FLIGHT COMMENT NOVEMBER " DECEMBER " 1965

Frost - Fact and Fantasy, page 2

Winter Wonderland, page 12

 DIRECTORATE OF FIIGHT SAFETY CANADIAN FORCES NEADQUARTERS

G C AB SEARIE
DIRECTOR OF FIIGHT SAFETY
We have all had a 9 ood smi le at some time or other , (p erha p s t o t he
point of nausea), at the "Think Ahead" slo 9 an desi 9 ned to ortra the
5 l MD BROADFOOT W C 1T MULIEN P Y
FUGHT SAFETY ACCIDENT INVESTIGA' ON
individual who means well but isn t q uite with it,
In DFS we have hod also man Y a 9 ood cr Y at some untf~inkin g p il ots
or technicians who have wracked u our aircraft s oiled our statistical
P ~ P
record, frightened the natives and turned the CO's hair g ra y , The tr u e
There's a surprising dearth of information on the frost on
professional keeps himself honed to a fine ed g e . Ne knows his 'lob a nd
aircraft phenomenon . A near-fanattcal abhorrence is the refuge does it well, not SO P er cent of the time nor even 90 p er cent of tIte
of most of us - and with good reoscn . The accidents shown THE time, but all the time, You have watched Y our favorite hocke hero on
Y
with the Frost, Fact and Fantasy article are genuine and con- NEED the ice - he might look relaxed but when the PY la is for him he's there -
vincing . We did a deal of digging on the subject (in the summer he stays, alert, in the ri 9 ht P lace at tl+e ri 9 ht time .
heat), and we're printing the findings because we were sur- TO Don t get us wrong, We have our P rofessionals, Men y of them .
There are a few outstandin 9 exam P les in our "Good Show" section in
prised at what we found, It will, we hope, spark a discussion .
BE every issue of this magazine and tfiere are man man others who are
By the way, as good a starting point as any, is this passage 1 EDITORIAL Y Y
from EO OS-1-1 AOI Notes General, (the Pilots Notes of yester- ALERT quietly, confidently and alertl Y doin 9 their essi 9ned tosks. But there
year) that venerable, and almost forgotten, volume of flying 2 FROST - FACT AND FANTASY are also others ; far too many! 1he Y are the ones wf~o kee p us in busi-
,
lore : ness . If you don t believe us come u P and see us sometime - have a
"Prior to takeoJ/, all aircru/t sur(aces must be cleared o/ 4 GOOD SHOW look through our files,
A cotter pin was missed from the rudder assembl on one of our
an~~ traces oJ sro,c~, ice, rime, or hoar/rost", Y
$ FALSE FIRE WARNINGS super-bang aeroplanes - the nut backed off and the P ilot found himself
The facts, such as they are, appear on page two . in a full hard port rudder condition and was obli ed to vacate,
9 SEARCH AND RESCUE A cotter pin came off, or wasn r t P ut on ~ the resultg
- an incom p lete
throttle linkage of a tried and trust Y T"Bird, The final outcome could
IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC
have been much much worse but the lack of alertness was there .
"On the Dials", beginning in this issue, will be a regular A pi lot of a T-Bird heard a hursh metal I ic sound as he a roached
12 WINTER WONDERLAND PP
feature of Flight Comment. Thanks to the OC and staff of the close to Mother runwa Y , Yes - he had for g otten to lower the undercar-
UICP School at W'innipeg, who'll be preparing the column, riage and not even the horn disturbed him . How unalert can ou et!
14 OXYGEN AGAIN Y 9
The attitude is not confined to militar YP ersonnel - a factor hand
the experts can now keep us current on what's new, what's Y
left a screwdriver in tl~t: innards of our new troiner, It wasn't found
old but not too well known, and what's in need of improvement. 16 REVISEO NOTAM SERVICE
Definitely, it's recommended reading. r~ until after several ferry sorties - fortunatel Y~ before it could I'am the
controls!
17

19
ON THE DIALS

ALCOHOL - FRIEND OR FOE?

u If you pilots and groundcrew tl~ink we are P ickino~ on Y ou how about
this one for a change of pace, We have written it u P and talked about
it before . The setting was a heavy snowstorm and the runwo Y half
In our next issue we'll have a laok at the New Look in cleared with a ridge of snow over o foot high ri 9 ht down the middle,
21 FROM AIB FILES
accident reporting - AFAO 21,56/Ol will have ceased to exist, Unalert control staff let not one, not two but three aircraft land under
to be replaced by the new all-service CFP for investigating those conditions . The third aircraft, a Voodoo, fli PP ed over on its
22 ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES back, fortunately, because of the deep snow, without in'ur
and reporting aircraft accidents . The new reporting procedures I Y to its oc-
cupants, We Canadians must always stay alert to the hazards im P osed
incorporate several changes based on our and other services
by snow and ice.
experience . For example, the term "accident" is now similar
To those who have read thus for and who when on the I'ob are with
to the definition used in the RAF, RAAF, USN, and other air
it 100 per cent, there is no messa 9 e here for Y ou . But if Y ou occasion-
forces, Too, they will eliminate the inconsistencies and anomo- ally goof off in the thought that no one will notice, think about these
lies which have caused much unproductive controversy in the Editor- FjL JT Richards
words . You may feel t{~at , everyone has faults and we are ex P ectin 9
past . Assistant Editor Miss AV Mtlntosh too much, but it just isn t so . There are many happy motorists who
Art and Layout {FHQ Graphic Arts have driven multi-thousand miles without a self-caused accident because
Editoriol Assistant-Mrs RW Hales they are alert all the time . There are many supervisors and P ilots who
know their procedures and who really think ahead and can meet an Y
We said goodbye the other day to S~L WA Smith, our editor emergency, There are also many technicians with a conscientious,
since January 1963 . His stay at DFS was a hectic one: we "fail-safe" attitude who never mis P lace a tool or for 9 et a cotter P in,
moved to a new building, lost the Flight Comment artists to Flight Comment is produced by ihe CFHQ,
If you made a program up for such professionals it would P robabl Y be
Directorate of Flight Safety, The contents do not 
a newly-formed CFHQ Graphic Arts Section, and sustained a called Zero Defects such as American aircraft companies and militar Y
necessorily reflect officiol policy and unless other-
staff reduction with integration . During his term as editor he forces take part in .
wise stated should not be construed as regulotions
received the Sherman Fairchild International Air Safety Writing orders or directives .
Be a professional - stay alert ALL the time,
Award "for unusually excellent writing on air safety" .
S/~L Smith's new assignment, a term at Staff College, will
Contributions, comments and criticisms are welcom
the promotion of flight safety is best served by /~
disseminating
ensure his continued association with words ond ideas, and on-the~job experience ond opinion.
$end submissions to : Editor, Flight Comment,
we heartily wish him every success. CFHQ DFS, Otlawa 4, Ontario . Annual subscription
rate is ~1 .50 for Canada and USA. Subscriptions
available oF Queen's Printer, Hull, P .Q,

GROUP CAPTAIN AB SEARLE

DIRECTOR OF FLIGHT SAFETY
ROCER DUHAMEL, F.R.S .C .
Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery
Ottawa, 1965
For the Sake of Argument . . .

The investigators concluded that the aircraft took off with frost on the wings

Fact and Fantasy

"Takeoff run was normal and just as the aircraft lefi the ground I checked the The aircraft had been left out overnight ; some wet snow ond light freezing
and crashed right after takeoff. speed between 70 and 75 kts . . . we were five feet off the ground when the rain had frozen to the aircraft. The three pilots on the flight stated they had
aircraft yawed to the right. The aircraft . . . was very difficult to control . We "looked it over carefully" during their preflight inspection and had chipped
hit a grade where the wheel broke off, the aircraft hit the ground again ond most of the ice off. They were sure that the ice remaining would hnve negligible
stnrted o ground loop . . . The aircroft wings had been covered with frost ." effect . The captain mentioned somewhat jokingly that he would add ten knots
to the takeoff speed just to be sure .

The two pilots had waited for the early morning fog interEeres with the smooth flow about an airfoil tends performance and handling characteristics during takeoff
to clear - impatience and the damp cold had been to increase its stallinR speed and decrease its lift nIR T~:h4P Tl PE ()F )''R(1ST T ;IKEOFF and climb out. This table does not represent tne entire
salved somewhat by that extra "cuppa instant" - then P ro P erties"
, . How's about a Dak win g , thou gh? It has °F DISTa'~'CF: nIRSPh :EU series of flights but these observations are typical.
ops had called that flying could commence . cnough nvet heads to equal a good dose of frost! Little
-I NO FROST 1420 110 mph After takeoff, the frost was rapidly dissipating by
Even at a dlstance the T33 was obviouslv covered wonder there is confusion.
200 knots and totally gone by 3Q0 knots .
with a layer of frost on the canopy top, wings, and Frost affects an aircraft adversely in two ways ;
14 FROST GRAINS 1549 122 mph $tay on the Sofe Side The implications of the find-
tailplane . Running a gloved hand over the wing, one these two fortify each other in combination to reduce
ings above are that for jets, frost isn't quite the monster
P ilot remarked : "What luck! This stuff'll never melt takeoff performance . Frost creates surface Eriction -18 FROST GRAINS 1578 12S mph it is generally thought to be . There is, however, the
today - looks like we'll have to get it de-iced" . (drag) and so reduces the takeoff acceleration . At the
"No need fcx that - it'll be okav~ ;~ look ~ it's onl Y same time the stallin K s P eed is raised and the c +7 y," HH :nVX FRUST t962 NGT
AVFRAGE: ~
about 1/16" thick . Let's go!" . efficient of lift of the win s is lowered. You then GRAINS RCCORDiJD Tl'PE : ()F FROST
I,IFT-QFF SPEFD '} :~1i}.~}'}' RCN-h . .l
A/C
"'Vot with me vou won't - I'vc heard that frost is atte mp ti ng takeoff with red u ced acceleration and lift h'RUS'C THICKN}a~
HAN[iBUpK ACTCAI.
-
HAN}1BOOE
-
ACTI ;AI .
;11RCRAFT 1~'EIGII'I' & PDWE":R Sr:TTINGS HELD CONSTANT (MMl
d e ad i },~~ somethinK J to do w ith the boundary layer, and a less than intelligent thing to do . It is the amount of
128 130 1650 1750
y~our win g s won't develo p lift" - this reduction of efficiency which testing over the FR6H ~ fRAItiS ~ .~1

"Let's Press on this frost isn't THAT thick. . ." years has attempted to ascertain . In 1952 an L19A (light, single-engine, all-metal FRGH GRr~1N
PATCHFS k
"Just a minute - I remember at Air Div when we ~lccording to aerodynamic theory, the high perfor- Cessna) was artificially `°frosted" ; the leading edge NFFDLFS ' .U 130 l34 ~ 1850 19h0
used to have frost-covered Sabres towed between two mance, thin, swe Pt win K should be less susce Ptible of thc wing back to about a quartcr of its width was FR6D Gh N 4,0 123 1 1 .1 243D :6~~1
running-up 86s - was that a bind! - No, it's not smart to frost interference . This runs contrary to what a covered with gravel of assorted sizes from 1/64" to - :
IZO 11S 2580 2335
to fool arotlnd with cruddy, air P lanes - fet's g et it lavman would think since we've been told that the FR6n G & N 2 .S
1/16" by scattering this gravel randomly on sticky
cleared off." modern f}ghter must have a clean wlng, even to the shellac. This extreme "Erost" caused a 30Jo increase F86U G 3 .0 130 ~ 13S 26~5 2650

Who was right? Actually, both arguments had some merit. extent of being free of scratches and dents. You might in takeoEf speed and doubled the takeoff ground roll . R4 i GR ;11tr
Y'es, we used to run thc: F86s through the let exhaust even t a g ood ar g ument g oin K on this P oint - and Flap cffects were not normal, and landing even at higher
PATCIIh:S ec
2R()n
'JFFDLF.S 3 .0 12S 127 .~~!!
to melt the Erost. It was some operation ; those chaps make a bet on it since facts (as far as they go) support speeds was difficult because the aircraEt showed no
on the wing suffered most, brcathing that jet exhaust - the theory . tendency to flare. In addition, the wings did not stall
B41 (~RAIN
PATCHFS ~
at least the p ilots could ~~o on 100%~ oxv,g en . Whenever Piston Low-Speed Aircraft No test programs on simultaneously . Frosting oE this order more closely I NEEULES 4 .0 I3R 13A 4AOD 4eSCJ

a discussion about frost arose in the crew room, it this subject have been made for some time . An XB2SE resembles perhaps the unevenness characteristic of Bd' ~ GRAIH
usually deKcnerated into a deadlock between the don't- (Mitchell) was used in some tests in 1945 at Cookin~ light icing of the wing . This is obviously nothing to
i'1TCfIF.~ 6c ~ i
;oni~
~FFI)LL~ t~ .~~ tal ~ 144 SOSn
mess-around scltool and the ske P tics who felt it was Lake near Edmonton . "The si gn ificance of the XB25E play around with ~ get it removed . The slow-speed
all lip service to convention . ~'e worried, too, about tests results to other aircraft is not entirely clear", aeroEoil is then demonstrably susceptible to severe distinct danger of someone regarding an ice-fouled
our operational capa6ility being jeopardized by those is the disappointing conclusion drawn . From these interference from frost. wing as frost - there is a diffcrence . There is also
F.uropean frosts . trials however emerges distinct evidence of Erost High-Speed Jet As we mentioned earlier, theoreti- the temptation to "press on" in away-from-home situa-
Frost on aircraft is common enough to have generated hazards . The table below will give some indicati lly, the high performance, thin, swept wing has less tions where aberrations of judgement are most common .
a lot oE words hut unfortunatelv little research has of what we're talking about. sceptibility to frost interference . During the winter The type oE aircraft, local orders, operational require-
bcen donc to support the extensive literature . One This chart points to the difEcrencc of 19$$-S6, a program of flight testing frost-covered ments and the facilities for frost rcmoval will all modify
"report", Eor example, strcsses in vague terms, the frost types ; frost needles and frost grains . What is aircraft (in this case an F86D, an F86H, and a B47) the pilot's judgement,
cian~er
_ oE frost on takcoff, .vet cites no tests or P roof - most significant is that the needle structure is flimsy produced an interesting substantiation of this . '1'hese Clearly, there's a real dearth of knowledge on the
truly, lip service to convention . Since there is little and readil Y blown oEf~+ the g rain is solid and adheres aircraft were unmodified production models flown by aircraft frost phenomenon but scanty though it is there's
available on which to draw conclusions, the temptation to untreated surfaces . Usually, the needle grows from test p}lots . The concluslons of these elaboratcly- suff}c}ent ev}dence to d}ctate cautlon . Frost can put
exists to generalize . For example, an aerodvnamacist a frost-grained surface and therefore may hide this monitaed flight tests were that frost up to 7 .0 mm you behind the power curvc, an area where, as all
will admit to a statement such as "An Y a g ent which lower layer of ice. (9/32") thick made °`no adverse effect" on aircraft non-fool types know~, "angels fear to tread" .

Flight Comment, Nov Dec 1965 3

 SGT C PATAF}L and LAC' DM C()NLIN LAC DA M1LLIlJ and CPL RJ DFSBOR(~t'GH

During a special maintenance inspection and engine During a recent detached operations at Key West,

GOOD SHOW
run-up on an Argus, LAC D!~1 Conlin, AF Tech from Florida, an AF Tech servicing team composed of Cpl
Stn Greenwood detected an unusual noise in the tail RJ Desborough and LAC DA 1lillie Erom Stn Summerside,
section . He entered t}re tail heater compartment to displayed a hig}~ order of technical knowledRe and a
investrgate and found the unusual norses there were pcrsonal standard of judgement
_ and workmanshi P whirh
is aorthy of special commendation .
ry pronounc:ed . LAC Conlin immcdiately informed
Before servicing was fully completed on their Argus,
crew captain, who judged that a thorough investi- a message was received which grounded the aircraft
F L MC' RANDAI .I . gation was required prior to test flight . for non-scheduled torque checks to be performed on
bolts in the tail structure . Dusk fell and night flying
Fi'L Randall atStation Chatham, NB, was assigned
commenced before therr mspectron was completed.
as chase prlot to a student on a low-level traininK
The followmg mornrng at frrst lrght the rnspection was
mission . During the run-up prior to takeoff F/L Randail
cont~nued.
very alertly noticed what appeared to be fuel leaking
The norse of other arrcraft hampered therr communr-
from the mid section of the student's FR6 . F / L R andall
cation, and poor lighting contributed to create sub-
adv ised the student to abort and return to the line . standard working conditions . Nevertheless, LAC Millie
than attempt another relight the student concentrated
Orl was drscovered to be leaking from the waste air found a scarcely perceptible rrack in the starboard
on t}ie forced landing pattern and successfully com-
manrfold ; further rnvestigation uncovered a broken horizontal stabilizer forward spar reinforcing channel ;
pleted a dead engine landing . .A valuable aircraft was
se~ment on a turbinc shroud and a crack in the turbine saved by 0/C Lister's fine dis p, Cpl Uesborough confirmed this hy a dye check . Checking
lav of airmanshi p .
whcel . F/L Randall's alertness undoubtedly P revented , for cracks was not part of the specral rnspectron ; the
a ma'or
J accident and P ossiblv. saved a P~ ilot's life . fine line of the crack looked similar to a marking line
and could not be reached with the fingers to help con-
LAC LW N}ARTIN
firm its presence . Less alert airmen could easily have
rr1lSSed t}re crack or dismissed the crack as a marking
The captain of a visitinK T33 at Cold I .ake complain-
lrne and not conlrrmed therr susprcrons wrth a dye
ing of a severe lreadache, requcsted a thorough check of
check . Later, eight other Ark_us aircraft were discovered
the oxy,gen systern . LAC 11artin conducted a complete to have similar cracks .
check but was unable to locate anv unservireabilitv . LAC Millie and Cpl I?esborough are to be commended
t~'ith commendable persistence he extendecl his in~~c ,ti- for therr sound ~udgement, alertness, technrcal know-
gation to the pilot's personal oxygen eyuipment ~~r led g e and exem p larv, personal stand a rds of workmanship .
disrovered that a deteriorated accardian hose or, ~
pilot's face mask was leaking . The captain repc~rte
no discomfort on }us return flight .
LAC ~lartin's inte~rity in persistin,~ in his invcsti-
g ation 1"~revented a p ossible serious in-fli kTht emer ~Tencv, .

The investigation revealed that the bolts holding

thc major brackcts on which the horizontal stabilizcr is
attached to the airframe were loose . Tlris looseness
was judt;ed sufficient to produc:e vibrations in the rear
fusela $e area and elsewherc to account for the pecu-
liar noise . \\
A "before next flight" special inspection was ordered
on all unit aircrah and a P riotit Y messa g e drafted. S g t
C Patafic, a highly-experienced AF Tech su gK ested
t}rat the bolts holding the lower fittin g s onto the horizon-
tal stabilizer also be checked. This was approved and
the message dispatched . C'PL RJ DES}30ROt1G1}
1~hile carrvin
, g out this s p ecial ins p ect'ro n r~n an
Argus at Key W'est, Flarida, (see Desborough-Millie
~od Show a crack was located in the lower female
0 C Fl) I.IS~['F.R
tink~ of the horizontal stabilizer . Subsequently, a

The high-level navigation solo in a Tutor nearly

completed, the student, 0/C ED Lister at 1
Girllll, was cleared to the 7'ACAN for a letdown . At
FTS,
otal of ei ~}rt aircraft were found similarly affected .
Due to the professional ability and integrity displayed
by LAC Conlin, a potentially very serious defect was
r
thrs pornt his engrne flamed out . The Irrst arrstart discovered . Further , th e suggestron put forth by Sgt
attempt at 220 knots and lSi~ r P m was unsuccessful ; Patafie that the defective fittings be located and re-
Or~C Lister declared an emer~ency . The second relight placed was also an exemplary display of technical LAC DA MILLII~
failed when the en~;ine started co overtemp . Rather abilit Y and insi g ht

4 i Flight Comment, Nov Dec 1965 5

 During the pre-flight walk-around on a CF101,
a thread of canvas material from the P itot cover was
found lodged in the pitot orifice . Had the thread been
PITOT COVER HAZARD further into the tube it would not have been visible
F L V~'C Hf1SKER on pre-flight .
1 It rs sugRested that the tnner seams be sewn
F L D LAMBETH prior to the final seams bein g sewn closed, to P revent
the material from fraying.
LAC AH C,a551N
LAC KL MAR"I~IIr` NEAR F/L KA McLeod
409 Sqn Comox
MISS
Transport operations, b~~ definition, are rather
SaJety deurces creattng hazards are parnfully
routine ; there was no reason to suspect this flight
ironic - in this ca : e, the commonplace canvas pitot
would be otherw~ise as crew and passengers, including saFETr cover . Many o/ these covers - vital zn thezr function -
.Air '~4atshal CR Slemon, boarded Cosmo 162 at 141alton SUGGESTION are manu/actured on the rtatton, an interestzng ex-
airport . Une hour later this aircraft was nose down in ception tn the normaI rule o/ issuing /rom stocks .
a ditch after a mid-air engine exp}osion and a hair- Thanks to this alert pilot this itern has, at Comox
raising escape from crashinK into a decp ravine and at leasi, 6een redesigned so that the ~raya6 Je edges
almost certain disastcr . .1 fine dis P,lav of airmanshi P are /olded outside .
and tearnwork averted injury and saved an aircraft ; it
was a Good Show all round.
Over W iarton at 20,000 feet the chain of events
began with the port engine showing a 4(1-pound torque
loss, h'.xcept for this indication, all seemed normal on
the other ~auges when "about 45 seconds later, a loud
ex P losion from the P ort en g ine accom P anied a Y aw to F; L WC HASKER
Station Chatham
LAC KL MARTIN
the lcft and rapid decornpression of the cabin" . '1'he i.AC AE CASSIN F L ll LAMl3L 1 H Typical of the laudable trend to higher standards
first thin~; to do was descend ; quickly the oxygen of transient flight services at Canadian Forces airports
e q ui P ment vvas o P ened and in use . Durin g the descent of-wind runway was available. The danger was 'udged is Chatham's flight planning centre . IIoused in a small,
J _
the engine was feathered. Next, the fire warning light to be too great for a crosswind landing with no hvdraul' ut well-located economy-type building the section's
odest resources have been intelligently and thought-
came c~n, and although no visual evidence of fire was pressure . F/L Lambeth flew a smooth and accur~a
lly employed . The lockers for visiting aircrew, for
reported, the captatn, takrng no chances, operated the flapless approach - the emergency lowerin g of the fla s
P example, are a feature which has been provided for
engrne fire exttngutsher . The warning light went out. had failed . Pneumatic ernergency brakin g was thou ght
convenience "above and beyond" the basic facilities .
As the initial immediate flurry of activity subsided, to be available ; F/l . l .anrbeth recalled the irony of his
The meteorology section is housed in the same building
amplc cvidence came to light on what had happened . remark "Thank God we still have the air". .cls the as is the servicing office, making Chatham's servi-
There were holes in the fusela g e and in the en g ine emergency air was introduced into the svstent it es- cing - flight planning - met briefing complex ttre ideal
nacelle indicating catastrophic failure of the turbine ca P ed throu g h a sevcrcd line and was lost+. A s,symetric environment for visitin g aircrew . The frustratin g run-
engine, Large sections of the engine cowling had been P ro
. P eller brakin K was not availahle wi tho ut hazarding around of yesterycar is becomin~ (but unfortunately not
torn 1 ike fabric . One of the en g ine mount struts was dtrectional control, Circumstances had become c rttrcal.
' ' completely) just another mcmory of the "good old The NOTAM board-neat and simple
severed, as were }rydtaulic and air lines. ~lnknown to The Cosmo showed no indication of slowing on the run- days" .
the crew, these systems were to remain pressurized way with its downhill ~radient . Collision with a radio
only until components were activated ; for example, the antenna site had a pp eared p ossible if direc trona
' l con-
undercarriage was extended during the descent but trol was lost, but as the aircraft continucd P ast this
could not be raised . Similarly, the emergency flap ex- obstruction it became obvious that maintainin the
g
tension and air pressure for braking Iailed at critical aircraft on the runway would mean runnin
g at }ti g h
times, The return to Toronto was a hectic one. The speed into a deep ravine at thc end of the runwa Y .
VHF had become inoperable, several of the integrated A quick decision had to be made . Using pro Pe11er
flight system failure warning flags were showing, indi- braking the aircraft was deliberately run off the runwa t~
cating an electrical system failure, Then, the fire warn- about 900 feet from the end . The Cosmo continued in
ing light came on again ; there being still no evidence an arc across the parallel taxi strip, cnding up in a
of fire, the reserve fire extinguisher was conserved . drainage ditch 150 feet further on . 'fhe aircraft came.
To increase the rate of descent the undercarriage to a )'arrin g halt which broke off th c nosewheel ; fortun
was lowered and consistent with the fortunes of the tely no one was injured.
day, the crew got an unsafe indication . This ruled out During the entire emergency the crew~ acted w~ith
Wiarton as a nearby ,liversion because of its lack of professional competence, later receiving a Personal
crash equipment . Fortunately, VFR conditions prevailed commendation from the Air Of(icer CommandinA, Trainin g
on the return to Malton . Later, radio contact with Toronto Command, Air Vice Marshal CH Greenwa }~. Fli ght
was regained and the Eire warning light had gone out. Comment wishes to add its enthusiastic endarsement
Apptoaching Malton the captain elected to use the act- to the fine job of handling a major emergency in a most
ive runway for a favourable wind althou~h a longer out- cammendable manner . A convenient repository for aircrew ~ear

6 Flight Comment, Nov Dec 1965 7

 ~'~ ~:aS~rti, . .t~~~l,~^l''b~".~~:~ . . 
. . -

>
~r,~
_

7
~u Search and Rescve
111111111111111

"Ilalifax kCC, t}~is is Ganaer Centre with an alcrt

on a C S4 .
Ro~;er, Gander, ihis is Halifax RCC, go ahead.
RCC from Gander , US hlarine C:orps C~"4 , 1.4ar~ne
'
Recent articles in aviation magazines attest to the ing method . This should prevent the detector elements 90411, Lages to Argentia, position at 2314 GMT
continuing problem of false fire warnings . In an articlP from creeping to a position close enough to the PRT was 4SlON 4310V~', TAS 175, estimating Argentia
on this subject in the t1SAF Aerospace Maintenance hood so that heat radiation or leakage would activate 0250 GMT maintaining 6000 feet, 26 persons on board .
Safety, the flight safety implications of false fire the alarm . Of course, this doesn't ensure proper location h1arine 90411 reports an engine on fire and requests
warnin g s were a P7
tl ~ stated : of the elements by technicians, or the components escort .
being dislodged a bent by others working in these Gander from RCC, Roger, will arrange escort, keep
"Every failure of a warning system is a threat to safety . areas . us advised of any further messages . . ."
Repeated false alarms undennine the crew's confidence Shorting Another problem area is shorting in the This alert message was passed by Gander Air
in the detector system . A false warning during takeoff cannon plug connectors . The causes of failure here are Traffic Control Centre (ATCC) to the Ilalifax Rescue
precipitates split-second decisions by the crew ; to bent pins, dirt, moisture, and loose connectors . For the Co-ordination Centre (RCC) at 2325 GMT 1 hlay 1965 . A
abort or to go around with the possibility of a fire most part, false fire warnings duc to these conditions
tlnited States Coast Guard (L'SCG) C130 was quickly
enroute, and then attempt an overweight londing. False can be attributed directly to insufficient care .
dispatched irom Argcntia . In the meantime, Marine
warnings in flight permit more time for decisions, but The problem has been around long enough for one
90411 was able ro extinguish the fire, feather the
they may also lead to actions that would not have been painful truth to emerge : th~s system is dtfficult to
maintain due to its sensitivity and susceptibility to troubled enginc, and continue on three engines . At
taken, had the true situation been known: discharging
dama ge . Failures in the warnin g s Y stem on the Ar g OS G11T the C130 intercepted the C$4, and escorted
fire extinguishers that might be needed later, or making
an unscheduled landing" . can be substantially reduced with improved clampi to a safe landing at Argentia .
of the element, and betterand more frequent inspections . .Another case closed successfully . This one was no
Considerahle improvement has already heen achieved ~;reat problem ; however, there could have been problems-
Our problern ~s well tllustrated by recent investlgations
primarily due to initiative at thc unit level . However, there could have becn a los5 o_f 26 lives!
of ,Argus fire warning system components by DFS,
in this electrical system malfunction or failure is
!Nateriel Command and the systern manufacturers. These
usually causcd by less than top-notch maintenancc ;
investtgations pinpo~nted the problem areas - materiel
we must therefore rely on the integrity of those who
and matntenance : Each dav across the North Atlanttc there are more the Gander Oceanic area . Each SAR organization is
service the aircraft . To this end, a continuous education
~ Some sensin~; elements, (at least one of which was than 100 commercial flights plus many other civil and simifar to the others and all work closely together
program is required to ensure close inspection, adequate
ncarl Y new ) were found to have low resistance . 'fhe n-~ilttary atrcraft, and although modern a~rcraft are very
maintenance, and an appreciation by all technicians on an international basis . The RCAF organization is
manufacturers, act~ng on the hndtngs, wtll correct reliable, the men in the search and rescue units know
of the care required to ptevent damaging or dislocating therefore quite typical .
the flaws in manufacture .
sensing elements . that emergencies will occur . As the cold rough waters Search and rescue in the Canadian area is co-
~ Most of the chafed elements inspected would not
of the North Atlantic do not constitute an inviting land- ordinated from the Halifax RCC . The role of the RCC
have caused a false warntng ; an element must be
virt u all y chafed throu gh the outer casin g t o c au se a- ing platform it's plain common sense for aircrew and is to initiate, co-ordinate and terminate all search and
-_ " p~FIC~
siknificant reduction in resistance . ~Ar~Nr passen~;ers to know their over-water emergency proce- rescue incidents .
Cha6ng-Design or Damage? ~~ost of the dures . The aircrcws must be familiar with the full
false fire warninl;s have occurred in the Power Recovery spectrum of aid which is at their call . ~mmun
Turbine ( PRT ) area where the elements were found to be l~'e'll briefly outline the North Atlantic Search and Obviously, a rapid and reliable communications
chafing against PRT hoods . !~4any of the malfunctions Rescue Organization and indicate how aircrew can system is essential to initiate, co-ordinate, and control

r~
were rectified sim PY 1 b Y re P lacin g and re Positionin g the ake optimum use of the tnternattonallv available Search search and rescue operations . Ncxmally, the Gander,
chafed element . Most of the elements removed as sus-
U
d Rescue facilities . Goose or New York ATCCs initiate alerts, using either
spect were serviceahle when subjected to testing . dtrect hotline to RCC from Gander or Goose Bay, or
The chafing itself was therefore eliminated as a major from New York via Comeastarea (t1SCG RCC New York).
cause of false indication, what emerges from simple The Search and Rescue (SAR) areas of coverage These alerts are responses to either aircraft messages
logic, then, is that the sensing units were being posi-
on the North Atlantic are generally co-incident with (or lack of messages), from aeronautical ground stations,
tioned too close to the PRT resulting is actual over-
the Oceanic Control Areas. The Royal Air Force has or Ocean Station ~'cssels (OSVs) . Airrraft messages
heattng of the elements .
SAR responsibility in the Shanw~ick Control area, the passed to OSVs are also passed to Halifax KCC' via
Chaf ing should be substantially reduced by thc "It's a breakthrough in aviation electronicr-this invention will warn ihe pilot if USCG in the New ~'ork Oceanic area, and the RC,AF in L:SCG networks .
timely replacing of worn clamps, and an improved clamp- the fire worning is real or false ." (Don't lough- if's already under study!)

Flight Comment, Nov Dec 1965 9

 Oncc the RCC is awarc of an over-water distress, the SAR organization in its efforts. If he canaot (or
it can take positive action in two ways . First, the does not) announce his predicament at the earliest
RCC can initiate a marine broadcast. This broadcast possible moment - his chance of survival may be greatly
may be prefixed by an autaalarm signal (not all vessels reduced .
t, buoy servicin~; vessels . Cur main interest here is in maintain a 24-hour radio watch) . This broadcast will It is imperative that the pilot of the aircraft in dis-
the lon g er ran ge or oceanic SAR facilities . alert all vessc}s along the proposed track of the dis- tress start the distress procedures when doubt e~aists
'.Vormallv., our lon~-ran ge !llaritime Patrol aircraft tress aircraft to maintain radio t radar and visual watch . as to the safety of his aircraft .
~' ! ~-~.~ The second method is by thc Automated Merchant An elaborate and eEfective system is ready to help -
are used to meet Oceanic SAR req uirements . The
/hrr.~ ssel Report (AMVFR) system which furnishes RCCs know your procedures to ensure its continued success .
' '`` -~ '" ~ ~ - craft used is the Argus, a four-engine landplane with
, 1
endurance in excess of 20 hours, a cruise speed c ith important information on the location and capa-
; .:~ ~~-~w~ about lu~ knots, and a wide variety of radio and radar bilities of those merchant ships who may be able to
e q ui p ment includin g VHF + I_1HF and trans P onders r rende~ emergency assistance . The AMVER system
The Canadion Coast Guard cutter "Relay", which performs search and rescue
homing devices, including SARAII search capability . consists of a network oE radio stations, RCCs, an elec-
duty in the Greaf lakes in surnmer and on the East Coasi in winter, The
cutters "Rapid" and "Rally" are permanently assigned to duty on the East There is usuallv an ArKus on patrol in or near the tronic computor at the Ah1VER Centre, New York, and
Coast. Gander Oceanic FIR , and one or more are al w a,vs main- participating merchant ships . When an emergency occurs
tained on a short notice standbv. in an offshore area, the controllin K RCC re q uests a
The Ar g us carries the dro PP able MA-I Sca Rescue SurEace Picture (SURPIC) from the AMVER Centre . In
Kit, consistin k,~ of two 20-man din g hies an~ three su PP lv, about two minutes the computor prepares a SURPIC
containers . The cre~ s are briefed on 5AR P rocedures , which lists the appropriate vessels on plot in the speci-
and carry the USCG publication "Aircraft E' :mergenc~~ fied area, their predicted positions, and their rescue
Procedures Gver Iti ater" . capabilities .
Other long-range aircraft are maintained on alert F/0 John Keech, a native of New Liskeard, Ontario,
status Eor SAR requirements in the Gander Oceanic hos served, since graduating as a navigotor in 1959,
FIR area : The SAR Organization is almost ready to perform with $earch and Rescue operations, From 1960 to 1963
~ ('130, operated by the USCG at Argentia, Newfoundland, its appointed task but it needs one more member - the F/0 Keech flew with 107 Rescue Unit, Torbay, New-
~C54, o P crated bv, the tISAF S4 Air Recover Y S 9 uadron r pilot of the distress aircraft . From the moment the foundland, and is presently Duty RCC Controller,
The Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker "$ir Humphrey Gilbert" rescuing Goose Bay Labrador . distress is announced, the pilot can guide and assist Halifax Rescue Co-ordination Centre .
sailors from the ill-fated french vessel, "Douala", which sank in the Atlantic
off Nova Scotio during a fierce winter storm,

To aid in co-ordination, Halifax RCC has hotline SAR aircraft dispatched or diverted to provide es~
telephone connections with Comeastarea, USCG I)istrict will attempt to establish communications on 1'}~Fi(~f
One at Boston, and interconnected to SAR and other emergency channels and may use 1'HF/IIHF homint,
agencies along the US coast. Ilalifax RCC is able to radar and visual aids ( flarcs ) as well as basic navi g ation "We'll P ut it in the minors - we're short one aircraft
contact all RCAF RCCs and the Joint RCC at Keflavik to effect an intercept . After intereept the escort aircraft for the morning operations."
on the NORAll telephone system . Similarly, throu~,~h can assist by providing navigation services, communi-
service teletvpe and commercial telex, Halifax RCC is cations r radar weather surveillance ~ visual ins pection
able to contact all RCAF RCCs r USCG RCCs , the J oint of t}~e exterior of the distress aircraft and if reyuircd,
RCC Keflavik, and British RCCs, ditching assistancc including flare illumination . If a
'1'o aid in control and dispatch of search vehicles ditchin gT actuallv, occurs the escort aircraft can dro P
during an SAR incident, Halifax R('C has access to sea survival gear and co-ordinate on-scene rescue
all Canadian ~lilitarv air and sea forces through the ~e+'.;
~' ~ , " ~.
operations . " " '
~laritime hleadyuarters (!~1H(~) communication network. The surface environment in the Gander ()ceanic ~
"
~ '/ ~
~
~ ~-1
~~~~
r~
'~"
1 M i

The RCC can contact USCG ArQentia via a hotline is covered in a variety of ways . }Iowever, primary SAR ~'"
throu gh ~III ~r and also has hotlines to both Summerside de Pendence must be P laced on the ocean station vessels
anu Greenwood . The 54 Air Recover Y San . at Goose Ba Y of w-hich two, "Rravo" and "Charlie", are stationed
may be contacted throu;;h the NORAI) telephooe system . in the Gander Oceanic Area . These vessels can provide
Here a gain ~ these and other re 9 uired a ¬~~encies ma Y also excellent assrstance to arrcraEt rn potentlal or actual
be contacted throu gh commercial or service channels . drstress . Therr capabrlrttes and servtces are not well
known but arc outlined in GPII 205 . Although other
surface vessels do not P rovide the extensive assislance
Search and rescue capability is of two typcs : availahle from an OSV, at least they may be in a po~iei
~o verla n d and short-ran ge missions within about ~~0 to p rovide a read Y~ rescue once a uitching has 'h~_
miles of the coast, accomplished .
~lon~-range oceanic missions . }3oth Canadian ~;overnment and naval vessels arc
The short-ran ~ e g rou p~ for cxam P le ~ cm P lov. Albatrosses available for SAR- dutv ; verv often one or more of t}~csc w .~
and the Labrador helico P ters based at 103 Rescue l'nit r shi p s o p erate in the~Gander Oceanic area . T he lar g er :: : - _
Greenwood . Supplementing this aerial capability, the Canadian government ships normally operate in coastal .. . ..
Canadian Coast Guard o P erates manv. vessels in coastal waters but are suitable for dis Patch on Oceanic SAR ...- . ,, .
waters including rescue cutters, icebreakers, and missions,

Flight Comment, Nov Dec 1965 11

 1

f~ 'fO , .
erl -1

rz
med in ~ Y ~
1am .`
. .1tile rons eratur 9 r 4 y fl . Qlro
'UKU''V osition ~ temf' et an d /
eutral P . , was w )orma. % d4
!
s!
l~~,~roe,P sno~ ~~r!' f~'1!'
t, d slot ~Q~, 'r~
n Kun°~'ay ice
31 F " . , ns tid
~ tal iot een , ~r ~
lrcra)t had b
~' . ~y ~r ~q
hfQ)} '.
int e r a ccidents rotes ore the
4S~!)1 ~0qr ~ICjP
Popu I a r n otion would have , ev e t I ~' f! Pd
ondttto .itatt°n+ . 1fi
e ~ n~ a~ o, the a ~n re ciP g! ~ ~',~1 ~ ,~P f ~~! fr
ttio ked outs i~e ti P !,¢ . ~rjR d~P r" ~ ~ro?, t~~ 0

ht' 9 hest ~ but our reco r ds of th .~s'~ t wo Y . show a reduction of 15 /o to rfrh ron Q' 4f
1P
c f.

. r to i ~
Par
prlo
li ht .
o /0 Iw h y . The effect of wmter
' on p~~o p le i s ob viousl ypy
s cholo e ical~, we're
!
d9~, 4d
~'~
~'
6Q
s,¢
Q.r
rt
sfP s~~!
more aware of wmter hazards and so sta Y ale rt f o r them. In the summer,
.
~h1
l~
nowfall,
S G, a pp arentl Y we are less alert . . . and so on . . . the s P eculation continues. _ H ea  Y s
CH IpMUNK 5 operators
_
e
atret
' the mood and ale rt Y o u t 0 winter ~ here's a p a 9eFvl
An Yw a Y~ to 9 et Y ou m bl I 2Zard
condition ~ now blower
hours, S
- e w
;,ntet ~ o~,
ns, e ea of cold-wea the r ca I a m'ti
i es - browse a while t and loter - BEWARE . w
orking lon9 frozen s now near
clearing occiden toll Y
evet ov~~~~,o cov~l~ ,as wo s r operotor
0~ to c yv~t ~ arle at ea wo,ta1 hon9o ~ 'ntending to
low vn .v4 e~ ARCI!S - Uurin ,kr six hours e levoted hood when r, ~hunk s of
tn ',t~ at tv~ . vow t a h, had 11 landin g s on snow-
the air ~ ft
ove it hor izontolly d windows
tvn"u~'. ~te`~v~ ro , 5 at e t,e and ice-co~~:red "' smashe
.v4 en~' taxiways sno W
tea'we~:~o~' tvv oE o~ and runw ays . The ice ond d art',aged
. tl,e vst ;,e uplock he flying 9lass
a~t" mechanrsm of the
Soo ~e ~ lbt tot p or t undercarria ~e and t oircraft .
~>>a~ ~~
,ava , ~t,. ot, y'bt ak~ n~, ca
us' avot
~et . door was dama ed P ort
elevotor of
1
bY rce and ,tilush
~ow ame tiace . nto build-upon the bo g ie door
uplock bracket
ovetc t~ sv`~et ve and o~~er-extension of the
lever assenibl
s114~ c ~o resultcd, Y
_tat

ARG U.S _ .
ic Y snow , Alrcraft bc i
for cond' ~'°vcred
~_ ink towe
Clll 13 , th e surfa
rt~ons~ . n a dark sn
ing , . ce . I)r~ver 5~ot' ta~` v hv~e'~ ~ vo~' t, '~ ' ~,o~
tioo ` On nose st arrcraft turned
a res , bscu eerin a and at too °'~Y
~ ni ~ht on a~tet ~~ t`~t ~tce ~to ~,~ _ . ~~a eX~ec et~t+
snaw an~ - els cut' o red v' . ~ ctuat ht~h tov~. to
a, V . , r°torssank throAc~ra . islon or u~, veiucle
~
~
)ack-1~ ifed~ a sAeed ti1~ ,v e~ at~e sb , '~~e 1 at`d
tno~'-
tr c~, ~nou- e~' t~ at ~ av av~ ~ ua
~
cu t t° ,rsrbilrty fallin,~ on d , fract ur .
, contaCte u~h , as , ~,~~~`l . soa
sn°w, dfew fe ath ovel ~a ark ni ~ht v~ at
Q°~y ~o~`e ' ~ ~ n~``"
et in b1° was. t~`"
co .~~s ~ stt ~ent °11
2e1 . ,
wrn $ - ction u ~ered yra, ol .
'
'T a1l s e .. 04
o sn oW c c>ti,E, ll e a )
, ~~K 'le t l h ad
P T33 - Prlot rec~uested clearance to land on a .G XPr,U17d str uck a P~heen P toP crly . ¬rt,is°r
4800' runway . Vieather - 1?~7(~ btokeo with
y an t ~ ts . 5uP re an ac-
r amP ca ha d n° 1 llyh
freezing dri~zle - (2?(1 gallon~ of fuel). Pilot an~ n - , e ar . c, ramp tax ea to ensu ~0 1 ailed
Nrpl' U ~~r E _ 6e, av~ The c- . repa tr ~ f,ctE'd ar hallc,T a
cdrne s a~rs e rance
.
Aircraft bern~ . advised snowplows would be f~nrslred clearrnK .° Arl° , lou~ln9 , l , insp , c mars e elea
han ~.ar
~ hit an im ro ~ towed rnsidr f1'rght,
p ptrl)' ,; ~' ed rn~ic t s
url servrc ro P cr ti . fh e 4 uat
he avily
' parked U 1 ?~ . Snowin the runway "in a few minutes" . Pilot, refusinX n ot 1' hl ¬ con dtition' trf ~a , .c ad -
witli win dat40ml Ait ~1oi . eahle ator cel,ta at th
. , , to w, art,
' selected an o th e r runwa y ( b000' ) . In
had not rec olcrcd~ . p i, dri ver s vi s ~on
from dr,vi Aito°t
li
t Are ~e
S turc'
fr
duri
tra Ape~ ng .
outside ; also hi ng in bri Kht sn ok . tryinK to touch down as close to the button as -,5sure,°2e ~ cutti ~ rn to se
s parka hood ng ofl'
lookout man was still on . possiblc, undershot, landed 200' short, rolled
on port win~ ti Th c
because trei ~ht
~ p did not see D1 throu~h 12" snow and skidded tu st~rboard . Web
rn the wa
y of hrs line o ,' . fract«red at port main undercarriage forward
f ~~s~on .
attachment point ; both ou bc~a~~i landint;~ear
t u,as doors dama R ed .
-- ~rcra~ 1t soow te-
, .1 ;{ter atcho~k, ca,
. l:H. nd cart . winds a
nd
sult~n~
tia li t dc~"~~ n aan ox ygen
. icien - Stton~ ~et, te
-- - ;eathet . rcta(t u ndet coed in+ the pott
shu ~ ° ~rlsuff ating w
rollE,d ~nt <, ana t , hre to tow
. e~t sno~`tittcd tr~, , tia~
slnFin9
detetlor et all a~ ein~ . . Comm°n
- b ,ic.e
N~a 7 erm , e , . ~~ut in~ ; c,<~at~. to K . ~,~ 'I'13 , .n a
't ne` .~ult 1cK~~ g
ch~,c kln9 l' sl1Pl' ~ ,.1 madeded
mo~a t t,ant.,at" Fc b~,
` ai doot .~ tet .
0n the han~ in w~n
m°~'e cTOV _tLted . atkinY,
surjact~ . ln a , pun` , h~.ni;at P
tar~K `s as
ti~ ~ high ~ler~s~ty
ciaen~ ~n
ac
Flight Comment, Nov Dec 1965 13
12
 S~~ Tech 3
Statement ~ ~-
;~~"'Si'-'
~+,~ ~s ~ ~wa

was ~, ` .drt,*~t
07 3~
. hrs I
ncrn in~ at ore 1 rroceeded I
'nlednesday . gef the
at
BFIs and Pls serviceabilitYd one of the
for or
oettinh set pen cart f . 1 ot~er~e
the o~` ;~n'~ar and that 1
ct~ecked 'nside the h es worked~ air_
~Pn corner 1 both tr,3u~ for all the
oXV P ~d found trat enou~h P and ~ I
was bottl
bottl_.s si which
I thPn close d the and tF:P lines
1~~ P
had about ad to r,o, the ~aunzs e~lceability "
craf t I h e oxyf?en from for s
Pd tY : zle aen hosP
empt' and °~' cart . . . ark
tre n°z
ch ecked the han f~ar ~,withPd
thea T3~ . . " I al~vs
to the filler
I then 1 eft roce,d vrom
I then r t two feet away ~ ked the A saEety equipment technician, an
rt ab°u ~ .inp. else 1 chec
t~`c,~ was ahout.
275
p
th ~ ox .V¢en ca
efore I -
,~id anyt"
1ft, man, te11s the story in his statement, It describes a job
h aircr~
val ve . B ssure ir. t e ana onened the h3tc}. to
i h covers he had done hundreds of times before and seemingly con-
o~pen ore clim,,ed ,~o''m ,rlu¢ wh ° een
;~uct
, " ~lt".en
si . rl re'~nved the then T`ut tre t seat- tains no irregularities in either handling or cquipment -
n valvp~ ~ . I z21e wss n°
filler fille r valve at least rt appeared that way at frrst . But a burst of
the
the hol e in thP flller valve . Th' n°
norm al) . . " Ythere plupaed
loose r than it was flame and molten metal badly burned his arm, came
n °z21e into a little n at t,h~ m~en
in¢ r p .
ro erly ~
t leakatrP of
°~¢e
e no2zle t°
er~sure close to injuring his eyes, and could have spread
slivh aen nozzle
was a I shook th held the c~ causing a serious fire,
e no2~,le . careful I noz218 t°
in th 3nd bein~ .d not w~'t t he
locked in'
bot t1e . . " I What had causee~ the explosion? The unit concerned
~d as 1 'tl e oxyqen
~'th m9 1Pft h when I orened th h3nd .
ri'rht 1 opened the conducted its investigation in two areas ; one to esta-
itself v31 ve with my e
unseat nozzle
the no2zle """ .~th a Planc blish the source of the oxygen and the other to discover
opened t he 'le holdine. ~d noticed nressure :
'r1Yu cart ~ n¢. up what material had united with the oxygen . Tcsts showed
ottle on the ¢. and buil~l °ut °f the
left hand b ~aune
5 were workln flame ca"'e
let ¢o of that the reduction valve on the oxygen cart would not
ball °f
that both the ~,
sa me time a
,
an~' . . " as I the cart, always close properly despite full movement of the At the time oI writing, the investi~;ation indicates down from the cart handle, the nozzle could easily
al~ ° ~ at burned m~' h ttle on " While I
.
flller v~
alve, Thisoff the o~yr'en ~aircra ~t : control handle . Thc only abnormalities in the valve that thcre was undoubtedly a possibility that grease toucli the wheel hubs - and the qrease .
I shut rom .e tY~ fall to
the n°z21e ca rt away f re dust tab fil . ler were a slight deposit on the pin valve stem where the from the wheel hubs on the cart could have become ln thls acctdent, which ts a classic, tw o substances,
l~d the awa,y 1 saw t f the
~`i ~ul ' the cart smok
e come out °
e . I ran rubber seal and the valve housing rnet, and considerable deposited on the nozzle . In fact, all three oxygen carts oxygen and probably grease combined without either
w as T'ullinr' and saw so~ne r the n°zzl e T33
a, around
nea that t play around the ball at the oxygen inlet point. It w as at the unit had heen greased in error by the Ground being detected, The explosion, as the pictures show,
the ¢rou"~d s°me on th ' tellin~ theme " 1 wa5
valve~
and
~ne Servic _
ina, iJler valv concluded that the oxygen in the explosion came from Handling section using general purpose grease (3JP-690) . w'as severe enough to melt the metal on the filler hose
r help to L1 t
he oxy~en f
the cart, not the alrcraft, and that the leaktng reductio Althoug}r the oxygen carts of the type rnvolved nozzle and ftller valve, and rn~ure - fortunately not
f ° bu~ina, near hosrit,al .
was station
driven to
the valve was to blame. 'fhe most Probable cause of the i Ii ;'120 ) are c q ui PP ed with a small cli P on the handle severely - an airman . This accident has given rise to
correctly open condition of the reduction valve was o hold the oxygcn filler nozzle, thc use of this clip further investigations into the equipment and methods
defect in the valve itself, and not an incorrect position is somewhat cumbersome, and it is of interest to notice employed in handling oxygen . 1'he need for vigilance in
of the control handle, that if the clip is not used and tlte nozzle left hanging handlin g this ex p losivc gas cannot be overstated,
'I'he history of oxygen explosions naturally led to a
search for oil or grease at or near the oxygen cart or ! 1,\' )" . .
in the area of the aircraft filler valve . There were no . " --
~'~11. ~~E! 1_l.F:~
traces oI such substances in the filler valve area, the
only foreign matter being the deposits resulting from
t}t e ex p losion,

I
1

Filler Valve of T33 ofter the explosion The partially~melted oxygen filler nozzle

Flight Comment, Nov Dec 1965 15

THE RE~I_S~DTAM
NCJ SERVICE 0300 GMT. Series A supplementals of importance are
selected and sent to the non-originating area . Stations

NOTAM (contraction of Notice to~Airmen), has been

can issuc su PP lemental NOTAMs for conditions of
greater than two }!ours' duration ; these amend the
On The Dials
used in aviation circles long enough to be commonplace summary . These supplementals are sent to all stations
among aircrew. However, recently a new NOTAM system in the originator's area and ta the central office . Also,
was introduced and there are some points which may coded NOTAMs are a PP ended to a station's weather
catch the uninitiated . Rather than discuss onlv the
' ht be co n f u si ng, let's review the whole
report on items of less than two hours' duration, pl
r~ The correct answer is dctermined bv the obstacle
clearance re q uirements . We all know that instrument

u
areas that rnrg those of more than two hours' duration but occurri
NOTAM s Y stem . approaches are designed to guarantee certain rninimum
with less than six hours warning. For a long time the GI(:P School has been looking
A NOTAM is a notice containing information (or some means o/ spreadiny new yen vn instrument
clearance of obstructron . Specrf~cally, these are at least
That's hou~ ihe system :ewrks - now, how to use it .
concerning the Pstablishment or change in condition ,flying. The newsletter concept has many times been
1000 ft above obstacles rn the area desrgnated for
lYhen you check NOTAMs start with the daily
of any aeronautical facility, service, procedure or hazard, the procedure turn and S00 ft clearance in the arca
summary . Parts I to IV will be found on the ti0TAh1 considered and discarded as it ~uould not get corn-
the timely knowledge of which is essential to those display board . Refcr to Part I for enroute information, plete distribution amvngst the working pilots, and
desrgnated irom completron of procedure turn to the
outcr marker rnbound . Now, rf therc rs a glrdepath to
involved in flight operations . airspace reservations, military activity, etc, in the i/ the line pilot does not read it, it has /ailed in its
follow, clearance is at least S00 ft to the auter marker
NOTAMs are divided into two classes. Class fli g ht information re g ions in which vour fli ght will purpose. Through the media oJ these pages ~e~e hope
, diminishing to zcro at touchdown point .
I NOTAMs, the familiar kind which are found displayed be made . Find out if any supplementary information to spread a little new gen and try to ans:uer yourquestions .
in the flight p}anning centre, are distributed by teletype . Returning> to the letdown in question, note that
has been iss u ed . Part I I is ncxt~, here , IFR airf ields ~1nd we do get questions . Our staJJ members
Class II NOTAMs contain items of more or less per- glidepath interception is made at ?800 ft and dcscent
arc listed alphabetically . Check the departure point, in their travels are o(ten Jaced wtth, "Hey, you're a
manent nature ; for example, the recentchange in off-airway th e n comm e nce
~d on a 2._~° slope . ' I'hrs
' guarantees the
enroute stations, destination and alternates and also G'ICP, what ahout such-and-such?" Rarely is it a
cruisin g altitudes ~ and are distributed b Y mail . Class I required obstacle clearance . At the marker, 1~20 ft is
for any supplements concernrng these pornts . In Ilyrng prvhlem that can be ansu.ered out v) hand . I,f rt u~ere
NOTAMs are subdivided into series A and B . These sufficient, however, if after completing procedure tum
off-airwa Y s or into a VFR airfield check Parts III that easy lhe questivn ~wuldn't hai~e been asked in
two series differ in composition, method of distribution immcdiate descent was made to 1820 ft, there would
and IV for any relevant information . In addition, check the first place . 7'he required answer is o/ten /ound
and conditions of issue . Series A NOTAh1s are issued he at least two ohstacles between completron of pro"
the weather reports for relevant Series B NOTAMs . only atter some research and consultation, fiy this
for a condition which will exist for more than two hours . cedure turn and the outer marker which would violate
CheckinK NOTAMs in this way is adequate most time you can't remember who asked the questivn or
They are in plain language using recognized abbreviations the mrnrmum S00 feet of clearance .
of the time but beware of tra P s. It is not therres Pon- you don't see hirn for a year or so and all is forgotten .
and are distributed on the Aeronautical Fixed Tele- Taking altirrcter errors and a touch of turbulencc
sibility of the wcather office to pass NOTAMs, so ,also, often the /ollo:c~-up of a particular question reveals
communication Network. Series B NOTAMs cover a into account descendinR to 1820 ft off procedure turn
when checking the weather, scan the actual teletype aspects which would be oJ general interest to all air-
condition existing for two hours or less . They are also would be a very drcey do .
sequences yourself . If there is not a NOTA1t9 code frame jvckeys. 6f'e hope tv answer this type oJ question,
To determine the correct altitude several methods
issued on short notice to cowr a situation requiring a chart in the weather office, refer to Section 1 of the and any can oJ ~~orms vpened up in the process can
can be used . Taking 500 It from the pr~~cedure turn
Series A notification but on which there is less than six forward to GPIi 270, Fli g ht Plannin g Doc:ument . e sorted out /or ez~ery one's edi/ication .
hours warning . Series B is added to the aviation weather altitude and using this figure is safe and effective .
Keep iu mind that all NO'TAMs from one are 9ny qu~stions, suggestions, or rehuttals u~ill
sequences of the affected location and is sent in code - This is based on the fact that the procedure turn altitude
are not necessarily sent to the other area . The A'I happily entertained and if not answered in pttint
gives 1000 ft clearance over a lar~;e ~area including the
the ICAN NOTAM Code, known as the "Q" code . Series centre, however, has all NOTAh1s ; these are avarlablc shall attempt to gii~e a personal an .rwer. Please
area desi gnated for P roceedin g inbound to the marker
B NOTAMs appear on the weather sequence for six on request. For exarnple, if you wish to check Parts ciirect any communications tv the Commandiny OJficer,
hours or until the condition is rectified . after completing proccdurc turn . The inbound area
III and IV for the western area and you are at an eastern kC-} F Station db innipey, !V'est:ain, ;blanitoha, .l ttention :
Series A NOTAh1s are divided into two groups : requires S00 ft clearance and this method gives atleast
station you can ask centre to check them for you. Beware, ('1(;'P T'liyht,
the dail Y NOTAh4 summar Y and supplementary NOTAh4s . that much .
when flying from one area to another, that while series As an opener we'll comment on a matter con- Also, you could maintain proccdurc turn altitude
The daily summary is issued at 0300 (~MT and contains B NOTAMs are normally issued to cover any circumstances cerning the latest low-leve) navi~;ation/flight procedures . until reachin g the outcr marker inhound . This certainlv,
all of the current NOTAMs for Canadian stations . For occurring after the summary is published, a series B
ease of reference, the daily summary is in four parts. "Un an ILS a PP roach to runwav 07 at Lakehead, with will give adequate terrain clearance but will require
NOTAM is not issued on items having more than six
~ Part I - NOTAMs on airway and air route changes,
the ~>lidc
n P ath off ~ what altitud~e should Y ou cross the a very high rate of descent to reach minimurns afler
hours warnin g ; it will a PP ear in the Series .A su Pp le- marker in}x~und?" . passing the n~arker .
airspace reservations, enroute navigational aids mental . Also, if the item is over six hours old, a Series B Before explaining the correct answer let's state The best method would be to usc thc published
and general information affecting enroute navigation . NUTAM is cancelled but the corresponding Series A
These are listed by Flight Information Region . the wrong answer : 1820 feet . This figure, shown on ADF inbound altitude where available . At Lakehead this
NUTAM may not have been sent to all stations . Once the letdown sh°et as an altitude inbound at the outer is 2200 . This holds true for all ILS letdowns having
~ Part II - NOTAMs on aerodromcs with published again, the centre can provide the information . marker is a t;lidepath check altitude . an AUF approach published in conjunction .
approach procedures and associated terminal facrlitres Now, you know all about NOTAMs - don't forget
and hazards. The airports appear alphabetically in to check them!
two rou P~ s east and west of Winni PK e .
As a result oJ representations by TCHQ, the
~ Part II1 - NOTAMs concerninA hazards beyond S nm of
a particular airfield . These are listed alphabetrcally
Department aJ Transport has ayreed tv a new routing A "NON-ACCIDENT" REPORT
procedure which uas smplemented 15 Mar 65 . Supple-
by province and divided into areas east and west mentary coveraye wil( now be prvvided to Namao, Cold
o~( V4'innipeg . The flight technician on an Albatross, LAC JH aircraft was taxied to a nearby protected beach and
Lake, ;'Noose Jaw, Rivers and Portaye in the western
~ Part lY - NOTAMs concerning VFR airfields and Laflamme, was performing the pre-landing check which shollower water.
NOT .AM arta as well as ta Gimli, Centralia, .North l3a
associated facilities and hazards . These are also luded visua) confirmation that the undercarriage The servicing crew dispatched b the scene, Cpl
and St Huhert in the eastern N'OTAM area . !n additio 1
listed alphabetically as in Part III . The daily summary as down . LAC Laflamme noted a large stone embedded GE Boll, LAC NC Torgeson, and LAC WJ Fogarty,
Namaq Cold Lake, .t9oose /aw, Rivers and Portag
is amended by issuing Series .A supplemental NOTAMs . Series A NOTA,~Is will be relayed to Gimli, Centralia, in the right main tire ; the captain landed on water quickly changed the wheel under windy conditions, in
The two areas of distribution are east of Winnipeg and Nath Bay, Si. Hu6ert and vice versa. Further, NOT.~1~~1 rather than risk a blowout on the runway . a manner described by the captain as "done cheerfully
west of Winnipeg ; Winnipeg is deemed to be in both coverage of Calgary, Saskatoon, Lakehead and Sauft After the water landing the tire was inspected, and well" .
areas . It's worth noting that Gimli is in the eastern area . Ste b9arie will be rela)~ed to tne air stations in the showing the embedded stone had cut through at least I~e're so accustomed to accideni reports that stories
Series A supplementals are sent to all stations in the apposite area . ~ three cords . such as this "non-accident" are a welcome relief.
area of origin plus the central NOTAM office .
The Central NOTAM Uffrce rn Ottawa prepares F/L J Glover At this point the flight technician stated that he Our thanks a 9 ain to h;~L .aL Se :..ard> 1~1 h(' > Stn
and distributes valid NOTAMs ; these are released at Central Plying School UICP Flight thought the wheel could be changed while afloat ; the Comox,

16 Flight Comment, Nov Dec 1965 17

 De headbone these days is connccted to a new hard-
hai comp lete with ear defe n de r s and ch rnstrap. ,As the
photo shows the recently-introduced head,r;ear for line
servicin K is u~orn bv, the Voodoo servicin g crews at
Ra~;otville . The new hat kceps all equipment well
secured to the rnan~, our hop c is that he can kee p th e
the whole assemhled unit - man and hat, out of trouble .
Our jet engines up till now, have ingested costly tielhits FRIEND OR FOE?
suc.h a~ ear defenders and airmen's hats to mention on
two Irom the FOD locker . AJ Berry

`DE HEADBONE CONNECTED TO . .

ing, Baden-Soellingen

So far, cornments by the wearers are ~enerally favour-

able, One thin g is cer tarn' ; liagotville line crews
~ ~ are
- There's no quick answer to t}us question (confirmed
s Portin g fewer bruised "no kg ins" these davs alcoholics anc members of the U~omen's Temperance
. and the
i7s are g oin~k ver y~ short on rations . >,~''e reco mm e nd Association please sit down) ; it all depends on the
for winter wear, the B~S woollcn E3alaclava which should circumstances,
fit nicelv under the hardhat . '1'radition has accorded the consumption of alcohol
F~L WC Wylie a unique position in the Armed Forces . 'fhe protocol
RCAF Stn Bagotville of "dining-in" and the re,t,~ulations governing the com-
position of a mess committce where the har member is
given precedence over his messing and housing col-
leaRues, serve to demonstrate this, The result is an
unfortunate anomal y~ where it is 9 rrite acce Ptable to Let's have a look at this hangover business! Ilang-
drink but not to show too much evidence of having done overs afllict some individuals more than others and
so . That's thc general situation ; now consider a few
R UNWA Y ICING UN A CLEAR DA Y2
tend to follow a similar paltern on repetition . The
of thc " P ros and eons" . symptoms are caused by a disrupted metabolism due
Alcohol - the Friend to an accumulation of aldehyde and ketonc (useful in
A CF101 aircraft pilot was diverted on a bright was better than 32°F and as the blowing snow crossed
In "reasonable" quantities alcohol is a unique its propcr place as a paint thinncr) associated with
clear sunny day. He didn't see why he shouldn't land the runway, it meltcd to a thin wet layer on the runway .
fluid and electrolyte imbalance compounded by gastric
but the tower told him to divert because of an icy run- During the hour the pilot was away, the temperature so~ i~tl emollient; shyness and reserve-barriers to
droPP ed two de g rees ; the melted snow froze leavin g :iabilit y loosen thcir hold and e~a s'e upset and often lack of sleep .
way, so he diverted, lie had been cleared for takeoff r r ~ocral contact
only an hour before and the runway was almost dry. thin sheet of ice. Because of the crosswind and tl possihle . (Take a few minutes out to watch a smootlr Curiously enough, although hangovers are common
There was not a cloud in the sky, the weather section ice, the pilot was given the diversion instructiori operator at a cocktail party .) Alcohol relicves worry (and often severe) verv little research into the condition
had reported the temperature as 22°F, the wind at 15 A clear, bright day with a crosswind and blowing and stress , and has a p lace after haza r do u~ti cxperienccs.
~ }ras been done . This probably explains the variety of
with a few 6~usts to 25, and blowing snow, snow can cause a hazardous condition . Be aware of Taken with meals, it stimulates the appetite and gencral- "guaranteed cures" available, ranging from lots of water
this hazard and plan accordingly. ly increases an appreciation of fc~d . through bromos and aspirins, 100% oxygen, coffee, pep-
When the pilot returned he wanted to know why
Aleohol has its place too as a medicine in certain pills and a "hair of the dog" .
he'd been diverted . Here's why, Although the outside F~L W Green
vascular disorders . (You've ,~ot to play it 6y ear thou,gh - It is too much to expect an individual, suffcring
temperature was 22° F, the runway surface temperature RCAF Stn Chatham, NB
it wouldn't do to p rescribe a 5tiff shot of ~ycotch as~a from fatigue and a queasy stomach who is not firing
ni~rhtcap for your maiden aunt - thcn again, it miKht .) on ei K ht c Y linders in. the first P lace ~ to P,roduce to p-
notch flyink if put m a high-performance arrcraft . Re-
Alcohol - thc Foe

False TACAN Lock-On

cently, one or two accidents appcar to have been as-
Alcohol impairs perception, judQement and perfor-
sociated with a hangover state,
mance, It induces addiction in susceptible individuals, CFP 100 requires an ei~;ht-hour period of abstincncc
A recent Safety of Fli~;ht Supplement to the lock-on within the proper 40 dr~ree sector . Securing with all the adverse consequences of excess . It slims prror to ilyrng . I'hrs Irmrtatron, however, rs a h41NIMUM
}}C.'-1308 Fli k~ht Manual warns of the p° ssibilitY of one's pocketbook . lt can eause serious liver dama,~e .
t}re sct and thcn turnin~ it on a~;ain will accomplish and rs a compromrsc between avordrng flyinK under the
TACAN lockin g on a false bearin k~ . 11~is is not 1~ust It causes hangovers .
tf~e same effect, rnfluence and unduly penalizing modcrate drinkers . 1t
peculiar to the HC'-1_~(1f~, hut can occur in any TACAN (Reprinted frorn US Coast Guard h:ffects of Alcohol rn no way covers the drmrnutron of abrlrty durrng_ the
equippcd aircraft . Flight Safeiy Bulletin) Alcohol ~eprcsses the central nervous system, and han~;over
_ P hasc .
T~1CAN bearings are determined by comparison with it your judgcment, discrimination, co-ordination VI'hat is the answcr to all this? I feel that hoth aircrew
of the phase of the modulatron of the recerved sr~~nal The 'I'ACAN may re-lock with the 40° amhiguity;
and consciousne,s arc progressively reduccd . 'I'he and supervisory staff are involved . It's up to thc aircrew
with a reference P hase . Usin~ 15 c Y cle nrodulation TACaNs are deceptively decisive about a false reading -
d_ek~ree of this reduction depends on the concentration io organize their cclebrations to allow ~ufficient time
a rough bearrn~ rs determrned (plus or minus 20 degrees), the ncedle homes in firmly and Rives you a }xarin
chan k~e as Y ou P roceed in fli Kht, lt's a srnart p il r rdual ' s conditioned
alcohol in ihc blood and the ind'v' to Ket over hoth the acute phasc and the hanKover before
Control of the indicator is then shifted t o 13S c e ~c lc.~
who is in a position to _s;ive the occasional readin br istance to alcohol . The laiter is largelv depcndent the ncxt airborne dutv is due . The timc re 9 uired varies
moaulatron circurtrv for t}~e frne measuremcnt . It rs
possible for the fine measurement circuitry to take double take ~ otherwise that momentary "changing on the degree of prior exposurc to alcohol (old soaks hut aftcr heavv drinkin u p to 30 ho ur s rs ' ~ ncedcd to
rontrol when the P ro P er 40 de k>ree secter has not been channels" ma~~ ncvcr occur . can withstand its effects hetter than beginners), Your recu ~erate fulhy~ . F. q uall r,~ i t 's up to thc supervisory
selected hy t}~e rough measurement, The bearing in- The approach control agency should, as a rnatter of blood alcoholconcentration can be estimated hy analysis staff to schedule the flvin
. gP ro g ram makin g allowances
dicator w~ill then lock on a reading which is in crror routine, moaitor on tlre UF t}te transmission at IP or of expired breath or actual measurement from a bloc~d for periods of hi Xh han gover incidence after mess
by some rrultiple of 40 degrees. A'hen this occurs, whenever a T ;1CAti position is given . One command sample, In legal circles a Ievel of 1)0 mgm/100 cc °f dinncrs and syuadron parties . ALCOHOL - FRIEND
changing channels momentarily will cause tlre set has already. cornmented on the notential hazard of the blood is reKarded as evidence of im~airment
1 re Kardless OR FOE? You've got the facts,
r -
to be~in
i, to search , and should result in an ac~cu r at c TACA'~`, and we couldn't agree more .- Ed . of othcr cvidence, It's up to you!

1S Flight Comment, Nov Dec 1965 19

 FROM AIB FILES

Y F(~1!u'vll'vl_~'hE.b ~l(~KF.

A Labrador helicopter was over Cobiquid }iay when the aircraft was landed immediately . The elapsed time
the P ilot noted a ra P id fluctuation of the aft transmission from start of the oil pressure fluctuation to shutdown
oil pressure, between 25 and SO psi (normal is 2()-85 was about ten minutes, In that short time, the 4.4 gallon
psi) . The fli~;ht technician was directed to examine the oil system had lost 2 .> gallons. EIow much longer would
Does this layout look reasonable? aft transmission where he discovered a m assive oi 1 thc transmission have run' With the oil being lost at
leak, A suitable landin~ area on shore was close by ; that rate, it's anybody's guess - ours was four minutes .
Murphy's Muddle Only four mrnutes more and the aft transmrssion could
have seized ; the aircraft would have been destroved with
This story concerns two pilots who flew an Expeditor enRines on takeoff or overshoot, ih~ead damaged 6y side load and vibrofion
the loss of all on board . The captain, F/L Hayes,
to another base, dropped off a parcel, drd three practrce A rather tnept technicran had mstalled the fuel
appreciating the great urgency of the situation, landed
circuits and returned to base . It was on the return leg selector control assemblres rn reverse, makrng an
the aircraft with minimum delay. Had he been further
that something was obviously wrong with the fuel apparent front fuel tank selectron, for example, actually
away from shore he would have landed on the water, he
s,ystem . The tanks which had been selected showed come from thc nose - see photo. The pilot, too, should
says, and quite right too. Incidentally, no increase
lrttle loss of fucl and yet there was an astonrshrng have seen the difference, but the chap we're really
rn aft transmrssron orl temperature was noted, There
low level of fuel in the nose (in fact, only one half annoyed with is the designer who built this part so that
is a hiddcn and insidious menace allied to this incident.
gallon rcmained on landing) . The pilot quite rightly it could be assembled in the wronK position in the
These oil pressure gauges have been known to mal-
referred rn hrs account to the danger of losrng both first place .
function . llad F/L Hayes shrugged off thc: fluctuation
as "another of those K oofv. g~au g es" l here'd be no ha pPY
ending to this cmcr g encv, .
The oil lcak came from the bushing where thc line
from the oil cooler g oes into the to P of the mix box.
U Thc exact reason for the failure of this bushing is still
(at time of writing) undcr investi~;ation, However, one
of these bushin g s failed before - on an Arm y (I' I 1 1 3~a -
but was discovered before any oil leak developed .
(lperators and maintainers take heed .

T33
NH'VF Ahus~:
As designed . . .
The '1'33 fuel systen~ modificatian has been uelayed
because of a shortage of parts, The lead time required
to g et these P arts is a PP roximately. five months . New
target date for the mod program is 1 Jan bb,

"Watch the Birdie" TOP

In three months , four Nf+ :NE en g i n es ha~~e been re-
movcd bccausc of overtem p erature dama g e . Two of
these had broken turbine blades . In the past, howevcr,
exceeding the limitin~,~ JP'C on engine accrleration has
~tation Trenton's Ob-24 runway
been the c:hief cause of this type of damage . Furtl~er
was not the final restrng place for
investigation hy :1IB is in progress on these en~;ines,
these birds - they wound up as Ne kn~w the acceleration control isn't much }iel ~ from
exhibits for a very effective FOD idle to S0,°o - this means that pilots are ~oing to have
photo. No reports of the bird strikes to be extra careful ducin g en ,~rine accelerations and
were received but obviously some- extra conscientious about rc P ortin g an Y~ overtem E~erature
one's propeller or plane had been otherwise sornetime in the future that en~,~ine will fail!
hit. A local dump has been attract- The 1'I:~:~~F' has a ~ine repuiatior~ ~or ruyyedness
in K these birds and attem P ts are ana rcliability - pcrhaps some ol ur are caking libertief
in progress to move it further hy i" x~~c~ctiny too much of the old ~u~or~horsP .
afield .

Flight Comment, Nov Dec 1965 21

 ARRIVALS and DEPARTURES YLKON, VS GIkAFFE That dis-
tant cousin to the Iorklift, the
Giraffe, has unfortunately the same
penchant for whacking aerodynes .
The Yukon was the hapless parti-
cipant in a comedy of errors . ,A
~ minor aches and pains are the driver with no official q ualification
CF100, '~A~'IGATOR IiAS THE gator coroplained of blurring vision onset symptoms of incipier~ was operating a vehicle which he
BENDS After being airborne an and an immediate descent com- hypoxia or decompression s : described as "tricky" to operate.
hour and a half at a cockpit altitude menced . The aches and blurring of ness . Further, he claimed, the Giraffe
of about 22,000 feet the navigator vision disappeared within a minute ~ incvitably, pains such as ex- controls made smooth movement of
complained of an ache in the right or two ; the navigator was feft with perienced by this navigator will the machine "impossible" . The
elbow . Iie suspccted the bends, a slight headache persisting for hecome worse if you persist in tail section of the Yukon which
but as the ache was not intensifyink about thrce hours. cxposing yourself to the condi- was damaged by the descending
the mission was continued . Fifteen The aircraft and personal oxygen tions which g_enerated them in platform, was temporarily obscured
minutes later a similar ache began equipment were found serviceable . the first P lare . by the boom . The Giraffe demands
in the right ankle. The mission :1 man as experienced as this Ilad these symptoms progressed extreme caution - somewhat more
was aborted b Y divertin g to a near- navigator should have known two further - sa Y~ in the P ilot a serious than was excrcised by this driver .
by airfield . By this time the navi- basic truths : emergency could have developed.

ALB .ATROSS, VF.IIICLF COLLI- But the poor design of any vehicle
CF10I, UNLOCKFD PANEL The kafuffle . T'he aircraft scrambled ; SION ?tlanoeuvering a shop mule ;s somethin g to (ive with - at
people who invented panels failed the thump felt by the pilot and while towinq another aircraft, the least until industry produces some-
to invent something to ensure thou~ht to be the nosewheel re- f loat of a nearhy A lbatross was thing better,
that the y~'d be closed before fli g ht . trartin g was actually the access damaged . The driver states : "wlrile
u'e've been operating Voodoos door bein - dama K ed~ ( sec P hoto) . backing, I noticed that I was
lon g enou g h to have a fine set At about 18,000 feet a control getting near the port float of the
of orders, SOPs, cautions, etc, problem developed causing the Albatross and attempted to stop
to fool-proof the system ~ or pilot to rcturn to hase, Which is and shift into forward ~ear . I ap-
have we? In this case an all-out ~ust as wcll ; ohvtously the airrraf ~arently missed the transrnission
Air Defence exercise was in pro- was in a dan g erous confi~lurati itch on the gear shift as I could
gress and simply stated, the door for hi ~,~lr-ti p eeci fli ~ht . gct it out of gear . At this
was overlooked in the resulting me I made contact with the float
and was slammed forward on the
steerin~; column, completely lost
control af the vehicle , and was
carried right under the float . After
T33, VEHICI,E C'(~LL1SI()N This Put yourself in the place of this passing under the float I regained
one has a painfully familiar ring to man . He was being anxiously control, and stopped the vehicle" .
it ; it also has a lesson . The air- watched bv, two masked men in the The design of the gear shift
crew were strapped in waiting for cockpit, who were perhaps empha- lever makes it possible to miss
~i ~ t a start when the energizer failed, sizinK their growing in~patience by
~~t the electric clutch switch in which
setting up ideal conditions for hcadshakes and hand siRnals . You case the tractor remains in gear .
~ =.o what was ahout to occur . Another can see the mental state that
ener~,~izer was obtained which also could result! Carelessncss it was,
failed to deliver. The "carelcss" but . . ,
airman in question rcturncd with a
third ener~;izer and whilc towing OTTFR, 11I1`GTIP I'~TO (IR()UNll power. The turn was w ider than states as "limited aileron move-
it around the tail of the aircraft Followin~; a touch-and-go landing anticipated bringing the aircraft ment, no airspecd indication and
struck the tailplane damaging hoth (downwind) the pilot overshot, and "alarmingly close" to a shore and unusable flap due to poor control
the clevator and the stabili~er, did a IRO for an inspection pass hillside . The aircraft continued with fla P down" .
over the small frozen lake . 'l'his sinking in its power and bank This pilot can now advise anv-
inspection pass can best be des " conf iguration, touchin,~ on the left one that continuin K a manouver
c rihed as eyuivalent to a very ski and win g . The aircraft bounced which becomes increasingly dif-
ht downwind on a normal circuit. becoming airborne and was flown ficult to cope with, is strictly for
T33, HAII . 1) :1ti4AGE l1'e're just was not possrble as there was a
isfred that the lake was rn good back to base with what the pilot amateurs,
tf~rowing anothet one in - we know "15-mile linc of CB5 directlv in
front of them whrcl~ they would be _>nciition for another touch-and-go
you've scen it before - just to re- lan~,uig (again downwrnd) the prlot
minc3 you that C:Bs cc~ntain hail . In enterin g in 30 seconds" . Three
entered into a verv ti g ht final
this case, the pilot requested ra~ar minutes of lightning, sevcre turbu-
turn - very trKht, that is, for an
vectors around any weather areas lence and harl was all it took to
Otter without Elaps . The pilot
that appeared on the scope . The damage one aircraft .
having forgotten the flaps, tightened
pilot was advised ;liat vectorink
the turn by rncreasrng bank and

22 Flight Comment, Nov Dec 1965

1(ERCULES, IIIGH WINDS 'I'he Some thrce hours later a second F/L Nurse who bv then had been
Ilercules landed at Thule, Greenland, wind warning was issued which informed obtained authorit Y(after
at twenty minutes past midnixht .
P redicted the tivind to veer 30 de ees some dtffrculty oue to the Phase BIRD WATCHERS' CORNER
The weather forecast w~as gJood and increase to SS knots. This III Alert) to proceed by tracked
and wtth the maxtmum wind ex- time, Transient Alert contacted vehtcle to the aircraft . He found
pected to be onlv 10 knots, there the C130 flight engineers and ar-

"~~~
did not a PP ear to be anv. need to weather conditions to be verv bad
ranged for them to get to Base Ops
put the aircraft in the hangar, ('1'his and the aircraft had started to n~o~;e
to tow the ain:raft into a hangar .
is in accordancc with the usual The flight engineers arrived within slowly towards the operati~
procedure) . Consequently the air- twenty minutes, but by this time building . Also, fuel fumes corn
craft was parked in front of Base
()ps and the crew, tired after thcir
the wind was blowing 30 degrees
off the aircraft 6eading and had
from the airrraft were entering
the buildin g , and consideration
'\~+~
long flight from Namao, with stops increased to more than 60 knots . was bein 8g iven as to whether it
at Churchill, Resolute Bay and Also, a Phase IlI weather condition should be evacuated. In spite of
Alert, soon went to bed. had been declared which meant the fire danger and zero visibility,
that personnel are not allowed to F/L Nurse decided he would start
lcave shelter and only rescue or
emergency trafftc (tracked vehrcles
numbers 2 and 3 engtncs and taxi
the aircraft clear. Before this
n-
rn parrs) are permttted to move
out of doors, could be done, however, the aircraft
By now, hangaring the aircraft stopped moving and as the storm
was impossible and the fli~;ht was finally abating no further
engineers, SRt J Neilson and Sgt action was required .
JL Dunn, realized that unless An analvsis of this harrowing
something was done immediately, ordeal indicates that there was
the aircraft was sure to be damaged not much that could have been done
from the extremely high winds . Since to prevent it . AlthouRh the flight
there was no time to get the pilots en g ineer's decision to start number
the flight engineers dccided to
1 engrne undoubtedly rncreased the
start number 1 engrne themselves
and turn the aircralt into wind . They damage ; he in fact should be com-
attempted a start but the aircraft mended for his initiative . T}~i~
was rc~cking 5o violently that the was the only preventative acti~
weight was coming off the starboard that could have becn takcn at t~
main gcar and activatinK_ the touch- time and had the aircraft been
down switch rontact which in successfullv started and turned
turn cut out the compressor and into wind Idama to the aircraft
interrupted the start . On the second might have been completely avoided .
attempt, using fuel enrichment, a In future, due to the possibility
"light off" was obtained but as
of extremely rapid changes in
the rpm was passing 40r~ a gust of
weather conditions at Thule, crews
wind (recorded at RS,S mph) rocked
are tc~ obtain hangar space if -"» .. .
the aircraft so violentl ~ that the
available, If it is not available
port wingtip and the sprnning pto-
peller hlades hit the Kround . I)ue and the forecast is good, the
At 0300 hrs the weather office to the damage to the engine, it aircraft is to be parked on a heading
passed a warnin g to Transient had to be shut down, 5 g~t Neilson 220 M (the usual direction of the
Alert of winds at 20 knots i,nrsting then phoned the captain, F/L Nurse . high winds) . If the weather forecast
to 35, Tlie information was passcd Skt Dunn remained in the pilot's is not guod and hangar space un-
to the transient crew barracks hut seat trying to hold the control5 . available, the aircraft should be t
did not reach the RCAF C130 crew . This proved to be impossible, and f lown out .
In any case a C130 parked into as the aircraft was rocking pre-
wind should not be in any danger cariouslv he too went hack to the
in a 3S knot wind, o E'e tations buildin g .

ur~npuRF~vrr. ~uvr .a~u

~Oli2/'YlC~l2~~ TO THE EDITOR
Dear Sir :
In the lfay-June issue o( Fli,~ht Comment I noticed Our apocogif's to lettcr u~ritcr-cartoonist b1 cl>iarmid No question about it, ol' Skylark's been around for years - a respectable member
a paKe of cartoons under the ca p tion "S q ui~hg les", for hi~~ exceLlent Sguiggles (b1ay,~Jurr) . w~e print herc of the bird community . He prides himself on his apparent maturity and basks in the
Could vou tell me who drew thesr and whether this the "cut line" .,~hic h someho~c u~us mi splaced (.r pelled sunshine of his comrades' confidence . But wait , . , beneath that feathered breast
Pe rson was in the Air Force? {~-0-0-F' ). --1:' c~, lurks an inner bird the Great Horned Skylark, poised and ready to burst into life .
by F O MJ McDIARMID Once possessed by the feathered fiend wtthm, the Skylark no longer heeds the rules,
408 Sqn, Rivers and ignores the hard-won lessons of experience . The Horned one, once out of Hyde-
inq is free to do his deadly work, and chortles his fanciful refrain:

za NORISKTOTHENECK SOCLOSETOTHEDECK
 JANUARY . 1 :1-:13RUARY MARCH . APRII_ MAY . JUNE

2 Dt-S INTEGRATION ? BR :1KlN(1 - A HF .aTFP 1 FI)ITURL-\L

DISCUSSION
6 R :1'I C ON 2 SARAH
4 hR()M A1F3 FII .FS
10 l)NF. FOR THF (IFAR 5 T33 CANOPY BRFAKOU'l
9 S0 .11F_WHF,RF OVER 'ICHF-
12 TIME TO THINK RAINH()W 6 BIRDS BANGERS AND
BALLISTICS
14 FROM AIB FILES 10 DON'T - COLOUR \iF
ORANGE 8 AIRPORT WINDS
16 Fl)RCED LANDING - 1'0\~ ER
OFF' 12 WAN] F_D : A GUUF-1'KUC_~F 11 PUES 'I FiIS LOOK LIKE
FORKLIFT "iIIIS`'
18 'I C INISTRUCTUR AWARD
PR(~GRAMh1E 14 "IF YOU GO DOWN IN Till-, 12 SQUIGGLES
WOODS TODAY . . ."
19 THE OTHER-SIDF-OF-THE- 14 TURNABOUT
F I :NC F: 17 SPOTLIGHT V( :tll)()U - A
SHINING EXAVFLF 15 HOW'S ~ ()L R STRESS
RESI'CJNSF?
18 FUEL : THE WORD ON THF
131R1) 18 FROM AIB FILES

20 \kHF*F'1_ UP AND LOCKED 20 ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES

24 COMNIF"NiTS TO THE EDITOR

Jl_LY . AUGUST SF-L'T1 .%1131'R . OCTOBER Nl)VF\tBF:R . DF-.CF-A1IiF-R

1 f~.f~I'1(_IIZIAL 1 1~:UI"CURI~~L I EDITORIAL

2 F?NI) OF THE LINF. FOR 2 FLIGHT SAFETY IN NAVAL 2 FROST - FACT AND FANTASY
NFI'TUNE 115 AVIATION
4 GOOD SHOW
5 GOOD SHO%k 4 G()()1) SHOW
7 ALCOHOL - FRIFNI) ()R F()F:?
6 I~VE :R PLAY RUSSIAN 7 CARRIER \~INh F=FF,t-.C-TS
R(-)UI ETTE?
8 UIC(FiiN(~ .~T SF-:A 8 E-AI,SF: FIRE \W ARNItiGS
1(l AN 1 .14 F(')R liL11.4tiS?
12 I?ESTROI'EK-HELICClPTF`.R 9 SEARCH AND RESCUF~.
12 FLIGHT SAFETY IN TIlI~ IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC
('ANAI)IAN ARMY 14 RAILROAD WITH THF.
ROCKET ENGINE 12 WINTFR WONDI :RLAND
18 FROR1 AIB Fll_F:S
19 WEATFIF.RMEN A'I' SFA 14 OXYGFN AGAIN
20 ARRIVALS :%ND DEPARTURES
22 FROM AIB FILES 16 REVISE[) NOTAh1 SERVICE
23 C(AIMENTS TO THE' EDITOR
23 ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES
17 ON THE DIALS
24 CU1iN1FNTS TO THE FDITOR
21 FROM A1B FILES

22 ARRIVALS AND nFPARTURf:S