MARCH " APRIL 1972

CANADIAN fORCES DIRECTORATE OF

HEADQUARTERS FIIGHT SAFETY

(..,orrtmertt~
COl R. D . SCHUITZ
The circumstances leading to a Good Show for two DIRECTOR OF FUGHT SaFETY
air traffic controllers (page 4) also demonstrated
MAJ 0. C. NEWPORT ICOI W . W . GARNER
that DF equipment continues to retain a high degree Netefin ad orlysls IWe!?I~NM ~ /re11MIN
of usefulness in terminal approach control .

Instances have been reported where a bright-coloured

flight recorder was overlooked at an accident scene
because searchers thought they were looking for a
Taken for Granted - But?
"black box" . Evidently, that familiar expression is
becoming increasingly less accurate as a description the '71 story
for mysterious electrical packages in aircraft . CF
flight recorders for example, are painted "interna-
4 better tires for safer landings Since powered flight became a reality, an unwritten maxim of air operations has

6 needles in a haystack
been, "the difficult we'll do now and the impossible will take just a little longer
tional orange .
and,'or a little extra effort" . This admirable if somewhat unreasonable attitude

8 more on graphite pencils demanded a great deal of everyone concerned yet for many many reasons the team
met the challenge most of the time . Is this true today? My impression is that we
Training Command's Transient Service Recognition
Program inspired 2845 reports during the last half of 9 close call-afte~ ejection can no longer give an unequivocal answer .
1911, the majority of which were submitted by per- Very rapid sociological change is one of the reasons, or excuses, given for
sonnel from other Commands . We're happy to pass 10 new role - new challenge today's more obvious problems, reflected in increased crime rates, drug usage and
along the appreciation of the SOFS to those who so on . Moreover, there is support for the contention that these sociological changes
have participated, and to encourage continued use of 12 the last mile result in problems that are less obvious but more insidious, such as, a decreased

14 helicopters IfR
these reports . sense of responsibility, and lower productivity and quality of work . I submit that
consciously or unconsciously military personnel adopt to some degree most of the

CFP 140(1), Canadian Forces Film Catalogue

16 total involvement attitudes exhibited by the population as a whole . Therefore, even though outward
signs of the effects of these changes may not be evident, dare we take for granted
(1200 of which are dis±ributed throughout the Cana- 17 cpi/fdr that in a given situation, the same or similar people will produce the results
dian Forces), contains an extensive list of flight accepted as normal two-or ten years ago?
safety films that can be obtained through the nearest 18 good show In no way am I questioning the dedication and professionalism of individuals
regional film library. Request forms (CF 244) are
available through normal channels . 21 how's your wx? but I am suggesting that we are vulnerable to the influences and pressure sur-
rounding us . This means that people question old values and even adopt new ones
22 on the dials without realizing it ; or the consequences . If we face facts we will allow for this
human factor in our daily operations and more important, give it due consideration
Two Squadron Reunions are planned for 1911 . 441
Squadron will assemble at CFB Moose Jaw on the
24 gen f~om 210 in the planning and setting of goals for future air operations .

weekend of 26-28 May . Maj B .R . Arnott of Moose

Jaw isthe reunion chairman . In November, 434 Squad-
ron is planning a reunion at CFB Cold Lake for all
officers who have served with the squadron since
its inception during WWII . The squadron would ap-
preciate receiving names and addresses of former
Editor Capf P.1 . Barrett
squadron members . The address : 434 Squadron,
CFB Cold Lake, Medley Alberta . Art and layout CFHO Graphic Arts

Flipht Comment is produced by the CFHQ Directo"

rats of FliQht Safety . The contenh do not neceswrily COL R . D . SCHULTZ
reFlect officiol policy ond unless otherwise stoted DIRECTQR QF FLIGHT SAFETY
FRONT COVER The newest circraft on the CF in- should not be construed os requlations, orders or

ventaYr the COH58A Kiowa. This aircraft will be diredives. Contributian, comments and aiticism~

used in severol roles, ir~cluding transport, air re- are welcome, the proTOtion of fli9ht soFety is best
ssrved by diueminotinq ideos ond on-the "~ob ex"
tonnaissance, pirborne command post, visual search
perience . Send wbmissions to : Editor, fliqht Com"
ond recce r and air observation ond control of ind~rect ment, CFHQ/DFS, Ottawa, Ontario, K 1 A OK?. Sub-
fire . When delivery is completed in lote 1972, the scription orders should be direded to Information
oircraft will be ,based at Lohr, Gagetown, Valcartier, Conodo, Publishinq Division, Clttowa KIA 059, I

Petawawo, London, Portage La Pratrie, Sht lo, Ed- Ontario. Mnual subscription rote is s1 .50 for
monton, Cold Lake and Victoria . Piroto courtesy Canoda and the USA.

Copt G.E . Moyer, CFB Portage La Pratrte.

 The hi 9 hll 9 hts of our 1971 accldent and
incident record are presented here. A more
detai led analysi s has been com P leted and
will appear in the Annual Aircraft Accident Destroyed 1
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15
B Cat 1 1 1 3 1 1
Analysis which should be off the press in
C Cat 1 4 2 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 11
mid March .
All Acc 39
Fatalities 4 1 3 8 16

Milestones
For the second year in a row all attempted ejections were successful . One factor was common to three (Tracker, Dakota and Otter) of the four fatal
These included the escape of a CF104 pilot at supersonic speed and a accidents : evidence indicatcs that they occurred following the stalling of the
CFS pilot's ejection from an extremely low and slow situation . aircraft at low altitude .

There were no fatal accidents involving jet aircraft-for the first timc Ground Accidents and Incidents
since the introduction of jet aircraft into Canadian military aviation in The Canaaian Forces sustained five ground accidents and 239 ground inci-
1948 . dents . Of the reported ground occurrences, 146 resulted in damage to aircraft
and there were nine minor injuries . All told there were 36 vehicle strikes on
Air Accidents aircraft .
The chart shows a total of 39 accidents-two more than in 1970 . Our accident
rate was 1 .17 per 10,000 hours, up from 0.99 in 1970 . During 1971 there was a
Air Incidents
significant reduction in the total number of flying hours-a continuation of the
Reported air incidents increased in 1971 to 2574, an increase of 188 over
general downward trend aver the past 16 years .
1970. "1'his increasing use of the reporting system is important ; the reports often
Ai rcraft Destroyed enable preventive measures to be applied in time to prevent an accident .
Keeping pace with the trend of recent years, more than one-third of all acci-
dents resulted in a writeoff-39~i~ . The total of 15 aircraft destroyed was two Air Accident Causes
less than in 1970. The 39 air accidents in 1971 were assigned 82 cause factors . Fifty-three
causes, a slight reduction from 1970, were assigned to PERSONNEL . Next came
Fatal Accidents and Fatalities MATERIEL, with 17 followed by ENVIRONMEN'f with 10 . The remaining threc
There were four fatal accidents in 1971, the lowest number on record . How- cause factors were listed as UNDETERMINED, UNIDENTIFIED FOD and OPER-
ever, these accidents resulted in 16 fatatities, the highest number since 1967 . ATIONAL .

You Can't Get There From Here Let's See What's What-Garefvlly!
One of the more embarrassing things that can happen This instance underlines the need for frequent surveys All pilots involved in closely inspecting another airborne importance is "looking good" or sacrificing safety in
in an emergency is having the crash rescue vehicle crash . and up-dating of Crash Grid maps . If Grid maps aren't aircraft, for any reason, should not forget the continuous order to get close enough to pinpoint the trouble . Single-
One unit recently had one of its vehicles damaged to the kept up to date, crash rescue vehicles, especially some presence of wingtip or rotor blade vortices of the genera- seaters do not have any extra eyes to help see what's
tune of $23,000 when the vehicle, responding to an air- of the newer, bigger models, might not be there when we ting aircraft . The prime requisite in formation flying and wrong, but multiseaters should have one pilot flying and
craft crash, took off down an unserviceable road . More need them the most . inspection is the safety of the two aircraft, and of least another set of eyes or two trying to determine what's what .
important, the vehicle never reached the scene of the Ah:RO~PA( :f~: SAFF:T~'
accident! AP!'ROAC11

2 Flight Comment, Mar Apr 1972 3

 Photo 1"5
Hercules main wheel tire failure showing delamination
1~~ of the bead area which was caused by the dragging force
on two of the tires during turns while the aircraft was
Photc #2 taxiing .
Hercules main wheel tire failure . The tread material
of the tire separated from the carcass ply . The failure
was caused by low adhesion between components . During
service the tread material and the carcass delaminated
and the tire failed due to tearing-off the ribs of the tire,
F±

, -~ti ~ .
a' +
~, , ~x ;~ . 3
~~~~~s
Photo ~t6
Properly designed Hercules main wheel tire . The
number of carcass plies was increased and three wire
It has been observed, with some concern, that the bundles were used in the bead instead of twa,
main wheel tires of a heavv aircraft f requentlL- praiuce
blue coloured smoke at touch down . Hi K h s lx'-.ed nic.rvie
film sliows that at touch down the non-rotatin K tire is
forced tc> attain, almost instantaneouslv,
. thc s F~ecd oE Photo ~ 1
the aircraft . I)urin~ this split second, when the hlue CF101 main wheel tire failure . The ribs of this tire
smoke is relcascd , the tirc loses its round sha pe , and were torn off during the first landing . The adhesion be-
becomes deformed . The deformations initiate wav`- (sin- tween the first reinforcing ply ond tread material was
uous ) curves on the crown and on the sidewalls .of the found to be low, and was probably the cause of failure . Photo ?t3
tircs, and as the wavea flatten, the tire reKains its In the latest procurement specifications the Canadian Buffalo main wheel tubeless tire failure . Interior
ori inal shax1 . These }~h~~sical
. deformatinns ~Kenerate Forces have stipulated minimum values for adhesion surface of the tire, which should be the air barrrer of the
unbelievablv eat forces in the tires, which tend to between the various components . tire and serves as a tube for the tire, shows air leakage,
tear thcm apart . During takeoff, landing, and taxiinX, Every group of air bubbles indicates a spot where the
the tires of an aircraft are ex ~osed to crther defonnations compound to make the tirc worth retreading . interior layer of the tire leaks . Tubeless tires which
all of which generate tremendous internal forces . r'~ good In some cases, however, such as hydro . P lanin g , (see show air leakage are unserviceable .
aircraft tire must withstand all these immense forces . Photo no . ~ ) the Rubber Laboratorv. is unable to hel P
I~nc of the main duties of the QE~~.TF. Rubbcr Lab- reduce tire failures . It is well known that hydroplaning
oratory is, in cooperation with Desi~n and lnspection is caused by a combination of factors, includin~ the
authoritica to assure to Pq ualitv. tires . These to 1-y
~ ualitv. s P eed and the thickness of the water laver . coverin ~ the
tircs arc obtainc:d only by thorou~h investi,Kation~: and runwav . llvdroplaning may be rcduced only by thc care
Pro Ex~r y ualifications . Sometimes the s xcifications used and skill of the P ilot .
to qualify tires are inadequate . 'I'he tires shown in photo ln the case of Hercules main whecl tircs, thc QI ;'I'F.
no . 1 and ? failed due to low adhesion between tire Ruhi~er Lahoratorv is faced with another task : To pro- Photo ~i7
components, but their speciJication had no requiremcnts Pose the redesi },~n of the tires . 1'hoto no . S shows a Sections of T33 main wheel tires . Both tires failed
lor adhc ~icin het:cecn componenr part ~, To overcome these section of an im pro 1~erlv: desi k>ned tire, which failcd in during dynamic test . The failure was caused by excessive
difficulties, the laboratorv, as another part of its function, service . Nhoto no . 6 shows a section of an improvcd heat which developed in the tread material of the tire .
develo~ed an adhesion test method, which led some manu- desi~n of the tire . The upper tire section was taken from a tire which failed
facturers to produce hi~hcr yualily tires and has helped Photo no . i shows scctions of 'C33 rnain w~heel tires because of inadequate ventilation provided by the narrow
the Canadian Forces to si R nificantlv. reduce the incidence which failcd the d~~namic test hecause of overheatin,~ of groove . The lower section was taken from a tire which
of tire failure . thc cro~sn area of the tires . duc to faultv. retreadin . ln had entrapped air bubbles initiating excess heat and
Similarlv to thc adlic~sion requirements, thc QETE this case the QETE Rubber Laboratorv, in close ec>- blowin 9 up the crown of the tire .
Rubher l .aboratorv has proposed air permeability tests o~eration
1 with the manufacturers, were ~ablc to su gK est
on tubeless tires ~ t o im prove tire y ualit`~, . Bv, tlre a pp li- corrective action and now the retreaders are able to
cation of this a i r leaka ~ e test , the air rctention charac- supply properl`~ retreaded tires .
teristics of a particular tubelcss tire were determined QETE Rubber I,aboratorv is equipped to tackle any Photo #4 Diplomacy
and the Rubber Laboratory was able to prove the inadc- tire problcm . Thcir services mav be obtaine.d throu~h one T33 main wheel tire damaged by hydroplaning . This
of this tire, (sec ~hoto Diplomacy is the art of saying "Nice doggie" until you
qu a t e y ualit y~ of the inncr layer
, of three channcls : Desi Kn ( D,G?1~ ) , QuaGtv. Assurance phenomenon cannot be controlled by the quality or by the can find a rock, - Robert Phelps
no . 3) which must be replaced with ~ood qualrty rubber (D(;QA), or 19arntcnancc (DG11) . design of the tire . lnrerceptor

4 fl~ght Comment, Mar Apr, 1972 S

 for the "needles in the haystack" began . In appallinK dropped them in the centre of its area of highest proba-
search conditions on snowshoes, skis , foot and snow- bilit~~ . ,Just as predicted, it had drifted almost two milcs
mobilc, the high-probability areas were crossed and re- withlthe wind after the CF104 broke u P . Most P ieces of
crossed , cou ~~1ed w~ith intensivc~ "19ark One Eveballin~"
, ~, wing and stabilizer were eventually recovered in this
from helico P ters . rnanner , and the search then centred on various elusive
The larK_e cockpit section ~ias found impaled on a hydraulic servos and "plumbing"
tree, havin_g fallen almost verticallv. into the forest . Based on a hunch that a trackin K do g mi K ht be able to
The h e avv ~ ve rt i c al stahilize r, less scrvos , was found "sniff out" hydraulic components hy the distinctive smell
within ?00 vards. of a heli Pad in an area that had al- of sprlled flurd, assrstance was asked from the RC11P at
readv been searched several times . Thc right outer Fort Saskatchewan . Aidcd by his tracking dog "Sam",
ti~in K. and ti P tank finallv turned u P about a mile and a Cor Poral Ilalter Acht~~michuk. was most successful in
I~ ~ J half awav. from the main wrecka g e . As each P iece was recovering even the smallest pieces-some even from
The search area comprised severa) square miles of snow- The right outer wing portion and tiptank as first sighted found , the tra'ecton~
J ; P redictions were continuallv: u P - under water .
covered northern bush . from the air . dated and more refined forecasts «'ere made nightly of Eventuall~~ the spring thaw prevented any more safe
the locations of missing pieces . '1'he numher-and helico Pter landin R s in the area and the search had to
size-of missing pieces became smafler and smaller . be called off-but not before sufficient evidence had

Needles
Due to prior commitments, the 1 Combat Group been gathered to pinpoint the accident cause and de-
Personnel had to return to Calgary before the search for termine necessarv corrective measures . A month's in-
vital evidenre was completed . Phone calls to Ottawa on tc,nsr~'ve e f for t s involvin g over 100 dedicated sear c hers
Easter Sunday ni~ht produced the welcome assistance of paid off. But even these efforts would have K_ one for
E~0 paratroopers from the Canadian Airborne Regiment at nou ght had it not been for a g encies at CFIi Cold I.ake

in a Haystack
I"'.dmonton . Their first task was to seek the rudder ; thcv and elsewhere . Their efforts indeed showed how Flir;ht
found it wit}rin fiftv. P aces from where the helico Pter Safct y~ is evervone's
, business . ®

"AFTER APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR OF

by Capt D . W. Rumbold CIRCUITS AND LANDINGS PILOT TOOK CON-
TROL OF AIRCRAFT . . ."

When CF104123 broke up in supersonic Cpl Achtymichuk

and "Sam" .
Murphied "THE A/C HAD BEEN DID BY ONE TECH-
NICIAN AND BFFID BY ANOTHER . . ."

/ Messages
flight 15000 feet over Primrose Lake Range
" . . . PILOTS NOTICED WEEPING ON THE
north of CFB Cold Lake last March, the pieces PkE-EXT~RNAL . . ."
scattered themselves over several square miles
Board President Maj S .G . Skinner (left), from CFB Bagot-
of snow-covered northern bush . To reliably "THE AIRCRAFT WAS DECLARED SERVICE-
vi Ile, plans an afternoon's search over (unch with Cpl
determine the cause of this disturbing accident, ABLE AND HAS SINCE BLOWN 3 .7 NIGHT
W . Careless, NCO i/c one of the CFB Cold Lake ground
it was necessary to recover all of these pieces . . . search parties.
HOURS WITHOUT ANY DISCREPANCIES."

~1ost major items of wreckage were discovered within "TNIRTY MINUTES AFTER TAKEOFF ALL
two or three davs CREW MEMBERS DETECTED STRONG ELEC-
, by~ air and ,~round search parties from
the Rase . However, the coek p~it section, vertical stabi- Most will agree that there is a certain art TRICAL FUMES ."
lizer, stabilizer servos, "kicker" unit, and tlrc: outer involved in message writing . Having mastered
portion of thc ri~ht wing toKether with its tip tank, could it, however, the drafter still can't be sure how "NORMAL BREAKING WAS APPLIED AFTER
not be found . Snowfalls, coupled with the small size nf his messa 9 e will look ot the other end for he is A NORMAL LANDING . A BANG WAS HEARD
the missing pieces, negated the use of infra-red air harossed by those same gremlins who bedevil AND A FEW SECONDS LATER A THUMPING
WAS FELT ON THE LEFT SIDE . THE AIR-
p hoto>ra
~, phv, . typographers . The following excerpts from recent
incident messages illustrate both problems : CRAFT WAS BROUGHT TO A HALT ON THE
1~'nrkin~ from the known positions of wrecka~e found
RUNWAY AND SHUT DOWN ." (Wc zcvndcr uhut
to date, and usin K the p ilot's best estimates ~f aircraft
hc "broke" to cause ull the repvrted .cyrnptoms .)
speed, height at brcakup, and mean wind, trajectories
" . . . ~ WHEN THE UNDERCARRIAGE WAS LOW-
were plotted which enabled cach piece to he "flown ERED THE FUMES BECAME STRONGER . THE "START CREW BUMPED THE JET PIPE ASSEM-
back" on paper to find the probable breakup position in MATCHES WERE OPENED AND THE FUMES BLY WITH THE RIGHT FRONT HEADLIGNT OF
space . Neights and draQ cocfficients were then estimated DISAPPEARED ." A D12 VEHICLE. . . CAUSE FACTORS : PERSON-
for the missin gP ieces, and their P robable tra'ectories
J NEL - MAINTENANCE/CF - CARELESSNESS -
plotted outwards from the likelv breakup position to pre- "LT GEN CAME OFF LINE SHORTLY AFTER PROCEEDING WITH VEHICLE WITH UNDUE
dict areas of hi h search probabilitv . START-UP . . ." CARE AND AT'~ENT10N ."
Reinforccments for the hard-workin g Cold I,ake search The Technical Member of the Board, Capt G .P . Grant
team wcre obtained from 1 Combat (~roup at Calgary and (left), examines the cockpit section with Capt Rumbold .
450 (Helicopterl Sqn 1)etachment at !~amao, and the search

Flight Commenf, Mor Apr, 1972

More on Graqhite Pencl
An article in our May-1un '71 issue entitled
"Dangerous Chemical Reactions", concerned a P hoto 1
The reassurin 9 shock of an o Penin 9 P ara-
circle drawn on an aircraft wing skin with gra- Alodized Panel - Grease Pencil - 20 hrs expo-
phite pencil . The article suggested that the sure showing no localized and minimal general chute after e'ection
i doesn't alwar s mean
graphite reacted with the aluminum alloy, pro- corrosion . r ou're out of the woods - a fact attested to
ducing accelerated local corrosion which led to by this student p ilot. Onl r his q uick think-
a "can opener" effect which eventually caused Ing In response to the new hazard facin 9
the entire disc to drop out . Response from readers
him averted the p ossibili ~r of serious in'ur
1 r
prompted DFS to obtain an evaluation from QETE
of the validity of the article . The following are durin 9 the landin 9 . All aircrew f)Y9
in air-
excerpts from the QETE report : craft equipped with e'ection
I seats mi 9 ht
ponder how ther would handle a simi lar
TEST PROCEDURES situation .
Tests werc performed on 70"r ~-TG aluminum allo~
sheet material the most commonlv. used win g skin mat- Thts was my 9th solo fltght In the Tutor. Everythtng
eriaL Some test panels werc prepared of unprotectcd had been normal during start-up, taaiing and takeoff and
stock, and others had alodized surfaces . The panels now I was climbing through 3000 feet (1100 feet AGL).
werc marked u~it}~ Kraphite pencil, grease pencil and About that time I noted that I had only 21SK and the
"11a K ic'~9arker", u~ith control P anels bein g left unmarked . Photo 2 EGT was close to the red line . At 3500 feet I started a
Thev, u ere all then P laced in a standard salt s Prav. test Alodized Panel - Graphite Pencil - 20 hrs ex- tum, keeprng a close watch on my engrne rnstruments .
chamher . posure showing localized corrosion along the As I reached 30° of bank there was a loud "bang" and
scribed pencil lines. I immediately hit the airstart and brought the throttle
TEST RESULTS back to idle . The aircraEt seemed to do a "full stop"
'1'hc unprotectcd i (li C pancls corrodcd ovcr thc uhole immediately. I noted 4200 feet on the altimeter and saw
test area, and thc marlcings made negligible difference the RPM still unwinding . When I called the tower, the
exce P t that the "~1a g ic ~larker" and K rease penci 1 mark- controller immediately responded with landing instruc-
in g s acted to srnne extent as Protective c~atin K_ . tions, however my aircraft was descending and it was
The alodized i07S P anels marked with "I`1a~ic k becoming apparent that I would be unable to make it

Close Call
ti1arker" and ~rease p encil showed verv little corrosion back to base .
after ?0., hours and were com parable to the unmarked con- As I told the controller that I intended to eject, I
trol panel (photo 1) . 'Che panel marked with reRular noted the master caution and master warning lights
g ra p hite l~ ncil, however, showed definite localized cor- glowing. I also thought-but I am not sure-that I saw
rosion alon,~ the marked lines (photo ?) . 1~7ren the period the fire waming light as well . The next time I glanced
of ex sure was extended to G4 hours the localized back at the panel there were no lights showing at all.
reaction rontinued while no general corrosion ocrurred I pulled the handles at approzimately 1000 feet above
(photo 3) . In terms of actual penetration, photo ~ shows ground .
the O.OOOS" penetration typical of the localized pitting Photo 3 After a brief period of tumbling I felt the seat sepa-
after ll? hours . After 300 hours ex~osure
> the corrosion Alodized Panel - Graphite Pencil - 64 hrs ex- rate and the chute open . I also felt my hatd 6at depart .
became lcss localized and pittinK depths reached as posure showing more severe Iocalized corrosion When the chute opened I looked up and saw a wide-
much as 0 .004 inches . and minin~al general corrosion . open canopy, but I was surprised to find the ejection
Thc results of the tests performed at Qh;TE. can ~ r-T .~ ~ r. ~ : seat right in front of me . Somehow one of the seat
hardly be directly related to field experience, houever barricr laver duc to the hardness of thc pencil ; or some handles had become tangled with a shroud line and the
thcy do indicate that a definite hazard exists . It is a combination of these effects . The QETE'~. conclusion : seat had pulled one of the risers down to a position
matter of record that authoritative references universallv Rraphite pencils do represent a corrosion hazard when 90° in front of me . Quickly I grabbed my knife Erom the
notc that there is no corrosive reaction between graphite used on hi gh stren gth aluminum allovs knife pocket and cut the shroud line, allowing the seat
, ; accordin lv .
and aluminum alloys . The QETE results do not neces- their use should be forbidden . to fall away . Moments later I landed, still clutching the
_ . __
sarilv negate these references since Rraphite pencils knife. While I was still lying on my back I put the knife
contain more than J~ust K ra P hite ~ and the P redominatin g Amendments to EO OS-1-2AU and EO 05-1- back in its pocket and got rid of the chute . I got up and
corrosive influence in the tests was the salt s Prav. en- 3/21, are being printed, stating that grease checked if I had broken anything, then I sat on the seat
vironment (no reaction occurs in dry air) . It remains, pencils are to be used . Meanwhile, all aircraft pack to await the arrival of the helicopter from Base
therefo re, somewhat con'ectural as to whether the adverse publications are being reviewed in order to delete Rescue . The helicopter made one pass but didn't see me
reaction with pencil markings is electrolytic, ratalytic any reference to the use of graphite pencils for so I put the red Elag out over my chute and was picked up
or ~ust
J tlre result of mechanical damaRe
_ to the alodized marking out repair areas . within minutes .

FIiQht Comment, Mar/Apr. 1972

 ~ . .,~~N
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"~^"~ . .~""' =.
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~T .Y

Coastal and fishery patrols, of necessity being flown at

~~,P ~ ~s
low level r encounter the added hazard of sea birds co~-I

centrated around fishing operations . There is a prohlem

of aircrew fati e as detachments usually. flv. P eriods of
by fapf T. A. Bailey concentrated operations . And above all there is the pro-
blcm of unprcdictahle weather.
UFSO, VS 880
was felt by many to be the death knel) for VS 880 . Future
Insteod, on entirely new concept of operations 'I'he Trackc.r will continue to he operated by VS 880
hos evolved for the squadron . The off-shore for an indefinite P eriod . The tasks assi ned assure a
capability was lost, but new defence priorities wide diversification of employment for the squadron pilots .
have oeneroted new roles and ta~ From detcctin g, }~hoto gr a p hin g and re p o rt ing suspected
fishing and oil pollution violations on coastal survcil-
lance hatrols, to ASW cxcrcises, SAR missions, or pro-
880 Squadron was formed as an RCN unit in May, viding air-to-ground support for the land forces, the
1951, flying Grumman Avengers from Shearwater and Trackers are bcing utilized to great advantage . VS 880
1 'S Ma gn ificent . In 19t6 the CS2F Tracker was intro-
IIhC~ will continue to provide its pilots with an interesting
duced and first flew from Hh9CS Bonaventure in 1957 . and challenging tour of duty .
Since then, manv extensive additions and modifications
ha ve been made~to the Tracker ~ rcsultin g in the C52F-3 I~I
in early 1967 . lluring thesc years, V'S 880's role had
been to develop and perfect ASL~' tactics, and to this end,
thc: squadron participated in many NATO, CAtit S and
Captain Bailey joined the RCN
in 1961 under the RnTP . After
Covld Be Famous Last Words
national exercises . qraduating with a REng(Civi1)
~rhe !~`ew Role : from RMC in 1965, h~ proceeded
With high ranking passengers aboard the small jet,
to conduct all-wcather survcillanre fliRhts over to flight traininq and received this flight crew flew their assigned mission in the fol-
waters of Canadian intcrest and ad~acent
J land his winys in April 1966 . He lowing fashion :
served operationally in VS 880 On start-up, the pilot noted his fuel quantity was
areas
from 1966 to 1969 and has now
to conduct maritime warfare erratic and he had no indicated hydraulic pressure . He
returnrd for a second tour and
to conduct operations in cooperation with other is employed as FSO . taxied to the takeoff position and upon advancing the
commands, forces and agencies throttles, noted no exhaust pressure reading . He con-
to perform search and rescue operations tinued his takeoff roll and upon becoming airborne the
during which time they ean sustain around-the-clock primary tasks of coastal reconnaissancc and those in- copilot reported no air conditioning or cabin pressuri-
The Aircraft o Pe rations for pcriods up to seven days . volving fishery and pollution patrols, new techniques zation . A decision was made to turn back, whereupon a
The Tracker is equipped for detection of surface and In operatinK from Shearwater or forward deployment had to be learned for missions such as ice reconnais- high ranking passenger stated, "If it's safe to fly, press
sub-surface vessels . It carries a four-man crew, various bases, VS 8R0 p rovides covera ge of a si Kn ificant part of sance, iceherg tracking, air-to-ground support of the land on", which they did .
combinations of bomhs, rockets and torpedoes and has an Canada's coastline, includin g the Pacific and Atlantic element , and search and rescue . Alon g with these , was The preceding was a good point that a lot of execu-
endurancc cf~ 8 hours , a cruisin ~,~ s p eed of 1 SOK and a mainland and islands and the Arctic mainland and islands . the continuing requirement to maintain the necessary tive pilots, civilian and military, are faced with daily,
maximum s }~eed of 260K . The aircraft is well suited for During the past year, the squadron deploycd in detach- expertise in the ASW role . the decision to press on at the desire of the boss . The
surveillance fliRhts and with the ability to provide cover- ments of two to six aircraft from such bases as Argentia, question in a lot of minds is, is it better to get chewed
a ge over maritime and land areas, it frees the Argus Frobisher , Fort Chimo ~ Goose Bav, Torba Y , Moosonee, Flight Safety out or fired by the boss because he was late, and live to
aircraft for lvng range and mld-ocean mtssrons . wabush, 1~''lctona, ,S ands p it , Yellowknife and N''hitehorse . As may bc expected, numerous fl~ght safety problcms work for a new boss, or be buried with the boss?
In addition, aircraft were deployed to Bermuda, Puerto occur with this diversit ~ of o Pe rations . F1 Y in g and g round It should be noted that the removal and reinstallation
The Squadron Rico, Norfolk ~' irginia, and Qunnset Point Rhode Island maintenance conditions are not always ideal. Bases and of two improperly installed cannon plugs corrected all of
'I'he ~ q uadran is comprised of three flights, each with to carrv out ASN' and training exercises . facilities in northern de P,
lavment areas are limited ; there the above discrepancies . Removal, reinstallation and
new ex periences for the
six aircraft and nine crews . '1'he flights are individually Ihese mtssl
~ ~'ons provided ~s a lack oI avallable altemates and nav~Kat~cx~ alds . checkout procedures took less than 30 minutes .
aircrew . Besides the new procedures required for thc
ca P able of q uick rcaction deployment for up to six weeks Gravel stri ps at some hases can present serious P rob}ems . l1SN (:)~0~.5FN:h;~

o Flighl Comment, Mar!Apr 1972

 TNE LAST MILI Figure 1 . Normol finol approach glide path .

Normal height
Opticaf illusions can cause some mighty embarrass-
3°
ing landing errors . "Eyc balling" the approach, particu-
larl Y at ni K ht or under stran ge field conditions, is akin
to sticking one's neck out .
hlany optical illusions are intentionally deceptive . Runway - NO slope Terrain " NO slope
created b Y sli ght of hand ~ misleadin g arran g ement of
lines, Pe rs Pe ctives, or Kaud Y colors . Knowin g the Y
exist is usuall Y enou g h to reveal their various as Pects . Figure 2. When the runway has an upslope, the nor- Normal glide path
Iiowever, illusions are so subtle that thev. g o unsus- mal glidc path will seem too steep. Flying what looks
more normal could result in a low, Flot approoch and
pccted, and since we've learned to P ut great tn~st in landing short of the runway . '--
our visual scnse it is difficult to override our inter- ,,
T ~~
pretat~ons of what we see unless we know better . In ;Possible flight poth
~ 3° ~
flying, falling victim to an optical illusion would expose
us to more than eye-strain, so we believe the following
Actuol height ;
collection on the subject has real value . ~ ' " ~ ~ ~ l°
_ _ ~ _ ~ A pparent height
Sloping terrain or Sloping Kunways (we have sever- Runway - UP slope
Terrain - NO slo Pe ' 't -
al ) can P la Y tricks with depth or height pcrccption during :
normal approaches . Four of the five conditions shown Normal glide path
in figures 1 through S have misled more than one experi- Figure 3 . When the runway has a downslope, the
__
enced pilot . Avoid these pitfalls by knowing the condi- normal glide path will look flat and there will be .
i
o tendency to overshoot.
tions on the approach to your airfield ; maintaining proper ~ ~ ~~ A pparent h e i gh t
power, airspeed, and position on VASI or ILS, and using -
i
the precision glide path rate of descent from minimum Possible flight path ~
altitude to flare will keep you out of trouble . -
-

i ~ Actual height
RUNWAY CNARACTERISTICS
Various illusions in depth and heiqht may occur as Runwoy - DOWN slope Terrain - NO slope
a result of runway characteristics :
~ The narrow runway may appear to be farther away
and longer, creating the illusion of being too low Figure 4, When there is an upslope in the approach
and P~' oducin g the I~ ssibilit Y of an overshoot . zone, the aircraft may appear to be above the normal
Apparent height ~
glide path .
~ The wide runway may appcar to be closer and
shorter, creating the illusion of being too high,
i Actuol height
possibly producing an undcrshoot . r
~ After landing, the humped ninway may appcar to ~~a 3o r
be shorter because the far end may not always bc --- ------f--------
in sight, possibly producing very heavy bcaking,
blown tire, and loss of directional control . refraction problem caused by the water on the wind Terrain - UP slope
Runwa Y - NO slope
screen . This would cause the horizon image to appear
RUNWAY LIGHTING below the true horizon .
Actual height
Similar illusions in depth and height may result Figure 5. When there is a downslope in the approach
under varying conditions or runway lighting : RUNWAY CONTRAST zone, the pilot will believe the oircraft to be on a low,
~ The dimlY-lit runwa Y may appear to be farther lllusions are also created by the contrast of thc flat approach, assuming the slope is not re°dily dis- ,
away, crcating the- illusion of being too low . This runway and the surrounding terrain : cernible . 'r APPa rent height
again introduces the possibility of an overshoot . ~ A snow covered runway or a dimly-lit runway may T
3°
~ The bri ghtl Y -lit runway may appcar to be closer, lack sufficient contrast to provide good depth
creating the impression of being too high . An perception . Not only is there a possibility of an ---- --------f-----
undershoot is the possible result . overshoot or undershoot, a hard landing can [
Terrain - DOWN slope
~ The absence of lighting in the approach zone result from an improperly judged altitude at flare . Runway - NO slope

mcreases the strength of the illusion created ~ A concrete runwa Y on a sand surface or a macadam
by the other two lighting problems . runway surrounded by dark foliage will provide
similar difficulties . action can be disastrous . "Eye balling" the approach ~ The use of the precision glide path rate of descent
VISIBILITY RESTRICTIONS path is something the professional pilot resorts to only fram minimums to flare .
Encountering visual illusions under conditions of CONCLUSIONS when the aids that will give him glide slope guidance ~ Careful study of the approach plate including
restricted visibility from haze, smoke, dust, fog, dark- lllusions and their effects can be minimized by the are not available . lighting systems, runway lengths and slopes .
ness, glare, ram or snow ~s also a poss~bil~ty . V~s~6il~ty p~lot who ~s aware of the factors wh~ch produce them . The safe smooth execution of the "last milc" usually ~ Full em PYlo ment of all Possib}e aids such as
restrictions reduce or eliminate many of the visual cues Simply think about these things before each flight and involves all of the following: 1LS, GCA, VASI and flight ~nstruments .
used in perception . When flying in rain, in addition to just before each approach . The consequences of not ~ Maintenance of proper power, airspeed and position If it doesn't look right - Take the bird around .
the reduction in visibility there is the likelihood of a considering these illusions and not taking appropriate on the 1'ASI or ILS . AIRSCOOP

FIigM Comment, Mar Apr 1972 '

 tube, the Radar Controllers, on a few precision app- techniques are up to par . If not, then we are gambling
roaches, you may find that your next square pattern with the lives . . . of ourselves, our crews and our pas-
doesn't have to be the same size as one flown by a 707 . sengers .
Have you ever asked Radar to experiment with approaches Instrument Ratings are valid for one year . We are
suited to a helicopter's capability? It's up to us, the required to fly only S hours per quarter IF, but how often
rotary wing afficionados, to make sure that we don't do we find ourselves squeezing those last few hours into
develop into an esoteric little clique, outside the main- those last few days? How much of our IF time is really
stream of aviation - a sure way to be treated as an out- good instrument practice? Do you remember those straight
sider . Remember, a little empathy can make for a lot of and level trips between Trenton, Ottawa and Petawawa
. sympathy . So much for one aspect of helicopter operations when you logged 3 hours simulated because the end of
but what about the whole question of Insttument Flying? the quarter was close?

HELICOPTERS IFR
For at least six months of the year in Canada we are How good are your terminal procedures? Can you
by Capt Baz Lawlor,450 Sqn unable to fly helicopters in actual cloud conditions be- handle any type of approach that ATC may give you?
cause of icing problems . On the other hand, clouds in the Just how good is your heading control? Is your RT pro-
summer often pose a hazard because of thunderstorm cedure getting just a little bit rusty? How about lost
activity and the turbulence associated with cumulus orientation? If you become IFR unintentionally will you
build-ups . Add to this the inherent instability of our be able to orientate to the dials immediately? How do
"Well now that we have seen each other" said the unicorn machines, our lack of fuel to guarantee alternate require- you recover from an unusual attitude caused by vertigo
"If Y ou'll believe in me " ~'~ `'°~ ~~" - ments, a dearth of appropriate instrumentation, and I am or disorientation? Can you fly IFR safely with one or
almost ready to agree with my jet jockey friend that the more emergencies to handle?
I'll believe in Y ou .
value of Instrument Flying in helicopters is questionable . The point of all these merciless questions is that
Is that a bar9 ain?" (Alice) Throu 9 h the Lookin 9 Glass . instrument flying in helicopters is not an area for com-
Why not just fly ESVFR (Extra Special VFR)? That's a
euphemism for the old sneak and peek trick . Well, for placency or "we don't need it" attitudes . The U .S . has
"IFR in a helicopter! ~'ou must be joking!" saic] a jct those of you who need convincing, rare occasions do discovered from bitter experience how important instrument
flying can be in what is essentially a VFR operation .
J'ockev. friend as he watched me fill out an IFK Fli~ht  arise when an IFR Flight Plan allows a mission to be
Plan for a C1I113A Voyageur . I assessed the remark as flown which would otherwise stay on the ground . As Let's profit from their experience, use our excellent
tv:p ical of fixed win g i gnorance and p roceede d to p oi nt pilots we are trained to exploit the capabilities of our training and common sense by making ptoper use of our
out that mv trustv, sleed had as much ri g ht to the airwavs aircraft and to deny instrument practice is to lose an instrument time .
,
as any. stiff win g and was 9 uite ca 1 ~ablc of fl ~~in g ADF, important facet of the pilot's art . Finally, there is always Finally, if you are having a little trouble when . . .
Radar, T~~CAN, and all that g ood stuff - J'ust like his that slight chance of rnadvertently entering IF conditions - "under the bag", take heart from the White Queen's
raunchv old T-Rird . a mistake made by even the most seasoned rotary wingers . words to Alice :
Since this incident 1 have been in many situations Paradoxically, it is because we only fly IFR so rarely "1 daresay you haven't had much practice, When
wherr demonstrated i g norance of helico Pter ca P abilities that our level of instrument f lying must always be at 1 was your age, 1 always did it ~or halJ-an-hour
and limitations on the part of non-rotarv wingers has peak . On those few occasions when we are required to a day. Why, sometimes 1've believed as marcy as
E~rom p ted me to sa Y "Yo~i must be J'okin g '." However file are we always certain that our IF procedures and six impossible things beJore breakf ast."
some of these situations have been P otential}v hazardous
and with the increased use of hclico~ters
F in the Canadian
Forces this "communications gap" will tend to increase

Obey yo1~r urge to b~ eathe

unless a concerted effort is made to achieve some "to-
getherness" . ,~tternpts are being made to educate the
CRUNTS (Gmundlings of Renown hndergoing Numerous
Trainin g Schemes) in the safe conduct of helico p ter "lleath by drowning," read the coroner's certificatc . swimmers rnay not even realize he's in trouble until he
operations, but have we really spread the good word "Rut he was an ex P ert swimmer " said iriends . "1~'hat loses all conscio u sn ess , automaticallv breathes , and , in
among our friends in the air environment ; the pilots and happened'" Studies by Albert R . Craig, .ir ., Assistant the case of the urr d erwater .swimmer , drowns .
air traffic controllers who, in the main, see helicopters Professor of Phvsiolo gY at the UniversitY of Kochester To simulate underwater swimming in the laboratory,
as vou di~l before you . . . became a r~~a! pilot . School of hledi c~ine and Dentistr y, indicate that one of Dr . Craig designed and perfonned experiments involving
I ." y'ou are clea r e d t o hove r over the heac on at s even
. . the ways in w}rich a person may droWl) IS to voluntarily hypcrvcntilation, breath-holding and exercise . In the
I thousand (pause) . Can you do that?"
I hold his breath too long and thereby lose consciousness laboratorY , the exercise consisted of ridin g a stationar Y
"Y'ou are cleared for a vertical takeoff to three thou- w}rile swimmin K underwater . Contestants in underwater bicycle . It was noted that when the subjccts overbreath-
I
sand feet ."Thcse are representative of some of the ed, then exercised while holding their breath as long as
I swimmin g events mav , be es P eciall YP rone to this dan ger
classic clearances received by the whirling wonders . because, under the stress and excitement of competition p ossible ~ the concentration of ox Ygen in their lun g s be-
'Che consequences of abiding by these clearances would came very low. One danger of low oxyKen concentration
they may ignore their own built-in "urge to breathe."
have made interc:sting reading in Flight Comment so how The P ossibilitv. of such an accident is increased bv, is that the sub'ect
J has little or no warnin g that he is
can we, as helicopter operators, help close this communi- about to lose consciousness .
the common practice of "overbreathing" (hyperventila-
cations gap'
tin g,)before swimmin g underwater . Overbreathin g de P letes Ur . Craig's advice to would-bc merrnaids and frog-
First of all, have vou ever discussed the peculiarities, men : in swimmin g underwater, obey vour natural urge to
the bod y~ of carbon dioxide, which is the main factor con-
or rather, the singular qualities of helicopter flight with trolling the urge to breathe . Thus, the urge to breathe is hreathe , and don't com P romise its effectiveness by. over-
thc controllers at vour base? Have vou taken the Tower breathingbefore you swim .lIe urges swrm«ung instrtrctors
delaved to the point at which the oxygen supply is in-
controller fur a farniliarization ride to show him just what ade q uate and the P erson loses consciousness . In such and water s P orts ofGcials to de-em P hasize com P etition
your flight envelope is? ,A quick trip may help to eliminate where thc prize might depend large}y on the length of
cases, the swimmer may havc little or no warning that he
those weird clearances and next time .vou probabl Y won't trme the underwater swrmmer can hold hrs breath .
is about to pass out . He may even continue swimming for
bc askcd to park next to that light aircraft that isn't tied a few more seconds . As a rcsult observers or fellow Aviation 4tedical Bulletin
down! If you takc thosc unsung hcroes of the cathode
~A
15
 . . . the navigator and filight safety

-~ J '
~- .
r

Remote Control Unit located in the cockpit and provides

the following ;
The recent acquisition of CPI equipment for CF a. Deploy switch (can be deployed manually in
passenKer carr~~inK aircraft means that all CF aircraft addition to various frangible switches which
will now carry some form of locator capabilit~~, either as
by Copt Gilles Bussieres will release the airfoil in the event of a crash) .
standard aircraft equipment or as an itcm of aircrew° b. Battery Test Button monitor
UFSO, CFANS personal survlval equiprnent . Addltronallv, most passen~;er
to the battery
charge circuit .
carrvinx
. _ aircraft (Herculcs, Falcon and Buffalo ) will c . Test Monitor Button to check the beacon trans-
carrv. a valuable accident in~~esti ~ ation svstem,
. the Fli ht mission and PilotiCo-pllot audio channels .
Is the navigator's involvement in Flight Safety super-
Uata Recorder . It is Planned to ,P u ~rade the P resent i0i d . System OniOff Switch to control system start
fluous? Some compare it to a non-paying passen ger at
svstem and consideration is bern~ ~iven CPI ;'Fl-)R in- and stop .
best, a back seat driver (pejorative sense only} at worst.
After all, are defensive driving courses directed to auto- stallation for the Cosmo . '1'he Twin Otter, ~4usketeer and e. Recorder Failure indicator light.
helicopters will he equipped with a CPI only . f. Replay indicator light.
mobile passengers? Of course not! Even the Directorate
of Flight Safety recognizes that attitude when it clas- Thc followin ;; are brief descriptions of the CPI and g . Battery charge indicator light .
associated equipment :
stftes navrgators after the weather forecasters in the
"Other Personnel" column (Annual Aircraft Accident
CPI Crash Position Indicator A ?~3 .0 h1Ii7. beacon
Analysis 1970, p. 7)~ There is nothing particularly up-
enclosed in an airfoil which is activated when
setting with this attitude, unless navigators advocate it
the airfoil is ejected either manually or auto-
themselves, m which case tt leads to a dangerous tn-
maticallv on crash deceleration .
difference, not only toward flight safety, but also toward
FDR Flight Data Recorder Provides a recordink of
the ulttmate goal-accomplrshment of the mtsston .
selected aircraft operating parameters durinR
Navigators are members of a specialized team dedi-
,~!

the prevrous 30 mlnutcs . w

cated to mission accomplishment . They owe it to them~
CVR Cockpit Voice Recorder Records cockpit
selves and to every member of the team to be an active responsibtlrty . Remember mstead that tnvolvement may
save costly material resources or even human lives . This voice and radio communication during the
and effective link in every phase of every mission.
is reason enough to make it your business too. previous 30 mioutes . Recorder This recorder is located in the airfoil . The
Providing safe and accurate navigation regardless
To be prepared for a given mission then, means much CPh''FDR FUR and CPl in the same packaKc . package contains the tape deck and a tape of the previous
of the situation is not easy . It is made complex by the
DAPI Downed Aircraft Position Indicator Civilian 30 m inutes of flight . From the accident investigation point
vagaries of weather, equipment unserviceabilities and more than just planning it . It also means anticipating
problem areas and resolving them in advance . A fter all, nomenclature for the (' P1 . of view it i s most important that thi s be located and
so on, all of which can severely test the navigator's
skills . emergency procedures have evolved from just such antici- turned over to the investigators . It should be quarantined
pation . Above all, care must be exercised to prevent and not tampered with in any way . DFS will issue dis-
The navigator has a vital role to play in the approach
and landing phase . Since this is where most aircraft routine tasks from leading to complacency. posal instructions .
accidents occur, it is no time for the navigator to consider Fellow navigators, ask no more whether you are
his work finished . It is a time to monitor approach clear- involved in Flight Safety . Ask instead, "What more can
ances, check clearance limits, monitor the approach I do for Flight Safety?" And by the way, do you know
itself with all the instrumentation at his command, and why the Directorate of Flight Safety ranks the navigator
assist the pilot with pertinent and useful information . behind the weather forecasters in the "Other Personnel"
Reporting and discussing unserviceabilities, danger- section? It is because we make fewer errors than they do .
ous procedures or problem areas with other members of Courtes Y HOT LINE
the team, on the ground or in the air, is another involve-
ment . The navigator should not be tempted to say that it
is none of his business or that it is outside his area of Capt Bussleres gmduated from
ANS in 1957 . Followinq qmdu-
'~CFP 135B (Flight Sa/ety For The Canadian ation, he had consecutive tours
Forces) recognixes the involvement o f "other with 426 and 437 Squadrons,
and ~4 (T) OPemtional Traininq Airfoil contains the Recorder System and Radio Beacon
aircrew" as cause Jactors. Chapter 16, article,
Unit . A recrultinq tour at Chicou- located atop the base which is fixed in the aircraft . The
16041 . c. reads : "Personnel - Other Personnel. timi was followed by two years
Any other persons, such as othe~ flight crew, as liaison officer at Laval photo shows the location of the switch to turn the beacon
passengers, air trafJic controllers, meteorological University . He has beai on off after it has been located 1 , and the location of re-
/orecasters . . ." By the way, we've changed the staff at CFANS since 1970, corder which is removable 2 . The airfoil is not a "black
_197_1 Annual . box" . It is painted' International Orange' .

Flight Commenf, Mar Apr 1972 17

 Good Show vehicle . Cpl Lewis ran to the hangar for the large C02
fire bottle while Cpl 0'Donnell rushed to the L-14 desk
CPL D.T . DOVE
to call the Base Fire Department . While checking the controls of a Tracker prior to
MCpI Fairhall and Cpl Lewis were required to use the launch, Cpl Dove noticed two screws missing from the
C02 extinguisher several times as the fire in number two lower left fairing assembly on the vertical stabilizer . The
engine repeatedly burst into flames, however they suc- portion of the fairing from which the screws were missing
ceeded in completely extinguishing the fire before the is in an obscure area normally covered by the elevator
arrival of a fire fi tin g vehicle . and only when the elevator is fully extended upward are
The timely action and unrehearsed teamwork displayed the screws visible from the ground .
by these four airmen averted a senous fire on the aircraft . C P 1 Dove's attention to detail resulted in the discove
of a condition which could have resulted in a serious in-
flight control problem .
CPL C .J . RIDEOUT
Cpl Rideout was removing the tapered pins from the
CAPT K .J . HOWARD MCPL A.L. ANDERSON
horizontal stabilizer torque tube in the course of a CFSD
During a periodic inspection on a Hercules, MCpI
CPL L .W . NANCARROW sampling inspection at AMDU . Finding one pin seized, he
removed the right horizontal stabilizer actuator to gain Anderson, an airframe technician, removed a wing root
Cpl R .G. Heans Cpl F .T. Lewis
Capt lioward and Cpl Nancarrow were on duty in the extra working area . He then examined the area closely panel to allow other trades to carry out their part of the
Bagotville Terminal Control when a MAYDAY call was MCpI K .D . Fairhall Cpl W .A . 0'Donnell inspection schedule . When the panel was removed, he
and discovered a deep groove on the right horn assembly .
received from the pilot of a light aircraft lost in cloud Further inspection revealed a similar, although less took the opportunity to carry out a general inspection
over mountainous terrain . The weather over the area at severe, condition on the left horn assembly . of the area ; his inspection revealed an extensive crack
the time was 3000 feet broken with extensive low visi- Actuator removal is not a requirement of the sampling in the TEE-beam fitting, as well as sheared and stretched
bility in haze . inspection . It would not have come up in the inspection bolts in the same area .
Capt lioward was able to get a DF bearing from the card system for 600 hours, until the next 800-hour in- b4Cpl Anderson's initiative in carrying out a check
first transmission heard by Bagotville . He advised the spection . Consequently, had it not been for Cpl Rideout's not called for in his particular inspection procedures,
pilot to climb to 5000 feet to keep him clear of obstruc- extra effort, the unsatisfactory condition might not have averted further damage to the aircraft which could have
tions and gave him a heading to steer for Bagotville . He been discovered until it caused a malfunction of the had serious flight safety implications .
then kept up a conversation to restore the worried pilot's horizontal stabilizer during flight .
confidence, while Cpl Nancarrow attempted to locate
CPL A. CARPENTER
the aircraft on radar . The two controllers spotted the
lost aircraft simultaneously, and having established Cpl Carpenter was inspecting the nose landing gear
positive ID, they vectored the pilot to a safe landing at during a primary inspection on a Hercules when he found
Bagotville . Lt E .R . Copeman a crack in the upper attaching bracket for the nose-gear
The timely and competent assistance given by Capt steering actuator . Investigation revealed that with normal
Iloward and Cpl Nancarrow, averted possible disaster for MCpI R . Bradshaw hydraulic steering pressure, this crack opened approxi-
the civilian pilot . mately 3/16 of an inch .
Although inspection of the nose-gear is part of a
MCPL R . BRADSHAW he informed the Base Flight Safety Officer of the situa- primary inspection, Cpl Carpenter's examination was
tion . Command l~eadquarters were subsequently notified particularly thorough ; it was apparent that the crack had
MCpI Bradshaw was watching from the tire bay as a occurred some time ago .
and a UCR raised .
Dakota taxied between two hangars . Suddenly the air- Cpl Carpenter, like many others on the base, had
Lt Copeman's keen observations and good memory
craft's brakes failed and a stron ggust of wind caused it Cpl A. Carpenter been subjected to the fatigue of twelve-hour workshifts
prevented the possibility of expensive damage to the
to weathercock 180 degrees . When the aircraft came to a and the pressure generated by Exercise Running Jump II .
aircraft .
stop the pilot shut down the engines while the first Cpl D .T. Dove Despite this, he took that little bit of extra care that
officer raced to the nearest hangar for chocks . may well have prevented a serious accident .
During the first officer's absence MCpI Bradshaw MCPL K .D . FAIRHALL CPL F .T . LEWIS
saw the aircraft start to roll backwards towards one of CPL W .A. 0'DONNELL CPL R .G . HEANS CPL S.G. MAX
the hangars . He quickly ran out and stopped the aircraft
by placing tires behind the main wheels . MCpI Fairhall, Cpl Lewis, Cpl 0'Donnell and Cpl Cpl Max was `front-end' man on a CF104 start . When
MCpI Bradshaw's quick thinking prevented the aircraft Heans were sent to investigate the unserviceability of he marshalled the aircraft out of the line after all post-
from being blown against the hangar . an Argus that was taxiing in with number two engine shut start checks were completed, he noticed a very fine
down because of smoke in the area of the power recovery accumulation of hydraulic fluid around the collar of the
turbine .
LT E .R . COPEMAN When the other three engines were being shut down,
MCpI A .L . Anderson nose section . He signalled the pilot to stop in order to
investigate the apparent leak . As the aircraft stopped,
I,t Copeman, a Hercules first officer, was preparing MCpI Fairhall noticed flames coming from the number two the nose oleo went completely flat and hydraulic fluid
for a flig~t in an aircraft that had just been overhauled engine . The intensity of the fire indicated that fuel was could be seen leaking from it .
at a civilian contractor . He decided to examine the ex- leaking onto the hot turbine . Fast action was required . ~.,.
The faint indications that something was amiss could
terior of the aircraft closely since the overhaul had The deplaning aircrew were immediately informed of Cpl C.J . Rideout easily have gone undetected during marshalling . Discovery
included a paint job . The examination revealed that the the hazardous situation while Cpl Heans manoeuvred an of the malfunction by Cpl Max prevented the possibility
painted designs had been outlined in lead pencil . aircraft towing vehicle into position so that MCpI Fairhall of damage to the airframe due to lack of proper shock
Remembering an article he had read about the cor- could use it as a stand as he attempted to contain the fire absorption during taxi, takeoff, or landing . It also showed
rosive action of graphite pencil lead on an aircraft skin, with the small dry chemical fire extinguisher stored on the

18 19
GOOD SHOW
gation revealed that several other aircraft had been fitted
with similar cables and it was found that stocks held by
that his previous checks on the aircraft were complete

~Ca~h-bach
an overhaul contractor were also unacceptable . Had this
and thorough, as he was immediately aware of even a condition remained undetected, the sheathing may have
small discrepancy . come loose during flight, jamming the stabilizer controls .
Si ificantl 5~
~ the ins pection of these cables was
CPL R .S. BUCKINGHAM made on Cpl Shepherd's own initiative, as it was not part " . . . In those days, the average pilot could expect
approximately one crash per flying hour, and only the
of the acceptance check . This was the second occasion
4y'hile conducting a routine check on a 707 engine exceptional pilot survived more than fiftti~ hours before
in little over a year in which his thorough inspection
following completion of the periodic inspection, Cpl killing himself . . .
resulted in a timely discovery which prevented the de-
Buckingham spotted what appeared to be a crack at " . . I would like to den y~ one rumour , to thc effect
velopment of a potentially dangerous situation . For Cpl
the weld in the upper mounting suphort of the fuel/oil that I tested the structure for strength by placing a
She E~herd his second Good Show .
cooler . This support is located in an area where it chicken between the wings and if the chicken was able
is very difficult to determine the presence of cracks to free itself from the maze of struts and wires, we added
without removing the existing lines, oil cooler, and tank . CPL M .E . RAMSDEN more sttucture . . . - it generated great clouds of dust ;
After discussing the situation with maintenance " . . . To prove the safety and controllability of the - it had one minor technical problem-it would
W'hile carrying out a routine daily inspection on a
technicians-who expressed doubt that the area was multi-motor concept, a motor would be deliberately shut not fly-but otherwise it was a good helicopter ;
CUH1N helicopter, Cpl Ramsden noticed excessive play
cracked-Corporal Buckingham was still not satisfied, down in flight while the mechanics would climb out on - control and stability were serious problems . 'I`he
in a flight control . Pursuing the inspection further he
so he wrote up an unserviceability against the aircraft . the wings and change the spark plugs as a demon- first motion pictures showed such an unstable
found worn bearings in the scissors lever assembly . He
The cooler, tank, and lines were subsequently removed stration . . . A number of stimulating incidents occurred, and erratic machine that we never showed the
then checked the same item on three other aircraft and
and a non-destructive testing check revealed not one, including an engine fire in mid-air (put out by two men films to outsiders except in slow motion, which
found discrepancies that led to the replacement of a total
but two cracks in the mount . climbing out on the wings and beating out the flames slowed the darting and bobbing into graceful
of seven bearings .
The key point in this incident was Cpl Buckingham's with their coats) . . . weaving . . .
Cpl Ramsden's professional approach to his job
P ersistence . Had the materiel breakdown not been found, " . . . The unusual configuration of my S-38 soon " . . . After one of our early demonstrations to a few
demonstrates the high quality of CF tradesmen . His
it is likely that the aircraft would have experienced earned it a variety of descriptions, one of which was guests, one of them said : `It's a remarkable machine . It
discovery of the worn bearings averted the possibility of
engine failure as a result of oil starvation . `a collection of aviation spare parts flying in loose hovers, flies sideways and even backwards . But I haven't
an in-flight bearing failure and its attendant hazards . seen it fly forward' . I was forced to answer ; `Yes . ., for-
formation' . . .
This is the second Good Show awarded to Cpl Ramsden . ward fli (~ t is a minor technical P roblem we have not
" . . . My first helicopter demonstrated many of the
MCPL C.S. LLEWELLYN characteristics of modem helicopters : solved yet' . In fact for some time the helicopter flew
MCpI Llewellyn was assigned as Flight Enginecr for - it cost considerable money ; better backwards than forward . However, by steady,
a niAht training flight on a Buffalo . As he was conducting - it made a great deal of noise ; patient work we solved these problems . . ."
the P re-fli ¬,h t ins P ection (in darkness ) he discovered a - it had much vibration ; from a lecture by Igor $ikorsky

seized bearing in an outboard flap hinge .

MCpI Llewellyn displayed his professional approach
to routine pre-flight inspections and by locating a mal-
function, in an area difficult to inspect under the best

Now's your Wz?

of conditions, he averted a possible in-flight flap failure .

Cpl R .S . Buckingham
CPL J .A . SHEA
Cpl Shea was watching from a towing tractor at Line
The "Remarks" portion of an hourly weather report may
Servicing as a llercules was being started some distance contam valuable Informatton . Test your knowledge by
away . When number one engine started he noticed exces-
matching the abbreviation on the left with its meaning on
sive smoke emission from the turbine area and quickly
the right .
drove across the ramp towards the aircraft, signalling the MCpI C.S . Llewellyn
crew to shut down the engine . All cockpit indications had
been normal to this time.
Theinvestigation uncovered an internal oil leak which l . COTRA A . frost on the indicator
2 . VIRGA B . cold transitional air
was causing oil to spill overboard through air valves into
the turbine area, where high engine temperatures during 3 . PKH;sSx>z C . lightning cloud to cloud
Cpl N.A. Shepherd 4 . FROIN I) . dri ftinR snow
takeoff could possibly have ignited the oil . The turbine
area has no fire fighting capability . S . KOCT}' E . frozen index
Cpl Shea's recognition of the problem and his quick b . I,TGCC F . balloon ceiling overcast
i . BINOVC precipitation not rcaching ground
reaction probably saved the Hercules crew from the hazard
8 . DRFTG SN41' H~ cold air over citv
of an in-flight fire .
I . contrails
J~ breaks in the avercast
CPL N .A . SHEPHERD K. pressure rising rapidly
L. smoke over citv
While carrying out an acceptance check on a CF104,
Cpl M .E . Ramsden Answers on page 23
Cpl Shepherd observed that the stabilizer cable sheathing
was crimped at one end rather than swaged the entire
length . As a result of his observation a further investi- Cpl J .A . Shea

20 Flight Comment, Mar ; Apr 1972 21

 On the Dials the reciprocal of' the track of the arriving aircraft, ate from the on course or glide path unless immediate requested by the pilot . In all cases both
In our Iravels we're ofte faced with "Hey you're on ICP, whal obout suth- provided : corrective action has been taken by the final con- DND and ~110T W'ILL give any warning of
ond-such?" "Usually, these questions cannot be answered out of hand ; if it
1 . the departing aircraft is airborne or, if troller . any situation which, in the controllers
were that easy the queslion wouldn't have been asked in the firsl ploce.
Ouesfions, suggestions, or rebuttals will be happily enferlained and if not
crossing runways arc used, has crossed But are we aware of any different practices be- judgement is likely to affect the safety of
answered in print we sholl attempt to give a personal answer . Please direct ony
<ommunicotion to: Bose Commander CFB Winnipeg, Westwin, Man. Attn : ICPS.
the centreline of the runway on which the twecn DND and N90T radar approaches'? the flight .
landing will be made before the arriving 1 . When cleared to the airport for a radar
No drscussion of radar approaches could be com-
aircraft reaches 2 miles from the end of approach DND requires that an alternate
RADAR the runway ; clearance to the airport be included in the
plete if distance from the touchdown at minimums
wete not mentioned, On a ?-1'?° glide path at ?00
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL 2 . when the possibility of a missed approach
exists, lateral separation from the missed
event of communications failure - h40T
does not, but gives missed approach in-
feet thz aircraft would be posltioned .7> of a nautical
mile from touchdown . On a 3'' glide path at ?00 feet
approach course is assured immediately structions in event of lost communicalions,
What are the rules'? Ilow are thcy applied? Are the aircraft would be positioned .6?~ of a nautical
after takeoff, and ; ? . DND requires that the pilot be advised of
procedures the same fot MO'T and DND? mil~ f_rom touchdown,
3, thc arriving aircraft will not carry out a the minimum altitude ~ASL) for the ap-
c~rcling procedure, proach ; that is, decision height for PAR ~~1ost of the preceding information was extracted
THE PURPOSE
Radar separation may be applied between an air- and minimum descent altitude with ASR . from CFP 164 where reference is frequently made to
The purpose of utilizing radar in controlling tht;
craft taking off or aircraft executing missed app- This is not the case with MOT . LOPS . Be sure and check yours .
flight paths of aircraft is to expedite the flow of
roaches and other radar controlled aircraft, provided 3 . Prior to the aircraft commencing final
trafltc, -
that in the controller's judgement, ihe dep<trting or descent the DND controller shall confirm
'1'he most crucial phasc of radar ATC is positive
missed approach aircraft will be identified within aircraft altitude and altimeter setting, and
ident~ticatton . Radar ~dentification shall be estab-
one mile of the end of the runway and radar separa- provide a gear check . Although most MOT
lished before radar control service is provided and
tion will be established at that point, and continuing controllers do give th~s informatron it rs
shall be mt;intained until radar control scrvicc is
separation from all other aircraft can be assured . not a r~quirement ; they are, however,
terminated . If identification is lost, the pilot shall requ~red to grve a gear check when rssu~ng
be notified and reidentification aceomplished imme- landtng clearance .
TERRAIN CLEARANCES
diately or standard IFR separation established . The ~, If specified in LOPS military controllers OF THE MONTH
When an aircraft is being vectored (e .g, vectors
IFF;'SIF transponder (sccondary surveillance radar) give a 3 second break while on precision
to a straight-in final approach) the controller is Because the pre-takeoff check had been done
provides A'l'C with the most effective method of approaches . MOT does not have this re- several minutes before takeoff, the T33 canopy
responsible for ensuring that 1000 feet terrain clear-
radar identification . Standard civil IFF'SlF code quirement, had been left cracked an inch or two . After
ance is provided, Ilowever an aircraft may be vec-
takeoff, a cold breeze through the cockplt alerted
assignmcnt for arr traffic control may bc found in 5, When both military and civilian controllers
tored at an altitude which does not provide adequate the instructor in the rear seat to the fact that
MOT MANOPS ART ~12 whereas local code assign- icrrain clearance above a prominent are on continuous transmit, a pilot is un- the canopy was still open . The speed was 190K
obstruction
ments are included in LOPS (Local Operating Pro- able to interrupt thcse transmissions . a s the instructor took control and told the student
provided that the obstruction is indicated on the
to close the canopy . Neither cockpit's electrical
cedures) . Discussions reveal that many military
radar drsplay and at least 5 mrles separat~on ~s switch was effective, so the manual crank had
maintained between the aircraft and the obstruction controllers do issue corrections in short to be used to close the canopy, which was then
SEPARATION STANQARDS until the aircraft has definitely passed the obstruc- transmissions thus allowing two-way com- locked -alld the mission continue_d!
Radar controlled aircraft shall be separated by tion . munications . At present this decision is
a minimum of 3 miles when less than 40 miles f~rorn apparently personal preference and appears
thc radar antcnna - otherwise a minimum of 5 miles DND - MOT to be determined by aircraft type . "The
Answers to Wx Quiz
shall be applicd . This separation shall be applied Now that we have introduced some of the basics ICP school would appreciate feedback
1-I ?-G 3-K 4-A ~-L 6-C 7- .J 8-D
betwcen : of radar control with which we were probably not too from anyone able to shed some light on
l . two or more aircraft under radar control ; familiar, let's discuss radar approaches, with which this subject .
a radar controlled arrcraft and all ob- we are all well acquainted - or are we? 6, During surveillance approaches, h40T
issue the recommended altitude at each
served unknown radar targets, and ; Do we know that a final controller shall accept Taxiway Markers
3, a radar controlled aircraft and the boundary control on only one aircraft or formation at a time? mile from the end of the runway, whereas
of airspace in which non-radar separation Of coursc we do? llND issue range and azimuth information It was suggested that taxiway identifier signs be instal-
led similar to those at mojor bases such as Ottawa and
is in effect . And we're certainly aware that there are no pre- leaving the descent to MDA at the dis-
Trenton . They would be of good value to visiting aircrew
W'hen an arriving aircraft on final approach is scribed limits for acceptable course or glide path cretion of the pilot . It should be noted and would reduce the RT on ground frequency .
that the military controller is also able
radar tdentifted, an atrcralt may be permrtted to take deviation . We know that after commencement of final Thr Flight Safet~~ Committee

off in a direction which differs by at least ~5° from approach the aircraft shall not be permitted to devi- to issue the rzcommended altitudes if

22 Flighf Comment, Mar Apr 1972 23

 BIRD WATCHERS' CORNER

heaw brakinx_ and shiftin~ into

neutral .
The investi~ators found that the occurrence indicates a need to re-
throttle linka ge had become discon- view quality assurance and the
l1RG( S . A'1"f .aCIih:U BY TOA'l'~G nected from the carburetor, at which standards of acce P tance ins P~-~ctions :
1'R,t1CTOR !~s the tractor, with thc point the throttle went to full the tractor was brand new, having a
towbar attached, was backing into power-a design feature hi~hly total of onlv 14 hours runnin K time .
position in preparation for towin~, desirable for some aircraft , but of All told~ it turned out to be an
the vchicle suddenlv aceelerated dubious value in ~round-bound expensive crunch-$16,000, a con- 1
and crashed heavilv I into the air- towing tractors . servative estimate for re P airs to
craft radome des p ite the driver's An additional aspect of this the radome alone .

VO()D00, ti1Ii)AIR COLLlSIOti A with lead . The dama~e was minor

~-plane sectian uas workin,K up for a and all aircraft landcd separatclv
formation dis P, lav to be held in a without furthcr incident .
few da~~s . On their second practice 'I'his marked the seventh midair
of thc dav thev crossed their 1P on since 1969 . Invariablv thc causcs
timc but . sli g htlv, fast, and E~o«er have been verv~ basic-in this in-
was reduccd to a low~ setting to stance failure~to establish win>ti
kP
ensurc p ro f~ r "on-~ta K e" time . clearance . Fortunatelv, it was an
The lead called the formati~n from inex P ensive refresher, lesson this
hox to line ahreast about ?-3 miles timc .
out . Durin~ this chan~e #? collided

1'001)(~0, Pl'1'('H('P '['he mission pitchup . Recovery procedures were

was a Vooduo transition mission ; initiated and worked as advertised .
thc manoeuvre was a simulatcd, co- '1'his manoeuvre is not simple ;
altitude break . As is the normal the pilot has very little "~" to w~ork
-..~ -
practice, the instructor counted with at normal s P ceds and must
down to a simulated "fire si Kn al" thcrefore utilizc: what "~" he has to
expectin~ the student to then un- the max imurn . If there is a moral to
load the "~" sli~htly, roll to ap- this story, it is this : Don't "rouQh
proximately y0° of bank, then smooth- handle" the 'v'oodoo-make vour
tlv incrcase the "K" loadinK to the control inputs snooth
r and deliherate
"~limiter" boundarv . Ilowcver, the and u~utch that PRJ (Pitch Eioundary
studcnt entered I t}re rnanoeuvre Indicator} . Ln,~incers arc now attempt-
rou K hlv. . This disen a ecj the "lim- in,~ to modify thc "limiter" system
iter" so that when he increased the to improve the. protection ~iven
<<~» loadin~ he pulled rikht into
during similar manoeuvres .

CF100, ()FF Tlih: Rl!Nti~Al' At onc

and a half miles on final everythin~
sequent hcavv brakinR and noscwheel
stcerinK did not salva~e the situation
Routine endeavours somctimcs havc
a wav of becomin~ ve.ry excitin~
BLUNDER-HEADED THROTTLE BASHER
appeared normal as the crew com- and thc arrcraft ran off the srdc of before~ the y~ are com p leted .
pleted the pre-landin~ check, but the runway just before reachin~ Years of experience have produced a wariness of the unpredictable behaviour which
whcn the aircraft crossed the thres- thc end . It made its wav across makes this flying oddity the terror of the nesting ground . Regard the characteristic com-
hold it was hiQh and hot (l0h fast) . sorne SO vards of sod and~ camc to motion (oblivious to him) in the wake of the Basher's departure from the nest : chocks, APUs,
The Pilot selected s I~ecd brakes rest with ~ the nosewhrc:l lod K ed in groundcrew and so on, all airborne at the same time . Some birdwatchers attribute this
and the aircraft touched dnwn near a depression . behaviour to an irresistible aversion to confined spaces, an apparent bird-drome phobia .
the 5000-foot-remainin~; marker . At Thete was onl~~ minor dama~;e to Others view it more simply as a manifestation of an inherited awkwardness while ground
the 4000-foot marker, thc F~ilot the aircraft, but this ineident serves manoeuvring . One thing is certain. For getting a Bossbird's maximum attention, it's hard
beKan moderatc braking which re- as a ren~~inder to all of us that we to beat the sound of a Basher loose on the drome. If you listen carefully, you may hear the
sulted in a very slow turn to thc can't afford to be complacent about call above the chaos:
left, but little dcceleration . Suh- even the most routine landin~s .
I'M-OFF-AT-LAST TO-HECK-WITH-THE-BLAST
24
Maritime
Lanyard Routing

{ 1) Outside Right
{2) .Over Right Parachute
{3) To Life Jacket Lanyard whim
routed under Right P~