Fires Bulletin Sep-Oct 2019

A joint publication for U.S. Artillery professionals September - October 2019
Achieving joint,
multinational
interoperability
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Headquarters,
http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin
Department of the Army. PB 644-19-5
• 1

3
domain operations
CONTENTS
Manuever Air and Missile Defense in multi- 32 The King of Battle and the defeat of the ISIS
Caliphate
Col. Gary Beard Lessons learned from Operation Inherent Resolve 18-19
Capt. Mathew J. Sullivan
6 Allied Fires training network 36 E-62 THAAD Soldiers return home after
Lt. Col. Matthew R. Arrol crucial role in FTG-11
1st Lt. Anthony Ross
10 5-7th ADA executes Panther Shield to 38 Firebase Saham
A day in the life of joint-artillerymen securing the Iraqi
evaluate total readiness border
1st Lt. Josef J. Danczuk Capt. Jason Welch
41 Lessons learned from CAESAR deployment
13 Globally integrated Fires in Iraq
Capt. Natasha Fultz-Castro Col. Olivier Fort
45 Theater Security Cooperation Week
Patriot battalion forges bonds with UAE air defenders
14 Innovative thinking
Looking behind to look ahead 1st Lt. Jessica Beatty
Maj. Timothy Heck
47 Multinational Fires in a multi-domain
18 Warfighter 19.2 environment
Targeting in America’s tank division JAGIC chief in Joint Warfighting Assessment 19
Maj. Joshua Herzog and Chief Warrant Officer 4 Steven Lt. Col. Nicolas Konieczny
Fernandez
51 Bold developments in the Field Artillery
Why Exercise Dynamic Front (DF) and Artillery Systems
23 The fire support dilemma in cavalry and Cooperation Activities (ASCA) matter!
armor units Robert Keith Gunther
‘A way’ to conduct company-level fire support without
forward observers 59 Toward understanding Fires on near-peer
Capt. Ellen Loran battlefield
26 Aggressive counterfire with ground moving Steven Yeadon
target indicator in large-scale combat 64 FA hosts ADA at Redleg CTE for first time
operations By Mitch Meador
Chief Warrant Officer 2 Timothy J. Porritt and Maj. Calvin 67 AMCOM’s display Patriot relocates to home
P. Roe II of Air Defense Artillery
28 Kasserine Pass lessons for the reemergence By Gina Baltrusch
of SHORAD 68 In the next issue of Fires
Capt. Joshua Urness and Capt. Abigail Carter
Editor: Jamie Southerland unsolicited material. By order of Mark A. standing of the power, limitations and
Art Director: Rick Paape, Jr. Milley, General, United States Army, Chief application of joint Fires, both lethal and
Assistant Art Direction: Judy Oman of Staff. Official: nonlethal; fosters joint Fires interdepen-
Assistant Editor: Monica Wood dency among the armed services; and
The Fires staff can be reached by
promotes the understanding of and in-
email at usarmy.sill.fcoe.mbx.fires-bul-
teroperability between the branches, all of
[email protected] or by phone at Gerald B. O’Keefe
(580) 442-5121. Administrative Assistant to the which contribute to the good of the Army,
Disclaimer Secretary of the Army, Auth. 1513304 joint and combined forces and our nation.
Fires, a professional bulletin, is pub- Fires is pleased to grant permission to re-
lished bimonthly by Headquarters, De- print; please credit Fires, the author(s) and
partment of the Army under the auspices photographers.
of the Fires Center of Excellence, 455 Mc- Wilson A. Shoffner Cover: Staff Sgt. Brandon Laureano, a
Nair Ave., Fort Sill, OK 73503. The views Major General, United States Army launcher chief assigned to 1st Battalion, 14th
expressed within are those of the authors Commanding General, Fort Sill, Okla. Field Artillery Brigade, 75th Field Artillery
and not the Department of Defense or its Purpose
Brigade, Fort Sill, Okla., ground guides an
elements. The content contained within Originally founded as the Field Artil-
M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Sys-
Fires does not necessarily reflect the U.S. lery Journal, Fires serves as a forum for
Army’s position or supercede information the discussions of all Fires professionals, tem (HIMARS) after being flown in by an Air
in other official publications. Use of new Active, Reserves and National Guard; dis- Force C-130J Super Hercules during Operation
items constitutes neither affirmation of seminates professional knowledge about Phantom Flight in Fort Chaffee, Ark., on April
their accuracy nor product endorsements. progress, development and best use in 12, 2019. (Sgt. Dustin D. Biven/75th Field Ar-
Fires assumes no responsibility for any campaigns; cultivates a common under- tillery Brigade)
2 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

Maneuver Air and Missile Defense
in multi-domain operations
By Col. Gary Beard
“The AMD force of 2028 must be many things such as agile, rapidly tailorable, scalable
and able to fight multiple, complex and integrated attacks. To achieve that, we have to
optimize our formations to see a mix of capabilities, integrated at all echelons.”
—Lt. Gen. James Dickinson at an Association of the United, States Army professional development forum1
Current and future capabilities as a means of defeat- complex anti-access/area denial

capabilities required ing enemy air threats. In addition (A2/AD) environment necessitate
to OCA, the U.S. has heavily in- maneuver SHORAD forces with
Joint Publication 3.0, Joint Op- vested in cyberspace operations the ability to operate in coordi-
erations, defines the purpose of as a means of disrupting ene- nation with adjacent AMD forces.
AMD forces as: my communications, command However, forces must also protect
Countering Air and Missile and control networks and even associated maneuver forces if re-
Threats...integrates offensive launch commands from control quired to operate independently
and defensive operations stations to platforms. These ca- due to a communications-denied
and capabilities to attain and pabilities could stop a platform environment.3
maintain a desired degree from launching, negating the fu-
of air superiority and force ture need to deal with a threat as Interoperability and data
protection. These operations it never becomes active. Attack sharing
are planned to destroy or operations further nest with ac-
negate enemy manned and tions before launch, seeking to AMD forces must effectively
unmanned aircraft and mis- destroy enemy systems capable share information across the force
siles, both before and after of launching air threats, such as and with coalition and allied part-
launch.2 missile launchers and unmanned ners. No force is capable of fully
This definition shows air and aircraft systems ground stations, defending the large battlefields
missile defense (AMD) takes mul- which would impact U.S. and al- U.S. forces will compete on in the
tiple forms and is required to lied forces. Once the threat is air- future. As such, the ability to share
protect against all air threats an borne, active defense provides fire control data in a net-centric
adversary can direct against the the greatest likelihood of defeat- environment is critical to protect-
joint force. The evolving threat ing the threat. DCA and ground- ing the joint force. This requires
requires the Army to reverse the based air defense seek to destroy SHORAD forces to possess the ro-
elimination of maneuver short a threat platform, optimally prior bust communications necessary
range air defense (SHORAD). It is to the threat impacting U.S. forc- to send and receive early warning
critical that integration take mul- es. and identification information.
tiple forms, both technically and Maneuver AMD forces must Only by effectively sharing all in-
doctrinally. The U.S. Army must possess the tools required to per- formation about threats can the
make use of the traditional pillars form the full engagement se- force take coordinated action to
of active defense, passive defense quence: detection, identification enhance protection.
and attack operations to ensure and engagement. This is support- That ability to share data must
protection for maneuver forces, ed by a robust communications also take place within the contest-
concepts that directly apply to and data-sharing structure that ed environment likely to exist in
current multi-domain battle doc- enables the exchange of informa- the future. A significant aspect of
trine. tion required to ensure accurate A2/AD operations requires the
Effective AMD requires both target detection, rapid correla- adversary to impact information
pre- and post-launch activities tion of detected targets, identifi- sharing and decision-making
to defeat enemy air threats. U.S. cation and threat decision made processes. While the ongoing de-
and allied forces possess signifi- by an appropriate leader and velopment of the Integrated Air
cant offensive counter air (OCA) engagement by a designated de- and Missile Defense Battle Com-
and defensive counter air (DCA) feat mechanism. Operations in a mand System (IBCS) is an im-
1 Jason Cutshaw, “Army’s Senior Air Defender Talks Future of Air, Missile Defense,” Army Online, 22 Mar 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/219177/armys_senior_air_defender_talks_fu-
ture_of_air_missile_defense (Accessed 31 Mar 2019).
2 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 Jan 2017), III-26, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/
jp3_0_20170117.pdf (Accessed 19 Nov 2017).
3 Tyler Rogoway, “America’s Startling Short Range Air Defense Gap and How to Close it Fast,” http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/13284/americas-gaping-short-range-air-defense-gap-
and-why-it-has-to-be-closed-immediately (Accessed 2 Nov 2017).
http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 3
portant part of integrating AMD ability to operate alongside allies ighting and enhance integration
systems into the joint force, it is and partners; and that only hap- between multinational forces.6
more important for the maneu- pens with integration.4
ver forces likely to be the target Integration of maneuver Contribution beyond AMD
of disruption attempts to share SHORAD forces into U.S./joint/
information across the depth and partner forces is about much more Rossi’s comments regarding
width of the battlefield. than the technological capability speed and integration demon-
Technical interoperability be- of passing data. True integration strate that maneuver SHORAD
tween forces is necessary on the requires complete involvement units must do more than “just” be
modern battlefield. Many of the in the battlespace, including plan- AMD experts. To maximize their
platforms the joint force relies on ning, entry, logistics, communi- contribution to the maneuver
require tremendous amounts of cations, command and control fight, they must do far more than
external data to effectively oper- and operations. That integration defeat air threats. Prior to 2006
ate. The need to share real-time requires relationships developed when the last divisional SHORAD
data across the battlefield is cru- prior to mission execution and units were inactivated, SHORAD
cial for the success of AMD forces the development of tactics, tech- units routinely operated along-
given the speed of targets and the niques and procedures that facil- side their maneuver counterparts.
risk if information is not shared itates SHORAD forces again be- Whether direct force-on-force
both vertically and horizontally. coming a part of the combined operations, security missions or
Establishing such a robust com- arms team. training foreign military forces,
munications package requires Maj. Gen. John Rossi, then-com- SHORAD units demonstrated
integration and interoperabili- manding general of the Fires Cen- proficiency on a variety of mis-
ty, both internal and external to ter of Excellence, clearly stated sions that went beyond protection
the organization. Having outside maneuver forces did not want “an from air threats.7
assets available, including the air defense battalion dragging be- Earning the confidence and
support provided by theater and hind, slowing it down with thin- trust of the maneuver com-
division communications organi- skinned vehicles.”5 While maneu- mander that owns a battlespace
zations, to ease that data sharing ver forces focus on forced entry is only achieved through interac-
burden improves the ability of and rapidly transition, SHORAD tion, integration and repetition.
the force to establish the redun- forces must be fully integrated A maneuver commander always
dant communications means that enablers to those roles. The ar- looks to maximize the ability to
protect the network, and the data ray of platforms under evaluation influence the enemy; the addi-
resident in it. It is critical this inte- for addition to the Army make tional force structure of a robust
gration occur at the lowest eche- it clear that full integration with SHORAD capability provides a
lon possible to ensure integration the scheme of maneuver and the boost to the combat power of
into the communications, ma- speed of maneuver is a factor. a BCT. If that combat power is
neuver, protection and logistics AMD forces also provide key planned for, employed and exe-
plan for maneuver brigade com- enablers to U.S. partners and al- cuted, SHORAD forces become a
bat team (BCT) operations. lies. The very strengths of inte- capability multiplier for the ma-
gration and data sharing provide neuver commander.
Integration with joint robust capabilities to partners
force/allies/partners and allies that otherwise might Research and development
not exist. The communications to meet future threats
The U.S. only fights effectively infrastructure brought to the bat-
while operating in a joint envi- tlefield by AMD forces provides a U.S. military forces cannot rely
ronment. Additionally, U.S. mili- significant boost to ally and part- on current capabilities to defeat
tary forces take great pride in only ner situational understanding. regional competitors, especially
fighting “away games,” necessitat- Additionally, U.S. forces have tre- in an A2/AD environment. On-
ing operations be executed out- mendous ongoing innovation and going development must provide
side the U.S. in order to minimize technological development in the a full range of technical solu-
disruptions to the national econo- AMD fight. These capabilities, tions to defeat air threats. As en-
my and keep conflict off American when shared with our allies and emy air threats increase in both
shores. Effectively fighting as part partners, enhance cooperation, quality and quantity, U.S. forces
of combined forces to achieve provide security, demonstrate must seek budget-informed solu-
military objectives requires the commitment to coalition warf- tions for detection, identification
4 Jim Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington, DC: The Defense Department, 19 Jan 2018), 7, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/
Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf,9 (Assessed 19 Jan 2018).
5 David Vergun, “Air, Missile Defense Effectiveness Transcends Materiel Solutions,” Army Online, 13 Feb 2015, https://www.army.mil/article/142901/air_missile_defense_effectiveness_tran-
scends_materiel_solutions (Accessed 10 Jan 2018).
6 Mattis, Summary of 2018 National Defense Strategy, 9.
7 Rick Starkey, “Divisional Air Defense Artillery Units Learn Keys to Survival and Victory in Iraq and Afghanistan,” , ADA Magazine, April-June 2005, 12-15, http://sill-www.army.mil/ada-on-
line/pb-44/_docs/2005/4-6/ADA_MAG%20April-June%202005.pdf (Accessed 19 Nov 2017) and Scott Dellinger, “Task Force 1-4: 1-4 ADA Soldiers Defend Baghdad International Airport,”
ADA Magazine, April-June 2005, 17-23, http://sill-www.army.mil/ada-online/pb-44/_docs/2005/4-6/ADA_MAG%20April-June%202005.pdf (Accessed 19 Nov 2017).

A Soldier from 5th Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, stands next to their Avenger Weapon System during
Shabla 19, a joint air defense live-fire exercise with short-range missiles at a range near Shabla, Bulgaria, June 11,
2019. (Capt. Aaron Smith/174th ADA BDE)
and engagement. Further devel- is only possible with a threat-ori- provides significant protection
opment for detection systems ented mix of detection and defeat for and enhancements to the en-
should include a wide array of mechanisms that puts the optimal tire joint force. Only by bringing
radar, acoustic, visual and elec- capability on target. together robust maneuver, Fires,
tromagnetic solutions. Only by protection, mobility, cyber/elec-
bringing in all potential detection Conclusion tronic warfare and all other ele-
methods, in a networked environments of U.S. military capability
ment, can detection thresholds The continually evolving abili- can we succeed on the modern
improve, providing the maneu- ties and organization of potential battlefield.
ver force with adequate protec- peer adversaries demonstrates Col. Gary Beard is a 1997 gradu-
tion. IBCS provides a powerful that they have studied the lessons ate of the U.S. Naval Academy and a
backbone for data exchange in of recent U.S.-joint force oper- career air defense artillery officer. He
a network-centric environment ations. The resulting growth of has served in a variety of SHORAD
of sensors, shooters and com- symmetric means to counter the and HIMAD formations, includ-
mand and control platforms. All technological advantages of the ing command of a separate Bradley
future systems must operate on U.S. have led to a challenging A2/ Stinger Fighting Vehicle battery and
this network to enhance detec- AD strategy. This strategy is sup- a Patriot battalion. He is a former
tion and engagement opportu- ported by a robust capability to OC at the National Training Center
nities. A holistic approach to de- hold the U.S. joint force and allies and was an Office of the Secretary
feat mechanisms is also required at risk from the air, a significant of Defense Joint Chiefs of Staff Army
for interceptors. All kinetic and threat the U.S. has not faced in re- staff intern. He is also a graduate of
non-kinetic defeat mechanisms cent memory. These threats must Georgetown University and the U.S.
must be considered, including be countered to allow U.S. ground Army War College. Beard assumed
high energy lasers, electromag- forces to execute operational and his current position as the TRADOC
netic weapons, high-power micro- tactical maneuver. The multi-do- Capability Manager-ADA Brigade in
wave options, missiles and guns. main battle construct supports July 2018.
Protection for maneuver forces AMD operations, which in turn
BY LT. COL. MATTHEW R. ARROL

With the Army’s renewed focus challenges in the current regional ing awareness of what is desirable
on Large Scale (Ground) Combat and global security picture. They and achievable), and define the
Operations (LSCO), the need for have watched, with growing con- requirements for integration and
digitally enabled responsive Fires cern, the resurgent threat posed interoperability; allowing for ex-
has never been more relevant. by Russia and recognize that the perimentation with solutions in a
Furthermore, history suggests possibility of LSCO against a peer relatively low-risk environment.
that, while the U.S. must remain competitor on the continent is Where Dynamic Front falls short,
capable of acting unilaterally in possible. Russian activities over is that it requires the Alliance to
LSCO, the likelihood of conduct- the last decade, punctuated by a assemble physically at a training
ing it without allies is extremely series of provocations including; site to accomplish its objectives,
remote. Based on this assump- the 2008 invasion of Georgia, the and thus, is very expensive both
tion, allied Fires integration is not 2014 annexation of Crimea, the financially, and in terms of time;
only desirable, but also necessary, 2015 intervention in Syria, the on- resources which could otherwise
and we should work toward opti- going support to separatists in the be dedicated toward moderniza-
mizing an approach to allied dig- Donbas and ‘grey-zone’ activity in tion or other collective training.
ital Fires training that ensures our the Baltics, as well as their numer- To maintain and accelerate the
readiness for collective defense. ous attempts to influence demo- momentum of allied digitiza-
While we have had some recent cratic elections world-wide, have tion and interoperability we will
successes in episodic training reinforced the need for readiness. need to normalize the inherent
events, this article will argue that In response, they have demon- benefits of that exercise into unit
it is time to augment the current strated their resolve through in- home station training for the par-
exercise-based approach with an vestment in high-end capabili- ticipants of all nations.
enduring digital Fires training ties like automated fire support To bridge this gap, nations in-
methodology that improves our and field artillery systems and vesting in their digital Fires enter-
current state of readiness and through increased participation prises could establish an endur-
promotes additional investment. in multinational exercises, most ing Allied Fires Training Network
An assessment of our approach notably from a Fires perspective, (AFTN), which would build on the
to digital training and readiness Dynamic Front, which has grown ‘Fires-focused’ success achieved
should begin with a review of in scope and complexity since through the episodic exer-
those factors that influence what is U.S. Army Europe introduced it cise-based approach, and normal-
collectively achievable. Generally, in 2016. ize it, greatly reducing the cost by
the development and effective- The benefit of the Dynamic allowing participants to remain
ness of allied digital Fires capabil- Front series is self-evident; it al- at home station while retaining
ity is bound by three factors. The lows fire supporters, across the much of the training benefit of
first factor is the commitment of Alliance and the Partnership for the collective exercise. Under the
individual nations to modernize Peace, the opportunity to focus umbrella of an AFTN, the collec-
and digitize their fire support en- on training the delivery of Fires tive strengths of the existing and
terprise. The second is the degree in a multinational context with- future allied virtual, constructive
of integration achieved national- out the need to meet the compet- and simulation capabilities could
ly both vertically with digital fire ing training priorities of the other be leveraged to improve the
support systems at each echelon, branches. From an automated fire practical skills of our Soldiers, as
and horizontally across the tech- support and fire control perspec- well as further the technical de-
nical systems of other warfight- tive, national participants (includ- velopment of our allies. Within
ing functions that provide coming the U.S.) get the opportunity this context, the AFTN is both a
manders with a fully automated to work through digital challeng- physical network and a cognitive
approach toward decision-makes and devise procedures and network, wherein subject mat-
ing. The final factor is the degree technical solutions without the ter expertise and Fires training
of technical interoperability that pressure to rush to less optimal knowledge are shared alongside
can be attained between the na- outcomes. Since its inception, firing data. While there are many
tions, opening the door for allies Dynamic Front has embodied possible applications for which
to leverage the capabilities of oth- that ideal of realistic Fires train- an AFTN could be employed,
ers. All three of these factors in- ing in Europe, and has been that there are three initial applica-
fluence and are in turn influenced influencer to drive change and tions which would significantly
by tough, realistic training which digital Fires development. From improve allied Fires readiness
builds and demonstrates readi- the standpoint of the constraints almost immediately and yield a
ness. on effectiveness described earli- long-lasting impact.
Fortunately, for our efforts in er, Dynamic Front offers an op- First, it could be used to build
Europe, our allies in NATO large- portunity for nations to “burden and sustain the training gains
ly share our desire for increased share” (increasing their willing- made in digital Fires interoper-
integration and acknowledge the ness to commit), observe (increas- ability during Dynamic Front
by leveraging one of the corner- Services for Time-Sensitive Tar- only by the level of ambition of
stones of those events, the Artil- geting, and the Air Integrated the signatories. Modern distrib-
lery Security Cooperative Agree- Command and Control System uted gaming technologies, such
ment (ASCA) protocol. ASCA has would be a force multiplier for as those found in most network
been an unqualified success by those forces who might be ex- enabled games, such as Fortnite,
any objective metric. As of Dy- pected to operate in a post Article create the opportunity for entire-
namic Front 19, the ASCA proto- 5 environment. This access would ly immersive experiences in ex-
col has demonstrated its ability further allow Army program pansive scenarios which can lay-
to pass critical mission data be- managers access to allied systems er complexity and allow our fire
tween signatory nations during to ensure that all future develop- support leaders to work distrib-
simulations, live environments, ment of U.S. systems were fully uted with their allies on a global
and distributed operations across interoperable with our partners. scale. It would further create the
Germany, Poland and Latvia. AS- Finally, the AFTN could im- opportunity for them to work col-
CA’s proven utility is borne out by prove access to joint Fires train- laboratively and simultaneously
the progressive expansion of sig- ing simulators increasing realism at echelon.
natory nations from the first Dy- and training opportunities for Having discussed some of the
namic Front to today. What ASCA U.S. and allied joint Fires observer benefits of this idea, as men-
lacks, is a permanent networked ( JFO) / joint terminal attack con- tioned, the conditions presently
presence to sustain training skills trollers based on FCoE accredited exist to put the Alliance on a path
and familiarize others beyond frameworks. JFO and joint fire towards implementation. First,
exercises. Within the AFTN, the support team simulation trainers there is a shared sense of urgen-
United States could link the Joint are continuing to evolve amongst cy, evidenced by expanded allied
Multinational Simulation Center, our allies and leverage realistic national defense spending in re-
in Grafenwoehr, Germany, with European environments in their sponse to Russian actions. Sec-
the Fires Centers of Excellence scenarios. Many of these newer ond, strategic leaders across the
of all signatory members to cre- simulators utilize the same tech- Alliance have recognized that we
ate the opportunity for live digital nology for their architecture as need to accelerate the speed of
sustainment training with allies those used by the United States, innovation, as evidenced by the
relying on the ASCA protocol. such as Virtual Battle Space Simu- establishment of Army Futures
This would be relatively easy to lation System, which would facili- Command and the increased
do since most of the signatories tate integration. Of note, the Ger- importance placed on experi-
(to include Germany, France, Ita- man Fires Center of Excellence mentation by Allied Command
ly, the United Kingdom, Denmark in Idar Oberstein, has recently Transformation. Third, in the
and the Netherlands) already have made significant gains in this last five years, we have already
digital training labs, with some area. In April 2019, the German witnessed an increasing trend to-
even used for the purposes of Schoolhouse in collaboration ward improving integration with,
on-site local area network -based with the private corporation ESG and among, our European allies.
ASCA training. Linking ASCA in unveiled a new joint fire support Evidence of this can be seen, not
steady-state training will reduce trainer, which focuses not only only in exercise participation and
the need for large-scale train- on individual skills but on collec- in ASCA proliferation, but also
ing events and will allow discreet tive joint fire support team skills. in the production of a whole se-
troubleshooting of the proto- This effort is an initiative taken ries of new NATO Allied Doctrine
col among nations for new and under the multilateral mandate (including revisions to Allied Ar-
emerging capabilities. A commit- established by a burden-sharing tillery Publications 1, 2, 3 and 5)
ment to link signatories may, in agreement known as the ‘Frame- aimed at procedural unification.
itself, act as an informal catalyst to work-Nation Cluster Joint Fires’ This trend is further exemplified
further promote ASCA amongst which centralizes multinational in the recent assignment of the
the remaining non-signatories Fires training resources, to in- first U.S. general officer into an
and encourage our allies to devel- clude instructors and facilities, at allied national formation (deputy
op their digital capabilities. a centralized location. If coupled commanding general, 3rd French
Second, an AFTN could open with ASCA-enabled fire direction Armored Division). Lastly, po-
NATO Fires web-based systems of and control systems, simulators tential contributors are already
record to the U.S. on an enduring like these on an AFTN could allow expanding their virtual, live, con-
basis, familiarizing U.S. Soldiers sensor-to-shooter linkage like that structive and gaming capabilities
with the protocol; a distinct ad- achieved in Dynamic Front in an independently; it only requires
vantage for those forces stationed entirely virtual environment. agreement and national will to
in, or designated for rotation to, Looking to the future, the have these systems grow together
Europe. The ability to train on opportunities for AFTN to im- instead of growing apart. These
systems like the Joint Targeting prove virtual, live and construc- conditions, while currently pres-
System, Flexible Advanced C2 tive training for Fires are limited ent, may not exist forever and the

Staff Sgt. Brandon Alborg, assigned to A Battery, 4th Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment, 173rd Air-
borne Brigade, inspects a high-explosive ammunition round for a M119 105 mm howitzer during exercise Dynamic
Front 19 at Torun, Poland, March 5, 2019. (Spc. Rolyn Kropf/U.S. Army)
further the Alliance grows from a that established agreed upon re- to training digital Fires would sig-
visible reminder of overt military quirements for future hardware nificantly enhance the ability of
provocations, the greater the like- and software upgrades to aid in the United States by, with, and
lihood that the current sense of product development. These re- through her allies, to fight and win
urgency will erode. If it does, the quirements could include speci- with responsive Fires in LSCO.
need for a low-cost alternative to fications for the layered develop- Lt. Col. Matthew Arrol is the Dep-
collective exercises will be more ment of cross domain solutions, uty Commanding Officer of the 19th
necessary than ever to retain the expansion and linkage of existing Battlefield Coordination Detachment
gains made over the last half de- fire support simulation software in Ramstein, Germany. He is a con-
cade. into ASCA-enabled fire direction/ tributing member of NATO’s Inte-
In conclusion, the U.S. has a fire control software, and ensur- grated Capabilities Group on Indirect
unique opportunity to lead the ing interoperability of scenarios Fire. He is a graduate of the Com-
Alliance into an enduring digital and exercise designs into a single mand and General Staff College. His
Fires training network. The first accessible database. Ultimately, civil schooling includes a Bachelor’s
step in this would be engaging the success of this venture would Degree in History and Political Sci-
key allied nations, multilateral- require a long-term managed ence from Michigan State University
ly, at the staff-to-staff level in the strategy that sought to connect and an MBA from Eastern Michigan
same manner that established the the distributed components of University. His previous assignments
general officer Military Person- the Allied Digital Fires structure include Battalion Operations Officer
nel Exchange Program, to work in a manner that promoted de- and Executive Officer, 3rd Battalion,
toward the integration of their velopment and integration, while 16th Field Artillery Regiment, prior
existing and developing simula- consistently and accurately repli- to which he was the G5 Fires Planner,
tions capabilities. One key aspect cating field conditions at reduced 1st Cavalry Division.
of this process would be to de- cost. The long-term benefits of
vise a collaborative ‘road-map’ adopting this enduring approach
Members of B Battery’s Quick Reaction Force (QRF) respond to a ground attack
from opposition force, played by D Battery (Markus Bach, Muna-Museum)

5-7th ADA
executes Panther
Shield to evaluate
total readiness
By 1st Lt. Josef J. Danczuk
During the month of March, tion of position crews, all equip- The battalion staff had to use cre-
U.S. Patriot forces returned to the ment mobility crews, missile ative techniques to continue the
Illesheim Training Area, near An- reload crews and air battle man- battalion’s mission despite the
sbach, Germany, for the first time agement scenarios. ever-changing ground situation,
in over eight years. The 5th Battal- As the Table VIII certifications complicated by “white-card” in-
ion, 7th Air Defense Artillery Reg- ended, the battalion transitioned jects that affected the battalion’s
iment deployed A and B Batteries, to the FTX portion of Panther operations. These situations test-
E Company and Headquarters Shield. This involved a dynamic ed the battalion on all levels, in-
and Headquarters Battery (HHB) and complex scenario in which cluding managing personnel and
for a three-week period. The goals the battalion was forward-de- casualties, providing religious
of the exercise were to complete ployed to provide AMD against a services, analyzing intelligence
Intermediate Gunnery Certifica- near-peer threat, while simultane- data and enemy actions, recom-
tions (Table VIII) for A and B Bat- ously defending themselves from mending adjustments to opera-
teries and then complete a battal- a hybrid insurgent ground force. tions, providing logistical support
ion field training exercise (FTX). D Battery served as the opposing and managing communications
The FTX evaluated the battalion’s force for the scenarios, conduct- systems to allow the battalion to
ability to execute sustained Air ing surveillance, probes and full- execute mission command.
and Missile Defense (AMD) oper- scale attacks against the battal- 1st Lt. Joseph Sierra, E Com-
ations against a near-peer adver- ion’s various locations. Key to the pany’s executive officer, served
sary in an austere environment. battalion’s training was a focus not as the battalion Quick Reaction
It served as the final training gate just on air defense training tasks, Force (QRF) officer in charge. In
prior to the battalion’s deploy- but many key movement and ma- addition to reacting to enemy ac-
ment to its external evaluation in neuver tasks. The training focus tions, his unit was still responsi-
Romania this summer. was on fundamentals of estab- ble for regular maintenance and
Throughout the first two weeks, lishing a deliberate defense, hasty logistics support requirements to
A and B Batteries conducted Ta- attack, route reconnaissance and allow the firing batteries to main-
ble VIII Gunnery Certifications, integration of aviation to support tain their AMD mission. “We were
validating their ability to rapidly the movements. tasked to maintain command post
deploy to a new location, secure This training not only validat- operations and logistics package
and establish the site and resume ed the battalion’s ability to defend missions while supporting QRF,”
AMD operations. This included their sites, but also to coordinate said Sierra on his Soldiers’ activ-
evaluation of the batteries’ recon- effectively between units using ities during the FTX. “They truly
naissance, selection and occupa- various communications services. enjoyed the experience since they
were doing something normally been a great experience, especial- ing exercise. The unique train-
out of their lane and having fun ly after some of us have attended ing opportunities with 1st CAB
while doing it.” the 14E and 14T classes in the fall allowed Soldiers from 5-7th ADA
In addition to the ground sce- of 2018,” said Sgt. 1st Class Simon to test their AMD skills and train
narios, 5-7th ADA had the op- Bjurgard of the Swedish 61st Air alongside Army aviation. Incor-
portunity to coordinate training Defense Battalion. “This visit pro- porating the Swedish observers
events with the 1st Combat Avi- vided a much-needed context to strengthened the connection be-
ation Brigade stationed around the things we were taught while in tween our two nations, estab-
Ansbach, Germany. Soldiers from the U.S. The visit included lots of lishing key relationships that will
A and B Batteries conducted ae- experiences and lessons learned help Sweden enhance the AMD
rial insertions and established which will help us in the process capabilities and better integrate
listening posts/observations post of moving forward as a future Pa- with allied systems in the future.
using UH-60 Blackhawk helicop- triot nation.” Panther Shield, however, was just
ters. During one of the ground Lt. Col. Magnus Stegmark, the precursor, as 5-7th ADA looks
attacks, friendly forces sustained 61st Air Defense Battalion com- forward to deploying again this
simulated casualties that required mander, had an opportunity to summer, this time involving the
immediate aero-medical evacu- shadow Lt. Col. Barry Carter, the entire battalion with split opera-
ation. HHB’s medics and Role 1 commander of 5-7th ADA, during tions between Astral Knight 19 in
Aid Station provided immediate the exercise. “From my behalf, Slovenia and Saber Guardian 19
care and ultimately evacuated the I see this as the starting point of in Romania.
casualties by UH-60 Blackhawks coming events which can be con- 1st Lt. Josef “Polo” Danczuk is a
to the proper medical facilities. ducted together,” Stegmark said. tactical director in Headquarters and
For air scenarios, AH-64 Apaches “Battalions meeting each other Headquarters Battery, 5-7th ADA,
serving as “Red Air” used terrain and exchanging experiences will stationed in Baumholder, Germany.
features around the ITA to try to be the foundation of building He is a graduate of the Patriot Top
avoid detection from the Patri- friendship.” Gun and Air Defense Artillery Fire
ot radars in order to attack them Overall, Exercise Panther Control Officer courses and previously
and their sites. Using the Live Shield allowed 5-7th ADA to exe- served as a platoon leader in A Bat-
Air Trainer software in the Pa- cute a wide range of operations, tery, 5-7th ADA.
triot system, the batteries, under from finalizing the battalion’s
the direction of the fire direction Intermediate Gunnery Certifica-
center, were able to detect, track, tions with A and B Batteries’ Table
engage and destroy the Red Air VIIIs, to the battalion field train-
Apaches, defending themselves
and their assigned assets. Final- A Guided Missile Transport reload crew from B Battery disconnects a training
ly, a CH-47 Chinook conduct- interceptor for offload from a launching station as part of their reload drill.
ed a reenlistment flight for eight (Markus Bach, Muna-Museum)
Soldiers from the battalion. Ulti-
mately, over 83 Soldiers from the
Panther Battalion were able to fly
in the Chinook as they trained hot
and cold load operations.
Partnered with 5-7th ADA were
eight members from the Swedish
Armed Forces’ Luftvärnsrege-
mentet (Air Defense Regiment)
as observers. Sweden has decided
to acquire the Patriot weapon sys-
tem and these observers received
a first-hand look at how the U.S.
employs the battalion, sustains
operations and conducts training
and certifications. Some members
of the observer team even had the
opportunity to fight an air battle
scenario and conduct emplace-
ment and prepare for movement
crew drills on a launching station.
“To get the opportunity to visit a
Patriot unit such as 5-7th ADA has

Globally integrated
Fires
By Capt. Natasha Fultz-Castro
(Judy Oman/FCoE CPG)
The 18th Field Artillery Bri- nian Armed Forces ( JAF) at the we do not share the same tactical
gade is tasked with conducting Marka Civil Airport in Jordan. experience, said Hensley.
theater security cooperation to During the exercise, the two Some of the challenges the two
build partner capacity and im- militaries worked together and militaries faced were that they
prove joint interoperability with compared methods and standard don’t train according to the same
partnered nations while serving operating procedures. The two doctrine nor do they train in the
as the U.S. Army Central Force units jointly prepared the JAF same manner. The U.S. military
Field Artillery Headquarters. The launcher and trained on the pro- cross-trains its Soldiers to per-
brigade is taking the necessary ficiency of loading and unloading form different tasks; whereas, the
steps to gain a common defense it onto a C-17 aircraft. Jordanian Armed Forces trains its
and a complementary capabili- “The Jordanians have an ex- Soldiers to only perform one task,
ty with allies and partners with tremely capable and highly pro- said Hensley. This could be fore-
subordinate units participating ficient military, so we are not re- seen as a potential issue, but in a
in joint exercises with host nation ally teaching them anything, but combat capacity the two militar-
militaries. learning and understanding their ies would complement one an-
These exercises create a shared processes and them learning and other, he said.
understanding between militaries understanding ours,” said Capt. Also, the Jordanians have de-
which, ultimately increases le- Ryan Victory, Alpha Battery com- ployments, but few have HIMARS
thality on the battlefield. mander. deployments; so we were able to
Recently, Wisconsin National According to Victory and his share with them a greater knowl-
Guard Soldiers of Alpha Battery, battery executive officer, 1st Lt. edge in that aspect, he said.
1st Battalion, 121st Field Artillery Jeffrey Hensley, both militaries As units continue to conduct
Regiment High Mobility Artillery stood to learn from the other in joint exercises and share process-
Rocket System (HIMARS) partici- order to bridge their technical es with allies and partners, Fires
pated in a joint HIMARS Raid via and tactical gaps. will become more globally inte-
Aerial Insertion cold-load train- The Jordanians complement grated across all domains.
ing exercise with the 29th Royal our military because we are equal- Capt. Natasha Fultz-Castro is the
HIMARS Battalion of the Jorda- ly technically proficient; however, public affairs officer for 18th Field Ar-
tillery Brigade.
INNOVATIVE
thinking:
Looking behind
2 look ahead
By Maj. Timothy Heck
Author’s Note: Thanks to Mar- bility of adding new tactics, tech- doctrinal instruction and how-to
garet Harrison at Joint Forces Staff niques and procedures (TTP) to a on artillery procedures, includes
College, Col. William Wyman, and commander’s playbook: artillery instructions on the use of artillery
H.G.W. Davie for source material and as a breaching tool. for minefield reconnaissance and
translation assistance. Thanks to Maj. The use of artillery to clear ob- breaching.3 Giving indication of
Craig Pachlhofer (USAF) for his edi- stacles has a lengthy history. In the its use, former German officer
torial input and advice. American Civil War, large-caliber Armin Scheiderbauer refers to
Innovation remains a buzz mortars and siege artillery were the technique in his chapter on
word throughout modern mili- used during the Siege of Peters- the Soviet Vistula-Oder offen-
tary culture. Typically, the notion burg, Va., by Union forces to re- sive but, being on the receiving
of innovation carries a require- duce Confederate earthworks and end, provides little in the way of
ment to develop new weapons, facilitate movement.1 Similarly, details.4 In the 1970s, Bernard F.
gadgets or munitions. However, the use of artillery to clear wire Halloran described the method as
innovation begins in the cognitive obstacles during World War I be- “costly [but] generally effective.”5
domain. Ideas are the birthplace came standard practice and part In August 1975, Col. V. Selyavin
for creating new solutions to old of the lifting barrage. As demon- published an article in Soviet Mil-
problems or finding new uses for strated on the Somme in 1916, itary Review explaining Soviet
old tools. When exploring ideas, this was not always successful, but artillery procedures for breach-
reviewing the past, even analyzing remained a crucial element in at- ing minefields.6 During the Cold
a competitors’ tactics, may pro- tacks later in the war.2 The Sovi- War, the U.S. Army’s FM-100-2-
vide readily available solutions ets’ historical artillery use brings 1 The Soviet Army: Operations and
without the necessity to procure more specific examples. Tactics lists artillery as part of So-
new hardware. Reviewing the During the Great Patriotic War, viet tactics to breach minefields
historical uses of Soviet and U.S. the primary Soviet artillery man- at the division and below level.7
artillery brings to light the possi- ual, which is a combination of The premise, that indirect fire can
1 Abbot, Henry L. “Siege Artillery in the Campaigns against Richmond, with notes on the 15-inch Gun, Including an Algebraic Analysis of the Trajectory of a Shot in its Ricochets upon Smooth
Water.” Professional Papers of the Corps of Engineers United States Army. No. 14. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office: 1867.
2 Hampton, Meleah. Attack on the Somme: 1st Anzac Corps and the Battle of Pozières Ridge, 1916. Solihull, United Kingdom: Helion & Company, Ltd., 2016.
3 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Manual of the Artillery of the Red Army: Rules for Gunnery for Land Artillery, 1942. Moscow: Red Army, 1943. See paragraphs 238-9, pgs. 110-12.
4 Scheiderbauer, Armin. Adventures in My Youth: A German Soldier on the Eastern Front, 1941-45. Solihull, UK: Helion & Co., 2003. See Chapter 10.
5 Halloran, Bernard F. “Soviet Land Mine Warfare.” The Military Engineer. March-April 1972, pg. 118. Available online: https://www.jstor.org/stable/44566032
6 Selyavin, V. “Artillery Breaches Obstacles.” Soviet Military Review. August 1975. pp. 28-29.
7 FM-100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1984. Pg. 5-27.

Table 1. Example sequence of phase 1 fire (155 mm). (Judy Oman/FCoE CPG)
clear obstacles for maneuver forc- for Joint Operations reiterates the fire support team but lacks engi-
es, has historical precedent, but importance of suppression and neer assets. G/2/6 faces a Sovi-
current doctrine barely mentions obscuration but does not assign et-style enemy using Warsaw Pact
this idea as a possibility. artillery a role in reducing mine- equipment and doctrine. The
A review of current joint doc- fields in combined arms breach- enemy is known to follow Soviet
trine reveals artillery support in ing.9 Similarly, JP 3-34: Joint En- templates for mine emplacement,
breaching operations is limited gineering Operations discusses the with typical anti-tank minefields
to providing suppressive and ob- importance of integrating engi- being placed on a 200-300 meter
scuring Fires. Breaching remains neering operations with fire and front by 60-120 meters in depth.11
largely the domain of engineer maneuver but does not express
units. A review of Engineer mag- the complementary nature artil- Scenario
azine contemporary to Selyavin’s lery can play in breaching mine-
instructions reveals multiple arti- fields.10 A modern-day American While conducting a deliberate
cles where artillery is used to sup- or NATO maneuver unit, when movement toward an objective,
press or obscure an obstacle but compared to Soviet units, is sig- G/2/6 loses one vehicle when it en-
only one which briefly introduces nificantly lighter in terms of indi- counters an unexpected anti-tank
the idea of reducing a minefield rect fire assets. Nevertheless, the minefield of indeterminate size
with artillery: premise has potential application and density. Due to terrain, G/2/6
Some U.S. commanders, realiz- today should engineer assets not is unable to bypass the minefield.
ing that they cannot rely on a ca- be available and bypassing the ob- Lacking attached engineer assets,
pability that does not exist, have stacle not be an option. the company commander asks his
developed expedient breaching For this historic, yet innovative, fire support team to breach using
methods such as pushing disabled idea to take hold, the following indirect fire. The company needs
vehicles through the minefield, example describes how to use ar- a lane 50 meters in width and an
aiming unmanned vehicles at the tillery to breach a minefield. Golf unknown depth along its route of
objective, using engineer equip- Company, 2nd Battalion, 6th Ma- march. The commander’s prima-
ment to scrape the ground or rines (G/2/6), a motorized Marine ry concern is anti-tank mines.
employing indirect Fires in an at- infantry company, is operating In order to conduct a mine-
tempt to provide a safe lane.8 in restrictive terrain with limited field clearance using artillery, two
Joint Publication 3-15: Barri- maneuver space for their vehicles. distinct phases occur. The first is
ers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare G/2/6 is supported by an attached minefield reconnaissance, in or-
8 Hambric, Harry N. and Edwin L. Booth “A New Way to Breach Minefields.” Engineer. Fall 1984. Page 28.
9 JP 3-15 Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations. 6 September 2016. Pages III-2 through III-5.
10 JP 3-34 Joint Engineer Operations. 6 January 2016. Page I-2. Available online: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_34.pdf
11 Parker, Fred E. “Soviet Counter Mobility Operations.” Engineer. No. 1, 1987. Page 15.
Table 2. Example sequence of phase 2 fire (155 mm). (Judy Oman/FCoE CPG)
der to determine the depth of the adjust at the mouth of the breach. onations are observed, that range
minefield. The second is breach- The battery adjust piece delivers can be reasonably assumed to
ing the minefield. a spotting round and is adjust- be mine-free. Once the maneu-
ed accordingly, similar to how a ver commander determines the
Phase 1: Minefield registration is conducted. Once depth of minefield, the FO puts
reconnaissance the battery is adjusted, a battery the battery in Phase 2.
four is fired in a converged sheaf
In Phase 1, the fire support to start the breach. After the con- Phase 2: Breaching
team finds an observation post or clusion of the battery’s Fires, the the minefield
asset that allows for observation adjusting gun fires another spot-
of the entire suspected minefield. ting round 50 meters beyond Returning to the mouth of the
This could be from a physical ob- the initial round and salvo along breach lane, the battery fires using
servation post or through the use the breach lane. Once accurate- time fuzes set to burst shells ap-
of available technology such as ly adjusted, the process contin- proximately 3 to 5 meters above
drones or aircraft with downlink ues throughout the depth of the the ground. Time fuzes produce
capabilities. From this vantage breach lane. downward shock waves and frag-
point, the forward observer (FO) At each range, the observer is mentation in order to detonate
accurately plots the minefield’s looking for a smoke cloud that the mines. After firing a battery 8
known or suspected boundar- differs from the normal shell at each range, the adjust gun fires
ies, estimated depth and G/2/6’s burst. If a different smoke cloud two or three check rounds while
desired route of march. This be- is observed (see Figure 1), the area the FO observes for mine detona-
comes the breeching lane. is assumed to be mined and the tions. If none are observed, that
The FO requests one round in- process continues. If no mine det- segment is considered clear and

the battery shifts fire to the next ing targeted by enemy direct Innovation may mean more
point. This process is repeated and indirect assets. than the newest weapon, hard-
until the breach lane is clear. See iii. An enemy with counter-bat- ware or munition. In this case,
Table 1 for an example sequence tery capabilities poses a signif- an idea from the past sparked a
of fire (Figure 1). icant risk to the firing battery. new way to use artillery. This idea
This example sequence of fire iv. Ammunition consumption is clearly is not meant to replace all
is designed around the 155 mm. quite high (between 90 and 180 other uses for artillery. Instead,
This TTP is not limited to 155 rounds per 50 m increment of this TTP offers fire supporters an
mm; however, the ranges and breach), possibly reducing the additional tool to support ma-
rounds will vary for different cal- battery’s ability to support fol- neuver commanders. Much like
iber of artillery or even mortars. low-on calls for fire. this example, the warfighter may
Using this TTP provides a benefit from reviewing the his-
Risks foundational basis for an alter- torical uses of their current tools
native means for fire supporters to identify new uses. The limited
Using artillery to breach a to assist maneuver commanders. number of tools available to com-
minefield is not without risk to Though draining on ammuni- manders does not prohibit using
the maneuver element or the fir- tion stocks and time-intensive, ideas to innovate TTP.
ing unit. the use of artillery to breach a Maj. Timothy Heck is a Marine
i. By deliberately breaching the minefield gives maneuver com- Reserve field artillery officer cur-
minefield using indirect Fires, manders an alternative to risking rently serving as a brigade platoon
the company risks losing the their men and machines forcing a commander at 6th Air/Naval Gun-
element of surprise. As such, breach when traditional methods fire Liaison Company. Among other
the use of artillery eliminates are unavailable or undesirable. places, his writings have appeared in
the advantage of surprise in- Conversely, units observing Rus- Fires, The Journal of Slavic Military
herent in an in-stride breach.12 sian forces firing similar patterns Studies, Infantry and Armor. He re-
ii. Enemy obstacles, including into known or likely allied obsta- cently authored a chapter on the Sovi-
minefields, are likely under cles and minefields have an indi- et Vistula-Oder Offensive of 1945 for
observation, putting halted el- cation that the Russian maneuver the Large-Scale Combat Operations
ements at increased risk of be- unit lacks organic engineer sup- series published by Army University
port. Press.
12 JP 3-15, pg. III-5.
U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to Brigade Engineer Battalion, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division and Ob-
server Coach Trainers assigned to Operations Group Sidewinder Team observe a mushroom cloud form from a Mine
Clearing Line Charge detonation during Decisive Action Rotation 18-02 at Fort Irwin, Calif., Nov. 29, 2017. (U.S.
Army photo by Sgt. Nathan Franco, Operations Group, National Training Center)
Warfighter 19.2
Targeting in America’s tank division
By Maj. Joshua Herzog and Chief Warrant Officer 4 Steven Fernandez
“Targeting is the process of se- predominantly in the hands of and targeting team determined
lecting and prioritizing targets the division’s fire support team, that the focus of targeting had to
and matching the appropriate the entire staff must understand be on long-range artillery capable
response to them considering op- and contribute to the process for of affecting the division, the inte-
erational requirements and capa- it to be effective at achieving the grated air defense system (IADS),
bilities.” At the beginning of Warf- commander’s targeting priorities. and reserve maneuver forces ca-
ighter 19.2 (WFX), the 1st Armored To achieve the collaboration nec- pable of conducting a counter at-
Division’s (1st AD’s) targeting pro- essary within the targeting pro- tack. The CG frequently discussed
cess used “focus areas” to synchro- cess, the staff organizes a target- the tension that would be neces-
nize intelligence collection, lethal ing working group to provide the sary between shaping the divi-
and non-lethal delivery assets essential analysis, prioritization sion’s deep area and supporting
and conduct assessments. This and coordination to achieve the the brigades in the division’s close
technique was sufficient in deter- commander’s objectives through area during critical events such as
mining the resources the division the D3A methodology. Given this forward passage of lines and wet-
needed to request from corps and doctrinal framework, the 1st AD gap crossings. The CG modified
the Combined Forces Air Com- targeting team conducted their his guidance and the Fires team
ponent Command during the train-up for WFX 19.2 and subse- continued to balance the tension
72-hour air tasking order (ATO) quently refined their standard op- between deep and close through-
cycle. However, this process did erating procedures. out the division’s CPXs and the
not generate the requisite detail military decision-making process
or synchronization of detection, Initial process for WFX 19.2.
delivery and assessment needed The staff, led by the chief of
in current operations, nor target Due to the timing of the train staff, constantly updated and re-
the commander’s high payoff tar- up for WFX 19.2, the majority of fined the battle rhythm to ensure
gets (HPT) effectively. This article the members on the 1st AD tar- that the targeting process nested
describes the process the 1st AD geting team were new. During the with corps’ battle rhythm. These
targeting team developed by the command post exercises (CPXs) adjustments facilitated the sub-
end of WFX 19.2 that successfully leading up to the WFX, the tar- mission of ATO-based requests,
synchronized assets in time and geting team conducted initial and provided the touch points
space, effectively contributing to training with the staff and partic- necessary for the CG to make de-
the commander’s mission. ipated in dialogue with the com- cisions and publish guidance to
The Army’s targeting process manding general (CG) to obtain the staff and subordinate units.
is centered on the decide, detect, his broad targeting guidance. The The result was the battle rhythm
deliver and assess (D3A) method- targeting officers conducted a se- seen in Figure 1. The targeting as-
ology. This process allows com- ries of briefs to the staff to cover pects of the battle rhythm were
manders to identify “enemy re- the basic targeting methodology, critical to the division’s ability
sources (targets) that if destroyed the targeting working group and to synchronize the fight and si-
or degraded will contribute to the the purpose and format for the multaneously support the corps’
success of the friendly command- targeting decision board, where targeting process and ATO cycle.
er’s mission.” Critical to D3A is the CG would approve the staff’s The decision working group each
the synchronization of informa- recommendations by ATO day. night provided the CG a touch
tion related capabilities, intel- This established a baseline under- point with the planners and se-
ligence, maneuver, fire support standing across the staff. nior leaders in order to set the
systems, nonlethal effects and Additionally, during WFX ac- stage to view how the he saw the
special operations forces to attack ademics, the fire support coordi- fight unfolding in the next 72 to
and destroy critical targets using nator (FSCOORD) and targeting 96 hours. This meeting was criti-
the most effective means possible team dialogued with the CG to cal to the targeting working group
at a specified time and place. Al- understand his intent for Fires. the next morning and when nec-
though the targeting process lies Through this dialogue, the CG essary, allowed the targeting team

to refine previously submitted working group. In order to do this VARTY, aviation assets from the
support requests based off chang- the division used “focus areas” in combat aviation brigade, joint
es to the plan. The division target- the decide portion of D3A to fo- air assets and non-lethal effects
ing working group then fed the cus the staff’s planning efforts for to HPTs within each focus area.
corps targeting working group, detection, delivery and assess- Lastly, assets were loosely aligned
allowing the deputy commanding ment assets. First AD’s focus areas to assess the effectiveness of our
general for maneuver (DCG-M) consisted of the unit and the high targeting efforts on each HPT.
and FSCOORD to influence the value targets (HVT) associated Although this method allowed
corps’ support to 1st AD. Similar- with that unit. During the TWG, the staff to improve every day, it
ly, the targeting decision brief fed the targeting team decided which failed to enable the staff to un-
the corps’ joint targeting coordi- HPTs within the focus areas derstand the finite detail needed
nation board. These two meet- should be targeted for the next to synchronize the components
ings then flowed back into the ATO day (72 hours out), validat- of D3A and achieve the necessary
decision-working group later that ed and refined the HPTs and asset effects.
night with refined information on requests for 48 and 24 hours out
what the corps was doing in the respectively. From here, the team Issues identified
next 24 to 96 hours, helping the discussed the detection assets re-
CG visualize beyond 72 hours. quired within each focus area and Although the targeting method
Throughout the division’s associated named areas of inter- previously outlined allowed the
CPXs, the targeting officers and est (NAI) or target areas of inter- staff to focus their efforts during
FSCOORD trained the staff in est (TAI). Then, the team assigned the detect, deliver and assess por-
more detail on the D3A process delivery assets including cannon tions of D3A in the TWG, there
and conduct of the targeting and rocket Fires from within DI- was no demand on achieving the
Figure 1. Warfighter Exercise 19.2 battle rhythm. (Courtesy illustration)
CG DCG-M NEW CORPS CORPS DIV WG

DCG-O
DCG-S
CoS
DIVARTY CDR
BATTLE RHYTHM CHANGES DIVISION as of 30OCT18
WFX 19-2 REPORTS
0200 DIV O&I
0400 GREEN-1 (INTSUM), GREEN-8 (INFORMATION COLLECTION
0400 REQUEST), RED-1 (PERSTAT), RED-1A (PRR)
CORPS DAILY INTSUM PUBLISHED
0600 DIV CUB
0700 DIV SHIFT CHANGE 0500 ORANGE-1 (COMSTAT), WHITE-1 (CBRNE SITREP)
0800 CORPS CG BUA

0800 DIV EFFECTS WG
0600 RED-5 (THEATER BLOOD REPORT)
0900 G5 OPT
0900 CORPS INTEL SYNC
0700 GREEN-2 (SENSITIVE ITEMS), YELLOW-1 (LOGSTAT)
1000 DIV TARGETING WG
1000 DIV PROTECTION WG
1500 YELLOW-1 (LOGSTAT)
1100 DIV O&I
1100 DIV CEMA SYNC
1100 CORPS COLLECTION MANAGEMENT WG
1600 GREEN-6 (DETAINEE/EPW STATUS), RED-1 (PERSTAT), RED-1A (PRR)
1130 DIV LOG SYNC
1200 CORPS OPS / INTEL SYNC (G3/G2)
1300 DIV CUB (w/ LNOs) 1700 ORANGE-1 (COMSTAT), BLUE-4 (ENGINEER SITREP), YELLOW-2
1300 CORPS TARGETING & COLLECTION WORKING GROUP (COMBAT SLANT), RED-5 (THEATER BLOOD REPORT), RED-6
(MEDICAL EQUIPMENT READINESS REPORT), WHITE-4 (PAO SITREP)
1400 G2/S2 SYNC
1400 G6/S6 SYNC
1800 BLUE-2 (CDRs SITREP), WHITE-6 (RELIGIOUS SUPPORT SITREP),
1500 DIV DECISION BOARD
GRAY-6 (MISO SITREP), WHITE-3 (CA SPOTREP)
1600 CORPS SUSTAINMENT SYNC (G4 & Sust)
1700 G3/S3 SYNC 1900 GREEN-2 (SENSITIVE ITEMS), WHITE-1 (CBRNE SITREP)
1700 CORPS CUB
1830 CORPS TARGETING BOARD (FSO, G2, TGTing Team)
WEEKLY RED-4 (PREVENTIVE MED DNBI/MTBI REPORT) – FRIDAY 1500, WHITE-
1900 DIV STAFF INPUT TO DAILY FRAGORD DUE
5 (PAO WEEKLY SITREP) – WEDNESDAY 1700
1930 DIV CUB
2000 DIV SHIFT CHANGE
2030 CG DECISION WG G5/G35
COMMANDERS’ UPDATE (NO DEDICATED TIME) WILL BE CONDUCTED OVER
2100 CORPS SUST DECISION BOARD VENTRILLO USING THE CPOF COP.
2100 DIV COLLECTION WG
2100 CG NIGHT EXPECTATIONS DISCUSSION (w/ STAFF)
2200 DIV DAILY FRAGORD
2200 CORPS PLANS HUDDLE
2300 DIV O&I
2330 CORPS DAILY FRAGO
0000 CORPS OPS / INTEL SYNC
level of detail needed from the
staff to effectively synchronize The first step in putting this
these requests and execute the
plan within current operations. As transformation into action
a result, traditional fighting doc-
uments that are part of the divi- was refining our process in the
sion’s fire support plan were not
detailed enough to be useful to targeting working group.
the field artillery intelligence of-
ficers (FAIO), G2, joint air ground my event template prevented the vide refined target data back to
integration center, chief of cur- intelligence targeting and collec- the targeting team in the TWG.
rent operations or subordinate tion management sections from As a result, accurate refinement
units. Lack of detail during the developing detailed plans to help of air support requests was nearly
TWG and subsequent targeting decide, detect and assess targets. nonexistent and DIVARTY rarely
products compounded the issue Lastly, over the course of hours received updated locations of the
based on an incomplete intel- and various briefings and updates, targets they planned to execute,
ligence picture, lack of holistic the G2 section would brief slight- creating an ammunition manage-
and detailed collection plan, lack ly different battle damage assessment nightmare. Lastly, due to the
of target refinement by the FAIO ments and assessments of the en- absence of accurate and detailed
and an over-generalized process emy course of action, leading to information that is a product of
during the TWG that prevented some confusion amongst the staff target refinement, the Fires team
the transition of a complete and and targeting team. Overall, a lack did not publish traditional fight-
synchronized plan to current op- of a cohesive, detailed and fused ing documents or provide them
erations for execution. intelligence picture hindered the to the current operations section.
First, 1st AD’s process could staff’s ability to achieve the req- These issues can generally be
have improved with a refined in- uisite level of detail necessary to traced back to the acceptance of
telligence picture. According to decide on HPTs and synchronize unspecific information through-
after-action reviews and final ex- detection, delivery and assess- out decide, detect, deliver and as-
ercise reports, a more thorough ment assets requests for future sess steps of the targeting working
process for understanding the en- execution. group. During the mid-rotation
emy could have contributed to a Due to a lack of detail with- after-action review, it became
more successful targeting process. in the intelligence estimate and clear to the staff that their process
Due to technical issues during the event template, it was difficult for had to change and that the level of
WFX, the G2 section was unable to the collection manager to align detail had to increase to achieve
exploit the distributed common assets to detect the right target, in synchronization and develop an
ground station-Army (DCGS-A) the right area, at the right time. effective and executable plan.
capability that hindered intelli- Additionally, the information col-
gence fusion, the application of lection plan (ICP) did not leverage Refinement
doctrinal intelligence tools and all of the division’s information
consistent assessments of the en- collection capability and often During the mid-rotation AAR,
emy course of action throughout was not specific or layered to best the commanding general asked a
the G2. According to the final ex- support the ability to answer in- simple question to the staff: “Are
ercise report, the fusion cell did formation requirements. In re- we a HPT or a HVT organization?”
not use the DCGS-A to develop turn, issues with the ICP led to is- This simple question sparked a
intelligence products that would sues with target refinement by the professional discussion about
have aided in their situational FAIO and the inability to execute how the division was going to kill
understanding, and answer infor- planned targets synchronized what was killing it. It was import-
mation requirements critical to with the maneuver plan. ant for the staff to understand that
targeting priorities. Additionally, Additionally, the FAIO with- although the enemy G6 artillery
the G2 did not integrate infor- in the division’s aviation combat pieces were on the high payoff
mation collected and analyzed by element did not have the appro- target list, a specific unit’s asso-
the DIVARTY S2 and combined priate level of focus on deliberate ciated G6s at a specific time and
arms battalion S2 regarding ene- target refinement. Without a con- place were on the prioritized high
my Fires and IADS systems into sistently produced and refined payoff target list. More specifical-
the division’s intelligence esti- target synchronization matrix, ly, the division would continue
mate even though these subordi- the absence of intelligence fusion, to prosecute G6s found dynam-
nate units had the most accurate and an incomplete, hand-waved ically within current operations,
and relevant data on these target collection plan, the FAIO strug- but would focus collection, deliv-
types. Additionally, the lack of gled to focus on the prioritized ery and assessment assets on the
doctrinal products such as an ene- high payoff target list and pro- prioritized G6s that could most

effectively disrupt friendly oper- Given shared understanding of data from across the various in-
ations. By clarifying this differ- the enemy and friendly schemes telligence domains.
ence, demanding more specific- of maneuver, the G2T outlined The Fires team captured this
ity during the targeting working the enemy’s high value targets. information on a modified target
group, refining the TWG agenda Next, the targeting team would synchronization matrix (TSM)
and producing documents that decide what the specific high pay- and fire support execution ma-
could transcend planning, syn- off targets were for that ATO. After trix (FSEM). The FSEM was con-
chronization, refinement and ex- identifying each HPT, the team structed on the decide, detect
ecution efforts, the 1st Armored would determine the detection and deliver framework as seen
Division was able to significantly asset(s), location for the asset(s) to in Figure 2. It also included close
increase its ability to target enemy focus (NAI/TAI), and the detec- air support allocations, priority
HPTs off the prioritized high pay- tion window based off event tem- of fire, fire support coordination
off target list (HPTL). plate and triggers. Then, the team line and coordinated fire line.
The first step in putting this determined the best available Within the decide portion of the
transformation into action was delivery asset(s) to achieve the document, the HPTs are listed in
refining our process in the tar- desired effect and submitted any order of priority across the top in
geting working group. Instead required asset requests necessary the fire support task format. This
of using the term focus area, we for execution during that ATO includes the task, purpose, meth-
simply used the doctrinal term, day, within the detection window. od and effect the division is trying
high payoff target. Once the G2 Lastly, the targeting team solidi- to achieve to support the friendly
provided their assessment of the fied the assessment plan in a sim- maneuver plan during that ATO.
enemy course of action for the ilar fashion. Only then would the In the detect portion, all avail-
given ATO day and then the G35 G2 move to the next HVT based able assets are listed by type with
described the friendly scheme of on the enemy course of action, specific HPTs and NAIs listed in
maneuver projected for that day. grounded in fused intelligence the time blocks. Listed next are
Figure 2. Warfighter Exercise 19.2 fire support execution matrix. (Courtesy illustration)
ATO KN FIRE SUPPORT EXECUTION MATRIX AS OF: 1317000NOV18

Neutralize 675th and elements of 672nd
T1: Neutralize 13th IFC (CAG) T2: Destroy 11th DAG T3: T4: Destroy GPS Jammers T5: Disrupt 675th Tank BDE
BAG
Prevent massed fires on 1/1 CAV in OBJ Prevent massed fires on 1/1 CAV in OBJ Prevent 13th Corps from protecting 675th Limit 675th ability to conduct CATK after
P: Prevent massed fires on 1/1 CAV in OBJ AZ P: P: P: P:
AZ AZ maneuver 1/1 CAV wet-gap crossing
9A52: SCAR / XINT / ATACMS G6: XINT (SAR) / MLRS / CAB (T) 2S19: SCAR / XINT OPTIMA-3: ATACMS / GMLRS / XINT T-90: XCAS / CAB
D UAS: IRON CURTAIN/VAIL / GMLRS UAS: IRON CURTAIN/VAIL / GMLRS 2S6: GMLRS TRC-274: ATACMS / MLRS / XINT
E
C M: M: M: M: M:
I
D
E
9A52: 5 / 10 G6: 5 / 5 2S19: 4 / 15 OPTIMA-3: 4 / 6 T-90: 20 / 108
2S6: 3 / 4 TRC-274: 1 / 3
E: E: E: E: E:
CAS ALLOCATION 1/1 2/1 3/1 1/101 2 1/1 CAV 3 MEB 2 (T) POF 1/1 CAV 1/1 1/101 3/1 2/1 o/o CAB
TIME (MST) 0600 0700 0800 0900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 2100 2200 2300 2400 0100 0200 0300 0400 0500
TIME (ZULU) 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 2100 2200 2300 2400 0100 0200 0300 0400 0500 0600 0700 0800 0900 1000 1100 1200
FSCL FAITH
CFL MCKINLEY
13th IFC 9A52 NAI I4040 / I4044
11th DAG G6 NAI I4039
COMINT
672nd/675th 2S19 / 2S6 NAI I4033
675th T-90 NAI A056 / A032 / A011
13th IFC 9A52 NAI I4040 / I4044
GMTI
672nd/675th 2S19 / 2S6 NAI I4034
675th T-90 NAI A056 / A032 / A011
D PAN / IR/ SAR Requested for all HPTs - several platforms available for cross cue - UGFs characterization
E 672nd/675th 2S19 / 2S6 NAI I4034
ELINT
T OPTIMA-3 NAI A056 / A032
E GE 1 11th DAG G6 NAI I4039 13th IFC 9A52 NAI I4040 / I4044
C GE 2 672nd/675th 2S19 / 2S6 NAI I4034
T GE CAB 13th IFC 9A52 NAI I4040 / I4044 11th DAG G6 NAI I4039
HUMINT OPTIMA-3 NAI A056 / A032
OPTIMA-3 NAI A056 / A032
SOF 11th DAG G6 NAI I4039
13th IFC 9A52 NAI I4040 / I4044
Q-53 13th IFC 9A52 NAI I4040 / I4044
672nd/675th 2S19 / 2S6 NAI I4034
CEMA
KNACR022 KNACR023
SCAR
KNACI011 KNACI012 KNACI013 KNACI014 KNACI015 KNACI016 KNACI017 KNACI018 KNACI019 KNACI020 KNACI021
AI KNACI024 UGF 23, 25, 30, 31
KNACC001 KNACC002 KNACC003 KNACC004 KNACC005 KNACC006 KNACC007 KNACC008 KNACC009 KNACC010
CAS
KNAIC001 KNAIC002
D KNACE001 KNACE002 KNACE003 KNACE006
CEMA
E KNACE005 KNACE004
L 13th IFC 9A52 (EAs vic NAI I4040 and I4044) 11th DAG G6 (EA vic NAI I4039)
CAB
I 675th T-90s NAI A056 / A032 / A011
V 13th IFC 9A52 NAI I4040 / I4044 (M30 / M39)
E 11th DAG G6 NAI I4039 (M26A2)
R 672nd/675th 2S19 / 2S6 NAI I4034
MLRS
OPTIMA - 3 / TRC-274 (M31 if required due to collateral concerns)
SEAD 13th IFC CAB ATK
SEAD 11th DAG CAB ATK
OPTIMA - 3 / TRC-274 (M31 if required due to collateral concerns)
ATACMS
IRON CURTAIN / VAIL IX (UAS GCS N.AZ & PYONGYANG)
EFFECTS
CAS supporting convoy security for SACP
ATO KN: 14-15 NOV 18 0600-0559 TARGET SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX
Neutralize 675th and elements of
T1: Neutralize 13th IFC (CAG) T2: Neutralize 11th DAG T3: T4: Destroy GPS Jammers T5: Disrupt 675th Tank BDE
672nd BAG
Prevent massed of fires on 1/1 CAV in Prevent 13th Corps from protecting Limit 675th ability to conduct CATK after 1/1
P: Prevent massed of fires on 1/1 CAV in OBJ AZ P: Prevent massed of fires on 1/1 CAV in OBJ AZ P: P: P:
O BJ AZ 675th maneuver CAV wet-gap crossing
DECIDE DETECT DELIVER ASSESS
TGT
FOCUS TGT LOC TGT # NAI / TAI Assets When Time Agency Assets Assets MOE Status Comments
CAT
SCAR/ COMINT / GMTI PRI: AI SCAR/ COMINT / 6/6 9A52
T1 FS 9A52 (13th CAG) AH4011 I4040, I4044 A 0600 - 0599 JAGIC
/ GE / SOF /Q53 ALT: MLRS GMTI / GE1 / SOF DESTROYED
COMINT / GMTI / GE2 / PRI: XINT COMINT / GMTI / 5/5 G6
T2 FS G-6 (11th DAG) AH4026 I4039 A 0600 - 0599 JAGIC
SOF / Q53 ALT: CAB GE2 / SOF DESTROYED
GMTI / ELINT / GE / PRI: XNIT GMTI / ELINT / GE / 4/15 2S19
FS 2S19 (675th, 672th ) AH4016 I4033 A 0600 - 0599 JAGIC
MQ9 / Q53 ALT: SCAR MQ9 / XINT DESTROYED
T3
PRI: MLRS 3/4 2S6
ADA 2S6 (675th, 672th) AH4021 I4034 ELINT / COMINT A 0600 - 0599 DIVARTY ELINT / COMINT
ALT: XINT DESTROYED
PRI: ATACMS 4/6 Jammers
T4 C4I JAMMER OPTIMA 3 AH4036 A056, A032 ELINT / SOF A 0600 - 0599 DIVARTY ELINT / SOF
ALT: M31A1 DESTROYED
PRI: ATACMS 1/3 Jammers
T4 C4I TRC-274 JAMMER AH4040 A056, A032 ELINT / SOF A 0600 - 0599 DIVARTY ELINT / SOF
ALT: M31A1 DESTROYED
A056, A032, COMINT / GMTI / GE2 / PRI: XCAS COMINT / GMTI / 20/108 T-90
T5 MNVR T-90 (674th) AH4045 A 0600 - 0599 JAGIC
A011 SOF / Q53 ALT: CAB GE2 / SOF DESTROYED
SCHEME OF MANEUVER KM ATO FLOW SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
FRIENDLY FORCES NEXT 24 (KN) XINT 0653 - 0905 PLANNED FSCL: FAITH HPTL
SCAR 0754 - 1005 PLANNED CFL: MCKINLEY 1 FS
III Corps Set XINT 0853 - 1105 2 ADA
2x DIV attacking in zone IOT seize key OBJ. SCAR 0954 - 1205 (XCAS) HOG 31 (A-10s) 3 C4I
- 3 ID attacks in zone to seize OBJ HORSE and OBJ HYENA XINT 1040 - 1305 4 MVNR
- 1 AD attacking in zone to seize OBJ ARIZONA SCAR 1053 - 1305 5 ENG
- 82 ABN conducting a screen along 1 AD's boundary (XINT) GUN 25 (F-16)
1154 - 1405
1253 - 1505
Major Event
1354 - 1605 (XCAS) HOG 43 (A-10s) POF
1 AD Attack in zone along a southern axis to isolate and seize OBJ ARIZONA
1554 - 1805 1 1/1 CAV
1453 - 1705 2 1/1 AD
Subordinate Unit Tasks
1653 - 1905 3 101 BCT
1/1 CD: T: Conduct FPOL with 1/1 AD and attack in zone from south to north in order to seize OBJ ARIZONA
1705 - 0155 4 3/1 AD
1/1 AD: T: Secure key terrain IVO OBJ YUMA and fix enemy IVO OBJ ARIZONA
1754 - 2005 5 2/1 AD
T2: BPT conduct a screen IVO OBJ ARIZONA oriented Southwest
1853 - 2105
2/1 AD: T: Transition to consolidation activities in preparation for follow on operations beyond OBJ ARIZONA
1954 - 2205 (XINT) GUN 01 (F-16)
3/1 AD: T: Follow and assume 1/1 CD
2154 - 0005
T2: BPT seize OBJ PHEONIX and isolate OBJ ARIZONA
2315 - 0205
T3: BPT conduct a screen IVO OBJ ARIZONA oriented Southwest
1/101 IBCT: T: Fix EN elements along MSR Washington 1000 - 1030
1200 - 1400
1400 - 1600 (XCAS) REBEL 21 (A-10s)
1500 - 1700
1600 - 1800 (XCAS) GUN 13 (F-15E)
1600 - 1630
1800 - 2000
1820 - 1920
1800 - 2000
2000 - 2200 (XCAS) GUN 23 (F-15E)
2200 - 2400 (XCAS) REBEL 25 (A-10s)
2300 - 0100
2300 - 2320
2320 - 0020
0000 - 0200
(XINT) STEEL 03 (F-16) 0100 - 0300
(XINT) STEEL 05 (F-16) 0200 - 0400
(AI) BUFF 71 (B-52) 0400 - 0559
(XCAS) REBEL 11 (A-10s) 0508 - 1900
Figure 3. Warfighter Exercise 19.2 target sync matrix. (Courtesy illustration)
the delivery assets available with days and the targeting priorities is required to request, synchro-
specific allocation windows and would be either refined or reval- nize and execute the division’s
HPTs identified. Overall, the col- idated based off the most current high payoff target list. The al-
ors throughout the document are information. The targeting team location/request of assets is not
used to associate detection and distributed and briefed finalized enough to efficiently or effectively
delivery assets with HPTs listed versions of the TSM and FSEM to target multiple targets that sup-
in the decide portion. This col- current operations the night be- port the division’s fight in time
or-coding allows the staff to see fore execution that included the and space. The use of fighting
the synchronization of targeting approved ATO and updated time- documents such as the FSEM and
efforts across the D3A framework. lines. TSM improve the synchroniza-
Additionally, the targeting Lastly, after execution, the option and effects achieved during
team used the FSEM in conjunc- erations research/systems analyst the targeting process, allowing the
tion with the Command Post of and G2T used the information in division to maximize their avail-
the Future (CPOF) overlays to the effect portion of the fire sup- able combat power through time,
brief the CG or DCG-M during port task in conjunction with bat- space and purpose at a decisive
the targeting decision board. This tle damage assessment collected time and place. Continuous re-
helped the CG/DCG-M see the to determine if reattack of a par- finement of the targeting process
synchronization and associate ticular HPT was necessary. As re- outlined in doctrine is required
targeting efforts between the map quired by a re-attack decision by in an ever-changing environment
and CPOF graphics. It also pre- the FSCOORD, the team refined with a near peer or peer enemy
vented duplicate work from the priorities in the TWG for the next threat.
staff by demanding the creation 24 and 48-hour ATO cycles. Over- Maj. Joshua Herzog is currently the
of only one product for planning, all, the production of these sim- battalion operations officer for 2nd
briefing and execution. Following ple, yet effective products in con- Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery. He pre-
approval in the decision board, junction with the refined TWG viously served as the Fires and Effects
the G35 published these two framework, allowed the division Planner for 1st Armored Division.
products in the daily fragmentary to obtain the level of specificity Chief Warrant Officer 4 Steven
order (FRAGO) at 72 hours out required to meet the CG’s target- Fernandez is currently the senior tar-
from execution. The FAIO used ing objectives in a near peer fight. geting officer, 1st Armored Division.
the TSM (Figure 3) to focus tar- He previously served as the senior
get refinements between 48 and Conclusion targeting officer for 1st Infantry Di-
72 hours out from execution. The vision.
FAIO and G2T brought refine- This article highlights that spe-
ments to the TWG on subsequent cific detail in the targeting process

The fire support
without a dedicated observer.
This platoon could still employ
indirect Fires from their scouts
dilemma in cavalry
as needed. The FSNCO and FS
specialist both functioned as
platoon FOs for those missions.
and armor units

They refined targets with the pla-
toon leaders, carried TLWSs and
FSEMs, and advised the platoon
leaders throughout the extent of
‘A way’ to conduct company-level fire the battle. They carried two ra-
dios each, one on the troop Fires
support without forward observers net and one tactical satellite (TAC-
SAT) and ultra-high frequency
By Capt. Ellen Loran (UHF) capable for air assets that
would be pushed to them. Calls
In frustration, the cavalry scout find the best way to employ indi- for artillery support were run
asked his troop fire support offi- rect fire in an organization with- centralized through the FIST ( just
cer, “But why can’t we just have out any dedicated observers. At me as the FSO) and subsequent-
our old observers back?” If only first glance, the answer is glaringly ly to squadron. I was co-locat-
it were this easy. In 2014, the simple: the scouts call for fire. This ed with the troop commander. I
Modified Table of Organization was presumably the logic behind carried two radios, one for troop
and Equipment (MTOE) for dis- the MTOE change. Why should Fires, and one for squadron Fires
mounted cavalry troops was up- we have FOs when calling for fire that was additionally TACSAT and
dated, eliminating forward ob- is a scout skill level one task? UHF capable. Initially, this system
servers (FOs) at the platoon level. After working with the Sol- worked well. With the FSNCO and
Instead of a fire support team diers in B/ 1-91st CAV, we found FS specialist at the platoon level,
(FIST) headquarters, and a FO for that their fire support knowledge all the reports, refinements and
each platoon, the cavalry troops and ability to call for fire were calls for fire were in the correct
found themselves with only a extremely weak. Talking to other format and easy to send to the fir-
FIST. FISTs across the formation, we ing unit. Additionally, as both ob-
By summer 2016, all of the found that this weakness existed servers were JFO qualified, I was
previously assigned FOs had left in all the troops. Of course, this able to send them aircraft and ro-
Bulldog Troop, 1st Squadron, 91st weakness could be addressed with tary wing with ease.
Cavalry Regiment leading my- more training—this was the easy As the enemy battalion dis-
self, as the troop fire support of- problem. ruption elements started moving
ficer (FSO), and my fire support The more complicated issue through the engagement area, this
non-commissioned officer (FSN- was: What does “having the scouts system began to fail. It became
CO) to realize that the troop’s call for fire” look like from a tech- impossible for one person to col-
ability to employ fire support was nical standpoint? Who is on the lect reports, monitor calls for fire
significantly degraded. During fire support net? Who refines the to artillery and mortars, check
troop situational training lanes, fire support execution matrix coordinating altitude, update the
not one element called for fire— (FSEM) and target list worksheet situation map, push air assets, and
even when the best way to prose- (TLWS)? Who carries the light- track and update the commander
cute a target was through indirect weight laser designator rangefind- to standard. We quickly realized
fire. No one refined pre-planned er? The list of details is endless— that the traditional method of
targets that the FIST had created. and these were the details killing having the FSO and FSNCO to-
No one was on the fire support us in execution. gether at the command post (CP)
net (except the FIST). The troop’s To conduct our experiment, was needed to handle the amount
mortar team sat in position ready we evaluated several FIST em- of information flowing through
to fire but did not receive a sin- ployment options and tried each the troop CP. Additionally, the
gle fire mission. Speaking to fel- of them in the virtual battlefield one platoon without a FO became
low fire support officers, B/ 1-91st simulator. a liability to the troop since the
CAV was not alone; all dismount- platoon was unable to process any
ed cavalry troops in our squadron FIST employment option 1 fire missions in time to have any
were dealing with the same issue. effect on the enemy. The enemy
We had to find a way to employ The first employment option realized that this was the weak
fire support without any FOs. was pushing out the FSNCO and point on our screen and sent its
This article provides case study fire support (FS) specialist to two exploitation force through that
on B/ 1-91st CAV’s experiment to platoons and leaving one platoon sector.
ever, this was not ideal, since he
would then lose contact with the
commander. Switching his other
radio meant losing contact with
his sections.
In addition to nets issues, we
also had difficulty understand-
ing and processing the calls for
fire. Many times, we received the
friendly unit location as the in-
tended target location—an ob-
viously disastrous situation in a
live-fire scenario. In the previous
weeks we had conducted multiple
skill level one call-for-fire classes,
but little of the information was
retained. We soon realized that
continuing with the status quo
meant fighting in a troop whose
eyes on the ground could neither
correctly employ shifts, under-
stand target-to-fuse pairing, call
for smoke or illumination, nor
could effectively employ any air
asset. This lack of ability was not
the fault of the individual scouts,
but simply was that these skills are
perishable and demand a great
deal of consistent training.
Planning Fires was another
pressing issue. For each mission,
the FIST developed a troop-lev-
el Fires plan, pushed out the fire
support overlay, TLWS and FSEM
to the platoon leaders, but these
products were filed away and not
employed during the battle. This
was not simply forgetfulness on
A scout observer conducts crater analysis during a squadron fire support team the behalf of the platoon leaders.
certification. (Courtesy photo) Their mind was not, nor could it
have been, on refining the pre-
FIST employment option 2 The largest issue was the practi- planned targets on the TLWS,
cal application of nets on the bat- tracking when the fire support co-
Our next planned employment tlefield. When a scout saw a target, ordination measures needed to be
option was to keep the FSNCO what net would he use to call for changed, or any of the required
and FSO together in the FIST and fire? We talked through several tasks for fire support. They need-
still push the FS specialist to the options. One option was to send ed to be leading their platoon
platoon that was most likely to the mission on the platoon net for during the fight.
use air assets—the decisive op- approval and then switch to the The result of this configuration
eration for the troop. The obvi- Fires net. The scout would send his was that updates and calls for fire
ous downside was that only one grid to the troop FIST before the came from the one element with
platoon could call for fire with a fire mission in order to ensure we the 13F FS specialist and the other
trained observer. However, the had an updated observer location two platoons were quiet. This re-
MTOE change was designed for since we did not have any updated sult made sense. Who was taking
scouts to employ Fires. We re- OP locations. But how would the responsibility for passing Fires
set the battlefield and impressed platoon leadership be tracking reports or updating pre-planned
upon the scouts that they were the fire mission? One option was target locations? No one. If every-
the only ones who had the ability that the platoon leader could also one in the platoon was supposed
to see targets and that they had to move his troop command radio to be thinking of Fires, no one was
initiate all calls for fire. to the troop Fires channel. How- thinking of Fires.

From these two less-than-ideal and faired remarkably well. After enable a dual information flow to
situations the troop realized that a year of trial at B/ 1-91st CAV, the the platoon leader, enhancing his
we needed another solution—we scout observer program was ex- situational awareness.
needed Soldiers in each platoon panded across the squadron and Upon identifying a target, the
who would specifically be think- produced the same results across team leader would send the report
ing about Fires. From here we de- all troops. During the last certifi- to the platoon leader via the sec-
veloped and employed the con- cation at 1-91st CAV, roughly one- tion sergeant. The platoon leader
cept of the scout observer. third of the scout observers out- would then make a recommenda-
scored the average FO score. tion for prosecution to the troop
The scout observer In terms of planning, the scout commander based on the high
observers took a role like that of payoff target list (which we put on
A scout observer is an MOS 19D any skill level one 13F. During the FSEM). Meanwhile, the scout
scout that receives significantly the planning process, the troop observer would pass a call for fire
more Fires training than the rest FSO worked directly with the pla- and the FIST would begin coordi-
of his platoon and is the one re- toon leaders to integrate indirect nation and building the fire mis-
sponsible for specifically employ- Fires into the platoon’s scheme sion in the lightweight forward
ing Fires for the platoon. of maneuver. Once the plan was entry device. If the commander
For each platoon, we trained developed, the FIST team made approved the target for indirect
one senior and one junior scout. all the products to distribute to fire, the FIST team would send
The senior scout observer is usu- the scout observers before meet- the mission to the firing unit and
ally a senior specialist, while the ing with them. Scout observers a message to observer then to the
junior scout observer is generally learned how to read TLWSs and scout observer. This dual-com-
a private and in the opposite sec- FSEMs and refine them, but did munication process significantly
tion of the senior scout, and usu- not make the products them- reduced the total mission pro-
ally serving as a dismount. selves. This ensured that the ob- cessing time.
The advantage of this system servers had adequate time to con- I hope this article sparks a con-
is that there is always someone in duct their primary scout mission versation throughout the field
the platoon who is fully trained preparation activities. The scout artillery and armor communities
and someone who is beginning observers participated in the fire about indirect fire employment
the Fires training process. Addi- support rehearsal and fire support in company-sized elements that
tionally, when the senior special- technical rehearsal during which lack dedicated FOs. It is very sim-
ists are selected as team leaders, they explained their piece of the ple to say, scouts or tankers will
they already have a solid under- plan and reacted to contingencies, call for fire, but the practical ap-
standing of indirect Fires and are just as their infantry company FO plication of this idea is difficult
more likely to think of employing counterparts did. and involves careful planning in
indirect Fires in their team. While The most complicated aspect terms of equipment, training and
scout observers have many func- of employing indirect Fires with readiness. “Sharing Soldiers” be-
tions like that of 13F FOs, they do scout observers still involved nets tween platoons also becomes dif-
not fulfill all the 13F functions. and radios. As a FIST, we kept ficult and requires an established
Whereas dedicated FOs always three radios at the troop level and relationship between the fire sup-
train with the FIST, the scout ob- distributed three to the senior port officer and the platoon lead-
servers still have their primary scout observer of each platoon. If ers. Using this article as a blue-
positions to fulfill. In 1-91st CAV, a platoon had extra radios avail- print, new fire support officers
we had one dedicated day every able, the junior scout observer can try a system that worked for
other week for the scout observers would also get one. The scout ob- one unit and improve fire support
to train exclusively on Fires. Even servers were always on the Fires employment in cavalry organiza-
this abbreviated amount of time net, and would pass size-activi- tions across the Army.
yielded immense improvements ty-location-time reports, observ- Capt. Ellen Loran is a field artillery
on battlefield Fires execution er locations and fire support co- officer currently serving as an assis-
during multiple NATO named ordination measures to the troop tant operations officer at 1st Armored
exercises. FIST, just as a FO would do. Division, Division Artillery. She pre-
The scout observers were This stream of information also viously served in multiple positions in
trained to the standards expected helped the commander maintain Chaos! Battery, 4th Battalion, 319th
of a skill level one 13F. Each scout situational awareness of the battle- Field Artillery Regiment and as the
observer was able to doctrinally field. Through trial and error, the squadron fire support officer for 1st
call correct fire missions within platoons found that the best place Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment.
45 seconds and make adjustments for the scout observer on the bat- Her Army education includes the U.S.
within 10 seconds. The scout ob- tlefield was to co-locate them with Army Ranger School and Maneuver
servers participated in the bi-an- their associated team leader. This Captains Career Course.
nual squadron FIST certification co-location additionally helped
Aggressive counterfire with ground moving
target indicator in large-scale combat operations
By Chief Warrant Officer 2 Timothy J. Porritt and Maj. Calvin P. Roe II
Counterfire + GMTI targeting currently located based on the fire battle drill: The first is that
= aggressive counterfire mathematical trajectory of the the ADAM/BAE section creat-
incoming rounds. Unless the ra- ed an area of air space around
This is what the 1st Infantry Di- dio detection and ranging detects the original point of origin for
vision Artillery (DIVARTY) calls another munition in the air, we a specified amount of time. Al-
“Aggressive Counterfire.” Aggres- have lost the current position of though the amount of time varied
sive counterfire fits in the space the adversary’s indirect fire assets. throughout the exercise, it nor-
between the doctrinal reactive In contrast, GMTI does not offer mally equated to the adversary’s
counterfire and proactive coun- PID however, it does provide the displacement time, movement
terfire. It is reactive in nature yet unique ability when paired with speed and distance to the next
includes a visual to the enemy’s a PID producing platform, to logical terrain feature from which
next move. Additionally, the pro- maintain PID and track the ene- artillery could fire. This enabled
cess is not as slow as targeting or my’s indirect fire assets after the responsive Fires in reaction to the
proactive counterfire. Acquiring a AN/TPQ radar loses the acquisi- enemy conducting survivability
target with one system and track- tion. Reaching a decision point, moves within their respective ar-
ing it through another maximizes the commander weighs the risks tillery maneuver area (AMA).
the shared understanding of how associated with the PID transfer The next enhancement was the
the enemy moves, fires and hides of enemy indirect fire assets. One GMTI analyst measuring the size
thus enhancing the DIVARTY’s could think of this as a reconnais- of the formation. The analyst was
ability to rapidly strike enemy in- sance and surveillance handover already determining the number
direct fire systems, increasing our between two systems. of vehicles for the strength input
overall lethality. Forming an aggressive coun- on the Advanced Field Artillery
The 1st ID DIVARTY’s aggres- terfire battle drill and adjust to fit Tactical Data System. Measur-
sive Counterfire Battle Drill lever- any staff. The key players associat- ing the formation area enabled a
aged organic assets and allocated ed with the drill include the coun- more precise target engagement
resources to defeat the adversary terfire officer, GMTI analyst, air and weaponeering solution for
in Warfighter 19-04. Although not defense airspace management/ the fire control element. Thus,
part of the Mission Table Organi- brigade aviation element (ADAM/ providing better ammunition
zation and Equipment (MTOE), BAE) and any fire control element management throughout the DI-
the DIVARTY was able to receive or fire direction center. The battle VARTY firing units.
a ground moving target indica- drill needs to be set up with every The final change was that the
tor (GMTI) feed on the current system prepared and everyone on S2 performed enhanced predic-
operations floor of the tactical standby for the final piece of data tive battle damage assessment
operations center. This provided in order to engage the target. That (BDA). Enhancing this predictive
the DIVARTY a notional tactical final piece of data should only BDA due to it being much more
ground station and processing, be the location of where the ad- than the sum of a short equation,
exploitation and dissemination versary stopped their movement friendly indirect fire response
(PED) cell. Which enabled the and physical size of their forma- time plus adversary displacement
unique cross-cueing of the two tion. Another significant portion time. The DIVARTY was able to
intelligence, surveillance and re- of the battle drill is air clearance. see emplacement of the enemy’s
connaissance platforms that DI- Requesting air clearance over an assets when the friendly indirect
VARTY had direct access to, miti- area large enough to where the Fires would strike a target. GMTI
gating each other’s weaknesses. enemy will conduct survivability also provided an excellent indi-
Establishing positive identi- moves is imperative. Additional- cator of how many vehicles were
fication (PID) through the AN/ ly and equally important is keep- able to disperse from a target area
TPQ radar is a single event. The ing that air open as long as your versus how many entered just
weapon locating radar has been commander deems is acceptable moments before.
and most likely will always be to maintain PID through GTMI There are limitations when
an authorized single source PID tracking. Below is the battle drill implementing the aggressive
producing platform. Although it designed when going into Warf- counterfire battle drill. The 1st ID
never actually tracks or sees the ighter 19-04. DIVARTY did not and does not
target on the ground, it tells units There were three enhance- have 35G geospatial intelligence
where enemy weapon systems are ments to the aggressive counter- analysts authorized on its MTOE

CF Cell creates shell fire
mission with previous Once the GMTI track stops,
acquisition data, without grid S2 announces “Attention in
location and assigns new the TOC, target number
ADAM/BAE creates a 3-5 km target number (new), grid. Formation size
ROZ around the target area XXX radius.” FCE transmits new target to
for 15 mins. designated firing unit as
WHEN READY
FCE identifies firing unit for

new target number
Simultaneous Actions
º SJA map spots new location
on imagery
S2 announces “Attention in
º CF Cell enters final grid and
the TOC, I have GMTI
formation size into FM shell
tracking on target number...”
and submits to FCE
S2 requests FMV for target
º ADAM/BAE confirms no
location
change to air clearance
status
Post CF Battle Drill: Radar S2 determines enhanced
acquisition & GMTI predictive BDA
Utilizing the lessons learned from the Warfighter and adapting our resources to better understand the fight we evolved
the battle drill into this. (Rick Paape/Courtesy information)
therefore, the DIVARTY was re- Some battlefield effects are tan- leviates some of the burdens of a
quired to cross train our 35F all- gible while others will never be. Joint Air Ground Integration Cell
source intelligence analysts to There are other effects besides and division Fires cell by fully
monitor a GMTI feed. GMTI it- lethal effects. Although you may utilizing the ability to prosecute
self does not identify a vehicle by never receive any confirmed or targets within the DIVARTY staff.
type beyond whether it is wheeled predictive BDA, you can get into GMTI is an underused and un-
or tracked. Cross-cueing an obser- the enemy’s decision cycle by tar- derrated resource in the artillery
vation platform such as an MQ-1 geting their planned AMA’s. It is fight and when paired with the
Gray Eagle will greatly enhance intangible and hardly measurable proper assets, it begins to paint
identification of the adversary’s with how much you have disrupt- the picture of the adversary’s in-
fire support system and will as- ed enemy Fires by the lull created tent and allows friendly forces to
sist in refining BDA. During WFX in between enemy fire missions. disrupt that intent.
19-04, the DIVARTY requested GMTI can offer a digital and Chief Warrant Officer 2 Timothy
an allocation of a notional tacti- visual beginning of target pattern Porritt served as a division artillery
cal ground system and associated analysis (TPA). With the proper counterfire officer for the 1st Infantry
PED platoon as this system and analysts in place, GMTI can show Division. Additionally, he served as
personnel are not organic to the you the boundaries of enemy in- part of a regionally aligned forces de-
organization. direct fire AMA’s, where they go to ployment with 1st Battalion, 7th Field
Understanding what level of rearm, refuel and resupply. It can Artillery Regiment.
risk the commander is willing also demonstrate when the adver- Maj. Calvin Roe served as the in-
to accept and whether they have sary moves about the battlefield. telligence officer for the 1st Infantry
enough information to formu- Layering GMTI with your own Division Artillery. Prior to serving in
late a decision, is an important TPA can create a greater and con- the DIVARTY, he was the collection
factor within the process. Tech- firmed understanding of how the manager for 1st Infantry Division.
nically speaking, PID is no longer enemy fights.
being produced, only maintained With the correct package of References
through GMTI platforms. Some equipment and personnel in DoD, 1ID DIVARTY TACSOP, 15 MAR 2019, Accessed 15
commanders may not accept that place, a DIVARTY and division March 2019,
risk. If this kind of counterfire is staff can get aggressive with their HQDA, Division Artillery Operations and Fire Support for
the Division, ATP 3-09.90, Accessed 09 January 2019,
presented, framed as counterfire counterfire. It will increase the https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/
or counterbattery and a specific lethality of a DIVARTY and ma- pdf/web/ARN5999_ATP%203-09x90%20FINAL%20
WEB%201.pdf
enemy who is only currently maneuver elements by striking the
HQDA, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artil-
neuvering to their next firing lo- targets the commander needs to lery Battalion, FM 3-09.21, 22MAR 2001
cation currently engages us, then engage on a high payoff target list
we can become comfortable with as soon as they attempt to fire at
this kind of battle drill. friendly forces. Additionally, it al-
Kasserine Pass lessons
for the reemergence
of SHORAD
By Capt. Joshua Urness and Capt. Abigail Carter
The reemergence of Short- made a limited impact due to a United States was at war. Through
Range Air Defense (SHORAD) lack of funding and hollow. One rapid training and mobilization,
provides an important opportu- of the most important of these the anti-aircraft artillery field
nity to examine lessons learned materiel developments was the grew 1,750 percent by 1943.7 Rapid
about developing highly techni- improvement of World War I growth presented materiel chal-
cal capabilities and rapidly build- era mechanical predictors, which lenges in equipment availability
ing force structure and training predicted locations of detected for training and deployment. In-
programs at other periods in Air aircraft as they moved. Mechan- tense lobbying focused on mod-
Defense history. Anti-Aircraft Ar- ical predictors were iteratively ernizing obsolete World War I era
tillery (AAA) experience’s during advanced to become mechanical AAA equipment. However, many
the period leading up to World “directors” capable of computing AAA units did not receive new
War II, and AAA’s first “trial by and transmitting firing solutions equipment, such as new mechan-
fire” at the Battle of Kasserine directly to AAA guns (similar to ical predictors, until late 1942, just
Pass is especially relevant for this modern fire control).2 By the late as they staged for the invasion of
reason. This paper identifies les- 1930s, it was clear from the ex- North Africa.8
sons learned from those AAA ex- ploits of the German Luftwaffe Anti-aircraft Soldiers deployed
periences and considers them in in the Spanish Civil War, and The with maneuver forces to North
the context of challenges the Air Japanese Army Air Service in Chi- Africa in November 1942. Then,
Defense Artillery (ADA) branch na, that “aviation technology had from Feb. 19 to 25, 1943, new U.S.
may face with the reemergence taken a quantum leap forward.”3 recruits faced an experienced
of SHORAD enabled maneuver Out of concern for the threat, German Army at Kasserine Pass.
today. The purpose of this paper the War Department attempted U.S. forces lost badly. The specif-
is to highlight lessons before an to make up for years of financial ic events of the battle fall outside
outbreak of conflict to mitigate and personnel “neglect” by pri- the scope of this examination but
as many potential challenges that oritizing anti-aircraft capabilities The Hammer of Hell, by Col. (ret.)
the branch may face in its next beginning in 1937 and 1938.4 That Paul Semmens provides an excel-
“first battle.” may have been too late. By 1940, lent AAA focused history. Sem-
there were still only eight active mens’ research highlights several
Prelude to war and the duty AAA regiments and 10 Na- key factors that led to challenges
Battle of Kasserine Pass tional Guard AAA regiments.5 Na- experienced by AAA forces at Kas-
tional Guard regiments were rea- serine Pass. These factors include
The anti-aircraft artillery sonably well equipped but lacked 1) AAA junior officers not under-
downsized almost entirely, sepa- the personnel, and some active standing combined arms tactics;
rating from the rest of the army duty regiments were described as 2) Anti-aircraft artillerymen lack-
under the Coastal Artillery Corps “skeletal,” consisting of only head- ing sufficient weapon system inte-
after World War I.1 U.S. Anti-air- quarters batteries.6 gration and mobility to perform
craft artillerymen continued to On Dec. 7 and 8, 1941, the Japa- their mission on a dynamic and
develop doctrine, tactics and ma- nese surprised the United States, shifting high-tempo operation;
teriel solutions to anti-aircraft attacking Pearl Harbor and the and 3) Anti-aircraft artillerymen
problems. However, their efforts Philippines. With little notice, the losing situational awareness for
1 Hamilton, John. Blazing Skies. Dept. of the Army, 2009. Page 27.
2 Crabtree, James. On Air Defense. Wesport, CT: Praeger, 1994. Page 44.
3 Hamilton, page 34.
4 Crabtree, page 44.
8 Crabtree, page 44.

the sake of mobility which led to
fratricide and ineffectiveness.9
We generate the following lessons
from those factors:
i. The air defender must under-
stand the ground tactical plan.
ii. Integration and mobility are
essential to supporting the
maneuver fight.
iii. Situational awareness and
early warning are the corner-
stones of the SHORAD fight.
These lessons are relevant today
because of similarities between
the AAA experiences during the
interwar period and the prelude
to World War II, and our current
“prelude” to war. Now, through
additional information about
each of those factors, the follow-
ing sections apply Kasserine Pass
lessons to important consider-
ations for the reemergence of
SHORAD enabled maneuver.
The air defender

must understand the
ground tactical plan
AAA Soldiers found themselves

on the forward line of troops
throughout the battle at Kasserine The crew of 105 mm howitzer, B Battery, 33rd Field Artillery with gun set
Pass. One of the opening stories in Arabic mud-block abode for firing in defense of the Kassserine Pass, North
shared by Semmens in the Ham- Africa. (Library of Congress)
mer of Hell account of the battle
highlights AAA units remaining Pass demonstrated that Anti-Air- nate benefit of their predecessors
emplaced at their fighting po- craft Artillery junior officers had “trial by fire.”
sitions while multiple brigades to understand the situation on the As the ADA branch pivots to-
passed them in retrograde. Soon, battlefield;” 2) “To provide effec- ward missions supporting maneu-
those AAA units were alone, and tive support, Anti-Aircraft Artil- ver forces with SHORAD in large-
the next thing they saw were ene- lery Soldiers had to understand scale combat operations (LSCO),
my troops.10 In hindsight, it prob- combined arms tactics...”11 and 3) ADA must develop air defender
ably seemed obvious that they “Anti-Aircraft Artillery Soldiers maneuver competencies and un-
should have followed the Amer- had to be just as tough as the in- derstanding. The goal should be
ican units they were supporting. fantry because they were operat- to develop the intuition of the
However, this story shows the ing along the line of contact and Air Defender to comprehend the
poor level of integration these enduring the same German [sic] shifting elements of a dynamic
troops experienced with ma- artillery fire, enemy probes and LSCO battlefield quickly. Then,
neuver forces. Poor integration, physical and mental hardships.”12 equipped with understanding and
combined with a limited under- AAA Soldiers at Kasserine Pass intuition, be able to make deci-
standing of maneuver tactics and learned these lessons the hard sions, anticipate decisive points
combined arms warfare, resulted way and eventually developed an and take action that reflects the
in failures by AAA units to antic- understanding for maneuver and fullest expression of their capac-
ipate locations and timing of de- combined arms tactics through ity to achieve their “support” mis-
cisive points on the battlefield. experience. Importantly, train- sion. Additionally, Air Defenders
These experiences led to three ing programs back in the United must develop a healthy relation-
primary lessons: 1) “Kasserine States were allowed the unfortu- ship with their supported maneu-
9 Semmens, Paul, COL (R). Hammer of Hell. Self-Published, 1990. This book is also reprinted from the ADA Magazine and available online at: http://www.skylighters.org/hammer/Semmends.
10 Semmens, page 31.
ver commander. A healthy rela- trinally planned to defend static Better yet, they should assist in
tionship is based on mutual trust points. However, Kasserine Pass producing these products while
and shared understanding. To showed that static points, in a telling the ADA story during par-
achieve mutual trust, maneuver high-tempo maneuver fight, fre- ticipation in the supported unit’s
commanders must value the air quently moved due to shifts in military decision-making pro-
defense contribution to their op- lines.14 Frequent movement of cess. The decision support tem-
erations and find their supporting “static points” generated a signif- plate illustrates the flow of the
capabilities credible. James Mc- icant unanticipated mobility re- battle and movement of forces
donough’s 1980s maneuver classic quirement during the battle. The executing a friendly course of ac-
The Defense of Hill 781 describes solution to this requirement for tion. The decision support matrix
the ideal maneuver commander many AAA fire units was to leave is developed from wargaming the
to air defense relationship using mobility-limiting equipment and template and course of action de-
the verb “husband.”13 To husband elements of their systems behind. cision points, decision point loca-
the ADA capability means to safe- Many fire units “abandoned their tions, actions taken when reach-
guard it, conserve it or value it directors because they slowed ing those points, and units with
very intentionally. To attain this them down so much.”15 Mechani- responsibilities to take action at
value and credibility, we must cal directors were the only means those points.16 In combination,
achieve a shared understanding of efficiently and accurately tar- these products provide road maps
by telling the “Air Defense Story.” geting an aerial threat because and intent for ADA capabilities to
The air defense story should be their AAA weapons did not have enable maneuver. Astute, com-
told by accurately describing ADA fixed-to-the-barrel sights. Thus, bined arms maneuver informed
system capabilities and limita- loss of mechanical directors dra- Air Defenders could use them to
tions to support a maneuver com- matically diminished AAA system achieve necessary effects, regard-
mander’s ground tactical plan, effectiveness. less of the state of communica-
cased in doctrinally correct and Mobility is the kind of discus- tions with the higher unit.
maneuver tactics informed lan- sion topic that often generates “if- Materiel solutions contribut-
guage, resulting in the communi- only-we-had” materiel solutions. ed to enhancing AAA support to
cation of a meaningful ADA effect Decisions to leave mechanical maneuver commanders follow-
on the battlefield. The best way directors behind were attempts ing Kasserine. To solve the mobil-
to tell the air defense story and to gain time, which enhanced ity problem, AAA leaders rapidly
build healthy relationships is in mobility. However, if we consid- equipped each AAA weapon sys-
person. The branch can achieve er that the desperation leading to tem with “on-board” weapon sites
both of these objectives through discarding critical equipment was and targeting equipment.17 On-
increased ADA attendance of a symptom of constantly chas- board weapon sights allowed AAA
maneuver-oriented professional ing the momentum of the battle fire units to perform their mission,
military education courses and without direction or guidance, in a less than optimal way, without
dogged integration into maneu- the root cause of the “mobility needing time to emplace the me-
ver exercises. In turn, these efforts problem” is integration. There- chanical predictor. This concept
will address the “just as tough” ob- fore, the mobility problem could of flexible methods for target-
servation from Kasserine Pass. have been solved with realistic ing is informative for today. Not
expectations of mobility require- because of targeting specifically,
Integration and mobility ments, contextualized through an but more because the AAA expe-
are essential to supporting understanding of combined arms rience at Kasserine Pass demon-
the maneuver fight maneuver, and nested in the sup- strates that realities of LSCO of-
port commander’s ground tacti- ten lead to operating in less than
Equipment was a key limitation cal plan. The anticipation of mo- optimal situations. ADA leaders
for AAA mobility at Kasserine bility requirements should lead to and Soldiers must consider that
Pass. The AAA “system” was com- pre-planned and pre-coordinated reality. Consideration means tak-
posed of weapons/guns (without primary, alternate, supplemen- ing a hard look at the balance be-
on-board fire control), mechani- tary and subsequent battle posi- tween optimal system use in the
cal directors (like our modern fire tions for the base plan (as well as context of risk acceptance. Con-
control and radar), displaced ob- branches and sequels). ventional wisdom holds that in-
servers and binoculars. Together, Furthermore, ADA leaders and dividuals operating in SHORAD
elements of the system enabled Soldiers must understand the units frequently deride tightly
the optimal use of the AAA ca- supported commander's decision controlled high-to-medium air
pability. The capability was doc- support template and matrix. defense (HIMAD) kill chains and
13 McDonough, James. The Defense of Hill 781: An Allegory of Modern Mechanized Combat. Presidio Press, 2010. Page 54.
16 United States Army. ADRP 5-0: The Operations Process, 2012. Page 4-4.

the cautious, top-heavy elements ous,” he ordered AAA not to “en- petencies and capabilities will take
of “HIMAD culture.” Converse- gage any aircraft until after it had time. As a community, we should
ly, individuals in HIMAD units attacked.”18 This condition “rele- take a hard look at whether or not
frequently deride what they view gated the anti-aircraft artillery to the ADAM/BAE’s current com-
as the dangerous, unknowledge- a revenge weapon.”19 Investiga- position, both regarding person-
able, cowboy-esque elements of tion after the fact attributed the nel and equipment, will enable
“SHORAD autonomy.” However, fratricide to poor fire unit situa- success in a LSCO environment.
in rebuilding SHORAD forma- tional awareness and specifical- Managing a complex, difficult air
tions, choosing between these two ly, not using observers. The role battles and accurately providing
extreme modes of operating is a of observers was, in addition to early warning to units is an ardu-
false dilemma. situational awareness and early ous task. Therefore, ADAM/BAE
Just as HIMAD units operate warning, to perform identifica- cells must not get left behind in
less optimally when divorced tion of aerial targets as friend or materiel and non-materiel solu-
from higher intelligence and ear- foe. Fire units stopped deploy- tions to overcome the SHORAD
ly warning, SHORAD units can- ing displaced observers to attain capability gap.
not operate in a fully effective higher mobility through speed.
manner when not integrated with Events such as this led to a key les- Conclusion
air defense early warning sys- son learned from Kasserine Pass:
tems. Both voice and data early “[AAA units] had to be in touch The Battle of Kasserine Pass
warning systems enable SHORAD with higher AAA headquarters to was the first combat experience
teams to properly emplace to en- integrate their operations with of many years of war for AAA
gage threats, to slew engagement those of the Anti-Aircraft Artil- Soldiers. Within two years, AAA
systems to threat azimuths, and lery command.”20 The purpose Soldiers successfully defeated V-1
to scan appropriate sectors for of this key linkage, beyond inte- and V-2 rocket attacks targeting
threats. Given the short range of gration with the ground tactical Antwerp, Belgium. They also val-
current SHORAD interceptors plan and situational awareness, iantly defended the bridge to Ger-
and the increasing effectiveness was to provide advanced warning many at Remagen from countless
of enemy air threats, these capa- of both friendly and enemy air at- Luftwaffe dive bomber and jet
bilities are essential. The “Mark-1 tacks. Advanced warning assisted aircraft attacks. Lessons learned
Eyeball” is not sufficient to effec- in the coordination of AAA Fires, from each of these experienc-
tively operate in todays’ near-peer enhancement of fire unit identifies can inform decisions during
threat environment. Yet, elevating cation of aerial targets (identifica- the critical years of rebuilding
engagement authorities to high- tion friend or foe), and direction ADA capacity to support maneu-
er echelons and removing the to optimal locations to engage ver forces. While some of these
authority of the SHORAD team potential threats. These advan- lessons focus on understanding
chief to engage hostile targets tages reduced dependence on maneuver tactics, many require
would render SHORAD capabil- the speed and mobility thought dedication to developing effective
ities ineffective. There must be necessary to accomplish the AAA materiel solutions and efficient
a balance. Ideally, that balance is mission. non-materiel solutions. The suc-
determined, thoroughly evaluat- Brigade Combat Team (BCT) cessful execution of these efforts
ed and proven in a realistic LSCO Air Defense Airspace Manage- will prepare ADA leaders and Sol-
environment, with necessary ma- ment/Brigade Aviation Element diers for the next “first battle.”
teriel solutions available, before (ADAM/BAE) cells perform the Capt. Joshua Urness is currently
our next “first battle.” essential role of the “higher air de- a student conducting Intermediate
fense command” today. However, Level Education. He has served as
Situational awareness ADAM/BAE cells are systemically an Avenger platoon leader in a Short
and early warning are undermanned and undertrained. Range Air Defense Artillery battalion
the cornerstones of As SHORAD capabilities left ma- and a Patriot battery commander.
the SHORAD fight neuver formations, ADAM/BAE Capt. Abbey Carter is currently an
personnel were often farmed out instructor at the Air Defense Artillery
On Feb. 21, following an ene- to perform additional duties for Captain’s Career Course. She served
my Stuka air raid, AAA Soldiers maneuver leaders who no longer most recently at the National Train-
engaged two American flights- viewed management of airspace ing Center as the division air defense
of-attack aircraft. Seven total or air defense as priorities. Al- officer and an observer coach/trainer
aircraft were engaged, and five though airspace and air defense at the brigade level. She also served as
damaged beyond repair. The ma- are now broadly understood as a Patriot and THAAD battery com-
neuver commander was so “furi- priorities, rebuilding these commander.

20 Semmens, pages 16-62.
The King of Battle and the defeat
of the ISIS Caliphate
Lessons learned from Operation Inherent
Resolve 18-19
By Capt. Mathew J. Sullivan

In support of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Soldiers assigned to the 2nd environment. First, we will pro-
Battalion, 32nd Field Artillery, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne vide an overview of how cannon
Division, fire a M777 towed 155 mm Howitzer on Qayyarah West Airfield, artillery impacted the fight against
Iraq, Aug. 10, 2019. The Soldiers conducted a fire mission to disrupt known ISIS. Then, we will provide some
enemy positions. As long as Daesh still poses a danger to the security of Iraq artillery tactics, techniques and
and northeast Syria, the Government of Iraq and ISF partners, supported procedures (TTPs) artillery pre-
by Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve, will continue cision-guided munitions (PGMs),
to strike and ensure the military defeat of Daesh. (Spc. DeAndre Pierce/U.S. operations in an expeditionary
Army Reserve) setting and maintenance and sus-
tainment in an austere environ-
ment.
When TF Steel deployed, ISIS
still controlled a 1,200-square ki-
lometer area surrounding Dash-
isha, a town near the Iraq-Syria
border, as well as numerous cities
and towns within the MERV. Over
the course of nine months, TF
Steel supported SDF as part of the
Combined Joint Task Force – Op-
eration Inherent Resolve (CJTF-
OIR). Second Platoon, A Battery,
“King,” supported the fight from
over 15 expeditionary fire bas-
es within Syria, while B Battery,
“Lion,” provided cross-border
Fires from Iraq.
Throughout June 2018, the pla-
toons provided Fires in support of
the Dashisha clearance operation.
This operation only lasted a few
weeks as the massed Fires from
air assets, artillery and mortars
quickly pushed ISIS to their last
stronghold in the MERV. In the
coming months, ISIS prepared a
defense-in-depth for the upcom-
ing SDF clearance of the MERV
by placing improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) along suspected
SDF axes of advance. Just prior to
the offensive, 2/A targeted one of
these axes with M825A1 smoke,
detonating no less than five IEDs
and permitting the SDF to begin
their operation unimpeded the
following day.
With the beginning of the SDF
clearance of the MERV, the onset
On March 22, 2019, Syrian non artillery played a tremen- of fall brought frequent rain and
Democratic Forces (SDF) an- dous role in attaining this victory. sandstorms. This severely inhib-
nounced that the village of Bag- From April 2018 to January 2019, ited the ability of intelligence,
houz, Syria, had finally been lib- troopers from the Field Artillery surveillance and reconnaissance
erated from ISIS. Many fighters Squadron “Task Force Steel,” 3rd (ISR) and fixed-wing platforms to
remain dispersed throughout Iraq Cavalry Regiment, deployed to support SDF and, unfortunately,
and Syria, the fall of this last sliv- Iraq and Syria in support of SDF. the enemy knew this. With coa-
er of territory within the Middle The purpose of this article is to lition aircraft unable to see, ISIS
Euphrates River Valley (MERV) share some select experiences launched a massive counteroffen-
mark the territorial defeat of the and lessons learned in employing sive. While the enemy attacked
Caliphate. Over the last year, can- expeditionary Fires in an austere SDF battle positions in the MERV,
ISIS cannons, rockets and mor- of PGK. There are many nuanc- “command arm decision” in the
tars targeted 2/A’s howitzers. It es to employing Excalibur (EX- last five seconds of the flight path.
was at this time that the all-weath- CAL) and PGK, and expertise is When transporting PGK, special
er capable King of Battle excelled. hard to attain in training given care and attention must be paid
Over the course of three days in the financial burden associated to the fuze’s canard covers. These
mid-October, the platoon en- with the cost of these munitions. covers often lost pins and proved
dured over 70 rounds of indirect Section and platoon-level leader- feeble in an austere environment,
fire (IDF), all while continuing to ship should start by familiarizing which meant that canard covers
support SDF at the forward line of themselves with the Quick Refer- had to be replaced in order to set
troops (FLOT) and respond with ence Guide for M1156 Precision the fuze. PGK should be applied
counterfire. The co-located target Guide Kit. While this publication to M549A1 Rocket-Assisted Pro-
acquisition platoon (TAP) from focuses on PGK, the steps provid- jectile whenever the rocket will
the Utah National Guard’s 65th ed to ensure a howitzer is PGM be utilized, and whenever friend-
Field Artillery Brigade played capable is 90 percent of the work ly forces are along the gun-target
a critical role in the counterfire in employing these types of mu- line (note that PGK is not compat-
process by providing accurate tar- nitions. The most frequent issue ible with the older M549 model).
geting data from their Q-53 Radar encountered in maintaining PGM This will help mitigate dispersion
System. The combined efforts of capability was simple key loaders from the high probable error in
2/A, the TAP and Marine Corps (SKLs) dropping “black” keys. In range, as well as account for any
mortars ultimately halted the en- an expeditionary environment, inconsistencies in the rocket’s
emy’s advance. Over the course of it is absolutely critical to estab- burn rate. When able, PGK can
those three days, approximately lish a process for receiving keys also be utilized to mitigate the ef-
400 rounds were shot and dozens remotely from the battalion or fects of a cold tube. We found that
of ISIS targets were destroyed, brigade S6, and to bring multiple doing so prevented the first two
neutralized or suppressed to in- SKLs forward. No matter how well rounds from landing short, and
clude enemy IDF assets, vehi- SKLs were maintained, stored permitted the following rounds
cle-borne improvised explosive and powered down following the to achieve effects on target with a
devices (VBIEDs), command and proper sequence, over the course standard point-detonating fuze.
control (C2) nodes, and troops in of deployment they still occasion- Throughout the deployment,
the open. ally dropped fill. Therefore, hav- TF Steel fired over 40 EXCAL
As the fight pushed deeper ing these measures in place will with outstanding results. This
into the MERV, 2/B established ensure PGM capability is main- PGM was utilized on multiple oc-
Fire Base Sa’hem across the bor- tained despite issues with a SKL. casions to destroy ISIS C2 nodes,
der while 1/B conducted “Oper- In addition, units should coincide stationary VBIEDs, construction
ation Swift” in December, an air daily maintenance with a PGK or equipment, as well as enemy in
assault to establish a fire base in EXCAL dry-fire mission in order buildings. It was especially use-
Makhmur, Iraq. From these loca- to consistently verify the PGM ca- ful during Danger Close engage-
tions, Lion prosecuted deep tar- pability of the howitzers. ments. On one occasion, SDF
gets within the MERV while 2/A With PGK’s threshold Circular were cut off and pinned down by
continued to support SDF at the Error Probable (CEP) of ≤ 50 me- ISIS machine gun fire originat-
FLOT. By January 2019, ISIS was ters, this fuze played a critical role ing from a building only 50 me-
contained to a few small villages in supporting friendly forces in ters away. An EXCAL with a delay
in the MERV, and the platoons suburban environments. Given its setting penetrated the building
were replaced by C Battery, “Car- CEP, it also reduced the total num- and destroyed the threat, permit-
nage,” 2nd Battalion, 32nd Field ber of rounds needed to achieve ting SDF freedom of maneuver.
Artillery Regiment, 1st Brigade the desired effects on target. PGK Even when fired past 37 kilome-
Combat Team, 101st Airborne Di- serves as an effective and cost-effi- ters (near its maximum range), all
vision (Air Assault). Carnage con- cient alternative to EXCAL, and it rounds landed within their CEP
tinued to support the fight until is important to keep the following of ≤ 10 meters. Oftentimes, firing
the enemy was contained to the considerations in mind regarding the round high angle is not ideal
village of Baghouz. In total, TF how and when to employ the fuze. given airspace coordination con-
Steel fired nearly 4,000 conven- Not only must the Five Require- siderations. It is important to note
tional and precision-guided mu- ments for Accurate Fire be care- that with updated Advanced Field
nitions (PGMs) in support of SDF. fully managed, but MET should Artillery Tactical Data System
The precision-guided M982A1 be updated ideally every 30 min- (AFATDS) software, the M982A1
Excalibur and the near-preci- utes instead of the standard four version of EXCAL can be fired at
sion M1156 Precision Guided Kit hours. Failure to do so may result low angle to reduce its maximum
(PGK) were heavily employed in the fuze not being able to cor- ordinate. No matter how much
in support of SDF, with TF Steel rect its flight path sufficiently and the projectiles were taken in and
shooting the entire theater’s stock deciding not to arm during the out of their casing or transport-

ed, they proved very durable and jectiles, fuzes, propellants and ammunition and howitzer parts
performed flawlessly. The weight primers proved challenging. After as early as possible.
of the projectile is 104.1 pounds sending the ammunition request While there are many other
(roughly equivalent to the weight it would take a minimum of two topics that could be discussed,
of a fuzed M795 high explosive weeks for the rounds to arrive at the abovementioned were some
round). When transported in its the fire base. This was due to the of the most important lessons
casing the projectile weighs 156 fact that that ammunition had to learned while employing expedi-
pounds and consumes a consid- be procured from Kuwait, then tionary Fires against the enemy
erable amount of space. In an transported to Iraq, and from in Iraq and Syria. The defeat of
expeditionary environment, this there to Syria. Therefore, it was the Caliphate is the culmination
was its most significant drawback. imperative that fire direction of- of five years of effort by both the
However, this was mitigated by ficers and platoon leaders close- SDF and CJTF-OIR. While thou-
factoring it into planning consid- ly monitored their ammunition sands of men and women across
erations and load-out plans. consumption and forecasted up- all services and many nations
Given constant fluctuations in coming requirements. Obtaining contributed to the fight against
the FLOT, load-out plans were ex- parts for the M777A2s at these ISIS, it is certain that U.S. Army
tremely important. At a moment’s austere locations proved to be cannon artillery played a decisive
notice, the platoons could be re- even more of a challenge. role in its territorial defeat.
quired to transport howitzers, ve- Sustaining the required rate As the Army continues to shift
hicles, personnel, ammunition, of fire at high charges, all while focus from the counter-insurgen-
containers and personal belong- constantly relocating in a sandy, cy fight to potential conflicts with
ings to a new location. There was desert environment proved ex- near-peer adversaries, field artil-
often only time to conduct a map acting on the howitzers. Despite lery has become a top moderniza-
recon instead of performing doc- thorough and frequent preven- tion priority. Recent innovations
trinal reconnaissance, selection tive maintenance, checks and include the capability to effective-
and occupation of position. With services, over time there were ly double the maximum range of
this expeditionary mission set, still issues with the primary feed the M777A2 howitzer, as well as
there were some key consider- mechanism lever, obturator spin- the creation of new self-propelled
ations that enabled success when dle group, dog coupler, elevation artillery platforms such as the
hastily moving to a new fire base. belt, power conditioning and con- 105 mm “Hawkeye” and 155 mm
First, whether a unit is providing trol module as well as the DAGR “Brutus.” As the modernization
its own organic security or has a and antenna cables. Depending effort continues, special attention
dedicated security attachment, on whether theater had the part and effort should be paid not only
it is important to both perform on hand, it could take upwards of to increasing range and mobility
sweeps and create a hasty securi- a month to receive parts. At cer- but also to tackling the challeng-
ty plan for the new location. Of- tain points in the deployment, es associated with operating in an
tentimes the location might only 2/A in Syria was forced to em- austere and expeditionary envi-
have a relatively small space that ploy temporary solutions to keep ronment.
is tenable for artillery. Howitzers firing and eventually could only
should be dispersed as much as sustain firing capability by rotat- References
possible (at least 75 meters) from ing between two theater-provid- Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Excalibur 155 mm
Families of Munitions.
each other while avoiding any ob- ed and three organic M777A2s. In Quick Reference Guide for M1156 Precision Guidance Kit
(PGK) ATP 3-09.50; The Field Artillery Cannon Battery.
stacles in front of the gun. This order to mitigate these problems, https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/07/284287.
will ensure the howitzers’ Muzzle it was imperative to have an expe- htm
Velocity Systems don’t conflict rienced, resourceful small arms/ Capt. Mathew J. Sullivan is cur-
and will avoid potential site-to- artillery repairer capable of cre- rently a student at the Field Artillery
crest issues. Finally, in case of the ative solutions to keep howitzers Captains Career Course at Fort Sill,
need to rapidly exfiltrate, it is im- in the fight, to establish a relation- Okla. He held all key artillery lieu-
portant to ensure that there is not ship with the program manager tenant positions and most recently
excess ammunition on ground – towed artillery systems for both served as the platoon leader for 2nd
so as to prevent use by the ene- assistance in troubleshooting Platoon, A Battery, Field Artillery
my. While there are many other rare/infrequent issues and expe- Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment in
things that will be refined during diting parts forward, and to bring Syria.
position improvement, these as many spare howitzer parts for-
considerations will allow a unit to ward ahead of time. For any artil-
safely and rapidly establish a new lery unit that might assume a sim-
fire base, employ as many howit- ilar mission set, commanders and
zers as possible and provide Fires executive officers should begin
despite inadequate conditions. working with their battalion staff
Staying well-supplied on pro- to refine the supply process for
E-62 THAAD
Soldiers return
home after crucial
role in FTG-11
By 1st Lt. Anthony Ross
Soldiers from Echo Battery, previous flight tests over the past eration of the highly valued sen-
62nd Regiment, 69th Air Defense two decades. The $244 million sor at Wake Island. The opera-
Artillery Brigade returned to Fort test had high visibility from three tors from E-62nd ADA, Terminal
Hood, Texas, recently after anoth- major combatant commands and High Altitude Area Defense Bat-
er groundbreaking test at Wake Is- the United States Congress; the tery included Sgt. Andrew Steffes,
land, Flight Test Ground-11 (FTG- importance of the flight test can- Sgt. Tyler Currie, Spec. Joseph
11). On March 25, 2019, AN/TPY-2 not be overstated. Air Force Lt. Thannisch, Spec. Timothy Brod-
radar and Prime Power Unit (PPU) Gen. Samuel A. Greaves, direc- ers and Spec. Dustin Maas. The
operators enabled the radar to tor of the Missile Defense Agen- mission started in January 2019
successfully track and discrimi- cy (MDA), said“This was the first at Fort Hood, Texas, where the
nate an Intercontinental Ballistic GBI salvo intercept of a com- group completed new equipment
Missiles (ICBM) launched from plex, threat-representative ICBM training for the X86 platform and
Regan Test Site at Kwajalein Atoll. target, and it was a critical mile- CX 3.0 Software upgrades for the
After the acquisition of the ICBM, stone…The system worked exactly AN/TPY-2 radar. In early Febru-
the AN/TPY-2 radar successfully as it was designed to do, and the ary the team deployed to Wake
cued the Sea Based X-Band (SBX) results of this test provide evi- Island to operate the radar in
radar via satellite communica- dence of the practicable use of forward based mode (FBM). The
tions links with command and the salvo doctrine within missile operators manually emplaced the
control, battle management and defense. The Ground-based Mid- radar within tolerance on the first
communications (C2BMC) over- course Defense system is vitally try after a near perfect primary
sight. The SBX radar provided important to the defense of our target line alignment and anten-
cuing data to the ground fire con- homeland, and this test demon- na equipment unit elevation. Sol-
trol unit in order to launch two strates that we have a capable, diers overcame obstacles with the
ground based interceptors (GBIs) credible deterrent against a very tropical climate to successfully
from Vandenberg Air Force Base, real threat.” calibrate the system without any
Calif. Both the GBI-lead and GBI- FTG-11 represents many fu- longstanding or significant issues,
trail effectively engaged both the ture opportunities regarding the logging over 75 hours of satellite
kill vehicle and the next lethal strategic footprint of the Unit- tracking. Soldiers put a strong
target in the debris field, proving ed States Joint Forces across the emphasis on maintenance, along
the Ground-based Midcourse De- globe. The test gained confidence with the civilian contractor logis-
fense’s (GMD) salvo engagement in the operability of the BMDS tics support team, working hard
accuracy. and the ability for warfighters to to ensure the AN/TPY-2 FBM
FTG-11 was a crucial step for- operate the complex systems in- radar remained fully mission ca-
ward for the Ballistic Missile De- volved. pable throughout the flight test.
fense System (BMDS) and the Operators of the AN/TPY-2 Their efforts set them up for suc-
reliability and trust of the United radar at Wake Island played a cess on test day.
States’ homeland defense. The crucial role in the emplacement, Soldiers from E-62nd ADA
test was the culminating event of calibration, maintenance and op- Battery pulled shifts to man the

rate AN/TPY-2 cuing data of the
ICBM. The mission was a success.
While the AN/TPY-2 operators
were the main effort, one must not
forget the importance of a major
supporting element. Sgt. Shane
McKenzie and Staff Sgt. Ende-
tayew Lemma, the PPU opera-
tors at Wake Island, were critical
to mission success. In support of
FTG-11, the operators and civilian
engineers labored to provide con-
tinuous system power for specific
mission needs. Scheduled main-
tenance and complex system up-
grades were conducted through-
out the mission timeframe, and
detailed diagnostics were com-
pleted to enhance the AN/TPY-
2 team’s reliability and mission
readiness. Special emphasis had
to be given to environmental con-
cerns in the tropical environment
for the duration of the flight test.
Flash rusting of exposed met-
als and electrical connections, in
close proximity to salt air and sea
water, required detailed preven-
tive maintenance care in order to
prevent poor electrical connectiv-
ity or structural deterioration.
Overall, the Soldiers from
E-62nd ADA Battery gained a lot
of experience and useful infor-
mation regarding the operation
Back row: Spc. Timothy Broders, Sgt. Shane McKenzie, Sgt. Tyler Currie, Sgt. of the AN/TPY-2. When not con-
Andrew Steffes, Sgt. 1st Class Cephus Wells; Front row: 1st Lt. Anthony Ross, ducting mission operations, Sol-
Spc. Dustin Maas, Spc. Joseph Thannisch, Staff Sgt. Endetayew Lemma; Upon diers learned in-depth knowledge
mission completion the AN/TPY-2 radar team pose for a picture in front of from their MDA, Operational Test
their Antenna Equipment Unit (AEU) in an unclassified area of Wake Island, a Agency, Raytheon and sub-con-
small island utilized for missile defense testing and exercises. (1st Lt. Anthony tractor counterparts. The Army
Ross/U.S. Army) personnel at Wake Island gained
experience working in a joint en-
system once mission operations established positive communi- vironment with all major sensors
began in early March. They were cations with the AN/TPY-2 op- and components to the BMDS to
given a Road to War by Strate- erators to warn of an incoming include C2BMC, Aegis Combat
gic Command, simulating a real track. The track was the ICBM System, SBX, Space Based Infra-
world scenario; the anticipation launched from Kwajalein, and the red Surveillance, and GMD. They
of an ICBM launch continued to operators successfully acquired, enhanced their unit’s readiness,
build with each update. This gave identified, recorded and reported validating the ability to deploy
Soldiers a sense of the normal op- the ICBM. Reporting procedures with the AN/TPY-2 radar in an
erability of the BMDS for home- from the operators to the mission extremely isolated area.
land defense against an ICBM. operations center (MOC) and the 1st Lt. Anthony Ross is currently
Without knowing the test date warfighter officer in charge were the sensor platoon leader and Crew
and time, Soldiers were forced flawless. Soldiers followed the 2 tactical control officer for E Bat-
to operate the AN/TPY-2 radar track from acquisition of sight to tery, 62nd Air and Missile Defense
as if deployed to a wartime loca- loss of sight. The successful inter- Regiment, 69th Air Defense Artillery
tion. On March 25, 2019, the sen- cept of the ICBM with a GBI salvo Brigade. He commissioned from the
sor manager at the 94th Army Air engagement was observed from United States Military Academy at
and Missile Defense Command the MOC, made possible by accu- West Point.
U.S. Army troopers assigned to the Field Ar-
tillery Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, fire
their M777 Howitzer on Firebase Saham, Iraq,
Dec. 3, 2018. The 3rd Cav. Regt. is deployed in
support of Operation Inherent Resolve, work-
ing by, with and through the Iraqi Security
Forces and Coalition partners to defeat ISIS
in areas of Iraq and Syria. (Capt. Jason Welch/
3rd Cavalry)
Firebase Saham
A day in the life of joint-artillerymen securing the Iraq border
By Capt. Jason Welch
The crackle of machine gun ing coordinated and lethal artil- layout of the base and provided
fire and the dull thuds of distant lery Fires against the fleeing ISIS security and logistics for the Iraqi,
explosions reminded 3rd Caval- members. French and U.S. troops.
ry Regiment troopers at Firebase “Not today ISIS!” said Sgt. “The first couple days were
Saham that the battle against ISIS Doug Moran, 3rd Cav. Regt., Steel pretty austere,” said 1st Lt. Mi-
was not far away. Squadron, gun crew chief, after chael Roberto, Thunder Squad-
Troopers assigned to the Field his crew unleashed a volley of 155 ron troop executive officer. “Guys
Artillery Squadron, “Steel,” and mm high-explosive shells from were sleeping in their kit, sleeping
3rd Squadron, “Thunder,” helped their M777A2 Howitzer. in their trucks.”
establish the temporary firebase The sound of their rounds im- Roberto’s troops were respon-
Nov. 8, near Iraq’s border with pacting hadn’t faded before the sible for developing the base plan
Syria, incorporating Iraqi M109 crew was already prepared for the that decided where everything on
Paladin and French Caesar 155 next volley. Fire missions came the firebase would go. They also
mm self-propelled howitzer units. with little to no notice, and gun coordinated with the Iraqi and
Their mission: to prevent ISIS crews scrambled to provide im- French units to incorporate ev-
fighters from crossing the Syrian mediate fire support. eryone into the base plan.
border into Iraq to escape the of- The Steel troopers brought The Iraqi and French firing
fensive in the Middle Euphrates their M777s to the fight, while the units were an integral part of
River Valley (MERV) by provid- Thunder troopers established the the firebase, providing three dis-

tinct artillery units to support port the multinational coalition cleaned laundry on makeshift
cross-border strikes against ISIS. fighting ISIS.” clotheslines.
“I don’t think there’s a single ar- The French Caesars and U.S. The initial air drops brought
tillery battery in the Army doing howitzers sat side-by-side at one supplies that were needed, but not
what we’re doing right now,” said end of the firebase, barrels point- always the supplies the troopers
Capt. Frank Thompson, 3rd Cav. ed across the Syrian border into wanted.
Regt., Steel Squadron, field artil- ISIS territory, the Iraqi Paladins “Early on, we got dropped a
lery battery commander. nearby with their barrels arrayed bunch of “Case A” MREs, which
“We’ve jumped to four totally to protect Iraqi Security Forces we didn’t think was possible,” said
unique locations in the last few border positions. Roberto.
months, establishing new firing The U.S. Army gun crews of There are a total of 24 differ-
points from scratch in some very “Bull Head” and “Big Rich” lived ent styles of MREs, divided into
austere locations,” Thompson with their guns. During the day Case A and Case B. Each type of
said. they did their laundry by hand, case holds a specified menu of 12
Thompson’s battery also coor- conducted physical training, MREs.
dinated with the French Caesars maintenance, crew drills and ate “When we looked into our MRE
and Iraqi Paladins to synchronize their meals on the gun line. holding area there was only Case
their Fires, delivering fire sup- At night, they awoke to the fir- A,” said Roberto. “Even if you had
port across the border into Syria ing of the French Caesars and one different MRE for each meal,
in support of the fighting against watched tracer fire along the bor- that still only gets you through
ISIS and bolstering the Iraqi border where Iraqi Security Forces four days before you start to re-
der security posts. prevented ISIS fighters from flee- peat.”
“No one else is doing all that,” ing into Iraq. “You know how you try to get
added Thompson. The sounds of strikes against creative with how you prepare
The Iraqi troops named their ISIS positions in Syria echoed and mix and match MRE con-
firebase “Saham” for the Arabic across the border 24 hours a day. tents? Well, we had to get even
word “arrow.” It was established “I think about it every day, ev- more creative,” said Roberto.
miles away from civilian popu- ery night, when I hear the explo- With no cell phone signal re-
lations and postured to provide sions right across the border,” said ception and limited internet con-
effective Fires against ISIS fight- Staff Sgt. Brandon Cass, Big Rich, nectivity, troopers turned to one
ers attempting to cross the border Steel Squadron. “The anxiety is another during their downtime
into Iraq. definitely there.” and formed stronger bonds with-
Logistics are delivered by air “I’ve been in combat situations out the distractions of social me-
and ground, providing the Iraqi, before, been in much more dan- dia and the internet.
French and U.S. troops with much gerous situations than this. But “They have each other,” said
needed water, food and ammuni- most of these guys have never Roberto. “They play cards, they
tion. deployed. This is their first time,” work out together, spend all day
“The coolest part of establish- said Cass. together. And when they get back
ing this location was the logisti- After the first jump to establish from the firebase and have better
cal demand and how we sourced Firebase Saham, the gun crews internet, they have more to talk
the needs of our troopers on the went to work immediately with about with their families.”
ground,” said Roberto. “We did multiple fire missions to stop ISIS They also reminisced about
whatever we had to in order to militants on the move toward the their experiences from the de-
enable our sister units to provide border. ployment and their time at Fire-
effective Fires into the MERV.” “Five days straight we shot,” base Um Jorais, the first tempo-
The priority on their deployed said Cass. “It was non-stop.” rary firebase established by Iraqi
mission was to secure the perim- Calls for fire came around the and U.S. troops in June to support
eter of the firebase and ensure the clock, and the gun crews executed clearance operations in Dashisha,
Iraqi, French and U.S. guns were fire missions night and day, with Syria.
ready to support fire orders that little to no sleep and the occasion- “I don’t think I’ve ever been in
came their way. al Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) to a more austere place,” said Cass.
“Because of our proximity to sustain them. “The heat, there were sand storms,
the border with Syria, we’re very “That’s all these guys wanna do it rained and our only protection
cognizant of the risk,” said Capt. is shoot,” said Cass. from the elements was our camo
Jordan Marks, a troop command- In between fire missions, troop- net.”
ing officer with Task Force Thun- ers took advantage of the rela- “We slept, ate, shaved and did
der. “This is what the U.S. Soldiers tive calm to improve their living everything outside. We put up a
signed up for – to operate in aus- areas, setting up expeditionary shower -- just a pallet with two
tere locations like this and sup- gym equipment, improving din- pieces of plywood against a con-
ing areas and stringing out hand-
nex box and water bottles,” said then looking for work and finding “The fundamentals are the
Cass. it in the laundry facility of a con- same, and we use a lot of the same
Firebase Saham had some lux- tractor supporting coalition forc- equipment and ammunition,”
uries, like showers and tents, but es in Iraq in 2004. He later joined said Moreira.
it was still a firebase and the ar- the Iraqi Security Forces as an ar- The Iraqi and U.S. artillery
tillerymen were anxious to get to tillery officer. troops trained together on funda-
work. At Firebase Saham, he stood mental tasks, sharing best practic-
“If you forget why you’re out shoulder-to-shoulder with U.S. es on crew drills, equipment cali-
here, the guns firing at two in the and French artillery units defend- bration and Fires coordination.
morning will remind you,” said ing his country’s border against Their training paid off as the
Roberto. ISIS. Iraqi, French and U.S. guns con-
During lulls between missions, Intelligence reports on ISIS ducted coordinated fire missions,
troopers expressed their frustra- activities were shared by Iraqi, delivering their firepower across
tion of not firing against the en- French and U.S. leaders. the border as weather limited the
emy and couldn’t wait to contrib- During one breakfast meeting, number of air strikes against ISIS
ute to the fight which was raging Hassan said that one of the nearby targets.
miles away. border security positions saw ISIS “If weather is poor and air forc-
“I think it’s going to pick up movement during the previous es cannot fly some of their mis-
soon,” said 1st Lt. Brendan Morei- night. sions, we are prepared to support
ra, the artillery battery fire direc- “We conducted strikes and the fighting across the border with
tion officer. small-arms fire, and kept them our own Fires,” said French Army
Moreira led the fire direction from getting close to the border,” Capt. Clem, the Caesar Battery
center, responsible for coordinat- said Hassan. commander.
ing all Fires between the three dif- The border positions were “We are here together to face
ferent artillery units and ensuring often probed by ISIS elements the same enemy with U.S., French
airspace was cleared before fire seeking to flee the fighting in the and Iraqi units on the same fire-
missions and commands were MERV by escaping into Iraq, but base,” said Clem.
passed to the gun crews. the Iraqi Security Forces sent sev- Across the border, in the MERV,
He also coordinated train- eral thousand troops to the bor- loomed the last significant num-
ing with the Iraqi Paladin crews, der in October and routinely con- ber of ISIS fighters looking for
many of whom were familiar fac- ducted strikes and direct fire from an escape route from the Coa-
es to the Big Rich gun crew from established border positions. lition-led offensive. At Firebase
their time at Firebase Um Jorais. When the firebase was initial- Saham, the gun crews of Big Rich
When the Iraqi and U.S. artil- ly occupied, everyone could see and Bull Head, along with batter-
lery units met at Firebase Saham, tracer fire from interlocking secu- ies of Iraqi and French artillery,
the gun crews immediately rec- rity positions all along the border, patiently wait, standing ready, to
ognized each other, waving and said Thompson. deliver lethal Fires at a moment’s
shouting out names of their fel- That was in early Novem- notice.
low artillerymen. They broke out ber, during intense fighting that “I would never have wanted to
their cell phones to share pictures forced large numbers of ISIS go home without coming here, to
with each other, asking about dif- fighters fleeing toward the Iraqi this firebase,” said Moreira. “This
ferent Soldiers and Marines that border where they were met by is what we trained for.”
they hadn’t seen in months. a line of defensive positions and Capt. Jason Welch, U.S. Army, is
The Iraqi battery fire direction Coalition-led Fires. the public affairs officer with the 3rd
officer, Maj. Hassan, also served Hassan worried that ISIS fight- Cavalry Regiment. He previously
alongside the U.S. troops at Fire- ers would throw down their arms, served as a plans and operations of-
base Um Jorais. Once he arrived change clothes and try to infiltrate ficer with U.S. Army Africa Public
at Saham, he began inviting the groups of refugees fleeing across Affairs. He holds a BFA from the Uni-
U.S. leaders to eat breakfast with border checkpoints. versity of Kansas and an MLS from
their Iraqi counterparts. They “[ISIS] have nowhere to go; if the University of Texas, El Paso. He
met almost daily and discussed they stay, they will die,” Hassan initially served as an air defense artil-
training opportunities, local intel- said. lery officer in both Terminal High Al-
ligence reporting and each other. The Iraqi artillery officers titude Area Defense and Patriot units
In the Iraqi tent, everyone sat were anxious to get their Soldiers before graduating from the Defense
huddled around a steaming tray into the fight and asked to train Information School as a public affairs
of chai tea, boiled eggs and fresh with the U.S. troopers as often officer. He is currently deployed with
naan bread, baked on site by one as possible. Their M109 Paladin the 3rd Cav. Regt. in Iraq, supporting
of their partner Iraqi Soldiers. self-propelled howitzers were Combined Joint Task Force - Opera-
Hassan talked about his life as very familiar to many of the U.S. tion Inherent Resolve and the Joint
an Iraqi army officer before 2003, artillerymen. Operations Command - Iraq.

Task Force Wagram emplace the CAESAR weapon system. (Courtesy image)
Lessons learned
from CAESAR
deployment in Iraq
By Col. Olivier Fort
From August 2016 till April eration of territories under Daesh line from Gladiator, “at my signal
2019, the French Army has been control, with a record of more unleash hell.”
committed, alongside with the than 2,500 fire missions conduct- Since 2008, when it was field-
U.S. Army, in Operation Inherent ed. This article deals with the les- ed in the French artillery, the
Resolve (Chammal for France) sons learned by the French Army CAESAR gun has been, almost
with Task Force (TF) Wagram on the longest commitment of constantly, deployed in opera-
and its CAESAR guns. More than CAESAR guns in operations. One tions: 2009-2012 in Afghanistan,
1,100 French Soldiers have been has to wonder if when the new 2013-2018 in Mali/Sahel area of
deployed within this TF in Iraq to gun was dubbed CAESAR, its de- operations, 2016-2019 in Iraq.
support ground troops in the lib- signers had in mind the famous From these operations, in differ-
ent circumstances, many lessons gression was fast and the long- minute long smoke fire mission,
have been learned. The French range gun was quickly needed. conducted to mask the maneu-
artillery itself has gained a great The clearance to deploy the gun ver of the Iraqi infantry. During
deal of useful knowledge from further north, closer to the front- this phase the French artillery was
Iraq, in a near high-intensity con- line, took time at the national lev- used intensely to prevent moves
text. Alongside the “Redlegs,” the el. Consequently 75 percent of the to and from the dense urban ar-
French gunners unleashed 16,000 fire missions were fired at charge eas and to fix the enemy infantry
rounds on the Islamic state of Iraq five and six above the M777 or Pal- and it did so with a noticeable ef-
and the Levant (ISIL) from Sep- adin maximum range (with classic ficiency.
tember 2016 to December 2018, munitions). The maximum range The use of our artillery in urban
living up to all expectations of achieved on a mission was 37,608 areas was not allowed, due to the
them. The French artillery com- meters (versus 29,090 meters in absence of a guided 155 mm mu-
mitment was decided by Presi- Afghanistan). nition to avoid collateral damage,
dent François Hollande, in the This operation marked the re- a major capability lesson from this
aftermath of the terror attack, in turn of high-intensity operations conflict. Tests are currently being
Nice, on July 14, 2016. Since then for the ground troops, support- undertaken to qualify the Excali-
all the artillery regiments from ed by our artillery, not seen since bur on the CAESAR. The French
the combined arms brigades have the campaign in Indochina. The gunners were impressed by the
deployed at least once for a five- Iraqi infantry showed impressive clever, and very efficient, count-
month tour. bravery, but they sustained very er, indirect fire tactics, displayed
The originality of Operation high losses fighting in an urban by the U.S. gunners, using guid-
Chammal for us, is double. First, environment combined with ISIL ed 155 mm. Above all, the rules
only artillery and no infantry or fanaticism. For that reason direct of engagement took into account
cavalry troops were deployed. support to the infantry regained the threat posed by ISIL indirect
Second only the gun end, with a all its importance beyond just de- Fires to the coalition troops and
minimal logistic autonomy, and stroying the enemy: to also pre- civilians.
artillery C2, were deployed (no vent them from moving, to con- According to a United Nations
forward observers, radars or un- ceal our allies, and to boost the report by United Nations Assis-
manned aerial vehicles (UAVs) morale of those who risked their tance Mission for Iraq/Office of
were deployed). UAVs and radars lives at close range with powerful the United Nations High Com-
were part of the U.S. battalion. strikes at the right time. A long missioner for Human Rights,
The French artillery force was forgotten aspect of the covering among the Ninawa governorate
called TF Wagram. Initially there mission by the artillery was partic- civilian victims in Mosul, between
were six guns and then from April ularly necessary, ISIL sometimes Oct. 17, 2016, and July 10, 2017, of
2018 this changed to three guns. used UAVs so that the Iraqi infan- the 3,486 casualties that had an
The mission was similar to that of try would waste their ammunition identified cause of death or inju-
the U.S. gunners, to support the firing against them. ISIL would ry, 41 percent were due to artillery
Iraqi army and liberate its territo- then assault these units with less strikes , of which 95 percent were
ry, and the CAESAR detachment combat power. In that circum- due to ISIL artillery. Although in
was therefore integrated in the stance, artillery firepower became an urban area this artillery was
U.S. artillery battalion. even more critical. quickly silenced.
The rapid evolution of this
pattern of operations uniquely Near high intensity rates 11th RAMa cleverly
enabled all artillery regiments to of fire: 11th Régiment decided to use artillery
operate in different circumstanc- d’Artillerie de Marine. deception in combination
es, and bring different lessons to February - June 2017 with the U.S. gunners
the fore.
This mandate was the liberation In order to localize ISIL mor-
Long-range artillery: 68th of West Mosul. During this peri- tars, some fake smoke fire mis-
Régiment d’Artillerie od 11th RAMa fired 5,366 rounds, sions were activated by the French
d’Afrique. August 2016 which doubled the previous and gunners, so ISIL, expecting an at-
- February 2017 the following mandate. The rate tack, shot a defensive mortar fire
of fire was 200 rounds per gun per mission. The mortars were de-
This mandate took part in the month, a steep change from the tected and swiftly destroyed by
move toward Mosul, and the lib- Afghanistan operations between guided munitions. This tactic was
eration of East Mosul. As the Iraqi 2009 and 2012 (13 rounds per gun regularly conducted with warn-
forces were closing in on Mosul, per month) and Mali in 2013 (52 ing rounds, as the ammunition of
CAESAR’s 52-caliber gun provid- rounds per gun per month). Di- choice, to elicit an enemy artillery
ed long-range capability to the rect support missions continued response. This ammunition had
artillery force. The rate of pro- with an accelerated pattern, a 45 already been used in Afghani-

the direct support from Paladins,
deployed in the forward operat-
ing base that they departed from.
More mobile operations needed
more mobile logistics. The lo-
gistical autonomy of TF Wagram
had to be reinforced as it could
not rely as much as it had previ-
ously on the convoys close to the
theatre depots.
First missions near Syrian

border: 3rd Régiment
d’Artillerie de Marine.
February - June 2018
For a while TF Wagram re-

mained the only artillery to sup-
port ground operations close to
the Syrian border. During these
Task Force Wagram fires the CAESAR weapon system. (Courtesy image) operations in the desert, collater-
al damage risks were nonexistent.
stan with the same effect. It gives In this mobile phase the moun- Fire missions were called to de-
the advantage of having a ballis- tain gunners operated their three- stroy small targets, to deny enemy
tic identical to the high explosive gun platoons far from each other, movements and to harass and to
(HE) round, and a very limited in different trajectories. This also destroy dug-in munitions caches.
amount of explosive. It is there- outlined the limits of very small In the last case it combined the
fore possible to use it in urban artillery platoons for deploy- gun’s accuracy and the deep pen-
areas without risks of collateral ments (a normal French artillery etration of FRAPPE fuzes.
damage. platoon has four guns). In fact, on During this mandate, the very
occasion, the extreme tempera- rough conditions of living in the
High intensity missions tures would have required time western desert frontiers, brought
in very hot temperatures: to let a gun cool down, and this to light the well balanced struc-
93rd Régiment d’Artillerie could have been a challenge with ture of our artillery detachment,
de Montagne. June only three guns at hand. Despite particularly the gun crew. The
- October 2017 these extreme conditions, CAE- five-man crew are necessary for
SAR again proved its reliability, regular, tactical, gun maintenance
Operations became more mo- as once more, no gun-related ac- operations, in a very hot and
bile after the liberation of Mo- cidents occurred. This is often a dusty environment. Moreover,
sul. In this situation CAESAR much underrated quality. for a time poor sanitary condi-
again displayed the impressive tions affected the crew, and lesser
qualities previously demonstrat- High mobility operations: numbers could have had conse-
ed during the Mali campaign in 40th Régiment d’Artillerie. quences on the operational avail-
2013. However, in the Iraqi sum- October 2017 - February 2018 ability of the gun detachment.
mer of 2017, the combination of Also taking into account that a
extreme temperature of up to 47 The following mandate saw an- truck-mounted gun, has far less
degrees Celsius, and high-intensi- other change of scene, and great- maintenance requirements than
ty fire missions tested and proved er mobility. The 40th Régiment a tracked gun with a turret. These
the extreme resilience of the gun. used CAESAR in an artillery raid, examples are invaluable for capa-
CAESAR is the only 52-caliber gun at night, to destroy enemy posi- bility development.
in the world that has been used in tions from an extremely unex-
operations near to high intensity, pected direction, creating a state Danger close fire missions:
and in such extreme conditions. of uncertainty. The enemy de- 35th Régiment d’Artillerie
The 52-caliber guns logically have fensive positions, part of an outer Parachutiste (RAP).
higher pressures in the tube, and defensive ring, were destroyed at June - October 2018
at high temperatures the pressure long range from the rear. Once
further increases. CAESAR passed more this operation was the out- More than the previous deploy-
the test very well, vindicating the come of a close cooperation be- ments, the 35th RAP had to sup-
extensive trials taken in Djibouti a tween French and U.S. gunners. port troops in close contact. Once
decade ago. The French guns were under again, (regardless of the great ac-
curacy of CAESAR), guided muni- This munition has proved in- dural and technical constraints
tions are key, especially in urban valuable and could be of prima- due to the fact that France is not
environments. However, standard ry importance in a conventional a Five Eyes member, interoper-
HE are critical to keeping the en- warfare situation. ability with the U.S. artillery has
emy’s head down and destroying Concluding a decade of oper- worked very well, and will be fur-
them at a distance when possible. ational commitments, artillery ther developed during the NATO
This would not be achievable with operations in Iraq have further exercises in Europe. This interop-
a guided 155 alone. strengthened the technical and erability is both technical, and
tactical expertise of the French cultural and spans through C2
First operational mission for artillery. Closer from conven- systems to munitions and tactical
BONUS anti-armor shell: 68th tional operations, this particular understanding.
Régiment d’Artillerie d’Afrique operation enabled our gunners Col. Olivier Fort is with the French
(RAA). November 2018 to have a very powerful physical Army, Artillery School and former di-
impact on ISIL, and also to reiter- rector of doctrine and capability. He
On Saint Barbara day 2018, ate that the efficiency of artillery graduated from the Military Acade-
68th RAA was able to use BONUS support isn’t exclusively mea- my of Saint-Cyr (1988-1991), served
ammunitions for the first time in sured in BDA, nor on the number in the artillery for 30 years in 12th
war operations. A column of 40 of ammunitions fired. Artillery as Artillery Regiment (MLRS), 93rd
makeshift ISIL armored vehicles general support fixing the enemy Mountain Artillery Regiment (towed
was sent to assail an allied Arab movements at a distance, and at 155), and 35th Parachute Artillery
forces position. A fire mission close range smoothed the maneu- Regiment. He served during six years
of four BONUS shells destroyed ver of the supported infantry. in two iterations at the artillery doc-
eight vehicles, thus achieving a Regarding urban warfare, and trine and capability directorate where
100 percent hit rate. This fire mis- particularly counterbattery in this he drafted the CAESAR, BONUS and
sion was of primary importance, context, a lot of lessons have been counterbattery doctrines, which he is
because standard training condi- identified and at first hand the currently leading. When assigned at
tions cannot easily replicate real- necessity to field guided 155 mm the French Army Doctrine Command,
istic combat conditions for such ammunition. In extreme terrain he drafted the French Army Afghan-
ammunitions that are able to hit and operational conditions, this istan lessons learned report. He has
moving targets. In total 17 BO- operation has once more vindi- been deployed in Kosovo (1999), Bos-
NUS have been fired before Jan. cated the capability choices made nia (2003) and Afghanistan (2005),
11. This mandate also signals itself in the past 15 years, particularly the last one as a liaison officer with
by the very important battle dam- regarding CAESAR gun and BO- CJTF 76. He also served twice with-
age assessment (BDA) inflicted on NUS. The range of 52-caliber mu- in the British Army, once at the ar-
the enemy. Since ISIL bands liked nitions will shortly be extended tillery school at Larkhill and once at
to break enemy encirclement, the to smoke and illuminate. More Army headquarters. He is the author
creation of a sizeable buffer zone CAESARs have now been ordered of a book "L'artillerie des stratagèmes"
encouraged them to gather for to replace our armored self-pro- published in 2016 dealing with artil-
counterattacks, a trap into which pelled gun, the AUF1. lery deception tactics.
they often fell. Finally, despite initial proce-
Task Force Wagram emplaces the CAESAR weapon system. (Courtesy image)

Theater Security Cooperation Week
Patriot battalion forges bonds with UAE air defenders
By 1st Lt. Jessica Beatty
“The working group helped us

The concept of Theater Securi-
ty Cooperation seeks to integrate
find a common ground with our

key U.S. and partner nation capa-
bilities to create a much stronger
counterparts, and helped us build

defense capability with less reli-
ance on U.S. assets and resourc-
off each other’s successes.”

es. The 1st Battalion, 43rd Air De-
fense Artillery Regiment hosted
a Theater Security Cooperation
(TSC) Week with the United Arab cal and maintenance knowledge plish missile reloads and conduct
Emirates (UAE) Air Defense Forc- while executing key leader en- maintenance checks and con-
es from April 30 to May 2 in Abu gagements and numerous com- ventional repairs. The Soldiers
Dhabi. The Cobra Strike Battal- bined social events. demonstrated their proficiency
ion’s TSC Week involved events The Cobra Strike Battalion’s on fault identification and move-
that incorporated tactics, main- tactical operations section hosted ment of canisters on and off the
tenance and social events. This an Integrated Air and Missile De- launching station while compar-
week strengthened relationships, fense (IAMD) working group ear- ing tactics, techniques and proce-
built interoperability and further ly in the week. During the IAMD dures unique to both sides.
developed combined tactics, all to working group, tacticians from “The combined reload exercise
enhance mutual readiness within both nations discussed the poten- was an awesome experience for
the theater. tial of bilateral cooperation and our Soldiers to build relationships
With the changing geopolit- the advantages of effective the- with our Emirati counterparts, an
ical landscape and subsequent ater security cooperation through opportunity that the average Sol-
refocus of U.S. military postur- mutual defense. They also agreed dier would not otherwise have,”
ing towards near-peer adversar- to regular tactics seminars and ex- said Sgt. 1st Class Jared Pointer,
ies such as Russia and China, the changes, designed to expose each 1-43rd ADA battalion master eval-
Central Command area of re- side to tactics, techniques and uator. “This friendly competition
sponsibility is in transition. For procedures used by each force, as helped the Soldiers gain different
the past decade, U.S. forces have well as discuss lessons learned. perspectives on training while
maintained a robust and constant “I think the working group also improving the readiness of
presence throughout the Mid- helped us find a common ground both organizations.”
dle East. United States Army Air with our counterparts, and helped A key objective of TSC Week
and Missile Defense battalions us build off each other’s success- was developing and finalizing a
have continued to deploy to the es,” said Chief Warrant Officer 2 plan that continues to increase
CENTCOM theater regularly with Ron Steeg, 1-43rd ADA standard- the frequency of combined events
no reduction in operation tempo ization officer in charge, as he ex- and knowledge exchanges. To this
despite the overall drawdown of plained the success of the IAMD end, key leaders participated in a
Army forces in the region. Patriot working group. “In the future, we combined Senior Leader Forum
units are a low-density force and plan to conduct combined Re- (SLF) in order to discuss the way
the demand for their capabilities configurable Table Top Trainer forward for this partnership. U.S.
to defend against air and missile exercises, tactical seminars and leaders that participated in this
threats is increasing, which means defense design sessions in order forum were Maj. Gen. Benjamin
that they will continue to deploy to maintain efficient theater secu- Corell, commander, 34th Infan-
across the globe. rity cooperation established with try Division, Brig. Gen. Clement
In the past decade the increase the Emirati Air Force.” Coward, commander, 32nd Air
of Patriot foreign military sales Extending integration to the and Missile Defense, Col. Jason
has resulted in many of our part- operator, Cobra Strike held a Hokaj, commander, AFCENT Air
ner nations being able to provide launching station reload and Warfare Center, and Lt. Col. Mi-
for their own defense, poten- maintenance competition on the chael Rodick and Command Sgt.
tially lessening the strain on U.S. U.S. Patriot site. The event con- Maj. Arthur Jones, the 1st Battal-
Air and Missile Defense (AMD) sisted of two teams mixed with ion 43rd Air Defense Artillery Bat-
systems. TSC Week contributed Emirati and U.S. launcher oper- talion commander and command
to this effort by furthering tacti- ators working together to accom- sergeant major. The command-
“The NCO Induction Ceremony
Barbara’s Dining In, where 1-43rd
ADA exposed the UAE forces to
was a great success in not only

all the customs and traditions of a
formal U.S. Army celebration. In
recognizing our new junior non-

turn, Emirati cuisine was served,
with U.S. attendees raving about
commissioned officers, but

the great taste and plentiful quan-
tity. Coward served as the guest
also in sharing the tradition

speaker and host for the evening.
After an entertaining grog cere-
with our Emirati counterparts

mony celebrating the 43rd ADA
Regiment’s lineage, a Regimental
and coalition forces.”

Affiliation and Honorable Order
of St. Barbara Induction Ceremo-
ny capped off the evening, with
ing general of UAE’s Air Defense et of this ceremony was the rec- many U.S. Army, Air Force and
forces was also in attendance, as ognition of 10 Emirati NCOs in a UAE contributors being present-
well as several other key leaders ceremony that has no counterpart ed their medals.
from our partner nation. in their organization. “The [St. Barbara’s Day] dining
The Senior Leader Forum be- “The NCO Induction Cere- in was an event that exceeded our
gan with in-depth conversation mony was a great success in not expectations. It was the culmi-
about the importance of theater only recognizing our new junior nation of a groundbreaking TSC
security cooperation and ad- non-commissioned officers, but week working with our Emirati
aptation to the constant secu- also in sharing the tradition with counterparts and everyone had a
rity fluctuations in the region. our Emirati counterparts and coa- great time and enjoyed the terrific
Lt. Col. Joseph Westerman, Air lition forces,” said Sgt. Maj. Albert food,” said Capt. Derek Sanchez,
Warfare Center’s IAMD director, Fletcher, 1-43rd ADA operations 1-43rd’s TSC officer.
explained the CENTCOM State- sergeant major. “The ceremony The 1-43rd ADA “Cobra Strike”
ment of Principles in order to is meant to express that there is Battalion’s Theater Security Week
reinforce the guiding philosophy more of a crossroad to becoming was a remarkable opportunity for
for IAMD in theater. The dialog a noncommissioned officer than leaders and Soldiers to gain a bet-
included possible avenues of in- just a rank. It is a transition to a ter understanding of the impor-
formation sharing, bilateral train- higher level of responsibility and tance of their allied partnership in
ing exercises and combined live duties to our formation. I believe UAE. From friendly competition
Fires to increase integration. that this combined induction cer- on the Patriot System and sports
Rodick commented that the emony will pave the way for the fields, the Cobra Strike and Emi-
SLF was “true progress toward Emirati Air Force and Air Defense rati Soldiers shared the experi-
combined enhancement of our to adapt in the future.” ences and laughter that solidified
air and missile defense readiness. The Sports Day, held at the UAE relationships and enhanced tacti-
I believe that this week of securi- Air Defense Headquarters, was the cal readiness in theater. Through
ty theater cooperation with our epitome of a team-building exer- this successful “TSC Week” and
Emirati Air Force counterparts is cise. Volleyball and soccer match- increased interoperability with
paramount to the legacy of comes featured combined teams that partner AMD forces, the lethality
bined partnership within theater.” learned to work together on the and operational readiness of the
In addition to tactical exchang- field. Additionally, the U.S. forces Air Defense Artillery Branch will
es and working groups, a priority introduced their Emirati counter- only become stronger across the
was improving social interaction parts to Ultimate Frisbee and par- globe.
and esprit de corps of all air de- ticipated in a joint Jiu Jitsu train- 1st Lt. Jessica Beatty is an Air De-
fenders, regardless of nationality. ing session and demonstration. fense officer currently stationed at
To that end, Cobra Strike hosted a Pfc. Clarence Allen, who played Fort Bliss, Texas. She has served as
combined Noncommissioned Of- volleyball with the Emirati team, a fire control platoon leader and a
ficer Induction Ceremony, as well said “I enjoyed playing with the Patriot battery executive officer. She
as a Sports Day and Saint Barba- Soldiers and getting to know them currently serves as the Headquarters
ra’s Dining In for U.S. and Emi- on a personal level. I also received and Headquarters battery executive
rati Soldiers alike. The NCO In- an awesome gift at the end of the officer for the 1-43rd Air Defense Ar-
duction Ceremony celebrated 20 game. The gift was very senti- tillery battalion.
newly promoted U.S. Army NCOs mental, which showed me the im-
while emphasizing the future portance of our relationship here
leadership within the Air Defense in UAE.”
Artillery Branch. The unique fac- The capstone event was the St.

The Joint Air Ground Integration Center included multinational service members who participated in the Joint Warf-
ighting Assessment 19. (Courtesy photo)
Multinational
stand-off and anti-access air de-
nial.
In this new environment, the
French Army has issued a new
Fires in a
concept, “future land action,”
while the U.S. Army is focused
on “multi-domain operations
(MDO),” both pointing out the
multi-domain
requirement to better coordinate
their capabilities in the different
domains. This also includes the
requirement to interact more
environment
with the multinational partners in
order to provide additional capa-
bilities, authorities and different
tactical possibilities on the bat-
tlefield to deceive and defeat an
JAGIC chief in Joint enemy that will never be able to

adapt to multiple approaches and
Warfighting Assessment 19 unexpected combined effects.

Therefore multinational in-
teroperability is key more than
By Lt. Col. Nicolas Konieczny ever. For the “Fires” warfighting
function it was the opportunity
After more than a decade ded- ernizing their equipment to be to test it during Joint Warfighting
icated to counterinsurgency op- able to face another kind of threat Assessment ( JWA) 19, especially
erations, the Western armies are that can compete with the nation- within the JAGIC of the 7th In-
reviewing their structures, orga- al capabilities and create strong fantry Division commanded by
nizations and missions and mod- challenges; especially regarding Lt. Col. Nicolas Konieczny, the
JWA
19
Figure 1. Fire support coordination measures developed for the Joint Warfighting Assessment 19. (Courtesy illustration)
French liaison officer to the Fires Ajax and future equipment for the and tactical commands and define
Center of Excellence with a team United Kingdom). The scenario the successive areas of operations
composed of the U.S. Army, Ma- depicted was aimed to challenge in order to attrite the high prior-
rine Corps (1st Anglico), Navy, Air a coalition led by the U.S. Army ity targets at echelon and create
Force, Australian and Singapore against a peer-threat competitor the conditions of transition be-
officers and NCOs. equipped with a large amount of tween echelons. Therefore, due to
long-range artillery assets (both the lack of global air superiority,
1. Joint Warfighting field and air defense artillery) and the Fires Enterprise was in charge
Assessment 19 able to use non-lethal Fires (main- of degrading, denying, disrupting
ly cyber and electronic warfare). and destroying the enemy capa-
The JWA is the Army’s capstone, In this multi-domain environ- bilities to enable the commitment
multi-echelon exercise intended ment and in close cooperation of the maneuver forces.
to demonstrate and assess future with the multinational partners, To enable this delineation, the
force concepts, capabilities and the “Fires Enterprise” was the traditional fire support coordi-
formations required to operate on main pillar to enable freedom of nation measures (FSCM) and air
the battlefield of the future. JWA maneuver for the 7th ID com- control measures (ACM) had to be
19 incorporated training forma- manding general and his subor- adapted before and during the ex-
tions from I Corps, 7th ID, Austra- dinates, while contributing to the ercise. In addition to the fire sup-
lia, Canada, New Zealand and the exploration of new procedures port coordination line and coor-
United Kingdom and personnel and policies in order to create dination fire lines, the JFLCC area
augmentation from France, Sin- more lethality and efficiency on of operations forward boundary
gapore and joint forces operating the battlefield. became a FSCM between the JFL-
in a live, virtual and constructive CC and CJTF. For the air coordi-
environment to assess the imple- 2. Joint Air-Ground nation measures, the coordinat-
mentation of MDO captured in Integration Center ing altitude had to be raised up
Training and Doctrine Command evolution in a multi- to 35,000/40,000 feet (instead of
Pamphlet 525-3-1. domain environment the 20,000 feet initially planned)
During this exercise, the 7th ID to leverage the commitment of
became a multinational U.S.-led The U.S. Army in MDO in 2028 multinational long-range Fires
division augmented by French, states that no single service com- assets.
Australian, Singapore, British and ponent alone can overcome the
Canadian officers and NCOs and layered standoff from a peer ad- Lethal and nonlethal Fires
had to fight as a Joint Forces Land versary. Consequently the joint
Component Command ( JFLCC) force needs to converge capabili- The high number of targets
under a Combined Joint Task ties to generate synergistic effects (the opposite forces were almost
Force (CJTF, I Corps). to counter the enemy’s standoff double our forces) and the mul-
The JWA 19 operational envi- capability. tinational capabilities/authori-
ronment was focused on the 2028 ties required to process the Fires
future environment integrating Delineation of responsibilities planning/coordination through
future capabilities (Multi-domain and adaptation of the Targeting Decision Board
Task Force, hypersonic weapons, coordination measures (TDB) led by CJTF commander.
strategic long-range cannon, pre- This TDB integrated not only the
cision-strike missile and extend- The challenge for the coalition lethal capabilities (surface-to-sur-
ed-range cannon artillery for the was first to delineate the respon- face, air-to-surface) but also the
U.S. Army, 1st Strike Brigade with sibilities between the operational nonlethal capabilities (space, cy-

MN Joint Air Ground Integration Center (DIV) in a MDO
Fires COP
Multi-Domain Fires
and Effects Center
(MDEFC)
JWA 19
- Integration of Lethal and Non-lethal Effects (Army,

Air Force, Navy, SOF, Marines, Space, CEMA, IO)
within MDEFC
- Augmentation with Multi-National Partners
- Contribution to the Targeting Cycle
- Key Interoperability/Coordination structure
Figure 2. Multinational Joint Air Ground Integration Center in multi-domain operations during Joint Warfighting
Assessment 19. (Courtesy illustration)
ber, electronic warfare, Military national brigades operations rience of all the joint and multina-
Information Support Operations, (forward passage of lines, wet- tional actors and created the con-
Public Affairs/Civil Affairs). At gap crossing); ditions of success for the JFLCC.
the JFLCC level, the decision was • To engage directly with the
made to adapt the Army targeting Multi-domain Task Force and 3. Interoperability with
cycle into a reviewed joint target- adapt if required by the MDE- multinational partners
ing cycle in order to include these BOs according to dynamic
additional capabilities and create targeting processes. During the whole exercise, the
multi-domain effects-based op- More than ever the multina- main challenge was to get the ap-
erations (MDEBO). These were a tional JAGIC became the cen- propriate level of interoperability
combination of effects through- tral core of the coordination and between all the joint and multi-
out the use of space, cyber, EW, execution of all the Fires, lethal national entities throughout the
surface-to-surface Fires, close air and nonlethal. The JFLCC was in Multi-domain Command and
support, unmanned aerial sys- charge, in close coordination with Control tools in order to operate
tem, attack helicopters aimed to G2 and G3, to assess the Go/No between the JAGIC and the sub-
deceive/disrupt the enemy capa- Go conditions and then the appli- ordinate commands. In order to
bilities and protect the coalition cability of the MDEBOs to support harmonize the processes, the de-
forces. the maneuver units. It also muted cision was made to use the U.S.
to become a larger entity integrat- procedures primarily even if ev-
Multi-domain and ing some aspects of a NATO joint ery country had to comply with
multinational integration fire support element or a French its own national Fires doctrines
fire support coordination cell (des- and rules of engagement.
The multi-domain environ- ignation of a deputy to the JAGIC
ment determined the JAGIC: chief, JAGIC commitment in the Technical interoperability
• To operate more with the for- Targeting Working Groups) and
eign liaison officers within the more important synchronizing In a NATO environment, the
JFLCC in order to synchro- the MDEBOs throughout the en- Digital Fires Systems rely main-
nize the Fires support with the tire exercise. This adaptation was ly on Artillery Systems Cooper-
different steps of the multi- made possible thanks to the expe- ation Activities (ASCA) to enable
JFLCC rules of engagement were
very clear and there was always a
constant dialogue between the key
leaders (ABCANZ) and within the
Fires Enterprise.
Human interoperability
More than fully compatible

systems and well managed stan-
dard operating procedures, JWA
19 success relied primarily on the
excellent human interaction. The
integration of a French officer as
the JAGIC chief of a multinational
division was initially a gamble but
proved to be an overall success
emphasized by Maj. Gen. Willard
M. Burleson, 7th ID commanding
Multinational partners participate in a discussion during the Joint Warfight- general, at the end of the exercise.
ing Assessment 20. (Courtesy photo) This multinationality triggered
a lot of discussions in order to
a full compatibility between the full interaction between NATO adapt and review the structures,
multi-national partners, like in and other systems as pointed out organizations and missions in a
Dynamic Front or Joint Warf- during this exercise. new operational environment. It
ighting Assessment 18.1 with the also facilitated the exchange of
French 7th Armored Brigade and Procedural interoperability information in the G3 and JAG-
the German 23rd Mountain In- IC with a better understanding of
fantry Brigade under the 1st ID. As mentioned previously the the operations conducted by the
During JWA 19, the Digital Fires procedures were mainly con- multinational brigades according
Systems used at the JAGIC level nected to U.S. standards but the to their doctrine and rules of en-
with the multinational brigades multi-domain environment and gagement and then an appropri-
were mainly U.S.: Advanced Field the requirement to experiment ate Fires support fitting their re-
Artillery Tactical Data System the MDO concept allowed the quirements.
(AFATDS), Tactical Airspace Inte- JAGIC to develop additional tac- As NATO Secretary Gen. Jens
gration System and Air and Mis- tics, techniques and procedures in Stoltenberg mentioned at the
sile Defense Workstation. The 1st order to cover the nonlethal Fires NATO summit in Brussels, July
Strike Brigade tried to connect applicability as well as a deeper in- 2018, the Alliance is “stronger to-
Fire Control Battlefield Informa- volvement in the planning phase. gether.” This applies perfectly to
tion System Application to AF- The NATO and ABCANZ (Ameri- the MDO concept and the new
ATDS via ASCA but unfortunately ca, Britain, Canada, Australia, New threats which require enhanced
the connectivity was not perma- Zealand, also known as Five Eyes) interoperability, to mutualize
nent. Some technical difficulties procedures and standards were the efforts, to combine the ca-
appeared as well with the Austra- used to develop new approaches pabilities and to share different
lia and New Zealand Brigade due like the targeting process, which approaches in order to more effi-
to a different version of AFATDS. – from the initial Army targeting ciently degrade, deny, disrupt and
Finally almost all the countries cycle – became more joint and destroy the potential adversaries.
got U.S. Army Digital Liaison De- even almost NATO (question on Lt. Col. Nicolas Konieczny, the
tachments to operate the three the redefinition of the target to French liaison officer to the Fires Cen-
systems. include the “key leaders”). ter of Excellence, has been involved in
In the future, Defender 20 in One major point to be covered the major exercise Joint Warfighting
Germany will demonstrate the at the JAGIC level with multina- Assessment 19 (May 2019) as Joint
requirement to enhance the use tional partners is related to the Air Ground Integration Center chief
of ASCA and possibly variable rules of engagement and cave- for the 7th Infantry Division (7th ID).
message format to get a full con- ats. Every country was in charge
nectivity between the different to identify a “Red Card Holder”
national Fires systems. For air- within their own headquarters
space control and air and mis- but it never happened during the
sile defense systems, there is still exercise that he had to intervene
room for improvement to get a due to the fact that the CJTF and

Sgt. Henry Kauffet, a cannon crewman with A Battery, Field Artillery Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, receives in-
structions during a firing exercise as part of Dynamic Front 19, March 5, at Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany.
Dynamic Front 19 is a multinational conducted by the U.S. Army in Europe designed to improve allied and partner
nations’ ability to deliver long-range capabilities. (Sgt. Gabrielle Weaver/U.S. Army)
Bold developments
in the Field Artillery
Why Exercise Dynamic Front (DF) and Artillery
Systems Cooperation Activities (ASCA) matter!
By Robert Keith Gunther
United States Army Europe exe- lery rounds and 200 rockets via ercise series is the match to the
cuted the U.S. military’s premiere 100 multinational artillery piec- Artillery Systems Cooperation
joint and combined artillery cen- es from three different countries Activity’s (ASCA) kerosene that
tric Exercise Dynamic Front 2019 simultaneously at Grafenwoehr ignites North Atlantic Treaty Or-
(DF19), from March 2-8, 2019, Training Area, Germany, Riga, ganization (NATO) and allied
with 2,673 participants from 27 Latvia and Torun, Poland. joint Fires processes and proce-
countries firing 4,244 field artil- The Dynamic Front (DF) ex- dures to rapidly and significantly
implement NATO multinational nations intended to help and puts
Fires interoperability. DF19 con- them together in a Fires-specific
tinued the DF exercise series’ hab- think tank and laboratory where
it of pushing the envelope of joint multinational solutions result in
Fires interoperability in Europe. bold developments for NATO
The key conduit to achieving joint Fires. This sets the example
joint Fires interoperability is the for NATO, partner and Allied na-
ASCA interface. ASCA is the dig- tions that communication capa-
ital interface that allows all com- bilities for the Fires community
ponents of the shooting solution is more efficient and lethal. With-
(observers, fire direction centers out ASCA, delays and large work
and fire platforms) to interact force requirements for liaison
with each other as if they were officer (LNO) packages and trans-
operating with their own coun- lators are required. The ASCA
try’s systems. NATO has two of- protocol does this for you. ASCA
ficial languages and 27 individual lessens the work force footprint of
languages. ASCA is the digital lan- the LNO team, but doesn’t com-
guage of NATO Fires. pletely eliminate the need for
The DF Exercise series is “de- LNOs. These bold developments
signed to increase readiness, le- include counter fire doctrine,
thality and interoperability by ex- revitalization of a theater-level
ercising allied and partner nations’ Fires command structure, ASCA
ability to integrate joint Fires in training, implementation and ad-
a multinational environment at vancement, and exercising mul-
both the operational and tactical tinational Fires command and
levels .” The exercise has grown so control across multiple nations in
much in the few years since its in- Europe simultaneously.
ception that it now requires mul- DF19 tested NATO Counter-
tiple countries and training areas fire doctrine developed during
to meet its training objectives. DF Dynamic Front 2018 (DF18). U.S.
matters because it produces bold Army Europe’s Joint Multination-
developments in the field artillery al Readiness Center ( JMRC) Fires
(FA) and Fires community while observer/control team (Vampire)
expanding the relevance, use and developed the NATO Counterfire
improvement of the ASCA digital doctrine and moved it through
interface. the approval process. The need
ASCA is crucially important to for an overarching FA headquar-
the NATO Fires community. It ters (HQ) to command and con-
is the Rosetta Stone technical in- trol all theater Fires in Europe oc-
terface to achieve multinational curred by testing the USAREUR
Fires interoperability. ASCA is a Theater Surface Fires Command within every HQ from battalion to
coalition-derived set of fire sup- (TSFC) concept in DF18 and DF19. Land Component Command lev-
port command and control (FSC2) The TSFC concept used a U.S. FA el. The procedural domain imple-
digital messages that each partic- brigade as the core of theater-level mented and utilized counterfire
ipating nation has implemented artillery HQ that integrated mul- doctrine and LNO teams. While
into their national FSC2 system. tinational Fires across the three the technical domain used NA-
These derived digital messages countries. TSFC lessons learned TO’s digital Fires language: ASCA.
enable each country’s system to have paved the way for the fu- Consequently, frequent multi-
send specific information (such as ture development and refinement national tactics, techniques and
fire missions, ammunition status, of the Fires Center of Excellence procedures (TTP) exchanges also
etc.) between all other systems Theater Fires Command (TFC) occurred for common gunnery
on a common Mission Partner concept. problems and other associated is-
Environment/Federated Mission DF was a major platform for sues, such as extreme cold weath-
Network. Successive DF exercises demonstrating the operation- er operations and their effects on
have perpetually enhanced ASCA al capabilities of ASCA, bring- the gunnery solution. DF19 was
usage in Europe and future DF it- ing it beyond mere theory. DF19 the first time DF occurred simul-
erations will continue down that demonstrated FA interoperability taneously in multiple countries.
path. across all three domains: human, The Dynamic Front exercise
DF is unique in that it brings procedural and technical. The hu- series is critically important for
together all ASCA participating man domain used augmentation multiple reasons. It is a joint and

Soldiers with A Battery, Field Artillery Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, fire an M777A2 Howitzer during Dynamic
Front 19, March 5, at Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany. Dynamic Front 19 is a multinational exercise conducted
by the U.S. Army in Europe designed to improve allied and partner nations’ ability to deliver long-range capabilities.
(Sgt. Gabrielle Weaver/U.S. Army)
combined test bed and experi- The DF series is a constant in (DIVARTY) controlled six multi-
mentation site for NATO artil- affirming and assessing the oper- national firing battalions (no U.S.
lery munitions, systems, and ar- ational capabilities of the ASCA battalions). A Canadian DIVARTY,
tillery-specific tactical concepts. interface, and is a major recruit- with a U.S. Digital Liaison De-
During DF19, coalition exercise ment tool. It showcases NATO tachment (DLD), controlled three
threads were developed and exe- artillery capabilities and is a multinational battalions and one
cuted during a command post ex- show-and-tell comparison that U.S. battalion. Other unintended
ercise (CPX) portion, then execut- influences newer NATO mem- training opportunities included
ed during the LFX. The exercise ber countries on modernization a M777 Cold Weather TTPs ex-
enhances NATO members and of their fire support systems. The change. The DF Exercise series is
allied FA modernization efforts of exercise also refines the ability for the key U.S. military opportunity
aspiring future members in fire a FA HQ to command and control to identify Fires interoperability
support, gunnery procedures and (C2) multinational artillery units. gaps and implement solutions in
modernization of systems. In DF19, a U.S. Division Artillery rapid order.
Soldiers with A Battery, Field Artillery Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, reload an M777A2 Howitzer during a rapid
fire exercise as a part of Dynamic Front 19, March 5, at Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany. Dynamic Front 19 is a
multinational exercise conducted by the U.S. Army in Europe designed to improve allied and partner nations’ ability to
deliver long-range capabilities. (Sgt. Gabrielle Weaver/U.S. Army)
The exercise experimented til now, military officials said.2 In

Bold developments with new C2 doctrine, specifi- DF19, this new doctrine was ap-
cally the need for a theater-level plied to a large joint and multi-
DF19 was an international plat- command and control node to national artillery exercise spread
form for emerging NATO Fires synchronize and coordinate mul- across three countries simultane-
interoperability developments tinational joint Fires and NATO ously.
and doctrine. It brought togeth- counterfire. During the exercise, Champion
er 27 nations to work in the three Col. Joe Hilbert, JMRC com- said, “The U.S. has its own counter
domains of interoperability. mander said, “Counter artillery is battery fire doctrine, and individ-
“This exercise is enabling the a critical doctrine for any military. ual NATO allies have their own
artillery community across multi- The ability to take out the artillery doctrine, but NATO doesn’t have
ple nations, NATO and non-NA- of the opposing force, removes a a specific doctrine in place,”3 until
TO, to come together and work strategic capability that they need, now.
through the frictions of our in- and gives you an advantage.”1
teroperability in human, proce- This is a significant develop- Why Exercise Dynamic
dural and technical domains,” said ment as the NATO alliance has Front is important
Maj. Andrew Champion, DF 19’s lacked a cohesive counterbattery
exercise officer in charge. fire doctrine in its game plan un- DF started in 2015 as a non-com-
1 Europe’s largest annual U.S.-led artillery war games underway in Germany, Martin Egnash, Stars and Stripes, March 9, 2019.
2 Ibid.
3 Europe’s largest annual U.S.-led artillery war games underway in Germany, Stars and Stripes.

allied operations.4 As an example, operations. It was designed to
DF19 made use of more than tri- coordinate Fires information be-
ple the amount of the long-range tween the land command and the
MLRSs as last year (2018), with firing units. The TSFC took both
24 MLRS vehicles supporting 62 the digital and analog systems of
howitzers.5 communications from the firing
The DF exercise series will con- units and coordinated firing plans
tinue to be the key Fires exercise for the land component com-
for U.S. and NATO Fires doctrine, mander.8
ASCA interoperability of fire con- An overarching Fires com-
trol systems, new munitions and mand is significantly required in
other aspects of interoperabili- Europe “to face the increasing-
ty. This is due to the necessity to ly lethal threats of today and to-
evolve and expand NATO Fires morrow.9 Such an organization, at
capability across Europe, USA- the theater echelon, would ensure
REUR’s close relationship with “the seamless integration and
nations in its area of operations, synchronization of cross-domain
and DF has emerged as a major Fires throughout the depth of an
platform for NATO allies and expanded and contested battle-
partners to train with and observe field.”10
other NATO members, and even- The concept emerged due to
tually modernize and expand necessity. “We need to be able to
their Fires capabilities, if required. synchronize our widely dispersed
To clearly describe the success units to get the right effects at
of DF19, one must use the old say- the right target at the right time,”
ing “the proof is in the pudding.” said Col. Andrew Anderson, com-
“We massed all of the units mander of the TSFC.11 It coordi-
across all three locations at one nated Fires alongside allied and
time on target so every firing unit partner nations for several multi-
fired onto one location, at each national division artilleries in Po-
location,” said Champion. “We are land, Germany and Latvia. "The
able to take multinational firing TSFC is designed to synchronize
units and coordinate those mass and integrate Fires across the en-
destructive Fires.”6 tire theatre on behalf of the [Co-
petitive training event focused on alition Forces Land Component
technical interoperability and a Theater Surface Fires Command]," said Anderson, bri-
benchmark exercise of technical Command (TSFC) gade commander of 197th FAB
FA data exchange within ASCA. and deputy commander of the
Dynamic Front Two, in 2017, saw The TSFC was a U.S. Army Eu- TSFC. "It allows allies and part-
a rapid transformation of the ex- rope concept to plan, coordinate ners to work alongside us."12
ercise to 1,400 U.S. and multina- and execute joint and allied Fires Recognizing the importance of
tional personnel, 32 howitzers, through organizational mission such an organization, the TSFC
and two Multiple Launch Rocket command. DF19 had the TSFC inspired and helped shape the
System (MLRS), and four radars headquartered at Grafenwoehr, emerging TFC concept that will
from three nations. DF18 once Germany, by the 197th Field Artil- replace the TSFC concept that
again increased to 3,500 person- lery Brigade (New Hampshire Na- will be tested in DF20.
nel, 94 howitzers, seven MLRS tional Guard), coordinating Fires According to the chief of Con-
and 16 radars. to 1st Cavalry Division DIVARTY cepts Development Division, Ca-
This exercise provides an in- and additional multinational DI- pabilities Development & Inte-
tense, realistic training environ- VARTYs in Poland and Latvia.7 gration Directorate, at the Fires
ment that takes advantage of U.S. The TSFC concept addressed Center of Excellence, "The TFC
Army Europe’s unique training the need for TFC and control preserves the TSFC's design to
resources to seamlessly coordi- in order to synchronize multi- synchronize multi-national Fires
nate Fires in support of U.S. and national Fires and counterfire and control counterfire opera-
4 Poland hosts Dynamic Front for the First Time, Christina Wetover, March 6, 2019, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/313368/poland-hosts-dynamic-front-first-time
5 Europe’s largest annual U.S.-led artillery war games underway in Germany, Stars and Stripes.
6 7th ATC hosts DF19 in three locations, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/314086/7th-atc-hosts-df-19-three-locations.
7 Multinational interoperability to forefront during Dynamic Front 19, Gabrielle Weaver, March 7, 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/218259/multinational_interoperability_to_forefront_
during_dynamic_front_19
9 The Fires Complex: Organizing to win in large-scale combat operations, Fires Bulletin, May-June 2018, Compton, Christopher and Boothe, Lewis L.
10 Ibid.
12 Dynamic Front 19: Minds behind the blasts, SGT Gabrielle Weaver, March 7, 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/218244/dynamic_front_19_minds_behind_the_blasts
tions across the theater, but also Interoperability, and STANAG the participant's as well as helping
provides a true fire support co- 2484 (AArtyP-5): NATO Fire Sup- to define the voids and vacuums
ordinator to the land component port Doctrine, and ATP-04: Allied for the ASCA community to try
commander and adds significant Naval Fire Support. and close/minimize."
targeting and fire support plan- During DF19, Canada’s par-
ning capability that allows the ticipation provided a verifiable ASCA University
Army to be an equal player in example. “The Canadian Army’s
joint targeting,” said Col. Christo- contribution to Exercise DF19 The use of ASCA related pro-
pher Compton. helped refine our role as an in- cedures and key strokes on Ad-
tegral member of the ASCA net- vanced Field Artillery Tactical
ASCA work, while strengthening our re- Data System (AFATDS) and other
lationships with gunners serving allied fire control systems to pro-
The ASCA interface allows with our allied nations. Interop- cess multinational fire missions
broad inclusion of multination- erability and joint readiness is all and joint Fires requests is a unique
al allies and partners into a sin- about getting to know your Allies, knowledge set not fully prolifer-
gle synchronized Fires network ensuring you can speak the same ated to the U.S. military services.
spread across multiple echelons. language on the battlefield in or- Problems experienced by fire
This enables the echelonment of der to execute operational effects direction operators are not new
multinational Fires across the bat- when it truly counts,” said Lt. Col. problems. They are problems the
tlefield by leveraging the most ca- Paul Williams, commanding offi- operators have either not been
pable firing unit available, regard- cer, 4th Regiment General Sup- trained upon or not repeated
less of nationality. It also requires port.13 enough to be part of their profes-
our adversaries to analyze sys- DF19 included numerous ASCA sional knowledge. The short-term
tems and capabilities of 29 NATO training priorities. First, air coor- fix to this training impediment is
and select Partner for Peace na- dination measure dissemination the ASCA University.
tions, not just one. (either on live fire or simulated). The ASCA University is a block
The ASCA Software interface Second, sensor-to-shooter link of instruction developed by JMRC
allows nations to digitally link using multiple options – any sen- to resolve this deadlock. JMRC
and exchange operational data sor, best shooter regardless of na- (Vampire Team) provides a week-
between participating nations tion. Third, a minimum of three long block of instruction to all DF
FA and fire support systems, en- nations had to be interoperating exercise participants operating
abling faster, more-effective firing digitally rather than by multiple fire control systems in order to
missions among allied and part- bi-lateral strands. Fourth, radar increase ASCA-related knowledge
ner FA units. deployment orders dissemina- prior to the start of any DF exer-
The ASCA program is a HQ De- tion. Fifth, deployment orders cise. For many, it is the first time
partment of the Army (DA) Secu- for other assets. Sixth, the net- they have ever heard of ASCA or
rity Cooperation program autho- work had to support fire mission utilized it during a major exercise
rized by the office of the Secretary initiation and allocation at corps or operation.
of Defense (OSD). The ASCA level. Seventh, the fire direction During DF19 ASCA University,
memorandum of understand- database design was provided to all ASCA member nations were
ing is negotiated by HQ DA. It is participants at the planning con- linked and digitally connected
signed between the participating ferences. Eighth, meteorological via a mini-CPX. It also included
nations equivalent. It is executed data sharing. Next, main plan- the 14th Marine Regiment and
by the Program Executive Office ning conference input from par- active participants from several
Command Control Computers, ticipants into the requirements sponsored, observer nations and
Tactical, Product Manager Fire for the “ASCA University” to take interested nations from all three
Support C2. The ASCA interface place before start of the exercise. locations.
was ratified by NATO Standard Then, the development of the
Agreements (STANAG) 2245 (FA Effects Guidance Matrix and dis- Interoperability
and Fire Support Data Interop- semination through ASCA, and fi-
erability), and is further shaped nally, validation of AARTY-P 1, 2, NATO defines interoperability
by the following documents and 3, and 5. as “the ability to operate in syn-
Artillery Publications (AArtyP): According to Dana Hatcher, ergy in the execution of assigned
AArtyP 1 - NATO Land Based project manager, Mission Com- tasks.” Even after many years of
Fire Support, AArtyP 2 - NATO mand Fort Sill, “Dynamic Front emphasizing interoperability and
Counter Battery Fires, AArtyP 3 - (exercise series) is a reality check NATO STANAG to foster it, recent
Artillery Procedures for Automat- on just how well the ASCA inter- missions have shown the limits of
ic Data Processing (ADP) System face works operationally between interoperability.14 To standardize
13 Canadian Gunners train with international counterparts at Exercise DYNAMIC FRONT 19 in Europe, Jaimie Tobin, March 15, 2019.
14 Enhancing interoperability: the foundation for effective NATO operations, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/also-in-2015/enhancing-interoperability-the-foundation-for-effective-na-

Lt. Col. Charles Knoll, commander of Field Artillery Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, inspects an M777A2 Howitzer
with Soldiers from A Battery, FA Squadron, 2CR during Dynamic Front 19, March 5, at Grafenwoehr Training Area,
Germany. Dynamic Front 19 is a multinational exercise conducted by the U.S. Army in Europe designed to improve
allied and partner nations’ ability to deliver long-range capabilities. (Sgt. Gabrielle Weaver/U.S. Army)
interoperability planning, the U.S. partner nation ability to integrate the exercise’s structure to devel-
Army recognizes four levels of in- joint Fires in a multinational en- op interoperability between all
teroperability. They are Level 0 vironment at both the operation- participants from the simulated
(Not Interoperable), Level 1 (De- al and tactical levels. 16 land command to the individual
conflicted), Level 2 (Compatible), ASCA interoperability of fire units conducting the live Fires in
and Level 3 (Integrated). The DF control systems easily allows the the training areas.18 Col. Patrick
exercise series maintains various command and control of mul- Macklin, commanding officer of
levels of interoperability from tinational forces spread across the 53rd Digital Liaison Detach-
levels 1-3 with the various NATO multiple countries at once. ment said, “This training builds
and allied partners as they contin- "This is a multinational FA for- joint readiness by enabling staffs
ually improve and upgrade their mation consisting of seven battal- to network infrastructure and
artillery systems and capabilities. ions from seven different nations," doctrine with this common lan-
The DF exercise series continual- said U.S. Army Col. Brett Forbes, guage. Interoperability is a fun-
ly proves that “we can no longer commander of Force Field Artil- damental condition of how our
allow ourselves the luxury of us- lery HQ for Dynamic Front 19. armies plan to fight tonight, to-
ing equipment that doesn’t work "We take those seven different morrow and in the future.” 19
together.”15 As a result, the DF formations, put them all together DF19 significantly enhanced
exercise series was designed to and fight as one cohesive unit."17 NATO Fires interoperability and
increase readiness and interop- DF19 integrated participating built upon successes in previous
erability by exercising allied and nations into every echelon of DF iterations. Enhancements oc-
to-operations/EN/index.htm
15 For NATO, True Interoperability is no longer optional, Hans Binnendijk and Elisabeth Braw, Dec. 18, 2017.
16 Poland hosts Dynamic Front for the First Time, Christina Wetover, March 6, 2019,
https://www.dvidshub.net/news/313368/poland-hosts-dynamic-front-first-time
17 Multinational interoperability to forefront during Dynamic Front 19, Gabrielle Weaver, March 7, 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/218259/multinational_interoperability_to_forefront_
during_dynamic_front_19
19 Canadian Gunners train with international counterparts at Exercise DYNAMIC FRONT 19 in Europe, Jaimie Tobin, March 15, 2019.
curred across the three domains Stefanie Bivins, USAREUR G8, Fires, several things need to occur
(human, technical and proce- IAD lead agreements specialist to assist in future iterations of the
dural) of interoperability. Key for DF19 said, “The agreements exercise.
interoperability milestones were we concluded are necessary to First, All NATO members and
enhanced and roadblocks to fur- identify and clarify responsibili- Partnership for Peace nations
ther interoperability were identi- ties on both sides and to capture must gain ASCA membership or
fied. vital provisions like entry and affiliated status. Second, all U.S.
exit, force protection and finan- FA units must continually train
Interoperability successes cial matters. Stakeholders might upon ASCA TTP’s. ASCA TTP’s
not want to deal with the bureau- should be taught to all U.S. AF-
ASCA protocols significant- cracy, but are happy they did, if ATDS operators as part of their
ly enabled digital fire mission questions arise.” core curriculum for interoper-
processing from the Combined Codifying and enacting such ability purposes, noncommis-
Joint Forces Land Component agreements allowed all DF19 mul- sioned officers associated courses,
Command (CJFLCC) to a multinational partners to fully focus and as a pre-deployment training
tinational firing unit. The use of on the interoperability tasks at required for inbound Regionally
an ITN cross-domain solution hand. Aligned Forces to Europe. Third,
was tested and proven. The TSFC add ASCA tasks to the Joint Task
utilized Joint Air Defense Opera- Keen interest ASCA List. Fourth, establish a perma-
tion Centers to track, coordinate and Dynamic Front nent “ASCA University” to facili-
and assign fire missions on behalf tate ASCA implementation. Fifth,
of the CJFLCC commander. For The Dynamic Front Exercise NATO should consider establish-
non-ASCA countries, the use of series sees significant interest in ing a NATO Fires Center of Ex-
LNO teams in the lowest HQ of not only multinational participa- cellence (NFCoE) to run a perma-
interoperability enabled them to tion but also significant interest nent “ASCA University” and take
input fire mission data into their by multinational military lead- charge of all other fire support-re-
systems directly and transmit to ership. The DF19 Distinguished lated training (targeting, concept,
the firing units over their national Visitor Day was no different. Key development and experimenta-
means.20 visitors included, the USAREUR tion, etc.) currently being taught
commander, Lt. Gen. Christopher by NATO. This NFCoE would
International agreements G. Cavoli, French Lt. Gen. Vincent be the proponent for all NATO
Guionie, the French Land Forces Fires related-standardization
DF19, and multinational Fires commander and U.S. Army Lt. agreements and doctrine. Finally,
interoperability, were successfully Gen. John Thomson III, the NA- NATO doctrine and terminology
established due to the hard work TO-U.S.A. Allied Land command- is the doctrinal bridge that brings
and behind-the-scenes work of er. Various other general officers together all the nations. Training
numerous specialized subtasks. from NATO, Turkey, Romania, and understanding of those terms
A key element is negotiating and United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium is essential in working in multina-
signing intricate and detailed in- and Czech Republic (Czechia) tional operations involving pri-
ternational agreements with all attended. The myriad of nations marily NATO nations.
participating nations. The USA- participating in this annual ex-
REUR International Agreements ercise signals its importance and Mr. Robert K. Gunther is the U.S.
Divisions (IAD) not only codified usefulness to attending nations. Army Europe lead planner for the
handshakes and promoted econ- Dynamic Front (DF) exercise series.
omy and efficiency, but also pro- Way ahead Additionally, Gunther plans and exe-
tected Army equities, eliminated cutes all USAREUR joint Fires relat-
redundancy and protected against The Dynamic Front Exercise ed exercises. He is a retired artillery
violations of U.S. Law. series is an enduring USAREUR officer with 22 years of service and
DF19 required 11 internation- exercise that will continue to ex- served in artillery positions in Bos-
al agreements with participating pand and execute in various coun- nia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, South Ko-
nations. As a rule, agreements and tries in Europe. It will continue to rea, Iraq and Afghanistan.
arrangements are intended for be “THE” exercise for NATO Fires
the primary purpose of recruit- interoperability, emerging doc- Reference
ing, organizing, supplying, equip- trine, ASCA expansion and inter- Dynamic Front 19 to Integrate Multinational Fires Capabili-
ties, 7th Army Training Command, March 1, 2019.
ping, training, servicing, mobiliz- face improvement, and a myriad
ing, demobilizing, maintaining, of other ideas, doctrine and con-
outfitting and constructing Army cepts still to be developed. To fa-
forces, equipment and facilities. cilitate this learning lab of NATO
20 White Paper: Dynamic Front 19 Interoperability Lessons Learned, 25 MAR 19, USAREUR G3/3 Fires.

Toward understanding
Fires on near-peer
battlefield
By Steven Yeadon
Editor’s note: This article is the of strike capability, nor are they in the next article in this series, it
first in a series of two articles consid- concerned with collateral dam- can be assessed how battlefields of
ering the serious aspects of the near- age.”6 the future are changing because
peer competition. Data from the Ukraine conflict of near-peer Fires.
The world witnessed in the on- show that artillery is producing
going conflict in Ukraine the use approximately 80 percent of all Near-peer field artillery
of Russian massed area Fires as- casualties, and because of high capabilities
sisted by overhead surveillance. troop losses Ukrainian Soldiers
This reconnaissance-strike mod- prefer to ride on top of armored A comparison of the military
el was central to the Zelenopillya vehicles and assault while dis- capabilities of Russia and China,
Rocket Attack that destroyed most mounted.7 British Maj. Gen. J. B. compared to advanced U.S. weap-
of two Ukrainian mechanized bat- A. Bailey said, “the possibilities ons, reveals both powers have a
talions in the open in July 2014.1 2 for artillery equipments and their mature technological capability
The increased availability of over- employment are hard to limit ex- that is more advanced than U.S.
head surveillance combined with cept by lack of imagination and or allied counterparts. In the case
massed area Fires have produced the resources needed to realize of Russia, first, Russia possess-
a new level of intensity in modern them.”8 It appears the Russian es the new 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV
conventional combat.3 Federation and its proxies are all 152 mm self-propelled howit-
As Maj. Amos Fox explains, too aware of this reality. Ukraine’s zer, which can fire eight preci-
“Russia’s actions in Ukraine have percentage of troops lost in com- sion-guided rounds per minute
revealed several innovations, bat to artillery is on a scale of the a range of 70 kilometers (km).10
most notably the employment of Second World War, which saw 60 Russian ordnance also includes
the semi-autonomous battalion percent of losses to artillery, 75 a variety of munitions such as
tactical group, and a reconnais- percent of losses to artillery on high-explosive precision-guid-
sance-strike model that tightly open terrain.9 These facts may ed munitions, jammer carrying
couples drones to strike assets, indicate that field artillery may projectiles, cluster projectiles with
hastening the speed at which over- be the decisive arm and shaper anti-tank sub munitions, as well as
whelming firepower is available of land warfare against near-peer standard and rocket-assisted high
to support tactical commanders.”4 powers. explosive-fragmentation (HE-
This reduced sensor-to-shooter The goal of this analysis is to FRAG) projectiles.11 This modern
time cycle combined with the use better understand near-peer tech- self-propelled howitzer can be ex-
of rockets and artillery dominates nologies and doctrine in relation pected to replace Russia’s current
Russia’s approach to land warfare. to Fires and some supporting Soviet-era self-propelled how-
To maximize this capability, most units, such as Russian electron- itzers. This range is significant-
firing units are organic to Russian ic warfare capabilities. This will ly greater than the range of the
battalion tactical groups.5 Howev- explain the nature of the threat new U.S. M109A7 Paladin 155 mm
er, “Russian forces are not con- against U.S. and multinational self-propelled howitzers, which
cerned with precision application forces. From this understanding, can use a 155 mm precision-guid-
1 Phillip Karber and Joshua Thibeault, “RUSSIA’S NEW-GENERATION WARFARE,” Association of the United States Army, May 20, 2016, https://www.ausa.org/articles/rus-
sia%E2%80%99s-new-generation-warfare.
2 “Ukraine conflict: Many soldiers dead in ‘rocket strike,’” BBC News, July 11, 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28261737.
3 Phillip Karber and Joshua Thibeault, “RUSSIA’S NEW-GENERATION WARFARE,” https://www.ausa.org/articles/russia%E2%80%99s-new-generation-warfare.
4 Amos Fox, “THE RUSSIAN–UKRAINIAN WAR: UNDERSTANDING THE DUST CLOUDS ON THE BATTLEFIELD,” Modern War Institute at West Point, January 17, 2017, https://mwi.
usma.edu/russian-ukrainian-war-understanding-dust-clouds-battlefield/.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Phillip Karber and Joshua Thibeault, “RUSSIA’S NEW-GENERATION WARFARE,” https://www.ausa.org/articles/russia%E2%80%99s-new-generation-warfare.
8 J.B.A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (Oxford: The Military Press Oxford, 2009), 18. Google Play Books.
9 James F. Dunnigan, How to Make War. ed. Fourth (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 105-106.
10 “2S35 Koalitsiya-SV 152mm Self-Propelled Howitzer,” Army Technology, accessed January 29, 2019, https://www.army-technology.com/projects/2s35-koalitsiya-sv-152mm-self-propelled-how-
itzer/.
11 Ibid.
A display for the TR-107, TR-122, and TR-300 rockets used in the Weishi (WS) family of artillery rocket vehicles is
displayed at a trade show.(CeeGee/Wikimedia)
ed projectile called Excalibur, onds.17 If a targeted armored vehi- targets, since similar U.S. GMLRS
which has a range of 40 km.12 cle has a laser detection capability, guided-rockets lack the capability
Second, Russia possesses la- then this allows the employment to strike moving targets.23 Howev-
ser-guided artillery projectiles for of countermeasures against la- er, this may not be a problem, be-
its older self-propelled howitzers ser-guided weapons, such as cause the Tornado-S has the abil-
and towed howitzers. This in- smoke grenades that obscure the ity to blast an area of 2.6 square
cludes both the precision-guided vehicle from laser light.18 Howev- miles.24 The smaller Russian Tor-
Krasnopol projectiles, which are er, a well-trained spotter can use nado-G MRL has also proved
marketed as capable of engaging a laser designator to paint an area useful in the role of massed area
moving targets13 at a range of 25 close to an armored vehicle, and Fires, since the Soviet-era BM-21
km,14 and the smaller Kitolov-2M several seconds later paint the ar- Grad MRL, the predecessor of the
122 mm laser-guided artillery pro- mored vehicle when the projectile newer Tornado-G MRL, was re-
jectile, which has a range of 11.5 reaches its terminal phase.19 sponsible for the devastation of
km.15 These projectiles are cur- Third, Russia possesses the Tor- the Zelenopillya rocket attack.25
rently used against pinpoint tar- nado-S Multiple Rocket Launcher The Tornado-G can launch rock-
gets, such as battle tanks, infantry (MRL), which fire satellite guid- ets armed with antitank submuni-
fighting vehicles, and field fortifi- ed rockets with a range of 120 tions a range of 40 km.26
cations, with a high probability of km.20 This is superior to the range Fourth, Russia possesses the
a first-round kill.16 A major short- of current U.S. GMLRS guid- Hermes line of Antitank Guided
coming of employing the Kras- ed-rockets, which have a range Missiles (ATGM) with a publicly
nopol (as well as other laser-guid- of 70 km.21 Although, because the disclosed range of 30 km, which
ed munitions) is the requirement guided-rockets of the Tornado-S can be fired from ground vehi-
to illuminate the target with the are satellite guided,22 they are cles, ships, or aircraft.27 If a war
laser beam for five to fifteen sec- unlikely to be able to hit moving with Russia occurs, then these
12 “Excalibur Projectile,” Raytheon, accessed October 15, 2018, https://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/excalibur.
13 “Krasnopol-M2,” KBP, accessed October 14, 2018, http://www.kbptula.ru/en/productions/artillery-guided-weapon-systems/krasnopol-m2.
14 Ibid.
15 “Kitolov-2M,” KBP, accessed October 14, 2018, http://www.kbptula.ru/en/productions/artillery-guided-weapon-systems/kitolov-2m.
16 Walter Williams, “Threat Update Krasnopol--A Laser-Guided Projectile for Tube Artillery,” Red Thrust Star, Federation of American Scientists Military Analysis Network, accessed January 29,
2019, https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/krasnopol.htm.
17 Walter Williams, “Threat Update Krasnopol--A Laser-Guided Projectile for Tube Artillery,” https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/krasnopol.htm.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Michael Peck, “Why Russia’s Most Deadly Rocket Launcher Could Soon Be a Threat to U.S. Troops,” National Interest, July 7, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-russias-most-
deadly-rocker-launcher-could-soon-be-threat-us-troops-25212.
21 “Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM)/Unitary/Alternative Warhead,” U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center, accessed
October 15, 2018, https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/guided-multiple-launch-rocket-system-gmlrs-dpicmunitaryalternative-warhead/.
22 Michael Peck, “Why Russia’s Most Deadly Rocket Launcher Could Soon Be a Threat to U.S. Troops,” https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-russias-most-deadly-rocker-launcher-could-soon-
be-threat-us-troops-25212.
23 Joseph Trevithick, “Army Plans to Double Guided Artillery Rocket’s Range by Putting Control Fins on Its Tail,” The Drive, June 22, 2018, http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/21708/army-
plans-to-double-guided-artillery-rockets-range-by-putting-control-fins-on-its-tail.
25 “Ukraine conflict: Many soldiers dead in ‘rocket strike,’” BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28261737.
27 Nikolai Litovkin, “Russia to test new anti-tank guided missiles in Syria,” Russia Beyond, October 28, 2016, https://www.rbth.com/defence/2016/10/28/russia-to-test-new-anti-tank-guided-
missiles-in-syria_642965.

Russian missiles may be used on because radar can detect artillery equipment will give it a powerful
U.S. armored forces from over- and trace it back to its source, OTH, anti-armor warfare capa-
the-horizon (OTH). Such weap- which allows for counter-battery bility greater than U.S. or allied
ons could, even in small numbers, Fires.31 Additionally, capabilities to prosecute the same
suppress, neutralize, or destroy • Russia employs a combination type of warfare. This means that
U.S. armored units. of dual-purpose improved Russia may possess a significant
Fifth, it is important to note conventional munitions, scat- advantage over U.S. and allied
that the range of the Russian terable mines, top-attack mu- ground forces.
Iskander-M tactical ballistic mis- nitions and thermobaric war- Again, Fox said, “The Russian
sile is 500 km, 200 km great- heads that have catastrophic forces’ capability to find and fix
er than the range of the U.S. consequences when used an opponent beyond the range of
ATACMS tactical ballistic missile. in preplanned, massed fire their adversaries’ ability to do the
This allows Russia to strike deeper strikes. The U.S. has removed same cannot be brushed aside,
than U.S. artillery.28 29 all of these warheads from its especially when considering the
Russia has several advantages inventory. associated ability to deliver mas-
for their electronic warfare and as • Ukraine and Russia are using sive quantities of rocket and artil-
observed in Ukraine, direct fire artillery at a range lery fire almost instantaneously.”33
Russia uses electronic warfare of 1 to 6 km as overwatch sys- A key point to remember about
for four primary roles: tems, to suppress anti-tank Russian operations in Ukraine is
• Denying communications: defenses, and as anti-tank that they are not joint, because
There are regions in [the weapons. there are no Russian air force or
Ukrainian] Donbass where no • The pursuit of increased artil- army aircraft in the air. This is in-
electromagnetic communica- lery range is a trend necessi- genious since it negates the need
tions—including radio, cell- tated by greater dispersion on to get clearance of airspace, mak-
phone and television—work. the battlefield and made pos- ing fire-support requests timelier
• Defeating unmanned aerial sible by a combination of un- than they would otherwise be.34
systems: Electronic warfare manned aerial vehicles on the One way the U.S. military is try-
is the single largest killer of battlefield and the increased ing to work around this problem
Ukrainian [unmanned aerial] capability of counter-battery is through new military concepts
systems by jamming either radar. such as multi-domain operations
the controller or GPS signals. • Increased emphasis on count- 1.5 and Brigade Deep Battle 2.0. To
• Defeating artillery and mor- er-battery radar and Fires explain just one of them, Brigade
tars: Russian electronic war- disrupts opposing fire mis- Deep Battle 2.0, infiltrating SUAS
fare predetonates or duds in- sions by forcing the enemy to teams and forward observers sup-
coming artillery and mortar move.32 ported by artillery assets hunt and
rounds that have electronic Russian artillery maintains an destroy strategic targets, most es-
fusing. approximate 3:1 size advantage pecially enemy air defense artil-
• Targeting command and con- over the [U.S.] Army’s artillery.” lery. This allows a handoff to ro-
trol nodes: Russian electronic Thus, Russia possesses a lon- tary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft
warfare can detect all electro- ger ranged and more robust an- that can then hunt and destroy
magnetic emissions, including ti-armor and deep strike capabil- enemy armor in a permissive en-
those from radios, Blue Force ity with its artillery than the U.S. vironment.35 These concepts are
Tracker, Wi-Fi and cellphones, military and comparable allied ingenious and hold great prom-
which can then be pinpointed militaries possess. Russia also ise, yet the fact remains that U.S.
with unmanned aerial systems possesses a powerful and mature ground forces will find it difficult
and targeted with massed ar- electronic warfare capability. Giv- to match Russia’s massed artillery
tillery.”30 en, events in Ukraine, which bet- raids head-on with their current
Lastly, Russia possesses advan- ter model a near-peer war than field artillery technologies.
tages to its Fires as demonstrated the insurgency in Syria, contin- Other nations than Russia also
in Ukraine. Before continuing, ued Russian investment in the de- stand to benefit from Russian ex-
it is best to explain that an im- velopment of and procurement ports of its military technologies.
portant factor in modern Fires of precision-guided ordnance, ar- This could result in a prolifera-
is counter-battery radar. This is ea-effect munitions and artillery tion of weapons aimed at destroy-
28 “ATACMS Long-Range Precision Tactical Missile System,” Lockheed Martin, published 2011, accessed October 14, 2018, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/mfc/pc/
army-tacticle-missile-system-block-ia-unitary-atacms/mfc-atacms-block-1a-unitary-pc.pdf.
29 Dave Majumdar, “Why Russia’s Iskander Missile is a Killer,” National Interest, July 19, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-russias-iskander-missile-killer-26216.
30 Phillip Karber and Joshua Thibeault, “RUSSIA’S NEW-GENERATION WARFARE,” Association of the United States Army.
31 James F. Dunnigan, How to Make War. ed. Fourth, 101.
32 Phillip Karber and Joshua Thibeault, “RUSSIA’S NEW-GENERATION WARFARE,” Association of the United States Army.
33 Major Amos C. Fox, “The Battle of Debal’tseve: the Conventional Line of Effort in Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine,” Armor, Winter 2017 edition, accessed May 23, 2019, https://www.benning.
army.mil/armor/eARMOR/content/issues/2017/Winter/1Fox17.pdf.
34 Ibid.
35 Capt. Joseph Schmid, 2nd Lt. Hector Lopez, 2nd Lt. Zach Tousignant, and 2nd Lt. Paul Mirabile, “An integrated brigade deep fight Brigade Deep Battle 2.0,” Fires, November - December 2018:
20, http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/archives/2018/nov-dec/articles/18-6_Nov-Dec_web_Schmid.pdf.
A WS-22 weapon system sits on display during a trade show. (Shadman Samee/Wikimedia)
ing Western ground forces using projectiles.36 This is a greater nopol projectiles that are also
massed area Fires. One serious range than that of the new U.S. available for export from Russia.40
concern is that China may already M109A7 Paladin with its 40 km Two versions called the GP-1 and
possess an untested ability to maximum range using Excali- GP-6 are produced by China.41
use artillery in a devastating way bur precision-guided projectiles. Second, China possesses sev-
against U.S. and allied troop for- China has so far developed the eral guided-rockets including the
mations. PLZ-52 self-propelled howitzer,37 AR3,42 WS-2,43 WS-3,44 WS-3A,45
First, China is adopting 52 and the PLZ-05 self-propelled howit- WS-32,46 and the A300,47 which
54 caliber artillery with a range of zer,38 and the lighter weight SH-1 are all Inertial Navigation Sys-
up to 53 km when using Extend- self-propelled howitzer with a tem (INS) and satellite-guided.
ed-Range, Full-Bore, Base-Bleed, 52 or 54 caliber.39 China already All these referenced guided-rock-
Rocket-Assisted (ERFB-BB-RA) possesses the Laser-guided Kras- ets have a longer range than U.S.
36 “PLZ52 155mm 52 Calibre Self-propelled armoured tracked howitzer,” Army Recognition, January 6, 2019, https://www.armyrecognition.com/china_artillery_vehicles_and_weapon_sys-
tems_uk/plz52_155mm_52_caliber_self-propelled_howitzer_technical_data_sheet_specifications_pictures_video.html.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 “SH1 Wheeled self-propelled howitzer 155mm,” Army Recognition, November 29, 2018, https://www.armyrecognition.com/china_artillery_vehicles_and_weapon_systems_uk/sh1_wheeled_
self-propelled_howitzer_155mm_technical_data_sheet_specifications_description_pictures.html.
40 “Smart ammo: precision-guided munitions for field artillery,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, published 2015, accessed October 14, 2018, https://www.janes.com/images/assets/423/54423/precision-guid-
ed_munitions_for_field_artillery.pdf.
41 Ibid.
42 “AR3 370mm MRLS multiple rocket launcher system data sheet specifications information description UK,” Army Recognition, March 4, 2011, https://www.armyrecognition.com/china_artil-
lery_vehicles_and_weapon_systems_uk/ar3_370mm_mrls_multiple_rocket_launcher_system_data_sheet_specifications_information_description_uk.html.
43 “WS-2 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System,” China Aerospace Long-March International, accessed October 14, 2018, http://cloud.alitchina.com/en/?c=show&m=view&id=23.
44 “WS-3 Precision Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System,” China Aerospace Long-March International, accessed October 14, 2018, http://cloud.alitchina.com/en/?c=show&m=view&id=20.
45 “WS-3A Precision Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System,” China Aerospace Long-March International, accessed October 14, 2018, http://cloud.alitchina.com/en/?c=show&m=view&id=19.
47 “A300 Precision Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System,” China Aerospace Long-March International, accessed October 14, 2018, http://cloud.alitchina.com/en/?c=show&m=view&id=16.

China has the SR5 Guided Mul- reinforces the strategic need to
tiple Launch Rocket System that prioritize artillery modernization
can fire various guided-rockets above all other acquisition proj-
with maximum ranges of 40 km ects for U.S. ground forces, a posi-
to 70 km.50 This range is equiva- tion already embraced by the U.S.
lent to current U.S. GMLRS guid- Army.57
ed-rockets. China’s Type 90B
MLRS can fire salvos of 122 mm Conclusion
rockets with various warheads
at a range of 20-40 km.51 Lastly, This article assessed the threat
China possesses the CM-501G presented by near-peer competi-
and CM-501GA precision attack tors against U.S. and multination-
weapons, precision-guided mis- al forces. An area of great con-
siles that can engage point targets cern is the longer range enjoyed
with a range of 70 km and 40 km, by Russian and Chinese Fires
respectively. The missiles can units. Thus, the acquisition of the
also perform reconnaissance and Tail Controlled Guided Multi-
damage assessment, and they can ple Launch Rocket System guid-
be fired from planes, ships, or ed-rockets, the Extended-Range
ground vehicles.52 53 Cannon Artillery howitzers, and
Third, China possesses nu- the Precision Strike Missile are
merous tactical, short-range, programs of the highest priority
medium-range, and intermedi- to match or exceed near-peer ca-
ate-range ballistic missiles, which pabilities. Fortunately, such is al-
can threaten not only the U.S. ready the case with the U.S. Army.
rear but also threaten U.S. bases In the next article in this series,
throughout the Western Pacific.54 the future of war will be assessed
Thus, China is acquiring field considering near-peer Fires capa-
artillery assets that could mass bilities.
Fires against U.S. or allied forces Steven Yeadon is an independent
with weapons technologies that scholar holding a Bachelor of Arts in
far outrange similar U.S. artillery. political science from the University of
Additionally, Ukraine shows Central Florida. He is a published au-
that the Russian military, and thor in the field of military operations.
likely the better funded Chinese He is currently preparing for work as
military, can afford the neces- a military analyst.
sary C4ISR assets, vehicles, ord-
GMLRS guided-rockets, with a nance, and training to fight land
range of 70 km, and all but the WS- wars with a heavy emphasis on
32 guided-rockets have a range of massed area Fires, and potential-
200 or more km. However, INS ly massed precision-guided Fires.
and satellite guidance likely mean This makes sense since the unit
they need to use submunitions cost of Western armor is in the
against moving targets. China range of millions of dollars,55 56
possesses the WS-33 guided rock- which allows for very expensive
et which can hit moving targets munitions to be cost effective in
with its infrared imaging terminal the attrition of Western armored
homing guidance and has a range forces.
of 60 km.48 China also possesses It must be stated that these ad-
the WS-43 Loitering Attack Weap- vantages to near-peer militaries
on System which can hit moving came about due to a lack of in-
targets and has a range of 60 km.49 vestment in U.S. artillery, and it
49 “WS-43 Loitering Attack Weapon System,” China Aerospace Long-March International, http://cloud.alitchina.com/en/?c=show&m=view&id=49.
50 “SR5 122mm/220mm GMLRS Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System,” Army Recognition, December 19, 2018, https://www.armyrecognition.com/china_artillery_vehicles_and_weapon_sys-
tems_uk/sr5_sr-5_guided_multiple_launch_rocket_system_gmlrs_mlrs_122mm_220_mm_technical_data_sheet_specifications_pictures_video_11601162.html.
51 “Type 90B 122mm MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System,” Army Recognition, published May 16, 2019, https://www.armyrecognition.com/china_artillery_vehicles_and_weapon_systems_uk/
type_90b_122mm_mlrs_multiple_launch_rocket_system_technical_data_sheet_specifications_pictures.html.
52 “CM-501G Precision Attack Weaponry,” Xinhuanet, published May 27, 2015. http://www.xinhuanet.com//mil/2015-05/27/c_127846853.htm.
53 Ibid.
54 Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of China,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018, last modified June 15, 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/.
55 “ABRAMS TANK M1A2,” The Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, accessed January 28, 2019, http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/fy1999/pdf/army/99m1a2.pdf.
56 “BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE SYSTEM-A3 (BFVS-A3),” The Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, accessed January 28, 2019, http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/
fy1999/pdf/army/99bradley.pdf.
57 Todd South, “Return of Fires: How the Army is getting back to its big guns as it prepares for the near-peer fight,” Your Army, Army Times, August 27, 2018, https://www.armytimes.com/news/
your-army/2018/08/27/return-of-fires-how-the-army-is-getting-back-to-its-big-guns-as-it-prepares-for-the-near-peer-fight/.
Joint terminal attack controllers stand by ready to integrate air-to-ground Fires and talk with the aircraft pilot to coor-
dinate close-air support during BOLC Class 004-19’s Redleg Culminating Training Event Aug. 8 at Fort Sill. (Monica
Wood/Fires Bulletin)
FA hosts ADA
at Redleg CTE
for first time
By Mitch Meador
In a first for the Fires Center of "Our role out here today is to explained Staff Sgt. Gregory
Excellence, 23 Air Defense Artil- see how the aircraft actually come Brookes, a 42 Papa BOLC instruc-
lery Basic Officer Leader Course in and do their offensive attacks. tor for ADA lieutenants going for
lieutenants in Class 002-19 joined So we, as air defenders, we actu- the short-range (SHORAD) track
Field Artillery BOLC lieutenants ally support maneuver units. We phase.
in Class 004-19 for the last day of support their defended assets. The ADA BOLC lieutenants got
their Redleg Culminating Train- So they had two defended assets to see how they would have been
ing Event Aug. 8. out there (in the training event)," employed on the hilltop observa-

tion post. They also saw the ave- What would the ADA instructor before graduation. The FA lieu-
nues of approach for the aircraft like to see his lieutenants get out tenants, on the other hand, grad-
and learned how they would de- of the lesson? uated Aug. 13, having wrapped up
fend ground forces from enemy "I want them to understand the Redleg CTE Aug. 8.
aircraft, along a tree line using defensive tactics that they can "It was really fun to get out
terrain, Stinger missiles and de- use. We go by BOWMEDs, which there and utilize all the skills that
fensive tactics. is balance of Fires, overlapping we had and see all the training
Instructors have long want- Fires, weighted coverage, mutual we had come together," said 2nd
ed to introduce ADA lieutenants support, early engagement and Lt. Hugh Fitzmaurice, whose first
to what goes on at Redleg CTE, defense and death. If they under- duty assignment after graduation
but ADA BOLC is 19 weeks long, stand those key principles, then will be at Fort Polk, La.
which doesn't mesh with anybody they can deploy anywhere in the Asked if he felt like he got into
else's training schedule, Brookes world, without an issue," Brookes the right branch, Fitzmaurice
noted. It just so happened that said. said, "Definitely. I always wanted
this time the planets aligned, and Having boots on the ground at to go FA. It's exciting to finally be
they were able to come out to the Redleg CTE gives air defenders going out into the force."
observation post to see how they and Avenger crewmembers key Besides the seven FA lieuten-
could defend an asset. insights on where to engage their ants standing on Andrews Hill,
"So (the FA lieutenants are) us- targets, whether it's inbound or about 70 more were in the field.
ing it as offense, but we're actually outbound. Half were on the gun line and half
using it totally opposite," Brookes "Now they get to see the better on Apache Hill.
said. "We're taking the aircraft picture and actually get a live pic- They were in two-member
that's coming in as enemy, and ture to see how they actually come teams paired up with a contractor
we're seeing how we can actually in and scoot out," Brookes said. and a civilian Joint Fires Observ-
employ our Avengers and defend This class of ADA lieutenants er Course instructor, according to
the asset." still had a month and a half to go Sgt. 1st Class Michael Huddleston,
Lieutenants in Field Artillery Basic Officer Leader Course Class 004-19 share binoculars to scope out the incoming
fighter aircraft during the Redleg Culminating Training Event Aug. 8. (Monica Wood/Fires Bulletin)
One of two F/A 18 Hornets performs a “show of force” flyover in memory of Air Force Maj. David Gray on Fort Sill Aug.
8, seven years to the day after he was killed by insurgents while supporting Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghani-
stan. (Monica Wood/Fires Bulletin)
noncommissioned officer in and most likely take the Joint Ter- integrate surface Fires and air-de-
charge of the Army Multi-Do- minal Attack Controller ( JTAC) livered Fires," Hansen said.
main Targeting Center. Qualification Course in the next He cited two things going on:
The FA lieutenants learned how six months to a year. First, a ground-based threat being
to plan, prepare and execute the "We are here with some of our suppressed and flicked with artil-
integration of surface-to-surface students observing training. The lery, after which air power is used
and air-to-surface Fires, accord- training is between the Field Ar- to destroy it, thus demonstrating
ing to Lt. Col. Nick Sargent, a tillery BOLC class with their cul- altitude deconfliction. Second,
British exchange officer nearing mination training exercise and using artillery to suppress a threat
the end of his time as leader of then also some JTACs. They are while using aircraft to destroy a
joint integration within the Army from the 6th Combat Training nearby target that would be high-
Multi-Domain Targeting Center. Squadron. They are here at Fort er up on the ground commander's
"When you look at the require- Sill, and they assist with the JFO intent, thus demonstrating lateral
ments that we'll have levied upon ( Joint Fires Observer) Course," deconfliction.
us in large-scale combat opera- explained Air Force Maj. Jeffrey "This is a practical example
tions, we can't afford to stop ar- Hansen, director of operations for deconfliction techniques for
tillery shooting to allow close air with the 137th Combat Training joint Fires we're actually able to
support to occur. So we're teach- Flight based at Will Rogers World demonstrate to them today," Han-
ing them the techniques that al- Airport. sen said
low them to develop attack geom- "What you are seeing is the Mitch Meador graduated from Okla-
etry that allows a simultaneous combination of JFO training with homa State University in the bicen-
massing of joint Fires, both from JTAC training. The JFOs are the tennial year of 1976 and has been in
the air and from the ground," Sar- experts in field artillery integra- the newspaper business for more than
gent said. tion with the JTACs as the air pow- 40 years. His father, Master Sgt. Ches-
Also part of the mix Aug. 8 were er experts. The JFOs are actually ter (“Chet”) Earl Meador, deployed to
Air National Guard students from deriving targeting data, passing Europe with Company B, 1st Battal-
the Initial Combat Skills Training that targeting data to the JTAC to ion, 354th Infantry, 89th Infantry
class that the 137th Combat Train- help the JTAC build the (close air Division, three weeks after D-Day
ing Flight teaches at Will Rogers support) brief, and having your and fought in the Battle of the Bulge.
Air National Guard Base in Okla- Army and Air Force partners work
homa City. Once they graduate together to essentially seamlessly
they'll return to their Guard units

AMCOM’s display Patriot
relocates to home of Air
Defense Artillery
By Gina Baltrusch
The decommissioned Patri- A cooperative team of Patri- Artillery Brigade to shepherd the
ot missile launcher on display in ot system and transportation launcher to its new home.
front of the U. S. Army Aviation experts from both installations “We’re really excited to have
and Missile Command's head- pooled their knowledge and ex- this Patriot coming home with
quarters departed Redstone Ar- perience to figure out how to us,” Hedlind said, smiling broadly
senal, Aug. 28, headed for a new partially dismantle and load the as a missile canister was crane-lift-
home at the front gates of Fort launcher, which has greeted trav- ed for loading. “We had already
Sill, Okla., to represent air de- elers on Martin Road passing the searched many other units and
fense artillery units and Soldiers Sparkman Center, during rain or maintenance depots for one soon
stationed there. shine, for almost 30 years. to be decommissioned that we
It’s been more than 10 years In order to transport the might be able to have, but had
since the U.S. Army Air Defense launcher on public highways, the no luck. So when AMCOM said
Artillery School and many ADA top two of the Patriot’s four mis- we could come get this one, we
units were relocated to Fort Sill sile canisters had to be removed came.”
as part of a Base Realignment and and transported separately from The Patriot missile launcher ar-
Closure. The 30th Air Defense the launcher so it would safely fit rived the afternoon of Aug. 29 at
Artillery Brigade is a subordinate under bridges along the way. Fort Sill, where it will get a face-
unit of the Fires Center of Excel- The team had a little trouble lift of sanding and fresh paint, said
lence, which is part of Training when they encountered rust on Hedlind. It is destined for promi-
and Doctrine Command. The 31st one of the launcher’s actuators, nent placement at Fort Sill’s Bent-
Air Defense Artillery Brigade and piston-like components which ley Gate on Sheridan Road to rep-
its three battle-ready air defense raise and lower the missile canis- resent the “Home of Air Defense
battalions are organized under ters on the launcher. Artillery” alongside “Home of the
the 32nd Air and Missile Defense “Naturally, it has some rust af- Field Artillery” displays.
Command, at Fort Bliss, Texas, ter all those years outside,” said The space left by its absence in
part of the Army’s Forces Com- Joe Woods, transportation lead front of the Sparkman Building
mand. from Redstone’s Logistics Read- will eventually be filled.
“For decades, Fort Sill has been iness Center, as LRC mechanics “We're already on the lookout
commonly known as the ‘Home assessed the situation. “But, that’s for another missile or rocket sys-
of the Field Artillery’ – there are not anything we can’t deal with tem ready for retirement,” said
numerous static displays of how- – we just need to get the parts to Rial.
itzers and cannons all around the start moving a little bit.” Gina Baltrusch, serves as a public
installation. In contrast, when it Some hammering, lubrication affairs specialist with the U.S. Army
comes to having a visible pres- and a cutting torch did the trick, Aviation and Missile Command, at
ence on the installation, it’s not eventually allowing the missile Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. With al-
easy to tell that Fort Sill is now canisters to be lowered using a most 25 years in Army public affairs,
also the ‘Home of the Air Defense hand crank to a level position for including seven as an active-duty Sol-
Artillery,’” said AMCOM’s Missile disassembly. The two canisters, dier (June 1991-November 1998), her
Maintenance Officer Chief War- then the launcher were lifted by experience includes media relations,
rant Officer 4 Araceli Rial. “So, crane onto flatbed trailers to be- public involvement, project-manage-
when we received a request from gin their 760-mile journey. ment support, writing, photojour-
the 30th ADA for our display “It definitely took the whole nalism, broadcasting and emergency
launcher, we didn’t hesitate to team to get the launcher ready for management communications.
agree. It just seemed right that the the trip,” said Electronic Missile
ADA school and front-line ADA Systems Technician, Chief War-
Soldiers should have our Patriot rant Officer 2 Jeremy Hedlind,
to represent them at their new who traveled to Redstone Arsenal
home station.” from Fort Sill’s 30th Air Defense
In the next issue of Fires
November-December 2019, Fires in cyber, electronic warfare and space. The proliferation of new and
sophisticated conventional capabilities are emerging that are designed to exploit U.S. Army weaknesses.
From unmanned aerial systems, to being tracked across the electromagnetic spectrum, what is Fires role
as the future of war becomes more and more reliant on networks of computers? The Nov.-Dec. issue will
discuss fighting in degraded and destroyed operations; operational security liabilities; and training to em-
phasize cover, concealment, dispersion, and operating without emitting a signal.
The deadline for submissions is Oct. 1, 2019. Send your submissions to usarmy.sill.fcoe.mbx.fires-bulle-
[email protected] or call (580) 442-1090 for more information.
Members of 2nd Battalion, 263rd Air Defense Artillery, South Carolina National Guard, participated in an Interna-
tional Joint Force assessment of the first generation Chemical Agent Detector Colorimetric Reader (CADCoR) prototype,
Clemson, South Carolina, July 13, 2019. Feedback from the Soldiers will be used to evaluate, improve and assess the
CADCoR in determining calorimetric responses. (Photos by Capt. Ed Duvall/678th ADA BDE)

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A joint publication for U.S. Artillery professionals September - October 2019

2 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

Current and future capabilities as a means of defeat- complex anti-access/area denial

4 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

6 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

8 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

10 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

12 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

(Judy Oman/FCoE CPG)

14 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

16 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

18 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

Figure 1. Warfighter Exercise 19.2 battle rhythm. (Courtesy illustration)

CG DCG-M NEW CORPS CORPS DIV WG

0800 CORPS CG BUA

20 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

ATO KN FIRE SUPPORT EXECUTION MATRIX AS OF: 1317000NOV18

CAS supporting convoy security for SACP

Figure 3. Warfighter Exercise 19.2 target sync matrix. (Courtesy illustration)

22 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

and armor units

24 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

26 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

FCE identiﬁes ﬁring unit for

28 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

The air defender

AAA Soldiers found themselves

30 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

18 Semmens, page 33.

32 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

34 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

36 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

38 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

40 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

42 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

First missions near Syrian

For a while TF Wagram re-

44 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

“The working group helped us

find a common ground with our

counterparts, and helped us build

off each other’s successes.”

was a great success in not only

recognizing our new junior non-

commissioned officers, but

also in sharing the tradition

with our Emirati counterparts

and coalition forces.”

46 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

JAGIC chief in Joint enemy that will never be able to

Warfighting Assessment 19 unexpected combined effects.

48 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

- Integration of Lethal and Non-lethal Effects (Army,

More than fully compatible

50 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

52 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability

The exercise experimented til now, military officials said.2 In

54 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability