a
LONG
and the woman saved. As a crew,
we had decided to accept the task
other time. Usually during an
air med-evac, while taxiing to the
pregnant woman who was having because of the nature of the emer- terminal, I would be helping the
extreme difficulty giving birth. The gency and also because it would take team set up their equipment for the
weather at the time was rainy and too long to call in the back-up crew. arrival of the patient. This particular
cool and it was dusk. The transfer day I felt tired and, as there were lots
After landing in Summerside, we
was to Halifax, Nova Scotia and we of people to help with the set-up, I
refueled and, with the air med-evac
had an air med-evac team on board. decided to sit on the right-hand-side
team on board, we proceeded to
It was our third tasking of the day, spotter seat.
Bathurst to complete our mission.
and we had already flown approxi-
It was raining at the airport when As we were taxiing and only about
mately seven hours. Although we
we started our approach to landing 100 feet from the turn off to the
were tired from the day of taskings,
and the runway lights were on. terminal, I noticed the right-hand,
we felt because of the short transit
The landing was smooth due to the landing-gear wheels were right on
time to Bathurst, Halifax, and then
wet runway and the taxi to the main the edge of the taxiway. When the
back home (approximately two
terminal seemed as normal as any aircraft just started its turn into
hours), that the task would be quick
the terminal, the pilot had turned

DAYof Flying
a little early and the right-hand
wheels rolled off the taxiway and
were lined up to hit the blue taxiway
would have caused not only the
delay of the med-evac, but also
major damage to the landing gear.
lights that indicate the turn-off to
The day was saved and the med-
the terminal.
evac was carried out successfully.
Immediately, on the intercom, I gave Enroute to Summerside, the crew
the command “stop, stop, stop” discussed the importance of team-
and the pilot jumped on the brakes, work and the importance of being
sending whoever was standing up alert after a long day of flying. I
to the floor of the aircraft. With made it a point from that time on
“not happy voices” coming across to always be aware, both in the air
the intercom, they soon calmed and on the ground, for any possible
down after realizing that the aircraft incidents that could happen. ◆
came to stop only inches away from RESCUE
running over the light stand, which P.H. Fleming

Try Not
to
T
Fry
hose of you who have been in
the Air Force for a while will
know that, every so often, aviators
experience a metamorphosis,
which I call “The Changing of the
Flight Suit.” Since the halcyon days
of the 50,000-strong air force
(yes Martha, we really were that
followed by 2700 tactical heli-
copter two-piece flight suits and
12,000 interim flight jackets last
summer. The FR winter flight
softeners contain paraffin, a flam-
mable substance that adheres to
the material. There’s not much
sense in wearing a FR suit coated
with a flammable substance!
Now you know that our new
suits won’t burn. That’s the good
news, but there’s a catch. Your
tender little body, clad only in
a FR flight suit, can still sustain
substantial second and third
degree burns in a flash fire. Why?
In a word, insulation. Canadians
understand insulation when it
comes to houses, parkas, and
other means of preventing heat
transference. The same principles
apply to protecting ourselves
big once!) we have slipped the suits (two-piece) were tested in
from the extremely high tempera-
surly bonds of earth clad in flying Cold Lake before Christmas and
tures of a flash fire. While it may
togs that morphed from dull gray we expect to receive 9000 sets in
not burn, the flight suit will still
to dark blue to dark green, to tan, November 2003. Until we have
transfer lots of heat through the
and to blue-gray. Finally, after sufficient quantities of the new
material to the body. Insulation,
spending time in such interesting garments to equip all aircrew,
in the form of a second layer, is
neighborhoods as Rwanda, Iraq, they are being issued under the
thus essential to the minimization
Aviano, and the Balkans, many of control of 1 Canadian Air Division
of burn injuries. This has been
us realized what the tactical heli- Headquarters. Thereafter, they
proven conclusively in burn
copter folks had known all along; will be available for general issue.
trials conducted both by DND
pretty blue suits with flashy gold
Many of us have never worn at the University of Alberta
accoutrements just don’t cut it out
Aramid, so this may be an oppor- and by DuPont, using their
there. Toned down flight suits,
tune time to replace the inevitable fully instrumented mannequin
while less than totally cool at air
rumours and flight line legends (Thermo-Man®) to measure heat
shows and at the bar, are just the
with some facts about the capa- transferrance. In the illustrations
ticket on operations. Now, we’re
bilities and limitations of these below, kindly provided by DuPont,
shedding our skins again, to
cool (and costly) new duds. the mannequin was clad in the
emerge from the hangar, anew,
Aramid is the generic name for a standard USAF 4.3 ounce Nomex
clad in toned down sage green.
type of FR fiber known to many flight suit (model 27/P) and sub-
This time, however, more than the
of us by the DuPont trademark jected to a three-second flash fire.
colour has changed; our new suits
“Nomex.®” Aramid does not In the first test, the mannequin
are made of flame resistant (FR)
melt or drip and forms a tough was clad only in the FR flight suit.
Aramid. We’ve gained significant
char when exposed to flame In the second test, the mannequin
operational capability, but at quite
or high temperatures. Being was wearing a second layer,
a cost; the price of our flight suits
inherently flame resistant, its FR consisting of short-sleeve T-shirt
has risen by 130 percent!
capabilities are not affected by and briefs. Note the burns on
We received our first shipment laundering. The flight suits can the lower arms and legs. In the
of approximately 9700 summer be machine-washed using house- third test, a second layer of long
flight suits (one-piece) last spring, hold detergents, but fabric soft- underwear was used.
with more on the way. This was eners should be avoided. Fabric

THERMO-MAN® TEST RESULTS FOR
CANADIAN AF PROTOTYPE SYSTEMS
SYSTEM PRED. BURN INJURY ESTIMATED

Weights in oz/yd2 2ND D 3RD D TOTAL % SURVIVAL
4.3 Nomex® + Lt. Wt. Long Und. 18% 11% 29% 94
5.5 Nomex®IIIA + Lt. Wt. Long Und. 9% 9% 18% 97
5.5 Nomex®IIIA + Hv. Wt. Long Und. 1% 7% 8% 99
Nomex® Rainwear + Lt. Wt. Long Und. 1% 7% 8% 99
Nomex®IIIA Fleece + Lt. Wt. Long Und. 1% 7% 8% 99
Photo 1 Nomex® Rainwear + Fleece + Sht. Und. 0% 7% 7% 99
* Thermo-Man® Single Test results, 1X HML, 2 cal/cm2s, 4 second Exposure

Source of Estimated Survival: American Burn Association 1991-1993 Study
PERFORM WHEN THE HEAT’S ON

Burn table
head (helmet, visor, oxygen mask) DuPont Thermo-Man® thermal

will add protection and increase protection system is based on
the chances of survival, but the ASTM Standard F 1930-99 which
numbers are still significant. applies to flame resistant cloth-
ing. These conditions may not by
Photo 2 Depending on what we fly and
typical of the conditions encoun-
what the temperature is, many
tered in actual situations. The
of us may already be partially or
results of these tests are only
fully covered by a second layer in
predictions of body burn injury
the form of flights jacket, anti-G
under these specific laboratory
trousers, or survival vests, not to
conditions. These results do not
mention the standard issue cot-
duplicate or represent garment or
ton long underwear. But when it
fabric performance under actual
gets hot and dusty, we tend to
flash fire conditions. The user is
shed layers; indeed, our flying
solely responsible for any inter-
orders direct local commanders
pretations of the test data pro-
to “promulgate an order on the
vided by DuPont, and included in
wearing of dual clothing layers,
this material, and for all conclu-
with due consideration for heat
Photo 3 sions and implications made con-
stress.” This way we can mitigate
cerning the relationship between
the risk of heat stress when it
Because the mannequin is bare mannequin test data and real life
outweighs the risk of burn injury.
headed, test results always include burn injury protection. SINCE
burns to the head. The following Aircrew are trained to use initia- CONDITIONS OF USE ARE
table shows that a person clad in tive and, those of us who use it OUTSIDE DUPONT’S CONTROL,
the new summer flight suit and wisely, tend to go far. Chances DUPONT MAKES NO WAR-
lightweight long underwear will are then, that some of us make RANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
sustain burns on 18 percent of the personal decisions to chuck the OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
body, including the head, and long johns sooner than autho- USE AND ASSUMES NO LIABILITY
will have an estimated chance of rized, when the mercury starts IN CONNECTION WITH ANY USE
survival of 97%. Depriving the legs to rise. Hopefully, this article will OF THIS INFORMATION. This data
and arms of second layer protection sensitize all aircrew to the risks is not intended for use in adver-
(photo 2 above) will lower the we take when we make these tising, promotion, publication or
chances of survival to 80%. personal choices. Fly safe! any other commercial use. ◆
Of course, anything worn on the

Eject!
Eject!
Eject!
problems. In some instances, on
W hen a pilot utters these
words and pulls the
handle on the ejection seat,
Star seat ejection systems.
An escape systems specialist
team was formed, headed by
ejection, the combination of
certain “all-up weights” (AUWs)
the escape systems better work the project officer, Captain and low centres of gravity
properly. These systems are the Charles Matthewson. (CofG), pitched the seat slightly
last resort life-saving measure forward, inhibiting seat/person
In June 1999, AETE was assigned
for aircrew and must be reliable. separation. The last thing a
to clear the 28-foot circular
As the flight test authority for pilot wants when ejecting from
parachute on the CT-114 Tutor
the Canadian Forces, Aerospace an aircraft is the added worry
and the CT-133 Silver Star. The
Engineering Test Establishment that the seat might collide with
CT-114 passed all tests; the CT-
(AETE) was tasked to address the parachute or worse, with
133 did not. The team at AETE
deficiencies associated with the him or her. What was needed
discovered a potential hazard —
CT-114 Tutor and CT-133 Silver was for the seat to “aft tumble,”
major seat/person separation

as the slight rotation spins the ejection envelope. In order to • Technology demonstration and
seat away from the pilot, like test the ARAD from ground level risk reduction testing:
what happens when snow flies to simulate the low-altitude, low-
A prototype ARAD was
off the treads of a car tire. speed ejection, a test vehicle was installed on the ejection seat
needed. And what a vehicle it and was fired one time from
The team tried to modify the
was — a jet black standard 1998 “Black Thunder” and four
variables of the test (AUW and
Dodge 3500 Series Chassis Cab times from the air in the
CofG) but after two failures,
Model truck powered by an 8L, modified CT-133.
they were faced with the fact
10 cylinder gas engine capable
that the plane ejection system • Basic certification:
of speeds of up to 175 kph, aptly
on the CT-133 was unsafe,
named “Black Thunder.” It has a During this next phase,
which led to the grounding of
protective cage enclosing the cab the team needed to have a
the fleet on 8 Oct 99. To find a
in case of direct hit from the ejec- minimum of eight consecutive
solution, the team went to the
tion seat after firing. The rear of successful tests. This included
Aerospace Equipment Research
the cage also serves as protection two ground-based ejections
Organization (AERO) to test
for the passengers in case of a from “Black Thunder” for
the AERO rigid arm drogue the low-speed testing and six
rollover. All of the test equipment
(ARAD) — a telescoping airborne shots at various AUW
(generators, cameras, strobes,
aluminium and CofG offsets. Both the
radio, fire extinguishers and
other test components) including 24-ft and 28-ft flat circular
the ejection seat and the “dummy” parachutes were used at this
were mounted on an 8-by-10 foot test stage. An additional two
flat deck located behind the cab. test points were conducted
to address CofG concerns
An even bigger challenge was as directed by Director of
to create a test bed for in-flight Airworthiness.
arm with a drogue chute ejection seat testing. The team
The CT-133 testing occurred
attached to it. During an modified a CT-133 aircraft. They
without incident resulting in the
ejection sequence, the ARAD removed the rear seat and all
approval of the ARAD installation
extends and the drogue chute rear cockpit controls from the
on all T-Bird ejection seats by the
deploys, increasing the drag 2-seater, low-wing monoplane
Director of Technical Airworthiness.
on the seat, which allows for and installed a test ejection seat.
Aerospace and Telecommunications
seat/person separation. This Among many of the changes
Engineering Support Squadron
equipment now had to go made to the aircraft, a stainless
(ATESS) in Trenton made installa-
through various stages of quali- steel blast shield was put in to
tion kits, under contract with
fication testing on the ground protect the rear cock-
AERO, with the ARAD installation
and in the air. pit from heat
on all the ejection seats performed
and reduce
The CT-133 seat had a 0/60 at the Squadrons operating the
the chances
(0 altitude and 60 knots of speed) aircraft. The grounding of the
of gases and
fleet was lifted on 26 Jul 2000.
smoke waft-
ing to the AETE is currently involved in a
forward program to test the installation of
cockpit. They the ARAD on the CT114 Tutor and
also removed improve the seat/person separa-
the rear cockpit tion to make the escape systems
plexiglas so there safer. This world-class facility, in
would be an unob- testing the operation of the ejec-
structed path for tion seat and making significant
the ejection seat improvements on safety and relia-
to clear the aircraft. bility standards, has improved the
Extensive testing seat-person separation and greatly
on the ARAD began reduced the risk of serious injury
in Dec 99 and was following an ejection. ◆
done in a phased Ray Carter
approach. Project Escape Systems Specialist

AIR FORCE FLIGHT
SAFETY TRAINING
www.airforce.dnd.ca/orgdocs/hq_fs_e.htm
the BFSC has made human promotion and education tech-
factors in decision making the niques, and program develop-
heart of the program. Human ment are some of the topics
factors and their consequences taught; additionally, skill sets
form an essential part in under- for effective utilization of the
standing “why” a course of computer based FS Information
action was chosen in a particu- System (FSIS) are developed.
lar situation; moreover it is one The main cadre of instructors
M any members have heard
of the flight safety (FS)
course, which is conducted by
of the more dynamic and inter-
esting portions of the syllabus.
are from the 1 CAD FS team,
however, numerous subject
These tools provide the unit matter experts are brought
the 1 CAD FS Team. The course
flight safety professional the in from across the country to
is a seven-day, interactive ses-
ability to conduct effective instruct on a variety of topics.
sion that is designed to develop
flight safety incident investiga-
essential skill sets to form and For those selected for Wing FS
tions, make the assignment
run a unit safety management HQ staff flight safety positions,
of meaningful cause factors
program. This article will pro- the AFSC is offered each
thereby improving our ability
vide you a brief overview of the September. If the candidate
to introduce more effective
Basic Flight Safety Course (BFSC), has not had the BFSC within
preventative measures.
which arguably is one of the the past three years, the entire
most effective safety manage- The BFSC is offered five times a course must be taken with the
ment courses available, be it year with one advanced serial AFSC modules as the content
military or civilian. (AFSC) in September. BFSC can- and scope has changed signifi-
didates are selected by their cantly. The advanced course
The flight safety system as
Commanding Officers (CO’s) reinforces many of the topics
we know it today, was created
to fill the FS NCM or FS Officer on the BFSC as well as covering
in the mid-60s by Group
positions on their unit. The can- additional topics such as medical,
Commander “Dutch” Schultz.
didates must be operationally media and accident investigation.
The BFSC was in response to the
capable and have supervisory There are also a series of case
rapidly increasing aircraft acci-
experience, for it is their skill studies and emergency response
dent rate of the time and was
sets that enhance the effective- analysis.
part of many initiatives that
ness of executing the CO’s flight
now form the core of our flight For those interested in taking
safety program. The course is
safety program. For many years the BFSC, contact your unit FS
seven days in length and is held
the course was only for aircrew representative and indicate
at CFSSAT, 17 Wing Winnipeg.
officers; however, as we have you are interested in joining the
The schedule is ‘packed’ and
evolved the ‘team concept,’ Flight Safety Team. If selected
provides the candidates a host
today’s course is 50% NCMs by your unit CO, names are
of topics essential for a safety
and 50% officers, which is ideal forwarded to the WFSO who
management program. This
from our perspective. will in turn prioritize candi-
was best typified in a recent
The FS system has evolved quite dates. The flight safety role
comment of the course critique
a bit since its early days in the is a tremendous leadership
“Okay I am not thirsty now,
60’s; however there remains opportunity and allows individ-
you can turn off the fire hose!”
once constant, that being to uals to directly enhance mission
In addition to human factors
provide specialist advice to accomplishment. ◆
training, risk management,
enhance operational effective- incident investigation and report- Captain Green
ness. Over the past few years, ing, cause factor assignment, 1CAD FS TRG

WHAT WOULD YOU DO?
…ever been WE’RE
VFR !!!
there?
t was supposed to be one of those
I really great trips we get only once
every blue moon. I was a junior
that New York
Approach certainly
wouldn’t appreciate a
co-pilot on an air show trip from
little old Canadian
Shearwater, Nova Scotia to Langley
helicopter requesting
Air Force Base in Virginia. The
an airborne IFR flight
weather in Shearwater was lovely,
plan, right while they were
but we were heading into a develop-
busy vectoring no less than thirty
ing low on the eastern seaboard
airliners through the cloud. At
with, as usual, several associated
about 3000-feet, while in cloud,
fronts. We stopped in Hartford-
radar contacted us and queried our
Brainerd, Connecticut for fuel before tell the tale. Even as a new crewmem-
current meteorological conditions.
continuing our flight over JFK, ber who is unfamiliar with local
“We’re VFR,” responded the AC.
LaGuardia, Newark, and various operating procedures, we all know
Again, radar queried, “Talon XX,
other busy international airports. the CFP-100, and there are no
confirm you’re VFR?” to which the
Squadron standard operating proce-
Hartford was reporting ceilings less reply came again, “that’s affirmative,
dures (SOP’s) which permit us to
than 1000-feet with visibility three we’re VFR.” To my protests, we con-
break its rules! If you feel your air-
miles in heavy rain showers. We tinued to fly VFR, in IMC conditions,
craft is in jeopardy, or you or your
waited for the “1000/3” call from over the busiest airspace on the east-
crewmembers’ lives are being put in
the tower before we pulled into the ern seaboard of North America,
harms way without due cause, there
hover in our Sea King. About five relying only on the premise that
are many options available to you.
minutes southwest of the airport, New York Radar would vector us
I tried several, but to my regret I
we encountered 400-500-foot ceilings around all the IFR traffic in the area!
didn’t try all of them. You should:
in climbing terrain, poor visibility,
Nearing 6300 feet, New York Radar • Speak up, voice your concerns!
and rain. The decision was made
called us with traffic information,
by our Aircraft Commander (AC) • Turn the aircraft around, and fly
“Talon XX, you’ve got a Mooney back into a safe flight regime!
to climb into the cloud to ensure
heading your way at 6300 feet, oppo-
ground clearance. We considered • Tell your AC why you’re not com-
site direction, three miles. Confirm fortable with what is happening,
turning around, flying out to the
visual?” “Looking,” came the reply. and why you don’t want to be a
coast where we could descend, or
“Looking at what?” I thought, part of it!
simply flying the contours, but, not
“All I can see is white!” At 6500 feet, • If all else fails, report the incident
wanting to be late for the Air Show
45 minutes after entering IMC con- to a higher authority!
Party, we elected to press on.
ditions, we broke out of cloud, only • Regardless of the outcome,
When we entered cloud, I began to see, seconds later, a bright red, write a Flight Safety — share
preparations for contacting New single-engine Mooney roar below your lessons learned so that all
York Approach Control to file an the cockpit. The crew figured that may benefit!
airborne IFR flight plan. To my we were less than 1/2 mile from the What would you do? ◆
protest, I was told by the AC not Mooney, with vertical clearance
Captain Leonard
to file IFR, as we would simply of less than 200 feet.
rely on VFR flight-following from
That trip has taught me many
New York Radar to maintain aircraft
things, and thankfully, I’ve lived to
separation. The AC’s reasoning was

MAINTAINER’S CORNER
A LESSON NOT LEARNED:
A DISASTER WAITING TO HAPPEN
The work of maintainers has many inherent dangers. Tasks such as starting or parking
aircraft, refuelling operations and towing can be dangerous if we do not follow basic
safety procedures. Towing at night can be particularly deadly, if we are not careful.
W hat incited me to write

this article was an incident
that happened in February
shocked and I could not help
wondering HOW THE HECK
COULD THIS HAPPEN? Haven’t
The message in the
we learned anything from that
caution is that the
2003. As the story goes, it was
a dark night, and a van was towing accident — a fatal acci- aircraft under tow
proceeding along a taxiway. dent? I know that preventive has to be visible,
The van driver saw a tow vehicle measures had been implemented
following the mishap; I clearly
no matter from
approaching and moved to the
right. Unfortunately, the tow remember that when we towed which direction
vehicle appeared to be moving at night we had to have strobe another vehicle
in the same direction. The driver lights attached to the wingtips
and the tail hook of the aircraft.
may approach it.
of the van sensed something
was wrong, swerved to the left That way, vehicles coming from
to avoid the vehicle, passed the any directions could see that
tow vehicle and saw that an something was being towed On a well-lit ramp, this step may
aircraft was being towed. The behind the mule. So, what not be necessary because the
driver of the van did not know happened to those measures? aircraft will be visible. But when
until that moment that there To tell you the truth, I have no the aircraft has to be moved to
was an aircraft behind the tow answers. They may have been poorly lit or dark parts of the
vehicle. The incident report did only local operating procedures. airfield, precautions have to be
not say but I bet that the van Nevertheless, I looked in the taken to protect other drivers.
driver’s heart must have skipped CFTOs to find out what the Of course, this demands some
a beat or two when he or she proper towing procedures are, kind of preparations before the
realized how close to the and what I found was pretty tow job is started, such as the
aircraft the van had came. interesting. lighting conditions of the route
to be taken and serviceability of
When I read this incident, my The basic reference for towing
the floodlights on the towing
own heart skipped a few beats, of aircraft is in the C-05-005-
vehicle and of the flashlights
and I was taken back 14 years: it P06/AM-001. A caution after
carried by personnel.
was October 1989, and a friend paragraph 7.g in Part 2 says:
died that night. That was a “… the aircraft extremities shall As mentioned above, the air-
terrible accident, one we all be made visible from the front craft has to be visible at night,
wish will never repeat itself. and rear.” This can be accom- and that responsibility falls on
However, the incident of last plished by using “… floodlights the tow crew chief. However,
February (2003) was almost from the towing and following other drivers have their share
identical to the accident of ’89, vehicles, or may be indicated by of responsibilities when driving
except nobody died. So, when I flashlights of safety personnel.” around an airfield.
saw this latest incident I was

• Always assume that an I just hope that by reading this the accident of October 1989,
incoming mule is towing article, people will be reminded the night a friend died.
an aircraft. of the danger of towing at We were supposed to have
• Slow down so you have time night and will take the neces- learned from that. ◆
to get out of the way before sary precautions to avoid colli-
Sergeant Anne Gale
the tow vehicle reaches you. sions. Look at the pictures of DFS 2-5-2-2
• Drive on the far right of the
paved surface.

“Perishable”
“
P
Skill
— Currency is Not Proficiency
erishable Skills.” We have all
heard the phrase, “That’s a
had significant recent experi-
ence in NVG flight. The hostile
The aviators involved in this
accident were NVG current.
They met the ATM standards
perishable skill,” but what does conditions overcame their skills.
it really mean? I have heard it They became disoriented during required to conduct the mission.
for almost twenty years and a takeoff and crashed, destroy- However, neither crewmember
always thought of my golf ing the aircraft. Fortunately, had flown more than three
swing as my most “perishable everyone on board will fully hours of NVG flight in a single
skill.” But a recent accident recover from their injuries. month for over seven months.
investigated by the Safety We have all seen this in our
We are all aware of “NVG cur- units at one time or another.
Center brought the phrase
rency” requirements as stated Other mission requirements,
back to mind in a much more
in the Aircrew Training Manual administrative obstacles, or
appropriate way.
(ATM) for each aircraft. Instructor flight time restrictions have put
This UH-60L accident serves as pilots and unit commanders nearly everyone in this position
a prime example of how perish- constantly monitor aviators to at some time. Most often, we
able some skills really are. It ensure that everyone remains manage to get the mission
involved a crew that no one current by flying at least one accomplished when called on.
ever expected to have an acci- hour every forty-five days under The problems arise when an
dent. The instructor pilot had goggles. As long as we maintain aviator who is just maintaining
over 8000 hours of rotary-wing that standard, we can report currency is placed in conditions
experience; the pilot was young combat-ready goggle crews to with which he is unfamiliar and
but highly thought of, and all the chain of command every that require real proficiency
the crew members had flown month. However, in the back of rather than currency.
together many times in the our minds, we all know that one
past. Both aviators were quali- flight every forty-five days does In this case, we put these aviators
fied and current for the night not maintain the proficiency in a dusty, windy environment,
vision goggle (NVG) environ- necessary to execute the tough with low illumination, with little
mental training mission. The missions we may be called upon recent experience under NVGs,
problem? Neither crewmember to complete. This mission is a and all these things added up to
perfect example.

DFS Note:
We include this recent
article from the US Army
Is your NVG not because of the NVG
proficiency lesson, but
proficiency more because that lesson applies
to almost any kind of pro-
functional than this ficiency. I’ve been using
the words: “currency is
outdated helmet?? not equal to proficiency”
(because I heard them from
you, the people of our
Air Force whom I admire
so much) in the annual DFS
briefings for some time
now, but understanding
the concept doesn’t make
a situation primed for an acci- force us to maintain NVG cur- it eliminate the problem.
dent. The cumulative effect of rency rather than proficiency, What can you do to ensure
the risks associated with this we must be aware that those insufficient proficiency
mission exceeded the capability aviators are not ready to proceed does not turn into an acci-
of the crew, and a major directly into harsh environments. dent in your part of the
accident was the result. Commanders must transition Air Force? You can identify
through the crawl, walk, run those tasks or sequences
If any one of the conditions —
scenario. NVG currency is the for which, in your profes-
low recent experience, dust,
crawl. NVGs in adverse condi- sional and valuable opin-
winds, or low illumination —
tions, such as the desert or ion, proficiency is not what
had not been present, perhaps
other severe environments, it should be to conduct
the accident would not have
are Olympic events. We can’t them safely. You can think
occurred. If the aircrew had
expect aircrews to go straight and brainstorm ways you
more recent experience, they
from one to the other. ◆ could improve that profi-
would have been better able
to deal with the harsh environ- LTC W.R. McInnis, Chief, ciency or reduce the risks
ment. If the illumination had Aviation Systems and Accident associated with the tasks,
been better, their low recent Investigation Division, and you could ensure your
experience might not have been U.S. Army Safety Center, leaders know about your
a factor. If the conditions had DSN 558-9552 (334-255-9552), concern and collaborate
not been as dusty, perhaps the william.mcinnis@safetycenter. with them in reducing the
crew would not have become army.mil risk. To get you thinking,
disoriented. If, if, if... read the article…
Reprinted with kind permission of
The key lesson to be learned is “Flightfax” magazine, edition Colonel Harder
that there are perishable skills. February 2003. Director of Flight Safety
Night vision goggle flight is one
of the most perishable skills in
our business. When circumstances

A Simple Slap on the Tank
Wasn’t Sufficient!
was an air weapons system (AWS) installation of a rocket launcher. The procedure required us to
I technician, fresh from my training
in Borden, and I had been at Cold
The job was to be completed by two
very experienced corporals and me.
physically open the fuel tank and
use a flashlight to confirm the tank
Lake for just two weeks. Naturally, I was directed to take up my posi- was empty, prior to removing it.
I was very excited about starting tion, as I had on other occasions, Obviously, this very important step
my new career in the Air Force at the tail of the fuel tank with my was omitted. Instead of using the
and I was especially excited about butt on the floor and my knees proper method, we used a simple
working on fighter aircraft. At 419 propped up underneath the stabi- slap on the tank to determine its
Squadron, passionately known as lizer fin. One of the corporals took contents. This incorrect practice
the “Moose” Squadron, I was work- up position at the front and the was used to save a little time.
ing on the night shift, carrying other prepared to remove the safety Hindsight being what it is, the
out reconfiguration changes. pin and unlock the rack, allowing mistakes are easy to identify. We let
Reconfigurations were very com- us to lower the tank. When the rack a hectic pace and poor judgement
mon on the CF-5 as the student was unlocked, the front of the tank allow us to omit a very important
pilots transitioned through various crashed to the hangar floor and I step in the process. Unfortunately,
phases of their training. was left supporting the weight of a this created a very dangerous situa-
full centre-line fuel tank. I was tion. The fuel tank sustained dam-
Most of the work had been com-
quickly helped from under the fuel age at the front end, but we were
pleted, but we had one more job
tank and, luckily, everybody escaped fortunate to escape without injury
to do. It involved the removal of a
without injury. to personnel. ◆
centreline fuel tank, followed by the
Sergeant Coombs

?
When You Read
Do You See
P rior to autumn 1999, I was
employed as an Avionics
CB panel had damaged insulation
and exposed conductors, however,
these entries before
and after every flight,
Technician on a First Line Repair no strands were broken. The poten- and not “see” them?
Crew at 8AMS Trenton. I have tial for dire consequences had
I feel that the answer to that question
always taken pride in the attention existed for over 600 flying hours.
lies in one word — Discipline.
I paid every job I was given, but
During my Integral Systems TQ3, I Checking the log set had become so
the following incident causes
was taught that broken strands are routine for me (and I am guessing
me to question how observant
not permissible on wire gauges #12 everyone else as well) that I failed to
I have been.
to #22 installed on CF aircraft. The thoroughly pay attention to what I
During AUP update, an aircraft Aircraft Wiring Procedures in C-17- was reading. These entries were not
technician employed by the con- 010-002/ME-001 further articulates worded ambiguously. In fact, they
tractor created two entries into this. Furthermore, the importance were very explicit. The statement of
the CF336 Aircraft Minor Defect of examining the log set before broken strands should have clued
Record on aircraft #334. The first doing a job was stressed repeatedly me in, and would have, if my checks
entry stated that wires to a cannon during all aspects of my trades were more than cursory. Personal
plug had broken strands and training. With that in mind, it is discipline should be applied to all
required resoldering. The second inconceivable to me that an aircraft aspects of the job, not just the
entry stated that the pilots forward could accumulate that many flying hands-on. This incident drove
circuit breaker panel had damaged hours without anyone questioning home this point to me. I can guar-
wires. The type of damage was not these entries. How could anyone, antee my checks of the log set will
stated. The repairs were deferred myself included, continue to read be more than perfunctory from
and this unit carried out the aircraft now on. ◆
acceptance check. The aircraft flew
close to 180 hours without rectifica-
tion. A supplementary check was THE LOG BOOKS
carried out and again these snags
were not rectified. A further 421
LOOK OK
flying hours were accumulated until TO ME…
a technician examining the log set
before Periodic Inspection noticed
the defect.
Inspection of the cannon plug
found six wires with broken
strands. One wire was so badly
damaged that attempts to read the
labeling on the wire caused it to
break completely. A second wire
also broke during the inspection.
Wires affected were part of the NLG
Position Indication System, Ground
Collision Avoidance System, IFF
Transponder, and Emergency Brake
Pressure circuits. Wires behind the
Did You
I
Check
t was a Monday morning in late
June, the day after a three-day
The Boeing went to dump fuel and
to try to shake loose the hung-up
nacelle. The pilot brought the
Boeing right down the middle
All
air show weekend, and all of the gear in the air. Departure times of the runway to a halt.
visiting aircraft were preparing to were rapidly moved up in an
I was part of the crew that assisted
depart. There was one lone Boeing attempt to get all the visiting
in the investigation and recovery of
707 in the circuit doing some aircraft airborne before the Boeing
the Boeing off the runway. Since
training…as if things weren’t busy would possibly tie up the runway
there was a heavy training schedule
enough! Looking up at the great for hours. After all the departures,
for the next day, removal of the
white sacred cow, it seemed that the pilot made several failed
plane became a priority. It was hot
something just wasn’t right. As it attempts to shake the gear loose
and humid and the work was gruel-
flew past the tower, I saw that only using the runway, and finally
ing, and every attempt to raise the
the nose-wheel gear and the left brought the Boeing in on the
right wing initially failed. The huge
main-gear were down. Shortly after smoothest landing I had ever seen.
cable on the crane snapped; we ate
reporting the news back to the sec- First, the left main-gear touched
chalk as the airbags burst like bal-
tion, a two-bell emergency sounded the concrete, followed by the
loons; we stumbled chasing their
and things just got busier. nose-wheel and then the #3 and #4

Those Cotter Pins?
compressors as they vibrated across • one nice big sledgehammer thereof, on a 3/16 bolt on the up-
the runway. Finally, with persever- (for above-mentioned 6 x 6); lock link that caused the up-lock to
ance and a combination of the • a couple of chains; and, fail that day, hanging up the right-
remaining airbags, the crane, and a • the assistance of one firefighter hand main gear. The bolt and the
couple of strategically placed jacks with the Jaws of Life. castellated nut were found without
(which required field-level modifi- a mark on one of the gear doors,
How, you ask? I’ll leave that to your
cations as pieces fell off) we man- while gaining access to lower the
imagination and, all I’ll say is, it
aged to raise the wing high enough gear. It’s surprising how that small
seemed like a good idea at the
to lower the gear. The following list cotter pin could bear such huge
time!?! It worked and the gear was
is the ingredients required to lower consequences. Since that day,
down and locked quickly. There
one hung-up Boeing main gear: I always ask myself (and everyone
were probably a series of events that
• one temporary, well-placed jack; I work with!) “did you check all
led up to what happened, but what
those cotter pins?” ◆
• cargo straps (various lengths); stuck in my mind the most was that
• one 6 x 6 piece of lumber, it was a small cotter pin, or lack Master Corporal Rosche
wedged under main wheel;

Better
SafeSorry
A bout ten years ago, I was working
as a new air weapons controller
(AWC) on my first tour in the
North Bay underground complex.
We were known as “Sidecar control.”
Than
performance fighter aircraft to track

It was a midnight shift and most
without being detected, whereas the
of the CF-18 flying operations had
slower speed, high manoeuvrability,
ended for the day. It looked like
and extended endurance of the
another night destined for simula-
Aurora make it a platform of choice
tor training when, from the radio
for such air operations. Although
console, we heard “Sidecar, Sidecar,
not officially tasked in this capacity,
this is XPLR; request a mode-4
the Aurora can lend assistance if
check.” It only took a simple switch
called upon.
action to perform the electronic
identification test that revealed That night, nothing out of the
that the transponder system on the ordinary transpired. When early
outbound Aurora was functioning morning came, the eastbound
properly. I replied “XPLR, mode-4 transatlantic airline traffic was begin-
sweet; have a good flight.” Their ning to trickle into Canadian airspace.
flight plan indicated that they Not long after, a westbound track
would be conducting an over-water without any apparent transponder
sovereignty patrol for the next seven code appeared just outside the Air
hours. Tracking them by radar Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ),
would be futile as they fly low-level east of Nova Scotia. Once an
with their transponders turned off unidentified track enters the ADIZ,
during tactical operations. the air defence control facility
(ADCF) has two minutes to identify
The Air Defence community recently
the intruder, otherwise fighter inter-
had a renewed interest in the capa-
ceptors would be launched to do
bilities of the Aurora as this aircraft
the job. Luckily, a positive mode-4
was ideally suited to track and
interrogation reply confirmed that
monitor drug smuggling aircraft.
it was an inbound, friendly, military
Such aircraft are typically classified
aircraft. In fact, this was XPLR
as small, slow-moving, single or
returning from its sovereignty
twin-engine models that try to pen-
patrol at 15,000 feet. Being starved
etrate North American Air Defence
for some live action, instead of
(NORAD) airspace. The drug
some simulated traffic, I radioed
smuggler’s flight profiles make
the crew to ask if they would be
them a difficult target for high

interested in performing a few between the designated flight and course and turn at the precise time
intercepts on targets of opportunity. the other aircraft. Additionally, a into the target’s rear quarter to
Being motivated in their new role, continuous mode-C read-out, adopt a shadow/monitor position.
they accepted. which confirms altitude, is required. To my surprise, XPLR took an
Looking for a suitable target, I took inordinate amount of time to
In Canada, “scramble, intercept, control of the Aurora and turned it descend to the directed altitude of
and recovery” (SIR) control regula- towards a civilian commuter aircraft 11,000 feet. Being determined to
tions are quite liberal and apply tracking northeast at 16,000 feet, keep things safe, I quickly repeated
to practically all types of airspace, according to his mode-C. The directed the instructions and asked the pilot
provided that a minimum of ten mission was a “stern intercept” to expedite the descent. Both aircraft
miles horizontal or 5,000 feet where the Aurora would offset its were now converging towards each
vertical separation is maintained
other with less than 5,000 feet of
vertical separation and only fifteen
miles of lateral separation between
them. Not taking any chances on
breaking our SIR agreement, I gave
the Aurora a hard turn (snap) to
the southwest in a last ditch attempt
to maintain separation. The two
aircraft came within eleven miles of
each other with 5,000 feet of verti-
cal separation and no violation of
airspace occurred. I was technically
safe on both accounts but my heart
was racing like I was running the
100-metre race. Needless to say, the
final roll-out to complete the inter-
cept was less than textbook geome-
try. After this run was complete, the
Aurora aircrew humbly requested to
return to their base, citing that they
had had a long night. I cordially
complied and thanked them for the
training opportunity they had given
me, hoping that I hadn’t muddied
the waters for the future.
Since then, I have figured out
how to make the experience more
rewarding for both the controller
and the aircrew. I no longer expect
fighter performance from a non-
fighter aircraft and crew. I also
allow for more lead and set-up time
prior to an intercept, particularly
under last minute circumstances.
After all, it is better to be safe and
to not break the SIR agreement than
to be sorry. ◆
Captain Riffou

Discovering
Electricity
he Aurora had been sitting on and, if anything, the exhaust would The orders from Ops arrived as
T the ramp, awaiting departure
for over an hour. To continue the
give a warming effect. The next
issue would be how to get the
expected, so I left for the aircraft
with my rigger buddy to get this
mission, Operations (Ops) would envelope onboard without having airplane on its way. As briefed, I
have to issue new orders to the to shut down the engines. Easy, I went to the port wingtip and sig-
aircraft. Little did I know how this thought, just hang a plastic bag on nalled the pilot that I was ready to
night shift would prove to shape a cord down the general-purpose approach, as planned. I received the
itself into something memorable. chute. I would simply place the thumbs up signal, and off I went.
envelope in the bag and the What a genius I was!!! So, as I was
The first problem to overcome was
crewmember would pull it back up passing under the stinger, I noted
to figure out how to get the paper-
into the aircraft. After all, we did it how comfy it was in the exhaust
work into the aircraft without creat-
that way on the Argus for years. So, and how much I adored the smell of
ing any undue delays. The weather
we passed our brilliant plan on to burning JP4 fuel, but I didn’t notice
was cold and windy so I deduced
the aircrew and briefed how the the bag I was supposed to put the
that approaching the aircraft from
evolution would be handled from orders in. It must be there, I was
the 6 o’clock position would not be
start to finish. Everything was set, thinking, so when I got a bit closer,
an issue as I was heavily dressed
or so we thought! I spotted it just on the edge of the

!!
away from the chute. As planned, I cold and windy night? Well, the
pulled the bag far enough away so I Aurora was a brand new plane back
could safely pull the cord, signalling then and I elected to carry out a
its retrieval. Unfortunately, the procedure, which I assumed would
crewmember was waiting on the work. That was a Big Mistake! Since
other end so, the millisecond it then, I never approach a strange
moved, they yanked it up. You aircraft unless certain that, whatever
guessed, it, BAAAM! Again! the task, I’m content that what I’m
chute. OK, they don’t want it flap-
doing doesn’t hold any surprises
ping in the prop wash; that was a In disgust, I headed back away from
in store.
smart idea. Too bad I wasn’t as the Aurora and returned inside.
smart!! I removed one mitten and What happened? In short, the Aurora While some might say that Ben Franklin
reached for the bag. BAAAM!! Six likes to keep the grounding straps couldn’t have been thinking too clearly
inches from the chute, I got hit with off the ground when the inboard when he flew his kite into that thunder-
a jolt at the left hand. OK! I was fine engines are running, leaving the storm, he was by no means the only
and I just wanted to get the job aircraft looking for somewhere to one to discover electricity in the most
done. I stuffed the orders in the bag, ground. The Argus didn’t exhibit this unexpected of places. ◆
making sure I stayed at least a foot trait. So…what did I learn on that J. Samson

Did I
Grow Wiser
T hey say that when you look
back, you remember only the
angle and gusting to seventy kilome-
ters per hour. My day got slightly
climate of Northwest Europe.
Unfortunately, the conditions at the
good times. This is a story about a worse when a snap security alert time were bordering, in UK terms,
time that I clearly recall being really (Northern Ireland, etc) had me get- on the Arctic. At a temperature of
miserable. During the mid 80’s, ting soaking wet on my way to work minus one with gusts of seventy
whilst serving in the Royal Air Force when my vehicle was inspected for kilometers per hour, the wind-chill
(RAF), I was stationed at a godfor- bombs, both under the bonnet factor was minus Omygoodnessits
saken place on the tip of the west (hood) and in the boot (trunk). cold!! So, there I was, using my
coast of Wales called RAF Brawdy. When I arrived at work, it was still shoulder to clamp the torch tightly
The place was pretty remote by UK dark but the message was to get the in the crook of my neck, trying to
standards. The nearest town was aircraft airborne. A break in the shelter from the rain and carry out
sixteen kilometers away and popu- weather was expected, which would the task at the same time. Needless
lated by relatively unfriendly peo- allow at least one wave of planes to to say, I got very cold; my hands
ple. As another measure of isola- be launched. After towing, I was and feet were numb and, on the
tion, there were no single service detailed by the line controller to top basis that they couldn’t really get
women permitted to serve there and up the hydraulics on an aircraft out any colder, I carried on.
the nearest McDonald’s was 176 km on the line. I gathered my tools —
About an hour later, I was relieved
away and didn’t even have a drive torch (flashlight), snips (side cut-
from the task and the work I had
thru! The airfield was on top of a ters), spanners (wrenches), locking
managed to complete was rechecked.
cliff, overlooking the Irish Sea. wire pliers (wire locking pliers), ris-
I’m not even sure how far I had
If you stood at the end of the run- bridger gun (version of a PON) and
gotten with the task. When I went
way and projected a line, the next other items I needed and went out
back inside and reported to the line
landmass that you hit was in the to the aircraft. The weather by this
controller, he immediately recognized
Caribbean. Consequently the time seemed to have gotten worse
that I was in the early to middle
weather, and especially the wind, but, bundled up in the RAF version
stages of hypothermia. After a
used to roll in with nothing to stop of foul weather clothing, I reasoned
change of clothing, a warm-up as
it. The place was renowned for that the simple task I was about to
close to a radiator as I could get, a
horizontal rain pushed by extreme undertake should not take more
good brew (cup of tea), and a quick
winds. Wind speeds of over one than twenty to thirty minutes.
check by the medics, I was told that
hundred kilometers per hour were
Now, it must be said that the foul I was going to be alright and to be
not unusual and I have seen sea fog
weather clothing issued at that time more careful in the future. The
roll in at almost fifty kilometers
was not the best and the general wind-chill had got me, but what
per hour. To work outside, even
issue of Gore-Tex was still twelve really caught me out was the fact
on a relatively normal day, required
months away. The nylon stuff we that I had been wet in the first
a jacket, bobble hat (toque),
had was optimistically termed as place. My clothes had already
and gloves.
weatherproof, not waterproof,
This particular day had started out and was designed for the temperate
badly; the temperature was -1°C
with a mixture of rain and sleet that
was coming in at a forty-five degree

from the Experience?
started out wet from the security I could have asked for help. I knew that something was not quite right.
check, the weatherproof clothing let what I was doing, or thought I did What I have since realized, and
the rain in like a floodgate, and my and, in the final analysis, how good what he already knew, was that the
body heat was just taken away by a job did I do? people we work with are our most
the wind. I have never been that important asset and, without them
Nevertheless, the lesson I learned
cold, either before or since, and it is and without looking after them, it
the most was taken from the atti-
definitely not an experience that doesn’t matter how simple or com-
tude of the line controller and it
I would care to repeat. plex the task is, it won’t get done.
is an approach that I have tried to
However, did I grow wiser from live up to ever since. Even though As for being really miserable? The
the experience? In the words of his job was extremely busy that experience of getting really cold was
songwriter Shel Silverstien, “Yes, morning, (forty guys and a flying bad enough but the really, really mis-
my dear, I grew wiser in many ways, schedule to look after), he still took erable part was when I was thawing
but the thing I learned most was…” the time to look after his men. out. Good grief, never again! ◆
Well, I learned several things that Somehow, in the hubbub, he had Greg Hallsworth
day. I learned that it doesn’t matter noticed that I hadn’t returned at
where you are in the world, you can around the expected time, so he
be caught out by the weather. We’ve sent someone to find me because
all been briefed about being “winter he suspected something was wrong.
wise” or, for that matter, “sun wise”, He knew my capabilities and me
but how much notice do we actually well enough for that “sixth sense”
take. The expected weather window to kick in and give him the message
never did materialize so, now, I
never implicitly trust a weatherman.
Another thing I learned was that I
didn’t have to do the job on my own.

Won’t need ‘em HEY YOU,
COME
WITH ME!!!
— take
— was in the cockpit,
working the gear
2 secs …
attention back in paragraph three.
Sure enough the whole thing
handle. Everything worked as advertised for several
seemed right, cycles. I figured we wouldn’t have
except I thought it odd to do too many more …
that we would not be I heard “Up,” and reached for the
making use of the nifty handle, as I had done half a dozen
headsets that were sitting times already. But this time some-
on the shelf for just this thing in the Corporal’s tone sounded
purpose. (“Won’t need odd; so I craned my head around
‘em — take two secs …”) and down to take a look. He was
Headset communica- still deep in the wheel well, making
tions seemed reason- his adjustment. He hadn’t shouted
able, what with one of two “Up!” or even shouted anything at
ttending the recent annual DFS
A briefing inspired me to relate
an event here that happened to me
techs being buried inside a wheel
well for the job, but I was as green
as a wet clump of broccoli, and got
all. What I had heard was the crew a
few spots down shouting instruc-
tions to each other. The noise from
more than a decade ago, on my first about as much respect. the running jet about a hundred
operational posting. Why am I feet away had completely destroyed
It was business as usual in the
making noises now, and not ten my ability to localize sounds.
hangar that day — in other words,
years ago? It could be because, as an
it was noisy. A few spots down, I almost killed that guy! I told him
apprentice technician, not only did I
another crew was scrambling all this afterward — being shocked and
not know what was going on around
over their jet, doing some sort of stunned that only chance hesitation
me, but also I failed to grasp even
check. Just outside, another Tutor had kept me from crushing this tech
the scope of that unfamiliarity.
was being run through a start. — and he shrugged. The incident
Today — given a greater familiarity
with the nature of Flight Safety — The Corporal got himself set up didn’t mean a thing to him. Life
the time just seems right. quickly, and disappeared into the goes on.
port wheel well. He hadn’t briefed In hindsight we pretty much
I was at the unit basically since cof-
me on very much, but the gist of engaged in every violation we’ve got
fee-break — the only thing wetter
the job was that he would make an a rule against. That incident has
than the space behind my ears was
adjustment deep in the wheel well, stayed close to my scalp since then,
the ink on my TQ3 (apprenticeship)
climb out, have me cycle the gear, fuelling a better-than-average inter-
qualifications, and everyone knew
and then make another adjustment. est in Flight Safety. Nowadays, for
it, most of all me.
We devised a clever method for better or for worse, I refuse to be
Assigned (“Hey you, come with determining when he wanted me rushed, and insist on being informed.
me!”) to a Corporal Airframe Tech to cycle the gear — if he shouted It’s the least someone in my position
to help with some gear retractions “Up!” that was my cue. can do. ◆
on a jacked Tutor, my place — as
If you don’t know where this is Cpl Marcel Gassner
resident Instrument Electrical Tech
heading by now, you weren’t paying

A
“Wake-Up”
Call
y years as an airframe techni- error in judgement. Luckily, it
M cian, a term now replaced by
“aviation technician with a strong
was never anything poten-
tially life-threatening or never
rigger background,” saw me working anything that could possibly
on everything from Hornets to cause injury. It was certainly
T-Birds to Hercules to Challengers. nothing that would warrant a
Somehow, as I moved from place flight safety incident report.
to place, I managed to retain a Nonetheless, I was making
reputation as a “good” technician. mistakes that I wouldn’t have
Normally, having your peers envision previously. Was I getting lazy?
you as an accomplished technician is Was it a case of too much work • If qualifications and authoriza-
a badge of honour. However, as the and too little time? tions (Q&A) are coming fast and
years went by, and the aircraft fleets furious, ensure that your compe-
Finally, IT happened!! An aircraft tence level for each and every job
have become a blur of unidentifiable
had a flight safety occurrence is worthy of the Q&A.
airplane parts, this moniker became
report against it and my name was • When asked “are you comfortable
difficult to maintain.
all over it. I distinctly remember the with doing this?,” let pride take
It seemed as if every time I was sickening feeling that swept over a back seat. It is a question that
introduced to a different fleet, my me as I realized what might have seems hard to answer in the
negative, but if you are not
rate of qualification and authoriza- been. I lost a lot of sleep. I tried to
comfortable, just say “NO!”
tion became quicker. Knowing this, recount the job in my head innu-
• When hearing “little voices in
in the back of my mind, I elected not merable times and to this day, for
the back of your mind,” just pay
to say anything and, if my peers and the life of me, I cannot figure out attention to them. You are not
supervisors thought that I was capa- what went wrong. Fortunately, the nuts for listening!
ble of performing the required tasks, mistake was found before anything • If you find the frequency of little
then I must have been. Don’t get me of consequence had happened. mistakes on the rise, step back
wrong; every time I received a new and take stock. Be wary, as little
This became my “wake-up” call. ones can become big ones
qualification I was asked “are you
Shortly after the incident, I sat very quickly.
comfortable with doing this?”
down and did some soul-searching
Normally, I was. Occasionally, how- Whether you are in your first year,
and tried to identify how all of this
ever, my little voice tried to intervene your last year or somewhere in
came about and what I could have
but would be obscured by another, between, technicians are charged
done to prevent it. This is my list.
not so little voice, yelling “shut up…- with ensuring our fleets remain
he’s done lots of stuff like this on • If you receive the label “good as incident free as possible. We all
other jets.” technician,” don’t let it go to
your head. Wear it well by always make mistakes but, if the little mis-
I accepted 99% of what was thrown being aware of just how easily judgements and errors are written
my way and, as personnel shortages and quickly it can turn to off to pride in ones work or just
“terrible technician.” being a “good technician” eventu-
became more and more evident,
what choice did I have? “More with • When Hornet parts and Hercules ally, IT will happen to you. ◆
parts start to look the same,
less,” after all! I continued to work step back and take some time
Master Corporal Spencer
and I’m sure that I made the odd to get perspective on what you
technical mistake and the occasional are doing.

ÉPILOGUE
Aircraft Accident Summary
TYPE: Jet Ranger CH139314

LOCATION: Southport, MB
DATE: 27 June 2002
you can reach high torque levels prior to the tail

rotor reaching sufficient effectiveness to counter
the main rotor torque. This can cause a loss of tail
rotor effectiveness and result in an uncontrolled
swing of the aircraft tail. If this were to happen
as the aircraft was touching down it could cause
the helicopter to roll over.
It is difficult to determine if a more positive
T he instructor and student were conducting a

Night 1 Lesson Plan. Following some initial circuit
work in Area North they proceeded to ‘Grabber
application of throttle would have prevented
the accident or simply aggravated the situation.
Regardless, there was insufficient rotor RPM left
Green’ autorotation landing area. The instructor at the cushion stage to safely land the aircraft.
was demonstrating a ‘500 foot’ straight ahead
autorotation to touchdown. The aircraft struck The investigation revealed that instructor profi-
the ground firmly during the termination of the ciency in night flying was not being re-evaluated
flare. The crew received minor back strain injuries. following completion of the Flight Instructor
The aircraft sustained “B” category damage. Course. This meant that instructor ability to safely
execute a night autorotation, conduct circuit train-
This was the instructor's first night auto to touching and basic aircraft handling at night was not
down during the mission. Wind conditions were re-visited unless a lapse in currency took place.
ideal with a southerly flow of 10 knots. The ground This was not a factor in this accident as the instruc-
elevation at Southport is 885 feet, but due to tem- tor had recently regained currency in night autoro-
perature and humidity, the density altitude (DA) tations during a standards check ride. DFS has
was high (2300 feet). The flare entry progressed recommended that night proficiency be included
normally but the instructor elected to terminate the in the annual category check for instructors.
flare with a more aggressive collective check due to
the high DA. Either the collective check was too At the time of the accident, students were still
aggressive for the conditions or the timing was being assessed for their ability to execute night
too early because the aircraft ended up being high autos despite the removal of night solo flights
for the level-off and cushion stage (10 feet). From from the training syllabus. In order to reduce the
10 feet it becomes more difficult to safely land the risk exposure incurred during night autos, the
aircraft. The instructor recognized his error and school has removed the night auto as an assessed
attempted to overshoot by adding throttle. Throttle manoeuvre for students. Instructors continue
application was tentative as the instructor was to execute this manoeuvre for demonstration
concerned about causing a loss of tail rotor effec- purposes. The school has added two night
tiveness. If the RRPM gets low (70% range) the tail missions to the Flight Instructors Course in
rotor speed and effectiveness become proportion- order to allow further proficiency training
ally lower as well. If throttle is applied too quickly in night autorotations. ◆

ÉPILOGUE
TYPE: CH12422
LOCATION: 150 NM South of
Honolulu, Hawaii, USA
DATE: 23 Jun 2000
A pproximately 25 minutes after launching from

HMSC PROCTEUR, a hot Main Transmission
Gearbox (MGB) was noted. As the crew returned
Crewmember in life-raft, immediately after ditching.
reducing the severity of indications from Land As

to land, cockpit indications were assessed as severe Soon As Possible to Land As Soon As Practicable.
enough to require a controlled ditching. After the
Given lack of guidance and resulting non-use of
crew successfully egressed uninjured, the aircraft
the #1 SSL procedure, the crew decided to enter
sank, suffering “A” category damage.
the hover with only Land As Soon As Possible
The investigation eliminated all possible MGB criteria in evidence. Once in the hover, significant
malfunctions as causal to this accident with the pressure fluctuations, strong welding-like metallic
exception of an over-temperature condition similar odours and radiant heat from the MGB developed.
to previous 21000 Series MGB overtemps. Only this These new indications led the crew to conclude that
inherent overtemp condition, that previously had MGB failure was imminent. Had the aircraft contin-
neither been satisfactorily explained nor caused any ued (as suggested by the Land As Soon As Possible
known damage, offered a plausible explanation of criteria in the AOI and checklist) instead of coming
the indications experienced by the crew. to the hover, the aircraft may have successfully
returned to land on the nearest flight deck.
The CF Sea King fleet has, since 1994, documented
a phenomenon of inherent overtemp in all regimes As a result of this accident, the AOI and Checklist
of operation in which MGB temperature rapidly were updated to accurately reflect the mandated
increases above the normal operating range up use of the #1 SSL procedure in instances of inherent
to and exceeding the maximum operating limit. MGB overtemp. The requirement for this procedure
Through informal trial, the “#1 SSL Procedure” was has subsequently been overcome by events with the
developed in which the #1 Speed Select Lever was introduction of the new 24000 Series MGB. It was
retarded to the ground idle position. This action further recommended that emergency procedures
was known to work with not only CF Sea Kings, but be reviewed to give aircrew specific direction with
also with USN Sea Kings despite the lack of the orig- respect to the notion of coming to the hover for
inal equipment manufacturer’s engineering data to MGB emergencies.
support the theoretical cause of internal overtemp
Other preventative measures included staff work
conditions. CF flight safety data showed that in all
to address both the experience levels and training
27 overtemp occurrences when the #1 SSL proce-
offered to HELAIRDET senior NCMs. 12 Wing also
dure was employed, it was 100% effective in not
initiated a training program to ensure that line
only arresting further MGB temperature, but also in
maintenance personnel are aware of torquing
reducing that temperature regardless of maximum
procedures in accordance with the CFTO and that
value reached. Furthermore, a significant number
the techniques are uniformly applied.
of these occurrences indicated that MGB pressure
fluctuations were evident with the overtemp indica- Finally, due to some confusion over ditching and
tions. Despite this data, the procedure remained a egress SOPs, it was recommended that the AOI
discretionary one in the Sea King AOI; it was not and Pilot Checklist be amended to give aircrew a
included for reference in the Pilot Checklist. logically flowing sequence of reactions to water
operations emergencies. It was also recommended
Analysis concluded that had the #1 SSL procedure
that current aircraft egress training be reviewed
been mandated for use in instances of MGB
to ensure that correct procedures are adequately
overtemp, it is highly probable that the high tem-
emphasized and that the hazards posed by non-
perature condition and all its associated indications
standard actions are understood by all aircrew. ◆
would have been reduced or eliminated, thus

ÉPILOGUE
TYPE: Jet Ranger CH139308

LOCATION: Southport, MB
DATE: 2 July 2002
at the 250-foot turning

auto). These facts point to
the likelihood of a decreas-
ing performance wind shear
as the aircraft descended
from circuit altitude to the
ground. Unfortunately there
is no wind recording equip-
ment at the autorotation
training area.
The accident manoeuvre
was the Instructor’s second
attempt at the 250-foot
turning auto. The Instructor
was sitting in the right seat
and flying right hand circuits.
The entry was normal, but
during the turn to final the
instructor used considerable
bank and backpressure to expedite the turn. This
T he Standards Officer was conducting a profi-
ciency check ride on one of the instructors
from the Basic Helicopter School in Southport.
bled off the airspeed to below the ‘60 knot’ ideal.
Although the requirements of the ‘100 foot’ check
The focus of the flight was to assess the instructor’s were met, the aircraft was on the low end of para-
proficiency in autorotations. The crew successfully meter acceptance (low and slow). The Instructor
completed a number of straight-ahead and 500- commenced the flare at 50-60 feet AGL. As the
foot turning autorotations, but the aircraft struck nose of the aircraft was pulled up for the flare
the ground during the landing portion of a 250- both pilots stated that the airspeed dropped off
foot turning auto. Both crew members received quickly and an excessive descent rate developed.
serious back injuries. The aircraft sustained “A” The Instructor was somewhat startled by the air-
category damage. craft reaction and did not immediately initiate the
overshoot. The Standards Officer took control at
The winds at the time of the accident were variable 30-40 feet and applied throttle and then collective
in strength and direction but within the limits (“low level save”). This did not seem to have any
indicated in School Orders. Crews operating in the effect and therefore he concentrated on getting
area reported having to add throttle to cushion the aircraft level prior to impact.
some landings and to adjust the entry point on
downwind due to strong winds aloft. The crew of It is possible that the transition out of the turn
the accident aircraft experienced problems with (low and slow) and into forward autorotation
airspeed control on some of their autorotations, may not have been “clean enough". This would
overshooting on several (both pilots’ first attempt have left less time to develop a steady forward

autorotative glide prior to flaring. With low
airspeed, the descent rate would be higher than 1 Wing
desired. At the commencement of the flare, the
rate of descent notably increased coincident with a
marked decrease in airspeed. It is perhaps at this
point that the aircraft entered a zone of decreas-
Flight Safety
Newsletter
ing performance shear. It is possible that these two
factors (glide and shear), in combination, created
conditions where the flare would be unable to
effectively reduce the rate of descent.
The investigation also examined the possibility We have included, by exception,
that Vortex Ring State (VRS) may have been a
contributory factor during the landing phase. For an insert in this issue of “Flight
this accident, the steep descent and/or the sudden Comment.” These articles reflect
increase in rotor thrust during the power recovery
attempt may have combined to create conditions several perspectives on a 1 Wing
for VRS to occur. However, the rotor must be gen- incident, which has taught us some
erating significant lift for VRS to develop fully, and
that would have occurred only after collective and lessons about some of our vulnerabili-
throttle application. These occurred too close to ties as “can do” aviators. While out of
the ground for VRS to develop sufficiently to have
had material effect. It is unlikely that fully devel- the normal “Flight Comment” format,
oped VRS was a factor in the accident however; we thought these articles excellent for
it is possible that the application of power during
the ‘low level save’ put the aircraft into the stimulating thought, discussion, and
incipient stage of VRS, thereby reducing the self-examination. My hat is off to
effectiveness of the overshoot attempt.
1 Wing for being willing to look hard
As an interim measure, the entry altitude for the
low level turning autorotation was raised from at what happened and to share the
250 feet above ground to 350 feet above ground results of that introspection with the
to allow more time for the set-up of the sequence.
DFS further recommended that: rest of us. This positive and active
a. a formal review of the policy for autorotation approach to promoting flight safety
training be conducted. The resulting policy must at all levels is a good example
ensure that pilots have the skills and knowledge
to preserve life and limb during helicopter for everyone. ◆
emergencies requiring autorotation. It should
also maximize the potential for saving the Colonel Ron Harder
aircraft in such an emergency, but only to the DFS
extent that it does not unnecessarily jeopardize
aircraft or crew in training.
b as a part of the above review, the possibility of
establishing wind variability limitations for
autorotation training be investigated.
c. the feasibility of employing wind and video
recording equipment at ‘Grabber Green’ be
investigated.
d. more emphasis be placed during Supervisory
and Proficiency Checks on low level save tech-
niques and recognizing the parameters when a
low level save/overshoot is required. ◆

GOOD SHOW
MR. ROBERT BLIZZARD

MR. BRUCE (HUTCH) HUTCHERSON
On Sunday, 22 Dec 2002, a civilian Lear jet, call sign PAR approach if the pilot was willing. The pilot
N45NP, was conducting an instrument landing accepted and Mr. Blizzard proceeded to the termi-
system (ILS) approach to runway 08 in Goose Bay, nal building to open the unit and align the PAR.
when he lost glide slope indications. As the
While on Gander frequency, N45NP advised he
terminal unit is closed on Sundays and precision
was “fuel critical.” Nine minutes (record time from
approach radar (PAR) services are only available
tower cab to terminal, let alone opening up and
with two hours prior notification, control of the
aligning the PAR) after devising the plan, Mr.
aircraft was handed off to Goose Bay tower
Blizzard coordinated transfer of control with
directly from Gander Centre. The visibility at the
Gander. The pilot advised that it was not his first
time was _ mile in blowing snow, with a vertical
PAR, but it had been awhile and he said, “We’ll
visibility of 300 feet.
take all the help you can give us.” One minute
As a result of the loss of glide slope, the pilot con- later, the pilot said “Be advised there is no ‘
ducted a missed approach and control was handed go-around’ on this one” and then declared
back to Gander Centre for another ILS approach. a fuel emergency. Thirty-eight minutes after
Once again, on the second approach, the aircraft initial contact, N45NP landed safely in Goose Bay.
lost lock on the glide slope and opted to over-
Mr. Hutcherson and Mr. Blizzard went beyond the
shoot. The tower controller, Mr. Hutcherson, in
scope of their normal duties and as a result of
conjunction with the ground controller, Mr. Blizzard,
their professionalism, quick plan and control skills,
(who happened to be PAR qualified) advised
they were able to safely recover an aircraft and
Gander that they might be able to conduct a
two people. ◆

FOR PROFESSIONALISM
CORPORAL GREG ROGERS
On 28 May 2001, Corporal Rogers, an avionics technician, was

performing a routine pre-flight check for bird nests on the search
and rescue standby Hercules aircraft. While carrying out this custom-
ary examination, he noticed what appeared to be a crack in the skin
of the rudder. Although not part of a regular bird nest inspection,
Corporal Rogers decided to further investigate. Upon inspection,
he discovered a crack of 15 mm in length in the rudder, as well
as a large dent in the skin of the aircraft. Immediately, he halted
his inspection and informed the servicing desk sergeant. Aircraft
structures technicians investigated and concurred with the seriousness
of the damage and the aircraft was declared unserviceable.
Thankfully, because of the proficiency of Corporal Rogers, this did
not result in a flight safety incident. Corporal Rogers demonstrated
superior professionalism and observation. His quick, decisive actions
ensured that a potentially disastrous flight safety hazarded was
averted and corrected. ◆
MASTER SEAMAN MARK VANDERHEYDEN
In April 2002, during a hot fuelling operation on HMCS Vancouver,

the flight deck engineer, Master Seaman (MS) Vanderheyden,
noticed that it was taking longer than usual to fuel the helicopter.
After the hot fuel was completed, he took the initiative to inspect
the fuel hose in-line filter for any evidence of blockage. He found
a severe delaminating of the inner hose lining, which was plugging
the in-line hose filter.
Realizing that two helicopters (“Renegade 440” from HMCS
Ottawa and “Slapshot 429” from HMCS Vancouver) had recently
been fuelled using the defective hose, the HMCS Vancouver’s
Air Chief recommended grounding both helicopters until the level
of contamination could be determined. “Renegade 440” was con-
taminant free, but “Slapshot 429” had evidence of small rubber
particles in the fuselage fuel filters. A flight safety message was
initiated and “Slapshot 429” had a complete fuel cell inspection
carried out by the HMCS Vancouver maintenance crew. The fuel
cell inspection revealed no contamination in the two fuel tanks.
MS Vanderheyden’s quick reaction to an abnormal fuelling rate and his fine eye to detail prevented
a severe fuel contamination problem from occurring in “Slapshot 429.” Without his diligence,
a catastrophic dual engine failure could have been the result. His prompt actions allowed two
Sea Kings to be quickly returned to flight status during the OP APOLLO deployment. ◆

FOR PROFESSIONALISM
MASTER CORPORAL DARRELL SHIELS
In August 2002, Master Corporal Shiels, while conducting a routine

corrosion control inspection on Sea King #416, discovered that the
electrical leads on the #1 engine fire bottle were connected in reverse.
This mix-up rendered the emergency extinguishing system inoperative.
It is very difficult to see the labels on the cable assembly where they
connect to the fire extinguisher system valve when the access panels
are installed. The #2 corrosion control inspection requires the area
to be accessed, however it does not call for inspection of the fire bottle.
Had this discrepancy continued to go undetected, the potential for a
serious accident was significant, as the capability to fight an in-flight
engine fire was greatly impeded.
Master Corporal Shiels’ in-depth knowledge of aircraft systems, profession-
alism, and initiative prevented the possible loss of a valuable aviation asset
and the potential for serious or fatal injury to the crew. Master Corporal
Shiels is to be commended for his outstanding professionalism, alertness
and dedication. ◆
CORPORAL BOB MCDEVITT
Corporal McDevitt was the duty radar controller

and, after receiving a briefing from the terminal
controller, made radio contact with the PA-32 pilot.
While controlling, Corporal McDevitt noticed that
the Piper aircraft had descended approximately
four hundred feet below the minimum safe alti-
tude (MSA) and immediately initiated corrective
action. As the PAR progressed, he recognized that
the pilot was experiencing difficulty maintaining
assigned headings. Corporal McDevitt suspected
that the aircraft might have a defective compass,
and briefed the Piper pilot on how to fly a
“no-compass” approach. Although the pilot
sounded quite shaken up and lacking in confi-
dence, Corporal McDevitt initiated a “no-compass”
approach to facilitate a safe transition to visual
weather conditions and to help calm the pilot.
On 19 April 2002, Halifax Air Traffic Control (ATC)
advised 12 Wing Shearwater ATC that they had a Corporal McDevitt was instrumental in alleviating
Piper Saratoga PA-32 who was experiencing diffi- what could have easily resulted in a catastrophic
culty with the instrument landing system (ILS) accident. After two unsuccessful ILS approaches
approach to Halifax International airport and had at the Halifax airport, the pilot of the PA-32 was
lost the localizer on two occasions. Halifax ATC noticeably upset and very nervous. Corporal
asked if Shearwater ATC could attempt to recover McDevitt’s calm, professional demeanor through-
the PA-32 using their precision approach radar out the whole situation influenced the pilot’s
(PAR), since the weather at the Halifax airport confidence resulting in a successful recovery at
was instrument flight rules (IFR) at the time. 12 Wing Shearwater. ◆

FOR PROFESSIONALISM
SERGEANT RUSS MUIR
During Sergeant Muir’s pre-flight inspection on a Hercules aircraft, concern

raised from a previous snag involving the electrical power distribution system
on another Hercules caused him to go beyond normal pre-flight checklist
requirements and inspect the electrical direct current (DC) transformer
rectifier unit (TRU) more closely. When he pulled the #1 essential DC TRU,
he noticed that the load on the #2 TRU dropped off line, and that when
the # 2 essential DC TRU was pulled, the #1 TRU dropped off line.
He suspected a wiring problem and alerted servicing personnel.
This error was confirmed by servicing personnel and rectified.
Sergeant Muir demonstrated the utmost vigilance when he discovered
two electrical TRUs that were incorrectly cross-wired. At the very least,
this could have lead to a confusing emergency checklist response had one
of the TRUs failed and, quite possibly, could have resulted in more serious
consequences. Sergeant Muir’s exemplary level of concern and vigilance
resulted in the discovery of a very serious hazard to flight safety that could have easily gone undetected
for some time. His actions and attention to detail on this day exemplify an outstanding commitment of
the Flight Safety program. ◆
MS. CHANTAL GAGNON
bays, although the CLT had been downloaded.

The location is very difficult to see, as the mount-
ing holes are located behind a maze of fuel and
hydraulic lines and wire bundles. This is not a
checklist item specifically identified in the turn-
around inspection procedure and this condition
was unobserved during previous inspections on
the aircraft. Ms. Gagnon immediately notified
her supervisor and raised a flight safety initial
occurrence report.
During the subsequent investigation, it was
found that only their last thread secured the
six-inch bolts. The bolts could have readily
become dislodged within the landing gear
assembly, damaging fuel and/or hydraulic lines
and electrical cables. They could also easily have
On 27 August 2002, Ms. Chantal Gagnon, a
interfered with the proper functioning of the
Bombardier Aerospace journeyman technician at
landing gear.
NATO Flying Training Centre (NFTC) Moose Jaw,
was assigned to recover CT-155205, an arriving Ms. Gagnon’s diligent performance demonstrates
NFTC Hawk aircraft. While performing the turn- her outstanding professionalism. Additionally,
around inspection, Ms. Gagnon noticed two centre her professional expertise and attention to detail,
line fuel tank (CLT) forward mounting bolts were combined with her superior flight safety work
still in their forward holes, inside the wheel well ethic likely prevented a potentially hazardous
in-flight emergency. ◆

FOR PROFESSIONALISM
CORPORAL RÉMI SIMARD
Corporal Simard is an aviation technician working in second line maintenance

(snags) at 433 Tactical Fighter Squadron. As maintenance personnel were
carrying out an inspection on Hornet #917, they noted that hydraulic line
# 74A6691068-1003 was rubbing against panel 113L. To access this line and
correct the problem, personnel were required to take off both the
hydraulic driving unit (HDU) and the remote valve.
Following the re-installation of the hydraulic line, Corporal Simard was
asked to reinstall both the previously removed HDU and the remote valve.
Attentive to the safety details of the completed work and ensuring that
nothing was missed, he carried out a detailed foreign object damage (FOD)
check and inspected the area for tidiness. Despite the fact that the work-
space was quite restrained and dark, his inspection revealed a substantial
crack on the remote control bracket. Corporal Simard’s attention to detail
led to a flight safety report.
Corporal Simard’s professionalism, alertness, and quick reaction revealed
this undetected problem, thus preventing a possible serious incident.
Without his initiative, this damaged bracket could have failed in flight,
which could have had disastrous consequences. ◆
SERGEANT STEVE TREMBLAY
Sergeant Tremblay was tasked to carry out an ordnance pre-flight

inspection on Aurora #103, prior to a maritime patrol mission. During
the inspection, the flight engineer questioned the weight limitations for
the rack and, subsequently, Sergeant Tremblay was asked to move the
stores around to rectify the problem. While moving the stores, he noticed
that the weight distribution for the MK 58 smokes did not seem right.
Upon opening the sonobuoy launch container, it was noticed that the
smokes were packed incorrectly; the smoke canister was packed next to
the explosive cartridge actuated device.
Upon further inspection by the technicians, it was found that twelve of
the thirteen smokes on the aircraft were packed incorrectly. It is the
responsibility of the AESOP to verify the load on the aircraft, however,
they are not required to physically open the canisters to check the contents. Had this gone unnoticed,
a potential existed for a fire in the pressurized sonobuoy launch tubes upon stores release.
Sergeant Tremblay’s alertness and commitment to his duties were instrumental in preventing a serious
accident. He is to be commended for his professionalism and dedication that led to this discovery. ◆

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SUMMER 2003

How Well Do You Know Your Crew?

1 ........................................................................................For the Birds?

12 ..............................................................................Maintainer’s Corner Printer

Flight Comment, no 3, 2003 1

2 Flight Comment, no 3, 2003

Flight Comment, no 3, 2003 3

4 Flight Comment, no 3, 2003

Flight Comment, no 3, 2003 5

6 Flight Comment, no 3, 2003

SYSTEM PRED. BURN INJURY ESTIMATED

Photo 1 Nomex® Rainwear + Fleece + Sht. Und. 0% 7% 7% 99

* Thermo-Man® Single Test results, 1X HML, 2 cal/cm2s, 4 second Exposure

PERFORM WHEN THE HEAT’S ON

head (helmet, visor, oxygen mask) DuPont Thermo-Man® thermal

Flight Comment, no 3, 2003 7

8 Flight Comment, no 3, 2003

Flight Comment, no 3, 2003 9

10 Flight Comment, no 3, 2003

Flight Comment, no 3, 2003 11

W hat incited me to write

12 Flight Comment, no 3, 2003

Flight Comment, no 3, 2003 13

14 Flight Comment, no 3, 2003

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16 Flight Comment, no 3, 2003

18 Flight Comment, no 3, 2003

Flight Comment, no 3, 2003 19

performance fighter aircraft to track

20 Flight Comment, no 3, 2003

Flight Comment, no 3, 2003 21

22 Flight Comment, no 3, 2003

Flight Comment, no 3, 2003 23

24 Flight Comment, no 3, 2003

Flight Comment, no 3, 2003 25

26 Flight Comment, no 3, 2003

Flight Comment, no 3, 2003 27

TYPE: Jet Ranger CH139314

you can reach high torque levels prior to the tail

T he instructor and student were conducting a

28 Flight Comment, no 3, 2003

A pproximately 25 minutes after launching from

reducing the severity of indications from Land As

Flight Comment, no 3, 2003 29

TYPE: Jet Ranger CH139308

at the 250-foot turning

30 Flight Comment, no 3, 2003

Flight Comment, no 3, 2003 31

MR. ROBERT BLIZZARD

32 Flight Comment, no 3, 2003

CORPORAL GREG ROGERS

On 28 May 2001, Corporal Rogers, an avionics technician, was

MASTER SEAMAN MARK VANDERHEYDEN

In April 2002, during a hot fuelling operation on HMCS Vancouver,

Flight Comment, no 3, 2003 33

MASTER CORPORAL DARRELL SHIELS

In August 2002, Master Corporal Shiels, while conducting a routine

CORPORAL BOB MCDEVITT