WHITE vs RED

INSTRUMENT IMPROVEMENT
COLOURED COCKPIT INTERIORS
 DIRECTORATE OF FIIGHT SAFETY CANADIAN FORCES HEADQUARTERS

~/ GiC A8 SEARIE
DIRECTOR OF FLIGHT SAFETY
1..0i'I2iIZBi2 ~

5('t MD BROADFOOT W ;'C JT MUIIEN

FIIGHT SAFETY ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIQN
Recently, after a training flight an aircraft sus-
tained major airframe damage in which skin was torn,
rivets popped, and other destruction incurred . During
a practice single-engine portion of the flight several
landings were made, in the words of the captain
"none of which were hard in my opinion, although
some were slightly harder than would be experienced
in normal operation" . The captain's statement was i
supported by his supervisors but this well-meaning
contention was later overruled in the face of the
evidence .
Suggesting that the structural failure of the air- 1 EDITORIAL
craft under such circumstances was the fault of the
aircraft or its manufacturer, is being something less
2 CFP135
than objective . When accident reports are made out, 5 FROM AIB FILES
bear in mind their prime value can be derived only if
"the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
6 GOOD SHOW
truth" emerges. It also suggests, in this case, an 9 ON THE DIALS Over the years our flight safet YP ro 9 ramme hos brou 9 ht about
"agonizing reappraisal" of this pilot's notion of an increasing awareness of the importance of sound safet YPractices
what constitutes a NORMAL landing. 10 A VITAL MESSAGE TO
by all those who operate and service our aircraft . As our P rocedures
JET AIRCREW improve, however, so the difficulties which confront us mount . Machines
12 NEW LIGHT SHED ON become ever more com P lex and costl Y , and the environment within which
For a year now, our directorate has been pro-
viding a MAID service which began in response
INSTRUMENTS they operate calls for ever 9 reater skill and attention to the task in hand .
to your demands for up-to-date flight safety infor- 16 THE TUTOR - Thus as we surmount one hurdle we are faced with another - and alwa y s
mation . Too often, you soid, an accident or incident will be. There is, therefore, no room for com P lacenc Y .
would go unreported pending the outcome of the
IT'S GREAT
mvestigation and cause assessment . As many Recently a discernible shift in the cause of accident has
18 THE HORIZONTAL
investigations are lengthy, an important occurrence - occurred . Human error on the part of those who o P erate aircraft has
or worse still, a series of similar occurrences - SITUATION become less frequent, and materiel failure a more fre 9 uent cause. In
would not immediately be publicized . The "quick INDICATOR
turnaround" nature of MAID has given rise to some the past year we have sustained a disa PP ointin 9 set-back in our CF104
criticism that the reports it contains, are often 21 GEN FROM TWO-TEN satety record, but our response to the com P lex P roblems which have
incomplete and inconclusive . We agree ; but to given rise to this set-back is beginning to have its effects and there is
achieve immediacy we have sacrificed completeness .
Flight Comment, in its column "Gen from Two-Ten" every reason to believe that we shall return to the stead Y rate of im p rovement
attempts to dwell at length on significant accidents, which has become our P attern over the Y ears . However if we are to
however, completeness is often purchased at the maintaln thls Improvement we must acce P t the fact that hl 9 h P erformance
price of immediacy . We'd like your comments on Editor-F/L JT Richards
what MAID service is doing for you . Assistont Editor-Miss AV Mdntosh
and simplicity are rarely com Patible . We must redouble our efforts and
Editorial Assistant-Mrs R Hales
respond with precision and speed to the conditions im P osed u P on us b Y
Art and Layout - CFHQ Graphic Arts the modern aircras't now in service or shortl Y to be introduced .
The title "Arrivals and Departures" wos a Unless we adapt with the times fli 9 ht safet Y will elude us .
legacy with an obscure origin and meaning . The I would, therefore, urge upon all of Y ou a continued and sustained effort
demise of the D14 and A25 afforded us the chance
to have a go at something new . The "Gen from
Flight Cornmenf is produced by the CFHQ, Direc- in this field while at the same time I con 9 ratulate Y ou for Y our P ast
torate of Flight Safety . The contents do not neces-
Two -Ten" i s new to reflect the introduction of achievements .
sarily reflect official policy and unless otherwise
their successor, the new CF210 which appears stated should nof be construed as regulafions, orders
on page 2 or directires.
Contributions, comments and crificisms are welcome ;
the promotion of flight safely is best served by
disseminating on-the-job experience ond opinion .
Perhaps, calling the event "a million-dollar RW Moncel
Send submissions to: Editor, Flight Comment, CFHQ/
shortcut" would reveal our annoyance at the un-
folding of details in a recent CF104 crash in the
DFS, Ottawa 4, Ontorio. Annual subscription rote Lieutenant General
is 51 .50 for Canoda and USA . Subscriptions ovoil-
Mediterranean. The pilot didn't appreciote his Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
able af Queen's Printer, Hull, P .Q .
experience - any more than we did - as the evi-
dence was brought to the surface by SCUBA divers.
For the full account, see AI B Fi les. RaCEA DLIHAMEL, F-B.S.C.

QtiEEN'S PNIIfT6R AND CONTpOLLER OF STATIONERY

OTTAWA, 1J6G
 THE
NEW
CFP
135 Vcxt to flyin~,~ clothing (and particularly orange flying
suit~!'1 there is P robablv, nothin g that will p rovoke a
heated discussion more than the accident reporting
system . 'Che consensus, so we suspect, mi~;ht go some-
thin K like this : the com p lexit Y of the form was conceived
b Y autocratic fli g ht safetv bureaucrats as a deterrent to
accidents the theor Y be~in > that if the form could be
made painfully complex we could cleverly link the
punishment to the crime!
Cynicism and levity notwithstanding, the serious
business of accident reportinK is often misunderstood .
'I'he CF?10 Accident/Incident Investi g ation Re P ort vou
submit is P rimaril Y a re Po rt of the inve-t'~ aticrn~ ~the
announcement has already arrivc:d by message. In other
AFAO 21 .56/01 words, we'rc hoping to employ the CF210 to PRE~'F:N'1'
the next accident . Witl~out tlie collective experience
available in our records, no sensible attack on accidents
and their causes can be devised .
About a year and a half ago wc started to write an
order which would remove manv of the annoyinK irre~u-
lanties and complex~t~es of the report~ng system ; we
used to ask, for cxam P le, how manv. ni g ht hours you. had
flawn in the previous 30 days if somebody rammed you
NGO 21 .56/4 in the win R ti p with a mule in the davli
, ght! w'e are pleased
with the new order but humble in tht: knowled g e that it
won't please everybody . For the first period we ask an
o pen-minded trial of the new CF ~ 10,~ we fe e 1 s ure that
it incorporatcs many of vour sugg~estions and recom-
mendations . The few ch a n g~es i n t h e new ~ FP135 (whccl~
incorporates the old AFAO ?1SG,~01 and GNO 21 .56/~)
are discussed below .

TIiE NF:«' DEFINITIONS

ACCIUENI' and INCIDENT The terrn ACCIDENT has

the ~~4 ~ been redefined . Whereas previously A, B, C and some D
C~2~~ Wh~c1~ ceP~°~es category damage determined the de inition, an ACCII)H:NT
now has a deqree o~ .reriou.rne .rs criterion . In this respect,
an accident differs from an INCIDI':NT by degree of
The "eW
Flight Comment,lon Feb 196b
 scriousness only ; you will see for example that when a 1 have just had an accident or incident ; ihis will require
fatalit y,
~ serious ~ or verv serious in~ur
J y~ is involved the my submitting the form CF210 (successor to the RCAF
occurrence is an 1CCll)E'~T D14) . Under the new orders and the revised form will
there 6e a completely new system or set of rules 1 will
AIR and GROUND Also new, is the desi~nation of an have to know about?
occurrence as AIR, or GROL''.VD . The AIR occurrence There arc no radical clrparturcs in the methods of report-
is dividcd into ACCIDEtiT and ItiCIDEN'[' ; a GROUND inR accidents under the new system, The form is as clear
occurrence is an ACCIDE :~T onlv . The definitions of as we could make it, llow~ever , there are areas which yu~o
AIR and GROIJ~D are identical to the P revious desi S n- should know about ; these have alreadv been discusscd
ators - .AIRCRAFT and GROh'~l) . For example, an in this article
occurrence previously namcd AIRCRAFT ACCIDE'~'1' is cF~oa so the accompanving inspection, which probably would
now called A1R ACCI1)EyT . The q ualifications or the FUEL POMP DRIVE SPLItiE FAILURE have revealed wear be y~ond limits . was not 1~ rformed.
descriptions of these areas are in paras 9 and 10 of the Why was the new cotegory SPECIAL OCCURRENCE l,ater, a fleet inspection uncovered numerous cases of
new order, In July we lost a CF104 from a fuel starvation flame- wear .
introduced?
.An important item to note is sub-sub-para ~ under out . Both pilot and aircraft splashed into tlre !~4edi- 'I'his inspection and lubrication order was late, but
Previouslv, minor occurrences reyuired overlv-elaborate
AIR L'vCIDF:~T which calls attention to a "hazard to terranean followrng a successful ejection . The splines still would havc prevented the loss of a valuable air-
and detarled reports ; this undoubtedly coloured t}ic
on thc: marn fucl pump drrveshaft had farled from ex- craft . The moral to the story is quite c-lear - deviotion
Ilight" . This arca is froueht with interpretative dif- judgement of the person involved, resultin~ in his dcrwn- cessive wear (see photo) ; the ]79 enginc has one fuel from laid down maintenan c e p roced u res w'rll result in
frcultres rn that a simrlar occurrence happenrng to two Rradin~ its importance, The special occurrence clas :;i-
pcople might be construcd by one person as an air P um P with one driveshaft, hence the flameout . disaster sooner or later.
fication em Plovs
. one sim P le format for initiall y~ re Portin~ `I'hirty flyin~ hours before, this cnginc had a peric~dic Our bouquets to the RCAF volunteer SCUB11 divers
incident, and of no partic:ular si~nificanre to another. diverse occurrences, ins P ection re 9 uirin ~ that this shaft and area be ins P ccted whose detcrmined efforts at depths of 100 feet and more,
An example of t}ris would be the failure of cockpit li~ht- and luhricated . The specificd lubricant was unavailable, resulted in recavery of the vital evidence .
ing during a da,Ytime flikht, Certainly, this occurrence
did not hazard the fli ht vet this is no matter for merelv,
an L14 entry, It would, iherefore, be reportable under Will the reporting procedures, that is my having to fill
out a CF210, 6e simplified? Two shafts, one showing spline failure.
P ara 11 > that is > SPEC'LAL OCCURRE'~CES . The inte-rit
~ )~ The ne~~~ reportin~,~ system and accident definition arc
of the Indrvrdual is mvolved here berause many ma~or
similar to that alreadv in existence in the armed forces,
entries fallowing flights now are reportable under para
The new fnrm CF~10 is much sim P lified from P rcvious
ll, SPECI :AI, OCC'i'KRF:NCES, The special occurrence
rcportlng forms .
report (,SOR) rs a simple format messaKe_ (see Annex 3 ,
to Appendix "D") . Ground accidents are heinX treated
in much the same manner as in 1-ucvious orders,
Will the new CFP135, Flight Safety for the Canadion
PARA 11, SPECLAL OCCLIRRENCE It is interesting Forces, involve a departure from the previous reporting
to note that under sub-para (d), a B1RD STRIKE is procedures in the Army and Novy?
reportable as a special occurrence only when there is no '\o, thc Army has for some years been reportur~ accidcnts
damage ; rf D catcgory damage or more results, It is and incidents usin~ the RCAF systcm, but while the
reportable as an arr accrdent or arr incident . All bird Nav y~ forms are different the information re 9 uired is q uite
~imilar .
strikes still rcquire the submission of a Bird Report .
ln the interests of fliKht safety it is vour responsibility
to P av. P articular attention to the re y. uirements s plcd
e 1
out in sub-para (e). These miKht be judged by the indi- There has 6een mucH discussion in tfre past years obout
vidual aircrew member as warrantin onlv. an entrv, in whether Canada's accident reporting definitions ore in
the L14, but seen in the context of flight safet,v could line with other nations. Was ihis a foctor in the alteration
be defined as havin accident or incident P otential, of the definitions?
Obviously, the inte~rity of the individual must be callcd To a rertain extent tlris is true ; however, the cl-ran~e i~
u~~on here, so that occurrences havin,K these danKerous also in rcsponse to a ~reater need for international under-
Po tentials are brou~;ht to liKht, standin~ of terrnino(o~y amon~ fliRht safety experts . Thc
introduction of ihe extent or scriousness of the darna K c:
CATEGOR`t' OF DA~9AGF: In "C'" cate~ory the in- or injury into our dcfinitions brings it morc into line with
clusion of "Replacement of a rnajor component" is new, the trend throu hout the world in definin accidents .
the chan~e bein~, thdt replacement of a major componene Statistical comparison howevcr, is still and will remain
on unit is now of "C" cate K orv. . Ior some timc an impreci~e and tenuous science . Ideallv,
what is required is a new international lan K ua R e amone
PARA ?1, PAREVT L:'~IT ;1nv confusion which miKht (light safety expcrts so thac dialo K ucs can be meanin K ful .
arise under the dcfinition of P arent unit can be resolved
by applyin~ this criterion : Which unit will receive credit
for the aircraft fl y~in hours at the time of the occurrence? Will the new system meon an increase in reports?
.Appendix "D" outlining reportin~ of aircraft accidents If thesc new rcr;ulatirns aredili~;er}tl~~ appliedvou rnav ` :e
and incidents is straightforward and essentially un- submittin g more ( but sim p ler , re mcmber,) re ports, hlan y~
chan g ed from earlier orders . Particular attention should disasters could have becn averted had we Possessed
be paid, however, to the reportin~ of SPECIAL OCCUR- more information, Seen in this lii;ht your report is a
RE'~CES, which includes several related re P orts . small - but 1~crha~s
1 vital - contribution to fli kht safetv,
.

Flight Comment, 1an Feb 19b6

 to reversc course and make for Sherbrookr . An emergency afterburner . During this descent the ENCS was shut off
declared on 1? 1 . S was an swered bv an RC'.'1 F C 130 and reactivated with no result .
which relaved communications and remained ticith the Even in full afterburner, altitude could not be main-
Ex~editor
E ~until the safe landin K was carried out at tained confirming that the afterburner had not lit .

GOOD SHOW
Sherbrooke ?S minutes later. A gradual descent of 1S0 However, F/L Barnes elected to leave the throttle in
fcet/min at 95 kts was established using ?0~0 rpm and this position as fuel was now being rapidly pumped
2$ inches manifold pressure ; this power setting was overboard, reducing the aircraft weight .
used b y' the ca ~~tain to Preserve the serviccability. of thc W'hen the failure occurred F/L Gregory declared
port engine . F/0 Salter ensured that the passengers a "Mayday" emergency and got an immediate response
were hriefed for a possrble emerKencti- forced landrng . from nearby Lechfeld with a heading to steer. As this
headrng was drrectly over the north end of Munrch,
The crew of the Expeditor, particularly F/0 Salter, F/L Barnes flew around the burlt-up area ; there was a
displayed good airmanship and skill in a potentially
real posstbrlrty that the crew would have to abandon the
dang°rous situation. 1'he captain of the I}ercules, aircraft . Then, Furstenfeldbruck (Fursty) GCA came
F!L 11S Vacirca of 43S Sqn Namao deserves praise for on the air w ith a positive contact. "Bulldog 51 this is
t}re speed with which he offered assistance to F;`0 Fursty GCA, you are niner miles northeast of Fursty
Salter . The low altitude thc C4~ eventuallv maintained turn left, turn left to a heading of 180" . GCA was
. . c~l~ (2800 ft ASLI with the sun directlv in the~ eves of the asked to vector for an emergency straight-in landing.
, "1 G~ ~~, `r!Gl ' ` : IG c,
1' p ilot made the assistance K iven to .F,''0 Salter welrome Fursty GCA then gave recovery instructions and vectored
r Lr FL~° `~ Cv ~ .. ~r C~ i~l5
, .: n~r' ~ ~ °''`'~ ~w~ ~~tiF'.~
rndeed . the 104 toward their airfield . However, they were too
,~~~~t, ~
~l~.r-~
ur'.e~ c F/L WJ HliTCHINSON, F/L RF PATRICK and SGf
~: " C eSAT;~Ii
:G
Bvhandlingthe emergency in this manner, F!0 Salter close to the approach end of the runway and the sharp
FIP~ CRA}?
AL MARLEY
, e Y,'S ~'E~1~ ~e ~
A~ ;F,U G':Tf -
t, pp Th .
i;F LiFE
i.~
demonstrated ~ood ~udgement m announcrng his pred~- 90 ° right turn necessary for a straight-in approach
cFQATIG~
Y ~p~ LG'' ~ ~ .-~G~~'1"`',
r. C r~i°;' ; ., would have been dangerous ; there was hardly enough
cament early, and doinK a cool, competent job of IxinginK
Ai~
'~rZ pGL~
A~,
,,;i~,; c
, -~,~YCI,
~~,q er.~
,,0.,r1_gL
As a last resort the fliglrt engineer Sgt AL ti9arley
",~ RE}L6r'iS P
..
passengers and plane to safety . thrust avarlable to marntarn level flrght . Now, at only
r.
.~,dt~
:5'tiiG' ,r 4, } ~~~Y
with the assistance of F/L RF Patrick, under difficult
" ~
, N- Fo
~ut'd ~ '
c~
,r',r,~NC
at~,~ .a r
T 1000 feet above the ground over a heavily populated
P~, .G6R~"'"
I3
~~Fi,f~CE ~'GNCL" FD conditions, cut a hole into the nose gear well with area, F/L Barnes elecied to do a shallow 270° left
AS ur r.Y ,~SG,'.AL
1F, .=. Pi~ ;:AL' CF A
`d~nF
FGP. '(ab T1'r ~GCRpv~, .L the crash axe, and then lashed the nose gear in thc turn away from the airport using a gentle 10-15 de g rees
: ;, R`-GLPL

~"~
LL ru ~ .
~ GC~~'t" ~~!i~~
ct, AUN, LarSTF~ k~~
LFtiSC'`2 partially down position . The aircraft was landed on a of bank to line up with the runway . Meanwhile, GCA
~yGf;:. .C
L~ ~,;~ ~ rc 
.L~,~tw,~ - ceN;".Ft :c
3$00 foot strip of foam without further damage . F; L N'R BARNES continued to give headings, distances and other infor-
cc~. ;~~, T~ D~}-~ :c :. The captain, F/I, Hutchinson, and crew exhibited matron rn a calm competent manner .
,;~ nip.
r,or~~~. ;,~ :5i~
a high degree of airmanship and resourcefulness in About twenty minutes after takeoff on a night low- The night was very dark although visibility was
combatting this emergency and bringing the aircraft level training mission in a dual CF104, F/L WR Barnes, excellent. However, the confusion of lights of Munich
the captain and F/L DH Gregory the first officer, and Fursty (which was on emergenc ruawa lighting
safely back without further damage .
experienced a nozzle failure. It moved from 2 .2 to and had no approach or lead-rn lights made e runway
l0+almost instantaneously, accompanied by a loss drfficult to locate . During this final turn, altitude
of thrust. F/I, Barnes commenced a zoom climb . During control became critical as the suburbs of Munich were
the climb the ENCS was actavated but the nozzle did not now only 800-1000 feet below. In maintaining altitude
F :'0 JK SAL7GR move, nor was there any indication of regained thrust . during the turn the airspeed decreased to 220 kts,
Full afterburner gave a small increase in thrust and the but later increased to 240 kts on final at eight miles .
zoom was conoinued to 6000 feet . This altitude could Undercarriage and landing flaps were delayed until
The two pilots and four passcngers frum Station a landing was assured.
Summerside, de Parted Ottawa for Sunrmersi~le in an not he maintained with takeoff flap and 2$0 kts ; the 104
was descending rapidly despite the selection to full In coping with this emergency and accomplishing a
Expcditor . At i000 feet and in ~'FR weathcr approxi-
successful night landing with an open nozzle F/Ls
mately 4? NE of Sherbrooke, white smake bcgan strcam- Barnes and Gregory displayed fine judgement and flying
ink from tlre starhoardengine . Thc cylinder head tempera- skill. In his attempt to bring in the crippled bird, F/L
ture and uil pressure bek~an dropping, so the enKine wa~ Barnes faced an enormous responsibility in overflying
F!L N'J IIUTCInNSON, shut down . Tfre captain, F/0 Jk Salter, wiselv elected a burlt-up area in the latter stages of flight ; in his
assessment of this situation he exhibited high com-
F~L RF PATRICK, petence worthy of commendation .
F/I, Barnes commented on " . . . .the competent pro-
SGT AL ~1.ARLEY' /essional r.ontrol provided under stresr by Sgt Detlef s
of the Cerman Air Force" . We wish, also, to commend
Sgt !)etle/s, whose alert handling of the situation
At destrnatron, the nose gear actuator of therr
played such an tmportant part in the recovery of this
Hercules failed, preventing the nose gear from cycling crew and aircra/t from a serious emergency at night.
to full down position . A nose gear up-lock emergency F'lL !I'K Barne .r i .r nn~rc our most experic~n~ ed opc~n-
release was tried without success and an emergency no~zle pilot ; in December 196 .3 he landed in open notizle
extension with the forward cargo door hydraulic system con~iguration . ~Not all the mc~mbe~rs o~ the "Op~°n ~'Vozzle
also met with failure . Club" havc appearc"d in thc Cood Shou~ ~olumn and zoe
Back at base the crew continued their attempts to are pleased to add th~ir names :
release the nose gear . Further attempts using emergency
release with "G" being applied caused a partial exten- Capt MD Cook, USAF
sion of the nose gear . Each time "G" was applied the F~L DW McGowan
gear would reach an almost full down position but F/L A Bowman and F/L L Nelson
would partially retract in Ievel flight . Several other F/L FG Fowler
methods were em P loY ed ~ includin g a touch-and o land- F~L BJ Gilland
ing on the main gear, without success . Mr B Fleming

Flighr Comment, Jan Feb 1966

 On The Dials
/ f f

The Hercules had landed fa a brief sto P for un-

loading, and during the shutdown check the flight
engineer noticed that the nose gear groundlock had
not been installed . Actually, this flight engineer was
observin g on another NCO who was under trainin g .
Later, the new man recalled his oversight, returned, TACAN POINT-TO-POINT POINTF;RS
and inserted the groundlock . Soon, most everyone will be blessed with TACAN, so Join thcse two points with a straight line (line BC) -
The unloading finished, the aircraft was prepared ready or not, you must be taught . It's a proven widely- a pcn or pencil is best but a gloved, knobby finger
Eor flight . Uuring the start-up the under-training NCO used nav aid, and simple to use once you learn how . will do . Now, transpose th~s ltne parallel to BC so
was acting as ground crewman outside the atrcraft but Unfortunately, for many of you this will involve self- that ~t passes through the centre oE the dtal . Where
since the exterual headset cord was unservtceable
tutoring ; for this, the Manual of Instrument Flying it intcrsects the degree scale (point D) read the re-
the removal of the groundlock was not confumed ; because
of this man's second oversight, it was forgotten . The Procedures, TC-42 (which can be ordered Erom supply quired track . The length of this track is measured by
aircraft took off and as the nosewheel came up there was or borrowed from the fricndly neighbourhood UICP) will the scale already established - in this case, the bearing
"a loud metallic crunch" followed by a continued tell you all about it . We propose to explain onc of the pointer tail equals 30 miles.
thumping noise which prompted the flight engineer to procedures used in T,ACAN .
investigate .While the flight engineer was de-pressurizing Basically, TACAN will enable you to fly:
the aircraft prior to opening the wheel-well panel the " a radial
overl Y -enthusiastic man under training had removed the - an arc
panel before de-pressurizinR was completed ; his eye - directly point-to-point .
glasses and flashli g ht were sucked into the well . The It's the third item that is the challenge for the TACAN
thumping noise turned out to be the red streamer oE the user .
groundlock flapping in the airstream beneath the aircraft Flying point"to-point is basic to any cross-country
at the edge of the door . operation. On a chart, a line is plotted between the
Next, d~e utility suction punip low pressure light
two points ; the angle to north ~s measured f or a track,
came on - the s,ystem reservoir was empty . Eight quarts
and a drstance thrown in completes the description of
of hydraulrc Eluid were added to the system to re-fill
the reservoir which, naturally enough began to drain the flight or leg. TAt:AN point "to-point navigation
out, also . By now, at destination the crew concluded differs:
that the gear would have to be extended manually . The ~ the points are expressed as a radial and DME dis- .
pilot, by deciding to continue the flight without im- tance from a TACAN station,
mediately attempting to confirn~ that the gear would ~ the TACAN instrument facc, (DRMI or HSI depending . POINT "C"
come down, had unwittingly necessitated this emer gency on aircraft equipment) is used as the plotting chart. 1
lowering of the undercarriage . The starboard came down A common situation is flying Erom your prescnt posi- POINT "D"
with no trouble but the port wheel could not be moved . tion directly to the initial approach fix . Say, you are
The crew decided to give the hydraulic system another on the O60 radial at 30 miles and going to the initial fix,
try,
, this time with the speed selector in hiKh _ torq ue . located on the 1 SO radial at 10 miles . On a chart you
I'he flight engineer put his last three quarts of fluid into .~ ... - would draw a line between these points, measure a
the system bringing the reservoir to one-third full . track and determtne the d~stance . To plot this tn thc
The nosewheel went down and locked but the port
cockpit, use the face of the TACAN rnstrument.
stopped nine inches short oE full-down as the hydraulic
The centre of the tnstrument represents the TACAN
system ran dry . The hand crank was sttll ~ammed so a
station (po~nt A) . The tatl of the beanng pomter, shows
"last ditch" three quarts of prop oil were added; this MORE POINT-TO-POINT POINTI':RS
the radial you are on - in this instance, the 060. An
time the gear came full down . 'I'he Hercules was landed
without flaps using full reverse thrust and minimum / imaginary line from 1S0 to the centre of the instrument
represents the radial you wish to proceed to. To com-
If you are looking for a more precise method of
TACAN point-to-point than afforded by the above
use oE the emergcncy brake system . The pilot expected
to have no nosewheel steering ; during the latter portion plete the picture you need a milcage scale, so let the method, here's one . Ever wonder what that squared
of the landing run a severe nosewheel shimmy left the distance from the cenire of the instrument to the bearing grid at the bottom of the computer slide is for? It may
tell-tale wavy rubber line on the runway . pointer's tail equal the greatest distance involved in not be designed for this use but it works quite well .
The nose gear groundlock (which ironically, had the problem - in this case, 30 miles . Set the zero oE the square grid undcr the center dot.
been installed incorrectly) was Eorced out of position ,,, , We have now converted the instrument face into a Set the radial you are on against the heading index and
when the gear retracted after takeoff and had been plotting chart ; we're ready to plot the points . You are mark on the grid scale the appropriate mileage (as you
squeezed against the nose selector valve where it .
on the 060 radial at 30 miles ; on the instrument it will would mark a wind velocity). Repeat this procedure to
broke the casting causing the hydraulic leak . be at 060 on the tail of bearing pointer (point B). Your mark the radial and distance to which you are proceed"
The whole story contains several ironic twists track will be tc a point on thc imaginary line, ie, the ing. Join the two dots with a straight line . Rotate the
not the least of which is the commendable resource- 1S0 radial, one third of the length of the bearing pointer. computer face until this line is parallel to the vertical
fulness of the highly~experienced Ff~: whose failure to
As the length of the radtal po~nter is 30 m~les, thc onc l~nes on the gnd. Read the required track at the head-
complete a check list caused the emergency in the
th~rd (point C) tepresents 10 miles. ~ng ~ndex ; for the distance use the grid scale .
frrst place .
Flight Comment, Jan Feb 1966 9
 A word of caution ; you can come up with the reci-
procal of your track . This, however, is easily resolved
as you no doubt know the general direction to go, or,
on the line joining the two dots put an arrow pointing Some recent ejections have been
from actual position to desired .
"close calls" . . . in each case the
GCA GLIDE PATH CHECKS pilots ignored the facts - read on . . .
Siace the unfortunate accident that occurred oa a
GCA final in 1 Air Div, much thought has been given
to devising a glide path check.
A bit of added insurance is yours if you can readily
calculate your altitude for a given range from touch-
down . This can be done as part of the cockpit chcck,
and it is extremel Y sim P le . For a 2~°sloP e the altitudc
change is 266 ft per mile ; a 3° slope gives 309 ft per
mile . Simplify this by rounding off the numbcrs :
2~°- 2S0 ft per mile

MESSAGE
3° - 300 ft per mile
Three miles is usually about half-way down the glide .- ",
path but two miles can be used as well . For three i ,
miles on a 2 °slo p e : add 3 x 2S0 ft ,( or 7S0 ft ) to the I ,, lles P ite the misnomer zero-zero a Pplied
field elevation and you get an approximatc indicated / , , to modern e'ection scat s ~stems, if an air-
l
altitude at three miles . We admit this is only approxi- I craft is smkm at a ~reater rate than an
mate due to minor altimeter errors and because the /
actual altitude should be 3 x 266 or 798. Okay, so add I e'ection
l cata P ult ean lih thc seat man
I

FO R
800 ft to field elevation for you nit pickers . ~ combination, thc rcsultant vector will be
/ downward .
/
le messa e or ow- eve e ectees as t ~ere ore.
uvou ol~m~;i~ar ~~ector.r a .cisz rate.r.

NEAR
MISS

SAfETY
JET This is best accom lished b Y thc tricd-and-true Zoom manoeuvre.
A 10°~n climb cvcn at
successful e'ection
1
round level in a fl Tin ai rcraft is enou h to ensure a
even with low ener~~y~ rocket or even a ballistic cataP ult .
SUGGESTIOM

AIRCREW
ALL IT TAKES TO ZOOM IS AIRSPEED AND IT
CAN BE DONE FROM THE DECK ! ! !
CANVAS BAG JAMS THROTTLE

The pilot reported an engine malfunction and made a

precautionary recovery at base ; however, repeated
ground runs uncovered no malfunction . Later, the piloi
was found to carry a canvas bag containing flight publi- The complete story is available in
cations which he would han on the throttle, This the booklet "Ejectioneering" -
would create sufficient inboard pressure to cause the read it - it could save your life .
binding the pilot originally reported .
After sevcral decadcs of military aviation behind
us, we have been able to largely resolve aircrew require-
ments of this sort . Usin g non-issue devices therefore
is onl Y askin g for trouble.

Flipht Comment, Jan Feb 1966 11

 creaces an abnormal environmcnt and if it must be used this intense brightness, each time he glances at his
it should be approached cautiously . Red li~ht handicaps instrumen ts, he must f irst adapt to the much lower
the eves by rcducin~ peripheral (side)vision . Diminished level of bri K htness in the cock P it . Irnder extreme
What did you think about that contrast of the instrument markin s mcans P erce Ption conditions this task becomes very distracting, con-
suggested compromise- pink lighting? time is increased . tributin K to delav,~ fati ~ue, and readin g errors . Grav.
The move to white instrument li~htin~ has becn a panels reduce the difference between the two adapta-
slow~ and cautious one and has been the ~uh'ect 1 of in- tion Ievels .
terminable disputes . ,ldmittedly, there are special roles ~~'isibility within the cockpit is poor under the "high
that require peak niKht vision ; in thesc, red lightinQ altitude K lare" of direct sunli $ht and the little or no
atmospheric scattering of light . Gray interiors reflect

' Neiv Light

will he retained fnr its uni 9 ue Pro Pertics .
liRht, making items in the darker recesses of the

i
cockpit more discernihle .
~l ;nder ultra-violet light, many pilots experienced

Shed on
The decision to employ white li~ht sparked studies "floatin K " of the instrument marks durin K lon g ni 8ht
to determine the colour best suited for the cockpit . fli~hts . The instrument marks - the only objects
Researchers found the ~ray cockpit interior tc} lrave visible - would appear to move . 'fhis generally
several advantages over tlre black : occurred under low lighting where the black panel

In.rtrument~ ~It was ~enerally agreed that ~ray effects a certain

colour harmony with tlre remainder of the work spacc .
was all but invisihle. The ~ray panel provides a
visihle back ound or reference for the instrument
markings .
~Iv9nunting a black instrument on a gray panel serves
F;'L W Tytula to del'rn eate the sha p e of each instrument case ,
enablin~ aircrew to readily identify each hy their
CFHQ
~~'iIIIL cs RLD dititinctive size and shape .
~Thc pilot is often exposed to hi~h intensity li~ht
COLOLIR[D CC~KPII INTF:RIORS from the skv and objects outside thc aircraft, c~,
White instrument lighting is already here for some reflection of( metal surfaces . If his eves
, ada P t to

i
and just around the corner for many ofhers . The Tutor 1\'tiI It~iA1[\ I 1~iPR0~'E~iLNT
and C130E have white liqhting and installation in the
Training, Transport and Maritime fleets is already
planned. The Argus, Neptune, Caribou and CS are pre-
sently being converted; the Buffalo and the CF5 will have BI:FORE
integral white lighting on delivery . Later, the Yukon
Cosmopolifan, and possi6ly the C1308 will be equipped;
6owever, some aircraft such as the Otter, CF104 ond the
CFI01 will retain their present lighting . The CF104
now has integral red lighting which proves to 6e difficult
and expensive to change ; the Voodoo, while less difficult
and expensive to convert, has too short a remaining
life to make the conversion economically leasible . There
are no plans at this time to convert helicopters to white The grey cockpit interior of USAF T33.
lighfing . 'l'he primary disadvantagr of a gray cockpit interior
is also that of whitc instrument lighting - it de~rades
During ~''orld War lI our lntelli~encc lcarned that V4'hat is achieved bv converlin~,~ from red to white nit,~ht vision . It also increases the amount of li~ht re-
Gerrnan scientists were experimentingwith red instrument instrumcnt li~htin~' flected from surfaces such as canopies (halo) . }~owever,
and cockpit liKl~tinK . 'I'hese scientists had found that these undesirable effects can be minimized bv, usin K a
red li~ht caused the least degradation of the ni~ht vision ~1~''hitc li~htin~ pcrmits thc unrestrictcd usc of ci>lour dark intclli S entl 7~ desi Kn ed lare shiclds .
klrav. and b`~
5o im Portant totar et detection and landinKat blacked-c~ut c:odinK for instruments, ran~~e markin,Qs, equipment, Gra ) ~ was specitied for thc Tutor as a trial, the
airfields . Until recentlv we have retained the conviction maps and charts ; e~, it is hiKhly dcsirable to cmpl~~r AFTER
decision to usc i;ray in t}rc: cockpit and on instrumcnt
Inot norc~ shared bv the Germans) that red likhtin~ still rolour in the new intekrated fliKht ~ystems instru- panels derivinK from exlensive consultations with thc
offers advanta Kes~which outwei k~h its drawbacks . The nicnts . aircraft users . Reports are so enthusiastic that we
drawbacks, however, arc formidable f:nou~,~h for most ~Fatigue caused by long exposurc to red light is plan to rcpaint other types on an "as practicable"
nations to have ahandorred red li~htin~ and with it the climinated . basi~ .
dull hlack cockpit and unt~ven illumination, to namc only ~lnstrument markinXs are more easilv di~cernihle 'I'he netiv colour~ selected for cock P it interiors are
two . . with the better contrast P rovided b ~ white li~ht . "h'led ium Gray~" ( Fedcral 5tandard i95 - Colour numbcr
Sincc World 1','ar II the requircmcnt for optimum nrxht ~Red warnin~ indicators become more prominent . 36?i ll for fli f;ht decks and lower portions of crew
visiorr no lnn K er P rcvails ; runwav. lii;hting, landini ; ~ Increased luruinositv of the r,ryro horizon for examplc, com~artments and "sk ~" (colour numbcr 3~~~4) for
li Rhts, air traffic control, place fewer demands on the P rovides vivid scnsorv imaKes cssential to rfducin,t ; upper decks and portions of crew compartmc~tt5 .
"ow1 eyes" of yesteryear . ~'et, cockpits remain black, disorientation . (;1ccidents have bcen caused by
cluttered and confusin~g - t}re bv- ,P roduct of red li Khtin K . disoricntation attributahle to inade q uate likhtin~ of
As a result, we had accidents labclled "I'ilot h:rror" attitude indicacors) .
with stated sub-causes such as "fatik"ue", and "dis- 1'he ronversion from red to white instrument li~htinR
orientation" - the c:ommc~n manifcstations of 1~rc>lon ~ed Low intensity red lightink produc:e~ -several unde- and the associated ahandonment of radioactive markinks
exposure to red liRhting . . , sirahle reactions in man . 11an is least eflicicnt uniler meant that instrument faces had to be repainted . The
Thcre are, no douht, operatrons where peak nli;ht low illumination ; the lower the illuminatii>n the slower new "lustrcless white" requires new silk scrcens to
v'rsron
' is vital . Hou~ccct , assumin-Y that ni ht visian his rcactions, both physical and mental . Since man is be manufactured for the repainting ; thi~ afforded us an
of this order is i;enerally not required, there are scveral li ~ht de~endent
1 hc should be p laced in an environmcnt cxccllcnt opportunity to redesi~m all instrumc:nt pre-
~ c kpr't im p rovements tlrat now hecomc p os5ible .
co conducive to cornfc~rt and efficiencv ; coloured li~hting The grey cockpit interior of RCAF T33 prototype. sentr~tiorrs at littlc a no cxtra cost,

12 Flighr Comment, Jan Feb 1966 13

 At CFHQ, a working party of designers, operators,
and a human factors s P ecialist directs the instrument ODERATIONAL
improvemcnt program . The program aims at a "c:lean-up" NEAR HAIARD$
of instrument displa Y s : MIS$
~ removing useless information, such as manufacturers'
SAFETY
name s, SAFfTY
SUGGESTION
~ standardizing lcttcrs, numbcrs and markers, SUGGESTION

~ eliminatin g "hot spots" .

THE GHOST RETURNS ICE COLD FEAR

Two rncrdents occurred recently when T33 arrcraft A pilot's flying career can be described as long 11 S kts at touchdown with 160 gallons.
periods of casual routine interspersed with moments of On shutdown two shaken pilots eaamined their air-
were given GCA identification on the basis of SIF radar
stark terror - this flight had both . T-bird operators in craft. There were two inches of rime ice on the leading
returns which later proved to be false . The SIF target
particular can grab some tips from this Near Miss but edge and tiptank cones ; three quarters of an inch on
seen by GCA was a ghost return on the same bearing 60
the lesson (the "stark terror" part) is there for all the windscreens! The engine screen was partially
miles closer than the aircraft's location . In the first
aircrew, covered and the nose section was one inch dee P in rime
case, a T33 was enroute from Namao to Grmlr; the con-
The T33 was to fly a target mission from Bagotville, back nearly to the static vents.
troller asked for "370 normal" on SIF for an identifica-
landing after dark at Chatham . The forecast for Chatham W'HAT HAD HAPPENED? At first glance it would
tion . At that moment, GCA observed a "370 normal"
B~FORE AFTER included a "slight possibility" of freezing rain . The appear to be straightforward airframe icing with a rcs-
return at approx 18 miles and requested the pilot select
pilot quite naturally checked at Chatham before des- tricted intake causiag loss of power, and increase of
Instrument clean-up prototypes were checked and double- "low" for identif ication ; GCA observed the target
ceading and also listened to reports of aircraft already drag . But a restricted intake will not lower JPT - quite
checked under both red and white liRhting and reworked change to "low" . For further identif ication the GCA
until the desired product was achieved . The program in descent - nobody mentioned freezing rain . During the contrary . What most probably happened was ice
controller had the P ilot turn to a headin g 180°I1~ - a
has been underwav for ovcr a year - many of the con- the descent in cloud it became apparent that the aircraft accretion on the sensor of the barometric pressure
change of 80 degrees from the inbound heading. The
verted instrumcnts are now in t}ie field . Most instru- was beginning to pick up ice . At about 1500 feet, below control (BPC). If the sensor is iced over, ihe fuel flow
SIF target was observed to make the turn and the GCA
ments will be converted by the end of 196G . The standards cloud, ice could be seen along the leading edge and tip- at a given throttle setting will remain conftant during
controller descended the aircraft to 2500 feet, although
established by this working group will be applied to tank cones as well as covcring the entire windscreen a letdown, rather than increase as it normally would do .
ao radar skin paint had been established .
future purchases of aircraft instrumcnts . and side panels . On the GCA at minima the pilot could So, you have a reduced airflow due to intake icing and
Members of the Instrumcnt Improvement Working Party The GCA controller had no reason to believe this
not see the runway lights, and the approach lights ap- a reduced fuel flow ftom the frozen sensor on the BPC .
was a ghost target ; he had never seen or even heard of
are rnvolved rn several other areas of cockprt rmprove- peared only as a blur . The pilot elected to overshoot, Add to this loss of thrust the much-increased airframe
ment . Their efforts arc be~nK directed toward better one before . The SIF tar~et was now at seven miles but
do a VFR circuit to permit the pilot in the back seat drag and toss in a loss oI forward visibility at night
~nstrument layouts, and removal of uselcss rnformatron, at fli ght level 290 it seemed unlikel y that a skin paint
to land the aircraft as his vision was less obscured . and you havc the makings of a real hairy do .
placards and clutirr . Therr influence now extends rnta was possible . Eie expected that during the descent he
Then things began to happen, or rather, not to happen . The pilot points to the major discrepancy in the
the selection, development, and procuremcnt of instru- would obtain a radar target ; the GCA approach would
The 90'% power on overshoot gave 1SS kts ; power was forecast weather and pireps from landing aircraft and
ments - aimed at creating 5imple, logical, comfortahle t1~en be based on a skin paint.
advanced to 98% on downwind and the aircraft (clean) feels that he wasn't given a fair shake -- ". , , not
and therefore efficient cock P it lavouts.
, Thus ~ the da Y s This same phenomenon was duplicated by another
staggered along at only 16S kts! The pilot quite rightly bad for an area where no frcezing rain or icing was
oE designing cockpits and instrument laynut for the T33, a few hours later .
suspected rntake rce but thrs would have caused hrgher reported . . , we nearly broke our necks walkrng rn on
convenience of tveryone except the aircre ;c~ are no more . Controllers should be aware of the possrbrlrty of
JPT but even at 98% rt remarned at a very low 4 2S ° . the slippery tarmac . . ." . Could be, but no doubt this
SIF ghostrng especrally wrth the CP'~4 and MPNI1
aith the wheels down on final turn it took 98% to get pilot has learned to expect thc worst and be prepared
equrpment. A technical report rs rn preparatron on thrs
140 kts ; power was then slightly reduced to 90% to give for nothing bctter .
sub~ect .
This reminds us of another incident recently when a
pilot deliberately created a radar misidentification .The
consequences of this type of behaviour are deadly
enough to deter even the most immature .

cc---~~a~h-U~ac Inter-service harmony - pre-integration style .

During a loading opcration on an Argus, the two

Port en g ines were tem Poraril Y shut down . As soon
as the en g ines were restarted thc P ilot P roceeded
Fj'L Tytula is presently engaged as a human factors special- to taxi the aircraft without informing the groundcrew
ist in projects involving equipment development and require- to disconnect thc ground power unit . This occur-
ments . He joined the RCAF in 1948, served at the Repair rence, which fortunately was just that, again poiats
Depat at Trenton and the CEPE Climatic Detachment at Namao out that check lists must be followed oa all engine
as an aircraft communications technician . In 1956 Sgt Tytula
starts . This near miss would have been avoided had
entered the University of Alberta as a serving airman, gradu-
ating in 1960 with a degree in mechanical engineering . As a the aircrew gone through the prescribed pre-taxi
commissioned officer (Tech AE) he served at Stn Rockcliffe and check .
at the Materiel laboratory until 19b3 . Following a year's Beware of get-home-itis - there is no short-cut
post-graduate study in the Industrial Psychology Department to safcty .
of Purdue University, West lafayette, Indiana, he graduated
in 1964 with a MSc in Human Factors Engineering .

14
Flight Comment, 1on Feb 1966 15
 The first flight - strapping in . The first group to graducte at Moose Jaw .  .and ot Gimli.

l r.rt R el iyi on ur culmination of a long and complex project . For others, Peril"! Or possibly it's the sudden confrontation of a
G'13~ rl~lYl~r pause to reflect on thc cnormous task that has bccn
it was the beRinning of an association betwcen aircraft modern coc kpit 1 ayout including an annunciator pancl accomplished : a new aircraft was built, a new main-
and student that will continue for years to come . For and TACAN e 9 ui P ment, or even the antici P ation of bein R tenance concept developed, new runwa,r-s construeted,
tlre students, it was the first step toward an exciting e~atched by somc keen beady-eyed student sitting close new svllabi writtcn technicians and aircrews trained,

Tutor
carecr . by , intentlv followin g his ever~y move men t . ),~o r th os e
Whether involved c~r not in the 'l'utor prograrn, we all of 5~ou who haven't vet ex Perienced the cc~ld s h iver s The transition from piston to jet basic training
have asked tlre question - How does the Tutor stack up? that accom Panv. the first side-b Y -sidr tri p~ it can be is over and the Tutor has more than lived up to
The Tutor is indeed an excellent basic trainer . 1~'ithout likened to the naked fear endurcd by the Ulyrnpic diving expectations .
a doubt, the performance of the aircraft and the standard ~ham P icm who emer g ed from the water after a pP rfect
of student skills achicved farexceededourexpectation5 . dive only to notice his bathing trunks floating in the Only the first chapter of the "Book of Tutor" has
From a studcnt point of vicw~ the inhercnt case ~r "vimmin gP ool! been w~rittcn ; the next few years will see additional
handling and safe flying characieristics throughout the chapters on syllabus changes, modifications to the
The cx-Harvard instructor finds a major difficulty
wide speed ranAe allow for concentration on Icarning aircraft procedures strc:amlined, and so on - but for th~se
in adjusting to the much larger flight envelope and en-
the instrument procedures and modern flying techniques of us involved in pioneering the Tutor, the clrmax has
vircmment of lhr Tutor, and its attendant complexities .
heen rcached wrth mixcd fcelrngs of relief and intense
without risk of losing control . The Tutor's high-speed He finds it hard to fnr~et about "mixturc rich, carb-heat
and high-altitude capabilities enahles the Basic: Flying saUs facUon .
cold" and concentrate instead on thc "15,000 foot
Syllabus to touch on all fundamental aspects of military check" . For hirn , t oda y ~'s comprchcnsivc brief ing has
r aviaticm . ln fact, the other stages of flyint; training yet re p laced the " P ull the chocks and crank the Pro P s - the
to come will bc a polishing of the skills he has already first one airborne is thc leader" . IIe must now considcr
developed in tlre Tutor . diverse weather conditions (the Tutor can reach a jet
The side-by-side seating arrangement has advanta,ges streaml,and that fuel supply is suddenly an important
F/ L R Dobson for both the studcnt and thc instructor . The studc:nt can factor - it doesn't last forever any morc: . A systcm of
learn by witnessing the instructor's movements ; simi- P lanned flvin g has hit him ri Kht betw~cen dayli
Dlrectorate of Tramlng , , ght and
.
larly, the instructor can m~re accurately assess thc sunset and hc can no longer rely on back-to-bac:k trrps
CFHQ student's actions . Gone forever is the P eerin g over the to pull him out of a holc, However, he rs so relreved
side, a talent perfected by Harvard instructors, es- to actually hear while airborne that he ,ratefully sits
pecially during night approachcs . back and enjoys the peaceful atmosphere of his draft-
A band was playing, men werc march ing and specta- Tutor instructors appreciate the wide performance free air c onditioned
. . cockP it . 11an Y were yut
i e s upr
r r~se cl
tors applauding - it was another graduation ceremony - envelape that permits covcrage of all thc latest flying on their frrst trrp to cliscover that the world is round
' w a.s a parade w ith a dif ference . Thc voun g men techniques . 'I'he predictable handling characteristics and that a mountain is no lonKer an insurmountablc
but thrs
receiving di p lornas were the first 'I'utor-traincd~ students . make dernonstrations a plcasurc and the varicty of obj ect .
Ovcr the years R(.'AF 5tations hlr~se ~aw and Gimli lesson plans throu~hout thc syllabus makc the job lt would he appropriate to interjcct some of the
have held many graduation pa rades but the one on
, 24 inf initcly mare interesting than during the Iiarvard cra . opinions of the maintenancc mcn at this particular
Se P tember was an im Portant milcstone in the long history Tfre road to unyualified acceptance howevrr was point, but their story is long and complex ; besides, it A native of Moose Jaw, FIL Dobson joined the RCAF in
of Canadian flying training. not a smooth one, The Tutor has a long way to go before could not be written without reference to the a PP ro- June 1956, and trained on Horvards at Claresholm, Alta,
lt was an occasion for mixed reactions from the it is re g arcled a staunch and true com Panion ; it has y~et priate E';0 and that onc is still emder revision . Actually, and on T33s at Portage. On graduating from the Flying
hundreds of people who were directly and indirectly to win over thc Doubting-Thnmas's . To somc T33 instruc- the ince P tion of the Tutor "1~aintenancc Concc P t" is Instructors School (FIS/, Trenton, in 1957 he went to Moose
tors, once the undisputed eagles of the traininR mill, it a ston~ in itself, and will appear in a later issue . Suffice Jow as a Horvard instructor, and two and a half years
a part o f th e transition pro gr am from Harvard to Tutor .
later, joined the staff of FIS which had by this time moved
A 200-page document would barely suffice to list the was a dash of salt on the tail feathers to "ste P down" to sav, here , the Tutor maintenance p m~,TramminK has
from Trenton to Moose Jaw .
numerous elements of the Uepartment of ?v'ational to basic traininK . Tlris attitude could stem from many bcen well plannc:d and professionally exccutcd .
F'L Dobson was commentator for the Golden Hawks in
Defence, the RC,AF, Canadair Ltd and Orenda Engines causes, for example, the unnerving spectre of facing '1'utor graduations will become commonplace as
1961 and was instrumental in the formation of the Harvard
Ltd whosc teamwork made possible the Septembcr gra- for the first time a horde of ab initio pilots who haven't Training Command pilots and groundcrews work year Aerobatic team (The Goldilocks) in 1962 . Since 1963 he
duation of Course 6406 on schedule . For many of the had the rough edges g<ound of f by a stalwart Harvard around to P rovide the o perational units with q ualified has been Tutor Project Officer for the CFHQ Directorate
departments involved, the ccrernony was the gratifying insvuctor aEtcr 16S death-dcf y~in g hours in the "Yellow pilots . But it was this first graduation that made us of Training .

Flight Comment, Jan Feb 1966 17

16
 The Horizontal
Depending on the equipment in your aircraEt the indicates the aircraft is ~6 nm from the T,~1C:AN heacon .
II~I will give you all lor part) oI thi~ information : (The heading memory marker has been deletcd Erom
Headin 9 Aircraft Headin g is dis pti la ~ed conven- the photos for sirnplicity) .
tionallv on the lubberline at top of the dial . Thc aircraft is approaching the desired track of

Situation Indicator
Heading Memory Marker This mav, be em P loved as ?60°, and the pilot has cut the intercf:pt angle to ~S°
.
a reference onlv,, or can >?e fed into the hank steerin7k
Eunction of Elight director and%or autopilot. The marker i~
rs set with the lower right-hand HUG knob . Thc heading
memorv marker mav also be controlled bv the tactical
260~-~ R~~ ` ,
com Partmcnt in maritime aircraft and bv~ " data link on r~,a ; R ~, ~s
5 L BT Bu~gess air defence aircraft . . ti,-
DFS 'AIB Desired Track The track appears in thc TRACh . .
window and also on tlre track deviation indicator (TDI)
rtion in tlre centre of the instrument . The settin ~ is
made with the TRK knob . qTc displacemcnt of the TDI
bar to either side of centre is controlled by the TACA\, . :
In the next year or so, many oE our cockpit panels
will be displaying a new navi ation instrurnent - the VOR, or ILS localizer, whichever is selected hv the
~ ~Il~~ t ,
Ilorizontal Situation lndicator HSI) ; the T33, V'ukon, pilot . ('I'he '1'DI can display target track on data link) .
Ar~rs and Dakota are slated far early conversion . This Bearin 9 Information The arrowhead p oints to the !
instrument will be more or less familiar to somc P ilots T~AC .aV', V'OR, or non~irectic~nal heacons - depending
and neu~ to others depending on the equipment you are an ~election . The tail will, of ~ourse, give the radial
usinl; nou~ . '1'hosc of us who have flown wit}r this new or hearins; irom a bcacon .
HSI yarc enthusiastic - once vou have mastered thc Distance :'~~~~earin,
1" K in the ',11ILES window, this
basics we know .vou'll be fired u ~~, too . A glance at is the 1'ACAN U11E:, or the readc~ut from any c~f the
_
the misleading complexity oE the HSI face may unnerve navigation or tactical computers .
y ou but once ( or twice) throu g h this article and vou're
,
well on the wav , to bein g another contented customer WORKING THE HSI
wondering, as we did : "u'hy didn't they do it this way To Intercept a Radial and Fly Inbound
in t}ie first P lace?"
'I'wo aims of the IISI prc_~grarn : The aircraEt headin~ (3S0°) is shown on the lubberline~
with the track knob ; as a result the TDI points to 13S° .
thc intended flik_ht is to intercept tlre ORO ° radial an .
fl Y touard the TACAN beacon . 1~'ith the track knob, Thc bar of the TDI is centered indicating the aircraft
~ to display navigation rnEnrmatron more clearly than
260° is set in the track window; this will cause the rs on track ; tn thrs rnstance, the prlot rs holdulg a
previous instruments, making the pilot's rnental
TDI to point at ~60° on the compass rosc - in this heading of 13S° (under the lubberlinc) to maintain the
gymnastic~ less complicated
to standardize tlre navi Kation dis P lav in as manv casc, on the left wingtip. Thc tail of the hearinK }~inter desircd track . The DME tells him he is 4 nm from the
aircraft as Possiblc concurrent with t}ie TACA ;\ holdinK Eix and the bearin,g pointer is indicating 31S°
modification programs .
/~
magnetic, ie, the TACAN beacon is directly behind the
aircraft .
~s~ ~r,
Ur''e'll outlinc some of the advantaKes of the HSI and t6Q=-` ,~ v ~ ~ "," ' 646 :-
g ive a brief preview of the instrument yuu'll be sceing rRaCK ~ ~ ~ ~ "r w~Es
more of in thc f uture. T

Let's examine the thinking behind tlre EiS1 desi~,m . =3 ~A~

0~~ F~
The basic aim was to present to the pilot a picture as
if he were looking directly down on his aircraft and
could see I~th his aircraEt and the desired track in ti~..
relation to his position - the horizontal situation . The ~'" ~2
aircraft rs deprcted as a small symbol etched on the ; ,v
x
~~e~~
glass in the centre of the H~I . 'I'he des ired track is
,., by turning left ; the headinK has now changed to 30S°
shown b ~ the track deviation indicator (TDII .
on thc lubbcrline . The tail of the bearin K i~~inter in-
dicatcs the aircraft is on the 08S° radial - S° from
desired track of ?60° ; the har of the TUI also indicatt:s

.~ .
i,~
i
/ r>>N~F
. . ~~SURING
. _~_iPMEN'
this by a displarement to the riglrt of one dot, or S° .
',~iote the TDI is sti11 pointing at the desired track
(?60° ), and pictorially shows the track at 4S° to the
Tp .FPQM
aircraft svmbol .
iND~c .4roR The aircraft is now inhound on thc 080°radial . The
headin,g is ?60° ; the magnetic bearing to t}re station
TqqCK
DEVIATION is ?60° ; the '1'Dl rcmains at '60° . The bar of the TDl
INUtC-ATOR
~roi! indicates nc~ displacement Erom track hy being centered
directlv undcr the aircraft svmbol .
HF nDING
0015 SHOw b`
CEFLEC'~ON shou~s the aircraft to hc on thc 100" radial and thus
oF oAa~
south of the desired radial or track. Bv being fully To Fly a TACAN Holding Pattern
MFMi'RV
VA~:MCF

dis P laced to tlre to P c~f the instrumcnt thc: bar x~rtion In thrs example the IO-milc: lonK TACAN holding
oE the TDI a15o indicates the aircraft is south of the pattern uses right turns, and is to the NW of the holdinK
desired radial . Note that the TDI shows pictorially
\ the intercept anKle the aircraft is making with the
fix at 30 nm on the 13S° radixl . The desired track is thc
13S° to thc 30 nm hol d i nK frx . Thrs rs set rnto the wrndow
desired track of 'GO° - in this case, 90° . The DME

Flight Commenr, Jan Feb 1966 19

ia
 'The aircraft has reached the holdink Eix, turned
through 180° to the right, and is in the holding pattern .
Thcheadin g is now 3IS° ; the TDI and To-From indicator C,orrt~nent~
Gen from Two-Ten
show pictorially that the inbound vack to the fix is
on the ri g~
ht and 180° to the aircraft hcadin g . 1~'hen TO THE EDITOR
the D11E indicates 20 nm the turn inbound will comrnence .
It can be seen then, that the HSI accomplishes two
Dear Srr:
major assists :
lt was with interest that I
~ it eliminates the separate instrurnent required by read F/L Chamber's letter in the
the older TACAN equipment, Jul-Aug 1965 Flight Comment re-
~ di splays pictorially the track in relation to the garding the susceptibility of an
aircraft, eliminating mental calculations of intercept aircraft to jet wash . F/L Chamber's
angles and aircraft heading . letter commented on a report in the
Jan-Feb 1965 Flight Commeat con-
All you ha~~e to do is fly - the I1S1 N'ill keep you cerning an incident involving a tcm-
in the P icture . porary loss of control of a Tutor
flying through the turbulence caused
bv another aircraft on the f inal CF104, 104 VS pmc Thc NCO in strike the invisible aircraft on the scriously injured. The photo shows
a~PProach . charge of the night shift had just left pylon, the wing leading edge how a combination of orders con-
In both these references, come on dut Y and was Proceedin g to and thc tip tank . travened plus inadequate equipment
the basic assumption is made that the button to ascertain the position The Sergeant fortunately was not can be deadly .
an aircraft's susce P tibilit Y to 'ct7 of hrs arrcraft . Contrary to regula-
wash is a function of the wing tions he elected to drivc down the
loading. This is not true . An air- taxr strrp near thc ccntre-Irne of the
craft's susceptibility to turbulence,
pavement rather than use the parnted
gusts or ~et wash rs a functton of the
"slope" of the lift curve . portion at the side of the taxiway
First it is necessary to undcr- designated for vehicle traEfic . Also,
stand what causes an aircraft to roll contrary to the usual procedure, a
whcn flying through the slipstream 104 was being towed at night unillu-
Fl~6~l~' &AFETY of another aircraft . Turbulence or minated . The tow vchiclc normallv
slipstrearn is simply "pockets" of illuminates the aircraft with rear-
air that have been given a vertical rnounted spotlrghts but thrs vehrcle
motion . An aircraft flying through had not been so modified .
thesc vertical gusts will temporarily
Thrs NCO saw the approaching
have the direction of the relative
tow vehicle, passed close-by at about
arrflow, and thetefore ifie angle of
attack and lrft wrll be changed. If 30 mph - close enough, that is, to
both wings Ely through the same
gusts, then the aircraft is simply
sub'J ected to a bum P . If, however,
only one wing enters the gust, then
this wing will temporarily have its TUTOR, FOD ON RUN-UP The
liEt increased if the gust is upwards tcchnicians involved in thc cnginc
ALTHDUGN THE (30AR0 OF INOUIRY HAS NOT YET COMPLETFD
or decreased if the gust is down- run-up are described by their super-
ITS INVESTIGATION, TNERE'S ALMOST CONCLUSIVE PROOF THAT AN
wards . This will causc the aircraft visor as "competent men of the
eIRCRAFT wAS FLOWN INTO THE GROIJND BECAUSE THF nPPROACH PROCEDURE
to roll . highest calibre", and yet an over-
wAS VIOLATED . THE RASE wEATHER WAS REPDRTED AS 3000 SCATTERED, Referring to Figure 1, aircraft sight in a run-up pracedure resulted
b~0~ OVERCAST, VISIBILITY l.ft MILES; HOWEVER, THE wEATHER IN THE " .A" has a high lift, low speed winR in a nut and spacer damaging an
LFTDOwN ARFA wAS ZERO ZERO IN HEAVY FOf, THE AtRCRAFT COMMENCED sectian . Aircraft "B" has a high engrne .
speed supersonic section . Both
A DESCENT TO MINIMUMS APPROXIMATELY FOUR MILES PeiOk TO THE
An cxtensrve rnvestrgatron at
aircraft are assumed to have the
PUBLISHED DISTANCE . FOR UNKNOwN REASONS THE CAPTAIN PERMITTED
the station led to the unearthing
continued on page 24
THE SECOND PILOT TO CONTINUE DESCENDING UNTIL THE AIRCRAFT
of several other contributing factors .
CONTACTED THE TREES. YOU ARF URGED TO STUDY THE LETDDwN PLATES
The list includes all the time-
PRIDR TD AN APPROACH TO ENSURE ALL POStIHLE KNOwLEDGE DF THE
honoured ones, and there's quite
PROCEDURES INYOLVCD . THIS EiULLCTIN 1S I)SULD N01 10 ~AY 6LAwE
a cluster of thcm . llnder these
BUT TO INfORM YCII DF AN ACTUAL EVENT AND ALERT YOU TO THE
circumstances this engine damage
DANGEROUSCONSEOUENCES OE VIOLATING LETDONh PROCEDURES .
had been just waiting to happen :
~ inadequate run-up area
~ poor lighting
~ extreme noise hazard
~ intensive maintenance program
(overtime~
~ improper design of coupler
~ lack of supervision .
FIGURE 1

Flighf Comment, Jan Feb 1966

TUTOR, HOT START The pilot the engine . As the rpm ran down, resulted in a hang-up . A defective L19, GROUNDLOOP The student Fifty feet further on, the aircraft And hc was so right - the air-
states "During the starting cycle, some white smoke or vapour blew starter was to blame. was on his first solo flight in the commenced turning to the left . "I craft groundlooped through 300°,
the engine rpm appeared to be in- out from the engine inlets". The pilot, however, had not L19 and had completed one circuit. applied right rudder in an attempt Applying power in a groundloop is
creasin g more slowl Y than usual . Further investigation showed referred to this previous start He rounded out at 70 miles an hour to keep the aircraft rolling straight . only asking for trouble. A look
After building to 38%, it rolled that the pilot had not cleared the attempt in his statement, lt can be in a light port crosswind. The The rudder was ineffective so I back in Flight Comments of yester-
back to 33% and the EGT rose to engine as outlined in orders follow- embarrassing when someone else student hit one wheel first, bounced applied power. . . I saw that the year makes this painfully clear.
BSO~C . I immediatel Y stop cocked ing a previous attempt which had comes up with the complete story. and settled in a three-point attitude . added power only aggravated the
condition. . ."

CH112, M1D-AIR FUEL SHUT-OFF in his headset, and was told to one spotavailable for an autorotation
The passenger was on his first step on the floor switch which was landing; they were too low to YUKON, TAXIED INTO HANGAR number one engine was started it established. All indications point
flight but had been associated with under the pilot's right leg. The pilot attempt a re-start . PVhat had started a few minutes registered full hydraulic pressure ; to the loss of hydraulic pressure,
the aircraft for the previous nine noticed the man reaching down The helicopter wound up tail-first before as a routine run-up was now a the number three was then started . which deprived the aircraft of wheel
months . The captain admitted later towards this button but did not notice in a pond . The photograph shows
nightmare - the four a~rmen inside As the power lever on number three brakes and nosewheel steering,
that he therefore, ". .. .did not brief that he had pulled the fuel cut-off the relative position of the two
lever, mistaking it fa the floor controls and why a re-positioning the Yukon stood by helplessly as was advanced about half thc travel caused by the manual hydraulic
him as thoroughly as I should have" .
switch . Moments later the engine of the fuel shut-off lever is currently they watched their aircraft roll out the aircraft began to move forward shutoff valve (which dumps the
Once airborne, the passenger com-
plained over the intercom of noise coughed and died, There was only being pursued. of control, nose-first into a hangar pushing aside the double-wheel main system pressure into the
daor, smashing the glass panelling chocks in the process . These were reservoir) being left in the unload
and carrying away a major section later judged wholly inadequate to position .
of the aircraft nose . The force was hold the aircraft even on the dry This accident would never have
so severe t6at the aircraft'bounced" surface . The brakes were applied occurred had the starting crew
backward from the impact about but the aircraft continued to move followed orders by ensuring adequate
five feet . forward on the down-slope . Ruling h Y draulic Pressure for brakin B
Earlier that evening the NCO in out the use of reverse thrust and purposes was available prior to
charge had appointed four men to possibly injuring the ground man towing the aircraft out in the first
carry out a run-up on number three outside there was nothing to do but place . An attempt to build up hy-
engine following a oropeller con- shut down the engines, turn off draulic pressure with the hand
trol unit chan Ke . He failed to dele- fuel and electrics, and brace them- pump had failed yet the crew con-
gate authority to any one man which selves against the impact. tinued with the towing out and run-
resulted in no one informing him The investigation was hampcred up .
that the aircraft had no braking because no one had recorded the Needless to say, this expensive
during thc towing to position for several details relating to hydraulic accident has sparked tighter con-
the run-up . Despite this obvious accumulator pressures and valve trols on run-up procedures and an
inadequacy in the aircraft state, positions, so the exact cause of the improved training program for crews
the run-up was continued. As the brake failure could not be definitelv running-up engines.

i~~

o~

NEPTUNF, ChIPPED TAII. The

engines had just bcen started when
a jolt was felt and the ground crew
signalled the pilot to cut the en-
gines. An Argus which was taxiing
behind a row of Neptunes struck
the tail cone of one of them . Why?
It had been parked twelve fcct
short of the designated spot and
had been left there. The photo
shows a Neptune way out-of-line
but wagging its partially-severed
posterior.

22 Flight Comment, lan Feb 1966 23

 Commen t s Uuring the repair of USAF
F84 jets at N .W'.I . in Edmonton I
BcJore we proceed let's recall that
QF'E means setting the .sub-scale ~v
was employed as a material ex-
To the editor pedi tor. Part of my j ob was to
that the airp ort o f de p arture or arri-
val reads zero altitude . 1ts vbvious BIRD WATCHERS' CORNER
identify parts that had been "cal(ed advantage is the Jreedom Jrom the
same weight and w~ng area and up" by the inspection teams, for interminable interpolativn oJ the
therefore the same wing loading. replacement . It happened one day
Both aircraft now fly at the same Q;VH - but :
that the team called for the re- The limits oJ the altimeter sub-
IAS through a gust which changes
placement of the "yaw cord" . I scale preclude the use o,( ~JFC ai
the angle of attack by aa amount
knew what a yaw cord was, but high-altitude airports and Jor terrain
equal to the distance "c". On air- what is its purpose on a jet aircraft?
craft "A", the change in CL is or obstacle clearance en route . Fro-
On the F84 the cord is s,
represented by the distance "a". viding adequate meteorvloyical
attached to the gun deck doar
Similarly, on aircraft "B", the approximately one foot back from services are available, (primarily to
c:hange in CL is represented by the the airscoo P~ directl Y in line with provide pressure readings at inter-
distance "b". It is obvious that the canopy, It is made from 3/16" vals oJ say, notmore than 100 miles)
"a" is greater than "b", Therefore to 1/4" nylon cord about 3 ft long . it is generally ayreed lhat Q :'V11 has
aircraft "A" will be subjected to a Since the F84 is a fairly modern these advantagc~s :
greater change in lift and therefore jet and is equipped with a varied
feela larger hump or suffer a grcater assortment of radio and instrument , provides reasonable en route
rolling moment than aircraft "B" . aids for landings and navigation, r~ertical sepurativn,
It can now be seen that the the yaw cord on this aircraft seemed ~ provides good terrain and oh-
reason the Tutor is susceptible to as out of place as a kimona at a stacle clearance at all altitudes,
turbulence on the final approach is bikini beach party . , pruvides yvod vertical separation
because it possesses a low speed My question, of course .. ., near airports - vital in areas
wing section . W''hy an item like a yaw cord on a that ha~r.~e tec~o or more airports
S/L R Feakes RAF modern jet fighter? Great aid on a ~with di~(erent elevations,
CFS RCAF Tiger Moth ., . .but an F84! ~can be used Jor takeoJ( without
1 hope your quandry dces the transition to en route pro-
The eJJect produced by the gust not parallel mine . cedures,
is proportional to : John G . Kirkman
~eliminates, prior to landing, the
~ aircra/t speed Edmonton, Alta
~ spanu~ise distribution oJ the gust iransition. frvm en rnute setting
~ lif t curve slope, thereby reduciny the risk oJ error
and inversely proportional to the The venerable yaw cord oJ b y the p ilot while makin 9 lar 9 e
inertia winy loadiny - th.is being yesteryear has deJied improvement
adjustrnents to his altimeter .
the most si yni Jicani . and resisted the best ef f orts oJ
The liJt curve .tlo}~e in your the engineers to produce svmething The ~)~ti'fl, we thereJore contend,
letter is true !or the overall wing more elaborate to replace it . The has tu~o prime virtues : Simplicity
perJormanee-attributable, oJ course yaw cord is an economical and and Logicality.
to the lou~ aspeet ratio normallv accurate indicator tfrat the aircraf t
Jound on hiyh-speed aircraJt, but Jlies true in the yawing plane, or,
preeise analysis requires the wing whether the aircraJt Jore-a/t axis
section to be employed in computa- and air/low are aligned. The RCAF's
tions. The li/t curve s1opE, in the T.~3s (which are gereerally in the Dear Sir :
unstalled region, is nearly the .rame F84's speed range) have yaw cords . The "Flash-Back" photos
Jor all airfoil sections . (3elou~ is a OJ course, ad'usting lhe yaw, ie, are very interesting and amusing in
comparison aJ a thick and a thin the rudder trim, requires a man out Flight Comment . However, I for one,
secttvn zcith trans2tzon at the Iead- back with a pair oJ plicrs as the T3 .3
iny edge and a Reynolds Number oJ rudder trim tab is a tnetal G'-bend-um would be even more appreciative of
10~ (Re~erence - Ro,yal Aeronautical variety, them if you could slip in a paragraph
Society Data Sheet N-ings 01 .01 .05). givin g at least, the type of aircraft,
whcn and where picture was taken,
tl c .20 0
and a word or two about "wha'
Trailing edge angle 20 ° 0 °
Dear Sir : hoppen" . . .
dCl,!da, per degn: e .10.f .104
LAC R Burke
I have been tryin~, without 1137 TSD
much success, to stimu(ate a bit of
controversy with the statement "I Our "Flash-l3ack" photos are Plummet's progenitors got by with a climb out on the wing and a quick
think we should used QFE rather from the Air II istorian's Jiles. In pull of the ring . Times change but not Plummets, however-"sink rate", a
Dear Sir : than QNH" . W'hat do you think? What those days crashes didn't get the Plummet would tell you, is something out of a plumber's price list . Before
While reading "Comments" do your readers think? I have my ar- photo cot~erage they do now, so ejectinq, his cockpit loitering reflects a blissful indifference toward a century-
regarding VASIS and safety aids for guments rcady in favour of QFF and
most o/ these were personal photos bird's deceptive rate of descent. The image of the "Zero Seat" fiaed in his
pilots (Sep-Oct) it brought to mind would like to know what tf~e arKu-
which were sent in many years mind, Plummet unwisely tarries, and swoops too close to the deck . At this point,
a questron which never to my satrs- ments are against it .
faction has bcen answered fully, later. We consequently don't have a victim of the hidden hazards in the geometry involved, he emits his character-
perhaps you can have it clarified F/L EV Mold this inf ormation which, we agree, istic cry:
for me, 3 14'ing, Zweibruckcn would increase their interest .
TOOLATETOOLATE NEXTTIMEI'LLNOTWAIT
24
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Is there a handy accident/ incident summary for my aircraft?

Can I keep up-to-date and in-the-picture on my bird?

Can I know if other commands are having similar problems?

Is there a document having MATERIEL, PERSONNEL and

ENVIRONMENT separated for easy reference?

Is a MAID available to me?