Field Artillery Professional Bulletin 6-22-3

2022, Issue 3
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Headquarters, Department of the Army. PB 6-22-3
Field Artillery Professional Bulletin
Editor: Jamie Southerland
Assistant Editor: Chris Gardner
Art Director: David Johnson
FA School PAO: Judith Oman
Contents For more information, contact the U.S. Army Field Artillery School at
(580) 558-0836.
Disclaimer
The Field Artillery Professional Bulletin is published by
Headquarters, Department of the Army under the auspices of
3 Chief of Field Artillery Sends the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 730 Schimmelpfennig Road,
Fort Sill, OK 73503. The views expressed within are those of the
By COL (P) Shane P. Morgan
authors and not the Department of Defense or its elements.
The content contained within the Field Artillery Professional
4 From the Desk of the CSM Bulletin does not necessarily reflect the U.S. Army’s position
By CSM Michael J. McMurdy or supersede information in other official publications. Use of
new items constitutes neither affirmation of their accuracy nor
product endorsements. The Field Artillery Professional Bulletin
6 Field Artillery: Shield of assumes no responsibility for any unsolicited material.
the Continental Army
By Dr. John Grenier, Field Artillery Branch Historian
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
10 56th Artillery Reactivates as
Europe’s Theater Fires Command JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
“The King has Returned” Chief of Staff
By MG Stephen J. Maranian and MAJ (P) Matthew K. Kabat
Official
14 The Fight for Razish
By LTC Derek R. Baird
MARK F. AVERILL
20 The Need for Delivery Systems Administrative Assistant
Within the Division Artillery to the Secretary of the Army
By 1LT Caitlyn Casten 2220301
28 The Ambiguity of “Shaping Deep”:

Rethinking the Concept of Echeloned Deep
Areas in Large-Scale Combat Operations SHANE P. MORGAN
By MAJ Benjamin Franzosa Colonel (P), United States Army
56th Field Artillery School Commandant, Fort Sill, Oklahoma
32 The Devil is in the Details: Artillery
Logistics in Sustained Large-Scale
Purpose
Combat Operations Originally founded as the Field Artillery Journal, the
By CPT James Sides Field Artillery Professional Bulletin serves as a forum for the
discussions of all U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps Field
38 When the Call Comes Artillery professionals, Active, Reserves and National Guard;
By MAJ Rich Ingleby disseminates professional knowledge about progress,
development and best use in campaigns; cultivates a common
understanding of the power, limitations and application of
44 Arctic Artillery: Fires, both lethal and nonlethal; fosters Fires interdependency
Overcoming Mobility Challenges among the armed services, all of which contribute to the
By MAJ Brian P. Bierwirth good of the Army, joint and combined forces and our nation.
The Field Artillery Professional Bulletin is pleased to grant
permission to reprint; please credit Field Artillery Professional
48 Operation Unlimited Reach: The Lessons Bulletin, the author(s) and photographers.
Learned from M270A1 Air Land Raid
By 1LT Kyle J. Walter, CW2 Cody R. Sorrell,
CPT Austin J. Cibik, MAJ Joseph G. Jankovich Cover
SPC Thomas Caines, the guidon carrier for the Fort Sill
Artillery Half Section, pauses in front of weapon systems
displayed on the Old Post Quadrangle during the 2021 Marine
Detachment change of command ceremony at Fort Sill. (Photo
by Monica Wood, Fort Sill Public Affairs Office)
2 • Field Artillery Professional Bulletin

Chief of Field Artillery Sends
There’s never been a better time to be a Redleg!

By COL (P) Shane P. Morgan
TEAM: Greetings from Blockhouse Signal Mountain and Fort Sill,

Oklahoma -- the home of the Field Artillery. COL Shane Morgan here
-- incredibly excited to report for duty as the 56th Commandant of
the United States Army Field Artillery School and the United States
Army Chief of Field Artillery.
Our relevance as the King of Battle continues to grow while the role of
the Field Artillery remains unchanged. Field Manual 3-09 Fire Support
and Field Artillery Operations published in April 2020 clearly defines our
role: to suppress, neutralize or destroy the enemy by cannon, rocket,
and missile fire and to integrate and synchronize all fire support assets
into operations. This role is just as critically important today as it has
ever been – mastering the fundamentals must remain our priority:
COL (P) Shane P. Morgan
We are all Fire Supporters first. For good reason, accurate target
Field Artillery School Commandant
location and size is the first of the Five Requirements for Accurate
Predicted Fires. From the platoon-level Forward Observer to the
division-level Fire Support Coordinator, our Essential Fire Support
Tasks serve as a binding contract to enable the commander’s scheme
of maneuver. Every call-for-fire or fire mission starts with target
location. We can never get this wrong!
We never put Artillery in reserve. In order to get all our guns

and sensors into the fight, we must strengthen relationships with
the commanders we support. For Redlegs, we earn their trust and
confidence through responsive and accurate Fires. Our task and purpose
remains fundamentally linked to the Five Requirements for Accurate
and Predicted Fire -- nothing more / nothing less.
For the past 111 years, the Field Artillery School remains set ready to
teach, train, and develop our people: Redleg Cannoneers of character
and competence who deliver the devastating Fires required to win
our nation’s wars. This is who we are, and this is what we -- and
only we -- do.
The Field Artillery is growing and full of incredibly unique

opportunities. From the OP, through the Fire Direction Center, to
the gun line, and from a firing platoon to the newly organized 56th
Theater Fires Command, there are exciting developments happening
across our branch. As a result, the Field Artillery remains ready to fight
-- and win -– Large-Scale Combat Operations with devastating Fires.
The Chief Warrant Officer of the Branch, CW5 Rolando Rios, the
Command Sergeant Major of the Branch, CSM Michael McMurdy, and
I stand ready to support you in this shared mission.
There’s never been a better time to be a Redleg!
King of Battle!
2022 Issue 3 • 3
From the desk of the CSM
Redlegs,
Please join me in welcoming our 56th Commandant and Chief of

the US Army Field Artillery, COL (P) Shane Morgan and his wife
Katy! Redleg 6, we are fortunate to have you return to Blockhouse
Signal Mountain and look forward to your leadership of the branch.
I would like to remind our Artillerymen and women there are

some changes within our Professional Military Education courses
that are effective in FY23 (inclusive of all Enlisted, Warrant, and
Commissioned Officer courses at Fort Sill and our eight Regional
Training Institutes).
-All Courses: In accordance with HQDA EXORD 153-22, classes

beginning after October 1, 2022, require passing the Army Combat
Fitness Test as a graduation requirement unless qualified to
receive an Exception to Policy outlined in Army Directive 2022-06
CSM Michael J. McMurdy (Parenthood, Pregnancy, and Postpartum).
Command Sergeant Major
of the Field Artillery -Advanced/Senior Leaders Course: NCOs scheduled for classes
beginning after October 1, 2022, will conduct the first three days of
the course via distance learning, using Blackboard from home station
for Phase I. NCOs are scheduled for subsequent phases in person
at the Fort Sill NCOA or designated Regional Training Institute.
Scheduling for all phases is sequential, meaning NCOs should receive
ATRRS reservations that reflect continuous enrollment through
completion allowing for travel days after Phase I. If NCOs have
difficulty accessing Blackboard or any concerns during distance
learning, please contact the Fort Sill NCOA or Regional Training
Institute leadership.
We are humbled to serve you and our Field Artillery community.

We look forward to another year of progress, leader development,
and driving change. Guns up and King of Battle!
RL7

PFC Kamarean Stratman prepares a round during the
live fire exercise for the 2nd battalion, 2nd Field Artillery
goodbye to their Commander, LTC James O. Johnson, with
a ceremonial firing of his last round. (Photo by Edward
Muñiz, Fort Sill Public Affairs Office)
2022 Issue 3 • 5
[\
Field Artillery:
Shield of the Continental Army By Dr. John Grenier, Field Artillery Branch Historian
[\
he Field Artillery’s 247th birthday on experiences with Americans led him to think very
T November 17, 2022, is approaching, and

FA units across the Army surely will gather
to celebrate the Branch’s long and distinguished
little of their fighting capabilities, explaining why
he initially proved reluctant to enlist Americans
in either provincial Loyalist battalions or regular
history. Very often, the emcee at birthday balls British regiments.
and dining-ins will give a short history of the
Branch, starting with Henry Knox and the When he arrived in the New World, he found
cannons at Dorchester Heights, before he/she that Rebel militia had laid siege to Boston after
quickly jumps to better known, more-recent Lexington and Concord in April, destroying
history, such as the World Wars, the Cold War, effective British governance and the crown’s
or the War on Terror. That said, we encourage authority everywhere not directly under Army
Redlegs not to overlook the early history of control. However, Howe believed that when push
the Branch in their professional-development came to shove, Americans could not—and would
study. A close look at the FA’s first “battle” at not—stand up to British regulars in an open-
Dorchester Heights in March 1776 can offer both a field fight. After surveying the situation before
cautionary lesson about a stronger military force him, Howe wrote to the War Office in London
underestimating the will and capabilities of its and requested an additional 12,000 Redcoat
enemies and the Continental Army’s first uses of infantrymen, several batteries of light and mobile
FA. Coincidentally, it was the FA at Dorchester FA (carriage-mounted 4- and 6-pound cannons;
Heights that was the reason for America’s first he had plenty of heavy, immobile guns he could
major military victory. take from Royal Navy ships), and a couple of
regiments of dragoons (infantry that rode into
Today we know FA as the King of Battle. battle on horses but dismounted and fought on
In the Army’s early years, however, American foot). With those reinforcements, he suggested,
commanders used FA primarily as the Shield of he could smash the Rebel militia to pieces in
the Continental Army, as a strategic deterrent short order and not bother being distracted with
and operationally defensive arm. As we approach winning hearts and minds, as some political
the Branch’s birthday, we will be well served leaders suggested. Schooled in the eighteenth-
by digging a little deeper into its history and century art of war, Howe saw the problem before
thinking a bit more deeply about the things that him almost exclusively in military terms, and he
we believe we already know. harbored little interest in seriously assessing the
Rebels’ will to fight. Howe thus put his staff to
King George III sent MG William Howe to work on building tactical and operational-level
America in March of 1775 to command the plans to break the siege of Boston as the first
4,000 British Redcoats tasked with suppressing step toward annihilating the militia in a decisive
the rebellion in the colonies. Howe was not battle somewhere in the countryside.
particularly worried when he reached Boston on
May 25 to lead his command into the field. During On June 13, 1775, Rebel leaders learned that
the previous war in North America, the Seven Howe intended to secure the unoccupied hills that
Years’ War, Howe served alongside American overlooked the Charlestown Neck and the road
provincial forces or colonists who served during from Boston to Lexington. They spent two full
contractually bound periods of time in battalions days weighing their options and planning their
that their home colonies raised and led. Howe’s response. On the night of June 16, they sent 1,200
militia under co-command of Massachusetts’s On the other hand, tradition has it that Howe
William Prescott and Connecticut’s Israel Putnam learned a painful lesson on June 17, 1775, and he
to fortify Bunker and Breed’s hills. At sunrise on determined never to attack entrenched Rebels
June 17, LTG Thomas Gage, the British commander again. But MG John Burgoyne, Howe’s other
in chief in America, ordered Howe and MG deputy, noted something quite different in his
Henry Clinton (one of Howe’s two deputy field after-action report on Bunker Hill: “nothing
commanders) to lead 2,200 Redcoats to drive the happened there, or in any of the little affairs since,
Rebels from the heights. Two assaults on the that raises them, in my opinion, one jot above the
hastily constructed Rebel position on Breed’s level of all men expect in the use of firearms.”
Hill followed, where either Prescott or Putnam Neither King George’s ministers nor the War
apocryphally uttered the famous order “Don’t fire Office, Burgoyne noted, should make too much
till you see the white of their eyes.” The militia of the Rebels’ accomplishment to “defend one of
repulsed the Redcoat charges at great cost both to the strongest posts that nature and art combined
the British and to the Rebel supply of powder and could make, and then run away.” Howe—and
ball. A third wave, however, finally overwhelmed Burgoyne and Clinton—in fact, remained more
the Rebels than willing
behind their to charge
breastwork, up any hill,
compelling anywhere in
them to America, that
retreat over held Rebels …
Bunker Hill as long as only
(which gave Rebel infantry
the engage- awaited them.
ment its name,
the Battle of In that
Bunker Hill). context, Howe
was heartened
Little has to learn that on
been written June 14, 1775,
about the the Continental
American Congress in
l e s s o n s Philadelphia
learned from created the
Bunker Hill. Continental
This map of Boston and its environs in 1775 shows the commanding position
While a Pyrrhic Army and gave
that “Dorchester Hill” to the southeast offered Washington and his artillery,
victory for the as well as the relative location of Bunker and Breed’s hills to the immediate its command
British—they north of the town. Image from the Library of Congress, in the public domain. to George
suffered over Washington
1,000 casualties, including 100 commissioned instead of Charles Lee (a brilliant but mercurial
officers with combat experience—Bunker Hill British officer who had retired to a plantation
also cost the Rebels over 400 Killed in Action in Virginia). Howe knew both of them, and
and Wounded in Action. After confirmation that he preferred to face off against the military
the Redcoats indeed fought like enraged lions dilettante Washington, a former colonel of Virginia
released from a cage, Rebel leaders knew they provincials, who during the Seven Years’ War, the
could not sustain a thirty-three percent casualty War Office several times refused to commission
rate each time they sent their formations into as even a major in the regular British Army. More
battle. Avoiding the regulars became a priority, significantly, Congress made the Continental Army
and they conceded that asking militia to stand predominately an infantry army—it contained no
against them without a preplanned escape route FA and claimed only a handful of poorly organized
was to potentially offer them up for slaughter. troops/squadrons of dragoons or cavalry. Howe and
If only they had FA in support, many Rebel his deputies could barely wait to bring Washington
regiment commanders said, they might better to battle. They hoped the newly-minted general
stand their ground. might imprudently consolidate the Rebel army
2022 Issue 3 • 7
outside of Boston, rather than forcing them set out for Boston on December 9; it took them
to chase it over hill and dale. As soon as the until late January to move the guns, first by water
reinforcements arrived from Europe, they promised and then by horse-drawn sleds, the 225 miles
to get to work. to Washington’s camp at Cambridge. Almost
immediately on Knox’s return to the Boston area,
Bunker Hill, after all, had cost the British Army Loyalist spies told Howe that the Continental
nearly a quarter of its effective fighting force in Army now had artillery it could use against his
New England. Nonetheless, it took Parliament forces and positions inside the town and on
most of 1775 to authorize funding for additional Charlestown Neck.
regiments for America, and recruiters inside the
British Isles struggled to find men willing to sail Washington waited over a month before he
across the Atlantic Ocean to kill other subjects of played his artillery card. Over the night of March
King George. In the end, Parliament and the War 4-5, the Continental Army’s FA bombarded
Office resorted to hiring German mercenaries (the British positions near Bunker and Breed’s
infamous Hessians) to fill out the British order of hills as a diversion while LTC Rufus Putman—
Knox told Washington he could transport Ticonderoga’s guns

to Boston, giving the Continentals what the British respected.
battle for 1776, but by the time they reached the Israel’s cousin and Washington’s de facto chief
colonies, the strategic and operational parameters combat engineer—barricaded with prefabricated
of the war had changed radically. chandeliers and fascines the summit of Dorchester
Heights, on the opposite side of Boston Harbor,
Over the rest of 1775, the new normal fell in essence encircling the town. At daybreak on
over the war in New England, as the Continental March 5, upon seeing the Rebels were again hard
Army watched the British Army passively sit in at work on high ground above the town, Howe
Boston while it waited for reinforcements. As ordered his Redcoats to cross the harbor and
rebels are wont to do, Americans tried to spread pry them from their positions. The race was on
their rebellion (it was not a revolution until July because he knew that if Washington succeeded
4, 1776) to Canada and thereby suggested they in barricading even light cannons on the heights,
were in the war for the long haul. The Continental the Rebel position might become unassailable and
Congress also unanimously elected a twenty-five- the British positions on Boston Neck untenable.
year-old bookseller, Henry Knox, as “Colonel of Heavy guns on Dorchester Heights also threatened
a Regiment of Artillery” on November 17. Highly Boston proper, and perhaps British ships moored
ambitious, intelligent, and wholly uninterested in in the harbor. However, a late-winter storm rolled
serving in the infantry, Knox earlier proposed to over Boston, and gale-force winds inside the
Washington that he should allow him to travel to harbor prevented moving the Redcoats overwater.
Lake Champlain, where in May, COL Ethan Allen Officers from the Royal Navy reported they could
and his militia had captured Fort Ticonderoga and not safely bring even their small frigates onto
its artillery and stores of ammunition. Dorchester Flats and put the ships’ guns into
play without running aground. By the afternoon
Knox told Washington he could transport of March 6, when the weather cleared, it was
Ticonderoga’s guns to Boston, giving the too late for the British. The ubiquitous Loyalist
Continentals what the British respected. Knox spies reported that the Rebels had ensconced
left for Ticonderoga the day before Congress themselves on Dorchester Heights and had placed
formally commissioned him, and upon arriving at Knox’s cannons in easily defensible positions.
the fort, he selected 58 pieces (mostly 12- and 18-
pounders, but one 24-pounder, nicknamed “Old The guns convinced Howe on March 7 to
Sow,” that weighed 2.5 tons) for the Continental’s completely abandon Boston and transport his entire
new artillery “corps.” Knox and his teamsters army and any Loyalist civilians that they could
fit on ships to Halifax, Nova Scotia. Washington
agreed to permit the British vessels to sail from the
harbor unmolested, provided Howe promised not
to burn Boston on his way out of the town. Both
generals proved true to their word, and on March
17 (Saint Patrick’s Day, also known as Evacuation
Day in New England), the British Army left Boston,
never to return. In the United States’ first major
battle, the Continental FA had driven the British
Army from New England. Thanks to the artillery,
what began as a small-armed rebellion, now
turned toward becoming a revolution, allowing
American colonists to even consider the possibility
of being a part of a new nation.
Of course, Howe was not fully deterred from

acting elsewhere, as his brilliant offensives in New
York six months later and then in Pennsylvania
in the summer of 1777 were soon after to show.
Nevertheless, after Dorchester Heights, he
proved extremely cautious in dealing with the
Continental Army whenever his reconnaissance
forces and/or spies told him Continental artillery
was present. Indeed, the Continentals’ cannons
and fortifications on Brooklyn Heights forced
Howe to take an operational pause, saving the
newborn Continental Army in its second battle.
On August 27, 1776, Howe successfully sent his

German mercenaries and Redcoats to complete the
annihilation of Washington’s army on the open
ground of Long Island. Today, COL John Glover’s
Marblehead Mariners receive most of the credit for
saving the Continental Army from a total disaster
on Long Island by ferrying it on the night of August
29-30 to Manhattan Island. But Glover’s men
can receive those accolades only because FA on
Brooklyn Heights overlooked the evacuation and
kept Howe from applying a coup de grâce to the
vulnerable Continental Army, an act that might
have ended the Revolution within a month of the
signing of the Declaration of Independence.
In the very first days of what became a long

and distinguished history, American artillery
not only established itself as the King of Battle,
it acted as the Shield of the Continental Army.
At Dorchester Heights, the Field Artillery won
America’s first battle; at Brooklyn Heights, it In 1806, the City of Boston commissioned portrait painter Gilbert
Sullivan to create George Washington at Dorchester Heights,
ensured the birth—and later survival—of our now which became one of the most famous paintings of Washington as
great nation. So, when morning reveille sounds Commander in Chief of the Continental Army. Cannons, however,
this coming November 17, American artillerymen are notably absent from the painting. Image from Wikicommons
across the world get to salute the flag with a little and in the public domain.
extra pride that day. King of Battle!
2022 Issue 3 • 9
I
n 2008, three former brigade combat team
(BCT) commanders wrote the white paper
“The King and I: The Impending Crisis in
Field Artillery’s Ability to Provide Fire Support
to Maneuver Commanders.” The now famous
article spoke of how the King of Battle had
fallen from its throne. It highlighted how the
Field Artillery (FA) branch had declined, not
just in Redlegs’ ability to provide support to
maneuver elements but also as a branch of
choice for Soldiers joining the Army1. The
paper was addressed to the Chief of Staff of the
Army and highlighted the detrimental effect
56th Artillery that several years of organizing, training, and
equipping our Army for counter-insurgency
Reactivates as Europe’s (COIN) had on the FA branch. Redlegs, once
known as detail-oriented leaders, had lost
Theater Fires Command the ability to consistently and effectively plan
and execute Fires in support of maneuver. The
“The King has Returned” overarching problems highlighted by (then)
COLs MacFarland, Shields, and Snow indicated
MG Stephen J. Maranian and the branch was also losing experienced gunners,
MAJ (P) Matthew K. Kabat as the limited need for artillery in the COIN
fight resulted in the use of Redlegs in several
non-traditional roles.
The downsizing of the Army in the 1990s saw

the elimination of Corps Artillery formations
from the Army. Later in the early 2000s,
primarily due to the need to reorganize the
Army to fight in a COIN environment, the FA
watched the inactivation of Division Artillery
(DIVARTY) and other brigade-sized elements.
While deemed necessary during that period,
these actions were a mistake for Command and
Control (C2) across the FA branch. As the wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq ended, and with China
and Russia developing long-term strategies
to challenge America’s global interests, the
Army recognized the need to realign once
again its efforts to focus on large-scale combat
operations (LSCO). It became clear to the Army
what the Field Artillery knew all along – that
the Army requires Field Artillery headquarters
at echelon. These formations were needed
both to synchronize Army, Joint, and multi-
1 Colonels Sean McFarland, Jeff Snow, and Michael

Shields, “The King and I: The Impending Crisis in Field
Artillery’s Ability to Provide Fire Support to Maneuver
Commanders,” white paper, 2008, https://coinenirak.
files.wordpress.com/2008/05/white-paper-field-ar-
tillery-mai-2008-sur-la-crise-de-lartillerie-en-coin.
pdf.

national Fires more effectively and to provide was first activated in September 1942 as the 56th
C2 and mission command to enable maneuver Coastal Artillery Brigade, and shortly thereafter,
commanders’ mission accomplishment through in May 1943, it rebranded itself as an Anti-aircraft
the effective and optimized employment of lethal Artillery Brigade. In that capacity, the 56th was
Fires. The Fires Center of Excellence took on the twice decorated by the Belgian government for
mission of designing units to provide C2 for Fires action in defense of Antwerp Harbor.
formations at echelon. DIVARTYs have returned
to the Army inventory in the past decade, with Following World War II, the 56th Artillery
the 1st Armored Division Artillery leading the inactivated but returned to active duty in 1983
way in 2014.2 This was a good first step, but as the 56th Field Artillery Command. With its
one that still left gaps at the Corps and Theater new name came a new mission – to provide
levels. As the Army continued to focus on LSCO C2 for Field Artillery battalions equipped with
and the concept of Multi-Domain Operations the Pershing missile. They performed their job
(MDO) emerged, it became even more apparent spectacularly, so well that they worked themselves
that headquarters also needed to perform C2 out of a job. As the Cold War came to a close in the
and fire support coordination functions for Fires early 1990s, so too did the mission of this unique
formations at the Corps and Theater levels. The strategic command. The 56th inactivated again
role of Force Field Artillery Headquarters (FFA in 1991 and remained off the rolls until recently
HQ) at these echelons was assigned to already reactivating on October 16, 2021. Just as the 56th
overtasked Field Artillery Brigades; formations Field Artillery Command of 1983 was completely
were inadequately resourced to simultaneously different from the 56th Coastal Artillery of WWII,
perform the role of FFA HQ and support a Corps today’s 56th AC is an entirely new unit, and its
with both integrating and delivering Fires. From focus and energy are clearly on the future.
this requirement were born the concepts of the
“Operational Fires Command” to provide Army What we do
Corps with a dedicated C2 formation focused on
Fires and the “Theater Fires Command” (TFC) The 56th AC’s purpose is to plan, coordinate,
to plan, coordinate and employ multi-domain integrate, and deliver Fires and effects at the
Fires and effects at the theater level. theater level in support of the ground force
commander. It serves both as the senior fire
The King is back in Europe support coordinating element and the FFA HQ
for USAREUR-AF, or a designated Combined/Joint
The Army took a big step to address these gaps Force Land Component Command. Although not
in 2021 by activating the 56th Artillery Command part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s
(AC) and 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) in (NATO) command structure, when called upon,
Europe. The linkage of these two new formations the 56th could certainly perform the same role for
ties the requirement to provide C2 for indirect NATO’s Land Command (LANDCOM).
Fires to the planning and integration of lethal
Fires and non-lethal effects in all domains at As the command activated, the USAREUR-
the theater level. Both units activated in the fall AF Commanding General, GEN Christopher
of 2021, with the 56th AC assigned as a major Cavoli, gave the 56th AC four key tasks on
subordinate command within U.S. Army Europe which to focus. Those tasks were to serve as
and Africa (USAREUR-AF) and the 2nd MDTF the senior fire support coordinating element
assigned to the 56th AC. in theater, to perform the role of the FFA HQ
for the theater, to grow interoperability and
The 56th AC is not new to the European theater, improve synchronization across the theater Fires
but today’s formation has a completely different Enterprise, and to integrate new capabilities and
structure and mission than it did in the past. The modernize the force.
56th AC has a rich and proud history of service
in Europe, distinguishing itself during World As the senior fire support element in theater,
War II as well as during the Cold War. The unit the 56th AC leads the land component’s targeting
2 “SGT Alexander Neely, “Division Artillery returns to the Army.” July 24, 2014. https://www.army.mil/article/130514/
division_artillery_returns_to_the_army
2022 Issue 3 • 11
Left: The 1-6th Fire Direction Center
during Dynamic Front ’21. (Photo by
MAJ Joseph Bush) Center: Dynamic
Front ’21 – Artillery Systems Coop-
eration Activities University. (Photo
by SPC Zachary Stahlberg) Right: MG
Stephen J. Maranian and CSM Darrell
Walls in Denmark during a HIMARS
Rapid Infiltration operational exercise.
(Photo by CPT Angelo Mejia)
process. To succeed, the 56th AC will capitalize Element, and the MDTF’s Long-Range Fires
on and grow the capacity of USARUER-AF’s Battalion will take planning, experimentation,
certified Targeting Work Center, which directly and hard work. It will require real-time feedback
supports the land component in Europe. The not just to the Army writ large but to our allies and
team comprises a number of Fire Supporters, partners as well. The 56th AC will inform the Army
‘Targeteers’ and Intelligence personnel. Their Enterprise of tactics, techniques, and procedures
roles include leading the deliberate target (TTPs), and help the institution develop DOTMLPF
development process across multiple domains implications and, in time, lessons learned for new
while retaining the ability to transition from formations.
deliberate to dynamic targeting and continuing
to advance integration and interoperability within How we do it
the Joint community and amongst our allies and
partners. A special area of emphasis is working From day one, the 56th has worked hard to
in direct coordination with our closest partner integrate into USAREUR-AF and the theater by
in planning and delivering long-range Fires, the tying into existing and emerging operational
U.S. Air Forces in Europe – Air Forces Africa. plans, operations, and exercises throughout
Europe and Africa. The timing of the ongoing
In the role of the designated FFA HQs, the 56th war in Ukraine and the U.S. and NATO responses
AC establishes the Field Artillery architecture to it have certainly accelerated the 56th AC’s
for the theater and conducts C2 of Field Artillery path towards full operational capability. The
brigades as well as Fires and effects, enabling 56th AC has supported USAREUR-AF’s efforts to
formations retained at the theater level. As an plan and execute operations in theater to assure
FFA HQ at any level would endeavor to do, the our allies and partners and to deter aggression
56th will maximize the application of all Fires directed against NATO. We will continue to do so
formations in theater through detailed planning by integrating Joint and multi-national Fires in
and coordination with operational and tactical both operations and exercises in the future.
maneuver formations assigned and allocated to
the European theater. Integration and collaboration with NATO are
vital to supporting USAREUR-AF’s commitment
The third key task of building the theater Fires to countering and deterring hostile near-peer
Enterprise requires significant coordination and aggression and violent extremist organizations
collaboration. Working with our NATO allies, the that present a trans-national threat. Furthermore,
56th AC aims to foster interoperability, develop the 56th AC and 2nd MDTF are committed to
an integrated Fires architecture with existing developing multi-domain capabilities in Europe.
artillery formations, and shape aspirational growth As the 2nd MDTF grows capacity in the future,
in multi-domain formations. Simultaneously, they will continue providing direct support to the
the 56th AC will encourage the growth of capable command. Their capabilities will enable the growth
artillery formations where gaps exist and are ready and evolution of the targeting process in theater.
to perform a leadership role in support of NATO Not only will the 2nd MDTF be employed to
LANDCOM when called upon to do so. leverage long-range precision Fires, but they will
also support the U.S. Army’s modernization efforts
Finally, as the U.S. Army continues to modernize by experimenting and testing new equipment
the force, so too will the 56th AC modernize the way within the current competitive environment.
it operates in theater. Employing new Fires and These capabilities will require fluid engagement
effects formations such as a Theater Information in all domains, facilitating synchronization
Advantage Detachment, Theater Strike Effects between cyber, intelligence, electronic warfare,

communications, and space entities. The 2nd Warfighting Function and continue to evolve with
MDTF team also plays an important role in the ever-changing environment. Our planning
engaging with our NATO allies and partners in and C2 capabilities will go a long way toward
theater, optimizing and facilitating an inclusive closing the gap of C2 for Fires formations above
and iterative discussion on MDO in theater. This the division level. The 56th AC will, for the first
is evident by our significant emphasis on building time, bring together a dedicated FFA HQ and
and growing relationships with the Fires and senior fire support controlling element under the
effects enterprise across the Alliance. The 56th command of a single commander for the theater
AC, with our allies and partners, are committed army in Europe. It will bring together the targeting
to countering the effects of malign forces in enterprise and provide a focus for improved fire
theater. To do so, we are actively working together support coordination and Fires interoperability
to develop and refine TTPs and engagement within the NATO Alliance.
strategies for now and in the future.
The activation of the 56th AC as a TFC is a great
The 56 has already begun to take a leadership
th
“next” step for the Artillery enterprise, but in
role in theater exercises. One of the most consistent order for our branch to truly say that “the King has
and effective methods used to grow interoperability returned” and to be able to fully provide necessary
in theater has been through multi-national C2 of Fires at echelon on the modern battlefield,
exercises with NATO allies and partners. Exercises we must grow a similar capability at the Corps
like the Dynamic Front series, an annual artillery- level. With a daily reminder of the relevance of
centric, multi-national exercise, allow nations to artillery Fires and the non-lethal effects we see
develop, refine, and modernize efforts in providing in Ukraine, the time to act is now to firmly place
timely and accurate Fires. This growth is also in the King back on the throne!
line with the integration of NATO LANDCOM as
well as other elements of the NATO command Long live the King and our protector – Saint Barbara!
structure into the Fires Enterprise, specifically
targeting to ensure maximum interoperability and MG Stephen J. Maranian commands the 56th Artillery Command
in Mainz-Kastel, Germany. He concurrently serves as the Fire
synchronization across the whole of the Alliance. Support Coordinator for U.S. Army Europe - Africa. His previous
Over the last decade, these exercises have brought assignments include Commandant of the Army War College, Provost
together units from all over NATO, and its partners of Army University, Commandant of the U.S. Army Field Artillery
for peace, providing a venue for those nations to School, and Director of the Long-Range Precision Fires Cross-
work together and practice ‘fighting’ together Functional Team. MG Maranian commanded the 19th Battlefield
Coordination Detachment in Ramstein, Germany, and the 4th
on a multi-national battlefield. Such exercises Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment in Bamberg,
demonstrate how far the Alliance has come in Germany, and Afghanistan. He is currently serving his 12th overseas
developing TTPs to overcome communications and tour, his ninth in Europe.
logistics issues while highlighting opportunities
MAJ (P) Matthew Kabat was born in Grand Rapids, Michigan.
for improvement. He graduated from Butler University in 2006 and commissioned
in the Field Artillery in 2007. He has served in every operational
Conclusion role from platoon to brigade, even activating the 41st Field Artillery
Brigade as the Brigade S3. He has trained, coached, and mentored
As the U.S. Army continues to modernize the new Cadets as well as new Soldiers before running one of the
observer, coach, trainer teams as a Vampire and Warhog at the
force and update how we fight, the TFC and other Joint Multinational Readiness Center. MAJ Kabat completed a
like-elements in other theaters will continue 15-month deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and
to grow in capability and capacity. As we grow has a master’s degree in International Relations. MAJ Kabat is
towards full operational capability, the 56th AC currently the Secretary to the General Staff for the 56th Artillery
Command stationed in Mainz Kastel, Germany.
will demonstrate proficiency within the Fires
Right: MG Roger K. Bean (right) and CSM Ian Tompkins case the 56th Field Artillery Command
colors in June 1991. (Photo courtesy of Ralf Stumpf)
Far Right: MG Stephen J. Maranian and CSM Darrell Walls uncase the 56th Artillery
Command’s colors on November 8, 2021. (Photo by SPC Joshua Cowden)
2022 Issue 3 • 13
I
am the Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD) great city from the BFB and Donovian aggressors.
for the 2nd Brigade, 52nd Infantry Division. I will As we scan the city, the same question continues
describe what the first week of the campaign to nag me as it has over the past three days. Now
in Atropia looked like through my eyes. it comes to the forefront of my mind: Have we
done enough to provide Joint Fires in the close fight to
It is 0600, the 6th day of fighting to expel the allow our brigade to seize Razish while simultaneously
Donovians from Atropia. The sun is cresting the providing Joint Fires in the deep area through the
eastern horizon and painting Tiefort Mountain integration of Fires in support of combined arms
with a golden glow. The city of Razish, the crown maneuver?
The Fight for Razish:

Journal Entry and Reflections from the 2-52nd ID FSCOORD
By LTC Derek R. Baird
jewel of Atropia, is nestled at the base of Tiefort. Let me back up a few days to describe how
Surrounding Razish are large rock formations; to we got here. We deployed to the southeastern
the south is Hill 876 (colloquially named Moose border of Atropia to expel an aggressive Donovian
Gardens for some unknown reason), north is force that invaded Atropia several weeks ago.
Hill 780, and a bit further to the east is Hill 760. Atropian forces initially put up a good fight,
Several days earlier, the 802nd Brigade Tactical but are quickly culminating, thus our entry into
Group (BTG), with help from local radicals called this arena. Over the past several days, we have
the Bilusivar Fighting Brigade (BFB), seized Razish been fighting elements of the Donovian 80th
in the name of the country of Donovia. The 802nd Division Tactical Group (DTG) to expel them from
and the BFB combined efforts to develop a rat’s Atropia. To conduct an attack against the 801st
nest of defensive positions over three days; wire BTG on D-Day, we left our staging area, Santa
and mine obstacles, ditches, rubble, and strong Fe, where we prepared our Soldiers and
points in and around Razish. We’ve seen gray- equipment for the combat that lay
white smoke drift here and there from former ahead. The fight was tough, to be
strongpoint positions. Shrapnel-scarred buildings sure, but we continued to progress
and the burning hulks of destroyed fighting north from the Whale Gap (from
vehicles now line the streets of Razish. A scan above, it does look like a giant
from our Shadow Unmanned Aerial System and whale) towards the Snow Cone.
spot reports from our observers watching over These few days of fighting were
Razish paint the picture of high explosive intense but manageable. We had
effects from artillery, mortars, rockets, and battalion objectives to seize a
close air support throughout the city. few small rural towns and
This operation began 36 hours some key terrain to maintain
ago and will continue until lines of communication and
we wrest control of this posture for
The city of Razish on Jan. 19, 2018. (U.S. Army photo by SPC Angel Heraldez)

the next phase of our fight. Our plan was simple destructive effects on the 802nd and BFB in Razish.
and somewhat effective, but upon reflection, This action allowed the 1-80th Infantry (IN) to
we didn’t combine arms to any real degree. We breach the defensive belt, then pass the 2-80th
essentially struck whatever targets appeared in Infantry to assault through and seize the city.
front of us with no focus or priority of effort. Meanwhile, we would also provide shaping Fires
There was zero massing with our organic and in our deep area to attrite the Donovian 803rd BTG
Joint Fires assets throughout the first few days of before they can reinforce the 802nd and BFB. On
fighting. Unfortunately, this lack of integration this second attack against Razish, my goal was to
reared its ugly head in the coming days. On keep the fire support (FS) plan as straightforward
D+3, we seized the Snow Cone (I guess it sort of and flexible as possible and to synchronize our
looks like a snow cone on the map) and began organic capability with Joint assets to maximize
preparations for the next phase of our operations. our desired effects. To do this, we needed to a)
So now, we aim to continue west towards the Iron combine high explosive rounds coupled with
Triangle (aptly named) and force the Donovians precision strikes in the city of Razish and b)
to leave Atropia. To do this, we must solve the shape deep with Joint assets to mass effects on
problem of Razish. the reinforcing 803rd. I turned to our targeting
team led by our targeting officer, brigade S2,
By our initial assessment, this now occupied and the brigade fire support officer, along with
city and its prepared defense would be a tough members of each Warfighting Function, our
nut to crack. From the onset, we knew this lawyer, and several others, to refine the FS plan.
would be like fighting Mike Tyson in his prime, Our lawyer was a huge help in ensuring we met
meaning we had to be agile, adaptive, and provide the targeting and execution criteria based on
multiple forms of contact to bring the champ Rules of Engagement (ROE), military necessity,
down. However, round one did not go well for and Law of Armed Conflict during large-scale
our team. Like Mike Tyson said, “everyone has combat operations. Our restrictions included no
a plan ‘till they get punched in the mouth.” We cluster munitions in town and zero effects on
got punched in the mouth over the past few any No-Strike List entities unless warranted by
days, and now it’s our turn to punch back. And military necessity, which was then coordinated
we punched back hard at Razish. through our Division or in case of self-defense
(ROE). Our restrictions were minimal, and we
On D+4, we attacked to seize Razish after were fortunate that the vast majority of the
developing an overly complex and inflexible plan population had already fled the city, but a few
with minimal to no rehearsals, which, as you remained, which added to our risk calculus.
may have guessed, did not go well for our side. Once we re-hashed and published the updated
The fight was over before it began since it was plan, we conducted a series of fire support and
not well understood, uncoordinated, and did not combined arms rehearsals to synchronize the
apply multiple forms of contact to overwhelm our fight for Razish. The FS plan was predicated on
adversaries inside Razish. After several hours of three essential fire support tasks (EFST), two to
fighting and heavy losses, it became apparent support the close fight (one EFST per phase in the
that we could not take the city. So we retrograded close fight), and the third to focus our efforts in
back to our original positions to reassess our plan the deep area (for all the doctrine experts reading
and figure out a way to bring combat power to my journal, this is where art meets science).
bear in support of combined arms maneuver so
that we could seize Razish. EFST 1 (supporting the first phase of the
close fight): Neutralize the 802nd and BFB inside
The brigade immediately began rapid decision Razish to allow our brigade to seize the city. Joint
and synchronization planning to reassess our plan precision strikes from Multiple Launch Rocket
to provide better Fires in support of combined Systems and close air support (CAS), precision,
arms maneuver. Our commander’s guidance, great and high explosive rounds from our organic
to begin with (and one I did not initially assets were the weapons of choice.
adhere to), was to provide
neutralization and
2022 Issue 3 • 15
EFST 2 (supporting our deep fight): Destroy plan was fairly robust (love this word, hard
80th DTG assets in the deep area to enable our to definitively define what robust means, but
brigade to seize Razish. Our priority of effort for we all like to use it), with layered observation
this EFST was using Joint assets to neutralize fire posts, information surveillance reconnaissance
support and air defense artillery (ADA) systems (ISR), and other information collection assets.
and then destroy the reserve force from the 803rd. Fire support teams rehearsed triggers with their
maneuver counterparts to synchronize the FS
EFST 3 (supporting the second phase of the plan. We identified friction to better mitigate
close fight): Provide suppression and obscuration risk, synchronized fire support with the maneuver
(SO) --I like to call these SO drills-- to allow plan and provided a much better understanding
1-80th IN to breach the obstacle belt and allow of the fight ahead than we had a day or so ago.
the assault force to seize Razish. By the end of D+5, we felt better prepared to
Figure one depicts the FS plan with associated seize Razish and were ready to immediately go
EFSTs. Our plan included group targets within back on the offensive.
Razish. The intent was to execute at any time to
disrupt the enemy and neutralize known strong At 1800, D+5, our Cavalry Squadron,
points, command and control (C2) nodes, or 3-13th Cavalry (CAV), departed to begin zone
anything that presented itself as a valid military reconnaissance west towards the Iron Triangle.
target. We delineated our close and deep fight Their tasks were to identify and destroy enemy
by a set of phase lines that provided a very recon in zone and identify points of penetration
permissive Joint Fires fight. The observation to allow our brigade to seize Razish. Seconds after
the CAV departed, the sky lit up with cannon and of Razish. They encountered stiff resistance
rocket fire as the initial volley of precision strike as they entered the John Wayne Pass (now
artillery shells and rockets began to neutralize that I think about it, that’s why it’s probably
defensive positions and C2 nodes in Razish, while named JWP, for the pass’ toughness), but the
CAS provided devastating effects by neutralizing 802nd was eventually neutralized through the
air defense threats and 80th DTG Field Artillery application of mortars, artillery, and direct fire
assets in the deep area. This initial barrage in systems. After several hours of tough fighting,
the city was observed by aerial ISR assets to the 1-80th IN began their breach with our Field
ensure we were meeting our objectives established Artillery battalion suppressing targets while
in our plan and refined through our targeting smoke obscured the defending forces from our
process. Fire support teams infiltrated their OPs breaching force. Mortars joined the fight providing
throughout the night to establish our layered significant effects on dynamic targets within
observation plan and provide an additional layer the city and its surrounding environs. The dull
of information collection throughout the seizure roar of aircraft could be heard in the distance,
of Razish. For the next 12 hours, we provided destroying the 803rd reinforcing elements. Once
constant pressure on the 802nd and BFB using breaching operations were complete, the 2-80th
illum rounds and group targets using HE rounds assaulted through the breach to seize Razish.
mixed with precision strikes. Joint assets in The combined efforts of Fires and maneuver
the deep area were used to attrite fire support over a 36-hour period proved to be too much for
and ADA threats in our deep area. The enemy the 802nd and BFB fighters within Razish. After
within the city was forced to cease defensive a successful breach and several hours of tough
preparations and constantly reposition forces to street-to-street fighting, the woeful defenders
survive the night. The strikes must have had a capitulated, and we officially seized the city.
huge psychological effect on the Donovians (my The captured 802nd BTG commander and his BFB
dog shakes and is scared after a firecracker goes counterpart were haggard and distraught. Their
off near the house). I can only imagine what the nerves were frazzled, and their willpower was
802nd and BFB felt like after 12 hours of constant broken (their words). The effects of the last 36
firing in and around Razish. hours of shelling and Joint strikes coupled with
rapid breaching efforts and the assault to seize
Our reconnaissance fight was tough but Razish the second time proved too much for
successful, identifying a point of penetration on the beleaguered commanders. The continuous
the south side of Razish, at the western end of and deleterious effects of Fires on C2 nodes and
the Hidden Valley. At times throughout the night, neutralizing strong points restricted movement
echelons above brigade assets were unavailable, within the city, hindering internal reinforcements,
meaning we had to rely solely on organic assets especially during intense periods of shaping
to manage the counterfire fight. Nevertheless, our efforts within Razish. Both commanders were
team was up for the challenge. Our mantra is “its unable to contact their higher headquarters to
professional courtesy for two opposing artillery gain situational understanding and awareness of
units to shoot at each other; otherwise, why play the 803rd reinforcements, which were completely
the game.” Using this mantra, we went to work destroyed by Joint assets as the reinforcements
targeting and executing a solid counterfire fight. attempted to maneuver to Razish from the Granite
To be fair, the counterfire fight was a little rough Pass and the Brown and Debnam Pass complex.
at first, but we quickly adapted our fire orders in
support of the seizure of Razish to enable better During a period of reflection after the seizure
survivability of our guns while maintaining our of Razish, I gathered my thoughts to assess what
desired effects and executing counterfire missions went well and what we could do better during
when division assets were unavailable. the next assault to seize the upcoming objective.
The following are key ingredients to improving
Present day (D+6): As the sun came up this Fires in urban terrain, and the close fight for
morning, and with the golden glow of Tiefort in that matter:
the distance, the 1-80th IN departed to maneuver
through the John Wayne Pass (cool name) to the 1. Have well-developed EFSTs based on
Hidden Valley (also aptly named) to eventually the commander’s intent for information
conduct breaching operations on the south side collection and Fires
2022 Issue 3 • 17
2. Develop a simple fire support and and space were especially fruitful, as we provided
observer plan multiple dilemmas against 80th DTG formations
3. Ensure the brigade combat team has (fire support and ADA, 802nd BTG, the BFB, the
well-developed common operating 803rd BTG reinforcements). A good FS plan coupled
graphics to rapidly synchronize assets with a well-understood sustainment plan allowed
4. Shape early and often us to maintain firing capability throughout our
5. Sustain effects--ensure processes are successful seizure of Razish.
in place to resupply big bullets and
repair broken equipment As we continue to press our advantage to expel
Donovian forces from Atropia, we must continue
First and foremost, commander’s guidance to provide constant pressure early and often for
and subsequent EFSTs are vitally important follow on objectives, provide Fires in support of
to visualize, describe and direct action. Our combined arms maneuver in the close fight while
first swag at the FS plan was atrocious, not simultaneously providing pressure in our deep
because it was overly complex, but because we area, and manage transitions over the coming days.
did not procedurally refine our plan through
targeting or rehearsals. The second go around LTC Derek R. Baird is Wolf 07, the National Training Center
senior Fires trainer. His former assignments include Commander of
was more refined, more flexible, and better
the 3-16th Field Artillery Regiment (FAR), Joint Fire Support Officer
understood across the brigade. Common operating for the 1st German-Netherlands Corps (a NATO Rapid Deployable
graphics provided shared understanding and Corps), 3rd Infantry Division Artillery S3, and the 1-9th FAR S3. LTC
synchronization across all echelons. Layered Joint Baird has three combat tours (two to Iraq and one to Afghanistan),
assets in concert with our organic assets in time and one Regionally Aligned Force deployment.

2022 Issue 3 • 19
U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to 12th Combat Aviation Brigade air drop M777A2 155 mm
howitzers with their CH-47 Chinook helicopters during sling load operations at a Lithuanian
military training area near the town of Rukla, Lithuania, June 13, 2018, during U.S. Army
Europe’s exercise Saber Strike 18. (U.S. Army photo by SSG Ricardo HernandezArocho)

The Need for
Delivery Systems
Within the
Division Artillery
By 1LT Caitlyn Casten
2022 Issue 3 • 21
I
n 2017 the U.S. Army announced a return to Historical evidence supports full-scale
large-scale combat operations (LSCO) with DIVARTYs; beginning in World War II, along with
the revision and republishing of FM 3-0. In the three 105 mm Howitzer battalions supporting
the foreword of this publication is the following their respective maneuver regiments, a 155 mm
statement, “The Army and Joint force must adapt Howitzer battalion provides general support
and prepare for large-scale combat operations to the division.4 This standard continued until
in highly contested, lethal environments where the Gulf War when the 155 mm battalion was
enemies employ long-range Fires and other augmented with a multiple launch rocket system
capabilities that rival or surpass our own.”1 The (MLRS) battery.5 The model throughout this 50-
re-emergence of LSCO also indicates a return to year period was to assign the DIVARTY the larger
the division as the main echelon on the battlefield, projectile, thereby giving it additional reach and
underscoring the need for a substantial division effects.
“To win in an LSCO environment, the DIVARTY

needs its own Field Artillery battalion.”
artillery (DIVARTY). Since the release of this The same 155 mm Howitzer that served the
FM 3-0, little has been accomplished to meet division in World War II and the Gulf War is
the intent of this outline, as units still lack the no longer effective for the division in today’s
means to operate long-range Fires against near- LSCO environment. The modern division area of
peer threats. operations (AO) averages 18 to 28 kilometers in
length, stretching the limits of the Army’s current
To win in an LSCO environment, the DIVARTY 155 mm Howitzer.6 The platform needed in the
needs its own Field Artillery battalion. The DIVARTY’s proposed artillery battalion is the
DIVARTY currently possesses command and extended range cannon artillery (ERCA) system
control capabilities and a target acquisition which boasts a 70-kilometer range and can easily
platoon but lacks the ability to organically deliver cover the entire division AO.7 The ERCA operates
Fires.2 on the same chassis and functions similarly to
the M109 Paladin, which is currently in service
Outfitted with a robust staff and targeting at the BCT level, allowing for minimal transition
section, the DIVARTY can operate its indirect for Soldiers who would control the new system.8
assets but currently only receives temporary The ERCA is priced at $6 million, which makes
control over attached forces.3 The ability of the it more economically feasible than the Precision
DIVARTY to deliver Fires organically will allow Strike Missile at $23.9 million or the Long-Range
brigade combat teams (BCTs) to retain control of Hypersonic Weapon at $106 million.9
their own artillery assets while simultaneously
allowing the DIVARTY to shape the division fight. The return to near-peer conflict will require

the ability to outmaneuver and outshoot enemy (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the
forces. However, many adversaries already possess Army, October 12, 2017), 1-2.
indirect fire capabilities in greater quantities than 3 Ibid., 1-13.
4 William G. Dennis, “U.S. and German Field
U.S. formations. Chinese doctrine states that
Artillery in World War II: A Comparison,” Army
artillery brigades contain both MLRS and self-
Historical Foundation, accessed June 3, 2022,
propelled cannon artillery battalions to be utilized https://armyhistory.org/u-s-and-german-
at the division level.10 Placing a battalion of ERCAs field-artillery-in-world-war-ii-a-comparison/.
at the DIVARTY level evens the playing field. By 5 MAJ Robert Wright Jr., 1LT Cliff Lippard,
adding a cannon battalion to the division, the Rex Boggs, “Air Assault in the Gulf,” U.S.
Army will balance the force structure between Army Center of Military History, June 5, 1991,
U.S. formations and its adversaries and gain the https://history.army.mil /documents/swa/
ability to mass Fires on the enemy. dsit/peay.htm.
6 U.S. Department of the Army, Armies, Corps,
and Division Operations, Field Manual 3-94
The U.S. Army must be ready to fight in a new
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the
era of conflict with adversarial assets that contest
Army, July 23, 2021), C-11.
those currently in the American inventory. The 7 Hal Foster, “Exercise Illustrates NATO’s
first measure is to strengthen the division’s Long-Range Fires Problem,” National
capability and provide the commander with an Defense, January 4, 2019, https://
organic artillery battalion to directly support www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/
mission accomplishment. In order to provide the articles/2019/1/4/exercise-illustrates-natos-
division commander parity with threat abilities, long-range-fires-problem.
the ERCA should be selected as the platform 8 Timothy Rider, “Extended Range Cannon
to serve the division. The ERCA contains the Artillery system demonstrates rapid-
fire precision and lethality during Project
maneuverability, speed, and range to compete
Convergence 2021,” U.S. Army, March 3, 2022,
with global threats.
https://www.army.mil/article/254439/
extended_range _cannon_artillery_system_
First Lieutenant Caitlyn Casten is a graduate of the Virginia
demonstrates_rapid_fire_precision_and_
Military Institute and has spent the past four years as a company
fire support officer, platoon leader, and assistant operations officer lethality_during_project_convergence_2021.
in 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division. Casten is a recent graduate of 9 Andrew Feickert, “U.S. Army Long-Range
the Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course and is now assigned to Precision Fires: Background and Issues for
the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade at Fort Benning, Georgia. Congress,” Congressional Research Service,
March 16, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.
Endnotes gov/product/pdf/R/R46721.
10 U.S. Department of the Army, Chinese
1 U.S. Department of the Army, Operations, Field Tactics, Army Techniques Publication 7-100.3
Manual 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the
of the Army, December 6, 2017), i. Army, August 9, 2021), 2-10.
2 U.S. Department of the Army, Division Artillery
Operations and Fire Support for the Division,
Army Techniques Publication 3-09.90
2022 Issue 3 • 23
2022 Issue 3 • 25
2-11th Field Artillery Table XV. (Photo by 1LT David Block, 25th Infantry Division)
2022 Issue 3 • 27
The Ambiguity of
“Shaping Deep”
Rethinking the Concept
of Echeloned Deep Areas
in Large-Scale
Combat Operations
By MAJ Benjamin Franzosa

The concept of a deep area is not a useful construct for
arranging forces in large-scale combat operations.
Instead, shaping areas at echelon should be designated based
on the relevant activities and forces, mirroring the designation
of the strategic support/Joint security areas.
A
s the Army moves towards its 2028 concept, of referring to their contribution to the fight
with the division as the unit of action, it as simply “shaping deep to set conditions,”
is time to relook our current battlefield ignoring the specifics of how their echelon
framework.1 In the context of this force design, operates in large-scale combat operations. The
the concept of a “deep area” loses some of its current doctrinal diagrams do little to clarify
utility for arranging forces at echelon for large- this (Figure 1).3 Because of this ambiguity, the
scale combat operations. The current battlefield concept of a deep area is not a useful construct for
framework laid out in Field Manual 3-0 states that arranging forces in large-scale combat operations,
units at any echelon may establish a deep area to especially in the Army 2028 concept. In large-
facilitate shaping operations for their subordinate scale combat operations, the deep area only truly
units.2 However, referring to every echelon’s applies to one echelon, the division. Additionally,
shaping areas as a “deep area” and the operations deep areas above the division do not benefit
they conduct in those areas as “shaping” creates from a geographic distinction. Instead, shaping
the potential for miscommunication and lazy areas at echelon should be designated based on
staff work. Planners at echelon fall into the trap the relevant activities and forces, mirroring the
1 Combined Arms Center, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Way Point 2028/29: Context Briefing FDUs in Preparation
for TAA 25-29 Field Staffing (Fort Leavenworth, 10 August 2021), 4.
2 US Department of the Army, FM 3-0, Operations, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2017), 1-26.
FLOT
Deep area
Strategic Joint security Consolidation
support area area area FSCL
Close area
Support
(Intertheater) (Intertheater) area Maneuver Fires
BCT
Division
Corps
Theater army
Space, cyberspace, information
BCT brigade combat team

FLOT forward line of own troops
FSCL fire support coordination line
Figure 1: Current Army doctrine does not clearly delineate how units operate in echeloned deep areas in large-scale combat operations.
2022 Issue 3 • 29
FSCL
FLOT
Strategic Joint security Consolidation Joint shaping
support area area area Manuever Division area
area shaping
Support area
(Intertheater) (Intertheater) area (Intertheater)
BCT
Division
Corps
Theater Army
Space, Cyberspace, Information

Strategic shaping area
(Intertheater)
BCT brigade combat team
FLOT forward line of own troops
FSCL fire support coordination line
Figure 2: Designating areas for maneuver and shaping at echelon, based on the relevant activities and forces, clarifies the specifics of
operations within those areas.
designation of the strategic support/Joint security achieve the effects of a deep area at this echelon
areas. with other permissive fire control measures.6
While this applies currently in the Army’s BCT-
The application of deep areas does not centric configuration, it is undeniable in the
communicate a blanket concept to Army forces context of the Division Artillery as a formation
at echelon. In its truest construction, the deep force design update.7 Removing organic artillery
area only applies to one echelon, the division. battalions from the BCT means less utility for
Only divisions have a true deep area: an area a deep area at that echelon. Divisional control
beyond their subordinates’ assigned area of over Fires assets requires specific permissive
operations where they shape primarily with fire control measures to support the BCT with
internal assets.4 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) Fires, rather than a set BCT deep area. On the
and below generally do not designate a deep other hand, the Corps and above do not have
area.5 While they use internal Fires to shape geographically distinct deep areas. All Fires
in front of maneuver forces, these elements do forward of the Forward Support Coordination
not benefit in the same way as a division from Line (FSCL) are inherently Joint Fires.8 The Corps,
a designated deep area. BCTs and below benefit field army, and theater army are all employing
from maximizing maneuver space and can better the same type of assets across often overlapping
4 US Department of the Army, ATP 3-91, Division Operations, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September
2016), 6-8.
5 US Department of the Army, ATP 3-94.2, Deep Operations, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September
2016), 1-4.
6 US Department of the Army, FM 3-96, Brigade Combat Team, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January
2021), 2-26. US Department of the Army, ATP 3-94, Fire Support for the Brigade Combat Team, (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1 March 2016), 5-27.
7 Fires Center of Excellence, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, TAA 25-29 FDU – Division Artillery (DIVARTY) as
a Formation, (Fort Sill, 28 June 2021), 6.
8 US Department of the Army, FM 3-0, Operations, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2017), 1-3;
and US Department of the Army, ATP 3-94.2, Deep Operations, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September
2016), 2-10.

physical spaces.9 The differences in deep shaping What are the discrete actions that makeup what
at the Corps and above level are questions of we describe as shaping? The shaping that happens
authorities, not geography. at the BCT and below, division, corps and above
are so fundamentally different that referring to
Referring to the disparate geographic, temporal, these activities in the same way, creates confusion
and cognitive areas where Corps, field armies, and about the activities and forces that operate in
theater armies shape all as simply “deep” only deep areas at echelon. Referring to the areas that
causes confusion. In terms of Joint Fires, the the BCT, division, corps, field army, and theater
same assets deliver the same effects regardless conduct their shaping operations all as “deep”
of echelon. For lethal shaping above the division oversimplifies the activities and forces involved in
level, this primarily means fixed-wing aircraft.10 those operations and leads to miscommunication
The same aircraft prosecute targets throughout the and lazy staff work. Designating shaping areas
depth of a battlefield. Using aircraft in division and at echelon based on the relevant activities and
below shaping is a completely different process, forces, and mirroring the designation of the
using permissive fire control measures (i.e., blue strategic support/Joint security area, clarifies and
and purple kill boxes) to effect enemy forces.11 simplifies how we arrange forces in large-scale
The same concept holds true for non-lethal fixed- combat operations.
wing platforms. In both cases, the only difference
is the authorities associated with strikes, not the MAJ Benjamin Franzosa graduated from the Advanced Military
Studies Program. He served as the G5 maneuver planner, Division
geography of the battlefield. Additionally, theater
Tactical Command chief, and chief of plans for the 10th Mountain
army and above shaping activities, including Division (Light Infantry) at the time of writing this article. He
cyberspace, space, information, etc., do not have currently serves as the Operations Officer for the Fort Drum
a clear geographic boundary.12 The geographic Directorate of Emergency Services and S3 for the 91st Military
shaping areas labeled as “deep” at echelon as Police Battalion.
part of the Army’s operational framework does
not increase clarity, and is not the most useful
construct for arranging forces for large-scale
combat operations.
Instead, division should designate maneuver

space for BCTs, with permissive fire control
measures to echelon Fires. This makes the area
directly forwards of the maneuver space the
“division shaping area,” where the division does
traditional division-shaping activities with its
internal assets, primarily long-range Fires and
rotary-wing attack aviation. The area forwards of
the FSCL then becomes the “Joint Shaping Area.”
In the Joint Shaping Area, efforts are echeloned
by authorities instead of geography for employing
Joint Fires. This leaves inter-theater shaping
(cyberspace, space, information, etc.), which in
this proposed construct occurs in the “Strategic
Shaping Area.” Designating areas for maneuver
and shaping in this way clarifies the activities
and forces that operate within those areas.
9 US Department of the Army, ATP 3-94, Armies, Corps, and Division Operations, (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 23 July 2021), 2-29.
10 US Department of the Army, FM 3-94, Armies, Corps, and Division Operations, (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 23 July 2021), 4-15.
11 US Department of the Army, ATP 3-09.34, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Kill Box Planning and
Employment, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 18 June 2018), 11.
2022 Issue 3 • 31
The Devil is
in the Details:
Artillery Logistics
in Sustained
Large-Scale Combat
Operations
By CPT James Sides
Artwork by Vecteezy.com

P
aratroopers are known to be highly four days. Each echelon went through a non-
aggressive, fit, and confident. We live to stop Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)
conduct a night-time parachute assault iteration, including various orders, briefings,
deep behind enemy lines to seize a key piece and rehearsals, ultimately culminating with a
of terrain. Because of our confidence in these full brigade Combined Arms Rehearsal. As soon
attributes, we are comfortable with the ambiguity as complete, the Devils in Baggy Pants donned
of not knowing exactly what we are facing, parachutes and equipment, boarded awaiting
executing on the fly, and trusting the lowest- C-130 and C-17 aircraft, then conducted a
level paratrooper to get the job done on their brigade-level mass-tactical drop in the middle
own initiative. However, we are also notorious of the night. While it seemed hectic throughout
for not putting much into planning for anything the process, looking back at all we accomplished
after our initial Airborne Joint Forcible Entry in such a short time, it was impressive.
(AJFE), relying on a quick concept and intent and
aggressive execution. While this method has many The AJFE went smoothly, with the majority
advantages, it also comes with disadvantages, of objectives seized by “Little Groups of
some potentially resulting in high-level failure. Paratroopers” from the various battalions in rapid
This is particularly the case regarding artillery fashion. The Gun Devils of 3rd Battalion, 319th
logistics and our ability to provide the Fires Airborne Field Artillery Regiment (AFAR) dropped
required when needed. Following two significant two M119A3 Howitzers and one Q-50 radar
brigade-level training exercises, we realized not assembled gun crews by whoever got to either
only all of the above but that the lessons learned gun first, de-rigged the Howitzer platforms,
from these experiences could be of value not just and fired an immediate live mission within
to the Sky Soldiers and All-Americans but to the about 30 minutes of the first paratrooper exiting
Field Artillery as a whole. the aircraft. With initial objectives secured, the
brigade transitioned to defense, building its
In May 2019, the Devil Brigade (1st Brigade combat power over the next 24 hours via Air
Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division) conducted Lands and ground convoys. Everything was going
Operation Devil Storm II, an annual brigade-level smooth but generally in line with the norm for
training exercise. The operation began with an this exciting type of training. At some point,
alert notification, similar to that received on an we knew we would eventually get a follow-
Immediate Response Force (IRF) activation. This on mission. Still, unexpectedly, the division
alert assembled the brigade from around the headquarters gave the brigade an order to conduct
greater-Fort Bragg area and started our 96-hour a contested wet-gap crossing several kilometers
sequence. Within two hours, the brigade’s leaders away within about 24 hours. A day later, they
were in the division headquarters, receiving gave us another brigade-level mission, to seize a
the mission to conduct a brigade-level airborne key piece of terrain via air assault. By the end of
assault on a notional forward landing site. the roughly four-day exercise, the Devil Brigade
The brigade immediately went into an intense had crossed the entire length of the Fort Bragg
planning and preparation cycle over the next training area, mostly on foot.
Devil Storm II Wet-Gap Crossing. DZ live-fire exercise.
2022 Issue 3 • 33
As a new Battalion S4 for the 3-319th AFAR, at the same time. Naturally, those areas did
these two missions were eye-opening; much not receive the attention that a brigade-level
like the rest of the brigade, I was surprised by combat operation required, compared to the
the operational pace required over this distance dedicated planning and preparation given to the
compared to previous training. For the Gun Devils, initial operation. By the time we got to the TOC
in particular, we also realized that if these had to assist, it was too late to affect any changes
been real missions requiring actual ammunition, needed – the distro plan was already in motion,
we would not have been able to provide anywhere with insufficient quantities and timing to ensure
near the number of Fires needed to support the batteries were in position and ready to fire.
either subsequent phase of the operation. Were As a result, we did not have nearly enough high
this “the real thing,” both missions would likely explosives or smoke distributed forward to provide
have ended as catastrophic failures due to our adequate Suppress, Obscure, Secure, Reduce, and
inability to provide adequate Fires, resulting in Assault Fires. At most, all we could have provided
significant casualties sustained by our maneuver was a 5- to 10-minute smoke screen, with far
forces. Knowing that we were just weeks away more high-explosive rounds staged than were
from assuming the IRF mission, the gravity of needed for follow-on suppression missions or
this realization was shocking. other targets.
Because of this exceptional training To correct this issue before our upcoming
experience, we made several major changes in JRTC rotation, we decided to bring our TOC and
how we conducted logistics, beginning with ALOC together during operations, relying on an
staff realignment during field operations and extremely light Tactical Command Post (TAC)
creating planning products. These changes made when Command and Control needed to move
a significant impact, but when put into practice forward. The TOC and ALOC remained separate
during a subsequent Joint Readiness Training to minimize target signature but always co-
Center (JRTC) rotation, further changes were also located in the same position. This simple move
needed, particularly in coordination with higher enabled the Executive Officer (XO) and ALOC
echelons. With those final refinements captured, I staff to move to the plans area within the TOC
feel confident that the battalion was ready to meet upon receipt of an order, combining to make
the logistical demands of a sustained large-scale a complete staff and allowing for a full form
combat operations (LSCO) artillery fight. These of MDMP for every follow-on mission. It also
lessons are shared here in hopes that they can allowed our TAC to be light and move quickly,
be of equal value to any readers from the Field often undetected. In short, we could utilize the
Artillery force in the future – or at least new entire staff, dedicating nearly the same amount
battalion S4s. of effort for each follow-on mission as we did
the initial. As a result, paragraphs four and five
Staff realignment of the Operations Order received more than just
the usual minimal emphasis, receiving the same
Previously, our battalion Administration and
Logistics Operations Center (ALOC) had always
been located separately from our Tactical
Operations Center (TOC), sometimes even as far
away as the Brigade Support Area (BSA) on the
original drop zone. While easier to coordinate
with the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) from
this point, this virtually removed half of the staff
from operations. As a result, when the mission
came down to provide Fires in support of the wet-
gap crossing, the personnel, medical, signal, and
– most notably in this case – logistics planning
and coordination were all conducted by several
assistant S3s, junior captains, or lieutenants
tasked with running the current operations fight
Jump Fire Direction Center.

consists of each firing battery’s maximum load
capacity of Class V, available distribution assets,
and a by-hour sequence mirroring what is on
the FASM. Templated targets are aligned on this
time sequence with the appropriate fire order by
firing battery or platoon.
With the TOC and ALOC co-located, it was

easier to share necessary information between
the battalion Fire Direction Center and the
S4 to create this product, including the likely
demands of counter-fire operations or unplanned
targets. Based on these planned missions and
other predicted demands, we prepared crops
Paratroopers land on the HDPI.
with appropriate ammunition configurations,
attention as paragraphs two and three. This detail synchronizing travel time and movements to
could likely be the difference between success ensure it was delivered where needed at the right
and failure in a large or sustained artillery fight. time. The LARP also added the benefit of serving
as a historical document, showing what was fired
Logistics Artillery Readiness Plan throughout an operation, and presenting valuable
information to the Fire Support Coordinator
Most triggers to resupply developed by staff (FSCOORD) and the rest of the staff.
officers connect to using a Rearm, Refuel and
Resupply Point during movement or rely on Pre-configured loads
point-supply “tailgate” distribution after
arriving at their next firing point. However, this Devil Storm II demonstrated difficulty moving
often becomes reactionary, usually resupplying the correct ammunition across a wide support
with whatever is on hand rather than specific area. During the exercise, the battalion used
predicted requirements needed to meet planned “chit” cards internally to simulate the effect
missions. Further, when units train, ammunition of moving certain projectiles on a HEMTT Load
is frequently notional, so the various types of Handling System; however, this quickly proved
munitions magically appear when needed, and ineffective in simulating realistic ammunition
the staff is never stressed. In actual operations, simply due to cheating. Specifically, while we
however, when the mission demands a large attempted to work a resupply plan when the
volume of smoke, the mass quantities required mission came down, units still conducted dry-fire
are stockpiled miles away, requiring considerable missions regardless of the ammunition numbers
logistics coordination and effort to move them actually delivered. While doing so was necessary
forward for use. All this becomes even more so the fire supporters and gun crews could train,
complex when synchronizing this distribution this failed to stress the logistics systems. As a
with firing battery movement. In addition, once result, this critical aspect of artillery operations
a distro platoon offloads the ammunition, it is was never developed and strengthened. This is
too late to go back and correct, having grabbed undoubtedly a commonly overlooked or under-
the wrong propellant lot or forgotten fuzes of a emphasized point of emphasis in training across
specific type. the Army.
In trying to create a solution to this problem, However, the training did still demonstrate
my team realized that we already had the the need to deploy ammunition packages to the
product we needed. With slight modifications, we firing batteries swiftly and efficiently. Therefore,
converted the Fire Support Execution Matrix, and before our JRTC rotation, we established pre-
Field Artillery Support Matrix (FASM) templates configured load plans organized for each crop that
to create an as-detailed logistical planning matrix, we could call forward immediately based on the
using the easy-to-remember title of Logistics missions the LARP projected. Each package had
Artillery Readiness Plan (LARP). The LARP a specific designation for quick understanding.
2022 Issue 3 • 35
Package “Red,” for example, was prepared based across the sustainment Warfighting Function,
on a Unit Basic Load of 70% high explosive, and again, especially in the subsequent phases
20% smoke, and 10% illumination. In contrast, of the operation following the JFE. In our case,
package “Blue” was tailored for the defense, built, the Brigade Support Operations Officer (SPO)
and on standby days before the execution of even gave the S4 a predetermined number of crops
the AJFE for delivery upon completing the initial to prioritize upon establishing ground lines of
brigade objectives. Images were printed to put on communications just prior to H-Hour. While
each prepared crop rack to “dummy proof” what we fought it, ultimately, this was the extent of
load each contained. Altogether, these measures redistribution of ammunition post-JFE, resulting
proved effective in understanding ammunition in a window of 24 to 72 hours with only three
availability between operations and the ALOC, crops worth of ammunition planned for the entire
giving the Fire Direction Center a picture of what battalion. Within the first day, we were asking for
was available on the battlefield, and helping immediate resupply. As a result, we did not have
translate artillery to our sustainers. sufficient ammunition for the upcoming defense
against the inevitable counterattack. The Devil
Ammunition stockage Paratroopers did what they do best and successfully
denied the enemy a breakthrough. Still, it was
While the LARP proved an effective planning also the last time the observer-controllers allowed
tool, we learned during our subsequent experience us to streamline our ammunition distribution for
in the swamps of Fort Polk that the expenditure the remainder of the rotation.
rates required to have an effect on a target caused
an approximately three-fold increase in demand As the exercise continued, while the previous
for munitions. This severely strained our higher- lessons learned and applied following Devil Storm
echelon logistics systems, and our Ammunition II paid some dividends internally, ultimately,
Holding Area (AHA) was never able to build our failure to properly integrate with our higher
anywhere near appropriate stockage. As a result, headquarters in training beforehand almost
most ammunition was pushed out as soon as completely negated our progress. Specifically,
received, and usually as an emergency tailgate while our ammunition requests were what
resupply for the firing batteries. LARP called for exactly, often, our SPO simply
ordered the same types of ammunition from
While we dealt with the usual issues of resupply our initial loads. Other times, the CSSB grabbed
requests getting lost or the wrong munitions whatever rack of artillery ammunition was
being delivered, the bottom line is we needed most readily available, resulting in the wrong
a non-stop resupply “into the box” of thousands type of ammunition arriving at the AHA, if any
of rounds, building an ammunition stockpile arrived at all. Further, our brigade held logistics
that we could draw from whenever needed. The synchronization meetings approximately every
only way this would have been possible is for two to three days. This did not give us enough lead
ammunition requests to be started 72 hours prior time to correct any requests. Compounding the
to the start of the exercise and establishing close issue, it did not help that frequently the opposing
working relationships with our BSB and even force ambushed and destroyed CSSB convoys upon
directly with the supporting Combat Sustainment entering the box, significantly disrupting our
Support Battalion (CSSB), to include possibly resupply. This culminated in another shortage in
embedding an artillery liaison within each, as artillery ammunition prior to our brigade attack.
will be discussed below. Again, the second the Lastly, perhaps the most significant takeaway
rotation started, a non-stop stream of artillery was that we had never been stressed in previous
ammunition should have poured into the box until training with “real” logistics, and neither had our
the parking lot with all the concrete simulation higher echelons. Going into our JRTC rotation,
rounds was empty. we felt we had applied the correct systems from
our lessons learned; however, these were only
Artillery logistics at all echelons internal to our battalion and proved almost moot.
This failure is on us for not reaching out and
Finally, the stresses revealed by a combat integrating during training.
training center (CTC) rotation demonstrated the
importance of planning and shared understanding The sustainment community is in a struggle
to develop institutional knowledge on Class V fight. That thought alone – and what it will
(ammunition), not unlike the majority of the require to complete such requirements – should
Army with its various required knowledge base give leaders at all echelons pause as we reflect
and technical skills. In the Devil Brigade, 89Bs on how we train.
were undermanned, resulting in most Class
V operations or decisions primarily falling on I learned a significant amount from these
the brigade warrant officer. In JRTC, this often experiences; likewise, our battalion’s overall
resulted in our over-tasked sustainers using readiness improved considerably as a result. As
the default setting of “just order what we asked I talked with my Battalion XO before we each
for yesterday” regarding artillery ammunition departed to our different positions and new
resupply. Naturally, what arrived was usually assignments, our conversation drifted to these
not what we needed (once, we received a rack of experiences, reflecting on how important these
illumination rounds in lieu of the high-explosives lessons were. We realized that they would likely
needed), if anything arrived at all. disappear with us as we moved on, that it would
not take long before the Army is forced to train
The recommended solution is to embed these lessons all over again, at great expense
artillery liaisons within the Brigade SPO team and effort.
to help shape and assist in this process. Doing
so will give a point of contact for contact and Undoubtedly, many units already practice some
control to ensure sustainers receive the order and of the systems and methods mentioned above;
process the requested resupply. In the future, I hope that we were the only ones that needed
we plan to place our battalion ammunition NCO to learn these lessons the hard way and that
inside the brigade SPO shop to fill this role, everyone else is already ahead of where we were.
thereby giving the battalion this secondary line But if some may have these same issues, we hope
of communication and someone familiar with our experience captured the lessons learned. If
artillery ammunition. This liaison will also help nothing else, maybe it will give a new Battalion
manage the previously discussed ammunition XO or S4 something to think about as they prepare
stockage and pre-configuration in the BSA. for a similar training path.
Similarly, we recommend dedicating an Captain James Sides served as the Battalion S4 in 3-319th
AFAR, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division from
artillery liaison to the CSSB at wherever location
2019-2022. His tenure included one CTC rotation, one “Devil
they draw ammunition from for the same Storm” brigade-level AJFE, and a no-notice IRF activation and
reasons. This would allow the added benefit of deployment to Central Command Area of Responsibility in January
controlled distribution of appropriate propellant 2020. James subsequently served as a Battalion Fire Support Officer
lots to specific brigades, minimizing the need for 2-501st Parachute Infantry Regiment “Geronimo” within the
brigade, where he was part of the security force sent to Kabul Airport
for registration and predictive muzzle velocity during the final withdrawal from Afghanistan. He is currently the
variations and simplifying and enabling the commander of C Battery, 3-319th AFAR.
achievement of more accurate and lethal Fires.
Given a real-world operation, a CSSB will be
required to support more than one brigade at a
time. We recommend that a Division Artillery
cell is best to assume this role, especially during
CTC rotations.
Conclusion
My team and I were fortunate to have our roles

stressed during two exceptional training events
designed to do just that. We had our eyes opened
to the demands of what it would realistically take
to provide artillery support in real-world LSCO,
which invariably will include multiple follow-on
operations throughout the duration of a sustained
2022 Issue 3 • 37
T
his is a story I hardly might bring. Perhaps this article
ever share. One of those can share a little of the perspective
personal experiences from that I had to earn as they train and
combat that you are inwardly prepare today.
proud of but keep to yourself
over the years. Interestingly, as I graduated from the Officer’s
I have returned to Snow Hall and Basic Course, or OBC, in December
have seen the new lieutenants 2006, right at about the time the
and captains coming and going, second lieutenants currently in
young officers who I once was BOLC were mid-way through
just yesterday; this memory has kindergarten – that hurts to
come to mind quite a few times. realize… At this time, the Global
I guess it is just the thought of War on Terror was at its peak,
my naivety at the time and how dominating the news, politics, and
the experience detailed below was everyone’s thoughts across the
about to change me forever, both nation. The war was not going
personally and professionally, just well, casualties in Iraq were
a few months after leaving these shocking, and the Afghanistan
same classrooms. I am sharing this When the war was resurging.
because, like me years ago, this
next generation of artillerymen Call Comes Watching the war start as a
and women could be called into cadet, I was excited to finally be
By MAJ Rich Ingleby
combat tomorrow and what that out of school and ready to actually
SFC Matthew Kahler supervises and provides security for PFC Jonathan Ayers and PFC Adam Hamby while they emplace an M240 Machine Gun as part of
a fighting position in the mountains of Afghanistan’s Kunar Province, Oct. 23. The Soldiers are all from Chosen Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute
Infantry Regiment. (Courtesy Photo Defense Imagery Management Operations Center)

get out there and do my part. I had orders in mission coming down.” There was no gradual
hand to be a Fire Direction Officer (FDO) with the settling in for us; the Taliban wanted to test the
4-319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment, 173rd new unit right out the gate. With the previous unit
Airborne Brigade. While I was not particularly having departed on the same birds we had come
excited about being an FDO, I knew that the wait in on, my platoon fired its first combat mission
was not going to be long for my chance to deploy on its own within minutes of arriving. Training
once I signed in. was over.
I always had a strong work ethic growing up That entire summer, we fired virtually every
and assumed that if you spend the time doing day, usually multiple times. We had missions
something, you might as well go all in. I had a of all types – Sweep in Zone, Danger Close,
great section and was fortunate to get assigned to and Direct Fire, all of them against real enemy
some fantastic noncommissioned officers with the targets. A couple of times, we even adjusted three
same mindset. We trained hard and were generally simultaneous Fires for Effects (FFEs) on two guns
proficient after the roughly five months we had – with multiple adjustments on each target. We
to prepare before we departed. That said, we had to do it – and pulled it off – but fortunately,
probably were about as proficient as the average we never had to try to do four. We were on call
well-trained Fire Direction Center (FDC) section 24/7. So much so that once I heard the radio
out there. send a mission warning order in my sleep. I ran
to the FDC and got the platoon stood up for the
As part of “The Surge,” our brigade went call-for-fire about to come down, only to find
to plus up Afghanistan, meaning that my unit that no mission had ever been transmitted. My
was extremely fortunate as Redlegs to get to troopers, of course, gave me a hard time afterward
stay on our guns, while the majority of the for hearing things, but not too much – because
branch was primarily tasked with maneuver or of the amount we had been shooting, it was not
security missions in Iraq. We arrived in Regional a big surprise.
Command-East in May 2007 and immediately flew
out to Forward Operating Base (FOB) Blessing, Naturally, both gun crews and the FDC got
a small infantry battalion headquarters tucked extremely proficient. Being involved in combat
into the mountains along the Pakistani border operations, including being intimately involved
near the town of Nangalam. Below the walled-off when some of our paratroopers had been hurt
FOB was a helipad, and just beyond that, a small and killed, things got real for us – fast. A sense
compound surrounded by a berm and C-Wire, of urgency came over us, knowing that we could
with two M198 155 mm howitzers sitting inside not afford to waste a fraction of a second getting
of it. The 10th Mountain Division unit before the rounds out, so we trained and refined our
us had named it Firebase Sloan; that was to crew drills to perfect efficiency. Further, whenever
be our home for the majority of our 15-month there was a report of troops in contact, we stood
deployment. If you saw the documentary Restrepo, our guns up and told the Battalion (BN) Fire
this was the headquarters for Battle Company’s Support Officer (FSO) that we were ready – even
parent unit, the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute if no call-for-fire had been submitted for us, so
Infantry Regiment, The Rock. This particular story they knew we were there. This aggressiveness,
took place on the main mission seen in the film, plus our increased proficiency, quickly earned us
during Battle Company’s exfiltration and right after an unequaled level of trust with the infantrymen
the camera crews departed. we supported –before long, every time they got
into a fight, one of the first things they did was
The Korengal Valley, a small offshoot a few call Bulls FDC.
kilometers to the southeast of the valley we
were in, was easily one of the hottest areas in Several months passed, constantly firing in
Afghanistan. And with the valley easily falling support of maneuver missions or in response to
within our range ring, our platoon was about to be enemy attacks. In early October, Rock decided
one of the highest-firing platoons – if not the – to do a clearing mission, air assaulting roughly
in both theaters of operation. In fact, my platoon four companies in the mountains above the
had not even had the chance to open their duffel Korengal Valley – again, one of the worst in all
bags after arriving when the radio squelched, “fire of Afghanistan – and then, in essence, walk down
2022 Issue 3 • 39
from the top of the mountains, inviting contact think much of it, and Battle continued their
and clearing the enemy as they went. They called movement down.
it Operation Rock Avalanche.
On the 25th, it seemed like it was all about over.
We spent the days prior in maneuver and We did receive a good amount of reports that the
fire support rehearsals, with Rock paratroopers Taliban was maneuvering to get into position
conducting constant PCCs and PCIs. We staged against Battle. This was nothing very unusual;
additional ammunition, gave the guns a little extra whenever our guys were out, there was always
maintenance, and ensured we had the Target List quite a bit of chatter, so we did not put too much
Worksheet and other products built and ready in thought into it and just continued to track their
all of our systems. I distinctly remember walking movement. On top of that, the terrain was rough,
back from the battalion with a steep hillside
headquarters late on dropping off to one
the night of October 18, side, so the reports did
2007, watching these not make much sense.
paratroopers all staged
and waiting to load onto Then the phone
waiting CH-47s to start rang. We had a VOIP
the mission that night. phone that connected
I had never sensed us to the Rock’s Tactical
anything like it before, Operations Center
but you could feel in the (TOC). Captain P., the
air that something big BN FSO, who we all
was happening. greatly respected and
even looked up to, was
The majority of on the other end. I
the mission went as will never forget what
shown in the film. We he said: “Rich, I need
shot a couple of times, twelve rounds of HE/
but it was relatively VT and WP/TI on this
quiet for us on the grid now.” I read back
gun line. For us, the the grid – loudly for my
whole operation was FDC to overhear – then
the same as any other just replied something
day. We just tracked like, “you got it sir,”
their movements and and hung up. Not a big
ensured our guns were deal – the guys were
on an azimuth in their probably in contact, but
direction. On October other than the call-for-
23, the mission had Firing high-angle in support of Rock Paratroopers from Firebase Sloan. fire coming in over the
generally ended, and all (Photo by MAJ Rich Ingleby) phone (versus the usual
the companies started a Internet Relay [mIRC]
two-day movement back to their various outposts. chat) and coming from the BN FSO himself, this
Assuming it was all over, the film crew boarded was pretty standard for one of our daily fire
Blackhawks and departed. missions. So not thinking much of it, roughly
about thirty seconds from me relaying that grid
As the Battle Company moved on October 24, they back to CPT P., the guns started thundering away
were attacked from what they called a “banday,” outside.
a sort of housing complex with a sizable number
of fighters located inside. They quickly called for I remember there being a longer than usual
our guns, and we shot over 30 rounds until one delay in waiting for feedback from the observers
round struck the structure perfectly, killing all the after sending “splash,” but we didn’t think much
fighters inside. It was a memorable engagement of that either. Maybe the mission was over, and
for us due to the unique target, but we did not they were taking their time sending End of Mission
(EOM). So we just waited. Eventually, we got a a big deal. A handful of minutes later, my team
“repeat” and sent another 12 high-angle rounds came back in, all extremely somber and wide-
into the air. A short time after, we received an eyed. Still thinking this was nothing out of the
“EOM” with the usual canned end-of-mission ordinary, I asked what was up, and they relayed
report across the mIRC, so we relayed to the gun what had just happened.
sections to stand down. Pretty standard.
From a short distance away, a large group
Then the phone rang, again with CPT P. on the of Taliban had ambushed Battle Company in a
other end. “Rich, I’m coming down. I need your classic L-Shaped ambush, mortally wounding the
whole platoon outside when I get there.” Not paratrooper walking point and killing the medic
Firebase Sloan and the helipad viewed from FOB Blessing. Just beyond the ridgeline in the center lies the Korengal Valley. (Photo by MAJ Rich Ingleby)
knowing what to think of this, I acknowledged nearby. As they engaged the company, pouring
and got the men standing by. I started to worry a massive amount of RPG and machine gun fire
that maybe we had hit some of the Battle guys or on the exposed men below, several fighters threw
something in that odd delay. a sort of lasso around the wounded point man,
SGT Joshua Brennan, and began dragging him
Battle Company was still out, so someone had to off. His team leader – we were told at the time
stay and watch the mIRC. I think we realized there this was SPC Hugo Mendoza, the medic who had
was something special about that mission at this been killed –had seen this and ran alone into the
point, so I stayed in the FDC while the guys went woods after them, driving them off and rescuing
out and got a pat on the back. Nice, but still not his severely injured squad member.
2022 Issue 3 • 41
Our artillery rounds had broken up the rest of the L-Shaped ambush and everything described
the ambush – the long side of the L on the elevated above, all less than 100 yards away from Battle
terrain off Battle Company’s flank – that odd delay Company troopers. When CPT P. first called, he
the result of the Forward Observer having to stay never told me it “danger close.” Whether out
squeezed against a rock until the last round finally of haste or deliberate, Battle was well within
splashed because they had us firing at “danger our Probable Error in Range at that distance.
close.” Apparently, during that pause, the BN And with such a large immediate Fire for Effect,
thought we had hit them too and were starting compounded even more by the call to use WP/
to get nervous in the TOC when the radio finally TI – which in those mountains usually required
came to life with, “it’s dead on, pour it on ‘em!” a Height of Burst correction – that was about as
(in Snow Hall terms, “repeat”). Standing there gutsy of a call-for-fire as it got.
outside the FDC bunker in the dark, the always-
solid CPT P. had broken down in tears as he told Without warning, that Forward Observer, then-
the story of what had just happened.1 SPC Roberto Sandifer, had been called on to plot a
perfect target location, all while cowering behind
Things changed a rock under intense
for me during enemy fire. No
that deployment; warning, no time to
in how I saw the think, double check
world, the war, etc. notes or stare at
More importantly, the target through
it changed how binoculars. Yet
I saw myself as his entire platoon
an artilleryman. depended on him
It changed how I for their lives. A half
understood our job of a second delay on
and what we are his part could have
here to do. I picked been the difference
the Field Artillery between a Taliban
because I thought fighter squeezing
shooting high off just one more
explosives from round and sending
a big cannon was a young paratrooper
awesome as hell, to Arlington under a
and because seeing Fire mission in action. White phosphorus bursting in the mountains to the
northwest of FOB Blessing. (Photo by MAJ Rich Ingleby) flag-draped coffin.
the crew drill in The slightest error
action was – and still is – one of the best things in direction or range could have just as easily
in the world to watch or be a part of. Nevertheless, sent our rounds on top of them with the same
I left the Pesh Valley – almost a year exactly result. Thankfully, SPC Sandifer had been ready
from when I left Snow Hall – with a completely the moment the call came.
different perspective on what it really means to
be an artilleryman. Moreover, while this shift I am proud to say that we were ready as well.
undoubtedly took place over the course of several Again, in our FDC, thirteen kilometers away, none
months, October 25, 2007, is the day that stands of us knew what was happening when the call
out most and probably solidified my view. came. It was the same fire mission as any other.
What we had done came out later, the full story
I did not know the entire story about what had even years later, after the specialist, who saved
happened until several years later when I ran into Brennan, then-SPC Salvatore Giunta, was awarded
the old Battle Company FSNCO. He told me about the Medal of Honor for what he did that day.2
1 This account differs slightly from what has been written about it today. At the time, details were unclear, and even
the above is clarified more today than what we were originally told had happened. The author tried to keep it as close
to what was originally understood immediately after it happened.
2 Awarded in November 2010, SSG Giunta became the first living recipient of the Medal of Honor since Vietnam.

My platoon understood that we had to ensure The bottom line, we have a special trust and
we were ready for every mission, that we could responsibility as artillerymen and women. No other
not allow any inefficiencies on our end, and branch has it. Yes, we have a “role” published in
that we had to give our preparation beforehand FM 3-09, but what we really do is bring our people
everything we possibly could – otherwise, that home. Our fires, both on offense and defense,
one-second delay on our part could result in an destroy the enemy so that they cannot kill or
American not coming home that night. We had wound one of the riflemen we see in the formations
to know deep down inside that we had done outside the barracks where we currently serve. Real
everything possible to ensure that delay never people. People that are prepared to go into harm’s
happened. Ultimately, the person responsible for way because our nation asked them to. And in
my platoon’s many cases,
timeliness our fires will
and accuracy be the only
was me. I thing that
knew I could allows them
not allow to return
the horrible when it is
result of any over.
one-second
delay on my You never
conscience, know when
something I this moment
would have arrives until
to carry after it is
for the rest over. When
of my life. it does, it
Fortunately, is too late
we realized to do more
this going training.
into the There is no
deployment switch to
and increas- flip to where
ingly over our suddenly you
first months, are perfectly
so we were spun up and
ready when ready. That all
the call came, has to be done
even though beforehand,
we did not right now.
realize it was Because, for
that call at the White phosphorus bursting during a fire mission in support of Battle Company somewhere in the all we know,
Korengal Valley. (Photo by MAJ Rich Ingleby)
time. As a we might be
result, I have sent to war
no doubts or regrets today. Neither does – or tomorrow – it is up to us as Redleg leaders to
should – any of my platoon. ensure our teams are ready now. When the call
comes, there is someone out there depending on it.
Again, I do not think I have ever fully shared
this story. I’m not sure I ever will again. But I leave MAJ Rich Ingleby is currently serving as the executive officer to
the Field Artillery Commandant at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. His desk
this here for the new officers currently walking
is located just down the hall from where he took his first gunnery
through Snow Hall or training with their sections. block of instruction a few years ago.
Hopefully, it will help them gain this perspective
faster than I did, without having to go through
the experiences I went through to gain it.
2022 Issue 3 • 43
Arctic Artillery:
Overcoming Mobility
Challenges
By MAJ Brian P. Bierwirth
F
ield Artillery units must be able to through Alaska, providing potential for direct
support maneuver forces wherever they confrontation between land forces.
operate. The U.S. Army Arctic units live
and execute operations in an austere and harsh Maneuverability in the Arctic is difficult. Contrary
environment, which requires different materiel to initial assumptions, the U.S. Army Arctic Strategy
and organizational solutions to remain an notes that maneuverability is often greatest in the
effective fighting force. To better enable the winter. However, the warmer summer months
Joint force in the Arctic, the U.S. Army should and thaws in the spring limit heavy vehicles’
invest in modifying existing Fires platforms in mobility due to melting snow and permafrost.
the 11th Airborne Division to enable the Joint force The Army currently stations an Infantry Brigade
to fight and win in a multi-domain environment Combat Team (Airborne), 1st Brigade Combat
in the Arctic region. Team, 11th Infantry Division (1/11th IBCT[A])
at Fort Wainwright, and an Airborne Infantry
Issue Brigade Combat Team (2/11th IBCT[A]) at Joint Base
Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER) as the only Arctic-
In January 2021, the U.S. Army released its positioned forces. Due to the weight of the Stryker
new Arctic Strategy, titled “Regaining Arctic in the previous configuration of 1/11th IBCT(A),
Dominance.”1 This strategy, along with the the U.S. Army also equipped both Alaska brigades
Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) “2019 Arctic with the M973 Small Unit Support Vehicle (SUSV)
Strategy,” highlights the growing importance and has also begun the process of procuring an
of the Arctic region.2 Climate change is currently updated, similar vehicle to the SUSV.5 The SUSV is
reducing the levels of Arctic Sea ice, opening reliable over all terrain types and has an amphibious
sea lines of communication and trade routes capability without any prior conversion. Due to the
previously limited to the summer months or amphibious capabilities of the vehicle, it is also in
routes that have been unavailable year-round.3 service in the U.S. Marine Corps. According to AFC
Both the DoD and the Army recognize that the Pam 71-20-2 “Army Futures Command Concept
growing importance and economic benefits of for Brigade Combat Team Cross-Domain Maneuver
the Arctic could lead to competition with both 2028,” the maneuver requires the support of Fires
Russia and China. Russia has also been building to be effective.6 As the Army looks to field these
its Arctic capabilities under the guise of defending light, maneuverable, and amphibious vehicles for
the Russian homeland. This would appear to maneuver forces, the associated Field Artillery
be in line with their large territorial claims to units in the Arctic must be able to match these
the Arctic Sea floor, which is estimated to have capabilities to provide close support to maneuver
approximately 35.7 trillion cubic meters of natural forces. Current towed artillery systems and their
gas.4 The Arctic geography also puts the United associated prime mover vehicles are ill-suited to
States in closer proximity to Russian territory keep pace with the SUSV.
Background: A gun crew from Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 8th Field Artillery Regiment sends a 155 mm howitzer round down range in the Yukon Training
Area, Alaska, March 7, 2018. The exercise, Automatic Big Rig, was part of the first gun raid in three years for the 2nd Battalion, 8th Field Artillery
Regiment, and was carried out in conjunction with helicopter support from the 1st Battalion, 52nd Aviation Regiment. The Field Artillery regiment is part
of the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division. (Army photo/John Pennell)

The U.S. Army requires long-range surface-to- use skis on CH-47s could be trialed to determine
surface Fires as part of the new Army Operating if they are sufficient for use on the X119. These
Concept, Multi-Domain Operations. U.S. Army Howitzers would be capable of being towed by
units must be able to “penetrate and disintegrate” the SUSV (or its replacement) and require an
enemy formations before an adversary can bring amphibious capability to maximize their use
their force to bear. As noted earlier, the Arctic with the SUSV. Much of the Howitzer consists of
climate and geography make the current planned hollow tubing, notably the trails. Testing should
use of High Mobility Artillery Rocket System be conducted on adding lightweight foams into
(HIMARS) vehicles impractical for the Arctic the trails and under the carriage, enabling the
environment. The Arctic regions suffer from poor Howitzer to float and meeting a cost-efficient
infrastructure such as roads and airports, the two buoyancy requirement. Such foams would also
primary ways in which HIMARS units travel at not add significantly to the weight when the
speed. Using HIMARS within the Arctic Multi- Howitzer and vehicle have to traverse snow or
Domain Task Force (MDTF) consequently ties that ice and requires no capabilities to be added or
MDTF to a fixed location, negating the ability of the removed depending on the environment. Since the
MDTF to execute survivability moves or to exploit Army has access to Arctic training areas in Alaska,
an opportunity on a pursuit. The vast distances in the units stationed at JBER and Fort Wainwright
the Arctic necessitate a long-range Fires system should be supported by Army Futures Command
that is all-weather capable, something the air with unit-based testing. This would encourage
component and (to a lesser degree) the maritime innovation and “buy-in” at the unit level while
component cannot provide as effectively. Air harnessing the experience and expertise of the
systems that deliver similar munitions do not have Soldiers who operate in the Arctic environment
the same endurance (even with aerial refueling) regularly.
to maintain the persistent coverage required. The
expensive costs, both monetarily and politically, While the author will freely stipulate he is not
of current naval cruise missiles also make use of an engineer, the basis of the technology required
those munitions prohibitive in competition against to implement this course of action is available
an adversary in the Arctic. today. The Army has helicopters stationed in
the Arctic with fitted skis capable of supporting
Recommended approach a vehicle dramatically heavier than a Howitzer.
While the Army does not currently use foam
A materiel solution would best enable the materials for buoyancy, the relative ease in
Army’s Arctic artillery capability. As mentioned modifying existing Howitzers can be done at
earlier, the main issue facing Arctic units is each unit location.
mobility. Being able to move rapidly about the
battlefield is essential to support maneuver forces. This conversion would also require an
Modifications to the M119A3 should be adopted organizational change based on the current
to facilitate better mobility for Arctic forces to structure of the BCT at Fort Wainwright and
achieve this aim. This would require divesting an airborne IBCT at JBER. Four batteries of
the current M777A2 Howitzers (three batteries M777A2 would have to be converted to an X119
at Fort Wainwright and one battery at JBER) in configuration. However, this could be executed
favor of the “Arctic” variant of the M119A3. This through a Force Design Update “junior,” as the
reconfiguration would also support the current MTOE strength of an M777A2 battery is 105
debate on whether a Stryker brigade is necessary personnel, while an M119A3 battery strength is
or appropriate in Alaska, as most of the assets 75 personnel.7 There would be no requirement
in a Stryker Brigade Combat Team are too heavy for additional MOS changes, and the resulting
to navigate softer terrain. decrease in overall manpower would enable Field
Artillery personnel to be shifted to support other
The “Arctic” variant of the M119A3 (referred to Army priorities.
as the X119 for simplicity) should have the option
of being fielded with skis in place of wheels and Downstream effects
be buoyant enough to overcome marshy, boggy, or
shallow water obstacles. The same ski equipment As mentioned above, this fielding of the X119
used by the aviation units stationed in Alaska that would necessitate an organizational change.
2022 Issue 3 • 45
Many of the same challenges faced in the Arctic as the ammunition is fixed (in that rounds and
environment are shared by those that operate charges come packaged together), lighter, and
in mountainous terrain. While the focus of the in the case of the IBCT, all of the same caliber.
X119 would be on the formations stationed in
Alaska, the 10th Mountain Division would also Due to the increased mobility of the X119,
be affected due to their designation as mountain the units would no longer have to look at doing
infantry. The overall impact on the organization dispersed operations due to road networks or
in terms of manpower is the same (in this case, air assaults. The organization would be able to
transitioning three M777A2 batteries to X119). move artillery units into positions where the
effects of all organic artillery systems can be
Doctrine would need to be revised for how to massed. Concerning multi-domain operations,
employ a new Arctic artillery formation. ATP removing the reliance on aviation to move artillery
3-90.97 “Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather assets frees up those aircraft to support other
Operations” would need to be amended to account missions where there is no viable alternative. It
for the new capabilities of the X119. While ATP also reduces the threat and effects of air defense
3-90.97 gives good planning considerations for artillery.
maneuverability and emplacement, it would need
to be updated to ensure that commanders and This change will be most evident in the brigades
staffs understand that the restrictive terrain of the stationed in Alaska. The overall structure of the
Arctic environment does not always necessitate brigades will remain the same, as each will
an air assault or dispersed operations.8 There retain its organic artillery battalion. However,
could also be an argument made that, based on the added mobility will enable the maneuver
the Army’s new Arctic Strategy, which bespoke forces to be better supported by artillery. This
doctrine for Arctic operations would be beneficial additional amphibious capability of the X119 also
to develop before the Arctic becoming a more will influence planning and operations at the 11th
geopolitically competitive space. This doctrine Airborne Division or a Joint task force commander.
would likely need to be developed in a combination The X119 and SUSV give the commander an
of the Centers of Excellence (CoE), with the additional method of conducting a forcible entry.
Fires CoE and Maneuver CoE collaborating to While not as capable as the vehicles typically
ensure mutual support. In a wider sense, the risks employed by the Marines, the mere capability
associated with removing the M777A2 capability introduces uncertainty for an adversary.
from both 1/11th IBCT(A) and 2/11th IBCT(A) reduce
the ability of those brigades to shape deeper into Concept of change
their area of operations.
The initial fielding and equipping of the X119
Operational concept will be less lengthy than more traditional materiel
solutions for the Army. This is mainly because only
The X119 would look similar to how current two brigades have an Arctic dedicated mission,
M119A3s are trained, employed, and fought. In with the 10th Mountain Division potentially being
the situations where marshy or snow conditions a secondary priority with their focus on high
are present, the X119 would be equipped with altitude, mountainous terrain environments.
skis instead of wheels and be towed not by a Additionally, as the X119 is still essentially
HMMWV but the SUSV. The foam materials a modified M119A3 with respect to mobility,
within the body of the Howitzers will enable additional training on the operation of the system
the SUSV to navigate the same terrain it could (except for driver’s training) is not required.
with its integral second compartment. Although
the overall firepower will have been reduced in One of the main friction points will be the
the two current Arctic formations, the X119 and changed structure of 1/11th IBCT(A), as under
SUSV will enable better mobility without reliance this proposal, the brigade will lose the range
on aviation assets or developed infrastructure. and destructive power of the M777A2. With the
This will enable more responsive Fires in support Army’s focus on long-range Fires and increased
of the Joint force and reduce the signatures lethality, the initial proposal to reduce the reach
associated with higher caliber artillery systems. of the brigade commander will likely be met
The logistic requirements are also streamlined with resistance. Although the operation at the
Howitzer level will remain the same, new tactics, modernization efforts must be applied equally
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) will take time across different Warfighting functions, with
to develop in order to ensure the Field Artillery special consideration given to the ability of Field
battalion, with the X119, can maneuver and be Artillery units to support their maneuver brethren.
more responsive to demonstrate the increased Enabling Army formations to operate effectively in
capability of the X119. an environment of growing importance requires
investment and attention now to maintain
The fielding of the X119 is designed for Army American dominance in the region.
units. However, due to its amphibious capability
and maneuverability with the SUSV, the U.S. MAJ Brian Bierwirth is currently the Brigade Fire Support Officer
for the 41st Field Artillery Brigade, Grafenwohr, Germany. He was
Marine Corps may also be interested in the X119
previously a U.S. Army Command and General Staff College student
system. This could cause the proposal for the X119 at Fort Leavenworth. Bierwirth has served in HIMARS, IBCT, and
to have to be routed above the Army Requirements Combat Aviation Brigade formations and was the Senior British
Oversight Council to the Joint Requirements Observer, Coach, and Trainer on exchange with the British Army,
Oversight Council, which could increase the time with responsibility for the certification of British Army airborne
formations and Royal Marine Commando formations. He has
it would take to get the system and capability experience operating and training with the Royal Marines in
fielded and to the force. Although the Marines northern Norway while evaluating the Royal Marines’ Future
are divesting their towed Howitzer systems in Commando Force. He holds a master’s degree in International
favor of rocket artillery, keeping the capability Relations- National Security Affairs through Troy University,
where his focus has been on Russia and security concerns in the
in units postured to support operations in the
Arctic and High North.
Arctic may bear further consideration.
Fielding the X119 would increase the mobility

of the Arctic brigades and provide a lower visual Endnotes
and logistical signal compared to the current
structures, thereby increasing survivability. The 1 Department of the Army, “Regaining Arctic
Dominance: The U.S. Army in the Arctic,”
materiel solution is modest in terms of cost, as
Chief of Staff Paper #3, (Washington D.C.,
modification of existing systems in the inventory
Department of the Army, 2021).
can be done instead of beginning the research and 2 Department of Defense, “Department of
development stage from the beginning. Defense Arctic Strategy,” Report to Congress,
(Washington D.C., Department of Defense,
Hasty solutions 2019).
3 Peter F. Johnston, “Arctic Energy Resources:
A solution that would begin to move in the Security and Environmental Implications,”
direction of the capability of the X119 would be Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 5-3, (Fall
fielding the M119A3 to the 1/11th IBCT(A) at Fort 2012), 14.
4 Johnston, “Arctic Energy Resources,” 16.
Wainwright. The M119A3 has increased mobility
5 Connie Lee, “Army Looks to Replace Cold
over the M777A2, and such fielding would enable
Weather Vehicle,” National Defense Magazine,
1/11th IBCT(A) to develop the required TTPs for the February 13, 2019, Accessed September 20,
X119 Howitzer to support maneuver formations. 2021, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.
This would also assist Army Futures Command in org/articles/2019/2/13/army-looks-to-
gaining data on how quickly the different training replace-cold-weather-vehicle.
and fielding times would look in preparation 6 Department of the Army, “Army Futures
for the X119 fielding. This could potentially Command Concept for Brigade Combat Team
demonstrate that while the amphibious nature Cross-Domain Maneuver: 2028,” Army Futures
of the X119 is a key system attribute, it may not Command Pamphlet 71-20-2, August 14, 2020,
65.
be a key performance parameter if the M119A3
7 Force Management System Website,
is sufficiently responsive and mobile to support
accessed September 28, 2021, https://
the BCT in an Arctic environment. fmsweb.army.mil.
8 Department of the Army, “Mountain Warfare
Conclusion and Cold Weather Operations,” ATP 3-90.97
(Washington D.C., Department of the Army,
The Army is already looking to expand 2016), 3-1.
its capabilities in the Arctic. However, these
2022 Issue 3 • 47
Bravo Battery, 2-4th Field Artillery Regiment M270A1 begins movement to the air land raid firing point to conduct a live-fire mission.

Operation Unlimited Reach:
The Lessons Learned from M270A1 Air Land Raid
By 1LT Kyle J. Walter, CW2 Cody R. Sorrell, CPT Austin J. Cibik, MAJ Joseph G. Jankovich
2022 Issue 3 • 49
Left: Bravo Battery, 2-4th Field Artillery Regiment M270A1 under the leadership of SSG Dela Cruz rehearses exfiltration upon arrival prior to the live
mission from Altus Air Force Base to Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Right: M270A1 launchers exfiltration C-17s following arrival at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.
A
s the Army returns focus to large-scale information from these meetings allowed units to
combat operations (LSCO), it is critical explain doctrinal requirements that could require
that all of the armed forces train as we changes to the mission requirements. These
would fight in LSCO. Understanding how different meetings were central in identifying requirements
military services operate and how their standard that impacted the key tasks needed to accomplish
operating procedures (SOPs) influence operations the mission.
is imperative to coordinating cohesive efforts. By
conducting unified action, we had the opportunity Missions with the greatest level of success
to identify the lessons learned and adapt them for are a result of good planning and placing the
future missions. right people in the right positions. Leaders met
for the air land raid to establish a realistic end
On May 26, 2022, the 2-4th Field Artillery state that the equipment’s capabilities could
Regiment (FAR) and the Air Force’s 97th Logistics meet. A lesson learned was to identify early on
Readiness Squadron (LRS) conducted an air land the essential personnel needed to conduct each
raid with two M270A1s Multiple Launch Rocket step of the planning process and introduce them
System (MLRS), a joint force mission usually to their counterparts who can leverage subject
reserved for M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket matter expertise. In doing so, this alleviated many
System (HIMARS). The air land raid simulated a problems in the top-down dissemination of tasks
raid mission conducted behind the forward line of and allowed for cross-talk between sections and the
own troops and would therefore require minimal units to facilitate more effective synchronization.
external support as outlined in ATP 3-09.60.
Two MLRS and two High Mobility Multipurpose While the 97th LRS had extensive experience
Wheeled Vehicles departed Altus Air Force Base, working on air land raids with HIMARS, the
Oklahoma, for Fort Sill, Oklahoma, via C-17s. tracked MLRS posed different problems. Joint
Once on Fort Sill, both MLRS acquired geospatial inspections proved to be a good learning experience
data and navigated to the firing point (FP) in highlighting the subject matter expertise of both
accordance with Fort Sill regulation. Within five units. Understanding the different requirements
minutes of arriving on the FP, both MLRS were needed to load the MLRS successfully onto a C17
ready to receive fire missions. The mission allotted was a task that none of the MLRS crews had
one pod of six M28A1 rockets. The MLRS fired experienced. The 2-4th FAR developed its air land
all six rockets and then proceeded back to the raid SOP in conjunction with the 97th LRS in order
aircraft, at which point the operation ended, and to utilize their expertise and create a product that
both units validated their command deployment can be disseminated to the other MLRS units in
discipline programs. the 75th Field Artillery Brigade.
Building mutual trust amongst the Army and Air The Field Artillery branch constantly
Force members was paramount to the mission’s revolutionizes how we destroy, neutralize, and
success. Utilizing monthly synchronization briefs suppress the enemy with indirect fire through
alternating between Fort Sill and Altus Airbase innovative ways. Long Range Precision Fires
allowed both units to lean on branch-specific (LRPF) have been the Army’s number one
knowledge and expertise. The dissemination of modernization priority since 2021. However, we

A 2-4th Field Artillery Regiment M270A1 conducts live fire at air
land raid destination firing point following download of C-17.
Read.
must shape the battlefield with equipment
on hand and with all services until new
Write.
rockets and artillery pieces are completely
fielded and supported in the DOTMLPF-P
processes. By training artillery units to
attack targets beyond the maximum range
of the weapon system, these units can
shape the battlefield to a greater extent
Photo-
and destroy, neutralize, or suppress the
enemy. The lessons learned from the air
land raid stress the importance of building
trust through constant communication
between the services and the importance
of determining equipment limitations.
MAJ Joseph Jankovich currently serves as the executive

officer of 2-4th FAR, 75th Field Artillery Brigade at Fort Sill,
Oklahoma. His previous assignments include S3, observer,
coach or trainer, battery commander, and fire support officer
during Operations Iraqi Freedom and New Dawn. He is an
undergraduate alumnus of George Mason University ROTC and
graph.
has master’s degrees from George Mason University, University
of Oklahoma, and the Command and General Staff College.
The
CPT Austin Cibik is currently serving as the assistant
operations officer in the 2-4th FAR, 75th Field Artillery Brigade FIELD ARTILLERY PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN
at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. His previous assignments include fire is the premier publication of the Field Artillery!
direction officer, fire support officer, targeting officer, and Stay informed and up-to-date on your profession.
battery executive officer. He was commissioned in 2017 through
the Northern Arizona University ROTC program. ACCELERATE YOUR CAREER
by staying informed, reading and writing for
CW2 Cody Sorrell was born in Fort Collins, Colorado, and a widely-distributed, official US Army publication!
grew up in Berwick, Maine. He enlisted in May of 2011 as a 13
Foxtrot and, in 2019, was selected to attend Warrant Officer
Take a great picture while out in the field?
Candidate School and later attended the Warrant Officer Basic
Course to become a 131A Field Artillery Technician. CW2 Sorrell LIKE TO SEE IT PUBLISHED
currently serves as the battalion targeting/intelligence officer in magazine-quality color? Submit your charts, photographs
for the 2-4th FA Battalion. and other support images with your article!
1LT Kyle Walter is currently serving with the 2nd Battalion, Consider adding PUBLISHED AUTHOR to your resume!
4th FAR as the battalion fire direction officer. His previous For submission deadlines and writing guidelines, contact
assignments include battery fire direction officer and executive FA PAO Judith Oman at: [email protected]
officer while serving at 2-2nd FAR. Walter has a master’s degree
in Human Systems Engineering from Arizona State University,
and commissioned through Officer Candidate School in 2019.
2022 Issue 3 • 51
The 2nd battalion, 2nd Field Artillery, came together to say goodbye to their Commander, LTC James O. Johnson, with a
ceremonial firing of his last round. (Photo by Edward Muñiz, Fort Sill Public Affairs Office)
The final 2022 submission deadline for the

Field Artillery Professional Bulletin:
Winter edition, Sep. 15
Submit your articles to: [email protected]
PIN: 212839-000

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2022, Issue 3

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

28 The Ambiguity of “Shaping Deep”:

2 • Field Artillery Professional Bulletin

There’s never been a better time to be a Redleg!

TEAM: Greetings from Blockhouse Signal Mountain and Fort Sill,

We never put Artillery in reserve. In order to get all our guns

The Field Artillery is growing and full of incredibly unique

There’s never been a better time to be a Redleg!

Please join me in welcoming our 56th Commandant and Chief of

I would like to remind our Artillerymen and women there are

-All Courses: In accordance with HQDA EXORD 153-22, classes

We are humbled to serve you and our Field Artillery community.

4 • Field Artillery Professional Bulletin

T November 17, 2022, is approaching, and

Knox told Washington he could transport Ticonderoga’s guns

Of course, Howe was not fully deterred from

On August 27, 1776, Howe successfully sent his

In the very first days of what became a long

The downsizing of the Army in the 1990s saw

1 Colonels Sean McFarland, Jeff Snow, and Michael

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The Fight for Razish:

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“To win in an LSCO environment, the DIVARTY

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28 • Field Artillery Professional Bulletin

Space, cyberspace, information

BCT brigade combat team

Space, Cyberspace, Information

30 • Field Artillery Professional Bulletin

Instead, division should designate maneuver

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Devil Storm II Wet-Gap Crossing. DZ live-fire exercise.

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With the TOC and ALOC co-located, it was

My team and I were fortunate to have our roles

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Fielding the X119 would increase the mobility

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MAJ Joseph Jankovich currently serves as the executive

The final 2022 submission deadline for the

Submit your articles to: [email protected]

52 • Field Artillery Professional Bulletin

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