TAC Attack

lllfiY 1970

HfRf COffifS fl CORSfliR...Page 4

 JAMIE SEZ ;
He who " presses on " to comple te r out i ne
fir efficint tactiul air ,ewer
train ing , may never see com bat.

current interest
lAC ATTACK MAY 1970
TRANSIENT ALE RT AND THE A -7D Pg 4

VOL.10 NO.5 SEVER E WEATHER AVOIDANCE Pg 8

TACT ICAL AIR CONMAND

MUNITIONS FLIGHT LIMITS Pg 16

COMMANDER
GENERAL WILLIAM W. MOMYER
WHAT WILL BE . .. WILL BE Pg 22
VICE COMMANDER
LT GEN JAY T. ROBBINS
B-17 Pg 24
Publ ished by the Chief of Safety

COLONEL VIRGIL K. MERONEY YOU BET Y OUR LIFE Pg 26

CHIEF SAFETY PUBLICATIONS

LT COL CARL E. PEARSON

departments
Angle of Attack Pg 3
Pilot of Distinction Pg 11
Unit Achievement
Awards Pg 12

editor Chock Talk Pg 14

Moj Bill Richardson TAC Tips Pg20

assistant editor Crew Chief/Maintenance

Don Reynolds Man Awards Pg 29
Letters Pg 30
art editor
Stan Hardison
TAC Tally Pg 31

layout & production

T A CRP 127•1

TSgt John K. Miller Articles~ accident brie fs, and associated materia l In this maQazln e a re non·direc·
tlve in natur e . All suQQestlons a n d recommen dations are intended to reinaln within the
scope of exlstin Q directives. In f ormation used t o brief accidents and incidents does
no t iden t ify the persons, places, or units Involved and may not b e construed as In·
monog lng editor criminating under Article 31 of the Un i form Code of Military Justice. Names, d ates,
an d placeB UBed In conjunct i on with acciden t stories a r e fictitious. Air For ce units
Mari ello W. Andrews a r e encouraged to republish the material contain ed he r ein; howe ve r* cont e n ts are not
tor pu bli c release. Written permission must be obtain ed from HQ TAC be fo r e materia l
may be republished by other than Depa r tment of Defense o rganizations.
Contributions of articles, pho t os, and Items of Interest from personnel in the fie ld
printing are encouraged, as are comments and criticism. We reserve the right to edit a ll manu·
sc ripts for clarity and readability. Direct communic~tion is authorized with: The Edi-
Hq TAC F ie ld Print ing Plont to r, TAC ATTACK, HQ TAC (OS P ), Lan~otley AFB, Va. 23365 .
Distribution F"x,, Cont rolled by OSP • TAC Publications Bulletin No. 22, dated 3
June 1969 Autovon 254-2937
 angle of attack

of HTTHCK

The individual is gone ?

In my last two Angle of Attacks, as well as other parts function is still an attempt to hold down needless loss of
of this magazine, we have stressed supervision. And life and equipment while getting the job done.
findings of supervisory error as primary or contributing in Though sometimes it's hard to see, individual
many of our accidents and incidents also indicates that responsibility is still present. As our weapons systems
more and stronger responsibility is being required of the become more complicated, the degree of acceptance of
IP, supervisor, or whoever is in charge ... all the way up this responsibility by each person at his individual job is
the chain of command. the final ingredient that either makes or breaks a unit.
Some of you may feel this has gone overboard; that Nowadays, this separates the men from the boys.
you are over-supervised to the point that it takes away all Though the day to day rush may be pressing, there are
personal initiative, and eliminates the old American many means available to the individual to express or bring
ingenuity of an individual coming up with a better to the attention of others, ideas that will improve working
mousetrap. I am sure some of you may dislike the conditions, or possibly be that better mousetrap. OHRs,
approach and methods, however our results have indicated URs, EUMRs, and the Suggestion Program are a few. Bull
progress. In the flying business, these strong controls and sessions with the boss, on and off duty. during a coffee
pressures on supervisors have developed into a way of life. break, or at beer call just might break that
A•"l though it is tied directly to the old and never-ending communications gap and result in more efficiency. And
11 of controlling expenditures of the dollar, its first you might be surprised, or at least confirm something that
you suspected all the time: your supervisor, while working
hard at his job and busily looking over your shoulder
because of higher-up pressure, sometimes can't really see
the trees. The fallout just might help you, your unit, and
the Air Force. An unnecessarily compressed schedule
could be corrected, or at least the self-satisfaction of
getting the problem out in the open will help.
Full acceptance of individual responsibility is the only
key that can open the door to a smooth operation.
Supervision can go just so far. In most cases, it finally
boils down to that one person performing correctly in a
cockpit, at a desk, bending a wrench, or what have you .
It's then that he realizes that rewarding feeling of a job
well done. It's also possible that This same person can
tarnish our fine command record and become part of a
bad statistic.
In one way or another. we are all directly involved in
this safety business.

~k
VIR~~-~. MERONEY,
Chief of Safety
 but it's usually the ground crew who makes the ct"l
However , the Corsair can be serviced with ease, assL
proper respect is given to the bird's mechanical syste ...~.
and a safe distance is maintained while the engine is
operating.
Unlike some new aircraft systems, the A-70 is not
expected to require the usual period of "getting
acquainted." Many of her characteristics are already
known from her sister ships, the A-7As and Bs, which
have been in the Navy inventory for about five years.
Except for the "D" model's bigger engine and a few lesser
modifications, all are a lot al ik e.
On arrival at the parking ramp, transient alert crewmen
will note the shrill and intense sound from the Corsair's
TF-41 turbofan engine. This is no time to be without
muffs or ear plugs, which are required within 150 feet at
idle, and 500 feet at military.
The arriving pilot will probably expect the usual tire
check before engine shutdown, then he's ready for
chocks. Installing gear down locks and pins are next: the
nose lock is stowed in the cockpit step well, and main gear
lock blocks are stowed in the nose wheel well.
On signa l to the pilot that gear is locked, he will
shutdown. Here's where the alert crew has it easy. All of
transient alert and the a-7d
the emergency accumulators can be dumped (bleed-off
pressure) from one position in the right main gear w~
simply turning one valve.
The crew chief needn't worry about having a coc .. ,...,
ladder waiting, there's one built into the left side of the
bird. A screwdriver is handy to punch the flush mounted
push button latches which open the cockpit ladder well
and the two retractable steps above the ladder. The ladder
telescopes to near ground level by simply applying a I ittle
finger pressure on a retaining latch .
Mounting the steps, a crewman can assist the pilot as
usual. The pilot has already deactivated the whole ejection
system while on the taxiway by simp ly pulling down the

• ejection seat safety handle, or "head knocker" as it is

commonly ca lled at the A-70's home patch. However,
two safety pins are required in the cockpit. One secures
the emergency canopy release handle, located slightly
above and forward of the throttle; and the other secures
the seat initiator, located behind headrest on the left side.
The Air Force's newest attack fighter will soon be seen When it comes to turn-around and launch, transient
at air bases throughout the country, and especially at T AC alert really has it made. Ninety percent of all service and
installations normally used for cross-country training. maintenance can be done from ground level, there's no
When this time comes, transient alert crews will get their drag chute to be replaced, and no ground power
first chance to service the A-70 Corsair II! equipment is necessary for engine start.
Some call the Corsair the ground crewman's dream, Refueling and hydraul ic service can be accomplished
and there are many reasons why. But as in most dreams via the roomy main gear openings. And electrical,
the scene can shift, seemingly without rhyme or reason, communications, oxygen, and engine components are
ending in nightmares. The A-70 offers this possibility too, accessible through ground level panels opened easily ~

4 MAY 1970
 Getting a transient A-70 serviced and on its way
can be done with little muss or fuss. Opposite
Page: Stopping the arriving aircraft just short of
its parking spot gives ground crewman an
opportunity to make a 100-percent tire check;
then she's ready for chocks. Upper Left: Gear
downlocks are installed next. The nose gear lock
is stowed in the cockpit ladder door, and main
gear blocks (Upper Right) are stowed in nose
wheel well. After engine shutdown signal, the
cockpit ladder is telescoped down and two
retractable step wells opened. When ascending the
ladder to assist the pilot, ground crewman should
use caution. The ladder is firm and entirely
adequate but the amount of foot and handhold
space is considerably less than the usual external
ladder. Two pins to safety the seat ejection
system initiators are stowed in the cockpit. The
pilot can reach and install the one for the
emergency canopy release handle, but ground
crewman must insert the safety pin in the seat
initiator, back of the headrest left of center.

ATTACK 5
 •
push-button latches instead of the usual dzus fasteners.
Another feature, especially for ground crewmen, is
step-by-step checklists permanently mounted on the main
gear doors. The checklists cover all routine servicing
procedures including refueling, hydraulic and accumulator
pressures.
A real ground crewmen's dream! But as mentioned
earlier, a nightmare possibility exists. The big one is the
air intake. It's big, it's low, and the TF-41 turbofan engine
draws like a Texas plains tornado. The Navy has recorded
more than one accident where ground personnel became
careless. The only thing between the A-70 intake and its
whirling front engine compressor is about 20 f eet of slick
walled 'gullet,' plenty wide enough to swallow easily a
two to three-hundred pound man ..
Though the retractable cockpit steps are convenient
and sufficiently rugged , lots of handhold space, availab le
on most cockpit ladders, simply doesn't ex ist. Mount
these steps slow and easy, giving the upper steps as much a-7d

shoe sole as possible.

There is plenty of headroom under the wings, but
beware of those permanently mounted pylons. Their thin
and streamlined configuration offers severa l sharp angled
edges that can easily crease the cran ium of the unwary,
especially when working in the main gear wel l servicing
areas.
The gun purge door on the left side, below and aft of
the cockpit, will close on engine start; the hydraulic
tailhook lowers fast; and the engine starter exhaust gets
hot, so stay clear of these areas, at engine start and when
the pilot is accomplishing controls check.
When crossing under from one side of the bird to the
other, ground crewmen should pass immediately forward
or immediat ely aft of the nose wheel, or aft of the
tail hook but forward of the tailpipe.
Be sure t o check tech orders for procedure details and
the danger diagrams that show critica l distances for each
hazard area. As said before, the A-70 is a transient alert
dream; but a nightmare isn 't impossible .. . it's up to y ou!

6 MAY 1!:Jtu
'---"' big attraction in servicing the Corsair II is
safety, convenience, and accessibility to the
various systems. But hazards do exist and the
gaping intake is one of the most obvious. Its low
level combined with the high volume of air
demanded by the TF-41 turbofan creates a
suction danger area unusual in the Air Force.
Upper Left: Crossing over too near the inlet,
even at idle thrust, means FOD from personnel
pockets like the rag shown here, or it could be
safety pins with streamers, hats, small tools, or at
high thrust, the crewman. Above: Most turn
around service is done via the spacious main gear
bays, and step by step checklists for each kind of
service are permanently mounted on the main
gear doors. Left: All accumulators are serviced
from the right wheel well. Gauges for testing, and
controls for dumping are all in easy reach.
Right: Refueling manifold and ground are in the
left wheel well, including complete checklist.

ATTACK 7
 SEVERt
You've heard these pilot "war stories" in bars and
briefings: "Center vectored me into the meanest monster
within a hundred miles," or "Approach brought us down
through more ice, turbulence, and lightning than the law
allows!"
We're concerned about pilots not having seen (or
forgotten!} FAA's Advisory Circular 90-12, on Severe
Weather Avoidance. Read it carefully. It's apparent that
many pilots do not understand what air traffic controllers
can and cannot do. This Circular will recalibrate (or
refresh) their thinking. We thought of adding underli~
for emphasis in some areas, but decided against it. ~
might be tempted to read only the underlined portt ......-
severe weather avoidance
and miss the "sense" of the Circular.

1. PURPOSE . This Advisory Circular (1) warns all pilots

co ncern ing flight in the vicinity of known or forecast
severe weather such as thunderstorm activity, severe
turbulence and hail, (2) advises all pilots that air
traffic control facilities (Air Route Traffic Control
Centers, Control Towers, Approach Control facilities,
et c.) even though equ ipped with radar, might not
always have the capab ility nor be in a position to
provide assistance fo r circumn avigat ion of areas of
severe weather, and (3) recommends certa in pract ices
for air traffic controllers in assisting pilots with
respect to severe weather phenomena.

DISCUSSION. The need for exercising pruc'

I 8 MAY 19,u
 AC NO: 90 -12

WEATHER AVOIDANCE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROl

AND GENERAl OPERATIONS

judgment with regard to flight through areas of situation along his route, he shou ld request such
known or forecasted severe weather is well recognized deviation from route/altitude as far in advance as
by experienced airmen. Fl ight through severe weather possible, including information as to the extent of
activity should be avoided if possible. deviation desired. Controllers should bear in mind
that limitations of airborne radar, limited flight
Present procedu res provide for controllers ass1stmg visibility and the speed of modern aircraft may result
pilots, particularly when operating on I FR flight in pilots having only a limited amount of time in
plans, in avoiding areas of known severe weather. It is which to avoid a detected weather condition they
important, however, that all parties concerned with might wish to avoid.
aircraft flight operations be fully aware that there are,
at times, limitations to an air traffic controller's Obtaining IF R clearance to circumnavigate severe
capability to provide such assistance. There are several weather can often be accommodated more readily in
reasons for this. First, it shou ld be recognized that the the en route areas away from terminals because there
>ntroller's primary responsibility is the provision of is usually less congestion and therefore greater
fe separation between aircraft. No additional freedom of action. In terminal areas the problem is
services can be provided which will derogate more acute because of traffic density, ATC
performance of a controller's primary responsibility . coordination requirements, complex departure and
Secondly, limitations of ATC radar equipment, arrival routes, adjacent airports, etc. As a
communications congestion, other air traffic, etc., consequence, controllers are less I i kely to be able to
may also reduce the controller's capability to provide accommoda~e all requests for weather detours in a
any additional services. terminal area or be in a position to volunteer such
routes to the pilot. Nevertheless, pilots should not
To a large degree the assistance that might be hesitate to advise controllers of any observed severe
rendered by A TC wi II depend upon the weather weather and should specifically advise controllers if
information availab le to controllers or the request by they desire circumnavigation of observed weather.
pilots desiring to avoid severe weather areas. Due to
the extremely transitory nature of severe weather 3. WEATHER PHENOMENON AS OBSERVED ON
situations, information available to controllers might RADAR. It must be recognized that those weather
be of only limited value unless frequent ly up-dated by echoes observed on radar (airborne or ground) are a
pilot reports or radar weather information. direct result of significant precipitation. Radar does
not display turbulence. It is acknowledged that
In-flight reports from pilots in direct communications turbulence is generally associated with heavy areas of
with controllers giving specific information as to area precipitation; however, all radar utilized for air traffic
affected, altitudes, intensity and nature of severe control purposes is not capable of equally displaying
weather can be of considerab le value. Such reports precipitation information. Under certain conditions in
when received by controllers should be relayed to the past, the echoes received from precipitation have
other aircraft as appropriate. render!ld ATC radar unusable. To avoid such
disruption to radar service, modifications designed to
Should a pilot desire to avoid a severe weather considerably reduce precipitation clutter have been

ATTACK 9
WEATHER AVOIDANCE
added to ATC radar systems. This feature known as (2) Forward reports to A TC of any SE'
Ci rcu Jar Polarization eliminates all but the heaviest weather encountered giving nature, loca\
areas of precipitation. Consequently, all areas of route, altitude, and intensity. Pilots are also
precipitation will not appear on the controller's radar reminded to review Federal Air Regulation
scope. 91.125 pertaining to pi lot reports.

In accordance with current procedures, controllers (3) Initiate requests to avoid severe weather
will provide information concerning severe weather activity as soon as possible being specific
echoes observed on their radar when deemed concerning route and altitude desired . Pilots
advisab le and will, upon pilot request, provide vectors are reminded to review the Flight
for avoidance whenever circumstances will permit. Information Manual pertaining to "Detouring
However, for the reasons outlined above, it is Thunderstorms" and "SIGMET Procedure."
emphasized that pilots should not completely rely on
air traffic controllers to provide this service at all (4) Adjust speed as necessa ry to maintain
times, particularly in terminal areas or in holding adequate control of aircraft in turbulent air
patterns. Pilots should also recognize that the and advise A TC as soon as possible.
controller's data is often far from complete due to the
design of the radar and its location relative to the (5) Do not rely completely on air traffic
weather observed. co ntrollers to provide information or to
initiate radar vectors to aircraft for avoidance
In addition to primary surveillance radar, all Air of severe weather particularly when arriving
Route Traffic Control Centers and some terminal and departing terminals or in holding
facilities are also equipped with secondary radar patterns.
systems. These secondary systems receive only those
signals emitted by airborne radar beacon transponders (6) Plan ahead to anticipate the need for
and do not display weather echoes. Since all aircraft avoiding areas of known severe weathr ~
operating in positive control areas are required to be necessa ry , delay takeoff or I andin~
equipped with operating radar beacon transponders, applicable.
controllers hand I ing such traffic normally uti I ize only
the secondary radar system. This permits filtering out b. Controllers:
non-pertinent traffic operating below the positive
contro l areas. Although contro ll ers using on ly ( 1) Suggest uti I ization of alternate routes,
secondary radar will not observe any weather on their whenever possible, to avoid known areas of
scopes, they can, if alerted, often turn on the normal severe weather along normal or requested
radar to observe weather, provided this will not result routes.
in weather clutter rendering the scope unusabl e for
traffic control. One exception is the Great Falls (2) E xpe dit e action on r equests for
ARTC Center which, at this time, does not have this route/altitude deviation to avo id known areas
capability. of severe weather. Such requests are time
critical.
4. RECOMMENDED ACTIONS:
(3) Relay pi lot reports of severe weather or other
a. Pilots: flights as appropriate and, if necessary ,
initiate requests for additional reports to aid
(1) Avoidance of known severe weather - in anticipating requests f or detours.
Recent research has proven beyond any
doubt that all thunderstorms are potentially (4) Plan ahead when known areas of severe
dangerous and should be avoided if possible weather co nditions exist and provide pilots
or penetrated only when the pilot has no with maximum information, rendering
other choice. assistance in avoiding such areas when
requested. __.::::.....

10 MAY l::,u
 Pilot of Distinction

1 Lt Lorenzen-Schmidt

First Lieutenant Hans-Uirich Lorenzen-Schmidt, of the he was approaching decision altitude for bailout at his
418 Tactical Fighter Training Squadron, Luke Air Force airspeed and aircraft attitude, he elected to try another
Base, Arizona, has been selected as a Tactical Air quick airstart by stopcocking the throttle and
Command Pilot of Distinction. immediately returning it to military . This time the engine
Lieutenant Lorenzen-Schmidt was flying a gunnery started. After notifying his flight instructor he headed for
mission in an F-104G during his advanced fighter training . Gila Bend Auxiliary Air Field . He made a perfect landing
During his first rocket pass on the climb to downwind his using takeoff flaps, even though his aircraft had ordnance
engine flamed out at an altitude of 4000 feet AGL and an remaining and a heavy fuel load.
airspeed of 300 KIAS. He tried to restart the engine Lieutenant Lorenzen-Schmidt ' s professional
without success. Knowing he must maintain relight airmanship during a critical inflight emergency readily
airspeed he put the aircraft in a descent and tried again to qualifies him as a Tactical Air Command Pilot of
start the engine. The engine failed to respond. Realizing Distinction.

\____..:ATTACK 11
 Tactical Air Command

UNIT ACHIEVEMENT AWA

Our congratulations to the following units for completing

1 Combat Crew Training Squadron, Clinton County Air Force Base, Ohio
1 April1968 through 31 March 1969

4424 Combat Crew Training Squadron, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida
1 December 1968 through 30 November 1969

4453 Combat Crew Training Squadron, Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona
1 December 1968 through 30 November 1969

132 Tactical Fighter Group, Des Moines Municipal Airport, Iowa

1 January 1969 through 31 December 1969

132 Tactical Fighter Wing, Des Moines Municipal Airport, Iowa

1 January 1969 through 31 December 1969

4472 Combat Crew Training Squadron, Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona
1 January 1969 through 31 December 1969

4457 Combat Crew Training Squadron, Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona
1 January 1969 through 31 December 1969

313 Combat Support Group, Forbes Air Force Base, Kansas

1 January 1969 through 31 December 1969

18 Tactical Airlift Training Squadron, Dyess Air Force Base, Texas

1 January 1969 through 31 December 1969

348 Tactical Airlift Squadron, Dyess Air Force Base, Texas

1 January 1969 through 31 December 1969

302 Tactical Airlift Wing, Clinton County Air Force Base, Wilmington, Ohio
1 January 1969 through 31 December 1969

928th Tactical Airlift Group, Chicago-O'Hare International Airport, Illinois

1 January 1969 through 31 December 1969

4409 Support Squadron, Homestead Air Force Base, Florida

1 January 1969 through 31 December 1969
4406 Combat Crew Training Squadron, Hurlburt Field, Florida
1 January 1969 through 31 December 1969

12 MAY 1£1,
 12 months of accident free flying:

1 Special Operations Flight, Otis Air Force Base, Massachusetts

1 January 1969 through 31 December 1969

58 Combat Support Group, Lu~e Air Force Base, Arizona

1 January 1969 through 31 December 1969

319 Special Operations Squadron, Hurlburt Field, Florida

1 January 1969 through 31 December 1969

4407 Combat Crew Training Squadron, Hurlburt Field, Florida

1 January 1969 through 31 December 1969

4517 Combat Crew Training Squadron, Luke Air Force Base, Arizona
1 January 1969 through 31 December 1969

I Combat Crew Training Squadron, Luke Air Force Base, Arizona

January 1969 through 31 December 1969

4515 Combat Crew Training Squadron, Luke Air Force Base, Arizona
1 January 1969 through 31 December 1969

Detachment 2, 1 Special Operations Wing, Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina
17 January 1969 through 16 January 1970

USAF Demonstration Squadron "Thunderbirds," Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada

10 February 1969 through 9 February 1970

317 Tactical Airlift Wing, Lockbourne Air Force Base, Ohio

14 February 1969 through 13 February 1970

40 Tactical Airlift Squadron, Lockbourne Air Force Base, Ohio

14 February 1969 through 13 February 1970

336 Tactical Fighter Squadron, Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina
15 February 1969 through 14 February 1970

4535 Combat Crew Training Squadron, George Air Force Base, California
22 February 1969 through 21 February 1970
4430 Combat Crew Training Squadron, Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, South Carolina
1 March 1969 through 28 February 1970

'ATTACK 13
 chock talk ..incidents and incidentals

case of tlte pit an tom cotter jamm e d fligltt controls

During formation tactics training, an AC advanced After a normal taxi and takeoff, the F-100 jock
throttles to 100 percent while turning his F-40. Out of completed the briefed Sl D and rendezvoused with his
the turn, he retarded throttles, but the left engine kept flight. At fuel check, he had 2000 pounds less than the
going full bore. He pushed the left throttle through the others so he decided to stay in the local area while the
full' range once more, but no response. So, he put it in other two completed the mission.
cut-off and turned off the left engine master switch. About the time he pulled away from the flight, he
After recovery at his home base, maintenance men noted that movement of the control stick forward and aft
found a bolt and castellated nut missing, the one that was becoming difficult. He made a controllability check
connects the torque booster arm to the clevis and the and decided he could get on the ground. He started a long
throttle crossover shaft connector arm. The bolt and nut straight-in approach. With gear and flaps down, it took
were found on the engine bay door, but the required both hands to hold the nose down, and trim wouldn't
cotter pin cou ld not be found. work. He found that half flaps gave better control
The plane had flown a littl e more than four hours since that's they way he brought it in .. . no sweat.
a left engine change, and it is believed that installation of Previous to the flight, the aft section had bee"
the cotter pin was missed during engine buildup. The removed. Now, on the ground they took a good look at
second engine saved this bird .. . which almost was the control system and found that the top left slab cable
doomed for need of one correctly installed, was caught on the pulley bracket above the left forward
two-for-a-nickel cotter pin! engine mount.
A maintenance briefing followed, outlining the
importance of a controls check after any aft section
maintenance.

touglt rap
With the preflight accomplished, the F-105F crew was s ticky serv ice
.
ready to launch. After a normal start, the engine reached
60 percent RPM, then flamed out. Beg inni ng a go-around from an airborne radar
Investigation showed that two terminal ends were approach, the RF-4C pilot pushed the gear handle up. The
loose at a cannon plug between the engine shutoff switch gear responded, coming up part way. Then pulsated up
and the rear cockpit fuel contro l panel. The improperly and down while remaining in intermediate position,
crimped leads allowed intermittent movement of the main according to the wingman. The troubled jock pushed the
fuel shutoff valve. handle down and the gear checked down and locked.
The last maintenance in this area was performed 35 He called it a day and made a straight-in approach,
missions before, during a depot level TCTO compliance . stopping on the runway to have the downlocks installed.
This is a tough one for a crew chief, but he repaired the On the parking ramp maintenance men found the
circuits and fired off an EUMR, his only way of trying to problem. Corrosion between the main landing gear
prevent a similar problem at another time. actuator and downlock arm caused the arm to stick. T~

14 MAY_1!:1,.-
 with a maintenance slant.

in turn caused loss of electrical power to the landing gear Phantom emergency escape system. It was his 16th system
selector valve during gear operation. check for the day without a partner, as required by tech
A briefing followed for all maintenance personnel, order. He applied 3000 PSI in accordance with his
reference Workcard 3-17, Item 3, which calls for checklist and an initiator fired.
Iubrication of the corroded area after the last flight of the He wasn't hurt, but his pride was pretty well bent
day. because he had failed to disconnect the lines to the
initiator and install a bypass tube.
The three-striper's supervisor took the count for
requiring the technician to work without the required
fatigue trap assistance. But it undoubtedly was fatigue and repetitive
procedure that caught the airman off guard and cost him
A young airman was performing a phase check on a disqualification.

old Gooney till the chocks were pushed aside. As the

.
nice guy
poor, picked-on bird moved backward the left tie-down
rope broke, then the right tie-down attach point was
pulled out of the wing. Shortly, the C-47's right wing
All four engines of a C-130 were being run up to check scraped a parked B-57 and then came to rest against it.
out prop flux, and guess where? On the parking ramp! A This trip of about 175 yards cost us 265 man-hours -
C-47 was chocked and tied down behind the big bird, but hope the C-130 checked out okay. It would be a total loss
just for a little while. Prop blast from the Herky moved if it didn't.

'ATTACK 15
 I

munitions flight limits

 FLIGHT LIMITS
By Captain L. G. VanPelt
Test Pilot, Fighter Branch, ADTC
Eglin AFB, Florida

Ever wonder why you are restricted to 3 Gs and 400 evaluates the aircraft station capability. The mun1t1on
knots when carrying a SUU- umpty ump? Or why a structural capability is then evaluated by studying the
BLU-999 must be released at 350 knots or less but can be mass properties (CG location, moments of inertia,
carried to 500 knots? The fighter pilot is expected to physical dimensions, etc.) and determining the theoretical
abide by the flight limits in the flight manual, but rarely is loads applied during positive, negative, and rolling G
he given reasons for such limits. This article is intended to maneuvers.
provide some of the background on external store flight Using these analytical results and applying them with
limits, with the hope that such an understanding will the tempered experience of the compatibility engineer, G
improve the attack-fighter pilot's capabilities. load flight limits are proposed . Roll rate limits are also
Munition manufacturer's design their products to based on the loads analysis as rolling creates centrifugal
withstand certain stresses. However, you may be surprised loads on the aircraft/munition combination. The rolling G
to know that some mi I itary design specifications are not limit is based on the roll rate limit being maintained,
very stringent. For instance, the suspension lug and unless otherwise stated. Incidentally, the unsymmetrical G
hardback must meet specific requirements, but the case or limit (which is the same as rolling G) refers to an
~ · •nit ion body often does not. The airframe and unsymmetrical maneuver, not an ~symmetrical load. The
msion equipment (MERs, TERs, pylon racks, etc.) aero engineers refer to a rolling pullout as an
more closely regulated and the load capabilities of unsymmetrical maneuver. (The aircraft is rotating about
such equipment are known precisely. more than one axis.)
The flight limits for a particular external munition load The only specified safety factor provided in these G
on a particular station of a USAF aircraft is first limits is a yield limit 1.15timestheactualflightlimit.
analytically det e rmined by the Compatibilities However, it must be pointed out, the stresses encountered
Engineering Branch at Eglin AFB, Florida. The item is by any one particular item are based on an average item
then flight tested to the specified limits. The loads with average mass properties. The mass properties vary
analysis, often referred to by the fighter pilot as an considerably in many cases as no design specification
engineering WAG, is made to determine G limitations on exists governing mass property tolerances! (For example,
the aircraft/store combination. The engineer first the M-117 bomb with fuzes and tail fins is assumed to
weigh 823 pounds, when actually it may vary
considerably from that . Indeed, the center of gravity of
this item has been found to vary~ 1.75 inches!) Static
pull tests are often conducted to confirm load studies,
especially where a suspicion of low G tolerance is
suspected.
Once the loads analysis is completed and G limits are
determined the compatibility engineer must determine
airspeed limits. The airspeed limit analysis poses the most
difficult engineering problem. Many varied factors affect
this determination, and the most severe airspeed
associated problem is flutter. When a flutter problem is
suspected, wind tunnel studies are conducted and then
flight tests by the airframe contractor with instrumented
aircraft are conducted. The airspeed limit based on a

17
 munitions separation at any speed. However, when the needs of~
Air Force are overriding they will recommend a sir
airspeed at which separation will probably be the I&, _
)

hazardous. In these cases flight test demonstrations are

usually not conducted. It remains for the fighter jock
(who is in a bind and must jettison his load) to establish
flutter problem is definitely worthy of respect, as no jock this test point and demonstrate the validity of the
wants his pylon, store, or aircraft wing suddenly torn engineer's WAG.
loose in flight. The speed restriction with partially filled The first published flight limits (airspeed and G limits)
external fuel tanks is often based on a flutter problem. are provided by the compatibility engineer and, as has
The aerodynamic loads placed on a munition at high been mentioned, are a result of stress analyses, wind
airspeed are very difficult to determine accurately. The tunnel tests, study of munition contribution to aircraft
vibration characteristics caused by turbulent airflow stability and control, and a large sprinkling of experience.
around the item can only be roughly estimated, and However, as any test pilot will say, the careful
experience (with a similar item) is the engineer's most prediagnosis made by the engineer is sometimes not
useful tool. exactly corroborated by in-flight results (Such as, "The
These studies of aerodynamic problems result in a bloody thing hit the slab when it came off!"). Consequently
recommended limiting airspeed for carriage of the a flight test program must be conducted prior to weapon
munition on the aircraft. Frequently, however, the using certification for carriage and release.
command has requested carriage of a munition at a Evaluation of aircraft handling qualities is the primary
specific speed. This speed will be the I imiting airspeed if it objective during first flights of new weapon/aircraft
is less than the maximum safe airspeed determined by the combinations. Regardless of weapon type, be it similar to
stress analysis. other munitions or completely different in appearance,
The airspeed restrictions during release (or dispensing) the effect this store has on aircraft stability and control
of the item are then evaluated and are generally associated while attached to the aircraft must be evaluated before
with concern for safe separation. Separation distances the weapon system is completely released for operatio~
decrease when airspeed is increased, as the aerodynamic employment. This is accomplished at Eglin by flyir
force (drag) of the item becomes larger and the vertical profile designed to allow the test pilot to qualitati\
ejection force remains essentially constant. Munition evaluate the handling qualities throughout the entire
models are constructed and wind tunnel studies are made proposed flight envelope.
when a separation problem is forecast. Unfinned items Also during this initial "compatibility" flight the
naturally pose the most severe separation problem as the structural integrity of the aircraft-munition combination
item generally has no directional stability of its is demonstrated . The maximum positive, negative, and
own- sort of like an unfinned arrow. rolling G limits are attained as is the maximum airspeed
The munition center of gravity location is perhaps the and mach number. Incidentally, demonstrating the
most significant contribution to separation characteristics. negative G limit is pretty sporting, especially after a meal
If the CG is located forward of the midpoint between of root beer and chili dogs! Limits beyond those
lugs, the item tends to be ejected in a nose up att itude recommended are not demonstrated, unlike our sister
(inertia). This attitude places the munition in a positive service (the one that crashes their ai rpl anes onto large
angle of attack which often results in a pitch up tendency. boats and calls the result a landing) who demonstrate up
Obviously, this motion is not conducive to safe to airframe limit G load and 30 knots beyond the
separation. recommended I imit airspeed!
The mass, or inertia, of an item assists in safe Eglin presently requires two consecutive flights to
separation and the size, or drag, degrades safe separation. verify aircraft/munition carr iage compatibility. The
Careful consideration of all these factors leads to a munition is examined between flights but is not
recommended maximum safe release airspeed. Again, if downloaded. The intent is to attain enough airborne time
the using command has requested a specific release to simulate a combat radius plus fifty percent. As much of
airspeed which is less, it will be adhered to . this time as possible is accrued at maximum limit speed
Some items or configurations are deemed especially where vibrational characteristics predominate- the kind
hazardous during separation (such as jettison of partially of loads which cause fin separation , case cracking, arming
loaded MERs, munition and pylon together, some wire withdrawal, etc.
dispensers, etc.) and the engineers will not forecast safe Once a munition has passed its compatibility flig)

18 MAY 1!:1.-
tho carriage I imits are determined to be val ida ted.
3tion flight tests are then begun. Initial drop tests
'-...__.....--onducted at the flight regime deemed most safe by
the planning engineers in consultation with the test pilots
(we are not about to make the first drop at high speed in a
dive no matter how safe the engineer thinks it is). The
first drop usually occurs at moderate speed in level flight
and the airspeed and dive angle are increased in succeeding
flights until the maximum recommended airspeed and
dive angle are attained. Incidentally, many munitions
never get by the first drop, having displayed a propensity
for colliding with the aircraft during release! Eglin's
sheetmetal men have a lot of experience in patching holes
in aft sections!
Safety and photo chase is used on all separation tests.
The safety chase makes an on-scene evaluation and the
photographer, as well as on-board cameras, record the
separation characteristics for ground study prior to release
envelope expansion on succeeding flights. Again, the Navy
demonstrates release at airspeeds and dive angles beyond
the specified limits whereas the Air Force tests only to the restrictive flight limits on the aircraft. This shows up in
limits proposed. the pilots' flight manuals- usually with no explanation!
Aircraft control problems are often encountered This reason alone behooves one to exercise extreme
during munition release. The sudden release of large items caution when contemplating flight beyond the specified
located forward of the aircraft center of gravity is a good limits. Under the right set of circumstances, such as CG
example. The sudden reduction in gross weight coupled location, angle of attack, turbulence, etc., exceeding the
the shift in center of gravity result in what we I ike to flight limits will have catastrophic results.
'instant G." This is especially critical during dive Occasionally, the control problem can be avoided by
releases, for if the pilot does not expect this and adds his requiring a center of gravity scheduling in the form of fuel
own aft stick input in order to initiate dive recovery, he management procedures. The F-4 loaded with tactical
may suddenly find himself with more G than necessary fighter dispensers is a good example. The CG scheduling
with the possibility of aircraft overstress. may also show itself to the pilot as a required ordnance
Another control problem encountered during release release sequence.
results from items that change shape or configuration as The published flight limits naturally apply only to the
they are ejected- such as high drag bombs. This can configurations shown. An unacceptable problem
create an airflow disturbance at high airspeed that the slab encountered during the certification tests may result in
may see with some rather spectacular pitch results. (We simply not certifying that munition for carriage on a
have had some good photo chase film of slabs bending particular station. The absence of a particular
upwards of 1 foot as a direct result of shock waves from configuration in the flight manual indicates the
M-117R bombs.) configuration has not been certified or was found to be
Control problems or safe separation problems naturally unacceptable. Rarely will this lack of information be
lead to modifications of munition or flight limits. Once explained.
these problems, or lack of problems, are identified and the The foregoing discussion illustrates the complexity of
weapon certification flight tests are completed the paper flight I imits determination and weapon certification. As
work begins. Eglin forwards a data package and you can see, there is much information left unsaid in the
recommendations to Air Force Logistics Command which pilot's handbook, including a multitude of
publishes the appropriate tech order change (Such as, weapon/aircraft combinations which have not been
Dash One Operations Supplement), which finally ends up certified. We at Eglin have seen what can happen when
in the pi lot's hands. flight limits are expanded, and as a result, have a healthy
When an aircraft/munition is incompatible, the respect for the published limits. If the flight limits are
alternatives are varied. If an unacceptable hand I ing quality adhered to, the operational unit should have no difficulty
rliscovered, the approach taken is generally to place in employing the munitions. __..:::,..

CATTACK 19
 ... interest items, mishaps
tac tips

nearly uncontrollable. A loud prop whine signalled:

airspeed counts on the ground, too! Runaway! The engineer called out 108 percent, torque
After landing, the jock turned his F-1 05 off the active 4000, and fuel flow 1000 on number four. Calling for
to a taxiway and opened the canopy. Heading toward the emergency shutdown of Four, the copilot complied with
parking ramp, he thought the canopy appeared unusually the pilot's directive. With fire emergency control pulled
high and asked mobile control to take a look. They and engine condition lever in feather, the prop failed to
confirmed his suspicions, advising him that it was opened respond and increased in rpm instead. The feather
about 90 degrees. Because the canopy was designed for a override button didn't pop out; the copilot pulled it out.
max opening of 55 degrees, the pilot figured he had The crew reset the fire handle to restore oil and
problems. This was verified when the canopy fell closed as lubrication to the windmilling, high-drag prop.
he slowed for the turn onto the parking ramp. The canopy Climbing very slowly in a yawed, right turn the pilot
had to be opened manually, and required 40 man-hours nursed airspeed and alt itude to clear high terrain.
for repair. Regaining aerodynamic control with increase in airspeed
The Thud pilot was sure he had not exceeded his max and copilot assistance on left rudder, the pilot decided to
ground speed with canopy open. But he failed to consider land on a wider hard-surface runway a short distf ~
the 14 to 18-knot winds from about 11 o'clock which, away. In the soup, his navigator provided steers aro,
when combined with taxi speed, exceeded the relative terrain obstructions as they struggled upward from 300 to
airspeed limits of the canopy. 3000 feet. GCA picked them up on a long straight-in final.
The pilot eased back number one throttle to reduce his
asymmetrical power problems and held 140 to 150 knots
on final. At higher airspeeds number four's increasing
prop piston problem prop whine suggested possible separation.
The Herky was on a max-pax run into an He flew Herky onto the runway at 140 knots and
aluminum-plank strip 5500-feet long and 72-feet wide. reversed inboards only, using brakes heavily. Tower
"Men and equipment" closed the first-1000 feet. At five reported sparks visible on the left side so he stopped on
miles on GCA final the copilot called, "Runway in sight." the runway, shut down, and off-loaded his passengers
With full flaps, the pilot touched down at the 2000-foot through the right paratroop door. Suspecting a left wheel
marker, lowered the nose, pulled throttles to ground idle, well fire, the pilot set right brake only. Climbing out of
paused, and applied reverse thrust. As the props changed the bird he saw four cherry-red brakes. He cleared the
pitch, the Herky swerved violently, the left main gear wheel-failure zone, had the nose wheels chocked, and
rolling off the planking onto the asphalt shoulder. returned to the cockpit to release brakes. After a
Reacting quickly, the pilot applied full right rudder, cooling-off period, the emergency crew towed the Herky
brought throttles out of reverse, and regained the wet off the runway.
planking. Over-correcting slightly, his right main rolled off Investigators discovered an insidious failure during
the aluminum onto the asphalt. He regained directional prop disassembly that may have been a factor in an earlier
control with left rudder and braking, but remaining C-130 accident. They mounted Four's prop dome
stopping distance with 80 knots to kill with brakes only assembly on another prop and engine combination and
appeared insuffic ient. He decided to go around, applied ran it. The prop wouldn't increase or decrease blade angle.
max power, and called for 50-percent flaps. It wasn't pitch lock; the regulator checked out okay.
After liftoff at 95 knots the bird yawed sharply, now During dome disassembly they found a crack on the t~

20 MAY 19,..,
 .
with morals, for the TAC a1rcrewman

of the sliding piston. This allowed oil pressure on caused number two engine to quit. There was no icing
outboard and inboard sides of the piston to equalize by forecast for their route . . . and didn't we all learn in
bleeding thru the cracked head. Without hydraulic school that ice doesn't form at a minus 43?
pressure to control the prop blade angle, Centrifugal
Twisting Moment took over and decreased blade angle to
the low-pitch mechanical stop, causing the uncontrolled
overspeed. Feathering attempts were also unsuccessful f-4 flight controls

because increase pitch pressure couldn't build up on the On outside downwind for a touch-and-go, the aircraft
piston. yawed left one full bal l width. Yaw aug was turned off,
A fleet-wide inspection of propeller dome pistons but it did no good. After a few minutes the situation
under tech order "843" is underway and will be seemed to correct itself so yaw aug was re-engaged and the
completed shortly. Some suspected cracks were pilot entered initial for an overhead. During the pitch
discovered in unmodified pistons in TAC's C-130s. The unscheduled rudder inputs were felt again, so yaw aug was
unmodified pistons will be re-inspected at intervals until turned off. The situation seemed to be corrected, but the
reworked and new "B" configuration pistons are yaw inputs came back on final.
\ 3ble for field retrofit. Procurement action is Uncommanded flight control inputs are becoming
'tompleted. In the meantime, keep current on Herky's more and more suspect as possible loss-of-control accident
prop procedures! cause factors. If you experience any flight control
problems, the best course of action is to make a straight-in
approach and let the maintenance troops trouble shoot
the system on the ground.
Hq T AC (OSF)
you can get it anywhere

A flight of three A-37s departed a mountain base

headed for the West Coast on an IF R clearance. Pi tot heat
and engine inlet heat were checked prior to takeoff. "fogged" technique
Fifteen minutes later the flight entered cirrus clouds with
visibility about a quarter of a mile. There was no visible After weather penetration for a night approach with
icing. A little later they entered thick clouds and radio out, the single seater began a circling approach
encountered light turbulence. The flight lead requested a according to local radi·o-out procedures. A few seconds
weather advisory from the center and was told that no later he crashed into the bay surrounding the airdrome,
precipitation was visible on their radar . They were at F L apparently still in control of his bird.
240 and immediately after the radio call, entered an area Board investigators suggested several possible causes,
of heavy rime icing. The leader got a clearance to climb none of which could be confirmed because the plane was
and they headed for 350. At FL 290 while climbing, not recovered . But one probab i I ity deserves continued
number two's left engine flamed out, outside temp was attention by all flyers, especially during night penetrations
minus 43. Two then descended to FL 260 after when distracting situations exist. If proper defrosting
unsuccessful attempts to airstart at 290. Five minutes technique is not used prior to and during penetration,
later they all broke out of the soup and joined up. fogging inside the windscreen may deprive the pilot of
It is suspected that ice build-up around the intake forward visibility at a time of critical need .

ATTACK 21
 •
l4

what will be.. will be

The most famous seven that America ever threw was a

winner in an out-of-this-world gamble that held 180
million Americans spellbound. That winning seven was, of
course, the seven astronauts of Project Mercury and their
flights into outer space.
To many Americans, the seven men who made up
America's first astronaut team seemed to be either
supermen or reckless daredevils.
But, they were neither. They were professional
pilots-men of the sky who chafed at the fetters of gravity
and hungered to take the logical next step from aircraft to
spacecraft. Backed by men of science and safety, they
looked upward confidently to the last frontier.
Not supermen : "They are strong," explained Dr.
NtltifJntll St1fety CfJuncil William Douglas, their Air Force physician, "but they are
not perfect physical specimens by any means. They have
most of the norma l human complaints."
Not daredevils: They not on ly had great courage but
survival ski lls and abi lities that qualified them for space
flight.
The exhaustive screening tests they went thro~

22 M AY ·· ~ _
 ~~· verges on nit-picking. But it is a good way to stay alive and
fly another day ."

~~
And the flight plan begins long before lift-off time,
while everything is still very much on the ground. During
the long countdown that precedes each f light, there is so
much that could go wrong, Gordon Cooper explained,
"that we put out a special manual to cover them all and
to spell out the detailed procedures for each kind of crisis.
It ran to about 80 pages."
Almost no detail of preparation was too small to be

• considered. Walter Shirra gave a revealing example of this

in a remark about the fit of the space helmets. "We
discovered that the entire rig fit best when we had about a

ltpi/4 five-day-old haircut. John Glenn refined this a bit and had
his hair trimmed every three days before his flight."

<'~ ll~
This sort of scrupulous attention to detail is an
example also of the astronauts' refusal to "trust to luck,"

~ p I or to give any support to the attitude of fatal ism often

expressed by, "When my number is up, I'll get it." They
all know that they themselves - like all men doing a
hazardous job - had a great deal to say about "when
showed additional basic characteristics. They all set their number was up."
realistic goals for themselves rather than to dream about When Virgil Grissom was assigned to make the second
the unattainable. They were all adventurous, but they suborbital flight, he became even more cautious than
could also accept the necessary routine of a job. They got usual. "The only thing I was afraid of was that something
along well with people; they were self-rei iant; they could might happen to prevent me from making the flight. So I
fr.,rely accept help and advice when it was necessary. None gave up water skiing and I was more careful than usual to
1em acted impulsively. They all had the habit of observe the speed I imits around the Cape."
ipating emergencies and planning for them. Interestingly enough, it was Grissom who ran into one
Those were traits shared with millions of other of the safety rules at Cape Kennedy - an example of
Americans - the millions of men and women in how seriously safety rules are enforced at the nation's
American industry who have learned the knack of space center. On the day the capsule he was to pilot was
avoiding accidents. Make no mistake, the astronauts were being mated to the Redstone booster that would drive it
pre-eminently men who sought to avoid accidents. into space, Grissom was almost barred from the launching
"Safety was one of the main principles in the operation of pad while the work was going on . "I had locked my hard
Project Mercury," said Gordon Cooper, "and maximum hat in the office and forgotten the key, and no one is
safety can be attained only when you have planned and allowed near an active gantry without a special hard hat to
prepared for the most serious and unforeseen incidents. protect his head. Someone finally loaned me one, and I
This is what we did." made it just in time."
The science of space flight is grounded in Newton's No one was surprised that the man who was to ride the
laws of gravity and motion. The work of Project Mercury, rocket was barred from a work area because he had no
according to John Glenn, was grounded in an additional hard hat. Project Mercury was a team effort. Every
law called Murphy's Law : "Any part that can be installed member of the team played by the rules, and
wrong will be installed wrong at some point by someone." "safety - particularly safety for the astronauts - was a
Murphy's Law is repealed only by painstaking paramount rule in Project Mercury," said Scott Carpenter.
attention to detail. Incredible as it may seem, 1,250,000 "Perhaps we astronauts were willing to take a few extra
tests were made before the first suborbital manned flight. chances in order to get moving; that was the way we were
"Test pilots - and astronauts- live by checklists," built. But our bosses had their eyes on a bigger picture.
explained Scott Carpenter. "They have so many They were not willing to let us take chances which they
complicated things to do and remember that sometimes felt might jeopardize the mission or discredit the program.
the little, obvious things do not get done simply because All of life, of course, is a compromise. And what we were
they are not written down in the proper sequence in the doing was life at its fullest."
"""ht plan. It is a meticulous approach, and sometimes it That is, after all, what safety means.

CATTACK 23
 Pilot's
An aviator's windfall in the form of a POWs World
War II diary crossed the editor's desk the other day. It
contained some classic examples of the inspired,
brown-shoe-days poetry that sustained the lagging spirits

Printable of downed aircrewmen spending involuntary TDYs in

Germany's scattered Stalags. The authors are unknown
and we're unable to give them much-deserved credit
for boosting morale.

Poetry Perhaps some of TAC ATTACK's readers will recall the

poet-pilot who authored these nostalgic notes. After
you've wiped away that tear, send us his name. And in
addition, if you have some not-too-boisterous ballads

Page you've collected during your Air Corps/Air Force tours,

send them along. We'll try illustrating them in future
issues on our Pilot's Printable Poetry Page.

8-17
You can talk of your airplanes and talk of them long She made the long hauls at whatever the cost
Discuss all their points both the weak and the strong Oh many came back and many were lost
You can argue with passion or calmly assess Formations were lashed by the fighters and flak
Demerits and merits each plane may possess And battles took place that were bloody and black.
Pile figures on facts and statistics relate
Or a personal preference impressively state But thru them she rode triumphantly strong
But when it's all over 'tis plain to be seen To del iver the goods where we know they belong
There's none that quite touches the B-17. So thanks to the escort for helping us thru
And thanks to the B-24's gallant and true
First of the four-motored bombers she came A toast to them all let every man raise
First to the stratosphere, first to the fame And this to the fortress deserving our praise
Of bombing by daylight in enemy skies She's a symbol of all that freedom can mean
And first to invite the Luftwaffee to rise When angered to fight - the B-17.

24
 you bet your life!

Man can survive under water, at most, for a little more times, swimming on the sloping side of the shore. Then
than a minute. If this sobering fact had been considered the T AC man and a com pan ion headed for the opposite
by several TAC personnel in 1969, it's doubtful that there shore. Ten feet from their goal, the airman yelled that he
would be reason to recall how they met death. could go no farther. His friend grabbed hold of him to
As a landlubber, man has done reasonably well pull him ashore. The struggling airman panicked and
adjusting to his earthy environment. And, it's not submerged.• dragging his friend with him. Breaking loose,
uncommon for the common man to fly through the sky the friend made it to the surface and saved himself. Park
with the ease of driving to the corner drug store. Wherever rangers recovered the airman's body two hours later from
he goes, on the ground or in flight, as long as he avoids 24 feet of water.
serious bodily injury, he can usually count on continued Less than two months later, another T AC mar
long life. pu lied from the same water by the same park rangers a,·-··
But if he ventures only a few feet from the shoreline, attempting a similar cross-channel swim. In this case, the
he need not be bodily battered to meet his end quickly. victim was considered to be a good swimmer.
Take away his access to air and it's all over. Giving the During the year, three more TAC men drowned during
TAC personnel in question benefit of the doubt, perhaps recreational swimming. Two had consumed considerable
their intention was to always remain in an environment of beer before swimming, and another was pulled from five
life-giving oxygen, with little thought to the possibility of feet of water where he lay after tiring and being overcome
being forced below the water's surface. Whatever their by sheer panic.
thoughts, it all boils down to one serious fact. Once on These deaths are tragic, but the greatest tragedy is that
the water's surface, they were situated where the they are repeats of previous drown ings ... and prophesy
difference between life and death was one little minute. more for this year. And to suggest that those T AC
As a result, time to ward off disaster became mighty personnel who will be dead by this time next year actually
short. anticipate drowning is ridiculous. But the truth is, if they
Several drownings in T AC happened as unexpectedly, will consider the possibility of drowning and anticipate
but with similar circumstances, as the following accident. their defense, they will still be around for 1971.
Summer temperatures were hot. The victim and three A sure solution is "Don't go near the water." But,
friends decided to spend a free afternoon swimming. All that's like being a fighter pilot told to fly straight and
could swim, but none were judged to be good swimmers. level and not to venture above ten thou. It just isn't
They went to a National Park lake away from congested practical. But find an old fighter pi lot and you've met the
swimming areas. The inlet they chose was about 300 yards guy who not only anticipated problems but knows how to
long, 35 yards wide, with a shoreline ranging from si x-feet handle them before they sink into the "deep-si x "
deep water only ten feet from shore on one side, to a position. If a swimmer is similarily prepared, his chances
25-foot sheer dropoff on the opposite side ... and no life of becoming an old swimmer are greatly improved.
guards. For instance: the last-ditch action a pilot has to avoid
For the first hour and a half, it was all fun and good an uncontrolled landing is to eject. If a swimmer is

26 MAY h11u
 "?t
o....- - - -

faced with i nabi I ity to move another stroke, what is his occurred , both men cou ld have made it to the surface. In
last ditch action to keep his nose an inch above water, other words, the men were not ready to enter an
instead of letting it fall the fatal inch below? One way is unforgiving envi ronment in either terms of equ ipment or
to float! It requires little energy (see T AC ATTACK, June emotional stabi lity. In short, they were not prepared.
1968), and an almost completely handicapped Recreational boating cost three TAC men their lives in
(physically) person can do it for hours. But unfortunately, 1969. In one accident, seven airmen were involved. On
it also calls for considerable self-control to ward off fear their day off they rented four boats, each equipped with
and panic; the bogey that gets most drowning victims. In an outboard motor. Several of the men had been drinking
- words, if a swimmer disciplines himself to respond beer, and beer and coolers were found in two boats when
\ Jely to emergency situations, his chance of later checked by investigators. A life jacket had been
~itting to panic is much less. issued to each boat operator and passenger before leaving
Another experienced TAC swimmer and a friend we'll the dock. After each boat went separate ways for a while,
call AI died during a routine scuba diving excursion. The they all converged, running a racetrack pattern,
TAC man was an experienced diver with good equipment eventua lly "horsep laying" by zig-zagg ing across each
and held numerous swimming and water safety awards. other's wakes, making sharp and reckless turns close to
Although AI had less diving experience, he owned a good each other.
set of gear. However, two items not used by either diver Now anyone with average boating experience knows
were tank gauges showing air pressure remaining, and an that crossing another boat's wake at high speed can be a
extra regulator for emergency buddy breathing. The latter tooth-jarring ride. And if done at some intersection angles,
would have probably saved both lives. it means loss of control and probably a flip. They found
The two intended exploring an underwater cave. out. One man, we'll call him Dave, was thrown from his
Nearing the cave at about 100-foot depth, AI suddenly boat. Helped back aboard, Dave took the helm and again
indicated he was out of air. Investigators believe they joined the melee. He was in a tight turn when another
attempted to buddy breath during ascent by sharing the boat cut short across his wake, slipped sideways in
TAC ai rman's system. Pan ic must have followed! Both midair, and landed on a co llision course so close it
men's bodies were marked with scratches and bruises cou ldn 't be avoided. The boat rammed Dave's boat
about the head. broadside near the stern! Charging over the gunwale, the
Apparently the men did not cross-check each other's bow struck Dave, threw him into the water, probably
equipment before entering the water . If they did, both unconscious. Only one of the seven men was wearing a life
overlooked a closed valve on one of Al's two tanks. When jacket, and it wasn't Dave. His body floated to the surface
found, the one tank contained a full supply of air. severa l days later.
Some fair conclusions are: had the valve been opened, Operating a boat calls for good decision making, a lot
the accident would not have happened; had an adequate more than simply "no horseplay." For the first time in his
pre-diving check been conducted on both systems, the military life, another TAC man was assigned to a base near
would have been noticed; and , had panic not the open sea. The mid-westerner had the usual experience

ATTACK 27
 your life!

that goes with boating and fishing on inland lakes. But fishing boat came alongside and _pulled he and his dead
this was his first chance to become a bona-fide salt water father from the sea. Floating a few hundred feet away was
Captain; a title he learned too late, carried considerable the body of the other man.
responsibility. The Captain's mistakes were many; and accepting
With his teen-age son, he and another T AC pilot responsibility for the safety of his son and another in an
planned a coastal fishing trip aboard his newly acquired almost foreign environment, without experience or
24-foot cruiser. After work, they headed a couple miles training, was pure naivet{ Seamanship training was
off shore where the Captain and his son had hooked a readily available in basic and advanced courses at a local
whopper the previous day. At their destination, they United States Power Squadron. A local. fisherman 1reported
began their trolling course parallel with the shoreline and that he advised the Captain only days before, when he
the waves of the moderately heavy rolling sea marked inquired about this particular fishing area, that it ~
with whitecaps, as an occasional wave turned breaker. The hazardous because shifting shoals made bre
boat, adequately constructed for the waters, rode easily unpredictable; enough so that most commercial fishem'"'''
over the crests and troughs of the flowing sea. entered the waters cautiously, if at all. Nor would an
Completely unexpected and without warning, an experienced Captain set a course parallel to the potential
approaching wave crested. Estimated by the teenager as breakers, exposing his beam to possible swamping as in
about ten-feet high, it broke over the starboard beam, this case. Or even worse, sudden capsizing.
washing the boy overboard. Water had filled the cockpit Emergency gear is of I ittle value if neatly stowed and
almost to the gunwales as the men pulled the boy back out of reach when an emergency arises. On this point. the
aboard. They made a fast search for I ife vests (six were Coast Guard requires public boats to keep buoyant
aboard) stored away in lockers. Two were found before survival gear in view and within easy reach, including
the boat was awash; so the third member grabbed several several that will float free if suddenly swamped. Signal
buoyant cushions as the boat settled below the surface, flares are also required to be within easy reach of the
less than two minutes after the breaker fell. A survival kit, Captain, at or near his station.
including a variety of flares, stored in a forward cabin Neither of these men would ever suggest that a novice
compartment went down with the craft. pilot, with flying experience limited to something like the
Water temperature was in the high 40s, offering an T-41 environment, would have a chance for survival if he
optimistic four hours survival time without anti-exposure launched in a modern fighter without adequate knowledge
suits. About two hours of daylight remained ... no one and training. But the Captain's excursion to sea was about
ashore knew their exact location, and they had no signal that. And he was not prepared.
devices. Water recreation, like gambling is here to stay. There's
The Captain lapsed into unconsciousness about four no doubt about that. So have fun and take your chances,
hours later and died. Soon after, the remaining adult you may never lose. But the least you can do is hedge
became quiet and floated away in the darkness. The boy, your bet. With appropriate knowledge, attitude, and
fortunately a husky and healthy teen-ager, remembered caution, your odds for continued fun on water are taken
nothing after that until early morning when he awoke from the hands of bookies. Wagering a few dollars is one
with the sun full in his face. Minutes later, a commercial thing ... but your life!? ~ '

28 MAY 1!ul..l
 Tactical Air Command
Crew Chief of the Month

Staff Sergeant John R. Kappmeyer, 481 Tactical

Fighter Squadron, Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico,
has been selected to receive the TAC Crew Chief Safety
Award. Sergeant Kappmeyer will receive a fetter of
appreciation from the Commander of Tactical Air
Command and an engraved award.
SSgt Kappmeyer

111P.---...111W--1111MMMc!

Tactical Mr Command
Maintenance Atm of the Monti

Senior Master Sergeant Carroll D. P.urnmer, 15

Tactical Fighter Wing, Mac Dill Air Force Base, Florida,
has been selected to receive the TAC Maintenance Man
Safety Award. Sergeant Plummer will receive a letter of
appreciation from the Commander of Tactical Air
Command and an engraved award.
SMSgt Plummer

TAC ATTACK 29
 ~
LETTERS to tl..e EDITOR
wind chill and exposure to severe weather.
Therefore, I would like to obtain a copy of the
November 1968 issue of TAC ATTACK plus any
additional information you can give me on this
subject.
If there is a charge for this magazine or any of
the literature y ou have, please notify me prior to
Let me extend my congratulations on the very sending them to me.
effective photo presentation on rate of closure in I will certainly appreciate any help you can
your recent issue ofTAC ATTACK. g1ve me.
We at the Air Line Pilots Association would be
most interested in getting copies of these photos, W. P. McKay
and any others on the same subject, and your 8819 Belleview
permission to use them in an upcoming issue of Kansas City, Mo.
AIR LINE PILOT.
The November 1968 issue of TAC ATTACK is
Lou Davis, Executive Editor on the way. We're happy to help your research
AIR LINE PILOT effort on wind chill. It's a subject near and dear
to our hearts when the cold breezes come. Ed.
Permission to reprint is granted with pleasure.
The photos are on the way. Unfortunately, the The GUNFIGHTERS of the 366th TFW
set you saw in the March TAC ATTACK are the
having their FIRST PRACTICE REUNION for ;,...
only ones we are aware of. Ed.
OFFICER members in Tampa, Florida, 19 - 21
June 1970. All members, past and present, are
requested to write for details and submit their
I read an article in the February 1970 issue of address to: GUNFIGHTERS, Box 6586, MacDill
FAA AVIATION NEWS in which there was an AFB, Florida 3 3608. Detailed information will be
article on the effect of wind chill. This article forthcoming to make this first stag reunion an
referred to some graphs and information enormous success.
contained in the November 1969 issue of TAC
ATTACK. Major William J . Launikitis
I am doing some research on the effects of 46th TFS, MacDill AFB, Florida

PEANUTS Courtesy of Do i ly Press, Newport New s, Vo.

~ United Feature Syndicate , In c . 1969

30 MAY 1!:1,...~
 TAC TALLY AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT RATES
* Estimated

UNITS
MAJOR ACCIDENT RATE COMPARISON THRU MARCH THRU MARCH

1969 1970. 1969 1970 *

lAC ANG AFRes 9 AF 1.2 2. 9 12 AF 7. 6 6 .0

1969 1970 1969 1970 1969 1970 4 TFW 0 0. 23 TFW 0 0

15 TFW 0 0 27 TFW 0 0
JAN 6.8 4.8 28.9 5.9 0 0 33 TFW 0 0 49 TFW 0 20 . 8

9. 1
FEB 6.2 3.9 12 .8 2.6 0 0 4531 TFW 0 14. 7 479 TFW 8. 1

474 TFW 29 .8 0

MAR* 6.8 4.7 12.6 1.7 0 0

363 TRW 11.8 12.4 67 TRW 0 14. 1
APR 7.4 15.1 0 75 TRW 0
0

MAY 7.5 12 .9 0
64 TAW 0 0 313 TAW 0 0
JUN 7.2 12.6 0 316 TAW 0 0 516 TAW 0 0

317 TAW 0
JUL 7.4 11 .3 0 0
464 TAW 0 0
~

AUG 7.3 11.5 0 4442 CCTW 0 0 4453 CCTW 0 0

4554 CCTW 0 0 58 TFTW 19.3 12. 2
SEP 6.9 105 0
TAC SPECIAL UNITS
7.1 9.9 0
1 sow 0 11. 1 2 ADG 0 0
r--
NOV 6.6 9.4 0 4409 SUP SQ 0 0 4500 ABW 15.7 0
4410 CCTW 26 . 2 0 57 FWW 18.9 0
DEC 6.8 9.5 0 4416 TSQ 0 0

In March we experienced four accidents, all occurred (we mean that literally) was notified that the F-104G gear
in TAC. T AC-gained ANG units have been accident free handle blocking solenoid is controlled by a switch on the
since January, and the AFRES units since December of nose gear scissors and it is possible to raise the gear handle
1968. There was one fatality for the month bringing our prematurely during a go-around. Then to top these off, we
total for the year to seven . Better than 1969, but not recently heard of a minor accident that occurred in
much. another command. Different airplane, same
There were three landing accidents. The first was an circumstances- during a go-around from a no-flap touch
A-1 that went out of control on landing and ended up and go, the student retracted the gear before advancing
sans gear. Next was a TF-104G that ended up on its belly the throttles. The IP valiantly tried to salvage what he
following premature gear retraction during a go-around could, but there was no way back; they egressed
(more on this one). The third was an 0-2 that stalled in successfully following a two thousand foot slide .
during landing. Our only in-flight accident was an R F-1 01 Looks as though you IPs are going to have to star,t
that_pitched up for reasons unknown. chaining the gear handle down on base leg. The other
Hey, what's with this landing gear retraction bit while alternative is to get at the root of this problem, which
still on the ground? We thought that trick went out with incidently, is not the location of the squat switch entirely.
the F-86F many years ago. Our files show one other case Moving the gear handle up while on the runway cannot be
of premature gear retraction along with a recommended an original idea for a student, someone had to teach him
solution that could have prevented our bash this month, it to do it or put the idea in his head . Think about that.
•rred back in June of 1969. At that time the world

~ ATTACK 31
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