FLIGHT COMMENT

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MAY " JUNE " 1962

1
 May " June " 1962

The flying safety aspects of `'round-the-clock" operations in Air

Defence Command are of vital importance to success in our assigned
Editor-in-Chief - Squadron Leader D. Warren

Editor H. G. Howith
1 Editorial role . Although I'light Safety cannot properly be regarded as an cnd
in itself in military air operations, it is a tnajor requirement if essential
Circulation

Artists
Flight Lieutenant 0. G. Amesbury

J. A, Dubord
2 Pitch-Up resources are to bc conserved froru needlcss waste, This Cornmand
haS a COlltlnlllrl~ rcyuirement to derive from the resources allocated
H, K . Hames

Editorial Assistant - Miss R . Mayhew

5 Good Show to it the maximurn in defensive potential and cannot afford needless
deprcciation of nraicrial and personnel asscts due to accidents . Our

OFFICIAL INFORMATION -The printing of

6 Flight Safety in ADC flight safety prograrn, therefore, retnains of extrcme imporlance and
will continue to in(lucnc e ~r II faccas of opcrations .

8
this publication has been approved by the
Minister of National Defence. Contributions Loose Rivets on Sabre Wings In recent years a positive approach io Nying accidenl prevention
are welcome, as are comment and criticism . coupled with increasing experience and a reduction in technical diffi-
Address all correspondence to the Editor,
Flight Comment, Directorate of Flight Safety,
RCAF Headquarters, Ottawa 4, Ontario.
10 Chip On My Shoulder culties has produeed a significant progressive decrease in the accident
rate within the Cornmancl. For the first time we were able to report
The Editor reserves the right to make any
changes in the manuscript which he believes 12 FOD Must Go ttivo completely accidcnt-frce months during 1961 . The supervi5ory
staff, aircrew . arld technical personnel responsible for this .1Chlevcmcnt
will improve the material without altering the
intended meaning. Service organizations may
reprint artides from Flight Comment without 15 Heads-Up Flying may be justly proud of their success.
Now~, however, a ncw and formiclablc challenge erncrges . The
further authorization. Non-service organiza-
tions must obtain official permission in
writing from RCAF Headquarters before
16 Hot Weather Take-of~ next few months will sce the introduction to service of the CFIOIB
and the CF10~ weapons sytitems in rapiclly increasing numberti . Sta-

19
reprinting any of the contents of this publica-
tistically it C11r be shown that, in the past, a substantial incrcasc in
tion . The opinions expressed in Flight Com- Near Miss
ment are the personal views of contributing accidents has invariably followccl a re-equipment project of this nature .

20 The in~mediate aim of those concerned with flight safcty, directl

writers ; they do not necessarily reflect the
official opinion of the Royal Canadian Air Arrivals and Departures Y
Force. Unless otherwise stated, contents
or inclirectly, must be to establish a pt'ecedcnt during this critical
should not be construed as regulations, orders
or directives . 24 Thrust ~n~ Parr Y
period by maintauring thc accidcnt rate at or bclow that which exists
at present .
This aim can be achiwecl, despite thc dlflrCUltIeS lnvolved, bv
cnergetic appliccrtion of thc p rinci p les which have served uti well tn
the past . Renewed awarenes~ of the problem and a conscicntious
attempt by all to adopt a truly professional attitude toward thcir duties
will cnsure that everything possible is done to minimize acciclents and
ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORC~ thu~ tc~ maintain the combat potential of Air Dcfence Command .

~1~.~~
DIRECTORATE OF FLIGHT SAFETY (WR MacBrien) A; °V, I~1
F Air Ofiiccr Commandin~,
Air Dcfcnee Command
 ---- NATURAL, OR ARTIFICIAL

\
STALL WARNING REGION

LIFT
(INCREASINGI

FIG . 1 c
1
0
/
> / ~ / ~ " "
-- ANGIE OF ATTACK "
(INCREASING~

i
i
AIRFLOW ON THE STABILIZER i
l

As the second g eneration of the su p ersonic increases in angle of attack . The degree of
S fighter aircraft has developed o~-~er the past longitudinal stability present establishes the
HIGH ANGLE OF ATIACK decade, a new phrase has been introduced arnount of control stick force and travel re-
AIRf10W ON THE
into the aviation vocabularlyto describe deter- quired to bring an airplane up to this stall
STABILIZER
iorationof flight characteristics at high angles p oint .
of attack . W11en deterioration reaches the "At stall, the conventional airpl<ane is at a
point at which longitudinal instability results l~igh angle of attack . The wing lift starts t.o
the name popularly used to describe t.he phen- decrease and the nose dro p s . With the aid of
DIRECTION OF FLIGHT
omenon is "pitch-up" . nose-down control, flying speed is regained
McDoruiell Aircraft Corporation, producc~rs rapidly and a normal pull-up completes recov-
of the RCAF's new CF101B "Voodoo" fighters, ery . Artifirial stall warning devices are
gives this definition : usually installed in aircraft thc~t do not have
"'Pitch-up' is the nose-up tendency devel- sufficient natural prestall buffet . t.o warn of
oped at high angles of attach that will, if not approach to the stall . " (See fig . 1 . )
recognized and compensated f~~r, lead to tl~e The longitudinal stability characteristics of
temporary loss of controlled flight . 'Piich-ul>' rnode.rn fighter aircraft deteriorate at high
FIG . 4 provides an upper lirrrit to the useable ~ngle of anglcs of attack ; the reason forthis phenomenon

STA ll attack flight boundary sirnilar to the conven- will be described in the following paragraphs .
tional sta11 boundary m low-speed aircraft . It 1'ilo t sshould not for g~et that attem~tin
1 g to fl Y
is a function of airplane angle of attack and not modern fighters in the pitch-up area is as
MODERN HIGH-SPEED
related to pitch attitude . foolish as trying t.o fly an older type of aircra.ft
FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
"In order to better understand pitch-up, let p ast the stall limit . In both instances one nn
us first examine the phenomena of the conven- longer has c~ntrol ; one is merely a passenger .
PITCN-UP REGION . tional stall . The primary cause of pitch-up is the inten-
"An airplane is stable in the longitudinal sified downwashoverthe stabilizer of a modern
direction if an increase in angle of attack pro- airc raft. at high angles of attack, 1~'ig . Z shows
duces an increase in nose-down moment . the airflow at low angles of attack, that is, in
PUSHER BOUNDARY Thus, in a longitudinally stahle aircraft, if level flight ; fig . 3 s}iowsthe changed conditions
the pilot is to increase angle of attack he must of airflow experienced at highangles of att.ack .
WARNING BOUNDARY a pp l Y increasin g amounts of nose-u p elevator Other influences on the amount and intensity
to counteract the increasing forces tending to of downwash are, chiefly : location and size of
push to nose-aown . engine inlets, type of aring-fuselage joint, and
"Normal stall occurs as the increase in relatianship of the horizontal stabilizer to the
angle of attack causes a deterioration of the wing, in so far as it is mounted "high" or
lifting flowonthe wing untilthepointis reached "low" .
where lift starts to decrease with additional Downwash is, therefore, the downward

3
conlpvnent imparted to the flow over the wing vary in tiize and number frorn one aircraft to
by the trai ling vurte~ field . The int.ensity of anuther, but es5enti ..rlly they do tlre sanze jotr .
dcr~ymvrash is proportional to t11e lift ~eneratc~d Pilots tvllo fly t,lre RC .~F's new aircraft are "
GIIIIII SIIIIII !;
by the wing and the distribution of thi~ lift . thoroughly trained in the functions and per-
Thus . the down~,vash pressure exl~erienced by formance uf ti:eir airc raft, and al?ree tl :at the
the hori.zontal stabilizer is irrcre~i5ed ~reatly pitch control s Y stern is ti~ital to s,-~fe o p eration .
at extreme angles af att.ack by tl~e concentxation 'I'he PCS, then, is one uf a pilot'S best friends,
of wing lift on tlre inbuard p~rt1U11 Of the win~ To se~~ iio«~ ti ;is friend oner ;rte5, ilave a look
as ti P stall develo P s . at. fi~ . I 1~,3nc~ 2 . t~urther inforrY~~ation can 1-rc
If the aircraft is left to continue int.o ~~ fully c"~leaned fror~~ ''F101 l"oc~duo 1'r t~l,
, ~ Contrul
developed pitch-up condirion, the nose curnes System" hy thc hlcDonnell :~irccaft Corpc :>r,.~-
up like tl~e lrc~ad of a West:ern brc~nc:o--,~cnd the tion ; "1" ~10' Test Pilut's ~ti`ote Bouk", b~~ Glenn
rider ~et5 the same type of ridc-~--rou~h! Re- R ~eti~es uf the Lockheed :lircraft Cur 1~or-~ctron ;
covery i;e~chnique v~r,ries ~i~iti ; il,e type of air- tiie G1~'10-'D :!OIs (~;0 ()5-16513-1_~) ; and the
craft--so read the .-~OIti, C1~'1(ilL3 :10I~ (LO 05-185 .1-1) .
The upc:rational pil©t has several devices
to warn and lrrutec't hir~l frorn enterin~ tllis
undesirahle fli~_ht conditir_rn . Pitch Contr~>1
S Y sterns ( PC,S ) rna Y var y~ arrron ~~ t YP_ es of air-
c:raft, but all ;

(~i) warn the pilot that he rs approachrng WIRED FOR DANGER

that portion of the fli~ht envelope at which
pitch-up takes place ; and Rec~k:nl ;~ . cident.s 'n :~~c: demonstrared tltat .
(b) take corrertive action automatic~illy if ,,
on tftc~ landinEt roll, t,f :c~ I1 .11~- b arrestinE~ c ;rl~lc~
the aircraft continues to appruach hitch-ttp ,
n~ayr nount~e aTid dam :r,~e rn,cin ~ear doors,
after the pilot has been warrrc~d . brake lilic:s, et~, h1 ;e B .11~ G i~ used at Unitc~d
States Nav~cl .1ir Stations .incl s-~r
~ nc U . S . lrr
These systen~s are an integral part, of the Force h ;itic~,, l
aircraft, and have been incorporated in the It is rernrn~ ;~ended tu ;r~uid takeoff ;rnd
desi~n evc~r since pitch-up was first discuvered landin~ ~~ruund re~lls ~y~~er tlic~ li :1f~ ; i~ when SGT . N .W . SPLANE
to be a harard . possihle . Ncr fcrrtrr,ction tal,eoff or larrdin~
The lritchcontrc~l systems consistuf devices should he mlde w ;~en it is necess~ir y~ tu rall
whiclr give a cenLral computer the followir.g A P ilot returning to Portage in a T-blrd suspected a gyrosyn compass
over this b~crrier .
rnfurrrta .tt~>rt ; Pilcri s sh,ould cl~eck F'lif;ht Pl .-,nning hufrlic- failure about 40 minutes out . When Kenora confirmed the failure, he
rlngle of attack - I-rorn ar1~1e of attack ations io find c_~tr~ ~~her~e the T'~ ~>`;,'f~ lrar-ric r is notified Porta g e and arran 9 ed for a no-com p ass GCA run . Weather was
prohes ; installed, reported to be above minima .
A'Iach nurnber - frotu pitot stat .ic 5ystc~ni ;
Rate of control-colurrrn rnovement - frorn When the aircraft arrived over the AG beacon, the pilot commenced an
a sensor on the contrc~ls ; ADF2 , and contacted GCA throu 9 h 10 000 feet . The weather was now
C! frirces ; a .nd
deterioratin g ra p idl Y~ with blowin 9 snow ~ and brakin g action reported
Position of undercarria~e and flaps . VOR STICKING as nil . Similar conditions p revailed at the alternate, so the pilot decided
'This inforrnation is lcd int .o the central
"black box" of the PCS which (a) warns the not to divert .
1'here havc: becn several recent occurrences
pilot that he is apprv~iclriu~~ hitch-up, eitber
of VOR indicators (To-Frot,~) stickin~ at statiun
l~y lrorn, lip;ht, or p}lysically "shZking" tlie S 9 t . N .W . ~~Micke Y ~~ S p lane the #2 GCA controller, established radio
I~assa t; i', Once ~ both sets failed simultaneousl Y
eontrol colttmn ; and (b~ applies a force uf ahout to indicate . It lras beett recomr~~ended 1.Irat the contact and 9 ave an excellent no-compass run-capable, confident and
30 lbs, totlre control colurnniftlre first warnin~ following be emphasized° accurate estitl~~~,tc~~, p rofessional . Weather conditions on landin 9 were such that without a
is disregarded or the pilot's re~ictiun is sluw . closc cross-checkin~ of both s~ ts, ;c t<<1~ on th~ hi 9 hl Y -skilled controller, a safe landing was doubtful .
The stage of flight at which t.he warnin~ is instrur~icnt ~lass if a "I-run~~ i~l~~,~"_ is sus P ectecl,
and cross-chc:ckin «ith Lh' ADF if ~tv~~~ilahl~~~
given is called the PCS W,~rnin`~ l',uundary ; tlre About five minutes later another T-bird pilot was preparing for an
i~fortover, as a reminder, it's a ~~ood id~:,r
stage at w}riclr correcti~~c~ act.ion is t.aken is ,
to co ;~~ 1~are RI":'1I headin~, witlc rr~a~~netic`con-r
, pass emer 9 encY let-down with a dead UHF . By transmitting on 314 kcs, Sgt .
called ''Corrective" or ''Pusher" Boundary . continuall y~ ~ Several accidents are un record S p lane brou g ht him in for a successful landin 9~ a 9 ain with adverse
Because Pitch Cont .rol svstems are auto- whicli su~kest "suspected errors up to ~5°in tlre
matic, they are sometrn~es called automatt~ fluxgate system,
weather conditions and despite the lack of radio contact.
Pitch Control systems ( .~PC) depending on the
S g t. SP lane deserves a Good Show for two highly-ef~icient talk-downs,
aircraft manufacturer, tiattrrally, black bo~es Flight Safety Foundption
without which both P ilots mi g ht well have been in serious trouble .
 If the prevention of flying accidents was the may effect operations . During the squadron's
only objective of the Cornmand it would be weekly ground training periods, these pilots
possible, by emphasis on safety measures, by arrange suitable lectures and drills to provide
avoidance of flying under difficult weather refresher-training to the aircrew, and to en-

FLIGHT SAFETY IN ADC

conditions, and by overcautious practices in sure alsothat new developments or procedural
general, to maintain a statistically satisfactory changes are explained in detail .
record of operations . This is not the case ; Station Flight Safety Officers, who are
the operational objectives must be met in the selected for their mechanical aptitudes and
national interest, and all restrictions imposed interest in the work, have a somewhat different
to increase safety in flight must be carefully function .These sperially-trained pilots, who
by Air Defence Command examined to ensure that they do not have an have completeda tour with a squadron and who
StQff 4fficers adverse effect upon operatiunal rapabilities . have receivedthe RCAF Flight Safety Officers'
While restrictions and regulations pertain- Course, are uniquely placed to influence the
ing to flying operations ran and do serve a education of aircrew and technical personnel
The 1~rofessienal a PP roach is one q ualit Y 'hhe nature of the Cotnmand objective is
useful purpose in preventing accidents, they
~~~ili :h is common to all successful organiza- such as to requirc: a delicate balance tu be
also have drawbacks . Over-regulatiun at any
tions enaaged in the operation of aircraft . strurk between acrident prevention, on the une
level can discourage initiative in thought and
Whc~ther the operation is lar~e or small, mili- hand, and the requirernent for effective and
action and thus an educational program must
t~ry or civil, it~herently risky or normally realistic training on the other . Flight Safety
supplement and, where possible, replace regu-
safe, optitnum results can l ;e attatned only by cannot be regarded as an end tn ttself under
, latory action . The reasoned avoidance by
the flreatest possible contri}~ution on the part these circumstances ; instead it rnust be cor.-
trained personnel of inefficient or hazardous
c~f the individuals toward the goals of the group, sidered as a vitally irrtportant means tothe end
actions and methods wi11 elirninate more poten-
I'he goals of flying organizations are many af accomplishing t .he object.ive of the Cornrnand .
tial accident causes than will blind adherence
and tl .e degree of risk which can be accepted The professional approac}i to the attainmcnt
to regulations . This professional attitude can
to achieve them a-lsovaries within wide linrits . of tl~e Command's objective requires the elim-
be developE:d hy continuous educatic~nal pro-
Despite this variai.iun in risl :s and in goals any iilation of a11 unnecessary hazards . Environ-
grams ernphasizing safe practices and the
suttndorganizatiun, whethE:r operating for profit. mental, procedural, maintenance and materiel
awareness uf flight safety problerlls .
or fitlfillinga military requirement, i .ZUSt safe- hazard5 must be sought out, identified, and
The Flight Safet.y Officers of Air Defence
gu,~.rd it.s resources against waste by striving eradicated without comprornise . It can be
Command play a rnajor part in organizing and
for the rnaximutn in safetynZeasures commen- argued, with ,justificatiun, that some risks
carrying our programs of this nature among
surate with the nature of its role . must be considered ac.ceptable by the n~3ture
the per sonnel concerned with the operation of
Flyin~ uperations by ;~ir Defence Command uf the d~tties tu he perforrned .
aircraft .
are desi~iled, primarily, tu eont .ribute toward Wl~ile i .his theory may I~e accepted, with
Sqttadron pilots designated as Flight Safety
its assi~ned c~bjecti~~e of c~rovidirrg cotnbat- reservations ; it must be applied wit.h discre-
Officers are attached to each F'light. of All- This is the type of publication stand found in the corner
ready fcarces forthe operational useof I\ORAD. tion . Before methods or procedures known to
Weather Squadrons . Thraugh tlteir e.fforts, of many AW squadron crew rooms . The flight safety
In a broad sense, the vast majority of the flying be hazardous are accepted as being essential publication display rack is eye-catching and practical
the group ts kept abreast datly of the latest
m~ty fie described as aperational training, the operat.ional value to bc~ derived f ron-~ their and serves the purpose of keeping publications neat
technical developments, and of changes in
whether it is carried out by an OTU trainee or continued existence must be carefully weighed and readily available .
environment or other circumstances which
by a ti~eteran _all-Weather crew . against the degree of risk involved .

ADC alert crews

may be called to operate in weather
A typical gathering or under conditions which would call
of AW squadron aircrew . One of a halt to normal flying operations .
the twice-daily meteorologital These officers take advantage

ill. _ -
briefings prior to day of the ice
or night operations . on one of our airfields .
alike .
I3y virtue of being e~l~ployed as test pilot.s (i) Loose explosive rivets maybe replaced (s) The maximum allowable number of
by oversize Cherry rivets with no loose rivets in a wing is one rivet in
for aircr<rft on cc~mpletic_~n cf marntenance
limitation on the number that may be five,
work, they ~_rre able t .c~ maint.~~in rlo-se c unta<:t
replaced . Where the hole is beyond (6) If not more than two adjacent solid
wii .}~ the
latest te~ hr,ic al dc~~cloprnent.s . In
tolerance, the next larger shank dia- rivets in a row of rivets are loose,
addition to ensurin~ that inforrnai .ion is dis-
meter of the nominal shank size Cherry oversize Cherry rivets may be used,

LOOSE
seminated to all cc_~n~ erned, and to initiatinh
rivet may be used . with the exception of the front and rear
training programs, they x-rre resp~nsiblc for
(2) Loose AD (A175-T~) rivets ma.y be spar areas .

RIVETS
assistin g as necessar Y in the investic~ation of
accidents and incidents, and for ensuring that
rebucked . (~) If more than two adjacent solid rivets
(3) Loose DD (24S-T ~) rivets may be re- are loose, they must be replac:ed with

ON
appropriate reporting action rs taken .
bucked . If the rivets are in the hard- solid rivets, unless authorized other-
As specialist advisers to Commanding Of-
ened condition, extreme care should be wise .

SABRE
ficers on Flight Saf ety, the Station Flight Safety
taken when rebucking them to avoid (8) Loose high-shear rivets on the wing
Officers have the responsibility of actively
cracking . A short and steady burst of are not permissible. Loose high-shear

WINGS
seeking outand c~lirninating potentially hazard-
the rivet gun is recommended . To rivets may be replaced by similar size
ous situations in all phases of air and ground
deterrnine the serviceabilityof cracked AN bolts (AN3 to r~N20 series with
operations . Theyare supported in t.his respeci.
rivets, see Figure 2 . Refer also to 6 ultimate tensile strength of 125, 000 to
by Station Flight Safety Committees which are
and 7 following . 145, 000 psi), provided that no spot-
chairedbythe Comrnandin~ Officers, and which
(4) Loose rivets are not permissible in the facing is required . Flush high-shear
meet monthly .
front and rear spars . 'I'hey must be rivets may be replaced by a special
The minutes of these tneetings are sent
replaced by the original type of rivet . screw made from a standard AN509
to the Command HQ where they receive the Re p orts ~rom the field indicate that some
Cherry rivets are not permissible as (F'igure 3), provided that the original
appropriate circulation and consideration . doubt exist .s as to what constitutes a ''loose
substitutes in these areas . hole and countersink are not over~,i%e .
F'light Safety Officers also encourage t.he sub- rivet", The following information has been
mission of Near Miss Reports and Operational compiled to assist servicing personnel to de- CANADAIR SERVICE NEWS
Hazard Reports, and handle their processing termine whether a rivet is loose . Note, how-
at unit level . ever, that this inforrnation is general, and FIGURE 1
'I'he Command Flight Safety Officer and doubtful conditions should be referred to a TYPICAL ROW OF TILTED RIVETS
his staff maintain close coniact with thc: unit competent authority .
specialists, and ensure the rapid transmission The flexibility of a wing is desirable and, R , /~~
%///////////////////,
of information between the stations and tlir since the rivets are working in the wing, a EXCESSIVE LOADS %l LZ %7//////~//i7U/UA Ylll//~L711
Defence Command Headquarters . Their as- slight seepage can be expected in the presence
sistance or advice is available on request to of fluids or other foreign rnatter, Conse-
the units at any time, and through thern, the quently, a trace of oil, fue1, water or graphite
facilities of the Directorate of F'light Safety on the skin surface adjacent to a rivet head is
FIGURE 3
are available when needed . no indication that the rivet is loose . Experi-
FLUSH HI-SHEAR RIVET REPLACEMENT
The Flight Safety organization described, ence has also shown that cracked paint around
by enlisting the support of aircrew and ground the head of a rivet is not a positive indication BREAK EDGE .005 ~ ~ H I`
personnel in the interests of accident prevc:n- either .
t.ion, has contributed toward a progressive lf the heads of a row of rivets seem to ha~re AN 509 SCREW
decrelse in flying accident rates within Air tipped, and chipped paint is observed around OPEN AND SUPERFICIAL INTERSECTING CRACKS SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS
Defence Cornmand over ihe years since its the heads, you may assume that the wing has
THE UPSET RIVET HEAD SHALL HAVE A MINIMUM CRACK-FREE
formation . been subjected to excessive loads, and these
SURFACE DIAMETER EQUAI TO ONE AND ~NE TENTH ( l .1 ~
There can be, however, no relaxation of ef- rivets shouldbe considered loose . (Figure l .)
TIMES THE RIVET SHANK DIAMETER
fort if reverses in the trend are to be avoided . If there is any doubt, one or rnore of the rivets
There is no doubt that the introduction of new should be removed carefully, to preserve the 1 .1 D (MIN .~ SIZE MAKE FROM H S (MAX)
aircraft to the inventory will create major rivet shank for inspection . If excessive loading RIVET SHANK DIA. 3 16 AN509-10 .047-.045 .036
prc>blems in accident prevention . These pro- has been applied, the shank may have becomc: 1 4 AN509-416 .Obl -.059 .036
hlems can and must be solved if waste of joggled and%or the rivet holes rnisaligned .
5 16 AN509-516 .068-.Obb .045
resources is t,o be avoided . Yet, single rivets with tipped heads may also
3 8 AN509-b_ 16 .078-.076 .045
.~ir Urfence Command must succeed in be the result of faulty workrnanship .
meeting it .s objective . To this end, sustained In brief, rivets on Sabre wings should not
surcess in minimizing flying accidents must be considered loose unless they can be moved
be achieved . When success or failure in these or pried loose, or over-stressing verified by 1 . STAMP HEAD "SPL"
AC~EPT REJECT
matters ran influencethe strengthof continental inspection .
2 . SUFFICIENT CLEARANCE AND FLAT SEAT
air defc:nc:es, there can be no excuse for failure The following remedial actiim may be taken REQUIRED FOR NUT
FIGURE 2
to adopt ti~e professional approach . for loose rivets on Sabre wings ;
TYPICAL CRACKED RIVET HEADS 3. AFTER MACHINING RE-PLATE (CADMIUM)
 or not-so-young pilot, attempts to demonstrate but fear of friendly t.easing overrides discre-
to the occupants of the other aircraft how he tion .
can really "bounce" them through his superior
s kill ; When you consider them, these situations
(b) t.ail-chases where excessive "G" is are just another kind of the old "knock that
pulled, or rnani~euv-res are carried out near chip off my shoulder" gam~ . If we, as fighter
the ground where there is no margin for error ; pilots, becorne rll~ture enough to exercise
Or self-discipline and say No'. we can take the
(c)
disregard for the weather, where pru- friendly teasing of our fellows, and thus show

CHIP ON MY SHOULDER dence and cornrnon sense indicate a diversion, that we are professionals, not arnateurs .

G
H :~,v often when vou
, were a boY~ did y ou the day
of the white scarf is past, and that
get inic~ a situation which e»ded with either you accepting ululecessary risks for "kicks" is
or anniher fellow reaching down dramatically, frowned upon-indeed, taboo .
select.ino a suitable chip, placing it on the after his graduation frorn FTS, the RCaF
shoulder, arld hurlin g the challen g e ; "Go ahead, pilot is channeled to Transport, hlaritime,
knock it off, I dare you ."' all-weather or day-fighter operatic~ns . (The I
lt took sonle nerve to knock it off, lt took latter will soon change to the tactical strike
rnore nerve to leave it there to e~libit sell- rc)le upon the introduction of the CF104 into
discipline, and endure the tawit.s of t.hc: others . :~ir Divisior~~ .
Now we are men, working at a profe5sion Recause of the nature of the aircraft he will
which require5 a great deal of self-discipline . fly in :~'I'C and Tv~IAC, alld the long hours spent
Professional military pilots must exercise it under training in the right-hand seat, and with
perhaps as rnuch, or more, than any ot}rer the exam E~le of the hi g hl Y - q ualified ca Ptains
V C)Cdt10i1. he will associate with, the young pilot makes
Here we may examine f~r a nlc~rnent the adjustlnents, and his mental attitude soon en-
paradox in the selectian and training of mili- compasses self-discipline . But the problern
ta ry pi lot s . We want rnen who are sober, of the pilot trained for all-weather operations,
consc.ientious, trustworthy, responsible in- and particularly the .Air Division role, i5
dividuals, who will tra_irr for a relatively different than his courlterpart in the two Com-
dangerous job (check the insura .nce rates :), be mands operating large aircraft .
a gg ressive, self-confident, and read y tu risk The fiohter pilot is trainedto he aggressive,
combat prepared to win, knowing full well the to havc: daslr, high rnorale, and readiness to
price of losing . In short, we want lnen wllo "tangle" when required . He is trained by men
fill all the requirements of ba.nk clerks to be- wllo, in many instances, llave won persunal
have a good deal like prire-fight.ers . distinction, and who have brought credit to the
Now 1 .}rcl'e's nothing wrong wit}r hank clerks RCAF by displaying these qualities, Most of
or prize-fighters . It's j~lst tlrat, in civilian these officers have retained these virtues, and
life, we don't usually find one man with the it is nat.ural for the young fighter-pilot trainee
trait5 of both . The RC;AF' faces a unique pro- to emulate them . The difficulty is that he
blern, because civilian ~lying doesn't entail rnust, at the same time, exercist the great
the agg ressive > corn p lete-tlie-mission outloc>k self-discipline necessary to direct his actions
required of military pilots . Aircrew recruits properly when flying alone, or without direct
join the RC,=~F to fly ; it nl,ist be assumed that supervision,
they have in rnind the combat role of tlle air IIUw does all t111S p11110St)~111ZlIlg flt 111t0 OLlr
fc~rce, as opposed to the passenger or cargo- fli g ht safet Y p ro g ram? llere's how : The
carrying role of cit~ilian companies . RCAF RCAF has had sonle Iata1 accidents because
pilotstherefore rllustbeaggressive individuals, l~ilots fl Y in g~ da y ~ or all-weather fighter aircraft
THIS OBJECT CAN WRECK A JET

ready to accc:pt challenges and their attendant exhibited aggressive spirit, 3nd, at the sarne
risks . time, a lack of self-discipline . Take these
:1s our aircrew trainc:es progress, the dis- three e~;anlples ; in each, regulations were
cipline of the service and the example of older, contravened :
etiperienced arrd respected pilots begins to
influ e n ce t hern . The y~oun g p ilot realizes that (a) the rnid-air collision, where the young,

ia il
 et engines are giant vactturn cleaners ; the c ombat. . money rnust be spent on fixing the engine (in
lar 7er ~rnd more p owerful the Y become, the on the ground that FOD is almost
It. is the field or at the factory~, on freight costs to
more effecaive their ability to ingest foreign always unacce.ptable, because carelessness and fro~T~ the place of repair, on tniscellaneous
object~-l->olts, nails, wire, stones, tools, or negligence is usually the culprit " handling costs, on increases in the support
parachute~, clothing, hurnans, and so on . Negligent tnaintenance personnel and poor procurement of new engines and spare parts,
Larger and tnore powerful engines are in- airfield housekeeping are not the only cause on increased maintenance and supply work-

FOD
stalled in the new aircraft coming into RCAF of FOD an the ground . Pilots, too can be at loads at each echelon ; and it all results in

operational service . It follows, then that fault . One aircraft was damaged seriously decreases in general preparedness .
foreign ahject damage is becorning an ever- when the engine was fired with the pilot's
increasing m enace , and must be wi p ed out . p arachute restin g in the intal:e . Another p ilot REMEDIES
Ever yt hin g enterin g a J~et. en g ine exce 1~t fuel, started an aircraft and tookoff without remov-
air, and water in the proper proportions is a ing the nose plug . It isn't possible to pinpoint the causes of
FOD and ,_rttach responsibility to onc trade or

MUST
hazard, and is alrnost certain to cause dam- Maintenance and housekeeping laxity c~~n
age attributable directly to a human failing, lead to malfunctions during rUtl-Up, or partial unit . What is needed is the co-operation of all
whether by atop supervisor or aninexperienced or complete failures in the air . Result. ; an ranks, from commanding officers to new tech-
unscheduled engine removal ; and thosc~ res- nicians . Supervisors at. all levels have an
technician .
Despite many flight safety prograrns, there ponsible are rarely found . Much uf the damage important part to play .
comes from aircraft and engine fasteners like The new anti-li'OD program should stress
are still a number of problem areas which,

GO
nuts, bolts, nails, washers, or safety wires, hoth maintenance and servicing techniyues,
with sorrte concerted effort, could be elitnin-
ated . ingested from the tarrnac, as well as front and airfield housekeeping .
We all know the old truism about an ounce objects such as pebhles, earth, sand, pieces
of prevention being worth a pound of cure . To of concrete, cinders, wood, or ire . Good HOUSEKEEPING
prevent financial drains and the loss of life, housekeeping could practically eliminate oc-

( currences of this kind . Good housc~keepingmeans keepingthe entire

t.}~e time to eradirate FOD is now .

i
Careless maintenance can result in wren- airfield clea.n-not just the ramp areas, but
ches, pliers, caps, and even technicians, the overrurt, taxiways, and runway shoulders
CAUSES
ending up in the engine intakes . As a matter of too .
Jet engines have t~een damaged by foreign grisly fact, a technician was recently ingested On the ramp, hazards range frotn a sma11
objects at every stage of their life histories, into a 5abre-the first instance of such an piece of wire to a towing vehicle or bull-
both on the g round ~znd in the air . Exam p les accident in over eight years . Fortunately dozer . Neglected taxiways or runways ~~ r e
examples like that are not too prevalent . often covered with engine-destroying rocks,
of the lati.er are bird strikes and ricochets
from air-t.o-ground or air-to-air firing in Every time an engine has to be repaired, p ieces of concrete ~ and ordinar `'~ trash . T}~is

12 13
 LITTLE THINGS MEAN A LOT
~i ~i~i .i~illi~~iid~illllll~lll~lilliill6~u6~riilld~~ un

D1D YOU KNOW that . HEADS-UP

One micron =

metres ?
1
25~100
of an inch = .001 mi11i-
FLYING
You can just see a ~0-micron particle with
your naked eye ?
WIRED FOR TROUBLE ALERT
~1 100-mesl~ sieve will p~ss particles of up to
150 microns? F/0 R .J . Saulnier took off ina T-bird from Mr . R . Gaudreau, a civilian test pilot
rro~~c.v 'rArca a human h~~~ir is about 100 microns in dia- Calgary on an IF"R clearance to Comox via employed by Aircraft Industries of Canada,
meter? Enderby, at flight level 3Z0 . The climb was carried out a run-up on a Dakota and found no
One g ramrne = .035 ox ., and 1 milligram (rng~ - in cloud from 6, 000 to Z7, 000 feet . About Z7 malfunctions .
. 00035 oz7 minutes after takeoff, the generator warning After the pre-takeoff cockpit check, the
One litre = 1 .76 pints = .22 Imperial gals? light flicked on and off for approximately 10 takeoff run began . The Dakota left the runway
seconds before staying on . The loadmeter at 80 kts . , using 44" MP . At this point Mr .
Clean dry fuel should contam ;
indicated zero . Gaudreau noticed that the port engine rpm at
(a) less than 2 mg of solid contarninant,
F/U Saulnier immediately turned 180 ° and nearly Z800 .
«~ith particle size of a m~.ximum of 7
headed back to Calgary ; After two attempts He pulled the control back to decrease the
. ~~.ryrtf"r'7 .,~~.~ ~,.~~,~ .~,~~  ,,~ ~ . .~.,~a~~ ,y~i.~,~~a lw~~.~~:~~, ~1' .1'~"~"l^'51.1~C"P%,".q"~"~
.'~"S".~"~..'S`"5 .,~"~' rnicrons, per litre af fuel ; alld
at reaching Calgary approach, on 119 .3 mcs, rpm ; at nearly the same instant an abnormal
:C1iP~~,
~

(b) no free or entrained water?

-. -r ~_i

he tried to switch to 121 .5 and squawk MAY- increase in noise and an unsynchronized engine
DAY, but the VHF failed to switch channels, condition accompanied another sudden surge in
Jet fuels are of higher specific gravity and
and went dead . rpm . The starboard engme tachometer was
is definitely the fault of inadequate inspection . more viscous than gasoline type fuels?
All eiectrics (except fuselage tank and radio indicating 3400 to 3500 rpm, Mr . Gaudreau
Now inspection isn't. just a cursory look- Jet fuels have a great affinity for water?
compass) were turned off . After Fl0 Saulnier cut power imrnediately and landed the aircraft
around, but a good habit requiring cont.inuiug Jet fuel s act as cleaning agents , dislodging
received station passage, he let dow~n in cloud straight ahead .
and exhaustive effort . And, most irr~portant of rust, etc?
from Z7,000 feet in the northeastquadrant and Quick brake application indicated that it
a11, inspection is useless unless followed-- Jet fuels retain particles longer than lighter
broke cloud at 10, 000 feet indicated . would be impossible to stop because of poor
promptly--by c:orrective action . fuels ; for instance, a 5-rnicron particle settles
He re-homed the beacon ; the generator braking action and lack of runway . The pilot
How about . it? Are YUUR cleaning methods 4 inches per hour in JP4 fuel, but as rnuch as
blinked on and off for about 10 seconds again, swung the Dakota mto the snow on the port
andequiprnentadequate? Can YOU recommend 18 inches per hour in :Avgas?
before the light stayed out, and the loadmeter side of the runway, and cut the switches . The
an improvement? Is all non-essential traffic Fuel may contain waterin dissolved, entrained
indicated a charge . F/U Saulnier contacted aircraft stopped within the field boundaries,
on aprons, taxiways, and runway prohibited? (suspended~ or slug (free) form?
approach control on 1Z1 .5 and landed without without airframe damage .
Moreover, are your perimeter roads ade- 1, 000 gallons of JP~1 may, on cooling by 90°F,
further incident . The weather at the time was The constant speed unit had a sheared drive,
quate? Do you have a planned aerodrome release 1 pint of dissolved water?
partially obscure, with visibility one mile in which was caused by seizure of the component .
cleaning schedule? Is your current manpower A separator (or stripper~ rernoves water by
snow . This caused a runaway propelter and engine
able to provide the necessary supervision, and use of the principle of interfacial tension
The intermittent power loss was caused b}~ overspeed .
is it in a position tc~ take corrective action to ~coalescing niethod)?
a loose screw in the generator switch in the rear The CSU had been installed for only 78 hrs .
elirninate hazards? :4 good separator will rernove entrained, but together with the
cockpit, and wires PP30ZAZU and PP300AZ0 ZO rrrin . It was returned,
1'he unit cornmander ought to be able to not dissolved, water?
were also loose, making intermittent contact . engine and propeller, to the overhaul con-
answer all these questions with a definite YES . The settling process will readily relnove free
Use of a split lock washer rather than a star tractor for further investigation .
If he can't, it's his responsibility to correct water ?
washer could have started the chain of events . Mr . Gaudreau's alert action in this sticky
deficiencies himself, or to bring them to the Additives such as c:orrosion inhibit .or5 reduce
This area isn~t readily accessible, and the situation undoubtedly prevented further dam-
attention of his Command Headquarters . water ;~fuel interfacial tension, and thus irnpair connection is rarely broken . It was felt that age . He was flymg an RGAF arrcraft, and
Foreign Object. Damage has to go, There's separator capabilities? congratulates him on a heads-
this failure was an isolated case, Flight Comment
no roorn for it in the RCAF . Wit.h the co- The mosteffectivemeans of rerna~ring particles
F/U Saulnier used good common sense and up performance . It's nice to know that our
operation and vigilance of all personnel, it can and water is by prolonged settling? aircraft are in capable hands while flying at
proper procedures, and refused to panic . This
be st.amped out . .Are you doing YUUR share? the contractor's .
was heads-up professional flying in a situation
FUEL IS .1N AIRCR .aFT'S LIFEBLOOD
r KEEP IT CLEAN .
which might have been even stickier if the bat-
teries had been 1ow' .

15
14
 TOs involvirig aircraft with a surplus of power, given throttle setting and airspeed, the weight
than with types which are marginal at all-up of air passing through the engine depends en-
weight . Could it be that the pilots with "power tirely on air density . 5ince air density de-
to burn" get a bit burned by overconfidence? creases as temperattrre increases, the thrust
If you don't want to end up slithering off the output of the engine decreases . Lower thrust,
runway some fine hot day, you'd better read of course, nleans longer takeoff distance .
on-no matter which type yourre flying . Some newer jet aircraft are equipped with
"flat-rated" engines, so-called because, by
PLANNING throttle movernent beyondthe normal maximum
setting for takeuff, the same thrust available

HOT-WEATHER TAKE-OFF
Planning is the beginning of any successful at b0 ° F', is maintained up to 100° F . This
o p eration . The more critical the takeoff, the feature reduces the effect of temperature, but
more accurately and completely all related does not elirninate it, because the groundspeed
factors should be considered The takeoff data required for t<~keoff is incxeased by tempera-
inthe AOIs show accuratelythe effects of tem- ture . This, and the high takeoff gross weights
perature on perforrnance . Effort has been at which these aircraft will be operated,

wi11 "buy the farm" when the conditions are

/
C ,~nes the hc~i, we,~tlrer, our t.akeoff accident
rate goes up . Wlry? 'Clre ::rrrswer i .5 siml~le : suc}1 that the tolerance for error is sm~-tll .
of all aircr,rft, herformance char~cteristics, While it is true that rnateriel failure < ould
takeoff l>erfc~rrn2nce is tl :e oue most profoundly- cause an a~cident on,r critir~tl takeoff (it rniglit
affected hy outside air temperzture (O .~T) . not if the takeoff w~~sn't ~~ritical), we'11 look
:1, thE: tenil~er ;~ture rises, t~keoff perform- here at only ii~osr~ fa,'u :-s ~r~'~~r wlri~,h the pilot
ance ~ocs down, but t :~:e same takeoff weights should lia~~e contrc~l .
are needed for tr~~inir.~ or operations . We Jacll aircr,~,ft type has different perforrn-
must, therefore, operate close to takeoff ance clYaracterititie.s, lrut al1 ~~re ~iffected rnore
perforrnance lirnit~rti :~ns dttrin~ hot weather, ar less. The he,~~'}~ jet tr~lnsport is suscept :ble
whf°n there: is less t.oler :rnce for erro_~, to tlze most perf~~rrnance losses, but the jet
To err is l~uinan, i~ut unfortunatel~,, the fighter is affected too .
mistul :e in jud~ment which will cause :~ few From a re~~iew uf the recurds, it would
bad T11C!Illt:nis during a non-critical takeoff, see»1 that the l~,( ;~~F" has had rnore ahorted
made to show all possible variations . means that takeuffs will still be critical in hot
In spit.e of this, pilots have been guilty of weather,
incomplete planning and a lack of appreciation
for the efferts of high temperature . For some, EFF~CT QN AIRFRAME
this was their last mistake . Remember that
anerror comitlitted in planning a critical take- The indicated airslrced required for takeoff
.
+ ~ ~t . ofI can easily nullify any emergency action at a given gross weighi. is indcpcndeni of air
.
takendrrringi,hr takeoff--no rnatter how proper . density . Ground speed, howev~:r, required to
attain this indicated airspeed varies inver ;ely
with air density . Since air density decreases
TEMPERATURE EFFECT
~~s ter~~perature increases, thc ground speed
The pilot should understand why temperature required tu attain a given indic~ated airspeed
is such a potent f,~ctor . T hi s rnay be "old hat" increases . I3ecause it is proportional to
for some, but it won't hurt to review it . High ground spced, takeoff distance increases with
outside air terzrperature increases takeoff outside air ter~~perature .
distance for two reasons, both stemrning from
the lower density of the air at high ternpera- TO GO OR NOT TO GO
tures .
li'irst, ennine thrust is decreased ; second, a critical takeoff should have a definite
the ~roun~l ypeed required to achie~~e takeoff influence on a pilut's decision uz the event of
airs p eed is in~:reased . an engine failure during the takeuff roll . To
The thrust output of an airbreathing engine appreciate what influence it should have, and
is directly proportional to the weight of air why, wc rz~usi understand takeoff limitations
passing through the engine . Since only a fixed and our method of rnoniioring t.akeoffs .
volume of air can pass through the engine at a The present lirnitlt.ion for pearetiine opera-

16
tionisthat critical field length mustnot exceed occurs after passing the V1 speed, the pilot
the runway available . This means that the shouldalwayscontinuethetakeoff ag .gressively .
aircraft can usually be handled safely if an There are obvious exceptions to this last
engine fails at any time during the takeoff roll . staternent, for instance, if the pilot was to
There are, however, some points in this roll lose control of the aircraft .
where this becomes serious, and sometimes a
rnoment's indecision, an improper procedure, WORD OF ADVICE
or a malfunction will result in the loss of the THE NOT-SO-ETERNAL
NEAR MISS
airplane . Let's look at this situation . One further word of advice c.oncerning the
V1 speed is a calculated airspeed helow V1 speed, and any emergency other than an TRIANGLE
which a takeoff must be aborted if an engine engine failure whi~~h rrlight oc: cur after passing
is lost, because not enough thrust is available this speed .
to permita takeoff fromthe remaining runway . It ts ea~tremely dlff~cult to guarantee accur- WRENCHED
In t.he most critical situatiun, critical field ate and representative aborted-takeoff data . External and internal checks onthe i~:pedi- The article in the November - December
length ecauals runway available . Time required for pilots to recognize and tor were completed norrnally, and nothing 1961 issue of Flight Comment on distress-
If an engine fails before reaching thc~ ~' 1 react to emergencies will vary with every ontoward was noticed until t~ikeoff . Just as pattern flying has been overtaken by our new,
speed, the aircraft cannot continue the takeoff ; pilot and type of emergency . Tire-to-runway
the aircraft becarne airborne, a 12" crescent faster aircraft-and it contained some dis-
there is not sufficient thrust available to be- friction coefficient, which is the primary wrench slid across thc nose section, and carne crepancies anyway. (See Letters to the Editor
come airborne before running ottt of runway . factor in braking performance, varies with to rest just at the base of the windscreen . It on page 24 of this issue . )
The takeoff must then be refused, and a every runway surface condition . Because of was impossihle to abort because of the short Recommended airspeeds for the distress-
successful stop can usually be made on the this, the c~-rpability of aborting safely becomes length of the runway, so the airspeed was kept pattern triangle are as follows ;
runway . But if a tire blows, or hits a wet more marginal and less reliable as the aircraft low and an immediate circuit commenced .
spot, the aircraft cannot be stopped on the progresses beyond the V1 speed . The pilot intended to land ; the open jaws of Aircraft Kts . IAS
runway . Even on a critical takeoff, then, if an emer- the wrench had caught on the hub of the wind-
If, however, the engine fails after V1 speed, gency other than an engine failur~ (or loss of shield wiper stopping its movement . As the T33 200
t}~e takeoff can be continued on the reduced control) occurs beyond the V1 speed, the pilot circuit was begun, however, the wrench started F86 240
t.}irust-in fact, it must be continued because should stick with his decision to go, whic.h he to rotate around the hub, "and it seemed prob- CF100 240
ttiere isn't sufficient runway remaining to stop m3de at the 1~'1 point, able that it might dislodge from under the GF104 260
the aircraft, even if brakes and all work per- In sumrnary, be aware of the effects of wiper and cause unknown damage to the air- CF101B 280
fectly . high temperatures on t.akeoff performance, craft or personnel or property in a built-up
It is apparent thatthe V1 speedisthe mean- and understand takeoff monitoring procedure, area below ." Don't forget to fly where radar coverage
in g ful P oint on a critical takeoff . Because itis so that you can take the right . course when the The wrench was now within reach, so the is available, and at the best height . Review
the earliest point in the takeoff ro11 at which lives of you and your crc:w depend on it . pilot turned control over to the co-pilot and the article, and use your head to rnake a tri-
the aircraft could suffer an engine failure (or Always consult your AOlS-and don't let a recovered the wrench through the clear vision angle .
sirnila .r loss of thrust) and sti11 continue safely, hot-weather tak~off be your lasf . panel . The rest of the trip was uneventful .
the pilot should obviously decide to abort if an The wrench had been left in such a position
engine fails prior to reaching the V 1 speed . Adapted from a Flight th~t it could not have possibly been seen from
If an engine fails, or any other emergency Safety Foundation artide the ground before takeoff, and because of the
dull, dark finish it did not stand out from the

SURE S~l'-UP
dark background, and was not noticed from
inside the airc raft until it movE~d .
The wrench could have caused a great deal
Aircraft opi:rating in the area of an accident
of grief if it had fallen off the aircraft into the
are in a deadly set-upfor a mid-air collision .
built-up area just beyond the end of the run- With no planned "pattern" existing, you'll find
way . An investigation was carried out and the aircraft with widely varying speeds, including
mechanic responsible was disciplined . helicopters, orbiting a crash site, oft~n in
opposite directions . With much attention con-
centrated on the crashed aircraft, the hazard
of another accident in the sarne vicinity is
increased tremendously . Pilots orbiting an
accident site for a useful purpose should rnain-
tain an extremely vigilant lookout, and pilots
who have no more than spectator intcrest
should leave the area, for their o~~~n safety and
that of others .
USN: Approech

18 19
 MURPHY AGAIN
During an overshoot, a Sabre pilot selected
undercarriage "up" at 150 knots . The main
gear retracted normally, but the nose gear
didn't ; it was found by the number t«ro to be in
:
contact with the "D" door . The pilot selected .~~-t~='.'.~`--~-
i~a~.,~~ _
gear "do~t~n" and rnade a safe, straight-in ap-
proach .
VOLUNTEER Detecti~ e work disclosed that a technician LOOSE
The airrnan volunteered to get an energizer had positioned an actuating rod incorrectly . A Neptune was ona Maritime exercise when
parked four feet 1'rorn t.he starboard ~ring tip of (See En 05-5E-~, page Z01, figure Z-53, detail the No . 1 hydraulic pressure gauge began to
a Sabre, He assurned hc h~~d enough room to "E") . It was old Mur p h y~'s Law a g ai n -" ll" an fluctuate . Five minutes later, while the flight
turn the rnule, and back it up to the energizer, aircraft part can be installed incorrectly, engineer was investigating, the main hydraulic
but he rr~isjudged the distar~ce, and the front of someone will install it that way . " The point gauge fluctuated and began to fall . The main
the rnule c:.ollide,i ~~~ith lhc port ~~'in,~; lip of the here is that all Sabres on that particular wing hydraulic systerz~ was bypassed and the reser-
aircraft . were checked, and three more instances of voir was subsequently found to be empty . The
The ~~~eather conditions werc ;ynud ; the improperly positioned actuating rods were crew declared an ernergency and headed for
tractor on examination was found to he in ,good found . The moral is obvious : 1IELP STAM1' base .
workin g order , ~ti~ith steerin g and brakes full y~ OUT biURPIIYS! ! A complete check of the hydraulic lines in
serviceable . Instead of turning t.he energizer the aircraft showed no breaks or leaks ; on
tow bar, the airman tried to manoeuvrc~ i:he reaching base the main hydraulic reservoir

ARRIVALS
rY~ule too close to the aircraft-and damaged was filled with a11 available liquids on board
an aileron beyond repair, and a wing tip le s s in the hope of gaining toe brakes, flaps and
~orrect
seriouslv . Excessive speed was not a factor . nose wheel steering . The liquids didn't help ;

and
The airman's error in judgment cost lrim a GCA a pp roach and fla p le s s landi ng were
$~5 .00 . carried out successfully .
Why this failure? A loose pressure line

DEPARTURES
frorn the port engine-driven hydraulic pump to
the fire~~~all quick-disconnect . The line had
been disconnec:ted to rectify a hydraulic leak
prior to flight, and had not been tightened suf-
ficiently when re-installed . Vibration during
flight caused the loose fitting to back off and
allowed the hydraulic fluid to escape .
The incident, assessed as Maintenance,
resulted in disciplinary action against the t~,vo
AETechs responsible for the loose fitting .

UP SIDE DOWN
There wa5 a thud during inverlecl flight at
l, 000 feet and thc engine failed, As he was
unablc: to relight, the pilot ejected, He had not
inserted the safety clih in the q uick release
box prior to takeoff and either during ejection
or separation from the seat. 1 .hc: parachute
harne~ti ~~~a~ released andthe pilot hung up5ide
do~ n, helcl only by the friction between the lcft
thigh strap and lcg loop . 5eeing he was going
to land in the ltiver Weser, he ~ra~ P ed a
st.rap wit}a one hand and inflated his hlae We~t
beCore Iritting the water head firsi,

RNZAF Flyin~ Safety

21
 ,~iN~

KID STUFF IS FATAL FAULTY HOIST

GEAR BOX BEARING FAILURE BOXCAR CIRCUIT-BREAKERS
An APU hoist (Ref . ~G/1730-Z1-~00-0903,
/ The 113~A was engaged in firefighting opera- The Boxcar captain found all temperatures
serial #E~) was bein~; used to install a net~" AI'U
tions ; it. e~ acuated 10 passengers, dropped and pressures vvithin takeoff lirnits during his
in the nosewheel well of a Yukon, When the
thern off, and becac~~e ~~irborne for another pre-takeoff check . During climbout, however,
AYU was about six inches froiY~ its mounting
trip . Just after takeoff, at a height of about the oil temperatures for both engines rose to
position, the lifting was stopped for a rY~ornent
150 feet, a severe vibration ~x. "as heard and 105 ° C . , and were not reduced by" a manual
to allow for the ''rnanhandling" necessary to
fe1t . toggling of oil control svvitches . After levelling
~uggle the unrt mto position for the lrnal lrft .
The aircraft started to rotate in a steep out, oil temperatures stayed at 10~° C, for the
At this point, one of the cables on the hoist
nose-down attitude, and crashedout of control . starboard engine and lOt3 ° C, for the port . The
broke, and the full ~t~eight of the unit broke the
Although the co-pilot sustained major injuries, aircraft was flo«m backto base without further
other cable, The A1'U fell four feet, wed~in~
it was fortunate that nobody was killed , incident .
the wheel well doors, and damagin~ both the
The crash was caused by a bearing seizure An unserviceable circuit-breaker, part #AE
APU and the well . If the unit had not jammed
in the input side of the interrnediate gear box, 3161-P10, left the circuit open, regardless of
m the doors, an airman standmg underneath
which resulted in the breaking of the tail rotor the position of the reset button . Both oil-
might tiarell ha~le been seriously injured .
drive-shaft . cooler exit-flap actuators were thus inop-
Fxtra precautions were being taken at the
A modification leaflet had been issued pre- erative, no matter which svvitch was selected,
tirY~e to prevent abnorrnal strain to the cables
viously, requiring installation of a new type of Further opening of the flaps f and a resulting
during the lifting operation, because there had
input and output bearing to intermediate gear increase inair flowto compensatefor potential
been several previous failures ol this type-in
boxes in service . The modification ta spares increases in oil terYrperature), was therefore
fact, this ~ti" a s the second such occurrence on
in stock was annotated "non-applicable" . prevented . (Refer to EO 05-90A-~, part I I ,
this particular aircraft . Both of these were
This aircraft had been fitted with an un- fi~ures 11-17, item 17),
on Al'U hoists being used for the first time ;
rnodified gear box from spares in stock during It was the second such incidentin t~~,~o years
moreover, the c~ianufacturer had rnodified
a normal maintenance function , on that aircraft, and a UCR recommending
both hoists, using a cable-tensioning device
All interrT~ediate gear bo~es-in service installation of a circuit-breaker for each act-
designed to prevent the cable from "piling" on
and in spares-have no«~ been modified . This uator was submitted . The recorr~mendation
the cable drum, thus eliminating such break-
ought to eliminate trouble of this kind . We all would ensure that such an incident could not
ages . Three UCRs had been subrz~itted .
learn from elperience . 3gam happen to both engmes at onc.e .
The manufacturer, at the time, was working
on a hoist which dispensed with the cable-and-
drum arrangement, substituting chains and
sprockets with a vernier adjustrnent to allow
Two (_:F 100 aircraft took off on an intercep- for rninute positioning on final alignrnent . This
After one intercept they w" ere hoist is no~~ in service ; in the interim, the unit
tion e~ ;ercise .
borrowed the rnanufacturer's production-line
instructed to return to base, and the section
changed Rl'I' frequency . cable, The accident was assessed ~,4ateriel-
During the let-do~~n, an unauthorizeci tail- fault~~ de s if;n .
chase be g an ; it turned into a sin~ulatc.d dog-
1'ight at 1ow level . The lead aircraft struck the
Jround and both occu P ants were killed .
The invest.igating board found that the in-
cident was caused by the pilot's disobedience
of flving orders . h'urther, it appeared that
both I pi'l ots were determined not to ''lose" the
dog-fight . Instead, the crew of one aircraft
lost their li~ ," e,ti-a hi g h p rice to p a y~ for a lack
of self-discipline .

22 23
 BIRD WATCHER'S CORNER

letters to and from thP Editor are not official RCAF

correspondence, and need not be directed through
official channels . Unless otherwise stated, statements in
letters and replies should not be construed as regula-
tions, orders or directives .
t

Dear Sir : The article "F1yin~ the Distress practicable to follow thern from a fuel-con-
Pattern" in the November - December issue sumption standpoint .
of Flight Comment has sorne rrlerit in allo~~~ing 1
I «~ou1d suggest that a minimum ot ;_'00 kts .
for the effect of «~ind on the shape of the tri- IAS is an acce p table speed for flying the dis-
angle, but the speed suggested for a jet would tress patt.ern in cither a T33 or an F86 .
create a hazardous condition . F .ll, Kaye, FlL
The article recomrnends that a jet be flo«~n (F/L Kaye's remarks arr' completely valid .
at 35, 000 ft . or 1, 000 on top at a TAS of Zd0 The s P eed recorTimended in our ar t i cle
~ was
kts . , which is in the order of 130 kts . LA S at decided upon in an atternpt to make the trian>;le
35, 000 ft . or 1L0 kts . IAS at 40, 000 ft . These flown by jet and piston aircraft sir~iilar in
speeds are dangerously close to the stall, size , This }tas been proved to be imprac:tic-
depending on fuel load . They do not perrnit able ; revised airspeed for ti~arious aircraft
retention of altitude in the turns, nor is it are listed on page 19 of this issue . -Ed . )

~»1~u~~~~y

FAMOUS LAST WORDS ,c~ i ~l

c-~ 1'~ -~-
~
,~1? < ~,r`(
vr

SOME LIKE IT HOT 1i1

(The i~allow~ing account is taken ver}~atim and the hot-cup electrical leads removed . The
from a D I ~l , Only the names of the fire truck was requested from the tower . The
i)akota's crew~rt-ten ha~~e been withheld to pilot windows were opened and the smoke
"prote~t the innoc:ent"-the incident was cleared from the galley and pilot ~~ompart-
assessed Materiel .-Ed .) ments .
"One hot-cup wiring was found to bf~
sr7~ouldering, and was extinguished . No further
''During ground run-up prior to takeoff the indication of overheating could be found, hence
crewrnan . . .noticed smoke coming for~~~ard the request for the fire truck was cancelled,
from the galley compartrnent . (The galley and the operation was continued-using the Alights unexpectedly in the "toolies" short of the desired perching
door was closed and the steward was in the rentainin~ hot-cup . " site, frequently clobbering such items as approach lights in the
passenger cornpartrnent .) The captain w~as (Many parts of an aircraft need attention process of damaging itself . Fatalities have also resulted . This bird
notified, and investigated immediately . The and maintenance, This incident could have seems not to understand why small wings, high loadings or marginal
speed should produce such a high rate of sink . Apparently thinks
source of the smoke could not be deterntined caused a serious fire in some circumstances- that the term "back side of the power curve" has reference to
imrnediately . or the crew could ha~~e lost its remaining hot- egg-laying .
"Th~e galley master s~c'itch ~~as turned off cup! -Ed .)

Call : THOUGHTIHADITMADETHOUGHTIHADITMADETHOUGHTIHADITMADE

Rocee Durran2EL, F- .rr .sc, (~creen's Printcr and Controller of Stationer~, Ottasti~a, 1962
 BIGGEST
ACCIDENT
CAUSE

YES!-UNLESS you remember that jet engines are giant

vacuum cleaners, and will ingest anything from runway
or tarmac with disastrous results. Pick up EVERY foreign
object and toss it in a refuse can. Remember too that
good housekeeping is just half the battle-the other
half is sound maintenance. DON'T drop tools or any-
thing from your pockets. Help stamp out F.O.D .-save
an engine, perhaps a life.

*Foreign Object Damage