The Professional Bulletin of the Armor Branch, Headquarters, Department of the Army, PB 17-17-3

E ditor in C hief Features

LISA ALLEY 4 The Lethality Imperative: Training Cavalry Squadrons to Fight for
Information
Commandant LTC Scott Pence
BG DAVID LESPERANCE 13 Increasing Reconnaissance and Security Proficiency through
Leader Experience
ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published quarterly by the U.S. Army LTC Mark McClellan
Armor School, McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg. 4), Suite W142, 1 Kark-
er Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905. 17 The Return of Cavalry: a Multi-Domain Battle Study
MAJ Nathan A. Jennings, MAJ Amos C. Fox, MAJ Adam L. Taliaferro,
Disclaimers: The information contained in ARMOR represents the MAJ David W. Griffith and MAJ Kyle T. Trottier
professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily re-
flect the official Army, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
24 Leveraging Space: an Examination of the Ultimate High Ground
or U.S. Army Armor School position, nor does it change or super- at Echelons Brigade and Below
sede any information presented in other official Army publications. LTC Coley D. Tyler
28 Missed Opportunities: How Stryker Brigade Combat Teams Are
Manuscripts and their accompanying figures become government
property and public domain upon receipt in ARMOR editorial of-
Misusing Organic Signals Intelligence, Electronic-Warfare Capa-
fices. (The ideas within the manuscript remain the author’s intel- bilities
lectual property and may be reused by the author, but the work it- CPT Elena Cherepanova
self — the particular expression of the ideas — passes to public do- 32 Scouts Fashion Victory in Gainey Cup Competition
main upon receipt of the manuscript.) ARMOR staff will make nec- CPT Patrick M. Zang and CPT John L. Albert
essary grammar, syntax and style corrections on the text to meet
publication standards and will redesign illustrations and charts for 38 Enabling Mission Command through Cavalry Squadron Operations
clarity and to standards as necessary. ARMOR staff may coordinate MAJ R. Perry White
changes with authors in the interest of ensuring that content re- 42 What Do We Mean When We Say ‘Fight For Information’?
mains accurate and professionally developmental. As a non-copy-
righted government publication, no copyright is granted if a work
LTC Nathan Palisca
is published in ARMOR, and in general, no copyrighted works should 49 Cordoba Cats: Ejercito de Tierra’s Leopard 2E Main Battle Tank
be submitted for consideration to publish. On occasion, however, Stefan DeGraef
ARMOR may wish to publish copyrighted material, and in that in-
stance, individual authors’ copyrights will be protected by special 51 Training and Evaluation in a Complex Environment
arrangement. LTC Jeffrey J. Barta and MAJ Chase S. Baker
As the primary purpose of ARMOR content is the professional de- 57 Iron Brigade’s Combat-Team Pursuit of Mobile Command-Post
velopment of Armor Branch soldiers, ARMOR focuses on materials Capabilities
for which the Armor School has proponency: armored, direct-fire COL Charles Lombardo and MAJ Ken Selby
ground combat systems not serving primarily as infantry carriers;
weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series en-
listed Soldiers; miscellaneous items of equipment which armored
and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all
19-series officers and CMF 19-series enlisted Soldiers; and informa-
tion concerning the training, logistics, history and leadership of ar-
mor and armored cavalry units at a brigade/regiment level and be-
low, to include threat units at those levels.
Distribution: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
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connaissance squadron headquarters; or armored cavalry troop,
armor company and motorized brigade headquarters of the U.S.
Departments
Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DoD schools, HQDA and
1 Contacts
Army Command staff agencies with responsibility for armored, di-
2 Chief of Armor’s Hatch
rect fire, ground combat systems, organizations and training of the 3 Gunner’s Seat
personnel for such organizations may request two copies by send- 63 From the Boresight Line
ing a request to the editor in chief. 64 Book Reviews
65 Featured Unit: 16th Cavalry Regiment
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McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg. 4), Suite W142, 1 Karker Street, Fort
Benning, GA 31905. By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
Official: MARK A. MILLEY
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

GERALD B. O’KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
Summer 2017, Vol. CXXVIII, No. 3 1714411
 Armor School Points of Contact
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BG David A. Lesperance (706) 545-2029
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REPRINTS: ARMOR is published by authority of the Chief of Email: [email protected] DSN: 835
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is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright Armor School Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM)
is indicated. Request all organizations not affiliated with the CSM Alan K. Hummel (706) 545-3815
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CHIEF OF ARMOR’S HATCH

BG David Lesperance
Chief of Armor/Commandant
U.S. Army Armor School

Strengthening the
Branch’s Core
It’s an honor to assume responsibilities We will continue to engage with the
as 51st Chief of Armor. I want to thank operating force through unit and com- platoons; our captains are able to com-
BG John Kolasheski for his leadership, bat-training center (CTC) visits, cavalry mand tank companies and cavalry
drive and dedication to the Armor and armored warfighting forums, divi- troops, and lead battalion, squadron
Branch and school for the past year. sion-level cavalry symposiums, Gainey and BCT staffs; and noncommissioned
and Sullivan Cups, ARMOR magazine, officers are experts on their combat
Reconnaissance and security are at the
Thunderbolt Blast and through our platforms and prepared to lead in Ar-
very core of our branch, reaching back
Facebook page. I want to highlight a mor and Cavalry formations.
to our foundation as Cavalry. Armor
and Cavalry leaders and Soldiers are key organization that manages out-
In support of MCoE’s efforts to mod-
renowned for their grasp of the com- reach among the Maneuver Center of
ernize the current force, the Armor
bined-arms fight and are well trained Excellence (MCoE), Armor School and
School is working closely with MCoE’s
to integrate all warfighting functions operating force: the U.S. Army Training
Capabilities Development and Integra-
into sound execution of reconnais- and Doctrine Command’s capability
tion Directorate to develop the doc-
sance and security fundamentals, en- manager for the ABCT (TCM-ABCT).
trine and capabilities of the future ma-
abling combined-arms maneuver. Ar- The TCM-ABCT director, COL Andy Bos-
neuver force that enable our Armor
mored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) ton, and his team spend a considerable
and Cavalry formations to dominate
are the center of gravity for the Armor amount of time on the road at CTCs
and win across the range of military
Branch. ABCTs are currently in high de- and division umbrella weeks to engage
operations.
mand, with continuous deployments in and interact with units to capture cur-
support of regionally aligned force op- rent observations. It’s an exciting time to be a member of
erations in Korea, Europe and the Mid- the Armor and Cavalry team, and I am
The Armor School is leading an MCoE
dle East. Tankers and scouts are mas- humbled to serve as the 51st Chief of
effort to analyze the current state of
ters of the combined-arms fight across Armor. We look forward to your atten-
combat platform lethality in all three
all BCT types – we remain the combat dance at the Maneuver Warfighter
BCT types. This effort will look across
arm of decision! Conference Sept. 12-15, 2017. Please
the Army’s doctrine, organization,
keep in touch.
The Armor School will continue to training programs, materiel, leadership
build and train lethal Soldiers and lead- and education programs and policy
ers as we prepare the growing Armor spectrum to assess, then develop, a Acronym Quick-Scan
force for the rapidly changing opera- combat-platform lethality strategy en-
tional environment. For the past 241 abling a more lethal maneuver force. ABCT – armored brigade combat team
years, the basis of that profession has Within our leader development and CTC – combat-training center
been the ability to decisively maneu- MCoE – Maneuver Center of
functional training courses, the Armor Excellence
ver against and deliver precise lethal School is ensuring that the leaders we TCM-ABCT – (U.S. Army) Training
direct fires on the enemy. Well-trained send to the force are educated, trained and Doctrine Command capability
combined-arms battalions and Cavalry and ready to lead on day one. This in- manager for the armored brigade
squadrons deliver shock effect and le- cludes ensuring our lieutenants are combat team
thality and are decisive. trained to lead tank and scout

2 Summer 2017
GUNNER’S SEAT

CSM Alan K. Hummel

Command Sergeant Major
U.S. Army Armor School

Shortages in the
Branch
I would like to use this setting to bid sergeants. While those numbers don’t
farewell to promotable BG John Kolas- seem very dramatic, there is a major their board appearance and ensuring
heski and his family as they depart Fort issue seen from them: while we are you are sending them to the Basic
Benning, GA. I would also like to thank short sergeants, 884 19D and 340 19K Leader Course as soon as they are eli-
them for their unwavering support and specialists were eligible to attend the gible and able to attend. Finally, lead-
incredible contributions to the Armor board in the primary zone. So the main ers should be training their Soldiers to
family. BG Kolasheski’s devotion and issue becomes we are not getting Sol- excel at the promotion board by mak-
expertise allowed us as the Armor pro- diers ready to attend the board. ing them rehearse and by conducting
ponent to make changes and decisions mock boards to simulate the stressful
As is always the case, there exists an environment they will be undergoing.
that will influence the Armor Branch
ever-growing need to grow leaders and
for the foreseeable future. We contin-
noncommissioned officers from within In closing, I would like to welcome the
ue to wish success to the Kolasheskis
our own ranks; this is what we do for 51st Chief of Armor, BG David Lesper-
as promotable BG Kolasheski progress-
sergeants and staff sergeants. Several ance, and his family. BG Lesperance
es to his next assignment as the U.S.
steps can be taken to ensure that our joins us after departing Fort Bragg, NC,
Army Forces Command’s deputy chief
junior Soldiers are prepared to be sent as the assistant commanding general
of staff, G-3/5/7.
to the board when the appropriate (support) for 1st Special Forces Com-
I would like to focus this edition of time comes, and all that these actions mand. I look forward to working with
Gunner’s Seat on the shortage of ser- require is some careful thought and at- BG Lesperance as we continue to guide
geants the Armor Branch is currently tention from you as their leader. These and develop the future Soldiers and
facing. As of July 17, the 19D military- simple tasks include ensuring your Sol- leaders of the Armor Branch.
occupation specialty is short by 115, diers complete structured self-devel-
and the 19K MOS is short 299 opment on-line courses well before

3 Summer 2017
 The Lethality Imperative:
Training Cavalry Squadrons
to Fight for Information
by LTC Scott Pence An idyllic scout mission includes unde- heightened need for rapid and forceful
tected movement to an OP, occupa- reconnaissance.
The voice came from the center speak-
tion, timely and accurate reports that
er box in the tactical-operations center
satisfy the commander’s PIR, and sub- Multi-domain battle
(TOC): “Contact, four enemy personnel, The very nature of multi-domain oper-
sequent destruction of the enemy by
west, out.” ations implies that the tempo will be
indirect fire. The scouts, of course, in-
My furthest scout element had made flict this humiliation on the enemy on overdrive. In the best conditions,
contact and compromised their posi- without ever being detected or using national assets and unmanned aerial
tion. I knew what would come next. their individual weapons. This might be systems (UAS) provide copious data on
The opposing force (opfor) at Joint the case in some missions, especially the operational environment (OE) pri-
Readiness Training Center (JRTC) is at CTCs, but in our warfighting history or to a JFE (airborne operation). In the-
ruthless – they know every inch of the we have often returned to the art of ory, the operational commander
training area, and I knew we had been fighting for information. should have full situational awareness
fortunate for too long. of conditions on the ground before de-
COL Curtis Taylor, commander of 1 st livery of paratroopers. In the worst
After the joint forcible entry (JFE), the Stryker BCT, 4th Infantry Division, the conditions, however, the enemy will
dismounted scout team had advanced R&S BCT, addressed this phenomenon deny the U.S. joint force’s asymmetric
off the roads and through swamps, in his seminal 2005 article, “Trading advantages from overpowering his de-
succeeding in establishing an observa- the Saber for Stealth.”1 He wrote that fenses through electronic and cyberat-
tion post (OP) overlooking a critical in- CTC trends often create a false securi- tacks that jam, spoof or exploit mis-
tersection. Up to this point, this scout ty in the ability of stealthy light recon- sion-command systems.
team was the single most successful naissance to slowly and deliberately
achieve reconnaissance objectives. The The 2014 Army Operating Concept not-
team in the brigade. Now, it seemed,
1987 and 1996 Goldsmith Studies from ed that “Army forces will have to sup-
the opfor had engaged them in a move-
RAND Corporation concluded that the port joint operations through recon-
ment-to-contact.
opfor at the National Training Center naissance, offensive operations or
My proactive command sergeant ma- (NTC) were able to effectively use raids to destroy land-based enemy
jor leaned toward the flap of the TOC stealth to win the reconnaissance fight space and cyberspace capabilities.”2 It
tent. In an instant, he would lead the against rotational units. The opfor used is in this challenging environment that
recovery and casualty-evacuation ef- light humvees to quietly and slowly oc- the role of the cavalry squadron in an
fort with the medics outside. cupy dismounted observation points, airborne infantry BCT (IBCT) thrives in
gain visual contact and harass the ro- support of the multi-domain concept.
I did not expect the next report: “En- tational unit with indirect fires.
gaged and destroyed four military- In a reversal of the relationship we
aged males. Continuing mission.” Taylor contrasted this with historical have operated under for years, U.S.
examples from both 1943 North Africa Army Training and Doctrine Com-
Cavalry squadrons must be lethal. Af- and 2003 Iraq to prove that warfare re- mand’s (TRADOC) recent whitepaper
ter many counterinsurgency deploy- quires high tempo and thus rarely on multi-domain warfare suggests that
ments in which brigade combat teams lends the commander the luxury of U.S. Army forces must be prepared to
(BCTs) employed cavalry squadrons as time. He demonstrated that higher conduct operations that set conditions
“smaller infantry battalions,” today’s tempo brought light-reconnaissance for the employment of Air Force and/
cavalry squadrons are returning to forces into an unacceptable level of or naval operations.3 Vertical-envelop-
their designated role as masters of re- risk and made movement-to-contact ment capacity by U.S. Army airborne
connaissance and security (R&S). We the primary form of reconnaissance. IBCTs offer a method to defeat units
see improvements in reconnaissance that prevent joint forces (Integrated
“The greatest lesson of the North Af-
tactics at each combat-training center Air Defense System, anti-access and
rica campaign was that direct combat
(CTC) rotation; after-action reports no aerial denial, mission-command nodes)
was virtually unavoidable if a recon-
longer bemoan the lack of scout field- without exposing friendly lines of com-
naissance force was to be effective at
craft and now focus on advanced col- munication to the effects of the ene-
all,” Taylor wrote.
lection management and priority infor- my’s protected considerable artillery
mation requirement (PIR) refinement. Taylor linked high tempo with a assets.

4 Summer 2017
In a JFE, each element of the IBCT mission-command systems to be mon- the mission begins, operations will re-
needs to be able to fight and win deci- itored, jammed or spoofed. Therefore, semble the battles of our forefathers
sively without support from enablers. especially in those vulnerable first few more than those of the recent past.
Fires from the field-artillery (FA) bat- hours after the airborne operation, the
For offensive reconnaissance opera-
talion are limited to only a few sup- cavalry squadron must use its organic
tions, we have much to learn from our
pression missions due the limited direct and indirect fires to overpower World War II veterans. At 82nd Airborne
amount of ammunition dropped; at- the select enemy forces it encounters. Division’s All-American Week in May,
tack aviation and close air support are This requires careful intelligence prep- retired LTC Bill Collier – a reconnais-
unlikely to be available due to the na- aration of the battlefield before the sance scout in World War II in 106 th
ture of JFEs; and, in many environ- mission to mitigate the risk of encircle- Cavalry Squadron – offered: “We were
ments, we can expect our ment and defeat in detail. And once taught in the schoolhouse to sneak and

Figure 1. The Russian reconnaissance battalion. (from The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics and Modernization
of the Russian Ground Forces by Dr. Lester W. Grau and retired LTC Charles K. Bartles)

5 Summer 2017
peak, but in combat we were fighting directed his 87 th Reconnaissance Sharon’s division through the gap dur-
for information.”4 Squadron to move forward and probe ing his counterattack.
the edges of the Egyptian front. That
Collier executed in Normandy what The addition of mobile protected fire-
night, the 87th found a sizable gap be-
would today be described as rapid and power (MPF) to the IBCT enhances its
tween the Egyptian 2nd and 3rd Armies;
forceful reconnaissance to detect the ability to fight for information. The
the Egyptians had left a mile-long
enemy and enable destruction by 5-73 Cavalry Squadron – which is cur-
stretch unprotected. 9 Sharon would
heavier units behind him. “You get in- rently responsible for developing tac-
use this gap days later to execute his
volved, and you soon learn how much tics, techniques and procedures (TTP)
division counterattack.
they have. You learn how [much] they for employing MPF organic to an IBCT
will fight for a roadblock,” he said.5 Sharon’s fellow division commander to – has one platoon of LAV-25s to em-
his north, GEN Avraham Adan, wrote ploy in support of infantry units as well
When engaged against a determined as to employ with reconnaissance
in his memoirs, “No columns of dust
near-peer adversary, scouts fight for units. Recent experience with the LAV-
were raised due to the sand dunes.
information. If a reconnaissance objec- 25 Excursion allows our squadron to
Thus unnoticed by the enemy, the unit
tive is of value to us, it is of value to test new techniques for employing
discovered the open ‘seam’ between
the enemy as well, and he will fight for heavier firepower with scouts to fight
the Egyptian Second and Third
it. These might be the enemy’s recon- for information.
Armies.”10 However, Adan was wrong.
naissance units; however, they are
He assumed the scouts advanced At Normandy, Collier’s cavalry troops
more likely to be enemy infantry ele-
stealthily and undetected all the way were organized with one jeep platoon,
ments.
to the Suez Canal. In actuality, they one anti-tank platoon and one tank
Earlier this year the author of The Bear were in a running gunfight with Egyp- platoon.12 Our current organization is
Went Over the Mountain, Dr. Lester tian forces. enough to execute aggressive recon-
Grau, and retired LTC Charles Bartles naissance missions against lightly ar-
A firsthand account of the battle from
published The Russian Way of War out mored enemy forces. The dismounted
the Israeli scouts recalled: “We moved
of the Foreign Military Studies Office reconnaissance troop, in mutual sup-
toward the canal, keeping up a con-
at Fort Leavenworth, KS. The authors porting range of the mounted troops,
stant shooting match with the Egyptian
make clear that, all other things being can identify enemy forces and allow
positions to our north. This way we
equal, a BCT cavalry squadron vs. a the mounted troops’ uparmored hum-
pinpointed their southernmost posi-
Russian squadron has three times the vees to destroy the lead elements with
tions.”11
amount of trained reconnaissance pro- .50 Cal, MK19, Improved Target-Acqui-
fessionals. Not every adversary will fol- The Israeli 87th Reconnaissance Battal- sition System or organic 120mm mor-
low Russian doctrine, but this organi- ion fought for information. The scouts tars. With MPF platforms, the IBCT’s
zation is instructive as a model. succeeded in moving all the way to the cavalry squadron can fight for informa-
Suez Canal and then returned and gave tion through detection and destruction
Figure 1 shows that Russian reconnais-
a full report. Later, the squadron led of enemy forces in the OE.
sance battalions are comprised of just
one company of ground-reconnais-
sance professionals; the other compa-
nies are radar and technical collec-
tion.6
Grau and Bartles note: “At the battal-
ion level, most maneuver units do not
have dedicated reconnaissance assets;
regular units from the battalion are as-
signed for this purpose on an ad hoc
basis.”7 Regular units, not scout units,
are trained to engage and destroy the
first enemy forces they encounter.
Therefore each scout team should be
prepared to react-to-contact and con-
tinue to reconnaissance objectives.
This is a method with which Israeli
scouts of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War
(Yom Kippur War) would be familiar.
During the Yom Kippur War, Israeli re-
connaissance forces detected a gap in Figure 2. 5-73 Cavalry LAV-25 platoon leader 1LT Christian McCollum engages
the Egyptian defenses along the Sinai targets at the March 2017 platoon LFX. 5-73 Cavalry supports the LAV-25 Ex-
Peninsula.8 On Dec. 9, 1973, the divi- cursion to test TTPs for MPF platforms in support of airborne IBCT operations.
sion commander, GEN Ariel Sharon, (U.S. Army photo by SPC Zackary Nixon)

6 Summer 2017
Training scouts for reality is another reason why airborne The platoon reacted to contact with di-
cavalry squadrons must be trained and rect fire on enemy forces overwatching
lethality ready to engage threats with their or- the IED site and then exfiltrated to a
“Conduct a guard” is a mission-essen- ganic weapons. covered and concealed site to call their
tial task (MET) for the cavalry squad- nine-line medical-evacuation (mede-
ron. Field Manual (FM) 3-96 notes that Until a higher headquarters designates vac) report and coordinate for evacua-
“guard is a security task to protect the an area of operations (AO), cavalry tion.
main body by fighting to gain time squadrons must train for all environ-
while also observing and reporting in- ments and specialize in those that are Then the platoon received intelligence
formation and preventing enemy most dangerous. Figures 3-5 show con- on an anti-tank team in a combat secu-
ground observation of and direct fire cepts, mounted and dismounted, that rity outpost, which required scouts to
against the main body.” 13 To reach one cavalry squadron executed to vali- dismount and call for fire (CFF) from
training proficiency in the guard task, date platoon leaders and troop com- the FA battery’s M777s. Once de-
a squadron must be able to engage and manders in their ability to manage le- stroyed, the platoon was hit by a non-
destroy targets that threaten the pro- thality across a broad spectrum of con- persistent chemical attack with live CS
tected force. ditions. These examples might be a gas and engaged several targets “under
good start point or provide an idea for mask.”
FM 3-96 continues: “A guard force dif- integration into existing plans. As in all The platoon consolidated, reorganized
fers from a screen in that it routinely training, the concepts are not perfect and downgraded its mission-oriented
engages enemy forces with direct and but bring individuals, units and leaders protective posture level only to receive
indirect fires.” In an airborne IBCT, JFE closer to combat readiness. a report from higher headquarters
conditions allow limited indirect-fires
about an enemy air-defense-artillery
capabilities in the hours following the The 5-73rd Cavalry Squadron executed
(ADA) site nearby. The platoon leader
airborne insertion. Only select gun an ambitious platoon live-fire (LFX)
organized his sections to conduct an
tubes can be air-dropped, and there concept in March 2017 at Fort Bragg,
aggressive hasty mounted attack by
are limits on the amounts of ammuni- NC. The situation took the platoon
bounds to destroy enemy ADA site and
tion. During this period of maximum from a deliberate link-up with a BCT in-
security.
vulnerability, the cavalry squadron is fantry battalion’s lead elements to re-
simultaneously without its most lethal act to improvised explosive devices Finally, the platoon established OPs
partner, the IBCT FA battalion. This (IEDs), supported by BCT engineers. and executed air-ground operations

Figure 3. 5-73 Cavalry’s mounted-platoon LFX concept.

7 Summer 2017
(AGO) with live Apache gunships. They
called for fire with live troop mortars.
Then multiple motorized targets ap-
peared, which triggered displacement
criteria. The dismounted OPs bounded
back in coordination with mounted
platforms that provided suppressive
fires to support their displacement.
The 5-73 Cavalry’s dismounted platoon
LFX concept validated skills uniquely
suited to the dismounted reconnais-
sance troop. The platoon entered the
AO via air assault. After the platoon
moved off the landing zone (LZ), they
reacted to contact from a force that fell
within its engagement criteria (a two-
man team). The platoon maneuvered
to destroy the enemy security outpost
and then executed a nine-line medevac
and secured the flight. From there, the
dismounted platoon moved through
concealed routes and reacted to a non-
persistent chemical attack with live CS
gas. The culminating event was three
short-duration OPs oriented on a
named area of interest (NAI). The
scouts executed AGO with live Apache Figure 4. LFX break-contact concept. Scheme of maneuver: Once rounds begin
gunships, called for fire with the BCT’s landing in the impact area and vehicles are prepared to move, Bravo Section’s
M777 FA battery and broke contact un- OP shifts fire to only Target-Reference Point (TRP) 3 to open SDZs for the occu-
der fire once displacement criteria was pation. Alpha Section’s OP will continue to engage. When the SBF initiates
met. fire, Bravo OPs will cease fire, begin bounding back to Phase Line (PL) Purple
and lock and clear (confirmed by an observer/coach/trainer (O/C/T)). Alpha’s
This concept, though physically and OP will engage from TRP 1 to TRP 2 until Bravo OP has called they are set at PL
mentally grueling for the platoon lead- Purple. This will trigger Alpha’s OP to cease fire, bound to PL Purple and lock
er, provided a crucible to evaluate the and clear. Once both OPs are at PL Purple, the SBF will begin to retrograde.
platoon and platoon leader as a fight- Risk mitigation: Vehicles will not be cleared to fire until they are established
ing element. It also validated the pla- in their SBF locations. O/C/Ts traveling with the SBFs will confirm that the
toon for operations in which they gunners have positively identified their TRPs before engagement. O/C/Ts with
would be required to destroy air-de- the dismounted elements will confirm they shift fire prior to the SBF occupy-
ing its position. When the dismounted OPs break contact, they will stay in
fense radars to allow attack aviation to their assigned lanes while retrograding to PL Purple.
enter the area. Each platoon leader fin-
ished the exercise (after a few were squadron live fires at Fort Polk, LA. moved to ensure continuous recon-
given more opportunities) capable of naissance.
In May 2017, 3 rd BCT, 82 nd Airborne,
employing our habitual enablers (engi-
supported our troop CAMLFX at Fort
neers, low-level voice intercept (LLVI),
Bragg. This exercise validated the cav- Lessons learned
electronic warfare, FA, mortars and at-
alry squadron’s ability to execute the Individual:
tack aviation) as well as be able to de-
“conduct a guard” MET. Multiple pla- • Rusty direct-fire skills. Training for
stroy critical high-value targets with di- toons led with their dismounted teams lethal operations demonstrated
rect fires to enable joint fires and be- into concealed OPs. Lead elements de-
yond. shortcomings in individual movement
tected enemy forces and suppressed techniques, controlling fires and
with FA and 120mm mortar fires. Once
Troop combined-arms motorized enemy forces arrived, the
timely and accurate reports.
maneuver LFX lead scouts cued the mounted recon- • Strong indirect-fire skills. Individual
To reach “trained” readiness status, naissance vehicles to move into posi- scouts demonstrated high proficiency
the new Objective T standards require tions to destroy them with direct fires. in live CFFs and AGO with attack
cavalry squadrons in all BCTs to com- Once OPs detected an armored force, aviation.
plete squadron live fires. This mandate the platoons each executed final pro- • Urban TTPs. Scouts learned how to
created an urgency to design and exe- tective fires, which suppressed the tar- occupy firing positions in buildings to
cute a troop combined-arms maneuver gets while sections bounded backward, engage targets while reducing their
LFX (CAMLFX) at Fort Bragg prior to broke contact with the force and signature from outside (getting out

8 Summer 2017
Figure 5. Dismounted platoon LFX concept.

effectively objective. For scout training, the

integrated flares, mission starts at the objective with
smoke and whistles, scouts in an OP. Targets may be
which enabled presented for indirect-fire missions
effective until scouts demonstrate proficiency.
operations. Local, closer targets then are
• Berm drills. p r e s e n t e d w i t h i n t h e O P ’s
Gunners and engagement criteria (a four-man
drivers practiced team and maybe one vehicle) as if an
berm drills to enemy force is attempting to seize
minimize their their position. The scout team
exposure. Ideally, engages and destroys the enemy.
practice these in Then, progressively more targets
e a r l i e r t ra i n i n g appear, which trigger displacement
iterations to allow criteria. Mounted vehicles, if
crews to arrive at integrated, move into an SBF position
Figure 6. A 5-73 Cavalry vehicle engages targets at the the live fire ready to to suppress targets while the scout
March 2017 platoon LFX. (U.S. Army photo by SPC Zackary maneuver. team displaces by bounds. If vehicles
Nixon) are not integrated, nearby
• Using
dismounted teams provide
of the window). Also, our scouts infantry’s targetry. Planners learned
that most infantry collective-training suppressive fire. Alternatively,
troubleshot “sniper blinds” with
concepts can be used for scouts – the platoons call for fire and obscuration
black felt strips and tape, which
planner just needs to reverse the to cover their moves. Once the
concealed the firers in the structure.
order. For example, an infantry dismounted teams are out of sector,
Collective: platoon routinely sits in a support-by- the vehicle SBFs bound back to
• High learning curve. We observed an fire (SBF) position, then occupies an covered and concealed routes and
initial lack of familiarity with signals attack-by-fire position, then initiates recover the dismounted teams at
and code words for lifting and shifting fire and shifts and lifts the SBF’s fire pre-planned rally points.
fires. Before long, platoon leaders as the assault element closes on the • Maximizing OP training through

9 Summer 2017
Figure 7. Mounted troop CAMLFX concept.

Figure
8. Dis-
mount-
ed re-
connais-
sance
troop
CAMLFX
con-
cept.

10 Summer 2017
 placement. Selecting OP locations on
the edge of impact areas allow live
CFF training before executing live
direct-fire training.
Leader:
• Pre-global war on terrorism range
concepts. Our planners worked
closely with Fort Bragg Range
Operations to design scenarios with
surface danger zones (SDZs) that
supported the overall concept.
Concepts from 2003 and earlier were
optimal for our requirements, and
the oldest Range Operations staff
members were happy to recreate and
certify them. Figure 9. Squadron scouts arrive via CH-47 at the May 2017 troop CAMLFX.
• Tactical exercises without troops (U.S. Army photo by SPC Zackary Nixon)
(TEWTs). During TEWTs, scout-
platoon leaders exhibited initial
reluctance to engage targets with
direct fires. We regularly use NTC’s
Scouts in Contact series of tactical
exercises. 14 Each platoon leader
completed a vignette with the
squadron commander in the room
and his/her troop commander
outside demanding reports over the
radio. As the squadron focused on
lethality, I increased the TEWTs in
which the situation called for the
platoon to destroy enemy forces with
their direct-fire weapons. Platoon
leaders often delayed as they
attempted to CFF or use attack
aviation, even when immediate
lethal action would have eliminated
the threat.

Conclusion
All units must be proficient in their as-
signed weapons; this comes as no sur-
prise. With renewed mandate for R&S
operations, however, we must not
overcorrect our training too far toward
stealth at the expense of lethality. Of
all the units on the battlefield, it is the
scouts who most need to eliminate
their adversaries the quickest.
The mission of cavalry squadrons re- Figure 10. Squadron scouts fire at dismounted targets at the May 2017 troop
quires scouts to gain and maintain con- CAMLFX. (U.S. Army photo by SPC Zackary Nixon)
tact with a cunning enemy, an inher-
ently risky task. The scout team who win upon chance contact. While stealth threat.
instinctively eliminates the JRTC opfor remains important, it is imperative for
threat with Multiple Integrated Laser scouts to be experts in lethal direct-fire LTC Scott Pence commands 5th Squad-
Engagement System lasers must also engagements. The return of R&S ex- ron, 73 rd Cavalry (Airborne), 3 rd BCT,
do so with their 5.56 bullets. To miti- pertise does not replace lethal opera- 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC.
gate the risk and allow scouts to pro- tions. Rather, the capability for lethal- He previously served as brigade S-3,
vide continuous reconnaissance, their ity is imperative to complete recon- 173rd Infantry BCT, Vicenza, Italy; bat-
training must allow them to fight and naissance missions against the modern talion S-3, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry,

11 Summer 2017
 Michigan. LTC Pence was the first Ar- 14
LTC J. Frederick Dente and LTC Bradley
mor officer to serve with 75th Ranger S. Nelson, Scouts in Contact: Tactical Vi-
Further reading Regiment. His operational deployments gnettes for Cavalry Leaders, Cobra Team,
In addition to works cited in “Notes,” include one in Iraq and three in Af- NTC, 2016.
primary sources for this article are: ghanistan.
• Mohamed Abdel Gahni el-Gamasy,
The October War, Cairo, Egypt:
American University in Cairo Press, Notes
1993. 1
COL Curtis D. Taylor, Trading the Saber
• Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli for Stealth: Can Surveillance Technology
Wars: War and Peace in the Middle Replace Traditional Aggressive Recon-
East from the War of Independence naissance?, land-warfare paper, Arling-
through Lebanon, New York: ton, VA: The Institute for Land Warfare, Acronym Quick-Scan
Vintage Books, 1984. Association of the United States Army,
• S.L.A. Marshall, Bastogne: The September 2005.
ADA – air-defense artillery
First Eight Days, Washington, DC: 2
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. AGO – air-ground operations
Infantry Journal Press, 1946. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Com- AO – area of operations
plex World, 2020-2040, Headquarters De- BCT – brigade combat team
Secondary sources include:
partment of the Army, Washington, DC, CAMLFX – combined-arms
• John J. McGrath, “Sinai 1973: October 2014. maneuver live fire
Israeli Maneuver Organization and CFF – call for fire
the Battle of the Chinese Farm,” An
3
TRADOC whitepaper, “Multi-Domain
Battle: Combined Arms for the 21st Centu- CP – command post
Army at War: Change in the Midst CS gas – a gas causing tears,
of Conflict, Proceedings of the ry,” Headquarters Department of the
Army, Washington, DC, Feb. 24, 2017. salivation and painful breathing;
Combat Studies Institute 2005 used in civil disturbances. Chemical
Military History Symposium, Fort 4
Author’s interview with retired LTC Wil- name: ortho-chlorobenzal
Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies liam H. Collier, May 26, 2017, Fayetteville, malononitrile. CS from the surname
Institute Press, 2005. NC. initials of its U.S. inventors, Ben
In addition to NTC’s Scouts in Con- 5
William H. Collier, The 106th Cavalry’s Carson and Roger Staughton.
tact tactical-vignette handbook for Story: The History of the 106th Calvary, CTC – combat-training center
cavalry leaders and TRADOC’s white- an Illinois National Guard Unit from 1898 FA – field artillery
paper on multi-domain battle, both to the Present, Bloomington, IN: Trafford FA – field artillery
cited in “Notes,” doctrinal publica- Publishing, 2012. FM – field manual
tions include: IBCT – infantry brigade combat team
6
Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, IED – improvised explosive device
• FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance and The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, JFE – joint forcible entry
Cavalry Squadron, Headquarters Tactics and Modernization of the Russian JRTC – Joint Readiness Training
D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e A r m y, Ground Forces, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center
Washington, DC, March 2010. Military Press, July 2017. The electronic LD – line of departure
• FM 3-90-1, Offense and Defense, version is at https://community.apan.org/ LFX – live-fire exercise
Vo l u m e 1 , H e a d q u a r t e rs wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/fmso-bookshelf; LLVI – low-level voice intercept
D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e A r m y, click on the book cover to download it LoA – line of advance
Washington, DC, March 2013. (it’s 402 pages and graphics intensive). A LZ – landing zone
• FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and limited printed run will be available Medevac – medical evacuation
Security Operations, Headquarters around Labor Day. MET – mission-essential task
D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e A r m y, MPF – mobile protected firepower
7
Ibid. NAI – named area of interest
Washington, DC, July, 2015.
8
John J. McGrath, Scouts Out!: The De- NTC – National Training Center
velopment of Reconnaissance Units in O/C/T – observer/coach/trainer
Modern Armies, Fort Leavenworth, KS: OE – operational environment
Vicenza; company commander, 75 th Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008. OP – observation post
Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, GA; Opfor – opposing forces
9
Abraham Rabinovich, The Yom Kippur
PIR – priority information
and tank-company commander, 1st Bat- War: The Epic Encounter That Trans-
requirement
talion, 72nd Armor, Republic of Korea. formed the Middle East, New York: Dou- PL – phase line
LTC Pence’s military education includes bleday, 2007. R&S – reconnaissance and security
the School of Advanced Military Stud- 10
Avraham Adan, On the Banks of the SBF – support by fire
ies, intermediate leader education, Suez: An Israeli General’s Personal Ac- SDZ – surface danger zone
Scout Platoon Leader Course, Armor count of the Yom Kippur War, London: TEWT – tactical exercise without
Basic Officer Course, Advanced Armor Arms and Armour Press, 1980. troops
TOC – tactical-operations center
Officer Course and airborne and Rang- 11
Zeev Schiff, October Earthquake: Yom
TRADOC – (U.S. Army) Training and
er schools. He holds a master’s of busi- Kippur 1973, London: Transaction Pub-
Doctrine Command
ness administration degree from Web- lishers, 2013. TRP – target-reference point
ster University, a master’s military art 12
Collier, The 106th Cavalry’s Story. TTP – tactics, techniques and
and science from the U.S. Army and a 13
FM 3-96, Cavalry Squadron, Headquar- procedures
bachelor’s of arts degree in organiza- ters Department of the Army, Washing- UAS – unmanned aerial system
tion psychology from the University of ton, DC, May 2016.

12 Summer 2017
 Increasing Reconnaissance and
Security Proficiency through
Leader Experience
by LTC Mark McClellan military decision-making process the squadron scout platoons are the
(MDMP) quickly and with less guidance most operationally inexperienced
Armored brigade combat teams
from higher levels. Assigning officers, scout-platoon leaders (PLs) in the BCT,
(ABCTs) are balancing reconnaissance
whether in the Armor or Infantry as these positions are “first time” po-
and security (R&S) education and train-
Branches, who have already served a sitions for the lieutenants. Generally,
ing of personnel to ensure that key
year in a position in a line unit and who CABs choose their scout PLs from
leaders in R&S positions have the skills
have shown the potential for success among nine line PLs. Thus, in an ABCT,
and experience to be successful in
in the Army could increase the cavalry three CAB scout PLs are chosen from
these positions. A possible method for
squadron’s mission performance. 27 line PLs. For ABCT cavalry squad-
ABCTs to increase operational experi-
rons, cavalry squadrons traditionally
ence within their R&S units is to make
R&S positions “second time” command
Scout-platoon leaders choose their scout PLs as they are re-
Cavalry-squadron scout platoons oper- ceived from installation reception.
or leadership opportunities within the
ate more independently and deeper in-
ABCT.
depth than the combined-arms battal- A possible method for ABCTs to in-
As cavalry-squadron units conduct mis- ion (CAB) scout platoons. In the deci- crease the operational experience of
sions on shortened planning timelines sive-action fight at combat-training their scout PLs would be to make scout
and with greater operational depth, centers, squadron scout platoons are platoons across the BCT a second PL
these missions require leaders and deploying 12-24 hours ahead of the position. Selection of these leaders
staffs who are able to execute troop- brigade combat team (BCT) line battal- would be managed at the BCT level.
leading procedures (TLPs) and the ions. Due to platoon density, though, CABs and the squadron would

Figure 1. Platoon positions within the BCT.

13 Summer 2017
nominate top-performing maneuver should ensure that CAB commanders operational experience within the
PLs for the BCT scout platoons (the still maintain input in the BCT com- squadron is weighed against the pos-
ABCT cavalry squadron has three tank mander’s selection of their unit’s head- sible excessively disruptive transitions
platoons). To align incentives, CAB quarters and headquarters company within the CABs.
commanders could still assign their commanders, as these positions re-
There is benefit from having a major
unit’s “top two” lieutenants to their quire a great deal of operational expe-
who has been with the squadron for a
unit’s scout platoon and mortar pla- rience and potential as well.
least a year, as that officer knows the
toon while nominating their Nos. 3, 4
This selection process would equip organization. The current 24-month
and 5 lieutenants for consideration for
troop commanders who have experi- limit for field-grade key and develop-
the squadron scout-PL position. The
ence training and employing maneuver mental (KD) service restricts the divi-
squadron would nominate the top
companies in attack and defense oper- sion’s and brigade’s commanders’ abil-
tank-platoon leader within the cavalry
ations. From these experiences, these ity to retain experienced majors within
squadron’s tank company for the pool.
commanders would be better prepared the BCTs. Thus, using this selection
This would create a pool of 10 people
to command troops answering the BCT process may result in two experienced
to compete for the six remaining
commander’s priority information re- majors who are newly assigned to the
squadron scout-PL positions. A method
quirements in decisive action. squadron. Again, the BCT commander
for choosing the next scout platoon’s
will have to balance requirements for
leaders in the squadron could be a Squadron executive officer experience vs. benefits from field-
BCT-led R&S field competition to select
officers to be assigned to the squadron and operations officer grade longevity in units. The Depart-
The first year in a BCT for a field-grade ment of the Army should look at relax-
scout PL positions.
officer is an eye-opening experience. ing restrictions on major brigade KD
A benefit of this method is that it New maneuver majors in BCTs spend service limits for BCT-level and cavalry-
would ensure that the squadron and the first year in a position learning how squadron majors to ensure that expe-
CAB scout PLs are some of the most to be a field-grade officer and how to rience is retained within the BCT for
operationally experienced PLs in the lead MDMP with inexperienced staffs those positions. With the 10-year pin-
BCT. A possible negative is that this se- – along with a number of other new on point for majors, there is time avail-
lection method would change the per- tasks and requirements. Adding to able after KD service for officers to be
formance level of maneuver-company those requirements, majors in a BCT assigned to broadening assignments,
executive officers, as these officers are cavalry squadron have to execute the even if serving three years within a
generally chosen from the same pool MDMP process on a shortened time- BCT.
of officers considered for CAB scout- line and possibly with a less-defined
platoon positions. Also, the ABCT BCT plan, compared to maneuver ma- Timeline and
would need to ensure that one battal- jors in a CAB. evaluation impacts
ion wasn’t the billpayer for most of the These selection methods have impacts
A selection method for ABCTs to in-
squadron scout platoons, as this would for officer and unit timelines. A com-
crease the operational experience of
not align the incentives for the CAB pany- and field-grade officer KD time-
cavalry-squadron executive officers
with the ABCT. line within a BCT is an important con-
and S-3s would be to assign these po-
sideration for these selection methods.
sitions to some of the more successful
Cavalry-troop commanders majors in the ABCT. The BCT would still Generally, 12 to 18 months is the max-
For the cavalry troops, second-com- imum amount of time an officer can
assign its “top two” majors to the BCT
mand troop commanders in the BCT spend in any one position type. These
executive officer and S-3 positions; the
could bring a great deal of operational methods assume transitions at one
No. 3 and No. 4 majors in the BCT
experience to cavalry-squadron opera- year.
would move over to positions in the
tions. Cavalry-troop commanders op- cavalry squadron or remain if already Human Resource Command manning
erate units more in depth and width assigned there. guidance recommends that company-
across the battlefield with reduced level commanders be in position for
planning time, compared with maneu- This method would ensure that the
12-18 months for one command and
ver-company commanders; troop com- ABCT cavalry squadron has two majors
up to 24 months if given a second com-
manders with a year of maneuver com- with at least a year of experience in
mand. By increasing the number of
pany command would have more rep- the BCT. This method does have draw-
second-time commands within an
etitions of TLPs under their belts and backs, though. Currently, officers gen-
ABCT, units can maintain experienced
would be more experienced in compa- erally move between the S-3 and exec-
and high-performing company-level
ny-level operations. utive-officer position within the squad-
commanders for up to six more
ron or CAB, except for the two officers
months.
A possible method for ABCTs would be who move up to the BCT S-3 and exec-
to pick their three cavalry-troop com- utive-officer positions. This may cause Also, very few units can sustain posi-
manders from captains who are com- a CAB to have two new field-grade of- tion transitions at a set time. Most unit
pleting a year of line-company com- ficers after brigade transitions. The bri- transitions occur sporadically through-
mand time in an ABCT CAB. Again, to gade commander would have to man- out a year based on the sustained
ensure incentives are aligned, BCTs age this to ensure that increasing readiness model, officers arriving and

14 Summer 2017
leaving the units, and time-in-position not be “top blocked.” Units would have provide the maneuver force with a
milestones. ABCT, squadron and battal- to weigh the possible operational-ef- more broadened and experienced cad-
ion staffs may have to align selection fectiveness increase vs. with the pos- re of leaders for future assignments in
processes as positions open in the sible negative impacts to an officer’s both cavalry and maneuver forma-
squadron and CABs. evaluation. tions. A maneuver major who has ex-
perience commanding both a maneu-
Key to the success of this program is
ensuring that officers have attended Conclusion ver company and a cavalry troop will
Due to realities on the ground, it may be better prepared to serve as a field-
the appropriate R&S functional course
not be possible to ensure that every grade officer within a BCT.
for cavalry positions. For scout PLs, this
functional course is the Army Recon- scout platoon and cavalry troop in the Experienced leaders are only a part of
naissance Course (ARC). For cavalry cavalry squadron is manned with “sec- what makes a unit successful in its mis-
troop commanders, this functional ond time” officers. Brigades can look sions. Training and education in R&S
course is the Cavalry Leader’s Course to ensure at least one platoon per are the other methods to improve cav-
(CLC). For squadron field-grade offi- troop is led by a “second time” officer alry-unit mission performance. As ev-
cers, the education is received in Fort and at least one cavalry troop is a sec- ery leader has different capabilities,
Leavenworth’s Command and General ond command position. Also, BCTs operational experience in a line battal-
Staff Officer’s Course R&S elective, should enforce attendance at ARC and ion doesn’t guarantee success in a cav-
A331-reconnaissance and security. Ma- CLC for leaders within their cavalry for- alry organization. Still, for decades,
jors who are attending sister-service, mations. Another option for BCTs to in- maneuver battalions have been assign-
non-resident and fellowships for inter- crease operational experience within ing top-performing maneuver PLs into
mediate-level education requirements cavalry units is to lengthen troop- and scout-platoon positions based on their
can attend CLC as well. platoon-level KD time from 12-18 performance and potential after ser-
months to 18-24 months. vice as infantry or tank PLs because ex-
Another important consideration is the
perience matters.
evaluation impacts for officers select- In addition to increasing performance
ed to serve in the ABCT squadron. A within the squadron, ensuring that LTC Mark McClellan is chief of the Com-
squadron made up primarily of PLs leaders within ABCTs have operational mandant’s Initiatives Group, U.S. Army
who perform in the top 50 percent of experience in maneuver line organiza- Armor School, Fort Benning, GA. Previ-
officers in the BCT could disadvantage tions before assuming positions within ous assignments include BCT executive
these PLs, as they would be competing cavalry organizations will produce ma- officer, 3rd ABCT, 4th Infantry Division,
against a more competitive pool of of- neuver officers with a more diverse set Fort Carson, CO; BCT operations officer,
ficers. Some of these officers would of operational experiences. This will 3 rd ABCT, 4 th Infantry Division, Fort

Figure 2. Experience increases R&S proficiency.

15 Summer 2017
Carson; combined-arms battalion ex- Infantry Captain’s Career Course and
ecutive officer, 1st Battalion, 8th Infan- Armor Basic Officer Course. He holds a Acronym Quick-Scan
try Regiment, Fort Carson; commander, bachelor’s of science degree in history
ABCT – armored brigade combat
Company D, 4th Battalion, 64th Armor from the U.S. Military Academy and a team
Regiment, Fort Stewart, GA; scout-pla- master’s of business administration de- ARC – Army Reconnaissance
toon leader, 4th Battalion, 64th Armor gree in logistics, transportation and Course
Regiment, Fort Stewart. LTC McClel- supply-chain management from the BCT – brigade combat team
lan’s military schooling includes Com- Naval Postgraduate School. CAB – combined-arms battalion
mand and General Staff College, CLC – Cavalry Leader’s Course
KD – key and developmental
MDMP – military decision-making
process
PL – platoon leader
R&S – reconnaissance and security
TLP – troop-leading procedures

GEN David Perkins,

commander of U.S.
Army Training and Doc-
trine Command, speaks
at the 2016 Maneuver
Warfighter Conference.

2017 Maneuver Warfighter Conference

MG Eric J. Wesley, commander of current and future issues affecting the Therefore, TDY participation in this
the U.S. Army Maneuver Center of warfighting capability, training and le- event is by invitation only.
Excellence, will host the 2017 Ma- thality of the maneuver force.
For the latest information, including
neuver Warfighter Conference at
Due to Department of Defense cap re- if the conference will live-stream
McGinnis-Wickam Hall on Fort Ben-
strictions on temporary-duty confer- (the information will at minimum be
ning, GA, Sept. 12-15, 2017.
ence attendance, the number of peo- posted to a password-protected
The purpose of the Maneuver War- ple authorized to attend the Maneuver Website), visit http://www.benning.
fighter Conference is to provide a Warfighter Conference in a TDY status army.mil/mcoe/maneuverconfer-
comprehensive forum to address is limited to 154 DoD personnel. ence/.

16 Summer 2017
17 Summer 2017
by MAJ Nathan A. Jennings, MAJ operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. when cadets struggled to understand
Amos C. Fox, MAJ Adam L. Taliaferro, While the Armor Branch, and its caval- its distinctive history, functions and
MAJ David W. Griffith and MAJ Kyle ry subset, strained to reconcile urgent purpose.6
T. Trottier COIN demands and traditional doctri-
A third area of institutional concern
nal mandates, the broader institution
The U.S. Cavalry has enjoyed a long his- centered on the predictable diminish-
seemed to place increasingly less im-
tory as both an enabling and decisive ment of tactical and technical acumen
port in formations designed to conduct
tactical force during American land- among officers and noncommissioned
forceful R&S. This perceived loss of
power campaigns. From its earliest officers (NCOs) in both combined-arms
stature was reflected in intellectual
manifestations in 1775 to its incorpo- battalions and cavalry squadrons as
questioning of the need for cavalry, ob-
ration into the modernized Armor they trained for COIN. As argued by
servations of diminished enthusiasm
Branch in 1950, the Army’s primary then-BG Scott McKean, who served as
for joining the branch at West Point,
mounted arm employed mobility, fire- Chief of Armor from 2014 to 2016, ob-
degradation of skills and identity, and
power and eventually protection to ag- served trends from combat training
the simultaneous loss of corps- and di-
gressively shape conditions across the centers demonstrated “a significant
vision-level cavalries in favor of less-
battlefield’s breadth and depth while degradation in our knowledge and abil-
capable squadrons assigned to brigade
providing distinct advantages to the ities to conduct [R&S] operations.” 7
combat teams (BCTs).3
larger combined-arms force. This included a loss of stabilized gun-
The decision to create less-resourced nery expertise, degradation of mainte-
This record of evolving contributions,
humvee, Stryker and armored-cavalry nance competence, atrophy of infor-
which ranged from dedicated recon-
squadrons with a relatively anemic al- mation-collection skills and diminished
naissance-and-security (R&S) efforts in
location of mechanized platforms familiarity with time-honored ceremo-
World War II to more generalized roles
stemmed from the Army’s embrace of nies and customs for many leaders.
during recent counterinsurgency
(COIN) campaigns in Southwest and BCT modularity. The transformation Despite these setbacks, the American
Central Asia, has once again found the aimed to empower economized recon- cavalry force has begun to regain its
“spurs and Stetsons” community at a naissance, surveillance and target ac- distinctive relevancy within the broad-
doctrinal, material and organizational quisition with emerging technologies er institution in recent years. In 2016,
crossroads.1 by shifting emphasis from aggressively the armored squadrons replaced their
fighting for information to attaining sit- humvees with more M3 Cavalry Fight-
The tradition’s newest inflection point uational awareness through stealthy ing Vehicles (CFVs) and gained a tank
centers on the unique service that le- observation. 4 As assessed by a 2014 company to allow increased lethality
thal, mobile and survivable cavalry Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) and survivability. Simultaneously, the
forces can potentially contribute to the study, the resulting composition – be- squadrons of the Stryker BCTs assumed
Army’s emerging multi-domain battle reft of the organic tanks and rotary training responsibility for their bri-
concept. As argued by GEN David Per- wing of the legacy armored-cavalry gade’s anti-tank and Mobile Gun Sys-
kins, 15 th commander of U.S. Army regiments (ACR) and division-cavalry tem (MGS) companies, thereby uniting
Training and Doctrine Command (TRA- squadrons (DIVCAV) – “left the force heavier firepower and wheeled scouts.
DOC), it requires “flexible and resilient structure without an organization that This focus on empowering R&S opera-
ground formations that project combat possessed the organic assets, doctrinal tions – often reflecting increased inte-
power from land into other domains to underpinning and specialized training gration of cyber-electronic, unmanned
enable joint-force freedom of action.”2 to execute the broad range of tradi- surveillance and informational tech-
In contrast to recent conflicts where tional cavalry missions.”5 nologies – indicates a growing appre-
scouts and tankers typically fought as
ciation by senior Army leaders for the
general-purpose Soldiers, this emerg- This perceived relegation of cavalry
dynamic role cavalry will perform in fu-
ing paradigm – which leverages emer- functions, at least in terms of resourc-
ture campaigns.8
gent technologies to shape “deep es, inflicted subtle identity confusion
fights” with cross-domain effects – of- on the “combat arm of decision” as a The squadrons of the infantry BCTs,
fers opportunity for fast-moving ar- generation of leaders predominantly though optimized with motorized
mored forces, and cavalry in particular, gained combat experience in stability scouts and light infantry to facilitate
to assume critical roles in dislocating operations. The ambiguity was further tactical and strategic mobility, have
and disintegrating enemy networks. clouded as the Army eliminated tank- continuing challenges resulting from
This advance holds potential to expand pure battalions, moved the Armor Cen- modularity. As assessed by the 2014
the purpose and identity of the Armor ter to the “home of the infantry” and MCoE study, they “lack the passenger-
Branch. reorganized its final deployable ACR as carrying capacity, protection and mo-
a Stryker BCT. Simultaneously, infantry bility required for [R&S] operations”
Context and background leaders increasingly assumed com- while maneuvering with a dearth of
The Army’s return to focusing on peer mand of cavalry squadrons and troops “organic mobile, protected firepower.”9
competition finds its mounted-maneu- populated by 19-series Soldiers, while Comprising most of the cavalry force at
ver proponent recovering from a di- Armor officers at the U.S. Military about 59 percent, the lighter squad-
minishment of perceived value after Academy reported, albeit anecdotally, rons’ modest vehicle density and logis-
years of optimization for stability the dilution of the branch’s “brand” tical requirements conflict with the

18 Summer 2017
doctrines of select parent divisions synchronizing their actions to achieve conflict that include all domains con-
that emphasize dynamic aerial move- the best effects possible.”12 Since the tested, increased lethality and range of
ment across extended distances and institution now possesses a historically weapons, complex and urban terrain,
restrictive terrain.10 low quantity of maneuver brigades to and degraded operations all argue for
attain offensive mass or endure unan- increasing importance of [R&S] capa-
Despite recent improvements, the Ar- ticipated attrition, it has become in- bilities at all echelons.”13 In the context
my’s cavalry formations still lack the creasingly vital for advance ground el- of multi-domain battle, this means that
robust combined-arms capabilities ements to integrate indirect, aerial, cy- current divisions and corps lacks opti-
once enjoyed by ACRs and DIVCAVs. ber, electromagnetic and information- mal elements to enable and exploit di-
The possession of organic scout or at- al fires to dynamically shape battlefield verse joint fires during forceful and
tack rotary wing, in particular, has his- outcomes. wide-ranging “recon-strike” – sensor-
torically delineated R&S capabilities at to-shooter tactics that synchronize col-
tactical and operational levels. With- While all Army tactical forces boast de- lection and fires networks – through-
out the air-ground maneuver profile of grees of operational reach and tactical out contested domains and spaces.14
their predecessors, the current squad- agility, cavalry formations – both
rons, regardless of increased CFV, wheeled and mechanized – are ideal The Army has a variety of options to
Abrams or MGS densities, remain lim- elements to host, integrate and syn- create specialized means and doctrine
ited in capacity to aggressively and in- chronize joint fires while sustaining to defeat complex defenses. While
dependently fight for information. high-tempo movement. Even as air- combined-arms battalions and cavalry
While the integration of emergent borne, air-assault and attack-aviation squadrons in BCTs remain indispens-
technologies is creating new possibili- entry becomes problematic due to im- able for enabling success in “close
ties, these issues will inform the cur- proving enemy area-denial (AD) capa- fights,” the emerging R&S brigade ex-
rent cavalry force’s ability to support bilities, ground penetration by fast- cursion – where select BCTs temporar-
multi-domain operations with en- moving, lethal and survivable forma- ily train to conduct historical ACR mis-
hanced speed and lethality across ex- tions holds potential to exploit kinetic sions – provides an immediate, if inef-
panded frontages and distances.11 and electromagnetic joint capabilities ficient, option for enabling corps-level
to dislocate enemy defenses. While forced entry. Alternatively, divisions
Multi-domain battle cavalry will always conduct traditional could create large air-ground task forc-
The Army’s renewed focus on defeat- R&S missions, the emerging paradigm es with the ability to execute dispersed
ing peer-adversary complex defenses, offers opportunities to lead integration maneuver from across subordinate bri-
even as it innovates to expand the ag- of multi-faceted fires and deep-strike gades. A more optimal solution would
ing 2nd Offset into 21st Century warfare, actions. be, as proposed by the Commission on
emphasizes land corps and division the Future of the Army, to form R&S
“deep fights” designed to create ad- This revitalized approach, which incor- strike groups (RSSGs), specifically de-
vantageous conditions. By incorporat- porates insights from past campaigns signed with enhanced ground, aerial
ing simultaneity, depth, synchroniza- of scale and depth, requires the Army and intelligence capabilities to enable
tion and flexibility, as argued by Army to examine its current brigade-centric echeloned joint efforts.15
Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Opera- cavalry structure. As argued by LTG
tions, “commanders seek to seize, re- H.R. McMaster, who commanded 3rd The establishment of larger and more
tain and exploit the initiative while ACR in Iraq in 2005, “trends in armed effective cavalry formations to execute

Figure 1. Example R&S force.

19 Summer 2017
Figure 2. R&S support to joint-force entry.

reconnaissance, security and strike op- economy-of-force options to corps and environments.” 18 Reminiscent of the
tions for corps and theater armies theater commands in diverse settings. services performed by ACRs along the
would allow the Army to better con- While 11th ACR proved its value during Iron Curtain during the Cold War, for-
tribute to joint campaigns. As suggest- distributed-security operations in Viet- ward-positioned R&S brigades, RSSGs
ed by retired LTG David Barno in his nam when they employed superior op- or comparable task forces in places like
2015 report, “The Future of the Army,” erational reach and firepower to over- Eastern Europe would reassure allies
reimagining the capabilities of legacy match Viet Cong opponents, the Amer- and deter adversaries by amplifying
ACRs, even if only through doctrinal ican constabulary regiments that pa- operational simultaneity, depth, syn-
solutions, “would give division and trolled West Germany following World chronization and flexibility in unified
corps commanders a scalable forma- War II demonstrated similar benefit land operations (ULO).
tion” with the necessary mobility, pro- when their mechanized presence en-
tection and firepower to conduct sured relative peace during a period of Branch identity
“screening and guard missions, as well precarious political transition.17 The Army’s embrace of multi-domain
as a myriad of long-range independent battle offers further opportunity for
operations in support of other maneu- A final benefit of modernizing cavalry Armor Branch, and its cavalry subset,
ver units.”16 This capability would ulti- contributions would include allowing to modernize the internal perceptions,
mately allow rapid bridging of air and the Army to better contribute to na- external expectations and joint impli-
land component efforts as cavalry tional strategic deterrence. By provid- cations of its organizational identity.
teams maximize cross-domain fires. ing regional combatant commands The U.S. military’s shift in emphasis to-
with forces optimized to reconnoiter ward achieving more rapid and deci-
The adoption of a focused recon-secu- over distance while leading the tactical sive “windows” of advantage across
rity-strike doctrine and philosophy in a synchronization of cross-domain fires enemy disruption and security zones,
joint context would also offer broader — similar to Operation Atlantic Resolve while providing early access for key en-
benefits across the full range of mili- but with teams specifically designed to ablers, creates the need for agile and
tary operations. Units with enhanced collect information and strike AD net- survivable ground partners. Armor and
mobility, lethality, protection and tai- works – the institution would fulfil its Cavalry leaders, with organizational
lored technological packages have his- doctrinal imperative to “prevent con- culture and material expertise suited
torically provided valuable flict and shape security for dispersed maneuver, serve as ideal

20 Summer 2017
hosts to maximize cross-domain efforts expansion of its identity within a multi- could be joined with unique expertise
during joint operations.19 domain context can broaden its “com- to coordinate and apply cross-domain
bat arm of decision” moniker to in- fires from a panoply of 21st Century en-
Since, as argued by LTG McMaster, the clude a greater range of decisive im- ablers.21 While all tactical leaders must
Army’s “competitive advantage doesn’t pacts. This would imply that scouts and attain combined-arms proficiency,
come from a single branch or single tankers bring not only unmatched di- 19-series officers and NCOs who oper-
technological capability” but instead rect-fire lethality but also the destruc- ate early, independently and forward
emanates from the “ability to employ tion of diverse joint fires – kinetic, cy- in cavalry troops and tank companies
a broad range of technologies and ca- ber, electronic, informational – as only are natural candidates to integrate the
pabilities in combination with each mounted forces capable of high-tempo joint armament.
other.”20 Therefore, the Armor commu- warfare can reliably enable. While all
nity should continue to lead integra- Commanders and staffs, according to
Army communities contribute distinc- Army reconnaissance doctrine, “man-
tion of both traditional and emerging tive capabilities, Armor, with responsi-
cross-domain fire and maneuver; this age assets by cueing, mixing and re-
bility to dominate R&S, owns the im- dundant employment” of systems to
demands capitalizing on emergent re- perative to shape “deep fights” for
quirements for ground elements able “collect the most critical information
joint force commands. with multiple perspectives.”22 Armor-
to combine reconnaissance, security
and strike capability across expanded This broadening of organizational em- Branch field-grade officers and senior
theater depth in the face of complex phasis holds implications for how the NCOs in mechanized and motorized
AD networks. The “rebranding” would mounted-maneuver community, and squadrons, as well as echeloned head-
subtly shift the traditional “jack of all the Army writ large, should perceive quarters, must accordingly exercise su-
trades” mentality of scouts to “cross- Armor and Cavalry leaders at various perior competency in planning and
domain leaders” as cavalry forces po- stages of development. Beginning with leading the tactical application of
sition to allow joint forces to dislocate company-grades, the traditional man- cross-domain fires. As premier manag-
and degrade adversary capabilities. date, as described by LTG Sean MacFar- ers of diverse enablers during ULO,
land, that armored forces be “led by 19-series majors, lieutenant colonels
While the Armor Branch will always re- officers and NCOs who are properly and sergeants major offer the depth
tain its singular status as the Army’s trained and qualitied to operate at and breadth of expertise for empower-
proponent for mounted maneuver, high speeds across large distances” ing maneuver with both traditional and

Figure 3. A continuum of expertise.

21 Summer 2017
newer technologies. This tactical acu- warfighting functions contribute criti- University of Texas at Austin in 2013
men makes them indispensable con- cal capabilities, task-organized cavalry and 1st place in the U.S. Army Armor
tributors to any command. formations offer a unique combination School’s 2015 Starry Writing Competi-
of mobility, protection and firepower tion. He is author of the book, Riding
If Armor and Cavalry Soldiers are mas- to dislocate and disintegrate sophisti- for the Lone Star: Frontier Cavalry and
ters of integrating cross-domain ef- cated enemy defenses through recon- the Texas Way of War, 1822-1865.
forts, those who rise to colonel and naissance and strike actions.
command sergeant major have inter- MAJ Amos Fox is also a student at
nalized the ability to negotiate the Continuing advancements in emerging SAMS. Previous assignments include
broader complexities of multi-domain technologies will only increase the in- commander, Troop L, 2nd Squadron, 16th
battle. The mounted-maneuver com- tensity of 21st Century conflict as the Cavalry Regiment, 199th Infantry Bri-
munity’s focus on planning, facilitating United States designs new doctrines gade, Fort Benning, GA; commander,
and leading diverse teams with tai- and structures to combat emergent Company D, 1 st Squadron, 11 th ACR,
lored task-organization creates team- threats. The Armor Branch, and its cav- Fort Irwin, CA; assistant operations of-
builders with aptitude for complex alry subset, will assume increasingly ficer, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR, Fort Irwin;
problem-solving and strategic deci- prominent roles in facilitating offensive commander, Headquarters and Head-
sion-making. Following the examples campaigns of scale by dispersed joint quarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cav-
of iconic leaders like GEN George Pat- task forces. Eventually, this may in- alry Regiment, 2nd Armored BCT (ABCT),
ton and GEN Creighton Abrams, senior clude increased incorporation of 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, CO;
Armor leaders, after decades of attain- ground and aerial drones, robotic ar- and assistant operations officer, Bri-
ing comfort leading dispersed and mo- mored proxies, emergent swarm tac- gade Special Troops Battalion, 2 nd
bile formations across distance, pro- tics and unprecedented cyber-elec- ABCT, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson.
vide the joint force with adaptive and tronic devastation as scouts and tank- MAJ Fox’s military education includes
agile practitioners.23 ers unleash cross-domain fires.26 If the Command and General Staff College
COIN wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (CGSC), MCCC, CLC, Bradley Fire Sup-
Maximizing this branch-wide “brand” seemed to marginalize the cavalry tra- port Vehicle Commander’s Course,
of cross and multi-domain expertise dition, the complexity, tempo and Field Artillery Officer Basic Course and
requires focused training in the profes- depth of the multi-domain battlefield Airborne School. He holds a bachelor’s
sional military education of all tankers may demand its return to prominence. of science degree in secondary educa-
and scouts. As argued by BG John Ko- tion from Indiana University-Purdue
(Editor’s note: Questions about this ar- University at Indianapolis and a mas-
lasheski, 50th Chief of Armor, the Armor
ticle may be sent to MAJ Nathan Jen- ter’s of arts degree in secondary edu-
School has long served as the “institu-
nings, lead writer and point of contact, cation from Ball State University. MAJ
tion of choice for developing agile and
at [email protected].) Fox’s awards include the Draper Armor
adaptive leaders” that can “operate in
any environment” and “are capable of MAJ Nathan Jennings is a student in Leadership Award, Fiscal Year 2012;
integrating combined arms.”24 As the the School of Advanced Military Stud- member of 11th ACR’s honorary rolls;
U.S. military anticipates engagement in ies (SAMS), Fort Leavenworth, KS. Pre- and Order of St. George (Bronze). He is
increasingly complex settings, the con- vious assignments include assistant also a recipient of Silver Spurs.
tinuous integration of newer technolo- professor of history at the U.S. Military MAJ Adam Taliaferro is a student at
gies to complement traditional en- Academy, West Point, NY; Headquar- SAMS. Previous assignments include
ablers in decisive-action training pro- ters Troop commander and Troop C board recorder, Department of Army
grams will ensure that 19-series Sol- commander, 4-9 Cavalry, 2 nd BCT, 1 st Secretariat, Human Resources Com-
diers, from private to colonel, are pre- Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX, and mand, Fort Knox, KY; aide-de-camp to
pared to maximize the potential of ma- Iraq; platoon leader, Company B, 1-34 the commanding general, U.S. Army
neuver and fires to shape future oper- Armor, 1st BCT, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Cadet Command and Fort Knox; troop
ating environments. Riley, KS, and Iraq; and 19D cavalry commander, Headquarters, 3rd Squad-
scout in 2nd ACR (Light) with Operation ron, 73rd Cavalry, 1st BCT, 82nd Airborne
Emerging horizons Iraqi Freedom tours in Baghdad and Division, Fort Bragg, NC; commander,
GEN Mark Milley, 39th Chief of Staff of Kirkuk, Iraq. His military schooling in- Troop B, 3rd Squadron, 73rd Cavalry, 1st
the Army, recently warned that “land- cludes the Command and General Staff BCT, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg
based forces now are going to have to Officer’s Course, Cavalry Leader’s and Rabiah, Iraq; and platoon leader,
penetrate denied areas for the rest of Course (CLC), Maneuver Captain’s Ca- Troop B, 4th Squadron, 73rd Cavalry, 1st
the joint force” while having the capa- reer Course (MCCC), Armor Officer Ba- BCT, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg
bility to “operate in all domains simul- sic Course (AOBC) and Air-Assault and and Paktika Province, Afghanistan.
taneously.” 25 Armored forces, when Airborne schools. MAJ Jennings holds MAJ Taliaferro’s military schools in-
maneuvering as combined-arms a bachelor’s of arts degree in history clude SAMS’ Advanced Military Studies
teams, have the potential to adopt from Northwestern State University of Program, College of Naval Command
more decisive roles in multi-domain Louisiana and a master’s of arts degree and Staff at the U.S. Naval War Col-
battle efforts as they enable rapid in American history from the Universi- lege, Jumpmaster Course, MCCC, CLC,
forced-entry across contested battle- ty of Texas at Austin. He won the Perry Airborne School and AOBC. He holds a
fields. While all Army branches and Prize for the best master’s thesis at the bachelor ’s of science degree in

22 Summer 2017
economics from Middle Tennessee 21st Century,” ARMY magazine, December Sept. 15-17, 2015.
State University and a master’s of sci- 2016. 22
Field Manual 3-98 Reconnaissance and
ence degree in administration from 3
For a critique of cavalry relevance, see Security Operations, Washington, DC:
Central Michigan University. MAJ Talia- Vincent Thomas, “A Dying Breed: The Government Printing Office, July 2015.
ferro also has a master’s of arts degree United States Cavalry in Today’s Army,” 23
Lisa Alley, “U.S. Army Observes 75th An-
in defense and strategic studies from published by SAMS, Fort Leavenworth, niversary of Armored Force,” ARMOR, Ju-
U.S. Naval War College. His awards in- 2013; for a critique of BCT cavalry re- ly-September 2015.
sourcing, see Todd Poindexter, “Trans-
clude the Bronze Star with one oak-leaf 24
BG John Kolasheski, “Chief of Armor
forming Mechanized Reconnaissance:
cluster, Purple Heart, Combat Action How the Armored Brigade Combat Team
Hatch: Applying Lessons-Learned,” AR-
Badge and Senior Parachutist Badge. MOR, July-September 2016.
Cavalry Squadron should be Structured
for [R&S] Operations in the Near Future,”
25
GEN Mark Milley, quoted in “Army $40B
MAJ David Griffith is a student at Short on Modernization vs. Russia, China:
SAMS. Previous assignments include SAMS, 2014.
CSA Milley,” Breaking Defense, Oct. 3,
commander, Headquarters and Head-
4
Cameron.
2016; also quoted in “Miserable, Disobe-
quarters Troop, 3rd Squadron, 3rd Cav- 5
Whitepaper, “Cavalry Squadron Capabil- dient and Victorious: GEN Milley’s Future
alry Regiment, Fort Hood, TX; com- ity Review,” MCoE, April 17, 2014. U.S. Soldier,” Breaking Defense, Oct. 5,
mander, Company M, 3-3 Cav, Fort 6
CPT Thomas Spolizino, “Not Just Infantry 2016.
Hood; assistant S-3, 3-3 Cav, Fort Hood; with Tanks: Who We Should Be and Why 26
Tim Baxter and Tom von Eschenbach,
scout-platoon leader, Troop E, 2 nd the Army Needs Us to Be It,” ARMOR, Ju- “Manned-Unmanned Teaming,” Ground
Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, Fort ly-September 2014. Combat Technology, April 24, 2014; John
Hood; and tank-platoon leader, Com- 7
BG Scott McKean, “Redefining and Re- Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Swarming
pany C, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor Bat- learning the Role of the Cavalry Squad- and the Future of Conflict,” RAND Nation-
talion, Fort Riley, KS. His military ron,” ARMOR, July-September 2015. al Defense Research Institute.
schools include Air Command and Staff 8
Leah Kilpatrick, “Cavalry brigade combat
College, MCCC and AOBC. MAJ Griffith team assumes new design, transition
Acronym Quick-Scan
has a bachelor’s of science degree in nearly complete,” Army News Service,
psychology from Northwestern State Feb. 17, 2016.
A2/AD – anti-access/area denial
University and a master’s of arts de- 9
“Cavalry Squadron Capability Review” ABCT – armored brigade combat
gree in military operational art and sci- whitepaper. team
ence from Air Command and Staff Col- 10
Force Management System Website, ACR – armored-cavalry regiment
lege. U.S. Force Management Support Agency. ADP – Army doctrinal publication
AOBC – Armor Officer Basic Course
11
Cameron. BCT – brigade combat team
MAJ Kyle Trottier is a student in the Ad-
vanced Military Studies Program, Fort
12
ADP 3-0, Operations, Washington, DC: CFV – Cavalry Fighting Vehicle
Government Printing Office, August 2009. CGSC – Command and General
Leavenworth KS. Previous assignments
13
LTG H.R. McMaster, correspondence Staff College
include instructor, MCCC, Fort Benning CLC – Cavalry Leader’s Course
GA; brigade plans officer, 3rd BCT, 101st with MAJ Nathan Jennings, Nov. 5, 2016.
COIN – counterinsurgency
Airborne Division; troop commander, 14
Barry Watts, “The Evolution of Precision DIVCAV – division cavalry
1st Squadron, 33rd Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Strike,” Center for Strategic and Budget- IADS – Integrated Air Defense
BCT, 101st Airborne Division; assistant ary Assessments, 2013; Ian Easton, “Chi- System
operations officer, 3rd Battalion, 320th na’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capa- JFACC – Joint Forces Air
bilities,” The Japan Institute of Interna- Component Command
Field Artillery Regiment, 3rd BCT, 101st JFLCC – Joint Forces Land
tional Affairs, 2014.
Airborne Division; and battalion S-4 Component Command
(logistics), company executive officer
15
National Commission on the Future of
the Army, Jan. 28, 2016. JFMCC – Joint Forces Maritime
and platoon leader with 2nd Battalion, Component Command
7th Infantry Regiment, 1st ABCT, 3rd In-
16
Retired LTG David Barno and Nora Ben- MCCC – Maneuver Captain’s Career
fantry Division. MAJ Trottier’s military sahel, “The Future of the Army: Today, To- Course
morrow and the Day after Tomorrow,” At- MCoE – Maneuver Center of
schools include CGSC, MCCC, Northern
lantic Council, Brent Scowcroft Center on Excellence
Warfare School, AOBC and Ranger and International Security, September 2015. MGS – Mobile Gun System
Airborne schools. He has a bachelor’s MI – military intelligence
17
GEN Donn Starry, Mounted Combat in
of arts degree in criminal justice from NCO – noncommissioned officer
Vietnam, Washington, DC: Department of
Texas Christian University and a mas- the Army, 1978; Cameron. OBJ – objective
ter’s of arts degree in organizational RSSG – reconnaissance and
18
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. security strike group
and business security management
Army Operating Concept: Win in a Com- R&S – reconnaissance and security
from Webster University. plex World, October 2014. SAMS – School of Advanced Military
Studies
Notes 19
GEN Perkins.
SOF – Special Operations Forces
1
Dr. Robert S. Cameron, To Fight or Not 20
LTG McMaster, 2015 Maneuver Warf- SPT – support
to Fight, Fort Leavenworth: Combat Stud- ighter Conference, Fort Benning, Sept. 15- TRADOC – U.S. Army Training and
ies Institute Press, 2010. 17, 2015. Doctrine Command
2
GEN David Perkins, “Multi-Domain Bat- 21
LTG Sean MacFarland, 2015 Maneuver ULO – unified land operations
tle: Joint Combined-Arms Concept for the Warfighter Conference, Fort Benning,

23 Summer 2017
 Leveraging Space: an Examination of
the Ultimate High Ground at Echelons
Brigade and Below
by LTC Coley D. Tyler that enable movement and maneuver, provide ISR, PNT, SATCOM, MW and
but our adversaries will increasingly EM for their forces. Some of these
Describing the space domain as “the
put these at at risk to neutralize our near-peer competitors have also devel-
ultimate high ground” may seem cli-
long-held technological advantage and oped counter-space abilities or the
ché, but there are some underlying
challenge conventional assumptions of ability to threaten others’ space assets
truths in the statement that the U.S.
domain superiority. Therefore units and means. 2 Some nations employ a
Army has taken for granted since the
must be adept at operating in a de- mix of national and commercial capa-
advent of the space-enabled force in
nied, degraded or disrupted space op- bilities, while others depend on com-
the late 1980s.
erating environment (D3SOE). mercial only.
Imagine a day without:
This article addresses how formations Considering that a typical U.S. Army
• Space assets providing intelligence, brigade combat team (BCT) has more
can best prepare for this reality to en-
surveillance and reconnaissance than 2,500 pieces of PNT-enabled
sure mission accomplishment regard-
(ISR) of denied areas; equipment and 250 pieces of SATCOM-
less of the level of space-domain deg-
• The Global Positioning System (GPS) enabled equipment, assured access to
radation. Commanders must be aware
providing position, navigation and space is tremendously important.3 The
of the threat, understand the role of
timing (PNT) for joint friendly-force recent conflict in Ukraine highlighted
space capabilies within the Army and
tracking; issues the U.S. Army could face in the
exercise future space support within
• Precision-guided munitions; future. Russian separatists were highly
the emerging conceptual frameworks
• Satellite communications (SATCOM); successful executing electronic attacks,
of multi-domain battle (MDB) and the
or GPS jamming/spoofing and signals in-
Army Functional Concept for Move-
• M i s s i l e w a r n i n g ( M W ) o r terceptions and targeting.4
ment and Maneuver (AFC-MM).
environmental monitoring (EM)
providing terrestrial weather, Carl von Clausewitz opines that “[h]is-
enabling land operations …
Threat torical examples clarify everything and
Any adversary can be space-capable also provide the best kind of proof” if
… and you quickly recognize the Army’s with access to many of the same capa- properly used through explanation, ap-
reliance on the capabilities afforded by bilities the U.S. Army enjoys if it can af- plication, supporting facts and deduc-
the ultimate high ground of space. ford the commerical rate for provided tion of doctrine.5
services. 1 Space-faring nations – na-
Over the course of the previous three
tions that possess their own space ca- Sun Tzu also counseled that one who
decades, the Army has shifted from be-
pabilities – have a wider range of op- knows the enemy and knows himself
ing space-enabled to space-depen-
tions. Some possess the ability to de- will not be endangered in a hundred
dent, a condition our potential adver-
velop their own space systems and engagements. One who does not know
saries understand and intend to exploit
function in the space domain as near- the enemy but knows himself will be
in future conflict.
peer competitors with the United sometimes victorious and sometimes
Space provides multiple capabilities States. These capabilities generally will meet with defeat. One who knows

Figure 1. Illustration of space support to operations. (Graphic by LTC Coley D. Tyler)

24 Summer 2017
neither the enemy nor himself will in- old adage, “The more you sweat in training at Training and Doctrine Com-
variably be defeated in every engage- peace, the less you bleed in war.” In mand (TRADOC) centers of excellence
ment.6 December 2015, the Chief of Staff of and schools. Currently at the Maneu-
the Army (CSA) challenged the combat- ver Center of Excellence (MCoE) on
If we heed their advice, then under-
training centers (CTCs) for “increased Fort Benning, GA, SMDC teaches blocks
standing how the space domain can af-
exposure to electronic warfare … as of space instruction to the Maneuver
fect the U.S. Army (in light of potential
close to combat as you can get without Pre-Command Course and Infantry/Ar-
threats) and how it is structured to le-
actual death. Rachet up the intensity mor Basic Officer Leader Courses.
verage the ultimate high ground is very
… to make the experience a leader and SMDC is also making progress toward
instructive for a “space saavy” future
Soldier crucible.”9 implementing instruction for the Ma-
force.
neuver Captain’s Career Course.
The Combined Arms Center (CAC)’s
Space’s role commanding general published a di- Through the operational LoE, SMDC
Recent observations, trends and in- rective mandating the inclusion of trains units at home-station and the
sights reveal that most units are ill-pre- D3SOE training into all professional- CTCs to better leverage space capabil-
pared for a D3SOE and there is much military-education (PME) courses. The ities and better prepare them to fight
room for improvement. For example, commander’s intent is “[t]o ensure the in a D3SOE. Units can coordinate with
in the 2015 Gypsy Kilo exercise – a Army Space Training Strategy is fully the Army Space Training Integration
Joint Navigation Warfare Center implemented within [PME] to improve (ASTI) Branch directly to integrate
(JNWC)-faciliated contested PNT and the Army’s understanding and [use] of space training into the unit training cy-
navigation-warfare (navwar) event – space capabilities, improve operations cle.
JNWC simulated D3SOE conditions for in contested operational environments
company-sized elements and conclud- and create a continuum of career-long Lastly, the U.S. Army has a core of
ed that units experienced significant is- space education throughout the pro- space cadre to offer subject-matter ex-
sues navigating and maintaining situ- fessional-development system.”10 pertise within the operating force.
ational awareness of force orientation Army space-support elements (SSE)
The U.S. Army Space and Missile De- are small cells of space cadre trained
in degraded environments.7 fense Command (SMDC) is working and experienced in space operations
National Training Center rotation after- hard to reverse these trends by fully organic to army, corps, division and
action reviews routinely reveal: implementing the Army Space Training Special Forces Group staffs. SSE under-
Strategy (ASTS) that the Army G-3 di- stand planning and operational consid-
• Underuse of GPS encryption;
rected in preparation for the future erations of employed space capabili-
• D e f i c i e n c i e s i n s p e c t r u m -
and by providing D3SOE home-station ties and have a firm knowledge of the
management operations/Joint
training to better prepare units for threats to those systems by an adver-
Restricted Frequency List;
training rotations. sary.
• Poor SATCOM terminal operations;
• I n s u f f i c i e n t c o n t e s t e d - s p a c e SMDC supports U.S. Army space train-
techniques (for example, primary- An Army space-support team (ARSST)
ing and professional development and
alternate-contingency-emergency can augment an SSE for product devel-
education through three lines of effort
plans, tactical standard operating opment and employment of unique ca-
(LoEs): institutional, operational and
procedures and battle drills); and pabilities during deployments, exercis-
space cadre:
• Inadequate unmanned aerial systems es or increased-operational-tempo sit-
(UAS)/counter-UAS operations.8 The institutional LoE aims to increase uations. An ARSST is also tailorable in
knowledge and awareness of space ca- size and expertise (rank and/or mili-
U.S. Army senior leaders believe the pabilities through education and tary-occupation specialty) based on

Figure 2. ASTS. (Graphic source: Space Update, MCoE Pre-Command Course brief)

25 Summer 2017
the supported organization’s needs.
Armed with knowledge of the threat
and self-awareness of space-domain
operations (function and structure),
the U.S. Army can better prepare the
force for future conflicts. Space-cadre
members resident within the force
structure offer units a myriad of sup-
port. Examples include reverse intelli-
gence preparation of the battlefield/
Red space; electromagnetic-interfer-
ence resolution; navwar and special
technical operations support; MW sys-
tem status; additional imagery/over-
head persistant infrared requests;
space-systems-constellation health
status; and GPS accuracy reports. Figure 3. Army space cadre at echelons above brigade. The ARSST structure is
diagrammed as an example only, as it is tailorable to fit mission requirements.
Future space support (Graphic by LTC Coley D. Tyler)
Just as the Second Offset strategy of
the 1980s connected the U.S. Army to engaged in concept-to-capability de- cross-domain maneuver and employ
space-based capabilities, the Third Off- velopment of potential capabilities cross-domain fires, as well as to fill
set strategy must maintain the U.S. across doctrine, organization, training, gaps in obscuration across the entire
military’s advantage over its adversar- materiel, leadership, personnel, facili- electromagnetic spectrum with the
ies in space. The CSA and commandant ties and policy for the force as well. U.S. Army cross-domain obscuration
of the Marine Corps recently signed off strategy.
In the past, the Army was primarily a
on an MDB whitepaper that will serve The nature of warfare is changing, and
receiver of space capabilities owned
to inform the U.S. Army on how cur- the question is: “Does the U.S. Army
and operated by other services. Emerg-
rent and future forces will operate and take the initiative and shape the
ing doctrine in MDB is an opportunity
protect capabilities within the space change, or just hold on for the ride?”
for the U.S. Army to become more of a
domain in light of the emerging near- provider of effects. Imagine a BCT com-
peer threat. The U.S. Army cannot al- LTC Coley Tyler is MCoE’s space integra-
mander being able to plan, coordinate
low current and planned space depen- tion officer, assigned to SMDC-Future
and employ space effects from a space
dencies to hinder operations in future Warfare Center and working at Fort
battalion in the same fashion as he/she
conflicts. Benning, GA. Previous assignments in-
would employ a fires battalion in direct
clude information-operations chief of
Concept-to-capability activities orches- support with priority of fires. This for-
plans, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan/North
trated by TRADOC aim to address these mation hypothetically could have high-
Atlantic Treaty Organization; space-op-
dependencies and better protect and altitude airships with interchangeable
erations chief and special-activities
employ current and future technolo- ISR, SATCOM, PNT, MW or fires pay-
planner, Eighth Army-U.S. Forces Ko-
gies to retain a continuing advantage. loads capable of providing real-time
rea; physical-education instructor, U.S.
How the U.S. Army plans to leverage responsive effects for the maneuver
Military Academy (USMA), West Point,
space in the future to execute MDB commander. Or perhaps this unit is
NY; and battalion fire-support officer,
and the AFC-MM is a considerable equipped with retrievable-payload-car-
2-7 Cavary, 1 st Cavalry Division, Fort
question to be addressed in the Force rying balloons or small satellites to
Hood, TX. His military schooling in-
2025 Maneuver Campaign of Learning. provide diverse capabilities dedicated
cludes the School of Advanced Military
There is no doubt that space capabili- to tactical formations without reliance
Studies (SAMS), intermediate-level ed-
ties are integral to the Defense Depart- on national assets.
ucation, Space Operations Officer
ment’s MDB concept or that the De-
The possibilities are extensive, and op- Qualification Course, Field Artillery
fense Department will enable the four
tions exist even in a fiscally constrained Captain’s Career Course, Field Artillery
components of the AFC-MM solution:
environment. Maneuver leaders owe it Officer Basic Course and Ranger and
cross-domain maneuver, semi-inde-
to their profession and their Soldiers Airborne schools. He holds a bachelor’s
pendent operations, integrated recon-
to create the demand signal for the of science degree in civil engineering
naissance and security and realized
space community on how best to sup- from USMA, a master’s of science de-
mission command. 11 Future threats,
port. Leveraging space at brigade-and- gree in kinesiology from Indiana Uni-
coupled with newfound self-aware-
below echelons is in a crucial stage of versity and a master’s of science de-
ness, require the U.S. Army to make
development. MCoE’s Capability Devel- gree in operational art and science
changes.
opment Division is pushing the enve- from SAMS.
The ASTS guides these efforts through lope on space integration with the
training, and SMDC is also actively multi-domain task force to execute

26 Summer 2017
Notes Acronym Quick-Scan
1
SMDC Directorate of Training and Doc-
trine (DoTD), Space Update, MCoE Pre- AFC-MM – Army Functional Concept LoE – line of effort
Command Course Brief (2016). for Movement and Maneuver MCoE – Maneuver Center of
2
Ibid. ARSST – Army space-support team Excellence
3
Ibid. ASTI – Army Space Training MDB – multi-domain battle
Integration MW – missile warning
4
Ibid. ASTS – Army Space Training Navwar – navigation warfare
5
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Mi- Strategy PME – professional military
chael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: BCT – brigade combat team education
Princeton University Press, 1984. CAC – Combined Arms Center PNT – position, navigation and
CSA – Chief of Staff of the Army timing
6
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Ralph D.
CTC – combat-training center SAMS – School of Advanced Military
Sawyer, New York: Basic Books, 1994.
D3SOE – denied, degraded or Studies
7
Navwar is a deliberate defensive and of- disrupted space operating SATCOM – satellite communications
fensive action to assure friendly use and environment SMDC – Space and Missile Defense
prevent adversary use of PNT, per DoTD. DoTD – Directorate of Training and Command
8
Space Update. Doctrine SSE – space-support element
EM – environmental monitoring TRADOC – (U.S. Army) Training and
9
SMDC G-31 Training and Exercise, ASTI GPS – Global Positioning System Doctrine Command
Branch, 2017. ISR – intelligence, surveillance and UAS – unmanned aerial system
0
CAC, D3SOE task order, 2017. reconnaissance USMA – U.S. Military Academy
JNWC – Joint Navigation Warfare
11
TRADOC, The U.S. Army Functional
Center
Concept for Movement and Maneuver
2020-2040, February 2017.

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published.

27 Summer 2017
 Missed Opportunities: How Stryker Brigade
Combat Teams are Misusing Organic Signals
Intelligence, Electronic-Warfare Capabilities
by CPT Elena Cherepanova squadron EWOs do not possess the LLVI technology add to the reconnais-
equipment to train on or enough per- sance fundamental to maintain contact
The Universal Brigade Combat Team
sonnel to push down to platoon and before, during and after operations, fa-
(BCT) Cavalry Squadron Organization-
squad levels; squadrons possess only cilitating the targeting process.
al and Operational Concept defines
one staff sergeant (E-6) and one ser-
the cavalry squadron as “a combined- The inherent limitation of EW and LLVI
geant (E-5) to plan and implement all
arms formation which employs move- capabilities (limited operational range
EW operations.
ment, direct and indirect fires, infor- and terrain restrictions) fits ideally
mation-collection capabilities [and] When it comes to SIGINT, most compa- with squadron missions. The squadron
joint enablers, and reports using mis- ny and troop commanders do not un- is the first to deploy and the last to
sion-command systems to develop the derstand how to use low-level voice in- leave. Scouts naturally find the terrain
situation.” 1 But do BCTs employ all tercept (LLVI) teams effectively, or they that is the most advantageous, which
their organic capabilities to their max- neglect them entirely. With a high op- is the perfect placement for the EW
imum potential and enable squadrons erational tempo, administrative tasks, and LLVI teams. All systems are able to
to do all the preceding? planning operations and time con- collect on the move and will not inter-
straints, it is difficult for the command- fere with squadron operations. Teams
Squadrons must continuously develop
er to include additional assets. In the can be embedded with the mounted
situational understanding for the en-
same way, squadron staffs fail to prop- and dismounted elements, and they
tire Stryker brigade combat team
erly integrate SIGINT capabilities into can operate out of Strykers. Electronic
(SBCT) while protecting the main body
maneuver plans. Planners do not un- reconnaissance will enable the troops
to prevent it from fighting at a disad-
derstand the capabilities and restric- on the ground and the squadron com-
vantage and, overall, to facilitate win-
tions and, as a result, fail to implement mander to maximize their collection
ning the war. The BCT has an incredible
this significant asset. After all, it is hu- efforts while maintaining freedom of
set of capabilities – electronic attack
man nature to ignore things we do not maneuver.
(EA), electronic support (ES) and direc-
understand.
tion-finding – to help the mission. To win the war, we must maximize as-
Moreover, better integration of elec- Furthermore, commanders are task-or- sets rather than rely on higher-echelon
tronic warfare (EW) and signals intelli- ganizing teams to infantry battalions assets that will be task-organized only
gence (SIGINT) capabilities into the even though there is no immediate for limited periods. To do so, leaders
squadron will enhance the cavalry’s need for EWOs or LLVI teams in their must pull all EWOs out of the battal-
ability to develop situational under- mission set. The infantry’s primary job ions and create tactical EW teams in
standing for the brigade commander. is to close with and engage the enemy; the same manner as LLVI teams. LLVI
This article identifies the problem with their movement has to be rapid and teams are comprised of two- to three-
current integration of organic SIGINT forceful. Unfortunately, LLVI and EW Soldier sections that can be task-orga-
and EW assets, proposes a solution for equipment is limited when it comes to nized when the mission requires it.
the squadron to better develop situa- freedom of maneuver because Soldiers These teams belong to the military-in-
tional understanding and recommends can’t effectively collect and engage telligence company (MICO). The MI-
tactics, techniques and procedures with it on the move. By the time they CO’s mission-essential task list (METL)
(TTP) for optimal employment. are able to engage, it is too late. For includes performing intelligence, sur-
this reason, cavalry squadrons must be veillance and reconnaissance, and pro-
Problem the primary implementers of LLVI and viding intelligence support to target-
SBCTs misuse and underuse EW per- EW systems. ing. In the same way, EW teams have
sonnel and assets. Currently, the SBCT to belong to the MICO to fulfill the
controls the EW plan and execution at Solution same METL requirements and to max-
the operational level, so electronic- The cavalry squadron’s focus is to gain imize their capabilities. Teams will be
warfare officers (EWOs) at lower ech- and maintain contact with the enemy; under a noncommissioned officer in
elons become message carriers rather they are the eyes and ears of the bat- charge (NCOIC), who will be positioned
than implementers and advisers to tlefield. Scouts are trusted not only to at the squadron and act as the link be-
their commanders. In many cases, they find the enemy but also with the em- tween the teams and the brigade EWO.
are viewed only as another person to ployment of direct fires at the squad Separated from the battalion, the
carry out unrelated details such as am- and platoon levels. The BCT command- teams and NCOIC can focus on contin-
munition pick-up, radio-transmission er relies on scouts to shape a tactical uous training to maintain their skills.
operation, entry-control-point duties, and operational response so he can op- Furthermore, LLVI and EW teams can
etc. Unfortunately, battalion and timally deploy the infantry. EW and train together to conduct offensive,

28 Summer 2017
Figure 1. LLVI and EW doctrinal template.

defensive and collection tasks. the elements on their right and left are These teams do not require a specific
doing, not to mention putting faces to setup. Mounted EW teams place their
Finally, squadron S-2s should attend a
the people on the ground to build trust antenna on a Stryker and conduct op-
school to certify as military-occupation
within a team. erations, while dismounted EW teams
specialty 35G, a SIGINT/EWO. Most
conduct missions independently with-
S-2s are young, with limited intelli- LLVI systems are sensitive in nature out need for additional platforms. Tac-
gence experience and understanding; and have to be imbedded with dis- tical EW provides EA and ES to include
some of them are branch-detailed. mounts at OPs. LLVI provides com- early warning, collection and direction-
Squadron S-2s must be the subject- manders with force protection, early finding.
matter expert (SME) during the plan- warning and target acquisition. During
ning and execution process to deploy mission analysis, the S-2 team con- Successful employment of EA allows
assets and continuously educate com- ducts a detailed terrain analysis by sur- the squadron to separate enemy for-
manders on the capabilities of EW and veying for ideal OPs. They also provide mations and command-and-control el-
LLVI. line-of-sight products that identify the ements through jamming, thus forcing
equipment capabilities and limitations the enemy to switch to targetable fre-
Recommended TTPs of the squadron and LLVIs. To provide quencies, deploy forces early, delay
To optimally integrate LLVI and EW ca- detailed and accurate collection, LLVI their movement or change its CoA.
pabilities within the SBCT at squadron teams require less than 10 minutes to “Encouraging” the enemy on what fre-
level, commanders must embed teams set up. With the set OP, they observe quencies to use reduces its ability to
with the S-2 during the military deci- enemy locations, intercept communi- effectively use the electromagnetic
sion-making process (MDMP), deploy cations, analyze traffic and disseminate spectrum (EMS) and focuses LLVI to de-
LLVIs with scout observation posts intelligence. termine the enemy commander’s in-
(OPs), integrate EW with dismounted tent while continuously painting the
or mounted teams and invest in new One of the most exclusive tasks LLVI enemy’s common operating picture for
technology (Figure 1). teams provide is communications intel- commanders throughout the SBCT.
ligence (COMINT). COMINT gathers any Through EMS usage, the S-2 is able to
During the planning process, squad- communication from enemy emits to cross-reference frequencies of interest
rons must imbed EW and LLVI teams identify and further define the enemy’s to confirm/deny and identify the type
with the S-2 section. This maximizes intent. The teams set up in the same of equipment the enemy is using.
the output of Step 3 of MDMP, where manner as OPs and can sustain and se- Moreover, the S-2 will be able to deter-
the S-2 and S-3 join forces in course-of- cure themselves. mine which elements are in the disrup-
action (CoA) development. What is
better than the SMEs having a voice in To maximize their effectiveness, squad- tion, battle and support zones, and
the mission plan? Also, those EW and rons must imbed EW teams with which CoA the enemy is employing.
LLVI teams gain full awareness of what mounted or dismounted elements. ES operations identify the enemy’s EM

29 Summer 2017
 Low-level voice intercept Electronic warfare
Primary use Collection asset Weapon asset
Mission Find and intercept enemy communica- Identify and locate emitters to support
tions and determine enemy’s intent communications jamming
Output Collects all communications data to pro- Collects data to determine enemy’s
vide analysis equipment to conduct jamming
Capabilities Early warning Electronic attack
Force protection Electronic support
Communications interception Frequencies interception
Target acquisition

Table 1. LLVI vs. EW.

equipment’s and systems’ vulnerabili- plan and train for electronic offensive assignments include intelligence plan-
ties. A single EW or LLVI team can pro- operations? ner/future operations, Headquarters
vide a line of bearing, indicating the di- and Headquarters Company, 2-2 SBCT,
The Army must invest in new technol-
rection of the signal and emitters. Add- JBLM; assistant S-2, 4th Battalion, 17th
ogy. In Fiscal Year 2016, only $12.69
ing two more teams provides the accu- Infantry Regiment, 1 st SBCT, 1 st Ar-
million of the U.S. Army’s budget of
rate geolocation of the enemy and al- mored Division, Fort Bliss, TX; human-
$127 billion was requested to fund EW
lows for the scouts to get “eyes on” the intelligence platoon leader, MICO, 6th
development.3 “If you go to a unit to-
enemy to ultimately identify high-value Squadron, 1st Cav, 1-1 SBCT, Fort Bliss;
day in the Army and you say, let me see
target lists/high-payoff target lists and and intelligence, surveillance and re-
your ‘[EW] equipment,’ and you go to
answer the commander’s priority intel- connaissance platoon leader, MICO,
the EWO and he opens up his wall lock-
ligence requirements. ES allows the 6-1 Cav, 1-1 SBCT, Fort Bliss. CPT
er, it’s empty,” 4 said COL Jeffrey
squadron to detect frequencies at Cherepanova’s military schools include
Church, the Army’s senior EW officer
greater ranges, provide real time early the Signal Intelligence/Electronic War-
in 2015. If the Army wants to conduct
warning of the enemy deployment sta- fare Officer Course, Military Intelli-
offensive EW operations, it relies on
tus and increase our reaction time gence Captain’s Career Course, Joint
borrowed assets from the Navy. An of-
while augmenting the squadron’s se- Human Analyst Targeting Course, Anti-
fensive jamming capability is not slat-
curity tasks. Terrorism Course and Military Intelli-
ed to enter the U.S. Army until 2023.5
gence Basic Officer Leadership Course.
The SBCT must invest in new EW and She holds a bachelor’s of science de-
SIGINT technologies. Paul McLeary, a Conclusion gree in pure mathematics from Indiana
foreign-policy senior reporter covering In the end, EW and LLVI complement University Purdue University Indianap-
the U.S. Department of Defense’s and each other. Either one can find a fre- olis, Indianapolis, IN.
national security issues, once said, quency and pass it to the other while
“American military officials are being actively collecting intelligence. This fa- Notes
forced to admit they’re scrambling to cilitates the squadron’s understanding 1
Universal BCT Cavalry Squadron Orga-
catch up to [EW] capabilities that Rus- of the operational environment during nizational and Operational Concept, Feb.
sia possesses.”2 He is not wrong. Cur- final planning and allows the employ- 29, 2016.
rently, we have people, but where is ment of electronic fires to shape con- 2
Paul McLeary, “Russia’s Winning the
the equipment? No one knows. The ditions for a successful fight. To facili- Electronic War,” Foreign Policy, Oct. 21,
equipment that exists for the U.S. tate EW and LLVI operations, BCT com- 2015; accessed April 1, 2017 at http://for-
Army is extremely outdated and is sit- manders must imbed teams at the eignpolicy.com/2015/10/21/russia-win-
ting somewhere on shelves, just like squadron and troop level. The collec- ning-the-electronic-war/.
the skills of our EWOs. Meanwhile, tion and scout teams must train to- 3
Exhibit R-2, RDT&E Budget: Electronic
Russia has deployed powerful and so- gether to synchronize and complement Warfare Development, Global Security,
phisticated EW equipment into the each other’s operations and ultimately February 2015; accessed April 01, 2017 at
help the squadron’s mission accom- www.globa.security.org/military/library/
countries of Georgia, Ukraine and Syr-
plishment. Without using our organic budget/fy2016/army-peds/0304270a_5_
ia to disrupt those governments’ pb_2016.pdf.
means of communication and coalition assets to their full capacity and train-
ing Soldiers in the proposed formation, 4
Sydney J. Freedberg, “Army’s Electronic
operations.
it can negatively impact mission execu- Warfare Cupboard is Bare: No Jammer un-
tion. til 2023,”Breaking Defense, July 20, 2015;
Will it turn into another fight in which accessed April 1, 2017 at www.breaking-
the U.S. Army is reactive and scroung- CPT Elena Cherepanova is the S-2 for defense.com/2015/07/armys-electronic-
es to find countermeasures? Or do we 8th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 2nd warfare-cupboard-is-bare-no-jammer-un-
need to maximize our efforts to con- SBCT, 2nd Infantry Division, Joint Base til-2023/.
duct active electronic collection and Lewis-McChord (JBLM), WA. Previous 5
Ibid.

30 Summer 2017
 Acronym Quick-Scan
BCT – brigade combat team LLVI – low-level voice intercept OP – observation post
CoA – course of action JBLM – Joint Base Lewis-McChord SBCT – Stryker brigade combat
COMINT – communications MDMP – military decision-making team
intelligence process SIGINT – signals intelligence
EA – electronic attack METL – mission-essential task list SME – subject-matter expert
EMS – electromagnetic spectrum MICO – military-intelligence TTP – tactics, techniques and
ES – electronic support company procedures
EW – electronic warfare NCOIC – noncommissioned officer in
EWO – electronic-warfare officer charge

Profession of arms Basics: A Study of the Second Leb-

• Don Higginbotham, George anon War and Operation Cast
Washington and the American Lead [CSI publication].
Military Tradition [commercial Chronicles the Israeli Defense Force’s
publication]. efforts to identify and apply lessons
learned from 2006 to operations in
• Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Gaza; and transition from counterin-
Snider, American Civil-Military Re- Recommended Reading surgency-centric orientation toward a
lations: The Soldiers and the State for Professional more traditional combined-arms ap-
in the New Era [commercial pub- proach, not unlike current shifts in
Development
lication]. U.S. Army in the last few years.
American Civil-Military Relations of- Listed by general subject
fers the first comprehensive assess- rather than command echelon Platform development
ment of the subject since the publica- • David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and
tion of Samuel P. Huntington’s field- perspective. Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the
defining book, The Soldier and the U.S. Army, 1917-1945 [commer-
• Robert S. Cameron, Mobility, Shock,
State. cial publication].
and Firepower [CMH publication].
Provides context for understanding the ear- Johnson examines the U.S. Army’s in-
Institutional development ly development of the Armor Branch and novations for both armor and aviation
• Bruce Godmundsson, On Armor its evolution from a platform-centric orien- between the world wars, arguing that
[commercial publication]. tation into a set of unique capabilities amid the tank became a captive of the con-
Overview of evolution of combined the constraints of organizational prece- servative Infantry and Cavalry Branch-
arms organizations from World War I dents, budgetary limitations and uncertain- es, while the airplane’s development
through Cold War; analyzes combined ty RE the capabilities of new technology. was channeled by airpower insurgents
arms teams from a multi-national per- bent on creating an independent air
spective, including the United States. • Martin L. Van Creveld, Supplying force.
War: Logistics from Wallenstein to • Orr Kelley, King of the Killing
• George Hofmann and Donn Star-
Patton; 2nd Edition [commercial publi- Zone [commercial publication].
ry (eds), Camp Colt to Desert
cation]. Highly readable overview of the devel-
Storm [commercial publication].
A second edition of this classic work, com- opment and fielding of the Abrams
Anthology that includes set of articles
devoted to principal eras in Armor menting on the role of logistics in warfare. tank.
Branch history; includes chapter on • John Stone, The Tank Debate: Ar- • Blair W. Haworth, The Bradley
U.S. Marine Corps armor develop- mour and the Anglo-American Mili- and How it Got That Way [com-
ment. tary Tradition [commercial publica- mercial publication].
• Robert S. Cameron, To Fight or tion]. Overview of the Bradley Fighting Ve-
Not to Fight? [CSI publication]. Analysis of tank development from World hicle and the factors influencing its
Overview of doctrinal and organiza- War II to 2000 with focus upon shaping fac- development; also provides contextu-
tional trends related to reconnais- tors and technology limitations; multina- al understanding of mechanized infan-
sance organizations and related is- tional perspective. try evolution.
sues; provides context for understand-
ing current state of cavalry/recon. • National Training Center Operations • Mark J. Reardon and Jeffery A.
Group, Training for Decisive Action: Charlston, From Transformation
• John J. McGrath, Scouts Out! Stories of Mission Command [CSI pub- to Combat: The First Stryker Bri-
[CSI publication]. lication]. gade at War [CMH publication].
Overview of reconnaissance organiza-
tions in modern armies; multinational • Scott C. Farquhar (ed), Back to Continued on Page 56

31 Summer 2017
 Scouts Fashion Victory in
Gainey Cup Competition
by CPT Patrick M. Zang and CPT John atrophied in the midst of the global competition provided a useful metric
L. Albert war on terror. With a reinvigorated ap- to evaluate the state of R&S training at
proach to R&S operations, the Gainey the level of tactical execution – the
“Effective reconnaissance and security
Cup stresses the importance of area re- scout squad – throughout the force.
[R&S] tasks confirm or deny the com-
connaissance, route reconnaissance The 24 teams who competed in the
mander’s and staff’s initial understand-
and the establishment of an observa- event represented Active, Army Na-
ing and visualization of the tactical and
tion post focused on answering the tional Guard and allied formations.
operational situation and further de-
commander’s priority intelligence re- (The Active Component represented
velop the intelligence picture for the
quirements within the constraints of each force structure: armored BCT,
[brigade combat team (BCT)] to allow
“latest time information is of value.” Stryker BCT and infantry BCT.) While
the commander to describe, direct,
The competition further challenged the competition did not control for all
lead and assess military operations as
scouts through the evaluation of com- variables, each team did participate in
well as make effective decisions.” –
mon tasks such as land navigation, call the same events that paired fitness
Field Manual (FM) 3-98, Reconnais-
for fire, medical skills and chemical, bi- with -10 level tasks. They also compet-
sance and Security Operations, July
ological, radiological and nuclear ed under the same terrain, weather
2015
(CBRN) events. To add physical stress and light conditions with the same
to the mental aspect of the competi- equipment, evaluated against the
Competition overview tion, a 22-station obstacle course as same standardized training and evalu-
The third biennial Gainey Cup Best well as two running events bookending ation outlines.
Scout Squad Competition, named in the competition stressed competitors.
honor of retired CSM William “Joe” The 2017 Gainey Cup differed slightly
Gainey, the first senior-enlisted adviser The competition scoring used a weight- from the 2015 version. A squad stress
to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, ed-scale concept, prioritizing critical shoot was added, while hasty demoli-
took place at Fort Benning, GA, May R&S tasks over sheer physical fitness. tions and “establish a helicopter land-
1-4. The competition featured 24 six- The most heavily weighted event in the ing zone” were removed. Moving for-
man scout squads from our allies and competition was the area-reconnais- ward to the 2019 competition, a
across the U.S. Army. Three Army Na- sance lane. The weighted grading con- wholesale overhaul of the concept of
tional Guard (Illinois, West Virginia and cept was a takeaway from the inaugu- operations isn’t expected. The 2017
Nevada) and four allied partners (two ral Gainey Cup in 2013. Weighting competition, like the 2013 and 2015
teams from Canada, one from the competition events ensures that a versions before it, captured lessons-
Netherlands and one from the United well-rounded scout squad wins the learned, particularly those identified
Kingdom) competed alongside 17 competition. by the competitors themselves.
teams representing active Army divi-
The competition was close throughout, The following will serve as an event
sions and separate brigades. with four teams consistently in the breakdown in those areas deemed to
Within the context of the competition, running for the Best Scout Squad: 1-1 contain capability gaps not only in the
a scout squad was defined as a squad Cavalry Squadron from Fort Bliss, TX; competing squads but in identified
leader in the ranks of staff sergeant to 6-8 Cavalry Squadron from Fort Stew- shortfalls in the larger Army as a
first lieutenant, a team leader in the art, GA; 2-106 Cavalry Squadron from whole.
ranks of sergeant or staff sergeant and the Illinois Army National Guard; and
four scouts in the ranks of private to 104th Reconnaissance Squadron from Land navigation. Competitors per-
sergeant. This rank structure and orga- the Netherlands. However, on Day 4 formed unevenly conducting unaided
nization aligns with Special Manual with just the “final charge” remaining, land navigation across broken terrain.
(SM) 3-20.96, Cavalry Squadron Uni- only 1-1 Cavalry and 6-8 Cavalry were Only three of 24 teams successfully lo-
versal Operational and Organization- mathematically in contention for the cated all three points over a six-hour
al Concept Volume III, The Standard Gainey Cup championship. Ultimately, period of darkness on the land-naviga-
Scout Platoon (6x36), February 2017. 1-1 Cavalry consisting of SSG Eric At- tion lane. Six teams were unable to lo-
Paragraph 3-38 of SM 3-20.96 states kinson, SGT Zachary Diglio, SGT Joseph cate any points. Some teams struggled
that “the scout squad consists of six Main, PFC Timothy Wood, PFC Ryan with unaided navigation of less than
personnel and one reconnaissance ve- French and PV2 Jeremy Blevins won one kilometer in a variety of environ-
hicle.” the competition. ments. It became readily apparent that
certain teams consisted of individuals
The competition design focused on re- After-action review lacking the personal experience of a
connaissance and Soldier skills that The 2017 Gainey Cup Best Scout Squad non-self-correcting land-navigation

32 Summer 2017
course. For others, land navigation had Vehicle identification. Competitors equipment enables them to adapt as
not been practiced since basic training. struggled to correctly identify military equipment changes over time. It also
Skills such as G-M angle conversion, in- vehicles. Overall, competitors correct- applies systematic analysis to what
tersection, resection and terrain asso- ly identified only 18 percent of vehicles otherwise becomes a very haphazard
ciation – the core of land navigation – presented. The modern battlefield will “guessing game.”
did not appear to be internalized and likely include multinational forces op- Also, there are some tools available to
“trained” by most of the competitors. erating with an array of military vehi- the unit to assist with vehicle-identifi-
cles. Military ground and air vehicles cation training. The Army maintains
This is disconcerting, as the Gainey Cup
from Israel, Germany, China, Japan, Ko- the ROC-V Website at https://rocv.
reflected the probable battlefield oc-
rea, India, France, South Africa, the army.mil. The Website takes individu-
currence of a cyber-electromagnetic-
United Kingdom and Brazil, among oth- als through the basics of thermal op-
activity denied environment. Satellite-
ers, will join common American and tics and using visual cues, and intro-
enabled position tracking may be con-
Russian vehicles on the battlefield. duces a large number of friendly and
tested, spoofed or denied by a modern
Scouts may have seconds to identify threat ground and air vehicles. A simi-
threat actor. The competition reflected
and react. The proliferation of friendly lar tool can be accessed from the Joint
the likely loss of technical assistance,
and threat unmanned aerial systems Battle Command Platform console in
requiring teams to navigate without
further exacerbates this difficulty. Army vehicles that have received that
Global Positioning System (GPS) or
electronic aids. Instead, teams were platform.
This year’s vehicle-identification lane
forced to employ the basic land-navi- took on a different-than-usual ap- Finally, many units commit the “sin” of
gation tools of map, compass and pro- proach to the Army’s traditional com- minimizing the vehicle-identification
tractor throughout all lanes during the puter-based methodology in teaching component of gunnery training. TC
competition. To build this capability, and evaluating vehicle identification. 3-20.21-1, Individual and Crew Live-
home-station training should be de- An observation post (OP) was built Fire Prerequisite Testing, requires
signed to and deliberately use elec- with 12 vehicles placarded to wooden crew members to correctly identify 18
tronic-warfare assets against the re- stakes at distances of 15 to 25 meters of 20 vehicles and all U.S. vehicles,
spective unit’s ability to use GPS devic- from the OP. Competing teams had with at least four of the vehicles being
es (either Army-issued or personal). standard M22 binoculars and a spot- identified using only thermal signa-
Unit training should address require- ting scope to choose from to aid them tures. Occasionally, this becomes a
ments for conducting land navigation in the task’s completion. This easy-to- slideshow drill where the master gun-
across varying conditions in a tactical replicate environment can be more val- ner familiarizes the crews with the
environment. A first step is to get the ue-added to today’s scouts. While slides and the test follows rapidly
land-navigation manual off the com- computer-based training such as Rec- thereafter. While this may meet pre-
puter and into scouts’ hands. Training ognition of Combat Vehicles (ROC-V) is requisites, it does not assist our scout
Circular (TC) 3-25.26, Map Reading a phenomenal foundational approach, crews or dismounts in the incredibly
and Land Navigation (November moving training beyond “what we’ve complicated task of combat-vehicle
2013), represents a repository of best always done” and thinking outside the identification. Options to improve gun-
practices for the science of land navi- box in exciting and challenging ways is nery vehicle identification include per-
gation. It includes sections on individ- the best way to engage a Soldier in the mitting more vehicle types in the con-
ual and unit training plans. Not infre- 21 st Century. One of the underlying duct-of-fire trainers, building mock-ups
quently, an Army Reconnaissance principles in lane creation at the 2017 or using different slide decks between
Course (ARC) or Reconnaissance and Gainey Cup was the ability for the com- practice and testing.
Surveillance Leader’s Course (RSLC) petitors, coaches and respective com- Call for fire. It is a matter of faith that
student will ask an instructor where he mand-team representatives to easily, the scout’s best weapon is his radio. In
learned a particularly successful navi- and in a resource-constrained environ- reality, it is the lethality provided
gation technique, only to find the in- ment, take the competition events through fires at the observer’s com-
structor opening to a page in TC back to home station. mand that gives the scout the ability to
3-25.26. Doctrinal techniques work! have a disproportionate lethal impact
Training should also address the grow-
Also, training should routinely occur on on the battlefield. However, competi-
ing diversity of battlefield equipment
land the scout has not operated on tors performed unevenly in completing
if scouts are to be successful in rapidly
previously. The disorientation that nat- an accurate and timely call for fire. As
and accurately providing battlefield in-
urally occurs to an individual in terrain with land navigation, competitors were
formation to the commander. This can
never before experienced needs to be forced to employ the basic tools of
be a daunting task. Initial training in
replicated in training. Orienteering in map, binoculars, compass and protrac-
this area should start with the devel-
state parks or other accessible unfamil- tor. These basic tools proved uncom-
opment of methods for identifying ve-
iar terrain could be an option for incor- fortable for competitors.
hicles. For example, a common method
poration into training plans. Together in identifying vehicles is use of the ac- Scouts have been empowered with po-
these techniques can assist scouts in ronym HATS (hull, armament, turret, sition navigation-enhanced laser
becoming more confident navigating suspension). Training scouts to me- range-finders and digital integration.
without technical aids. thodically evaluate vehicles and From the Long-Range Advanced Scout

33 Summer 2017
System to the Lightweight Laser Desig- Actions on contact. Scout success and Way forward
nator Range-finder and M2/M3 Brad- survivability is tied indelibly to mini- It is evident that a knowledge gap ex-
ley call-for-fire quick message, scouts mizing and managing signatures. Em- ists in the Army today, so scouts should
have been enabled to initiate and re- ployment of stealth as a necessary tool read the Center for Army Lessons
ceive precise, accurate and timely of the trade does not mean that scouts Learned (CALL) Handbook 17-01,
fires. We’re not saying scouts shouldn’t do not or cannot develop the situation Scouts in Contact: Tactical Vignettes
use these tools; the efficiency and pre- through contact with enemy forces. In for Cavalry Leaders (December 2016),
cision created should continue to be fact, many situations will require de- and CALL Handbook 17-12, Reconnais-
maximized when possible. However, veloping across the forms of contact to sance and Security Commander’s
since the likelihood of a threat actor gain more and better information. As Handbook (April 2017). These two
spoofing or denying these systems is sensors proliferate on the battlefield, publications, focused on leaders at the
high, expertise in the high-end capabil- the need for scouts to fight for infor- section through brigade level, provide
ity cannot come at the expense of the mation grows, not declines. During the useful quick-reference pocket guides to
scout’s basic ability to employ fires. Gainey Cup, competitors struggled to train and educate leaders. Whereas
execute meaningful actions on contact. the Scouts in Contact manual provides
Target-location error (TLE) greater than When chance or deliberate enemy con-
250 meters accounted for more than many tactical-decision exercises re-
tact occurred during reconnaissance or quiring nothing more than a sandtable
half of competition deductions. Army live-fire events, some squads appeared
Technical Publication (ATP) 3-09.30, and/or whiteboard, the Reconnais-
uncertain how to develop the situa- sance and Security Commander’s
Techniques for Observed Fire (August tion. In particular, competitors failed
2013), notes that while 250-meter TLE Handbook is a synthesis of useful doc-
to apply engagement and disengage- trine (FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and
is the mean for observers employing ment criteria. Though lane fragmen-
map, binoculars and compass, it is un- Security Operations; FM 3-55, Infor-
tary orders included commander’s re- mation Collection; ATP 3-20.96, Cav-
acceptable for first-round fire-for-ef- connaissance and/or security guid-
fect mission or target suppression. Sev- alry Squadron; FM 3-20-2, Reconnais-
ance, many competitors confessed to sance and Security and Tactical En-
eral competitors misestimated the not understanding, never having heard
range to the target in excess of two ki- abling Tasks Volume 2, among others).
of or never been taught its use. To ex-
lometers. Upon debriefing, many ecute the mission, scouts need clearly The two CALL handbooks are a starting
proved unfamiliar with the mil-relation defined and understood guidance. point for increased proficiency in cav-
formula (commonly called the WORM alry operations. Leaders should regu-
formula), which enables an observer to The Army employs scouts to turn am- larly reach out to the combat-training
determine range if known-size equip- biguity into definitive information. centers (CTCs), to the schoolhouse
ment is present. While we note that a However, scouts should initiate and re- (RSLC, ARC and the Cavalry Leader’s
live event vice a virtual event is more act to contact intuitively. Unit training Course (CLC)) and to the Army Publish-
substantive training, on the whole, should include the requirement for ing Directorate (apd.army.mil), to en-
competitors did not blame the simula- scouts to develop contact through all sure that the latest doctrine and tac-
tor or their unfamiliarity with the sys- training events. The best weapon may tics, techniques and procedures (TTPs)
tem for their shortcomings. be the radio, but the M240L is on hand are available to our respective forma-
for a reason. Training actions on con- tions.
A second large source of competition tact may take the form of opposing OP
deductions was the inability to initiate occupation during a situational-train- Learning is a lifelong event. According
the call-for-fire within three minutes ing exercise. Likewise, ambiguity to U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
after being given a five-minute block should be brought into live-fire train- Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-8-
of time to conduct familiarization with ing events. While safety will remain im- 2, The U.S. Army Learning Concept for
the map and simulator screen. portant, forcing crews, squads and pla- Training and Education 2020-2040
Unit training can start with getting ATP toons to think through the enemy pre- (April 2017), “The objective of Army
3-09.30 into scouts’ hands. In particu- sentation to properly employ engage- learning is to provide forces as part of
lar, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 provide in- ment criteria will pay off in improved joint, interorganizational and multina-
depth discussion of locating, initiating decision-making and confidence later. tional efforts that are trained and
and adjusting timely and accurate fires. It further translates to the scout’s abil- ready to accomplish campaign objec-
Beyond this initial step, an easy point ity to generate options and make rec- tives and protect U.S. national inter-
of departure may be borrowing train- ommendations. ests. To achieve this objective, the
ing plans from the annual brigade for- The ability to generate options only re- Army will create and maintain a learn-
ward observer (FO) certification. It may mains if you survive first contact with ing environment that develops agile,
not be possible to replicate the depth the enemy, retain freedom of maneu- adaptive and innovative Soldiers and
of full FO training; however, scouts ver and develop the situation. All these Army civilians, [building] cohesive
must approach the same level of ob- benefits accrue from scouts empow- teams that conduct training and edu-
served-fires capability. Copying those ered and understanding solid com- cation under tough and realistic condi-
who hang their hat on providing time- mander’s R&S guidance. tions. This environment is centered on
ly and accurate observed fires seems a the learner (learner-centric), who
good idea. learns through a combination of

34 Summer 2017
training, education and experience establish OPs and conduct evaluation highest echelons place emphasis on
through the three training domains of and evacuation of casualties. Compet- R&S operations? Will lessons highlight-
Army learning: operational, institution- itors in the 2017 Gainey Cup improved ed by the Gainey Cup be taken back
al and self-development.” This model vastly on their peers in the 2015 com- and improved on by junior leaders at
is based on a series of assumptions, petition in their understanding and ex- installations across the U.S. Army and
but arguably none are more important ecution of route-classification tasks by our allied partners?
than “The learner-centric, career-long and of CBRN decontamination and re-
The 144 competitors in the 2017 Gain-
learning model will produce the train- porting procedures.
ey Cup represented the very best of
ing and education outcomes to sustain
The 2017 Gainey Cup acted as a sign- the Army and its future. Are your
Army effectiveness and ethical applica-
post on the road to recovering scout scouts up to the test? What will they
tion of the Army profession.”
ability; as such, clear improvement was be working on in the meantime?
As we mentioned previously, the Gain- seen but much work lies ahead. The
CPT Patrick Zang is the ARC course
ey Cup was built off doctrine as the competitors demonstrated a lack of
manager, Troop B, 3-16 Cavalry, Fort
means to evaluate and grade competi- proficiency in some of the core recon-
Benning, GA. Previous assignments in-
tors. Doctrine is the baseline for the naissance tasks (land navigation, call-
clude commander, Troop C, 2-13 Cav-
U.S. Army. Doctrine is the language by ing for indirect fire and vehicle identi-
alry, 3/1 Armor Division, Fort Bliss, TX;
which the U.S. Army communicates. fication). A cavalry scout who cannot
assistant S-3, 2-13 Cavalry, 3/1 Armor
Words mean things, and as one of the navigate, cannot call for fire and can-
Division, Fort Bliss; executive officer,
authors’ former squadron command- not correctly identify a vehicle on the
Troop G, 3/3 Cavalry Regiment, Fort
ers stressed while he served as an as- battlefield is nearly useless to com-
Hood; mortar-platoon leader, Head-
sistant S-3 and troop commander, we manders. The authors also can attest
quarters and Headquarters Troop, 3/3
must use “precise terms used precise- to similar gaps from their time in com-
Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood; and tank-
ly” so as to avoid confusion, particular- mand of cavalry troops.
platoon leader, Troop I, 3/3 Armored
ly in stressful environments. One must
Many of the capability gaps identified Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood. His mili-
first understand the baseline (doctrine)
in this article can be addressed through tary schooling includes Maneuver Cap-
before he attempts the hip-pocket ap-
Sergeant’s Time Training. Training in tain’s Career Course (MCCC), Infantry
proach (TTPs). Too many times it is
these fundamental skills costs few re- Mortar Leader’s Course, ARC and Ar-
heard around Fort Benning, the home
sources and little additional time if in- mor Officer Basic Course (AOBC). He
of maneuver doctrine and foundation-
corporated into a regular training pro- holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in po-
al training, “that is how I did it in my
gram that focuses on building and sus- litical science/history from Indiana Uni-
unit.” Point blank, that is an unaccept-
taining skills. Sergeant’s Time is just versity of Pennsylvania.
able answer. Avoiding shortcuts, read-
such a recurring event.
ing doctrine and committing to the elu- CPT John Albert is the CLC course man-
sive self-development domain of the In conclusion, the Gainey Cup will con- ager, Troop B, 3-16 Cavalry, Fort Ben-
Army learning methodology is a rela- tinue to move forward, capturing les- ning. Previous assignments include
tively easy starting point for increased sons-learned and best practices from commander, Troop B, 4-4 Cavalry, 1/1
understanding and subsequent capac- this year’s competition and striving to Infantry Division, Fort Riley, KS; assis-
ity to execute successful R&S opera- make the 2019 competition better tant S-3, 4-4 Cavalry, 1/1 Infantry Divi-
tions. than the 2017 competition. However, sion, Fort Riley; rear-detachment com-
it is more imperative that the opera- mander, 2-12 Cavalry, 4/1 Cavalry Di-
Conclusion tional Army captures these lessons- vision, Fort Hood, TX; executive officer,
The reader should not walk away from learned and reaches out to the institu- Headquarters and Headquarters Com-
this article with the belief that the tac- tional Army and the CTCs for ways to pany, 2-12 Cavalry, 4/1 Cavalry Divi-
tical and technical expertise of the 24 execute innovative and effective train- sion, Fort Hood; and tank-platoon lead-
competing teams was below average ing. The proof will be in the pudding: er, Company D, 2-12 Cavalry, 4/1 Cav-
or that the Gainey Cup has identified are we as an Army comfortable with alry Division, Fort Hood. His military
gaps requiring wholesale re-evaluation merely coming together every two schooling includes CLC, MCCC and
moving forward. The competitors dem- years, trying to prove our worth in the AOBC. He holds a bachelor’s of arts de-
onstrated proficiency in their ability to Gainey Cup, or will leaders at the gree in history from Virginia Tech.

35 Summer 2017
 Figure 2. A team member from second-place finisher 6-8
Cavalry, 3rd Infantry Division, checks a radio during the
Gainey Cup’s “final charge” event. Scout squads competed
on a soggy, rainy day in the “final charge,” a “gut check”
that tested the squad’s ability to complete a 2.78-mile
run, followed by seven tasks executed on Brave Rifles
Figure 1. A team member from Team 5, 1-1 Cavalry, 1st Ar- Field, Fort Benning, GA. Twenty-four scout squads com-
mored Division, assembles/disassembles a machinegun peted. The Gainey Cup is named in honor of retired Army
during the competition’s “final charge” event. Team 5 was CSM William J. (Joe) Gainey. (Photo by Markeith Horace,
named the Army’s newest Best Scout Squad on the final Maneuver Center of Excellence Public Affairs Office photog-
day of the 2017 Gainey Cup competition May 1-4. (Photo rapher)
by Markeith Horace, Maneuver Center of Excellence Public
Affairs Office photographer)

Figure 3. Scout squads compete in an

obstacle course, squad live-fire and
stress shoot in the Harmony Church
area of Fort Benning during the bien-
nial Gainey Cup competition, which
is designed to identify the most com-
petent and versatile scout squad in
the U.S. armed forces and partnering
allies through an extremely challeng-
ing contest centered on essential
R&S tasks and skills. (Photo by Pat-
rick A. Albright, Maneuver Center of
Excellence photographer)

Figure 4, right. A scout from 4-3 Cav, 3rd

Cavalry Regiment, observes “enemy”
movement during the Gainey Cup com-
petition. Competitors were challenged
with physically and mentally challeng-
ing events centered on essential R&S
tactics, techniques and procedures.
(Photo by Markeith Horace, Maneuver
Center of Excellence Public Affairs Office
photographer)

36 Summer 2017
 Acronym Quick-Scan
ARC – Army Reconnaissance Course
ATP – Army technical publication
BCT – brigade combat team
CALL – Center for Army Lessons Learned
CBRN – chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
CLC – Cavalry Leader’s Course
CTC – combat-training center
FM – field manual
FO – forward observer
GPS – Global Positioning System
OP – observation post
R&S – reconnaissance and security
ROC-V – Recognition of Combat Vehicles
RSLC – Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leader’s Course
SM – special manual
TC – training circular
TLE – target-location error
TRADOC – (U.S. Army) Training and Doctrine Command
TTP – tactics, techniques and procedures

Figure 5. A competitor from the United Kingdom’s Queen’s

Dragoon Guards low-crawls during the Gainey Cup compe-
tition’s obstacle course. (Photo by Markeith Horace, Ma-
neuver Center of Excellence Public Affairs Office photogra-
pher)

Armor School Book Offers Free

Professional Development to Individuals, Units
Armor in Battle: Special Edition for
the Armored Force 75th Anniversa-
ry offers examples of the tactical
employment of armored combat or-
ganizations from the interwar years
through Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Based on first-person accounts, af-
ter-action reports, interviews, spe-
cial studies and other source mate-
rial, the book also includes sections
devoted to the early development
of armor, including the text of the
orders establishing the Armored
Force. The material readily supports
professional development at pla-
toon, company and battalion levels.
Armor in Battle can be ordered
from Army Publishing Directorate
Students from the Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course practice tank gun- by providing title and PIN number
nery at the Digital Multi-Purpose Range Complex, Harmony Church, Fort
Benning, GA. The course, administered by 2nd Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regi- (106431-000) to (703) 614-3727 or
ment, trains Armor Branch lieutenants to provide the Army, Marine Corps usarmy.pentagon.hqda-apd.mbx.
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(Photo by Patrick A. Albright) zations.

37 Summer 2017
 Enabling Mission Command through
Cavalry Squadron Operations
by MAJ R. Perry White lead and assess operations to make de- the composition and disposition of en-
cisions. Cavalry squadrons, along with emy forces in their areas of operation,
Cavalry squadrons shape the brigade
other brigade information-collection information about terrain is vague and
combat team (BCT) fight. They conduct
(IC) assets, provide a continuous flow time is limited. In these cases, recon-
reconnaissance and security (R&S) to
of information that make contact (vi- naissance assets work over a broad
enable adjacent units to seize, retain
sual; obstacles; direct; indirect; air- area to develop the enemy situation.
and exploit the initiative. Effective em-
craft; chemical, biological, radiological As they gain an understanding of ene-
ployment of cavalry squadrons, how-
and nuclear; non-hostile and electron- my weaknesses, they then “pull” the
ever, is a highly complex endeavor. To
ic warfare) with enemy elements under main body to positions of tactical ad-
overcome this, commanders must le-
favorable conditions. They identify op- vantage.
verage mission command and facilitate
portunities, prevent surprises and en-
shared understanding that enables What is mission command?
able brigades to make timely decisions
rapid initiative through clear intent
while providing reaction time and ma- It is the exercise of authority and direc-
and orders.
neuver space to set conditions for fu- tion by the commander using mission
GEN David G. Perkins, former com- ture operations. orders to enable disciplined initiative
mander of U.S. Army Combined Arms within the commander’s intent, em-
Center and now commander of U.S. Further, employment of reconnais- powering leaders in conducting ULO.
Army Training and Doctrine Command, sance assets reduces uncertainty, es-
pecially when used for reconnaissance Mission command guides command-
addressed the students of the Maneu- ers. To do this, they must leverage its
ver Captain’s Career Course in April push and pulls. A reconnaissance push
occurs when commanders have a rela- six principles:
2014 to discuss mission command and
leader development. In his opening tively thorough understanding of the • Build cohesive teams through trust.
comments, GEN Perkins said, “When operational environment. In these cas- Mutual trust is shared confidence
you are in charge of an organization, it es, commanders “push” reconnais- among commanders, subordinates
is not about what you do but what you sance assets into specific portions of and partners. Effective commanders
are for.”1 In the Army, we conduct uni- their areas of operation to confirm, build cohesive teams in an
fied land operations (ULO), which de- deny and validate planning assump- environment of mutual trust. Trust
scribes how we seize, retain and ex- tions. A reconnaissance pull occurs f l o ws b o t h ways : l e a d e rs to
ploit the initiative to gain and maintain when commanders are uncertain of subordinates and subordinates to
a position of relative advantage
through simultaneous offensive, de-
fensive and stability operations to pre-
vent or deter conflict, prevail in war
and create the conditions for favorable
conflict resolution (from Army Doctri-
nal Publication (ADP) 3-0).
As we discuss mission command and
how it pertains to cavalry squadrons, it
is important to understand “what we
are for.”

What are we for?

Summarized from Field Manual 3-98,
R&S operations are essential to effec-
tively execute ULO. BCTs conduct R&S
operations to develop the situation
and to identify, create and preserve
options to seize and exploit the initia-
tive. R&S tasks allow BCTs to achieve
Figure 1. A scout competing in the May 2017 Gainey Cup “Best Scout Squad”
positions of relative advantage by con- competition low-crawls through undergrowth at Fort Benning, GA. The bienni-
firming or denying initial assumptions al Gainey Cup’s competitors are challenged with events centered on essential
of the tactical and operational situa- R&S tactics, techniques and procedures. The Gainey Cup is a good test of re-
tion. They reduce uncertainty by allow- connaissance “push” and “pull” tasks. (Photo by Markeith Horace, Maneuver
ing the commander to describe, direct, Center of Excellence Public Affairs Office photographer)

38 Summer 2017
Figure 2. Then-SPC Ty Carter conducts reconnaissance from the highest point of Outpost Fritsche in Afghanistan, where
he was assigned in late Spring/early Summer 2009 with Blue Platoon, Bravo “Black Knight” Troop, 3rd Squadron, 61st
Cavalry Regiment, 4th BCT, 4th Infantry Division. Cavalry units assess progress through continuous reconnaissance to
help modify existing and/or developing plans to allocate BCT assets based on changing tactical situations. Unfortunate-
ly, risks in cavalry employment’s basic principles were underestimated when Carter and his fellow Soldiers rotated in
Summer 2009 to Combat Outpost Keating, which sat on low ground in the valley below and was nearly overrun Oct. 3,
2009. (Carter’s actions during that battle resulted in his being awarded the Medal of Honor.) (Photo courtesy of retired
1SG Jonathan Hill)

commanders. commanders act to achieve the is a deliberate exposure to potential

commander’s desired results without injury or loss when the commander
• Create shared understanding. further orders, even when the judges the outcome in terms of
Shared understanding and purpose operation does not unfold as planned mission accomplishment as worth
form the basis for unity of effort and (Joint Publication 3-0). the cost (ADP 6-0). Opportunities
trust (trust implies expectations that come with risks. The willingness to
are shared). Commanders and staffs • Exercise disciplined initiative.
accept prudent risk is often the key
actively build and maintain shared Disciplined initiative is action when
to exposing enemy weaknesses.
understanding within the force and these conditions apply: 1) absence of
orders; 2) existing orders no longer
with unified-action partners by
fit the situation; or 3) unforeseen
Supporting brigade
continual collaboration throughout
the operations process. opportunities or threats arise. commander
How does the cavalry squadron sup-
• Provide clear commander’s intent. • Use mission orders. Mission orders port the brigade commander in mis-
The commander’s intent is a clear and are used to assign tasks, allocate sion command? The cavalry squadron
concise expression of the purpose of resources and issue broad guidance. is the brigade commander’s primary
the operation and the desired military • Accept prudent risks. Commanders asset to develop the situation and pro-
endstate that supports mission accept prudent risk when making vide timely information that will refine
command, provides focus to the staff decisions because uncertainty exists subsequent courses of action (CoAs)
and helps subordinate and supporting in all military operations. Prudent risk for the brigade’s decisive operation.

39 Summer 2017
The cavalry squadron improves situa- developing shared understanding. Af- to seize, retain and exploit the initia-
tional understanding for the com- ter brigade commanders have an un- tive.
mander by providing a better under- derstanding of the problem, they can
Though similar, reconnaissance guid-
stand of the tactical, human and polit- visualize an endstate for the cavalry
ance is different from security guid-
ical dynamics within an area of opera- squadron; describe time, space, re-
ance. Generally speaking, reconnais-
tion. sources (initial), purpose and action;
sance guidance is geared toward offen-
and direct the squadron through use
Cavalry squadrons help visualize oper- sive operations, while security guid-
of mission orders (Warnord 2, Annex
ations in the context of mission vari- ance is used during defensive opera-
L).
ables to facilitate decisive operations tions. R&S guidance both help develop
in time and space with a greater de- Cavalry squadrons are unique in con- the situation to ensure an organization
gree of detail, accuracy and fidelity. ducting R&S. They conduct parallel can accomplish its objective. Security
Cavalry squadrons direct the execution planning with the brigade, operating guidance requires more details to ad-
of decisive operations with additional within broad guidance to conduct mis- equately perform the cavalry squad-
flexibility, adaptability, synchronization sions in front of, on the rear of and on ron’s security mission.
and integration that moves the BCT to the BCT’s flanks.
concentrate strengths against enemy What are cavalry squadrons for? Why
weakness. Commander’s intent are they important to the BCT? They
How does the commander’s intent fa- conduct R&S to enable brigades to de-
Finally, cavalry squadrons assess prog- cilitate mission command? The com- feat and destroy the enemy. Their op-
ress through continuous reconnais- mander’s intent articulates the reason erations help commanders seize, retain
sance to help modify existing and/or for an operation. It explains the ex- and exploit the initiative. Central to
developing plans to allocate BCT assets panded – or, in other words, broader – this is the effective execution of mis-
based on changing tactical situations. purpose of an operation and allows sion command. Collaborative, parallel
subordinates to understand what is ex- planning facilitates shared understand-
Mission command pected of them to accomplish a mis- ing to enable disciplined initiative that
in R&S tasks sion. The commander’s intent becomes culminates in battlefield success for
How does the brigade and cavalry the basis on which staffs and subordi- the BCT.
squadron use mission command in nate leaders develop plans and trans-
conducting R&S tasks? Mission com- form them into action. MAJ Perry White is the cavalry-squad-
mand enables commanders and staffs During the planning process, squadron ron operations observer/coach/trainer
to counter the inherent uncertainty of commanders issue planning guidance on Cobra Team, Operations Group, Na-
military operations. Squadron com- before, during and after dialogue with tional Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA.
manders conduct R&S to protect the the brigade commander’s staff. This is Previous assignments include cavalry-
force and to seize, retain and exploit usually in the form of a directed CoA squadron operations officer, 6th Squad-
the initiative. with planning guidance for each warf- ron, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Infantry
ighting function. Commanders are able BCT (IBCT), 3rd Infantry Division, Fort
The commander sets reconnaissance
to direct a CoA because of their ability Stewart, GA; battalion executive offi-
priorities early since squadrons will
to understand the problem, visualize cer, 3 rd Battalion, 15 th Infantry Regi-
precede main-body movement and op-
the endstate and describe it to their ment, 2 nd IBCT, 3 rd Infantry Division,
erate with less time available for troop-
staff and subordinate commanders. Fort Stewart; inspector general, 3rd In-
leading procedures (TLP). After a bri-
Though staffs may understand the final fantry Division, Fort Stewart; com-
gade receives its initial warning order
array of forces on the battlefield, they mander, Troop B, 5th Squadron, 7th Cav-
(warnord) from higher headquarters
must refine the CoA, conduct CoA anal- alry Regiment, 1st Armored BCT, 3rd In-
and publishes Warnord 1, the cavalry
ysis and synchronize assets. fantry Division, Fort Stewart; and assis-
squadron has already begun its TLPs.
tant professor of military science, Ship-
Unlike most battalions, however, the
cavalry squadron is operating on a Guidance important pensburg University, Shippensburg, PA.
Why is R&S guidance important? His military education includes Com-
highly accelerated timeline and initi-
Squadron commanders issue R&S guid- mand and General Staff College, Cav-
ates movement prior to other battal-
ance to allow subordinate command- alry Leader’s Course, Inspector General
ions. Therefore, brigade and squadron
ers to operate with disciplined initia- Course, Armor Maneuver Captain’s Ca-
staffs must work closely during mission
tive. R&S guidance provides focus, op- reer Course, Armor Basic Officer Lead-
analysis to conduct parallel planning.
erational details and guidelines for en- er’s Course and Airborne School. He
More importantly, the relationship and gagement, disengagement and dis- holds a bachelor’s of science degree in
direct dialogue between the brigade placement of the organization. The aerospace management from Middle
and squadron commander is para- commander develops this guidance Tennessee State University and a mas-
mount for successful CoA development based on the brigade’s mission, time- ter’s of science degree in organization-
and to allocate IC assets and other en- line and intent. Together, R&S guid- al development and leadership from
ablers (artillery, aviation) appropriate- ance, along with the commander’s in- Shippensburg University. His awards
ly. Collaboration and dialogue between tent, work to satisfy information re- include two Bronze Star Medals and
brigade and squadron is essential in quirements and identify opportunities two Meritorious Service Medals.

40 Summer 2017
Notes Acronym Quick-Scan
1
Address April 14, 2014; retrieved March
14, 2017, from https://vimeo. ADP – Army doctrinal publication R&S – reconnaissance and security
com/91292851. BCT – brigade combat team TLP – troop-leading procedures
CoA – course of action ULO – unified land operations
IBCT – infantry brigade combat team Warnord – warning order
IC – information collection

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A new mobile application, Gunnery- The point calculator allows you to cal- VA, with support from the Maneu-
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gagement and base scores during the engagement score on DA Form cers and officers at Fort Hood.
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stabilized platforms. The Gunnery-Timer and Calculator
The engagement-modifier calculator app for Android is available at
The Gunnery-Timer and Calculator allows you to calculate and update en- https://play.google.com/store/
app features three functional tools: gagement and modifier points for the apps/details?id=mil.army.gtac.
timer, point calculator and engage- modifier fields on DA Form 8265.
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The app was created in partnership be- app for iOS is available at https://
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time engagements during crew gun- Fort Hood Research Unit and the Train- timer-and-calculator/
nery for DA Form 8265. ing and Doctrine Command Capability id1213841158?ls=1&mt=8.
Manager Mobile-Learning, Fort Eustis,

41 Summer 2017
What Do We Mean When We Say
‘Fight For Information’?
by LTC Nathan Palisca context, are not mutually exclusive reconnaissance or security operations,
and, in many cases, can overlap during observation of secondary echelons or
The term fighting for information is
the course of a single mission. enemy reactions by other sensors (ro-
used widely across our Army to de-
tary wing, UAS, SIGINT, etc.) helps har-
scribe the employment of cavalry Context-specific definitions of fighting
ness the breadth of information the
squadrons in both reconnaissance and for information should include:
cavalry squadron generates. Synchro-
security operations. Unfortunately the • Fighting with the intent to cause an nizing all the BCT’s IC assets in time,
meaning of that term is often just as enemy reaction that can be observed space and purpose; using the manage-
widely misunderstood. Ask a group of and reported by either a cavalry unit ment methods of cueing, mixing and
maneuver professionals what it means or another sensor (unmanned aerial redundancy; plus integrating the fol-
to fight for information and you’re like- system (UAS), signals intelligence lowing tenets, are critical to achieving
ly to receive a wide variety of answers. (SIGINT), rotary-wing aircraft, the necessary effects of fighting for in-
This article will attempt to codify what counterbattery radar, etc.). This is formation.
fighting for information can and should often an objective of a forceful,
mean for our cavalry formations and, enemy-oriented zone The six core tenets of fighting for infor-
by extension, for the maneuver force reconnaissance, and it is the primary mation should include:
writ large. purpose of a reconnaissance-in- • Winning first contact. Fighting for
force. information does not imply only
As a phrase, fighting for information is • Destroying enemy reconnaissance direct-fire contact. Cavalry formations
common in both our professional con- assets to access and expose secondary c a n c o l l e c t i n fo r m a t i o n a n d
versations and in our doctrine. A word threat echelons to friendly collection potentially influence enemy forces
search of the four cavalry doctrinal assets and potentially alter the through any of the eight forms of
manuals – Field Manual (FM) 3-98, Re- enemy’s decision cycle. A cavalry contact. Regardless of the form,
connaissance and Security Opera- squadron or troop conducting a establishing contact on the
tions; Army Technical Publication (ATP) s c r e e n t h a t d e s t ro y s t h r e a t commander’s terms and maintaining
3-20.96, Cavalry Squadron; ATP reconnaissance elements and forces or seizing the initiative is critical to
3-20.97, Cavalry Troop; and ATP the enemy commander to deploy his/ shaping the engagement. It sets the
3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon, plus her main body earlier than intended conditions to fight for information.
FM 3-55, Information Collection – re- provides valuable information about
turns 45 hits for the term fight (or • Focused and limited offensive or
the threat’s disposition to the brigade
fighting) for information. Regrettably, defensive action. Whether engaged
combat team (BCT).
all five of these manuals fail to define in reconnaissance or security
the phrase. The closest reference to a • Fighting to reach a position from operations, fighting for information
definition can be found in FM 3-98 that which to conduct collection. An ideally begins with U.S. forces
contains a vague description of cavalry example of this would be a cavalry initiating offensive or defensive
units fighting to overcome enemy ef- squadron fighting through an enemy action across the appropriate forms
forts to protect vital information. This disruption zone to establish contact of contact. It is critical to keep the
lack of specificity leads to fighting for with the enemy main body. scope of this action focused on
information being misused in many Regardless of the definition or context collection requirements and limited
conversations as an umbrella term to used, fighting for information entails to prevent decisive engagement
generically mean “cavalry stuff.” the use of contact with an enemy force when possible. Circumstances under
to generate information that will in- which to engage, with which form of
Defining ‘fight for form the higher headquarters’ com- contact and how much combat power
information’ mon operational picture (COP) or oth- to employ should be clearly outlined
So what do we mean when we say fight erwise further the information-collec- in the commander’s reconnaissance
for information? What should we tion (IC) effort. or security guidance.
mean? The short answer is that it de- • Retaining freedom of maneuver.
pends both on the tactical circum- Tenets of fighting for Throughout the course of the
stances and the mission (i.e., recon- information engagement, cavalry units must
naissance or security). There are three It is important to note that in many retain the freedom to maneuver. This
broad definitions for fighting for infor- cases fighting for information can, and allows them to reposition and expose
mation we should consider and inte- should be, a synergistic effort. While a more of the threat’s order of battle
grate into our professional vocabular- cavalry organization will collect and re- or to conduct a battle handover with
ies. These meanings depend on port information resulting from its m a n e u ve r co m p a n i e s a n d /o r

42 Summer 2017
 battalions if necessary. It is important setting the condi-
to keep the idea of retaining freedom tions to success-
of maneuver in perspective by fully fight for in-
echelon. A troop or squadron can formation is the
retain freedom of maneuver even if development and
one of their subordinate elements is issuance of thor-
decisively engaged. ough command-
er ’s reconnais-
• Causing an enemy reaction that can
sance or security
be observed. This is one of the most
guidance. Descrip-
critical aspects of fighting for
tive and well-ar-
information. As cavalry units fight
ticulated guidance
through and identify multiple threat
(focus, tempo, en-
echelons, the enemy will react.
gagement/disen-
Potentially, the enemy’s reaction will gagement criteria
be in several ways simultaneously. and displacement
Each of these threat reactions offers criteria) clarifies
information on the enemy’s strength, the conditions un-
disposition and intentions. BCTs der which subor-
should synchronize and orient all the dinate elements
IC assets at their disposal (cavalry are expected to
squadron, UAS, rotary-wing aviation, fight (or not). Ful-
SIGINT, etc.) to derive maximum ly developed com-
value from the cavalry’s actions. mander’s recon-
• Rapidly developing the situation. naissance guid-
Once the threat has reacted to the ance outlines how
initial engagement, it has changed the reconnais-
the tactical situation in some way and sance is to be con-
potentially in several ways. Cavalry ducted; specifies
units must evaluate and report these what information Figure 1. Inverse proportion of fighting and analysis at
enemy reactions, then act swiftly to must be collected echelon.
either seize opportunities or and reported; and
reposition to identify a different preserves the squadron’s combat pow- have a requirement to identify, under-
enemy vulnerability. It is critical that er by avoiding unnecessary engage- stand and report what they are observ-
cavalry commanders are empowered ments. The key to producing sound ing or are in contact with, the respon-
commander’s reconnaissance guidance sibility to analyze and distill meaning
and trusted to act within the BCT
is balancing between being descriptive from those reports increases at higher
c o m m a n d e r ’s i n t e n t a n d i n
enough to provide focus but not pre- echelons. (See Figure 1.) Specifically,
accordance with the principles of
scriptive to a point that it limits subor- squadron staffs should correlate re-
mission command.
dinate leaders’ flexibility of action. ports and place them into context with
• I d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f e n e m y respect to the entire BCT area of oper-
vulnerabilities to exploit. Enemy It is important to keep the term fight- ations. They should continuously com-
units will generally reveal more of ing for information in perspective by municate and work with the BCT staff,
their strength and intentions formation type. All cavalry squadrons adding to the overall COP. Critical to
throughout the course of an (armored BCT (ABCT), Stryker BCT and this process is the staff’s understand-
engagement. It is incumbent on the infantry BCT) possess the ability to ing of the linkage between BCT-level
cava l r y s q u a d ro n to wo r k i n fight for information, but each forma- decision points, the priority intelli-
conjunction with the BCT staff to fuse tion type is best used against specific gence requirements (PIR) that inform
i n fo r m a t i o n , i d e n t i f y e n e my types of threats. Understanding the ca- those decisions and the named areas
vulnerabilities and recommend ways pabilities and limitations of a specific of interest (NAIs) where answers to the
to apply the BCT’s combat power formation type and assessing available PIR can potentially be found.
from a position of advantage. The combat power relative to the enemy is
cavalry-squadron S-2 (intelligence critical to understanding the conditions
under which a cavalry squadron can Although the squadron S-2 and S-3 are
officer) and S-3 (operations officer)
fight for information successfully. likely not fighting directly, this analysis
must maintain a continual dialogue
at the squadron level generates the in-
with the BCT S-2 and S-3 to assess
While keeping formation type in mind formation that is the second half of the
both the friendly and enemy
is important to understanding a unit’s fighting for information equation.
s i t u at i o n s , a n d to fo r m u l ate
ability to fight for information, it is Fighting is the first half; capturing and
recommendations for the BCT
equally important to focus on what it making sense of reported information
commander.
means to fight for information at ech- that informs the BCT commander’s de-
One of the most critical aspects of elon. While all cavalry organizations cisions is the other half.

43 Summer 2017
This is not to imply that cavalry troops likely within mutual supporting dis- In this scenario, the squadron’s goal is
and scout platoons don’t have a re- tance of each other). Upon making the collection and reporting of infor-
sponsibility to understand and refine contact, the battalion commander as- mation to inform the BCT’s COP to en-
the information they report. On the sesses the situation within the battal- able decision-making. Destruction or
contrary, this is where the refinement ion’s area of operation, identifies posi- defeat of the enemy is only useful to
of collected information should begin. tions of advantage and maneuvers to the cavalry squadron as it relates to
The proportional shift in responsibility destroy the enemy. In this situation, furthering the IC effort. Developing the
to generate information is simply a the battalion’s goal is the destruction situation occurs in due course of the
function of increased analytical capa- or defeat of the enemy. Reporting the engagement rather than being the im-
bility at higher echelons. combat information occurs as a matter mediate imperative it is for the maneu-
of course during the engagement. ver battalion.
Fighting for information vs.
A scenario where a cavalry squadron
developing the situation conducts a force-oriented zone recon-
The following vignette seeks to illus-
Some in the maneuver community trate some of the key concepts of fight-
naissance shares many similarities with ing for information. Note that all the
would submit that fighting for informa- the movement-to-contact example,
tion is simply developing the situation units in this vignette are fictitious.
but it also has some critical differenc- They are not meant to depict the ac-
by another name. Those in this camp es. When enemy contact is made, the
would point out that reporting is key tions of an actual unit either during an
squadron is almost certainly not operational deployment or at a com-
to both terms, and that developing the massed. Instead, it’s likely dispersed
situation is one of the fundamentals of bat-training center (CTC).
across the entirety, or at least the bulk,
reconnaissance. In both cases, they of the BCT’s frontage. Upon contact,
would be correct. However, although the squadron commander assesses the Vignette: zone
the two phrases are unquestionably situation, decides to fight or displace reconnaissance
close cousins, they are nonetheless based on engagement/disengage- The 2 nd Squadron, 23 rd Cavalry Regi-
discernibly different. ment/displacement criteria, avoids de- ment, supporting effort (SE) No. 1 for
Take the case of a maneuver battalion cisive engagement if possible and, the BCT, is assigned to conduct an en-
conducting a movement-to-contact. At above all, strives to maintain situation- emy-oriented, rapid and forceful zone
the point when contact is made with al awareness and continued reporting reconnaissance in support of a deliber-
the enemy, the battalion’s formation is across the entirety of the BCT’s front ate attack by 2/88 ABCT against a de-
relatively massed (i.e., companies are or flank. fending reinforced enemy

Figure 2. 2/88 ABCT sittemp.

44 Summer 2017
mechanized-infantry battalion. The not critical, and time is of the essence. Tank company: Your primary focus is
BCT situation template (sittemp) is de- We must quickly collapse the disrup- destroying enemy tanks. Allow the cav-
picted in Figure 2. tion zone by either destroying or forc- alry troops to develop the situation be-
ing the displacement of the enemy’s fore committing our armor. Tank pla-
2-23 Cav mission: 2-23 Cav conducts
counter-reconnaissance forces. Locate toons will engage individual enemy
an enemy-oriented zone reconnais-
bypasses around any disrupting obsta- tanks and sections; the tank company
sance from Phase Line (PL) Dallas to PL
cles to allow us to maintain momentum will engage enemy tank platoons.
Denver not later than 290500OCT20XX
and quickly identify the enemy’s main
(military time = 5 a.m. Oct. 29, 20XX) Displacement criteria: Enemy armored
defensive positions.
to cause the collapse of the enemy dis- vehicles greater than platoon size and
ruption zone and identify the main de- Engagement/disengagement criteria: closer than 1,500 meters are criteria
fensive belt to enable the BCT’s seizure Cavalry troops: Immediately engage for displacement. Assess the situation,
of Objective Chrome. enemy BRDMs [Boyevaya Razvedy- report if displacement criteria has been
2-23 Cav commander’s reconnais- vatelnaya Dozornaya Mashina – a Rus- met, recommend a course of action
sance guidance: sian scout vehicle] or BMPs [Boyeva and request authorization to displace.
Mashina Pekhoty – a Russian fighting We must maintain contact even if we
Focus: Our primary focus during this vehicle] of platoon size or smaller. The are forced to displace.
reconnaissance is to identify enemy de- preferred method is to engage with in-
fensive positions; our secondary focus direct fire and transition to direct fire With this guidance, 2-23 Cav arrays
is to identify terrain that supports the when enemy vehicles begin to displace. one cavalry troop against each avenue
BCT scheme of maneuver. Reconnais- Do not engage enemy tanks without of approach (AoA): Troop B in the
sance objectives include: 1) the enemy support from D/2-23 Cav (the tank north, Troop C in the center and Troop
disruption zone; 2) the enemy main de- company) except in self-defense. You A in the south. The squadron has task-
fensive belt (including obstacle loca- are free to engage anything on the organized a tank platoon to Troop C
tions); 3) bypasses for any manmade high-payoff target list with indirect fire and directs Company D (-) (tank com-
or natural obstacles; and 4) terrain or attack aviation. Request authoriza- pany) to follow and support Troop B in
that supports assault positions, attack- tion to engage these targets with di- the north. The 2-23 Cav crosses PL Dal-
by-fire (ABF) positions or support-by- rect fire. Be prepared to transition to a las line-of-departure (LD) at 9:30 p.m.
fire (SBF) positions for the maneuver screen or a hasty defense once the en- Oct. 28, 20XX.
battalions. emy main defensive belt is identified. At 1 a.m. Oct. 29, 20XX, 2-23 Cav iden-
Tempo: Rapid and forceful. Stealth is tifies and destroys two enemy

Figure 3. 2-23 Cav identifies the enemy’s disruption zone at 1 a.m.

45 Summer 2017
Figure 4. 2-23 Cav identifies obstacles and the enemy main defensive belt by 2 a.m.

Figure 5. 2-23 Cav identifies enemy reserve and establishes guides at the northern bypass at 3:17 a.m.

observation posts in NAIs 204 and 206, and observes a third displacing to the east from NAI 205 (Figure 3). This

46 Summer 2017
indicates that the enemy’s disruption At 3:10 a.m., Troop B and Company D identified a sizeable bypass around the
zone is farther west than was original- (-) have forced the displacement of southern obstacle and has established
ly depicted in the BCT SitTemp. An at- three BMPs from NAI 210 and identi- a screen to maintain contact with at
tack-weapons team (AWT) in direct fied a bypass around the northern dis- least two platoons of enemy BMPs de-
support of 2-23 Cav identifies two en- rupting obstacle. As they move east of fending in the vicinity of NAI 215 (Fig-
emy BMPs in NAI 210 and three BMPs the obstacle, they come into contact ure 6). Troop A has established guides
west of NAI 211. The 2-23 Cav com- with an enemy mechanized-infantry identifying the bypass around the ob-
mander recognizes that these BMPs in- company in defensive positions and stacle and begins reconnaissance of
dicate the location of the enemy’s dis- cannot advance more. Troop B posi- terrain that will support assault or ABF
ruption zone and reports to 2/88 ABCT. tions guides at the bypass around the positions for the maneuver battalions.
obstacle and establishes a screen in
By 2 a.m., 2-23 Cav has made contact conjunction with Company D (-) to Troop C (+) has forced the displace-
with disrupting obstacles (mine-wire) maintain contact with the enemy (Fig- ment of a platoon of BMPs in the vicin-
overwatched by BMP platoons on all ure 5). Troop B also initiates reconnais- ity of NAI 211 but has been unable to
three AoAs and has confirmed the en- sance of terrain that will support as- identify a suitable bypass around the
emy’s disruption zone. The 2/88 ABCT sault positions and ABF positions for disrupting obstacles in the central AoA.
counterbattery radar has identified the the maneuver battalions.
location of several pieces of enemy ar- The 2/88 ABCT commander recognizes
tillery north of NAI 217. The 2/88 that the enemy disruption zone has
At 3:17 a.m., an AWT identifies six to
ABCT’s UAS identifies two platoons of collapsed, the central AoA is impass-
eight enemy tanks moving north to NAI
BMPs moving into prepared defensive able and that the enemy’s reserve has
217 and reports this action to the 2-23
positions supported by obstacles in repositioned to the north. The BCT
Cav command post. The squadron
NAI 213 and south of NAI 214 (Figure commander redirects 1-65 Armor
commander determines that the ene-
4), indicating the location of the ene- (main effort) and 2-44 Infantry (SE 3)
my is repositioning its reserve and re-
my’s main defensive belt. to conduct battle handover with Troop
ports to 2/88 ABCT. BCT SIGINT assets
A in the south, and to attack to destroy
detect increased communication sig-
The 2/88 ABCT crosses PL Dallas (the the enemy company in the vicinity of
natures and tentatively identify the en-
LD) with 1-65 Armor (main effort) ori- NAI 215 and the enemy battalion CP
emy battalion command post (CP)
ented on the central AoA and 2-65 Ar- southeast of NAI 218. The 2-65 Armor
southeast of NAI 218.
mor (SE 2) oriented on the northern (SE 2) is directed to fix enemy forces in
AoA. The 2-44 Infantry (SE 3) is direct- By 3:25 a.m., Troop A has destroyed or the vicinity of NAIs 213 and 214 to pre-
ed to follow and support 1-65 Armor. forced displacement of three BMPs, vent them from influencing the BCT’s

Figure 6. 2-23 Cav establishes a bypass in the south at 3:25 a.m. 2/88 ABCT commits to the main effort.

47 Summer 2017
main effort in the south. Regardless of whether it is used to con- Bragg; and scout-platoon leader, 1 st
vey 1) fighting with the intent to cause Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Divi-
Not always appropriate an enemy reaction; 2) destroy enemy sion, Fort Hood, TX. LTC Palisca’s mili-
Fighting for information is certainly not reconnaissance assets to access and tary schools include Command and
appropriate in every tactical situation. expose secondary threat echelons to General Staff College, Joint Planner
There are a host of scenarios that re- friendly collection assets; or 3) fighting Course, Jumpmaster Course, Ranger
quire stealth, patience and a deliber- to reach a position from which to con- School, Cavalry Leader’s Course, Armor
ate approach to collecting information duct collection, fighting for informa- Captain’s Career Course, Armor Officer
on the part of our cavalry squadrons. tion has the power to accurately de- Basic Course, Air-Assault School and
The ability to employ both stealthy and scribe what we expect and require of Basic Airborne Course. He holds a
aggressive techniques, the flexibility to our cavalry squadrons during both re- bachelor’s of science degree in environ-
transition between them and the tac- connaissance and security operations. mental engineering from Pennsylvania
tical wherewithal to understand when State University and a master’s of sci-
each is appropriate is a critical skill for With these definitions in mind, the
ence degree in administration from
the leadership of our cavalry forma- next logical step is to fully incorporate
Central Michigan University.
tions. However, for the purposes of a comprehensive description of fight-
this article, the preceding vignette il- ing for information into our maneuver,
lustrates a scenario where aggressive intelligence, fires and mission-com-
reconnaissance is both appropriate mand doctrine. Programs of instruc- Acronym Quick-Scan
and capable of generating information tion for our professional-military-edu-
through action. cation courses and points of emphasis AoA – avenue of approach
during leadership training programs ABCT – armored brigade combat
In the vignette, the BCT was able to and CTC rotations will naturally follow team
identify most of the defending enemy in time. Doing so will help create a ABF – attack-by-fire
battalion, either directly through the ATP – Army technical publication
shared understanding between com- AWT – attack-weapons team
cavalry squadron or by other sensors manders and staffs in regard to the BCT – brigade combat team
that detected enemy reactions to the planning and execution of reconnais- BMP – Boyeva Mashina Pekhoty
squadron’s operations. Fusing this in- sance-and-security operations. It will (Russian fighting vehicle)
formation informed the BCT’s COP, al- also clarify ways our cavalry squadrons BRDM – Boyevaya
lowed the BCT commander to recog- can be of maximum benefit to their Razvedyvatelnaya Dozornaya
nize the southern AoA as a position of Mashina (Russian scout vehicle)
BCTs.
advantage and then adjust the scheme COP – common operating picture
LTC Nate Palisca is chief of the Cavalry CP – command post
of maneuver to apply combat power CTC – combat-training center
against it. Once the decision was made Doctrine Branch, Doctrine and Collec-
FM – field manual
to alter the scheme of maneuver, the tive Training Division, Maneuver Cen- LD – line of departure
cavalry squadron was positioned to fa- ter of Excellence, Fort Benning, GA. IC – information collection
cilitate the BCT’s transition by guiding Previous duty assignments include op- NAI – named area of interest
it through the established bypasses erations officer, 2nd BCT, 82nd Airborne PIR – priority intelligence
and to ABF/SBF positions that had Division, Fort Bragg, NC; operations of- requirement
ficer, 1 st Squadron, 73rd Cavalry, 82nd PL – phase line
been reconnoitered. SBF – support-by-fire
Airborne Division, Fort Bragg; chief of SE – supporting effort
Conclusion t r a i n i n g , C o m b i n e d /J o i nt Ta s k SIGINT – signals intelligence
Fighting for information remains a use- Force-82, Bagram, Afghanistan; com- Sittemp – situational template
ful, if somewhat vaguely defined, term mander, Troop B, 3 rd Squadron, 73 rd UAS – unmanned aerial system
within our professional lexicon. Cavalry, 82 nd Airborne Division, Fort

48 Summer 2017
A look at NATO ally Spain

Cordoba Cats: Ejercito de Tierra’s

Leopard 2E Main Battle Tank
by Stefan DeGraef four-man crew (tank commander, gun- situation awareness using a multi-col-
ner, loader and driver) are able to en- or display indicating the exact position
In mid-February of this year, Spain’s
gage targets at an effective range of of his tank, his company’s tanks and
Ministry of Defense and the Ejercito de
about 4,000 meters. For battlefield ob- the enemy’s MBTs.
Tierra (Spanish army) decided to send
servation, target identification and
soldiers, six Leopard 2E main battle
elimination, the tank commander uses The loader, standing left of his com-
tanks (MBTs) and 15 Pizarro II armored
a turret-mounted 360-degree rotatable mander, manually loads the L/55 gun
infantry fighting vehicles to Latvia as
day/night PERI-R 17A2 stabilized pan- using munition stored in the back of
part of the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
oramic periscope. The gunner, seated the turret (15 rounds) and left of the
nization’s (NATO) enhanced forward
in front and below the tank command- driver in the body of the MBT (27
presence (EFP) initiative in the Baltic
er, uses a dual-magnification stabilized rounds). A blast door separates the
States (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia)
sight with an integrated laser-range- back of the turret from the crew com-
and in Poland. This multinational mili-
finder and thermal imaging unit. The partment and, when hit, this turret
tary force reinforces NATO’s northeast-
stabilized gun allows the tank com- section will explode upward without
ern flank from invasion.
mander and gunner to individually de- danger to the crew.
The Spanish deployment – part of a tect, target and attack (hunter-killer)
Latvia-based multinational battalion enemy tanks and armored personnel Standard munition used by the Leop-
under Canadian leadership – not only carriers while moving over rough ter- ard 2Es are the German-made DM43
illustrates Spanish willingness to par- rain in all weather conditions. A back- kinetic-energy penetration anti-tank
ticipate in NATO-member-supported up telescope is also available to the sabot-round and the DM12 multipur-
operations but also to continuously in- gunner. pose anti-tank projectile. The DM43 is
vest in a capable, deployable and cred- able to penetrate 56-centimeter steel
ible Leopard 2E MBT force. At the same All systems are integrated into the armor when fired at a range of two ki-
time, Ejercito de Tierra initiated inter- Leopard Information and Command lometers. When its ammunition is
nal reform to become a more organic, Equipment (LINCE) command-and-con- manually loaded by an experienced
deployable force able to respond to trol system, developed by Rheinmetall loader, a Leopard 2E can fire up to nine
any threat scenario. Defense Electronics and Spain’s Indra shots a minute, with some of its am-
Company. The LINCE-battle-manage- munition (especially kinetic-energy
Leopard 2A6 variant ment system also allows each tank penetrators) reaching velocities up to
The Spanish army’s Leopard 2E (E for commander to optimize his battlefield 1,800 a second. Able to shoot the
Espana) is based on Germany’s capable
Leopard 2A6 variant in service with the
German army. The 2A6 MBT was devel-
oped as a Kampfwertsteigerung of the
existing Leopard 2A4 model by replac-
ing its Rheinmetal 120 L/44 by a more
potent and longer-barreled Rh120 L/55
cannon and to improve the tank’s ar-
mor protection and survivability on the
“classic” battlefield. Additional add-on
wedge “arrow-shaped” armor was in-
stalled on the turret’s frontal arc and
roof to make it less vulnerable to kinet-
ic-energy penetrating munition like ar-
mor-piercing sabots. To give the MBT
more protection against mines and im-
provised explosive devices, more belly-
armor plates were also incorporated
into the design and manufacturing pro-
cess.
Figure 1. A Leopard 2E assigned to Brigada el Guzman X moves through the
Armed by the potent Rheinmetall L/55 terrain of the training area at Spain’s CerroMuriano Barracks, located near
120 mm, the Leopard 2E and its Cordoba, Spain. (Photo by Edwin Borremans)

49 Summer 2017
Rheinmetall L/55 on a nine-degree 42 MBTs, joined by Leopard recovery ‘On stage’ in Latvia
downward angle and to climb obsta- tanks. In reaction to Russia’s annexation of
cles up to 1.1 meters, the Leopard 2E Crimea and invasion of Ukraine, NATO
can use terrain concealment to target One of these battalions, Batallon de In-
decided during its 2016 summit in
and attack enemy MBTs without expos- fanteria Carros de Combate Malaga
Warsaw to deploy four multinational
ing its bulk to the opponent. IV/10, is based at the Spanish army’s
battalion-sized landforces/battle-
CerroMuriano Barracks, located 15 ki-
When forced to fight at close range groups as EFP to Poland and the Baltic
lometers north of Cordoba in southern
(such as in urban areas), two 7.62mm States. The battlegroup at present is a
Spain. The unit is part of Regimiento
machineguns can be used: one turret- six-nation military force: Canada, Alba-
Acorazada Cordoba No. 10, joined by
mounted and one coaxially mounted. nia, Italy, Poland, Slovenia and Spain.
Grupo de Cabelleria Acorazado Ala-
Two groups of four side-mounted mansa II/10. This mechanized-cavalry The Spanish army deployed some 350
76mm Wegmann smoke mortars on unit operates Austrian-Spanish Coop- military personnel, six Leopard 2E
the turret can be electrically fired to eration Development Pizarro II Vehicu- MBTs and 15 of the Pizarro IIs to the
create smokescreens within seconds. los de Combate de Infanteria (VCI) ar- Latvian army’s Adazi military barracks,
An internal overpressurization system mored infantry vehicles in support of close to Latvia’s capital Riga. Initially
protects the Leopard 2E’s crew from the Leopard 2E fighting force. Armed personnel, tanks and vehicles of Briga-
nuclear, biological and chemical with a 30mm Mauser Mk-30/2 cannon, da Extramadura XI were sent to Latvia,
threats. the Phase II Pizarro is an updated ver- with rotations of personnel planned
For training purposes, all Leopard 2E sion of the initial version, with a small among the various MBT-equipped
regiments use a high-tech dynamic tur- increase in overall length but with im- BOPs. The Spanish Leopard 2Es are
ret simulator, designed by Indra. This proved armor, interior design, control joined by a company of Leopard 2A5
simulator can be used to train MBT handling and, more importantly, new MBTs of the Polish armed forces.
commanders, gunners and loaders dur- tactical displays for the VCI command-
er and gunner. Stefan Degraef is a Belgium-based
ing various simple and more complicat-
freelance aviation and army journalist.
ed tactical scenarios and operational Frequent joint operations with MBTs, He graduated with a doctorate in eco-
environments. To boost the realistic Pizarro II VCI and command vehicles – nomics and is working in Belgium’s fi-
value of this crew training, simulated and even M125A1 120mm heavy mor- nancial sector as credit adviser. He has
iron munition, similar in size and tar carriers – are simulated in the Cer- published articles in a number of inter-
weight, can be handled by the loader roMuriano Barracks’ training area. national aviation, army and defense
and “fired” by the gunner.
In 2015 the Spanish army initiated a in- magazines.
Organization depth reorganization, transforming its
Since its introduction by the Spanish brigades into eight brigadas organicas
army, several brigades – all belonging polivalentes (BOP) (polyvalant organic
to Spain’s Division San Marcial – have brigades), allowing these units to re- Acronym Quick-Scan
been equipped with the new Leopard spond, adapt and deploy in a more
2Es. Each of these brigades has one flexible and adaptable reaction to any
BOP – Brigada organicas
Regimiento de Infanteria Acorzado type of (inter)national humanitarian, polivalentes (Spanish) or polyvalant
with one Batallon de Infanteria de Car- peace-keeping and peace-enforcing organic brigade (English)
ros de Combate, which are each com- mission. To be more deployable as a EFP – enhanced forward presence
posed of three companies (companias) unit, the Brigada Guzman el Bueno X LINCE – Leopard Information and
of Leopard 2E MBTs. Three individual BOP received two more fighting com- Command Equipment
platoons (primara, segunda and ter- panies. If needed, each BOP will be MBT – main battle tank
cara seccion) all have three MBTs in supplemented by more companies/ NATO – North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
each seccion, augmented by two battalions to boost its overall capabali- VCI – Vehiculos de Combate de
“staff” Leopard 2Es. On paper the ties (in other words, heliborne capabil- Infanteria
Spanish army has a combined force of ity by one of the army aviation units).

50 Summer 2017
 Training and Evaluation in a
Complex Environment
by LTC Jeffrey J. Barta and 2. Collect relevant information. One of because it did not adhere to the ac-
MAJ Chase S. Baker the most critical O/C/T functions is col- tion/reaction/counter-action format of
lecting data and information objective- t h e c o u rs e - o f- a c t i o n a n a l y s i s
The Chief of Staff of the Army identi-
ly to build the backbone of the AAR, (wargame)? An O/C/T must have both
fies his No. 1 priority as “readiness,
which is the primary mechanism for the knowledge and experience regard-
and there is no other number-one pri-
discussing areas to sustain, improve or ing required quality and level of detail
ority.” With that in mind, the best way
increase proficiency. The process be- to assess how the unit executed every
to get after readiness is internally re-
gins with product review, including ob- step of the military decision-making
sourced and planned training with ex-
serving the publication of orders and process (MDMP) and troop-leading
ternal control and evaluation.
rehearsals. An O/C/T must be able to procedures (TLPs).
quickly read an order and key annexes,
Doctrine provides references on train- There are three primary areas an
and must be able to understand the
ing management and training assess- O/C/T should focus collection efforts
commander’s intent and concept of against to identify potential friction
ment, but it provides little guidance
the operation, while simultaneously vi-
about formal evaluation and feedback points for the training unit. The first is
sualizing the plan and identifying po-
mechanisms or methods currently em- comparing the unit’s mission-essential
tential friction and missed opportuni-
ployed by the observers/coaches/ task list (METL) self-assessment to the
ties in accordance with the scenario
trainers (O/C/Ts) at the combat train- training objectives and overlaying both
design. Shortcomings may include
ing centers (CTCs) beyond the after-ac- with the scenario design as described
missing key products or details, but an
tion review (AAR). So how does an el- in the eighth tenet. If the METL assess-
O/C/T must know doctrinal planning to
ement, unit or individual appropriately ment matches the remaining training
an extent that the root causes of the
plan and provide doctrinally focused foci, you can then derive that the unit
friction are nearly immediately appar-
external assessment and evaluation? is self-aware and the unit-identified
ent, thus enabling AAR production.
With that question in mind, we have training objectives will help focus the
identified 10 tenets and proposed a For example, if a unit fails to produce AAR. If the unit-identified training ob-
training and task outline that defines a decision-support template needed to jectives do not correspond with the
the O/C/T’s observation and coaching enable the brigade commander’s deci- METL assessment, it may cause O/C/Ts
opportunities to provide dynamic feed- sion-making in execution, is it because to coach a unit to refine its objectives
back in a high-fidelity, complex deci- the staff ran out of time and/or to enable appropriate feedback.
sive-action training environment
(DATE).

1. Relationship development. Many

leaders use the phrase “relationships
are our pacing item.” This rang true for
me as an O/C/T more than for nearly
any other job in the Army. The over-
arching tasks of an O/C/T are to iden-
tify flaws, weaknesses and shortcom-
ings of an individual, a unit or a group,
and tell them in a way that enables
positive change and growth. You must
build a non-attributional relationship,
based on mutual trust and respect, en-
suring a counterpart knows his/her
O/C/T has his/her best interest and de-
velopment as a priority. If an O/C/T
cannot provide effective, constructive
criticism and input – early and often –
and cannot maintain a completely
open dialogue that encourages ques-
tions and learning, then the other nine
tenets following are irrelevant because Figure 1. O/C/Ts observing a 3rd Stryker Cavalry Regiment combined-arms re-
observations will fall on deaf ears. hearsal at NTC in February 2016. (Photo by MAJ Chase Baker)

51 Summer 2017
The second collection opportunity is 3. Maintain common operational pic- imperative that an O/C/T can immedi-
leader engagements. This requires a ture (COP). One of the most important ately apply the appropriate doctrinal
rapid relationship build as described in tenets of successful evaluation is the reference to the situation. To do this,
the first tenet that enables early can- COP. At the formal training centers as O/C/Ts must have an extensive doctri-
did conversation of both personal, unit well as at Active Component and Re- nal knowledge base, but he/she must
and subordinate strengths and weak- serve Component training sites, ob- also read the doctrine associated with
nesses from your counterpart. servers have access to exercise-control the specific PIR or potential friction
(EXCON) equipment related to Multiple point ahead of time so as observation
Lastly, understanding the unit’s equip- Integrated Laser Engagement System, occurs, the doctrinal shortcomings be-
ment status, capabilities and limita- specifically the Combat Training Center come obvious. The ability to match a
tions helps develop expectation man- Instrumentation System (CTC-IS). O/C/ rotation’s challenge to a doctrinal ex-
agement within the scenario. Units Ts should use these systems’ complete tract – and then tie it to the rotational
conduct collective training at varying capabilities, as well as the Army Battle construct and the outcome of the ac-
levels of readiness. If maintenance is Command System, Force XXI Battle tual fight – establishes the basis for the
low from the start and remains low, Command Brigade-and-Below, Com- AAR: identifying what was supposed to
the unit will struggle to achieve neces- mand Post of the Future and analog happen, what did happen, what we
sary force ratios; logistics will quickly maps and graphics to maintain an un- could have done differently and what
become a focus topic, overshadowing derstanding of the friendly and enemy to sustain.
and distracting from other large collec- picture.
tive tasks as the primary shortcoming. 6. Provide appropriate feedback. The
The difference between an O/C/T’s ability to determine a feedback meth-
Just like the intelligence-preparation- COP and the training unit’s view is that od and optimize both content and
of-the-battlefield process, one of the an O/C/T does not have to have perfect timeliness depends on an O/C/T’s abil-
most important outputs of informa- “current operational picture,” only a ity to determine the appropriate mes-
tion-collection planning is the develop- common one among himself, other saging tool and subject approach to
ment of priority intelligence require- O/C/Ts and the CTC-IS. This construct use. There are many methods to pro-
ments (PIR) that are supported by enables an O/C/T to develop the pic- vide feedback, but we’ll focus on the
good refined intelligence requirements ture in minutes instead of seconds. CTCs’ staples. Some topics are too de-
that enable subordinate O/C/Ts to fo- This gives the O/C/T the time/space to tailed for counterpart hotwashes or
cus their collection. Without PIR, ob- confirm accuracy before reporting. “Green Book AARs.” They require at
servations become too broad to con- This enables near-perfect battle sum- least some, but possibly a significant,
firm/deny suspected issues or identify marization to determine exactly what amount of instrumentation to present.
potential new ones, which leads to happened. Much like good furniture In these cases, a formal, instrumented
feedback that is “a mile wide and a begins with perfectly square lumber, a AAR is necessary. This forum usually
foot deep.” PIR should be developed as good AAR begins with precise data that relates to the broadest audience (com-
a collaborative process among O/C/Ts a unit would be incapable of collecting mand and staff) at any echelon. It
and should not change during the cur- itself. strives to link observations across the
rent mission or you risk having two in- 4. Maintain technical competence. At warfighting functions much like an in-
complete data pulls. Lastly, the collect- the root of precise data collection is a tegrating cell within the staff. A de-
ed PIR should be objective and the re- technically competent O/C/T. The tailed battle-action summary sets con-
sult becomes a “sustain” or an “im- O/C/T must understand (in detail) the ditions about what happened, refer-
prove,” depending on the context of organization and capabilities of a unit, encing hard data collected from PIRs,
the scenario design. its enablers and all its mission-com- and it generates good questions that
mand combat and sustaining systems. encourage active participation and
It’s impossible to cover all the friction, self-awareness of the friction encoun-
An O/C/T must instantly recognize
mistakes and deficiencies during an tered.
when a mistake is being made to cap-
AAR, so an O/C/T must separate which
ture the data because once the individ-
cyclic and enduring faults bridge the AARs inherently address the problem,
ual or unit has moved past that mo-
unit as a whole from those specific to concluding with the unit designating
ment or event, it’s nearly impossible to
an individual counterpart or small an action officer to ensure follow-
go back and recreate or capture the
group. Those preventable mistakes and through. The optimal way is to ensure
observation without becoming disrup-
“low-hanging fruit” are great coaching the AAR leads a unit to its own solu-
tive. Also, one must remember that to
opportunities to fix early and re-en- tion. In a time- or terrain-constrained
focus collection and know what system
force as success later. This methodol- environment, an O/C/T can still suc-
to observe, an O/C/T must have well-
ogy not only increases individual and cessfully execute an analog formal
refined PIR as described in the third te-
unit effectiveness exponentially, it en- AAR, with the data pulled from PIR
net.
hances the O/C/T-to-counterpart inter- throughout the battle and a series of
personal relationships and strengthens 5. Sustain tactical relevance. Once in- doctrinal “right way” printouts that
mutual trust, furthering the willingness formation collection is complete and a can be displayed and discussed instead
to learn and accept constructive criti- training objective, friction point or of the O/C/T-collected data. The visual
cism. coaching opportunity is identified, it’s aids routinely spur acknowledgement

52 Summer 2017
but often drive discussion as the train- to this could be if an O/C/T is inten- can also serve as a one-source location
ing unit self-identifies more faults. tionally identifying a trend or direct of knowledge to share with other pro-
comparison between two phases or fessional contacts and the various
The most informal method is the
periods. Overall, the common goal warfighting-function (WfF) centers of
“Green Book hotwash,” preferably
across all forms of AAR feedback is excellence. A further important prac-
used in a leader-only or counterpart-
self-discovery and acknowledgement tice for O/C/Ts is to reach out to future
only role. This method is best em-
from the training unit. This is accom- training units and share lessons and
ployed as feedback in the most time-
plished via presentation of precise and trends with them. This will help the fu-
constrained training environments or
timely analysis from the O/C/Ts to de- ture unit more effectively prepare for
when the preponderance of AAR top-
rive improved performance the train- its upcoming rotation as well as to as-
ics clearly points to key leader short-
ing unit. sist the force as a whole to reverse
comings and isn’t appropriate to dis-
negative trends and reduce the endur-
cuss in front of the entire unit. 7. Track emerging trends. The training ing warfighting challenges.
Also, when applying answered PIR to teams’ standing collection plan, as de-
scribed in the third tenet, presents an Lastly, an O/C/T must be an avid writ-
the tactical outcomes, O/C/Ts must ac- er, sharing personal observations, les-
knowledge that gaps in collection may opportunity to provide relevant feed-
back, not only to the training unit but sons and increasing knowledge within
lead to false negative assumptions. If the profession of arms. Participation in
there is friction, but the cause and ef- across broader formations. The first
noun in an O/C/T’s title inherently po- WfF symposiums, writing for Army
fect is not available to present as an journals and other professional venues
area to “improve” – either on a slide, sitions him/her to observe many tac-
tics, techniques and procedures across is an O/C/T obligation to help shape
CTC-IS screenshot or in hard data col- the future force.
lected from the training unit – O/C/Ts a variety of training units. When com-
should leave it out completely. O/C/Ts mon challenges are observed across 8. Know the scenario design. Through-
should look for another opportunity to multiple units or innovative solutions out this article, the scenario design
encourage self-derived feedback from are observed, O/C/Ts have an obliga- arises as a key tool to enhance feed-
the unit. The most destructive thing tion to share this across the force, es- back and training opportunities. One
you can do during feedback is present pecially with future training partners. of the most important features of an
incorrect data to the unit and lose The U.S. Army Center for Lessons externally evaluated training event is a
credibility or trust as described in the Learned (CALL) has the mandate to well-integrated scenario that threads
first tenet. Once lost, an O/C/T will not lead this effort through the analysis of multiple elements together to create
have time within the short remainder information collected to become Army opportunities to train the selected
of a training event to rebuild it. lessons-learned and shared across U.S. tasks. It requires a great deal of plan-
Army Training and Doctrine Command ning to build an event that meets a
Lastly, “improves” are like fish; after a agencies and other major commands. multitude of individual and collective
short time, they begin to stink and are
tasks simultaneously across echelon.
no longer welcome. Feedback has a O/C/Ts should collect and collate their
The first step is to evaluate and fore-
last-time-information-is-of-value mark. observations for submission to the
cast the trained/needs practice/un-
If a unit has changed its standard op- Joint Lessons-Learned Information Sys-
trained status of a unit following com-
erating procedure (SOP), moved on tem (JLLIS) for CALL’s use. O/C/Ts
pletion of its prior collective training.
from the friction or is now into anoth- should have access to a JLLIS user with
The higher headquarters must provide
er phase within the scenario, it is best administrative permissions to upload
clear training guidance and endstate.
not to include old data. An exception and organize binders of lessons. This
The subordinate unit commander must
also identify training objectives and
the evaluation focus. Once complete,
the planners can begin developing a
threaded scenario. The primary events,
such as a brigade attack or defense,
provide the opportunity to exercise the
primary WfF supporting the METL
tasks, but it’s the injects developed to
keep the commanders and staffs en-
gaged in the scenario that make a good
training event great.
A good example of a thread could be-
gin with an echelon-above-brigade In-
telligence feed that provides a single-
source report about a limited objec-
tive, such as a high-value target (HVT),
Figure 2. Bronco Team O/C/Ts in the field at NTC during July 2015. (Photo by in a town. The brigade is then tasked
MAJ Chase Baker) to conduct a raid, which is designed to

53 Summer 2017
interrupt their current plans cycle. The phenomena of “the O/C/T said” erodes exercise, and the O/C/T must be able
brigade then mission-commands two the ability to create improvement in to affect this to best improve the unit.
operations at once (the ongoing and training tasks and must be avoided Furthermore, the EXCON provides
the new one) and apprehends the HVT. through the use of HICON. However, many of the tools necessary for effec-
The HVT then stresses the use of the the O/C/T must be closely tied with the tive information collection, and it
human-intelligence control team but HICON to ensure synchronization. It is serves as the repository for the PIRs
provides a warning of a spoiling attack. important for O/C/Ts to review orders collected by adjacent team O/C/Ts that
Concurrently, taking the HVT off the during the HICON staffing process to may impact others’ counterparts.
battlefield provides a threaded reduc- identify areas that the unit may misin-
The EXCON will maintain an SOP which
tion in enemy information operations, terpret. This further allows the O/C/T
all O/C/Ts must understand and help
but it causes an increase in local un- to provide effective feedback through
the training unit to understand. This al-
derground support because of some a deep understanding of the unit’s di-
lows for the implementation of battle-
collateral damage. However, the bri- rected mission and any constraints im-
field effects that aren’t able to be
gade combat team (BCT) then must ex- posed by their higher headquarters.
properly replicated. The EXCON SOP
ecute a decision to transition to a hasty
will normally contain standard reports
defense or re-allocate reconnaissance The EXCON may overlap roles with the
that an O/C/T submits; they should
assets in anticipation of a spoiling at- HICON or may be a separate entity, but
keep these readily available.
tack. in either case it is equally important for
an O/C/T to liaise effectively with it to Lastly, the EXCON is the invisible shield
The actions based on this one pre-
create the appropriate conditions nec- of safety responsible for managing
planned scenario event provides an
essary for each training task. This is ac- risks involved in the training exercise,
AAR that covers all the WfFs, and it ex-
complished by directing all resources especially as it relates to elements out-
ercises multiple echelons simultane-
involved in the training event, such as side of the training unit’s control. O/C/
ously. The senior trainer or senior ex-
the opposing forces, roleplayers, con- Ts fall within this purview and must
ternal evaluator should have multiple
structive adjacent units and virtual en- abide by EXCON regulations and en-
options within the scenario each day
ablers. The scenario drives the entire force them among all elements
to increase or decrease the tempo
based on unit performance. How much
more practice is required against spe-
cific previously identified training ob-
jectives is a consideration in selecting
these options. This may be accom-
plished as described in the ninth tenet.
9. Interface with higher-control (HI-
CON) and EXCON. The HICON and EX-
CON are crucial nodes for maintaining
the integrity of the scenario as de-
scribed in the eighth tenet. They cre-
ate the suitable training environment
that will lead to increased performance
in the identified tasks. An O/C/T must
understand the role of each and be
able to effectively interact with them
to create the proper conditions for the
training unit.
The HICON is responsible for the issu-
ance of orders and collecting appropri-
ate reports from the training unit. In
rare instances or in smaller-scale
events, the O/C/T can perform either
of these roles. However, as described
in the first tenet, this may damage the
relationship between the O/C/T and
the training unit. When O/C/Ts provide
direction rather than recommenda-
tions, it degrades the feedback’s inter-
nalization because the unit will no lon-
ger self-discover areas for improve-
ment. Instead, it will blame the O/C/T
for providing bad directions. This Figure 3a. Top part, training and evaluation outline (T&EO) task list.

54 Summer 2017
operating in the training area. The
readiness derived from a training event
is never worth the loss of life, limb or
eyesight. It’s also never worth signifi-
cant damage to equipment. O/C/Ts are
the first line in a comprehensive EX-
CON plan to mitigate this, and they
must effectively work together to min-
imize risk.
10. Sustain the trainer. The worst-kept
secret in the Army is a day in the life of
an O/C/T while assisting a unit. The ru-
mors of barbecues, clean clothes and
humvee camping are all true. O/C/Ts
must have a short logistics tail, but
conversely must be self-reliant and in-
dependent from the training unit. Any
reliance on the training unit provides
the opportunity for shortcomings to be
blamed on the added stress of the
non-organic sustainment require-
ments. Because O/C/Ts are not under
the same internal stresses of the train-
ing unit and do not have the responsi-
bility of significant leadership deci-
sions, they should remain better rest-
ed, more professionally presentable
and tactically patient than the training
unit. O/C/Ts must be present for any
significant activity taking place, includ-
ing but not limited to, all MDMP/TLPs,
conditions checks, rehearsals and exe-
cution as described in the third tenet.
However, not all O/C/Ts need be pres-
ent for every event. For example, de-
veloping roles and responsibilities
within an O/C/T team enables a rest
and rotation plan. The logistics training
team experts may be of little value-
added while observing a BCT breach
sequence, but they will provide critical
reporting 12 hours after the fact dur-
ing consolidation, reorganization and
reconstitution. Conversely, company-
grade trainers, who all share a similar
“jack of all trades” zone-coverage con-
cept, must ensure refit within their
team while maintaining a consistent
presence to observe TLPs. The best
practice is to simply refit a third to a
half of the team during the TLP time- Figure 3b-c. Middle and bottom parts of a simulated T&EO task list.
frame and surge to full strength during
periods of high-tempo combined-arms
maneuver or wide-area security feedback. To quote a former senior for trainers who often operate inde-
events. trainer, “you don’t have to look per- pendently.
fect, you just have to look better than
The O/C/T’s goal is not to be above it the training unit.” Properly sustaining Whether via eXportable Combat Train-
all or appear immaculate, but to main- the trainers is paramount to providing ing Capability, home-station training or
tain a professional and groomed ap- clear, level-headed feedback to the at the CTCs, O/C/Ts are the first shap-
pearance to enhance the reception of training partner. It also mitigates risk ing operation to enable a unit to

55 Summer 2017
accomplish its training tasks. External Army Command and General Staff Col-
evaluation is the gold-standard meth- lege (CGSC), Cavalry Leader’s Course, Acronym Quick-Scan
od of assessment for units conducting Armor Captain’s Career Course and Ar-
AAR – after-action review
collective task-focused training, pre- mor Officers Basic Course. He holds a BCT – brigade combat team
paring for a CTC rotation or completing bachelor’s of science degree in environ- CALL – Center for Army Lessons-
requirements prior to contingency op- mental science from the University of Learned
erations. Illinois and a master’s of science de- CGSC – Command and General
gree in administration from Central Staff College
This article and its accompanying pro- COP – common operational picture
Michigan University. LTC Barta has
posed training and evaluation outline CTC – combat training center
made 46 training rotations as an O/C/T
task list (Figure 3) provide 10 tenets for CTC-IS – Combat Training Center
at NTC and JMRC. Instrumentation System
those serving in an O/C/T position.
Adopting these means the O/C/T pro- DATE – decisive-action training
MAJ Chase Baker is operations officer environment
vides maximum value to his or her
for 2-13th Cavalry, 3rd Armored Brigade EXCON – exercise control
partnered unit. Filing the gap of O/C/T HICON – higher control
Combat Team, 1 st Armored Division.
performance doctrine will not only im- HVT – high-value target
When he co-wrote this article, he was
prove O/C/T performance but improve JLLIS – Joint Lessons Learned
the live-fire operations officer with Information System
the readiness of our force as a whole.
NTC’s Operations Group, Fort Irwin. JMRC – Joint Maneuver Readiness
LTC Jeff Barta is a professor of military Other assignments include assistant Center
science at Slippery Rock University’s brigade operations trainer, Ops Group, METL – mission-essential task list
Army Reserve Officer Training Corps, NTC, Fort Irwin; assistant squadron op- MDMP – military decision-making
Slippery Rock, PA. Other assignments erations trainer and troop trainer, Ops process
include BCT S-3 O/C/T for the National Group, NTC; commander, Company C, NTC – National Training Center
O/C/T – observer/coach/trainer
Training Center (NTC) Operations 52 nd Infantry, Joint Base Lewis-Mc- PIR – priority intelligence
Group at Fort Irwin, CA; maneuver task Chord, WA; and platoon leader, 3rd Pla- requirement
force S-3 O/C/T for NTC’s Operations toon, Company C, 1-35 Armor, Baum- SOP – standard operating procedure
Group; BCT S-3, 4th Battalion, 101st Air- holder, Germany. His military educa- T&EO – training and evaluation
borne Division, Fort Campbell, KY; ex- tion includes CGSC, Cavalry Leader’s outline
ecutive officer, 2nd Battalion, 506th In- Course, Maneuver Captain’s Career TLP – troop-leading procedures
WfF – warfighting function
fantry, Fort Campbell and Khost, Af- Course, Armor Officer Basic Course and
ghanistan; maneuver task force S-3 Air Assault School. He holds a bache-
and company O/C/T, Joint Maneuver lor’s of science degree in international
Readiness Center (JMRC), Hohenfels, relations from the U.S. Military Acad- Walker School of Business and Technol-
Germany; commander and team O/C/T, emy at West Point and is currently a ogy.
JMRC’s Operations Group, Hohenfels. master’s of business administration
His military education includes U.S. candidate with the George Herbert

Continued from Page 31 completion of six missions. A modern

version of The Defence of Duffer’s Drift,
Overview of Stryker Brigade Combat it provides a light-hearted tactical prim-
Team development and initial entrance er for making serious command deci-
into combat. sions and learning lessons about tactics,
people and what it takes to win a battle.
Combat operations
• Center for Army Lessons Learned • Dale Wilson, Treat ‘Em Rough!
(CALL), 17-01, Scouts in Contact, Recommended Reading [commercial publication].
Tactical Vignettes for Cavalry Lead- for Professional Narrative of American tank experience
ers Handbook, 8 Dec 2016 [CAC]. Development in World War I.
Full of vignettes developed by subject- Listed by general subject • Harry Yeide, Steeds of Steel: A
matter experts at the National Training
rather than command echelon History of American Mechanized
Center to help lead teams through a va-
riety of scenarios that will help challenge Cavalry in World War II [commer-
of Hill 781: An Allegory of Modern cial publication].
young reconnaissance leaders’ decision-
making skills. Facilitator instructions
Mechanized Combat. Readable overview of the varied expe-
guarantee you have the information Follows the fictional exploits of a lieuten- riences of mechanized cavalry in all the-
needed to make leaders and teams suc- ant colonel who has died and found himself aters of operations, including the Pacif-
cessful. in purgatory (which happens to be the Na- ic.
tional Training Center). He must atone for
• James R. McDonough, The Defense his sins as an officer through the successful Continued on Page 62

56 Summer 2017
Lessons-Learned About Command Posts

Iron Brigade’s Combat-Team Pursuit

of Mobile Command-Post Capabilities
by COL Charles Lombardo and MAJ Gaps The “old” way – something like the
Ken Selby While 1 Armored Division and 2 BCT
st nd configuration in Figure 2, which is an
have made great strides in developing illustration from FM 71-123, dated
Command posts (CPs), no matter the
expertise for integrating the WIN-T In- September 1992 – is still worthy of em-
formation which sets them up, are a
crement 2 network, the brigade has ulation. The graphic clearly identifies
concern for today’s battlefield. As GEN
not been able to make the required the personnel, network and multiple
Mark Milley, Army Chief of Staff, said
progress in developing the entire MC CP configurations from the initial SICPS
at the Association for the United States
system,3 particularly the CP’s materiel methodology.
Army luncheon Oct. 4, 2016, “Our bri-
gade [CPs] must be able to jump with- aspects, and in refining the doctrine In addition to the doctrine and layout
in two to three minutes or they will be that tactical echelons use to simulta- of CPs from a network and hardware
destroyed.” neously command-and-control com- perspective, our current doctrine lacks
bined-arms maneuver and wide-area the how-tos of integrating personnel.
Since 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), security in decisive action (DA). The In the DA environment – with the focus
1st Armored Division, spent the past six fact that the Standardized Integrated on continuous operations and removal
years serving as the Army Experimen- Command Post System (SICPS) is in sus- of “suspension of battlefield effects” –
tal Task Force (AETF) for the Brigade tainment phase has further exacerbat- the BCT must account for the integra-
Modernization Command (BMC) and ed the materiel gap in capitalizing on tion of key personnel in their staff roles
the Army Capabilities and Integration the gains of uninterrupted MC. for CP analysis and functions as well as
Center, we have some lessons-learned
In addition to addressing the aging and for the CP’s security aspects. The BCT
to share with the force. The Army es-
static tent-based CP solutions, the must integrate key staff personnel into
tablished 2/1 Armor under BMC to
Army needs to relook the codification dedicated security teams of the distrib-
evaluate the network and other Army
of doctrinal TTPs for brigade-and-be- uted CPs.
modernization technologies and to de-
low CP. Our current doctrine, Field
velop tactics, techniques and proce- This shift to DA should jump-start a
Manual (FM) 3-96, Brigade Combat
dures (TTPs) for their employment.1 doctrine, organization, training, mate-
Team (October 2015), describes the six
riel, leadership and education, person-
This article’s purpose is to describe the principles of MC and lays out MC tasks.
nel and facilities review of personnel
Iron Brigade’s final assessment during The FM even provides duty descrip-
(nodes) networks, functions and secu-
Army Warfighting Assessment (AWA) tions for the staff officers. However,
rity over time in an attempt to place
17.1 in October 2016 and to offer po- what the FM doesn’t contain is the sci-
the appropriate personnel by echelon
tential TTPs to improve expeditionary ence aspects of command-and-control
in each CP.
and uninterrupted mission command at BCT or battalion level. Current doc-
(MC), leveraging the Warfighter Infor- trine doesn’t address the application A second gap in our MC systems is the
mation Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Incre- of personnel and networks to the dif- CP materiel solution. The current CP
ment 2 network and mobile CP solu- ferent echelons of CPs within the bat- structure is vulnerable to a variety of
tions.2 talion or brigade. attacks and lacks mobility as well as

Figure 1. 2/1 Armor’s main CP in May 2016 during NIE 16.2. The unit’s previous CP had a large footprint (11 tents and 2
battalion TAAs; long setup/teardown times; and a significant logistical tail, nor was it survivable in a DATE environment.

57 Summer 2017
 enemy in the DATE. Achieving this dis-
tributed MC TTP gives the commander
“reach.”4
• Look. Leveraging upgraded vehicle
capabilities developed during six
years as the AETF under the network-
integration evaluations (NIE), 2/1
Armor replaced the Airbeam tents
with four M1087 expansible vans,
two M1079 vans and two Light
Medium Tactical Vehicle-linked
Sesolinc containers. Facilitated by
BMC, the brigade upgraded one
M1087 that housed 10 workstations
with Secure Internet Protocol Router
(SIPR)/Non-secure Internet Protocol
Router (NIPR)/Coalition enclaves,
two built-in projectors, five mounted
whiteboards, light-emitting diode
(LED) lighting and an improved
environmental-control-unit (ECU)
system. The 2/1 Armor also used two
upgraded M1079 vans converted into
Figure 2. BCT main CP with established SICPS (T configuration). (From FM 71-
CP platforms (CPP) that eliminated
123, Figure 1-3)
the four-humvee SICPS-solution
CPPs.
survivability. Near-peer threats are reconnoitering enemy that the CP
able to detect and target MC nodes was either a brigade- or division-sized • Size. By employing three more
due to their large signature. As a re- element. M1087s and two more M1079s, the
sult, the operational force seeks to • It took too much time. Setup and brigade reduced its footprint from 17
standardize CPs that are austere, mo- teardown times ranged between 10 to one 20-foot-by-32-foot tent with
bile, expeditionary and – from an elec- to 20 hours, depending on Soldier accompanying vehicles. This vehicle-
tromagnetic (EM) aspect – able to training and experience level. based CP housed the S-2, S-3, S-4 and
match mobility and survivability with S-6 sections as well as a Temporary
• It consumed too much manpower
the subordinate maneuver forces they Sensitive Compartmented
and transportation resources. The
support. Information Facility (T-SCIF) and
CP required extensive manpower and
mobile brigade intelligence-support
Note that the physical and EM signa- lift assets using many offloaded
element (BISE). From this design, the
ture of large CPs present a significant transit cases and up to 5,000 feet of
b r i ga d e l e ve ra ge d i t s W I N - T
opportunity for the opposing force to CAT-5 cabling.
Increment 2 on-the-move (OTM)
disrupt the BCT’s initiative by employ- • It ate too much power. This large and capability employing two points of
ing effective combined-arms attacks overly cumbersome CP consumed presence (PoP) as an enroute CP.
that deplete BCT resources while hin- large quantities of resources and
dering the BCT staff’s ability to syn- power generation that required a • Time. Incorporating this mobile CP
chronize reconnaissance, fires and lo- significant logistical tail. concept, the brigade developed an
gistical support. early-entry CP as well. After multiple

Acknowledging these unsettling reali-

Fixes CP jumps during AWA 17.1, 2/1
With an upcoming National Training Armor decreased BCT jump times
ties, 2/1 Armor identified that its CP from 18 hours to under two hours
Center rotation, the brigade decided to
was vulnerable to precisely this type of near the exercise’s end. Also of note,
immediately reduce our CP footprint
coordinated attack in a decisive-action the CPP trucks are invaluable should
during AWA 17.1. To combat the cum-
training environment (DATE) construct. a vehicle breakdown occur, as the
bersome and static CP structure, 2/1
The vulnerabilities: server stacks are easily removable
Armor’s vision was to capitalize on the
• It looked like a CP. The brigade’s CP WIN-T Increment 2 network by creat- while housed in transit cases. The
consisted of 11 Airbeam tents ing an uninterrupted-MC philosophy opposite is true with the Army SICPS
centering off one large tent; three 40- that enabled the BCT to exercise MC solution, as hard-mounted server-
foot wings housed the brigade across multiple locations with built-in stack removal requires hours of
warfighting functions (WfF) and WfF and leader redundancies. This CP tedious work while the network
command group. would be capable of fusing intelligence remains cold.
• It was big. The CP’s sheer size and enabling subordinate units to si- • Manpower and transportation. To
presented a clear confirmation to a multaneously prosecute the hybrid lessen electromagnetic-field (EMF)

58 Summer 2017
Figure 3. 2/1 Armor mobile CP endstate during AWA 17.1.

emissions while further reducing the computers, intelligence, surveillance ECU is too loud and hinders verbal
CP’s footprint, 2/1 Armor developed and reconnaissance systems plus com- communication, forcing the staff to ei-
a tactical-operations center (TOC) 1/ puter-screen clutter. Shrinking seat ca- ther turn it off during meetings – pro-
TOC 2 concept that distributed the pacity also placed more personnel on ducing an uncomfortably hot environ-
infrastructure geographically while security, facilitating insurgent ground- ment – or shouting with the ECU kept
still being interconnected using MC attack deterrence. The brigade also on.
systems. TOC 1 is analogous to a BCT eliminated many sleep tents while dis-
tactical-actions center (TAC) but persing the engineer and fires battal- Also, the BCT used a container-based-
robust in capability. Using vehicles to ions into noncontiguous tactical-as- system CP node for our CPP and for the
plug in and out of different TOC sembly areas (TAAs), further distribut- build of the alternate CP. These recent
configurations, 2/1 Armor created ing the brigade’s MC nodes. The bri- restorations have led to a Defense Lo-
scalability that provided redundancy gade also eliminated boot tents con- gistics Agency Class IX parts-kit solu-
and depth in MC and gave the necting the vehicles to the tents to fur- tion that can be procured or modern-
commander options to choose the ther reduce setup times. ized in the Army system using Global
capabilities he wanted at each CP, Combat Support System (GCSS)-Army.
depending on the mission set. The Using a fold-out awning attached to
• Power. Further CP footprint reduction
2/1 Armor increased survivability as the vehicle platform is an alternative
measures and time-saving include
well by distributing the footprint boot option the United Kingdom’s
intelligent power generation/
using hardened vehicles and lowering army uses and can be set up in less
distribution, transport convergence
the EMF signature in any one location. than two minutes.
via Modular Communications Node-
This CP design complicated the The Iron Brigade used a variety of plat- Advanced Equipment (MCN-AE) and
enemy’s reconnaissance efforts since forms: M1087 and M1079 vehicle up- wireless CP capability. Increasing
the MC nodes broadcast battalion- grades were conducted by a contract- power-generation efficiencies while
size elements. ed design and engineering company or reducing generator clutter further
Reducing the footprint forced the bri- by unit personnel using military work reduces the CP footprint and gives
gade staff to eliminate redundant com- orders. The ECU upgrade was the most time back to noncommissioned
mand, control, communications, critical, however. The standard M1087 officers and mechanics. The 2/1

59 Summer 2017
Figure 4. 2/1 Armor employs distributed MC capability while reducing EMF in any one location.

Armor used the Advanced Medium and win in a DA environment. This CP (CONOPS) principles.
Mobile Power Source microgrid configuration does not require an COL Chuck Lombardo commands 2/1
during NIEs 16.1 and 16.2 and Army acquisitions-system develop- Armor, Fort Bliss, TX. Previous assign-
decreased the CP generator count ment and fielding cycle, as the materi- ments include seminar leader, School
from 14 to four 60-kilowatt generators el solution already exists in our inven- of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS),
running in parallel using intelligent tory. Fort Leavenworth, KS; special assistant
power distribution. The entire power- to the commander, U.S. Army Training
generation package fits on one C-17 Multi-domain battle poses a significant
and Doctrine Command, Fort Eustis,
pallet. Also, the MCN-AE performed problem to large stationary TOCs, indi-
VA; squadron commander, 2/1 Cavalry,
well during NIE 16.2 and replaced the cating that the current Army SICPS BCT
Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA, and
bulky Trojan system’s two humvees CP solution requires changes to MC
Zabul, Afghanistan; squadron S-3, ex-
and trailers with two Pelican cases. node design and configuration. Coun-
ecutive officer and BCT S-3, 1/1 Caval-
This system linked into the WIN-T tering this requires CP mobility, scal-
ry, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX;
Increment 2’s tactical-component ability and survivability that is achiev-
and troop commander, 3 rd Armored
network (TCN) for network access able with the proposed CP design de-
Cavalry Regiment, Fort Carson, CO. He
while showing no visible degradation scribed in this article. BCTs should not
holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in
in bandwidth capacity. These wait years for a future Army-approved
psychology from Missouri State Univer-
complementary CP systems provide BCT CP solution and subsequent field-
sity, a master’s of arts degree in hu-
more footprint reduction options to ing with a “fight tonight” readiness
man-resource management from Web-
BCTs working to shrink their CPs. goal. We recommend consideration to
ster University and a master’s of arts
implement this actionable CP concept
degree in strategic studies from SAMS.
The vehicle-based configuration is a for all BCTs as an interim solution while
logical and cost-effective solution to the Army develops a long-term solu- MAJ Ken Selby is the deputy G-3, 1st Ar-
produce a scalable, survivable and ex- tion commensurate with Command mored Division, Fort Bliss, TX. Previous
peditionary BCT CP designed to fight Post 2025 concept-of-operations assignments include deputy brigade

60 Summer 2017
Figure 5. Modernized M1087 Expando van as a combat information center (CIC) variant. Thirty minutes forward-opera-
tions establish time.

commander, 2nd Armored BCT (ABCT), California-Davis and a master’s of arts 3

Army Doctrinal Reference Publication
1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss; battal- degree in management and leadership 6.0, Mission Command, defines mission
ion executive officer, 1-35 Armor, 2 nd from Webster University. His awards command system as the arrangement of
ABCT, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss; include the Bronze Star Medal with two personnel, networks, information sys-
tems, processes, procedures, facility and
battalion operations officer, 1-35 Ar- oak-leaf clusters, Defense Meritorious
equipment that supports the philosophy
mor, 2 nd ABCT, 1 st Armored Division, Service Medal and Meritorious Service of mission command as well as the mis-
Fort Bliss; and mission planner, South- Medal. sion-command warfighting function.
west Regional Support Team, Joint Task 4
This interpretation of reach is defined as
Force-North, Fort Bliss. His military Notes collaboration, shared situational under-
schooling includes Command and Gen- 1
https://www.army.mil/article/51926/ standing and effective relationships with
eral Staff College, Cavalry Leader’s brigade-modernization-command/. key actors. From Mission Command Net-
Course, Armor Captain’s Career Course 2
See Army News Service, https://www. work Vision and Network, Mission Com-
and Field Artillery Officer Basic Course. army.mil/article/177286/awa_171_in- mand Center of Excellence, Fort Leaven-
He holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in creasing_the_pace_of_battle_in_a_coali- worth, KS.
psychology from the University of tion_environment, for more information.

61 Summer 2017
 Acronym Quick-Scan
ABCT – armored brigade combat DCGS-A – Distributed Common OSRVT-SA – One-System Remote
team Ground System-Army Video Terminal situational awareness
ADAM – air-defense airspace ECP – entry control point OTM – on-the-move
management ECU – environmental-control unit PoP – point of presence
AETF – Army Experimental Task EM – electromagnetic RF – radio frequency
Force EMF – electromagnetic field SAMS – School of Advanced Military
AFATDS – Advanced Field Artillery EMS – electromagnetic signature Studies
Tactical Data System FM – field manual SICPS – Standardized Integrated
AMDWS – Air and Missile Defense FSC – forward-support company Command Post System
Workstation or Army Missile Defense HDMI – high-definition multimedia SIPR – Secure Internet Protocol
Warning System interface Router
A/V – audiovisual JBCP – Joint Battle Command SME – subject-matter expert
AWA – Army Warfighting Platform STT – small tactical terminal
Assessment JMC – Joint Modernization SVOIP – Secure Voice over Internet
BCT – brigade combat team Command Protocol
BFT – Blue Force Tracker LED – light-emitting diode TAA – tactical-assembly area
BISE – brigade intelligence-support MC – mission command TAC – tactical-actions center
element MCN-AE – Modular Communications TCN – tactical-component network
BMC – Brigade Modernization Node-Advanced Equipment TFOCA – tactical fire-operations
Command NetOps – network operations cable assembly
CIC – combat information center NIE – network integration evaluation TOC – tactical operations center
CONOPS – concept of operations NIPR – Non-secure Internet Protocol TSCIF – Temporary Sensitive
CP – command post Router Compartmented Information Facility
CPoF – Command Post of the NOSC – Network Operations and TTP – tactics, techniques and
Future Security Center procedures
CPP – command-post platform OE – operational environment WfF – warfighting function
CUOPS – current operations OSRVT – One-System Remote WIN-T – Warfighter Information
DA – decisive action Video Terminal Network-Tactical
DATE – decisive-action training
environment

Continued from Page 56 Collection of urban operations in which

armor played a significant role.
• Gene E. Salecker, Rolling Thunder
Against the Rising Sun [commercial • Asymmetric Warfare Group, The
publication]. Defense of Battle Position Duffer
Details operations of Army tank units in National Training Center narrative cov-
the Pacific during World War II – good ering electromagnetic warfare, spec-
illustration of the use of armor to sup- trum management, operational security,
port forcible-entry operations.
Recommended Reading for social media, information operations
Professional Development and others. Focused on brigade and be-
• Donn Starry, Mounted Combat in low.
Vietnam [CMH publication]. 2005 [CSI publication].
Readable text detailing the role of ar- • William Haponski, Danger’s Dra-
• William G. Robertson (ed), In Con- goons: The Armored Cavalry of the
mor/cavalry in counterinsurgency; high-
tact! Case Studies from the Long War, Big Red One in Vietnam, 1969 Can-
lights versatility and adaptive qualities
at a time when mounted counterinsur- Vol. 1 [CSI publication]. tigny Park: First Division Museum,
gerncy doctrine was largely nonexistent. • Donald P. Wright (ed), Vanguard of 2014.
• Robert S. Cameron, Armor in Bat- Valor: Small Unit Actions in Afghani- Discussion of an armored-cavalry task
tle [CMH/APD publication]. stan, Vol 1 [CSI publication]. force conducting multi-national combat
Collection of tactical engagements operations in restrictive terrain.
• Donald P. Wright (ed), Vanguard of
spanning experience of American armor • James Sawicki, Cavalry Regiments
Valor: Small Unit Actions in Afghani-
from the interwar years through Opera- of the U.S. Army, Dumfries, VA:
tion Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring
stan, Vol. 2 [CSI publication].
Wyvern Publications, 1985
Freedom. • David Zucchino, Thunder Run [com-
mercial publication]. • Stephan Bourque and John Bur-
• Jon T. Hoffman (ed), Tip of the
Detailed description of the planning, prep-
dan, The Road to Safwan: The 1st
Spear: U.S. Army Small Unit Action
aration and execution of the April 2003 ar- Squadron, 4th Cavalry in the 1991
in Iraq, 2004-2007 [CMH publica-
mored operations into Baghdad. Persian Gulf War, Denton: Univer-
tion].
sity of North Texas Press, 2007
• John J. McGrath (ed), Between the • Kendall Gott, Breaking the Mold: Describes an armored-cavalry squadron
Rivers: Combat Action Iraq 2003- Tanks in the Cities [CSI publication]. conducting forced entry.

62 Summer 2017
FROM THE BORESIGHT LINE
Armor Accuracy Checks?
by SFC Joseph Cook and successfully complete this step could Currently there are two versions of
SFC John Roberson lead to round-to-round dispersion, software you should expect to encoun-
causing master gunners to give dis- ter in the fleet: 4.4.2 and 4.5. Crews
Based off a recent poll from master-
creet CCFs based on a correctable still using Appendix Alpha of the heavy
gunner candidates, 85 percent stated
maintenance checks. This causes units brigade combat team’s TM – which is
they have never done armor accuracy
to fire additional rounds and could po- for software versions 4.0, 4.2 and 4.3
checks (AACs). Out of the 15 percent
tentially lower the crew’s confidence – will incur false ballistic solution fail-
who have conducted AACs, more than
in the platform’s ability. ures. Crews must ensure they are us-
half realized they had conducted them
ing the appropriate ballistic solution
incorrectly. You may be wondering why tanks that chart for the version of software the
An excessive amount of the Abrams have not had AACs performed on them tank is running. If you do not have the
fleet currently requires discreet com- can still fire accurately. Think about it proper publication for the version of
puter correction factors (CCF) during like this. If your car’s manual requires software you are running, notify your
screening. The fleet CCF is designed to an oil change every 5,000 miles, you Abrams field-service representative.
encapsulate 90 percent of the tanks in may be good at 6,000 miles, but even-
tually if the car is left unserviced, this With the increasing capabilities of
the force. The discrepancy between
will lead to catastrophic failure. AACs threat tanks, it is more important than
the two numbers can usually be relat-
are a monthly check. ever that we are achieving first-round
ed to the fact that AACs are not being
kills. This is accomplished by conduct-
conducted to standard.
As leaders, how do we ensure units are ing maintenance to standard and en-
Despite the fact that the M1A2 plat- conducting AACs to standard? Check suring we are conducting AACs prop-
form can conduct 52 ballistic solution your motorpools for an AAC solution erly. Bottom line: the live-fire accuracy
checks on its own, this only accounts board; ask to see a crew’s AAC work- screening test is not a maintenance
for one of the six AAC steps listed in sheet; ask the crew what version of check, but monthly AACs are!
the training manual (TM). The main- software their tank is currently run-
gun-mount check is the first step in ning; and ensure that the AAC steps
conducting AACs. This step ensures are correct for the version of software Acronym Quick-Scan
that the main-gun recoil system parts the tank is currently running. These
AAC – armor accuracy check
are assembled correctly and that each steps will help a leader identify if a CCF – computer correction factor
time the gun is returned to battery, it crew is properly maintaining their TM – training manual
is in the same position. Failing to equipment in accordance with the TM.

63 Summer 2017
BOOK REVIEWS
The quality of the detailed after-action With most units undermanned and
Hitler’s Ardennes Offensive: The Ger- reports, questionnaires and interviews lacking enough material, they were un-
man View of the Battle of the Bulge, of the German officers is the result of able to affect a speedy exploitation of
Danny S. Parker, editor, London: Green- the professionalism and diligence of the armies’ initial penetration of the
hill Books, 1997; reprint by First Sky- COLs William A. Ganoe, S.L.A. Mar- Allies’ defenses. He criticized the Su-
horse Publishing, 2016, 264 pages, shall, Harold Potter and MAJ Kenneth preme Command’s unwillingness to
$14.95. Hechler, the transcribers and transla- consider the Allies’ ability to rapidly re-
tors from the European Theater of Op- spond to the initial attack.
The first printing in 1997 of this book erations Historical Section. The Ger- Seventh Army General der Panzertrup-
was advertised “as a unique work giv- man officers’ responses to question- pen Erich Brandenberger’s recollec-
ing unparalleled insight to the German naires and interrogatories are incisive tions do well in reflecting American
view.” There is little in the 2016 reprint and professional rather than self-serv- forces’ dispositions, capabilities and
to qualify it as insightful or unique. ing. conduct of combat operations. His
Parker’s editing lacks analysis, and he written recollections serve as a stan-
The exception is shown in the tran-
merely stitches together the reminis- dard for battle analyses. Today’s com-
script of the interview of SS Sixth Pan-
cences of the senior German officers manders and staff officers can learn
zer Army commander SS-Oberstgrup-
who planned and executed Wacht am much from how he established opera-
penfuhrer Josef “Sepp” Dietrich, which
Rhein. (Their views are now readily tional security and conducted opera-
exposed his effort to hide the truth.
available from other sources.) Parker tional planning.
With the SS considered a war-crimes
apparently assumed that the casual
organization and the Nuremburg War Gunther Blumentritt in his critique of
reader could draw his own conclusions
Crimes Trials looming, Dietrich at- the Ardennes operation unambiguous-
about the complexity of corps- and ar-
tempted to distance himself from Hit- ly concludes that by December 1944
my-level operations by solely examin-
ler by claiming that at the Dec. 12, Germany had lost the war, although it
ing the German perspective of this
1944, commanders’ conference, he ad- was still fighting virtually everywhere
campaign.
vised Hitler that the offensive was un- in Europe. Allied airpower’s destruc-
This work won’t satisfy the curiosity of workable. Dietrich struggled to deny tion of Germany’s industry and infra-
accomplished military historians. Park- any knowledge of the Malmedy Mas- structure rendered it incapable of of-
er’s introductions to each section are sacre, yet he stated he directed an in- fensive operations.
short biographic sketches and mile- vestigation of the event.
wide but inch-deep summaries of the The German officers were unanimous
officers’ recollections. His endnotes af- It was a stretch to consider Dietrich a as to why the offense failed. From the
ter each introduction are more valu- professional military officer; as late as start, Germany lacked adequate
able than his text; the lack of a biblio- 1934 he was merely Hitler’s driver. ground forces and air parity. Shortages
graphy reflects Parker’s lack of scholar- of petroleum products, transportation
Six weeks before the offensive, Hitler
ship. It is inconceivable that there are vehicles, engineer equipment and
personally assigned Generalmajor Fritz
only two maps, one depicting the Ger- spare parts hindered the German ar-
Kramer as the SS Sixth Panzer Army’s
man operational plan and the other my’s ability to exploit its early success-
chief of staff. Kramer was a highly re-
describing the general traces of each es after its initial attack. The sole ad-
garded regular-army officer who a
German division’s axis of advance. vantage of surprise was lost because of
month before the attack assumed re-
Parker shortchanges the professional the Allies’ greater mobility, combat
sponsibility for final planning. Kramer
soldier by not including a systematic power and leadership’s flexibility in
describes how the emphasis on opera-
battle analysis and detailed maps de- hastily strengthening its defenses, fol-
tional security denied the Germans the
picting the ebb and flow of the cam- lowed by rapidly counterattacking the
opportunity for detailed reconnais-
paign. There is much to learn about the enemy’s flanks. The Germans believed
sance of the front-line disposition of
operational level of war from the Ar- that the failure of the Ardennes Offen-
allied units.
dennes Offensive. Unfortunately, Park- sive was preordained because Hitler
er fails to synthesize the thinking of the Sixth Panzer Army commander Gener- and his sycophants Keital and Jodl
German generals into a coherent ex- al der Panzertruppen Hasso von Man- were wishful amateurs who were un-
amination of how the German army teuffel considered the leadership and able to execute a complex military op-
practiced the operational level of war- the quality of German soldiers inferior eration on faith alone.
fare during the closing months of to those who invaded France in 1940. RETIRED LTC LEE F. KICHEN
World War II.

64 Summer 2017
 ALRY REG
AV IM
C
16 TH

EN
T
S TRIK E H A R D
The regiment was constituted in 1916 and organized with per-
sonnel from 3 rd, 6th and 14th Cavalry. Green was the color of the
facings of the Mounted Rifles, now 3 rd Cavalry. The embattled
partition line commemorates the first engagement of 6 th Caval-
ry when it assaulted artillery in earthworks at Williamsburg in
1862. The shield is yellow, the Cavalry color; the blue chevron
is for the old blue uniform; the 16 mullets (spur rowels) indi-
cate both the numerical designation as well as mounted ser-
vice. The distinctive unit insignia was originally approved for
16th Cavalry Oct. 28, 1958. It was amended to correct the sym-
bolism June 23, 1960. It was redesignated for 16 th Armor Aug.
22, 1968. The insignia was redesignated for 16 th Cavalry May
12, 1970. It was amended to update the description and sym-
bolism April 3, 2012.
 ARMOR
Building 4, Room 142H
1 Karker Street
Fort Benning, GA
31905

PB 17-17-3 Headquarters, Department of the Army

PIN 201940-000 Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited