IR 358 MIDTERM NOTES

1. What is Security?
2. Anarchy, Power, and the Security Dilemma
3. Coercion and War
4. Alliances
5. Economics and Security
6. Nuclear Weapons
7. Ethnic Conflict
8. Terrorism / Counterterrorism

1-WHAT IS SECURITY?

Types: Military Security – Economic Security – Societal Security – Environmental Security

Who Decides: States, International Organizations, Powerful Groups, Individuals

- A nation is secure in the extend to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if
it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challanged to maintain them by victory in such a war.

- Security in objective sense, measures the absence of threats to aquired values, in a subjective
sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked. (WOLFERS)

- In the case of security, the discussion is about the pursuit of freedom from threat. Security is
about the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their
functional integrity (BUZAN)

- Human security can no longer be understood in purely military terms. It must encompass
economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, respect for
HR and the rule of law. (KOFI ANNAN)

DESECURIZATION: involves the return of an issue from urgent, securitized situation to the area of
normal negotiations in political sphere. Making something security issue.

POLITICIZATION OF SECURITY: the process of becoming or being made politically aware. Who gets
what, when and why

MEANS: Actions of states + Actions of IO’s + Actions of Groups + Actions of Individuals

Most scholars within International Relations (IR) work with a definition of security that involves the
alleviation of threats to cherished values. Defined in this way, security is unavoidably political, that is,
it plays a vital role in deciding who gets what, when, and how in world politics (Lasswell 1936)

This involves interpreting the past (specifically how different groups thought about and practiced
security), understanding the present and trying to influence the future.

Security can therefore be thought of as ‘a powerful political tool in claiming attention for priority
items in the competition for government attention’ (Buzan 1991: 370).

Security studies is understood as an area of inquiry loosely focused on a set of basic but fundamental
questions, the answers to which have changed and will continue to change over time. Security studies
can be crudely summarized as advocating political realism and being preoccupied with the four Ss:
states, strategy, science and the status quo.

Security was not just about states but related to all human collectivities; nor could it be confined to
an ‘inherently inadequate’ focus on military force, as in strategic studies. Buzan’s alternative approach
argued that the security of human collectivities (not just states) was affected by factors in five major
sectors, each of which had its own focal point and way of ordering priorities:

 Military security: concerned with the interplay between the armed offensive and defensive
capabilities of states and states’ perceptions of each other’s intentions. Buzan’s preference
was that the study of military security should be seen as one subset of security studies and
referred to as strategic studies in order to avoid unnecessary confusion (see Buzan 1987).
 Political security: focused on the organizational stability of states, systems of government
and the ideologies that give them their legitimacy.
 Economic security: revolved around access to the resources, finance, and markets necessary
to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power.
 Societal security: centered on the sustainability and evolution of traditional patterns of
language, culture, and religious and national identity and custom.
 Environmental security: concerned with the maintenance of the local and the planetary
biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human praises depend

Many of today’s security problems are so complex and interdependent that they require analysis and
solutions that IR cannot provide alone. While security studies have its professional roots in the
discipline of IR, today’s world poses challenges that require students to engage with topics and
sources of knowledge traditionally considered well beyond the IR pale. It is therefore unhelp - ful to
think of security studies as just a subfield of IR.

What Is Security?

Security is most commonly associated with the alleviation of threats to cherished values, especially
those which, left unchecked, threaten the survival of a particular referent object in the near future.

The first philosophy sees security as being virtually synonymous with the accumulation of power.
From this perspective, security is understood as a commodity (i.e. to be secure, actors must possess
certain things such as property, money, weapons, armies, territory etc.). In particular, power is
thought to be the route to security: the more power (especially military power) actors can
accumulate, the more secure they will be.
The second philosophy challenges the idea that security flows from power. Instead, it sees security
as being based on emancipation, that is, a concern with justice and the provision of human rights.
From this perspective, security is understood as a relationship between different actors rather than a
commodity. These relationships may be understood in either negative terms (i.e. security is about the
absence of something threatening) or positive terms (i.e. involving phenomena that are enabling and
make things possible). This distinction is commonly reflected in the ideas of ‘freedom from’ and
‘freedom to’.

In the second philosophy, true or stable security does not come from the ability to exercise power
over others. Rather, it comes from cooperating to achieve security without depriving others of it.

‘International security’, Palme argued, ‘must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than on
the threat of mutual destruction’ (1982: ix).

Whose Security?

Without a referent object there can be no threats and no discussion of security because the concept
is meaningless without something to secure.

Security in international politics was synonymous with studying (and promoting) ‘national security’. In
fact, it is more accurate to say that what was being studied (and protected) was ‘state security.

For many decades, the dominant answer was that states were the most important referents.
Particularly after the end of the Cold War, this position came under increasing challenge. In contrast,
some analysts argued for priority to be given to human beings since, without reference to individual
humans, security makes no sense (e.g., Booth 1991a; McSweeney 1999).

A third approach has focused on the concept of ‘society’ as the most important referent object for
security studies because humans do not always view group identities and collectivities in purely
instrumental terms.

Another perspective approached the question as a level-of-analysis problem, that is, it offered an
analytical framework for thinking about possible referent objects from the lowest level (the
individual) through various sources of collective identities (including bureaucracies, states, regions,
civilizations etc.), right up to the level of the international system.

In recent decades, a fifth approach has gained increasing prominence, calling for greater attention to
be paid to planet Earth rather than this or that group of human beings who happen to live upon it.
This perspective argues that, at a basic level, security policies must make ecological sense. After all, as
Buzan (1991) put it, the environment is the essential support system on which all other human
enterprises depend. Without an inhabitable environment, discussions of all other referents are moot.
What Is A Security Issue?

In one sense, every thinking individual on the planet operates with a unique set of security priorities,
shaped, in part, by factors such as their sex, gender, age, religious beliefs, class, race and nationality
as well as where they are from, where they want to go and what they want to see happen in the
future.

Most of life’s insecurities are shared by other individuals and groups. This means that when studying
security, it is important to pay attention to how representatives of particular groups and organizations
construct threat agendas.

It is also important to recognize that not all groups, and hence not all threat agendas, are of equal
political significance. Clearly, what the US National Security Council or the United Nations Security
Council considers a threat will have more significant and immediate political consequences for world
politics than, say, the threat agendas constructed by Ghana’s National Security Council or, for
instance, the concerns of HIV/AIDS sufferers living in one of Africa’s many slums.

After much debate, the panel’s report, A More Secure World, identified six clusters of threats
exercising the world’s governments: economic and social threats, including 8 INTRODUCTION poverty,
infectious disease and environmental degradation; interstate conflict; internal conflict, including civil
war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities; nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons;
terrorism; and transnational organized crime (UN General Assembly 2004: 2). No consensus as to
which of these clusters should receive priority.

One perspective argues that security analysts should focus their efforts on matters related to armed
conflict and the threat and use of military force (e.g., Walt 1991; Brown 2007; Miller 2010).

On the other hand, there are those who argue that, if security is supposed to be about alleviating
the most serious and immediate threats that prevent people from pursuing their cherished values,
then for many of the planet’s inhabitants the lack of effective systems of health care is at least as
important as the threat of armed conflict (e.g., Thomas 2000; Rushton and Youde 2015).

How Can Security Be Achieved?

The actions of international organizations have long been a staple of security studies courses. Less
attention has been devoted to analyzing a wide range of non-state actors and the roles they can play
as agents of both security and insecurity (but see Ekins 1992; Evangelista 1999; Keck and Sikkink
1998). Important examples might include social movements, humanitarian and development groups,
private security contractors, insurgents, and criminal organizations. In addition, some individuals have
the capacity to help provide security for particular referents in certain contexts.

Realist theories are the archetypal traditional security approach, to the point that realism and
traditional security are often used inter - changeably. Realisms suggest that security can be defined as
the preservation of the state from (usually external) military threat.
Critical approaches, by contrast, are more likely to embrace a post-positivist epistemology
(questioning the idea of genuinely objective analysis) and a broader ontology of security (moving
beyond material power to focus on ideas, identity, discourses, and dynamics of interaction between
actors in what is for them a social realm). these approaches are more likely to either suggest that
security is socially constructed or produced in different ways in specific contexts (e.g.,
poststructuralism, constructivism, or securitization) or to advocate a specific definition of security on
ethical grounds, such as emancipation (e.g., critical theory).

This is far from a definitive or categorical distinction: some approaches (e.g., constructivism) straddle
a traditional/critical divide; some are relatively traditional by some criteria, less so by others. Liberal
approaches, for example, largely endorse traditional forms of theorizing about security and orient
towards an (international) status quo in normative terms, while endorsing the importance of
universal (rather than particular) sets of values.
2-HEALTH

In March 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced an outbreak of Ebola virus disease
(EVD or, more simply, Ebola) in the West African state of Guinea.

It was against this background that the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2177,
deeming the outbreak a ‘threat to international peace and security’ and the UN General Assembly
authorized the deployment of the UN Mission for Emergency Ebola Relief (UNMEER). Militaries from
the UK and US were also deployed to the region, ostensibly to assist in medical relief operations but
many also suspected to provide support in case of state failure.

Sometimes millions, have died each year from AIDS-related illnesses. The scale of suffering caused by
this single illness is immense and the impact on lives globally dwarves that of more traditional
security crises, such the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, or terrorism. Moreover HIV is only one of a
number of communicable diseases, many of which are preventable, which each year kill millions of
people. These include long-established diseases such as polio and malaria; new diseases such as SARS
and HPAI.

For much of the past 50 years the relationship between health and national security has been limited
and unidirectional: conflict has caused health problems. In the nineteenth century, as trade between
Europe and the rest of the world increased, so did the risk of infectious disease be brought into
Europe from elsewhere. Disease was viewed as an exogenous threat to the optimum functioning of
states, which had to be dealt with by means of inter - national cooperation and the introduction of
internationally agreed health regulations.

1- Health is a national security risk when it threatens the functioning of a state or the ability of a
state to protect itself.

2- Global (public) health security is largely identified with the health community and especially
the WHO. It refers to the way certain health threats have become global in nature requiring a
global response.

3- Biosecurity is sometimes used in a vague and all-encompassing manner relating to any health
issue considered a threat to a community.

4- It is concerned with the insecurities of daily life on an individual scale and is especially
concerned with two freedoms: from want and from fear.
After the Second World War, however, this relationship disappeared for two main reasons. First,
health was constructed not as a security issue but as a human right. Second, during this period the
perception grew those infectious diseases were being conquered, especially through the use of
antibiotics and improved public health measures.

What was patently clear was that this was not the case elsewhere, where living conditions and levels
of poverty were much worse. Therefore, global health became for the West less of a security concern
than one of development.

Crucially however the CIA went further than this, arguing that infectious disease also posed a risk to
international stability and to economic growth, placing it firmly in the territory of national secur - ity
(CIA 2000). On the second, at its first meeting of the new millennium, the UN Security Council
discussed the threat of HIV/AIDS to Africa and in Resolution 1308 warned ‘that the HIV/AIDS
pandemic, if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security’.

Thus, the declaration by the UN Security Council that the 2014–15 Ebola outbreak in West Africa
represented a ‘threat to international peace and security’.

The Emergence Of Health As National Security Issue

Three issues contributed to the emergence of health as a security issue: the spread of new and
existing infectious diseases; the continued growth of the HIV/AIDS pandemic; and bioterrorism.

The end of the Cold War saw security analysts shift their focus away from threats, especially military
threats, to more diffuse risks. This opened the door for a more eclectic range of issues to be
considered as security concerns. Further, the shift from threat to risk allowed security’s focus to move
from the idea of a ‘clear and present danger’ to more probabilistic assessments of potential hazards.
Both moves opened up a space whereby health issues could be raised as security concerns.

After all, individuals generally were as likely to be at risk from new infectious diseases spread because
of globalization as they were from ethnic conflict, environ - mental disasters or terrorism. The second
facilitating factor was human agency. A number of prominent individuals used their positions of
power and influence on place health on the foreign and security policy agenda.

The Spread Of Infectious Disease

The impact of these has been or has the potential to be global in nature (see Box 36.2). Although this
phenomenon may be a by-product of increased urbanization and the speed of movement of goods
and people, it may also be that changes are occurring in the microbial world that are independent of
these social forces.

Modern biology is leading, directly and inadvertently, to the creation of new pathogens in
laboratories (see Box 36.3). But why have these developments triggered concerns in the security
community? There are broadly three reasons for this. First, the spread of these diseases could pose a
direct threat to the health and well-being of the very people that states are there to protect.

Infectious disease may therefore pose an exogenous threat to the lives of people in a state and at the
very least raises feelings of insecurity and perceptions of being at risk. Second, a pandemic may cause
social disruption and threaten the effective functioning of a state. social inequalities may be
highlighted as the rich or privileged obtain access to better drugs or health care, potentially leading to
public disorder; if large numbers of people die or are unwilling/unable to go to work, public services
may be placed at risk; violence and disorder may appear if the authorities become unable to cope
and if groups feel they have nothing to lose.

Third, a large-scale epidemic may also contribute to economic decline by: forcing increased
government spending on health as a percentage of GDP; reducing productivity owing to worker
absenteeism and the loss of skilled personnel; reducing investment (internal and external) because of
a lack of business confidence; and by raising insurance costs for health provision.

WHO into not declaring swine flu a pandemic in 2009 because of fears of the impact on the global
economy after the financial crash; and the Zika virus threatened the success of the 2016 Rio
Olympics? The macroeconomic effects of a major epidemic may therefore be very significant,
threatening to make the relatively affluent poor and the already poor poorer, with a consequent
impact upon the ability of states and individuals to provide for their security and well-being.

HIV / AIDS

The HIV pandemic has not only led to widespread humanitarian concerns but has been identified as a
security issue by the UN Security Council.

The effects of the disease on economies and on governance have been consistently highlighted as a
risk to state stability. AIDS appeared to pose particularly severe economic problems because of its
cumulative effects over several years; because its full effects are postponed as those infected only
become ill gradually but then pose an increasing economic burden on society; and because of its
disproportionate impact upon workers in what should be the most productive period of their lives.
Such economic decline may increase income inequalities and poverty, exacerbating or creating social
and political unrest.

AIDS may also lead to exclusion from work and/or society, creating alienation, fatalism and anger
among people living with HIV/AIDS. These people may become prone to criminal violence or to
following violent leaders (CIA 2000; Justice Africa 2004).

A second concern focused on the high rates of HIV infection among security forces, including the
military – typically cited in the years immediately following Resolution 1308 as being up to five times
higher than that of the civilian population and some - times dramatically higher.

A third concern was the impact of HIV/AIDS on peacekeeping. Peacekeepers may be at increased risk
from HIV infection since many of the world’s conflicts are in regions with a high prevalence of HIV.

BIOTERRORISM

The idea of using biological agents (or pathogens) to cause disease as a weapon of war goes back
several hundred years and was a major source of concern not least during the Cold War. The terrorist
attacks of 11 September 2001, however, dramatically increased the sense of risk, demonstrating the
willingness and ability of terrorist organizations to inflict mass civilian casualties.
‘Spanish flu’ – which killed more people worldwide than the First World War. Three problems
however have emerged in responding to the risk of bioterror. First, there have been clear tensions
between an internationally versus domestically focused strategy.

This tension is also revealed in the second problem: whether it is better to try to prevent such attacks
from happening or whether the priority should be on defense. The former suggests that attention
should be given to international cooperation on intelligence and to the use of diplomatic efforts
(including arms control) to make the supply and production of such weapons more difficult. In this,
public health would be important in the monitoring and surveillance of activities, but not the key
element in an international strategy.

The third problem is whether the risk has been overstated. Despite the use of such weapons in Iraq,
Japan and the United States, there remain doubts both over how easy it is for sub-state groups to
gain access to or produce effective weapons and over how easy it is to use them in a manner that
might cause significant loss of life.

Health affects every one of us: our state of well-being affects individual life, lifestyle, and livelihood.
Poor communities for example are more likely to be at risk from TB and malaria is endemic in certain
parts of the world but not others. Thus, health officials have long understood that well-being is as
much socially determined as it is a biomedical condition.

But the process of globalization has led to awareness that this international dimension is becoming
more important and that the ability of national health services to protect their populations is partial
in the face of such change. Health therefore is increasingly globalized (Lee 2003). With this
recognition has come an increased interest on the part of the public health community in foreign and
security policy: an awareness both of shared interests between these different communities and the
possibilities of health issues gaining increased attention and resources through ‘piggybacking’ on
foreign and security policy because of their greater traction in international politics.

Simultaneous to this, security communities have become increasingly aware of health issues as
security risks, most notably the three issues identified above. Thus, the prospect has developed of a
mutually beneficial partnership between health and security. For those on the security side of this
partnership, public health brings valuable tools and expertise to a range of novel problems; for those
on the public health side, securitizing health raises its political profile, leading to the prospect of
greater resources being devoted to urgent health needs. This securitizing move however is not
unproblematic.

The third problem is that of the referent object: whose health is at risk and whose security? Despite
health being a risk to individuals, national security perspectives place the referent object at the state
level. Tobacco is not considered a global health security issue because, despite the number of
individuals who die from tobaccorelated illnesses each year, there are no implications for the stability
or security of the state. On the other hand, although deaths from bioterrorism are speculative rather
than real, the risk to the state in terms of disruption is such that it is clearly entrenched on the
agenda.

The incorporation of health issues into the national security agenda has been aided by the post-Cold
War shift away from military threats that pose a ‘clear and present danger’ to more diffuse and
conceivably long-term risks. To date, this attention has focused on three health-related risks: the
spread of infectious disease, HIV/AIDS, and bioterrorism. Although some may have seen this
increased attention to health issues as a means of gaining greater political support (and resources) for
pressing global health issues, the risks have also been substantial in terms of subordinating both the
health and development agendas to national security needs.

3-ANARCHY, POWER AND SECURITY DILEMMA

REALISM:

1- Classical Realism
2- Neorealism
3- Offensive Realism
4- Defensive Realism
5- Rise and Fall Realism

Even its harshest critics would acknowledge that realist theories, with their focus on power, fear, and
anarchy, have provided centrally important explanations for armed conflict and war. State behavior is
driven by leaders flawed human nature or by an anarchic international system. Selfish human
appetites for power, or the need to accumulate the wherewithal to be secure in a self-help world,
explain the seemingly endless succession of wars and conquest. Accordingly, most realists take a
pessimistic and prudential view of international relations (Elman 2001)

Six different variants of realism – classical realism, neorealism and four flavors of contemporary
realism: rise and fall, neoclassical, offensive structural and defensive structural realism.

1-CLASSICAL REALISM

Classical realism is usually held to be the first of the twentieth-century realist research programs.
According to classical realism, because the desire for more power is rooted in the flawed nature of
humanity, states are continuously engaged in a struggle to increase their capabilities.

State’s government is a permissive condition that gives human appetites free rein. In short, classical
realism explains armed conflict with reference to human failings. Wars are explained, for example, by
aggressive statesmen, or by domestic political systems that give greedy parochial groups the
opportunity to pursue self-serving expansionist foreign policies. For classical realists’ international
politics can be characterized as evil: bad things happen because the people making foreign policy are
sometimes bad (Spirtas 1996: 387–400).

State strategies are understood as having been decided rationally, after taking costs and benefits of
different possible courses of action into account.

-Human Nature

-Animus Dominandi (ulusarası ilişkiler dersinde kullanılan, bütün insanların doğuştan itibaren diğer
insanlara hükmetmenin peşinde koştuğunu belirten latince bir terim. Desire to control / rule over)

2-NEOREALISM
Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics replaced Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations as the
standard bearer for realists. Waltz argued that systems are composed of a structure and their
interacting units (1979: 77). Political structures are best conceptualized as having three elements: an
ordering principle (anarchic or hierarchical), the character of the units (functionally alike or
differentiated) and the distribution of capabilities (Waltz 1979: 88–99).

Contrary to classical realism, neorealism excludes the internal make-up of different states when
thinking about their foreign policy preferences. Unlike classical realists, Waltz’s (1979: 91) theory is
not based on leaders’ motivations and state characteristics as causal variables for international
outcomes, except for the minimal assumption that states seek to survive.

State behavior can be a product of competition among them, either because they calculate how to
act to their best advantage or because those that do not exhibit such behavior are selected out of the
system. Alternatively, state behavior can be a product of socialization: states can decide to follow
norms because they calculate it is to their advantage, or because the norms become internalized.

Waltz nevertheless suggests that systemic processes will consistently produce convergent
international outcomes. Waltz notes that in international politics the same depressingly familiar
things happen over and over. This repetitiveness endures despite considerable differences in internal
domestic political arrangements, both through time.

Waltz’s purpose is to explain why similarly structured international systems all seem to be
characterized by similar outcomes, even though their units (i.e., states) have different domestic
political arrangements and particular parochial histories.

Because systems are generative, the international political system is characterized by complex
nonlinear relationships and unintended consequences. Outcomes are influenced by something more
than simply the aggregation of individual states’ behavior, with a tendency towards unintended and
ironic outcomes. Neorealists therefore see international politics as tragic, rather than as being driven
by the aggressive behavior of revisionist states (Spirtas 1996: 387–400). The international political
outcomes that Waltz predicts include those multipolar systems will be less stable than bipolar
systems; that interdependence will be lower in bipolarity than multipolarity; and that, regardless of
unit behavior, hegemony by any single state is unlikely or even impossible.

Excluding neorealism, there are at least four contemporary strands of political realism: rise and fall
realism, neoclassical realism, defensive structural realism and offensive structural realism. All four
take the view that international relations are characterized by an endless and inescapable succession
of wars and conquest. The four variants can be differentiated by the fundamental constitutive and
heuristic assumptions that they share. Briefly, these four realisms differ on the sources of state
preferences – the mix of human desire for power and/or the need to accumulate the power
necessary to be secure in a self-help world – while agreeing that rational calculation is the micro
foundation that translates those preferences into behavior.

-Ordering Principle (anarchy or hierarchical)

-Character Of The Units (functionally alike or differentiated)

-Distribution Of Capabilities

-Hierarchy Comes From Power

-For Neorealists Might Is Right

Question: What is the role of international make-up of states in foreign policy preferences according
to neorealists?

A: Does not matter from neorealist perspective.

3-DEFENSIVE STRUCTURAL REALISM

Defensive structural realism developed out of neorealism but is distinct from it. Defensive structural
realism shares neorealism’s minimal assumptions about state motivations, suggesting that states seek
security in an anarchic international system – the main threat to their well-being comes from other
states.

There are three main differences between neorealism and defensive structural realism.

First, whereas neorealism allows for multiple micro foundations to explain state behavior, defensive
structural realism relies solely on rational choice.

Second, defensive structural realism adds the offence–defense balance as a variable. This is a
composite variable combining a variety of different factors that make conquest harder or easier (see
Lynn-Jones 1995, 2001). Defensive structural realists argue that prevailing technologies or
geographical circumstances often favor defense, seized resources do not cumulate easily with those
already possessed by the metro - pole, dominoes do not fall, and power is difficult to project at a
distance.

Third, combining rationality and an offence–defense balance that favors defense, defensive structural
realists predict that states should support the status quo. Expansion is rarely structurally mandated,
and balancing is the appropriate response to threatening concentrations of power (e.g., Walt 1987,
1996). Rationalism and an offence–defense balance that favors defense means that states balance,
and balances result.

Perhaps the best-known variant of defensive structural realism is Stephen Walt’s ‘balance of threat’
theory (e.g., Walt 1987, 2000). According to Walt, ‘in anarchy, states form alliances to protect
themselves. Their conduct is determined by the threats they perceive, and the power of others is
merely one element in their calculations’.

One difficult problem for defensive structural realism is that the research pro - gramme is better
suited to investigating structurally constrained responses to revisionism, rather than where that
expansionist behavior comes from. To explain how armed conflict arises in the first place, defensive
structural realists must either appeal to domestic-level factors (which are outside of their theory) or
argue that extreme security dilemma dynamics make states behave as if they were revisionists (see
Herz 1950; Chapter 9). Steps taken by states seeking to preserve the status quo are ambiguous and
are often indistinguishable from preparations to launch offensive strikes.

Revisionist behavior can be innocently initiated in a world characterized by status quo states,
defense-dominance, and balancing (see Schweller 1996; Kydd 2005). Because increments in
capabilities can be easily countered, defensive structural realism suggests that a state’s attempt to
make itself more secure by increasing its power is ultimately futile. Second, defensive structural
realists contend that states routinely signal their benign intentions to their peers, thus mitigating the
uncertainty that drives the security dilemma (see Rosato 2014/15; Glaser et al. 2015/16). States can
reveal their peaceful intentions to others by reducing their arsenals, by limiting the size of their
armed forces or by investing in arms that are good for defense and deterrence but provide little
offensive utility. Through these so-called ‘costly signals’, states can avoid the action–reaction spirals of
the security dilemma that produce arms races and war.

Defensive structural realists suggest that the world is made up of states that seek an ‘appropriate’
amount of power and signal to their peers that they intend no harm. If states do seek hegemony, it
must be due to domestically generated preferences; seeking superior power is not a rational
response to external systemic pressures.

-Rational Choice

-Offence / Defense Balance (weapons)

-Status Quo Bias ( states are not expansionist + try to survive)

-Causes Of War: War should not happen (optimism) since there is status quo bias.

-Domestic Level Factors

-Extreme Security Dilemma Dynamics

Security Dilemma: In international relations, the security dilemma (also referred to as the
spiral model) is when the increase in one state's security (such as increasing its military
strength) leads other states to fear for their own security (because they do not know if the
security-increasing state intends to use its growing military for offensive
purposes).Consequently, security-increasing measures can lead to tensions, escalation or
conflict with one or more other parties, producing an outcome which no party truly desires.
The term was first coined by the German scholar John H. Herz in a 1950 study.

The security dilemma is the core assumption of defensive realism. According to Kenneth
Waltz, because the world does not have a common government and is "anarchic", survival is
the main motivation of states. States are distrustful of other states' intentions and as a
consequence always try to maximize their own security.

Offensive realism and defensive realism are variants of structural realism. They share the
basic beliefs of survivalism, statism (state as the primary unit), self-help and anarchy.
However, contrary to defensive realism, offensive realism regards states as aggressive power
maximizers and not as security maximizers.

4-OFFENSIVE STRUCTURAL REALISM

Offensive structural realists, in contrast, argue that states face an uncertain inter - national
environment in which any state might use its power to harm another (Mearsheimer 2001, 2014a).
Under such circumstances, relative capabilities are of overriding importance, and security requires
acquiring as much power compared to other states as possible.

Theory of offensive structural realism makes five assumptions: the international system is anarchic;
great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability, and accordingly can damage each
other; states can never be certain about other states’ intentions; survival is the primary goal of great
powers; and great powers are rational actors. From these assumptions, Mearsheimer deduces that
great powers fear each other, that they can rely only on themselves for their security and that the
best strategy for states to ensure their survival is maximization of relative power (2014a: 32–6).
Power maximization is not necessarily self-defeating, and hence states can rationally aim for regional
hegemony. States are sophisticated relative power maximizers that try ‘to figure out when to raise
and when to fold’ (2014a: 40).

By expanding against weakness or indecision and pulling back when faced by strength and
determination, a sophisticated power maximizer reaches regional hegemony by using a combination
of brains and brawn.

Mearsheimer (2014a: 140–55) argues that ultimate safety comes only from being the most powerful
state in the system. However, the ‘stopping power of water’ makes such global hegemony all but
impossible, except through attaining an implausible nuclear superiority. The second best, and much
more likely, objective is to achieve regional hegemony, the dominance of the area in which the great
power is located. Finally, even in the absence of either type of hegemony, states try to maximize both
their wealth and their military capabilities for fighting land battles. In order to gain resources, states
resort to war, blackmail, baiting states into making war on each other while standing aside, and
engaging competitors in long and costly conflicts.

While buckpassing is often preferred as the lower cost strategy, balancing becomes more likely (all
things being equal) the more proximate the menacing state and the greater its relative capabilities.

Buckpassing: Passing the buck in international relations theory involves the tendency of nation-states
to refuse to confront a growing threat in the hopes that another state will. The most notable example
was the refusal of the United Kingdom, United States, France, and/or the Soviet Union to confront
Nazi Germany effectively in the 1930s. With the Munich Agreement, France and the United Kingdom
passed the buck to the Soviet Union, which then avoided armed confrontation by signing the
Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact.

A continental great power will seek regional hegemony but, when it is unable to achieve this
dominance, such a state will still maximize its relative power to the extent possible. An insular state,
‘the only great power on a large body of land that is surrounded on all sides by water’ (2014a: 126),
will balance against the rising states rather than try to be a regional hegemon itself. Accordingly,
states such as the United Kingdom act as offshore balancers, intervening only when a continental
power is near to achieving primacy.

A regional hegemon is a status quo state that will seek to defend the current favorable distribution of
capabilities.

Great-power wars are least likely in bipolarity, where the system only contains two great powers,
because there are fewer potential conflict dyads; imbalances of power are much less likely; and
miscalculations leading to failures of deterrence are less common. While multipolarity is, in general,
more war prone than bipolarity, some multipolar power configurations are more dangerous than
others. Great-power wars are most likely when multipolar systems are unbalanced.

Offensive realism regards states as aggressive power maximizers and not as security maximizers.
According to John Mearsheimer, "Uncertainty about the intentions of other states is unavoidable,
which means that states can never be sure that other states do not have offensive intentions to go
along with their offensive capabilities”. According to Mearsheimer, though achieving hegemony by
any state is not likely in today's international system, there is no such thing as a status quo and "the
world is condemned to perpetual great power competition".

Supporting the belief that the international system is anarchic and that each state must
independently seek its own survival, Waltz argues that weaker states try to find a balance with their
rivals and to form an alliance with a stronger state to obtain a guarantee of security against offensive
action by an enemy state. On the other hand, Mearsheimer and other offensive realists argue that
anarchy encourages all states to always increase their own power because one state can never be
sure of other states' intentions. In other words, defensive realism contends that security can be
balanced in some cases and that the security dilemma is escapable. While offensive realists do not
disagree, they do not agree fully with the defensive view instead contending that if states can gain an
advantage over other states, then they will do so. In short, since states want to maximize their power
in this anarchic system and since states cannot trust one another, the security dilemma is
inescapable.

-Anarchy: Lack of a global centralized power exercising authority.

-All great powers have some offensive capabilities.

-Uncertainty about intentions

-Main Objective: National Survival and Security

-Great Powers are rational actors

-3Patterns: Self-help / Fear / Power Maximization

Causes of War: Bipolarity > Balanced Multipolarity > Unbalanced Multipolarity

5-RISE AND FALL REALISM

Rise and fall realism emerged as a powerful alternative to the balance of power theories that
dominated International Relations scholarship during the 1950s.

Organski’s claim that hegemony is the foundation for peace, while balance is often associated with
war, has since become a central theme of rise, and fall realism. This research program emphasizes
that war between major powers is least likely when the international system is dominated by a single
state and when there is an absence of rising challengers vying for system leadership. Given its
privileged position, the dominant state can shape the rules and practices of the international system
in such a way as to satisfy its selfish interests. Stability is a product of this hegemonic order, as states
that are dissatisfied with the status quo lack the capabilities to change it.

When two or more states approach power parity, the declining hegemon may rationally calculate the
need for preventive war to preserve its status as the world’s top power (Gilpin 1981). Rise and fall
realism depict the course of human history, or some significant portion of it, as the successive rise
and fall of great powers.

In contrast to neorealism, rise and fall realists contend that differential growth rates are mainly
caused by processes internal to states, including the timing of industrialization (Organski 1958,
1968b), social formation and type of economic system (Gilpin 1981), bureaucratic politics and
productivity (Doran 1983), and military, economic and technological innovation (Modelski 1978).
states tend to rise and fall in relation to one another.

The rise and fall research programme has spawned a number of theories to explain differential
growth patterns and the onset of major power war, including debates over (1) whether it is the rising
challenger or the declining hegemon that initiates war; (2) what specific internal processes drive
differential growth; and (3) whether the theory is applicable across time and space, or limited to a
period of history or a particular region of the world (see Elman and Jensen 2014). Rise and fall realists
have enriched explanations of power trends and war.

Question: How is rise and fall realism different from offensive structural realism?

“Hegemonic Stability Theory”: Hegemonic stability theory (HST) is a theory of international relations,
rooted in research from the fields of political science, economics, and history. HST indicates that the
international system is more likely to remain stable when a single state is the dominant world power,
or hegemon.

Hegemony---> Peace

Parity--> War

Preventive Wars---> initiated by the challenger

Differential Growth Rates: Timing of Industrilization

Social Formation and Type Of Economic System

Bureaucratic Politics and Productivity

Military Economics

6-NEOCLASSICAL REALISM

Neoclassical realism suggests that what states do depends in large part on influences located at the
domestic level of analysis. Neoclassical realism employs a ‘transmission belt’ (Rose 1998) approach to
foreign policy, which illustrates how systemic pressures are filtered through variables at the unit level
to produce specific foreign policy decisions.

While neoclassical realists agree that the distribution of capabilities is a good starting point for the
analysis of state behavior, they contend that the international system rarely provides states with clear
information on which to base foreign policy decisions.

Given these challenges, variables at the unit level often intervene between systemic pressures and
state behavior to determine the precise nature and direction of a state’s foreign economic and
military policy. Neoclassical realists have incorporated many unit-level variables into their theories of
foreign policy decision-making (see Ripsman et al. 2016).

In response, neoclassical realists contend that how a state reacts to systemic imperatives is largely
shaped by the perceptions of its leaders, the culture of its military, bureaucracy and society, the
nature of its domestic political institutions and the ability of its state apparatus to extract and
mobilize domestic resources to achieve foreign policy goals.

State behavior is primarily driven by the relative distribution of material power in the international
system. He notes, however, that exactly how states choose to react to threatening accumulations of
power depends on the degree to which they embody structural realism’s unitary actor assumption.
Furthermore, divided states often lack the extractive capacity to mobilize the resources from society
that are necessary for restoring a balance of power.

-Perception of its leaders / -Predictivity is less, all stuff matter

-Culture of its military / -Mobilization Potential

-Bureaucracy and Society / -Nature of domestic political institutions

REALISMS AND THE RISE OF CHINA

Predictions that realists make about how the growth of China is likely to shape international relations.
While offensive structural realists and rise and fall realists generally share a pessimistic view of the
consequences of China’s rise for global security, defensive structural realists are more optimistic that
the relations between China, its neighbors and the United States will remain peaceful. Neoclassical
realists are open to a wide range of potential outcomes, ranging from mutual accommodation to war.

Rise and fall realists are generally pessimistic about a rising China and the prospects for cooperation
and peace in international politics. Thus, as China rises relative to the United States, rise and fall
realists expect to see relations between the two countries become increasingly antagonistic, reaching
crisis levels as they near each other on measures of material power.

Defensive realists are far more optimistic about China’s rise and the future of inter - national security.
As they see it, the international system is relatively benign. Aggressive behavior and power
maximization usually trigger self-defeating balancing coalitions, technology and geography make
offensive action difficult, and states can signal their peaceful intentions.

Offensive realists argue that, given the required capabilities, states will pursue regional hegemony as
the best means of staying safe in a dangerous world. Most stress that there is no reason to assume
that China will behave any differently. Offensive realism predicts that if China’s power continues to
grow it is likely to assert greater control in Asia. China will invest more of its resources in military
capabilities to become the predominant power in the region.

Different realist theories say and predict different things. They also have very different implications
when considered as the basis for prescriptive policy. For example, the best offensive structural
realism has to offer the world is an armed and watchful peace anchored in mutual deterrence,
punctuated by wars triggered by structurally driven revisionism when a state calculates it can gain at
another’s expense. The best defensive structural realism has to offer is a community of status quo
states that successfully have man - aged to signal their peaceful intentions and/or refrained from
obtaining ambiguously offensive capabilities. Second, realism’s capacity for change opens the
tradition to some criticisms.

CONSTRUCTIVISIMS

Constructivists argue that the world is constituted socially through intersubjective interaction, that
agents and structures are mutually constituted and that ideational factors such as norms and identity
are central to the constitution and dynamics of world politics.

Constructivists argue that their approach enables a more sophisticated and complete understanding
of dynamics traditionally associated with realist approaches to security, including the nature of power
(Barnett and Duvall 2005), the security dilemma (Mitzen 2006) and the balance of power (Hopf
1998). Crucially, as Friedrich Kratochwil (1993) and Alexander Wendt (1992) have argued,
constructivist approaches are therefore better able to understand periods of structural change
enabled by strategic actors in world politics, most prominently the end of the Cold War.
Security is a social construction. For constructivists, this applies to the meaning of the concept itself,
to definitions of the community and its values in need of protection, to perceptions of threats and to
the types of actions that are viewed as legitimate in pursuing security.

Constructivists therefore emphasize the importance of ideational factors that help determine these
conceptions, practices and dynamics of security, factors generally neglected in realist accounts of
inter - national politics.

IDENTITY AND NORMS: At the international level, constructivists have explored the way in which
norms – ‘shared expectations of appropriate behavior held by a community of actors’ (Finnemore
1996: 22) – have influenced how states behave and how governments understand their national
interests.

Constructivists suggest that powerful expectations of what it means to belong to that society can
emerge issue areas, expectations that encourage or discourage certain forms of behavior and can
come to be incorporated within states’ own views of what constitutes their interests.

Constructivists suggest that states decide to adhere to accepted norms not simply because it serves
their interests (a logic of instrumentality) or because they will be punished for failing to do so (a logic
of consequences).They suggest, the actions of states can be driven by considerations of what
constitutes expected and appropriate behaviour regardless of their immediate national interests or
the enforcement capacity of institutions. This is referred to as a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and
Olsen 1989).

While emphasizing the importance of ideational forces at the international level, constructivists also
argue that domestic ideational factors are important in influencing conceptions and practices of
security. Constructivists emphasize the importance of national identity.

Constructivists, by contrast, were able to point to the ways in which prolonged cooperation had seen
a shared identity develop in Europe, a shared identity that ensured key institutions such as NATO
were more resilient than realists suggested.

Constructivist approaches challenge these positions and point to the import ance of public support
for or acquiescence to elite discourses. They would further suggest that they are in a strong position
to account for instances where non-state actors both within and beyond states are able to effect
change in foreign or security policy discourse and practices. Such change might occur, for example,
through the activism of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which have in some instances
enjoyed success in promoting global political change on issues such as environmental change and
human rights (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

Stuart Kaufman (2009) draws different conclusions about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, albeit using
similar constructivist insights. For Kaufman, the continued violence and mistrust characteristic of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is fed by narratives of identity on both sides of the conflict that justify
hostility towards the other. The intractable nature of the conflict, for Kaufman, is to be found in the
continued resonance of exclusionary and violent narratives of identity on both sides that limit the
extent to which political leaders in Israel or Palestine can compromise in dealings with the other
without a loss of legitimacy among key domestic constituents.

-Common Tenets: norms – identity – intersubjective interaction – postitivism

-Security Dilemma? Anarchy what states make of it. Security is a social construction. Its not
inevitable. Specific to particular historical moments and particular forms of identity politics.
4-UNCERTAINITY
The security dilemma is a foundational concept because, above all, it engages with the existential
condition of uncertainty that is explicit or immanent in all human relations, not least those
interactions in the biggest and most violent political arena of all – international politics.

When states practice cooperation, or societies embed trust in ‘security communities’ (explained
below), significant degrees of security are attained, even within the house of uncertainty. It is
preferable to live with the tolerable uncertainties of what Kenneth Boulding (1979) called ‘stable
peace’ than with the high risks implicit in what Stanley Hoffmann (1965) called the ‘state of war’.

In the international politics wing of the house of uncertainty, the largest room is occupied by
sovereign states and their governments. State decision makers, including military planners and
foreign policy analysts, can never be certain about the current and future intentions of those with the
capability of harming them militarily. We call this situation one of unresolvable uncertainty. It is the
basic predicament creating the security dilemma.

The security dilemma is a two-level strategic predicament in relations between states and other
actors, with each level consisting of two related lemmas (or propositions that can be assumed to be
valid) which force decision makers to choose between them. The first and basic level consists of a
dilemma of interpretation about the motives, intentions, and capabilities of others; the second and
derivative level consists of a dilemma of response about the most rational way of responding.

FIRST LEVEL: This dilemma of interpretation is the result of the perceived need to decide in the
existential condition of unresolvable uncertainty, about the motives, intentions and capabilities of
others. Those responsible must decide whether perceived military developments are for defensive or
self-protection purposes only (to enhance security in an uncertain world) or whether they are for
offensive purposes (to seek to change the status quo to their advantage).

SECOND LEVEL: A dilemma of response logically begins when decision makers have resolved this
dilemma of interpretation. They then need to determine how best to react. If the dilemma of
response is resolved based on a false interpretation of the motives and intentions of other actors, and
results in a militarily confrontational posture and diplomatic intransigence, then there is the risk of
creating a significant level of mutual hostility in the relationship when none was originally intended
by either party.

Advocates in the United States of deploying missile defence systems in recent decades have often
justified their case with the argument that missile defence would help protect the US homeland
against a limited missile attack from ‘rogue states’ in general, and crucially Iran and North Korea in
particular. Critics of US plans (in the potential target countries and elsewhere) have claimed to the
contrary that the shield of missile defence could be used to destroy a much degraded
counterattacking missile force following a devastating first strike against them by the sword of US
offensive nuclear missiles.

Intentions are therefore susceptible to misinterpretation, not least because governments will
normally go out of their way to keep secret a great deal of what they say and do on strategic matters.
They also, sometimes, engage in deliberate deception. The interaction of the ambiguous symbolism
of weaponry and the other minds problem helps ensure that politics among states takes place under
the shadow of unresolvable uncertainty.
Therefore the security dilemma is such a fundamental concept in security studies; it focuses attention
on the existential condition of the future environment in which political groups frame their thinking,
devise their plans and prepare their weaponry.

The Quintessential Dilemma

The dilemma of interpretation confronts those responsible for the security of a political community
with great complexities, be it a superpower in the Cold War or ethnic groups in the Balkan wars in the
early 1990s. They must decide whether military developments on the part of others are for
defensive/self-protection purposes only (to maintain the status quo) or whether they are for
offensive purposes (to seek to overthrow the status quo to their advantage). Logically, the dilemma of
response kicks in when the dilemma of interpretation has been settled.

Three Logics

Fatalist logic is a set of assumptions proposing that security competition can never be escaped in
international politics. Human nature and the self-help condition of international anarchy determine
that human groups will continue to exist in a world of conflict.

Mitigator logic is a set of assumptions proposing that security competition can be ameliorated or
dampened down for a time, but not finally eliminated. ‘Security regimes’ and international ‘societies’
can be constructed, blunting the worst features of anarchy, at least for a time.

Transcender logic is a set of assumptions proposing that the social, political, and economic character
of human existence is self-constitutive, not determined. Humans have agency, as individuals and
groups, and so human society can seek to make their own realities – though inherited structural
constraints will always be powerful.

In the case of the EU, the ambiguous symbolism of weapons has become irrelevant, because the
members do not engage in military planning against each other, while the other minds problem is
concerned not with the ‘kill or perish’ mindset of fatalist logic but rather with the normal politics of
life under capitalism and liberal democracy.

The house of uncertainty will be challenged by a combination of old and new security predicaments
in such issue areas as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, ‘climate chaos’, competition for non-renew able
(especially traditional energy) resources, mass migration, great-power rivalry, cultural and religious
clashes, ethnic conflict, food and water security and the growing gap between haves and have-nots.

As we will show in the four illustrations below, security dilemma dynamics threaten to heighten fear,
provoke mistrust, and close down possibilities for building international cooperation and trust.

First: the prospect of a new Cold War. Students of IR have long been concerned with the instabilities
supposedly caused by power transitions between rising and falling great powers. Today, this concern
is focused on the rivalry between China and the United States.

Second: the dynamics of new arms competitions. In several regional situations, security dilemma
dynamics have the potential to work in well-understood ways to provoke new arms competitions with
all their attendant dangers.
Third: towards a world of many nuclear powers? International order faces the long-term threat of the
breakdown of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), followed by the spread of nuclear weapons
technology to an increasing number of states.

Fourth: terrorism and the spread of mistrust. The 9/11 attack on the United States by al-Qa’ida
jihadists, and then the Bush administration’s declaration of a global ‘war on terror’, marked the
apogee of the globalization of ‘international terrorism’. In the years since, terror tactics have been
employed across Europe, but the most violent incidents have been in the Middle East, Africa, and
Asia.

Security dilemma sensibility and the new politics of trust-building that it makes possible (Wheeler
2018) offers human society globally the hope of coming through the dangerous decades ahead in a
more harmonious state than presently seems conceivable if governments and societies continue to
remain wedded to business as usual in their attitudes and behavior. Fatalism about global security will
be self-fulfilling if uncertainty is met exclusively by a mix of technological optimism and rational
egoism.

This would construct a global house of uncertainty, open to the uncertain political, economic and
social winds of human existence, yet a structure whose rooms are progressively occupied by people
confident in their ability to defend human society globally from the fears of radical insecurity.
5-COERCION AND WAR
Commonly understood as ‘collective killing for some collective purpose’ (Keegan 1998: 72), war
involves a range of strategic activities: thinking about what military means can achieve, and against
whom; defining and prioritizing vital interests and values, and who might threaten them; and a host
of practical considerations in gearing up for military campaigns and living with their aftermaths. But
war is much more than the strategies and tactics of warfighting: it is a ‘full-spectrum’ social
phenomenon that is ‘present beyond the war front and beyond wartime, in and among apparently
pacific social, cultural, and economic relations’ (Barkawi 2011: 713, 707–8).

Warfare is an intense form of political relations between belligerents that impacts upon virtually
every dimension of human life. It has caused huge amounts of suffering and destruction, but it has
also been a major engine for social, political, economic, and technological change.

Humans are much more likely to suffer violent death via homicide, gang violence, domestic violence
and even infanticide than in battle. The Geneva Declaration (2015) estimates that nine out of 10
violent deaths now occur outside wars. This requires an examination of the ways in which robotics
and artificial intelligence as well as activities in cyber space and outer space are influencing war’s
evolution.

The Concept Of War

Warfare is the art of groups using organized violence. It is one of humanity’s most significant activities
not only in material terms but also in defining core elements of our identities such as heroism,
sacrifice, honor, fear and peace. War’s salience is illustrated by how frequently art, culture and
commercial institutions reflect ideas, language and even the practices associated with war.

War is thus often referred to as ‘a social fact’ (Centeno and Enriquez 2016: 4) or ‘a deeply ingrained
cultural practice’. Fear is particularly important for understanding war’s importance because wars are
generally launched to prevent a frightening future from materializing. At a basic level, war is
emotionally appealing because it provides a way to resist our fear of domination.

The war habit is also intimately connected to some other core sources of human identity. Chief
among them are heroism, sacrifice, honor, and peace. Similarly, striving to maintain professional
ethics and codes of conduct even in war has made the profession of arms an honorable pursuit for
many people. Finally, peace is also inevitably related to the idea of war, in part because it is the
purpose for which wars are usually fought.

Among the most widely debated taboos are killing the defenseless (e.g., prisoners, the wounded and
unarmed civilians), the use of chemical weapons, and more recently the widespread ban on anti-
personnel landmines. In IR and security studies, the concept of warfare has commonly been
approached by distinguishing its cultural, legal, political, and sociological dimensions. Less attention
has been devoted to its biological and psychological aspects.

DEFINING WAR

CULTURAL: War can therefore be understood as a socially constructed institution, but one with
powerful material implications, as with marriage, the market or society.

LEGAL: War has also been defined in juridical terms, for example as ‘the legal condition which equally
permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force’ (Wright 1983: 7). In 1945,
the UN Charter outlawed war, except in self-defense or with explicit authorization of the Security
Council.
POLITICAL: organized violence carried on by political units against each other. Violence is not war
unless it is carried out in the name of a political unit; Equally, violence carried out in the name of a
political unit is not war unless it is directed against another political unit.

SOCIOLOGICAL: war is understood as a socially generative form of relations, that is, warfare
‘consumes and reworks social and political orders.

THREE PHILOSOPHIES OF WAR

Clausewitz was arguably the most important proponent of the political philosophy of war. This
defined warfare as ‘an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will’ (Clausewitz
1976: 75). It was essentially a rational, national, and instrumental activity. During Clausewitz’s lifetime
(1780–1831), war was widely viewed as a legitimate instrument of state policy.

The eschatological philosophy, in contrast, had a teleological view of history that would culminate ‘in
a “final” war leading to the unfolding of some grand design – divine, natural, or human’ (Rapoport
1968: 15). Rapoport offered two variants: messianic and global eschatology. In the messianic variant
the agency destined to carry out the ‘grand design’ is presumed to exist already. Its ‘mission’ was to
‘impose a just peace on the world’, thus ‘eliminating war from future history’.

Finally, the cataclysmic philosophy conceived of war ‘as a catastrophe that befalls some portion of
humanity or the entire human race’ (Rapoport 1968: 16). Here, war could be seen as a scourge of
God or as an unfortunate by-product of ‘human nature’ or the anarchic ‘international system’. This
philosophy also comes in two variants: ethnocentric and global.

First, the concept of the battlefield, so central to the way in which Clausewitz understood warfare,
has dissolved. The 9/11 attacks and other ‘terrorist spectaculars’, for instance, demonstrate that
‘battle’ might be waged in Western (or other) cities, while the US-led ‘war on terror’ – subsequently
rebranded as the ‘long war’ – conceives of the battlefield as literally spanning the entire globe.

Second, as the speeches of Osama bin Laden and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi but also former US President
George W. Bush and current US President Donald Trump make clear, leaders on both sides of the ‘war
on terror’ have often rejected political narratives of warfare. Instead, they have adopted
eschatological philosophies in their respective rallying cries for a global jihad and a just war against
evildoers (and, in Trump’s case, their families).

A third problem for the political philosophy – and one that Clausewitz obviously never encountered –
is the irrationality of war between states armed with nuclear weapons.

CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR

In new wars the traditional distinctions between war (violence between states or organized political
groups for political motives), organized crime (violence by private associations, usually for financial
gain) and large-scale violations of human rights (violence by states or private groups against
individuals, mainly civilians) become increasingly blurred. These new wars are said to be distinct from
‘old wars’ in terms of their goals, methods, and systems of finance, all of which reflect the ongoing
erosion of the state’s monopoly of legitimate organized violence.
Understood in this manner, globalization is not a process separate from war that acts to change
warfare in the way suggested by Kaldor. Instead, war has been intimately implicated in the
globalization of world politics for thousands of years.

THE DOMAINS OF WAR

New or old, most wars have been fought in geographic domains: on land, on and under the sea and,
more recently, in the air. Indeed, constraints imposed by geography and climate meant that major
wars have been confined to a relatively small portion of the Earth’s surface. While many wars have
been fought on traditional battlefields and insurgencies countered in rural landscapes (‘the bush’), it
is increasingly likely that as more humans inhabit urban environments, we will see more examples of
‘metro war’ – war in urban environments, including the world’s estimated 260,000 shanty towns and
densely populated slums.

Militaries and war are also sites of cultural mixing and hybridity. Military travelling cultures expose
soldiers to the foreign and lead them to reassess their ideas about home. Soldiers returning from
abroad transmit new ideas and practice to their native lands. (GLOBALIZATION AND WAR)

Wars fought in geographic domains have always included instruments of techno - logy, from weapons
and materiel to logistics equipment. But technology advances, especially in robotics, are increasingly
leading humans to share them with autonomous machines.

The US National Intelligence Council predicts that the risk of armed conflict will rise during the next
two decades because of new technology advances, new strategies, and the evolving geopolitical
context. Together, they are likely to make warfare more diffuse, diverse, and disruptive.

Diffuse: the greater accessibility to instruments of war, including IEDs, unmanned vehicles and
precision-guided rockets will empower a variety of factors including states, insurgents, mercenaries,
criminals, and private firms to engage in armed conflict, including remote operations.

Diverse: future wars are likely to be fought using a broad spectrum of means, including non-military
capabilities such as economic coercion, cyber-attacks, and information operations, to advance
conventional weapons and WMD, and occur in multiple domains, including outer space and
cyberspace.

What Are Wars?

War is continuation of politics by other means -Clausewitz (On War)

Transformation in politics causes transformation in war.

“Collective killing for collecting purpose” (Keegan)

What are the differences between war, organized crime?

Violence Vs War:

Minimum of 1000 battle related fatalities (Singer & Small 1972)

Typology

International vs Civil Wars

Interstate Wars (between 2 states) vs Imperial/Colonial Wars (independence)

Major (Great) Power / Hegemonic Wars

NEW WARS vs OLD WARS

Has globalization given rise to a “new” type of warfare?

How are “old” wars different from “new” wars?

-Goals / Methods / Systems Of Finance / Domain

Realist Explanations: Balance of Power Theories

Power Transition Theories

Liberal Explanations: Economic Theories

Domestic

Balance of Power Theories VS Power Transition Theories

Balances of power deter aggression --> major wars are likely only when one state possesses a
preponderance of power.

Rising and near-equal states will attack to gain status and rewards denied by the established order.

Equality between states dangerous.

CLASSICAL REALISM: Multipolarity should be relatively more stable than bipolarity. Bipolar Systems
are unstable since if any inequality between two great power opens.

NEOREALISM: Bipolarity forces states to be more conscious about maintaining balance of power.

In bipolarity great powers avoid being chain-ganged into major war by crises over small power.

They stand firm to prevent losses on the periphery thus enhancing deterrence.

Great powers are less inclined to neglect internal military spending that might allow a superior
military power to arise.
Realists: Asymmetrical Dependence

Protectionism

Retaliatory Policies --> War

Trading With The Enemy

War frequently does little to depress the volume of trade between adversaries (Bariberi-Levy 1997)

Diversionary Theory Of War

Rally around the flag effect: conflict with an outgroup increases the cohesion of a well-defined in
group. (Coser 1956)

Ingroup-Outgroup

Bush 9/11

Logrolling Theory Of War

Internal groups have parochial interests that favor different but limited forms of imperial expansion
or military buildups.

Logrolled coalitions pursue the foreign policy interests advocated by each --> more aggressive or
expansionist foreign policy than desired by any single group.

“Strange BedFellows Theory” ex. Saudi Arabia – Israel – Iran

6-ALLIANCES
Why alliances created according to realists?

A)REALISMS: “Alliances represent a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between

two or more sovereign states.” (Walt 1987)

 BALANCE OF POWER: States will ally against the strong one

 ALLIANCES (defense pact, offensive pact) VS ALIGNMENT(sharing common thought)

Alliances represent biliteral or multilateral agreements to provide some element of security

to the signatories (Weitsman 2004)
EXAMPLE: NATO / WARSAW PACT (EU IS NOT HAS NO ARMY)

INTERNATIONAL DETERMINANTS:

Capabilities aggregation model (West Germany)

Coercive Model (Warsaw Pact)

ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA: Abandonment /Entrapment

International balancing (investment in weapons)

External Balancing (Alliances)

MULTIPOLARITY: have flux change of alliances (Albania left Warsaw Pact without harm)

What does balance of threat theory have to say on alliances? States will ally against the threat state.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A THREAT?

Aggregate Power

Proximity

Offensive Capability

Offensive Intentions

HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY: States ally with most powerful state.

B) LIBERALISMS: Alliances of democracies represent “pacific unions” (Kant 1795)

LOGIC OF IDEOLOGICAL SOLIDARITY:

-Similarity = goodness

-Hard to imagine “good state” attacking

-Enhance legitimacy

-Ideology prescribes cohesion

“Alliances of autocracies represent an Al Capone alliance” (Keohne 1971)

“Alliances represent security institutions” (Wallander 2000)

1) Regime Type
2) Institutions -expectations- lowering transaction costs

“Alliances represent the result of bribes” (Viner 1952)

“Alliances represent the result of interest groups and bureaucratic units” (Keohne 1971)

INTERNATIONAL BRIBERY: The more aid the tighter the alliance

PENETRATION: Covert or indirect manipulation of one states political system by another (agents,spy)

MEANS OF PENETRATION:

Public Officials

Lobbying Organizations (AIPAC)

Foreign Propaganda

DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS:

Ideology – Regime Type

Economic Incentives

Lobbies

C)CONSTRUCTIVISMS: “Alliances represent security communities” (Deutsch 1957)

Common Identity (EU – SCANDIVANIAN COUNTRIES)

DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS: IDEOLOGY / SOCIALIZATION

D)MARXISM: Alliances of socialists represent “The coming together of the world proletariat to fight
for the cause of peace, in accordance with the “workers of the world unite!” (Marx,Engels 1848)
DOMESTIC DETERMINANT: Ideology

INTERNATIONAL DETERMINANTS: Capitalist Block

Why alliances endure realism?

International Determinant: Distribution of Capabilities

Threat Persistence

Why alliances end liberalism?

Domestic Determinant – Regime Type

Int. Determinant – Institutions

Why alliances endure constructivism?

Ideology / Socialization

Why alliances endure Marxism?

Domestic—Ideology

International—Threat Persistence from capitalist block.

Exercise Question: What are the alliance dynamics underpinning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?

How Alliances Managed According to Realists?

The weak suffer what they must

Strong do what they can

CLASSICAL REALISM / HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY:

“Big influence of small allies”

When small states hold more intense preferences than alliance leader.

When small states threaten to defect or to remain neutral in disputes among superpowers.

When superpower perceives a high level of threat

When small states pool resources and confront the alliance leader.
How Alliances Managed According to Liberals?

“Big influence of small allies”

Under certain conditions: democratic alliances (EU)

Alliance of Democracies: Managed democratically, representative, pluralism, transparency, checks

and balances.

Rule Of Law applied to everyone (NATO-CSTO-WARSAW PACT)

Democracies Form Democratic Communities

Norms committing the allies to timely consultation

Democratic pressures are frequently used to increase one’s leverage in alliance interactions

Transnational and trans governmental coalitions among bureaucratic actors can tip the

domestic “balance of power” in the patron in favor of allied demands.

Because alliances are among the most valuable instruments for advancing a state’s interests. Alliances
are a primary tool for enhancing a state’s security in the face of external and, sometimes, internal
threats.

Waltz (1979: 118) noted that the means available to states for achieving their ends can be grouped
into two broad categories: internal efforts and external efforts, including moves to strengthen and
enlarge one’s own alliances or to weaken an opposing one. And, for smaller states with limited
material resources, reliance on alliances may be the only option. Thus, the formation and use of
alliances is a frequent response to the dangers of aggression and the opportunities for
aggrandizement present in the international system.

Alliances were important in the out - break, spread and results of militarized conflicts. ‘The formation
and cohesion of international alliances’, Walt noted, ‘can have profound effects on the security of
individual states and help determine both the probability and likely outcome of wars.

Walt’s seminal study on the origins of alliances defined an alliance as ‘a formal or informal
relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states’ (1987: 1).

More recently, Weitsman described alliances as ‘bilateral or multilateral agreements to provide some
element of security to the signatories’

Such broad definitions are reflected in quantitative coding schemes. In their efforts to be
comprehensive, the most complete alliance databases have grouped together defensive alliances,
offensive alliances, non-aggression pacts, neutrality pacts, and consultation agreements.

At least two potential problems follow from such broad definitions of alliances. First, they may be so
expansive as to encompass just about any imaginable security arrangement between states. The
other problem is the failure to distinguish between various forms of security cooperation.
What has traditionally distinguished alliances from many other security arrangements between
states, however, is the emphasis that they place on military forms of assistance, especially the use of
force.

Theories of alliance formation fall into two categories: those that emphasize international
determinants and those that focus on domestic factors.

INTERNATIONAL DETERMINANTS

The most prominent international explanations of alliance formation are associated with the realist
school of International Relations. They emphasize how states form alliances to combine their military
capabilities and thereby improve their security positions. The most parsimonious explanation is
balance of power theory. This posits that states form alliances to balance the power of other states,
especially when they are unable to balance power through their individual efforts or when the costs
of such internal balancing exceed those of alliance membership.

An important exception to this general rule may occur when one state becomes so powerful that no
combination of other states can balance its power. In that case, other states may choose to ‘band -
wagon’ with the predominant state. Clearly, balance of power theory can also serve as a theory of
alliance persistence and disintegration. In this case, shifts in the international distribution of power
may threaten the existence of established alliances. For example, the previously predominant state
may decline, to the point where an alliance of other states is no longer required to balance its power.
Indeed, with the passage of time, an alliance member may become the most powerful state in the
system, prompting its allies to cut their ties and perhaps even to form counterbalancing alliances
against it.

An important refinement of balance of power theory is balance of threat theory. Sometimes, alliances
appear to be unbalanced in terms of power. For example, during much of the Cold War the alliances
centered on the United States were more powerful, as measured on several indices of capability, than
those revolving around the Soviet Union. An important refinement of balance of power theory is
balance of threat theory. Sometimes, alliances appear to be unbalanced in terms of power. For
example, during much of the Cold War the alliances centered on the United States were more
powerful, as measured on several indices of capability, than those revolving around the Soviet Union.

Some scholars have noted that states may also use alliances to manage, constrain and control their
partners.

DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS

Threat perception may depend as much, if not more, on the internal characteristics of states.

Scholars have identified possible domestic determinants of alliance formation. One set of
explanations focuses on similarities and differences in the culture, ideologies, and political institutions
of states. The general argument is that other things being equal, states will tend to ally with states
whose political orientations are similar to their own. Similar value systems may generate common
interests and common interpretations of what constitutes a threat. In the case of states sharing a
formal ideology, such as Marxism– Leninism, they may even be operating under an explicit injunction
to join forces in the face of a hostile international environment.

Such arguments also suggest possible causes of alliance disintegration. Most obviously, a sudden
regime changes in one partner or another as the result of a revolution, coup or other internal
upheaval will immediately loosen the bonds of affinity that held the alliance together.
In view of such considerations, scholars have suggested that alliances among liberal democratic states
are likely to be especially strong and resilient (Gaubatz 1996). One reason is the relative stability of
public preferences and the greater continuity of national leadership. Although different
administrations may come and go, the democratic process ensures that leadership transitions occur
smoothly, and abrupt shifts are unlikely.

ALLIANCE INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND SOCIALIZATION

One of these processes is alliance institutionalization. Some alliances are endowed with important
institutional characteristics from the outset, and some may become increasingly institutionalized over
time, with important implications for their staying power. Two dimensions of alliance
institutionalization stand out. First, alliances may include or develop intergovernmental organizations
to facilitate cooperation among their members. These organizations often include a formal
bureaucracy with a staff, budget, and physical location. Although presumably of use to the alliance
members, such bureaucracies are also actors, with some degree of autonomy and an inherent
interest in perpetuating themselves.

The overall implication of such reasoning is that alliances characterized by high levels of
institutionalization will last longer on average.

Another process that can promote alliance longevity is the socialization of member states, or, more
precisely, of their political elites and possibly their general publics. Alliance-related social interactions
can lead to the development of more similar world views and even a common identity. Because allied
states have less to fear from one another than from third parties, other things being equal, they may
be more likely to engage in trade and to be receptive to the exchange of capital, technology,
information, ideas and people.

Here we might note three principal reasons for NATO’s longevity. One is the residual threat posed by
the remnants of the Soviet Union, notably Russia. A second external factor was the emergence of
new types of threats that were shared to a significant extent by NATO members. Concern about
regional conflicts was followed by the growing threat of international terrorism.

7-ECONOMICS AND SECURITY

What are the strands of Liberalism that focus on economics and peace?

Commercial Liberalism

Capitalist Peace Theory

Complex Interdependence

MAIN ARGUMENTS OF COMMERCIAL LIBERALISM:

States depend on each other // “supply chain”

CAPITALIST PEACE THEORY: Economic freedom is 50 times more effective than democracy in reducing
violent conflict. (Gartzke 2007)

CASUAL MECHANISMS: The invisible hand (Smith)

Division Of Labour (Hume) – specializing economic actors

Comparative Advantage (Ricardo)

Technological Advancement (Buckle)

Complex Interdependence (Keohane and Nye)

WHAT IS COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE?

Theory that emphasizes the complex ways in which as a result of growing ties, transnational actors
become mutually dependent, vulnerable to each other’s actions and sensitive to each other’s needs.

SpillOver Effect: (EU) “Weaponized Interdependence”

The spillover effect refers to the effect on the economy of a country from unrelated events happening
in another country. Events, including natural calamities, such as earthquakes or political crisis in
another country can have positive or negative effects on the economy of a country.

WHICH BODY OF THEORIES AGAINST COOMERICAL LIBERALISM?

Economic Nationalism: central idea – “zero sum game” industry protectionism

Mercantilism: If your own nation was to be wealthy, it could only be so by making others poorer

Marxism: Struggle between the bourgeoisie and proletariat.

Question: Why didn’t economic interdependence prevent the Russian Invasion of Ukraine?
(Miscalculation- historical revisionism?)
WHAT DOES IT MEAN THAT “WAR MADE THE ECONOMY AND THE ECONOMY MADE WAR”?

Profiting from war (war—economy)

Sanctions

Profiting Arms Trade

Innovation

Rally Around the Flag: The rally 'round the flag' effect (or syndrome) is a concept used in political
science and international relations to explain increased short-run popular support of a country's
government or political leaders during periods of international crisis or war. Because the effect can
reduce criticism of governmental policies, it can be seen as a factor of diversionary foreign policy.

HOW DOES WAR MAKE THE ECONOMY?

Conquest Of Territory: Acquisition of new resources + stimulate production + expand employment

WAR AND CONQUEST

DOES CONQUEST STILL PAY?

HOW DOES ECONOMY MAKE WAR?

EXAM!! “MONEY IS THE SINEWS OF WAR” --> WEALTH IS A MUST TO WAR TO HAPPEN

COUNTER: There are other stuff obedience of troops, soldiers (MACHIAVELLI)

Demands for resources held by other countries (water, oil, raw material)

Globalization  diffusion of military technology

Tax Extraction and fiscal mobilization (money need for war)

Revolution in military affairs: War in the information age (GPS)

Network Centric Warfare (DRONES / SWARMING)

WHAT ARE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS?

Economic sanctions are commercial and financial penalties applied by one or more countries against
a targeted self-governing state, group, or individual. Economic sanctions are not necessarily imposed
because of economic circumstances—they may also be imposed for a variety of political, military, and
social issues. Economic sanctions can be used for achieving domestic and international purposes.

LIBERALISMS:

TRADITIONAL / KANTIAN LIBERALISM: According to Kant, the only justifiable form of government
was republican government. Such laws became ‘categorical imperatives’; they were directly binding,
and monarchs as well as ordinary citizens were subject to them. Kant argued that republican states
were ‘peace producers’; that is, they were more inclined to peaceful behavior than other sorts of
states.

Rousseau (1917 [1754]) argued that states were naturally pushed into watching one another and
adjusting their power accordingly, usually through alliances. How - ever, this practice resulted merely
in ‘ceaseless agitation’ and not in peace.

DOUCE COMMERCE: According to Moravcsik, ‘commercial liberalism’ focuses on ‘incentives created

by opportunities for trans-border economic transactions’ This contemporary formulation attempts to
make specific the causal mechanisms behind the inclination of economically liberal states to prefer
peace to conflict. According to Moravcsik, ‘trade is generally a less costly means of accumulating
wealth than war, sanctions, or other coercive means.

MERCANTILISM: Mercantilism is an economic policy that is designed to maximize the exports and
minimize the imports for an economy. It promotes imperialism, colonialism, tariffs, and subsidies on
traded goods to achieve that goal. If your own nation was to be wealthy, it could only be so by making
others poorer. Tariff walls were needed to protect the prosperity of domestic producers from the
‘attacks’ of foreign competitors. Subsidies were required for export producers so that they could
‘seize’ the wealth of others in foreign markets. Resources in foreign lands had to be militarily
‘captured’ to keep them out of the hands of commercial rivals.

Donald Trump, elected to the US presidency in 2016, demonstrated clear neomercantilism in his
economic plan, announced during his campaign (Trump 2016), in which he promised to raise tariff
walls and create domestic employment by limiting imports. He described trade as a zero-sum game in
which countries lose by paying for imports.

COMMERCIAL LIBERALISM: Commercial peace is a branch of liberal international relations theory

which states that free trade and economic interdependence contribute to peaceful behavior among
states. The physiocrats argued that giving up mercantilism and allowing freedom to trade would
civilize the citizens of a nation, facilitating a peaceful coexistence among fellow citizens and
guaranteeing the rule of law.

A division of labor and trade benefited all participants, and David Ricardo (1817) formulated the
theory of comparative advantage. According to Ricardo, wealth accrued in the degree to which states
concentrated production in areas where they had ‘comparative advantage’ and traded for other
products.

Liberal trade doctrine, or the theory of douce commerce, held that trade among states, like trade
among individuals, was mutually beneficial. All men would gain through participation in a global
division of labor – a way of life in which they offered to each other the various products in the
production of which they specialized.

There are various exceptions and qualifications that are seen to limit the circumstances under which
economic interdependence results in conflict reduction.

DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY: The ‘democratic peace’ thesis is the argument that liberal states do
not fight wars against other liberal states. Liberal institutions include the broad franchise of liberal
states and the need to ensure broad popular support; the division of powers in democratic states,
which produces checks and balances; and the electoral cycle, which makes liberal leadership cautious
and prone to avoid risk (Russett 1996).

Liberal culture argument, liberal states tend to trust other liberal states and to expect to resolve
conflict through discussion and compromise. But equally, they distrust non-liberal states. liberal
culture argument, liberal states tend to trust other liberal states and to expect to resolve conflict
through discussion and compromise. But equally, they distrust non-liberal states. This is sometimes
referred to as the monadic variant.

In the later variant, sometimes called the dyadic variant, a few have argued that democracies may be
even more robust in the use of force than non-democracies, owing partially to the ideological nature
of democratic wars and partially to the fact that liberal democracies are generally strong states with a
large wealth base.

In the final analysis, security depends on encouraging liberal institutions and a security policy must
have as its long-term goal the spread of liberalism.

NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM: Neo-liberal institutionalism concentrates on the role of

international institutions in mitigating conflict. institutions cannot absolve anarchy; they can change
the character of the inter - national environment by influencing state preferences and state behavior.
International institutions do this by a variety of methods that either create strong incentives for
cooperation such as favorable trade status, or powerful disincentives such as trade sanctions. In
consequence, many neo-liberal institutionalists argue that international actors should promote
institutionalization as a means of promoting the collective interest in international stability.

Constructivist institutionalism, on the other hand, conceptualizes institutions as a collection of norms,

rules and routines, rather than a formal structure. Constructivism focuses on the central role of
ideology, rules and norms that institutions diffuse to constitute agents.

Neo-liberal institutionalism contrasts in several critical areas with realism. Both agree that powerful
states influence the formation and shape of international institutions, but for different reasons.
According to liberals, states create institutions to maximize shared interests; for realists, however, it is
to realize and maintain domination.

In ideational liberalism, the underlying motive is social identity, and conflict will ensue if borders do
not accord with social identity. Conflict will also ensue across social identities. In commercial
liberalism, the underlying motivation is economic benefit, which does not necessarily lead to
cooperation, but which identifies under what sorts of circumstances the economy can be a peace
producer.

POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE

Three assumptions are integral to the realist vision. First, states as coherent units are the dominant
actors in world politics. This is a double assumption: states are predominant; and they act as coherent
units. Second, realists assume that force is a usable and effective instrument of policy. Other
instruments may also be employed, but using or threatening force is the most effective means of
wielding power. Third, partly because of their second assumption, realists assume a hierarchy of
issues in world politics, headed by questions of military security: the “high politics” of military
security dominates the “low politics” of economic and social affairs.

Which we call the characteristics of complex interdependence —one would expect world politics to
be very different than under realist conditions.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE:

Multiple channels connect societies, including informal ties between governmental elites as well as
formal foreign office arrangements; informal ties among non-governmental elites (face-to-face and
through telecommunications); and transnational organizations (such as multinational banks or
corporations).

The agenda of interstate relationships consists of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or
consistent hierarchy. This absence of hierarchy among issues means, among other things, that
military security does not consistently dominate the agenda. Many issues arise from what used to be
considered domestic policy, and the distinction between domestic and foreign issues becomes
blurred.

Military force is not used by governments toward other governments within the region, or on the
issues, when complex interdependence prevails. It may, however, be important in these
governments’ relations with governments outside that region, or on other issues.

MINOR ROLE OF MILITARY FORCE

If the security dilemma for all states were extremely acute, military force, supported by economic and
other resources, would clearly be the dominant source of power. Survival is the primary goal of all
states, and in the worst situations, force is ultimately necessary to guarantee survival. Thus, military
force is always a central component of national power. Yet particularly among industrialized, pluralist
countries, the perceived margin of safety has widened: fears of attack in general have declined, and
fears of attack by one another are virtually nonexistent.

Moreover, force is often not an appropriate way of achieving other goals (such as economic and
ecological welfare) that are becoming more important. It is not impossible to imagine dramatic
conflict or revolutionary change in which the use or threat of military force over an economic issue or
among advanced industrial countries might become plausible. Then realist assumptions would again
be a reliable guide to events. But in most situations, the effects of military force are both costly and
uncertain.

Even when the direct use of force is barred among a group of countries, however, military power can
still be used politically. Each superpower continues to use the threat of force to deter attacks by other
superpowers on itself or its allies; its deterrence ability thus serves an indirect, protective role, which
it can use in bargaining on other issues with its allies.

LINKAGE STRATEGIES:
Under complex interdependence, such congruence is less likely to occur. As military force is devalued,
militarily strong states will find it more difficult to use their overall dominance to control outcomes on
issues in which they are weak.

Most economic and ecological interdependence involves the possibility of joint gains, or joint losses.
Mutual awareness of potential gains and losses and the danger of worsening each actor’s position
through overly rigorous struggles over the distribution of the gains can limit the use of asymmetrical
interdependence.

AGENDA SETTING:

Other issues will only be very important when they seem to affect security and military power. In
these cases, agendas will be influenced strongly by considerations of the overall balance of power.

THE ECONOMICS OF WAR AND PEACE

Those occupying the commanding heights of the global economy seem to think so. In 2015 the World
Economic Forum (2015: 7) labeled “interstate conflict” the number one “global risk,” because “2015
differs markedly from the past, with rising technological risks, notably cyber-attacks, and new
economic realities, which remind us that geopolitical tensions present themselves in a very different
world from before. Information flows instantly around the globe and emerging technologies have
boosted the influence of new players and new types of warfare.

DOES CONQUEST STILL PAY:

The field largely agrees on what has changed in the relationship between economics and war. The
most direct link between these two practices—going to war in the pursuit of wealth—is largely
irrelevant to contemporary international politics. The opportunity cost of war in terms of prosperity
(for most states) seems profoundly high, and the gains from conquest seem equally low.

Oil, so often blamed for conflict (Klare 2001), is rarely its direct cause (Schultz 2015; Meierding 2016;
Colgan 2014). Some predict water wars in the future (Starr 2016), but evidence remains scarce to
date (Wolf 1999). None of the world’s ongoing large-scale conflicts and plausible future ones—
Indian–Pakistani tensions in Kashmir, Russian aggression in its Near Abroad, Saudi flailing in Yemen,
the multinational cockpit of Syria and Iraq—can plausibly be described primarily as economic
disputes. Even China’s maritime “land reclamation” seems largely an attempt to protect itself from
economic coercion and to expand its influence and prestige rather than a quest for rapidly depleting
fisheries or unproven undersea resources.

war—as Richard Betts (1999) glumly observes—still seems to find a way, and thus the economics of
producing war continue to matter greatly. Even if many rich countries seem to lack the willingness to
fight, wealth remains an essential prerequisite for war (and perhaps more broadly for “power”);
arming and fighting are not free.

UNIPOLARITY AND GLOBALIZATION:

While vague in many respects, hegemonic stability theory and its cousin “power transition theory”
nonetheless make it clear that rapid and large power shifts make war more likely and that
globalization in general makes war less likely. Realists and liberals can agree that the decline of
American unipolarity, economic interdependence, or both bode poorly for peace.

Hegemonic Stability Theory: Hegemonic stability theory (HST) is a theory of international relations,
rooted in research from the fields of political science, economics, and history. HST indicates that the
international system is more likely to remain stable when a single state is the dominant world power,
or hegemon.

Power Transition Theory: An even distribution of political, economic, and military capabilities
between contending groups of states is likely to increase the probability of war; peace is preserved
best when there is an imbalance of national capabilities between disadvantaged and advantaged
nations; the aggressor will come from a small group of dissatisfied strong countries; and it is the
weaker, rather than the stronger power that is most likely to be the aggressor.

SINEWS OF POWER:

The economics of war making matter greatly for the likelihood and conduct of both war and peace.
The number of substantive issues on this front has steadily grown: the advent of military drones and
robotics, renewed attention to nuclear proliferation, the strange rearmament of an economically
reeling Russia, the development of “anti-access” weaponry to resist US power projection, and the
estimated short-term cost of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns to the United States alone at $1.6
trillion (Belasco 2014).

More recently, alongside the larger fears of deteriorating unipolarity, some predict a fading of the
stunning imbalance in global military capability. American struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
financial crisis, and newly aggressive, rapidly arming China and Russia have led many, not least in the
Pentagon, to reconsider the robustness of this advantage.

Once money is found, what can it buy? Given secular trends in rising labor costs and accelerating
information technology, advanced weapons appear to be the place to invest, potentially making the
RMA no longer the exclusive province of the United States. Drones, like much military capability, will
probably bifurcate in terms of sophistication.

First, a country faces a “platform challenge” in designing, developing, and manufacturing a combat-
effective weapon system. Second, that country then must deal with the “adoption challenge,”
ensuring access to the required infrastructural and organizational support.

Moreover, some changing factors are only doing so slowly. Finally, several of the most important
changes make the United States relatively stronger, not weaker. In reviewing the capacity for change
in the economics of war and peace, this chapter has taken several strong stances. First, the
economics of conquest appear to have made war for financial gain a bad investment. Second, both
globalization and US military and even economic preponderance will decline slowly, if at all. Finally,
the financing of modern military power, and thus of warfare, continues to become prohibitive for all
but the wealthiest and/or most aggressive states.

8-NUCLEAR WEAPONS
WHY DO STATES BUILD NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

1-SECURITY MODEL

Nuclear weapons seen as ultimate deterrent. (powerful, destructive)

Conventional Rivalry --- nuclearization

Nuclear Rivalry ---- nuclearization

EXAMPLE: Arab Countries ---> Israel // South Africa (becoming hegemon in the area)

NEOREALISM:

Motivation for pursuit - anarchy

Motivation for renunciation - extended nuclear deterrence

2-DOMESTIC POLITICS MODEL

Pluralist Model of Public Policy: Classical pluralism is the view that politics and decision-making are
located mostly in the framework of government, but that many non-governmental groups use their
resources to exert influence. The central question for classical pluralism is how power and influence
are distributed in a political process.

The pluralistic approach suggests that there is more than one source of power in the relationship
between workers and business leaders. Unions are often a central component to the pluralistic
approach that seeks a balance of power between leadership and employees.

-interest group

-government policy

LIBERALISM:

Motivation for pursuit - bureaucratic infighting

Motivation for renunciation - government/regime change

3-THE NORMS MODEL

NPT (1970) – not getting nuclear weapons + not giving nuclear weapons

Safeguards (güvenlik önlemleri)

5 recognized NWS (China-USSR-US-UK-France)

Grandbargain (countries who have it disarm)

CONSTRUCTIVISM:
Motivation for pursuit - absence of norms

Motivation for renunciation - norms, socialization

HOW DO COUNTRIES AQUIRE NUCLEAR BOMBS?

Technological Determinism

Non-governmental Organizations + Nons-state Actors = TRY TO AQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PATHWAYS TO THE BOMB

Indigenous route

Multinational cooperation: Manhattan Project the Manhattan Project was a research and
development undertaking during World War II that produced the first nuclear weapons. It was led by
the United States with the support of the United Kingdom and Canada.

Nuclear trade

Smuggling rings: a group of people involved in the secret and illegal importing or exporting of
prohibited or dutiable goods.

Capture another state’s facilities

International organizations: IAEA The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) serves as the world's
foremost intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful use of
nuclear energy.

Why Have We Had Only 10 NWS?

Tough to produce and have it.

Enrichment (uranium) and Reprocessing (Plutonium)

REGULATOR EFFECTIVENESS AND PROLIFERATION

The nuclear market suppliers = countries can choose from suppliers / combination

BENEFITS FOR THE BUYER

Better cost

Better product

Better terms of use

Definition of the Nonproliferation Regime

NPT

Informal technology denial regimes: NSG, MTCR

Multilateral treaties & agreements: PTBT, CTBT, Outer Space Treaty, FMCT, nuclear weapon-Free
Zones

Bilateral agreements: SALT I, II, START I, II, III IAEA - ensure compliance of key aspects of the NPT
regime

CHALLANGES

What are the three key nuclear proliferation challenges in the post-Cold War world?

States within the existing non-proliferation regime: DPRK withdrawal; modernization of nuclear
arsenals by US, Russia, UK, China

States outside the non-proliferation regime: non-signatories (NPT: India, Israel, Pakistan); non-ratifiers
(CTBT: China, DPRK, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and the United States)

Non-state actors: Aum Shinrikyo; Al-Qa’ida; Islamic State; A.Q. Khan

APPROACHES

Efforts to strengthen the traditional multilateral institutional approach anchored in treaty-based

regimes: indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995; CTBT in 1996; 13 steps at 2000 NPT Review
Conference

Efforts to establish non-treaty-based multilateral approaches initiated within the UN: declarations &
resolutions of the UNSC; Ban Treaty; UNSCOM; UNSC Resolution 1540

Efforts to build a set of ad-hoc, non-institutional, non-conventional approaches to address the

immediate challenges of proliferation: preventive war against Iraq’s WMD programs; Proliferation
Security Initiative; P-5+1 negotiations with Iran & JCPOA; 6-party talks with DPRK; Indo-US civilian
nuclear initiative; Nuclear Security Summits

EXAM QUESTION: Is the NPT a success or a failure? Please explain using IR theoretical frameworks

States will seek to develop nuclear weapons when they face a significant military threat to their
security that cannot be met through alternative means; if they do not face such threats, they will
willingly remain non-nuclear states.

Nuclear weapons, like other weapons, are more than tools of national security; they are political
objects of considerable importance in domestic debates and internal bureaucratic struggles and can
also serve as international normative symbols of modernity and identity.
"the security model," according to which states build nuclear weapons to increase national security
against foreign threats, especially nuclear threats;

"the domestic poli- tics model," which envisions nuclear weapons as political tools used to advance
parochial domestic and bureaucratic interests; and

"the norms model," under which nuclear weapons decisions are made because weapons acquisition,
or restraint in weapons development, provides an important normative symbol of a state's modernity
and identity

The NPT encourages this long-term trend by promoting the development of power reactors in
exchange for the imposition of safeguards on the resulting nuclear materials.

THE SECURITY MODEL: NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL THREATS

According to neorealist theory in political science, states exist in an anarchical international system
and must therefore rely on self-help to protect their sovereignty and national security.4 Because of
the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons, any state that seeks to maintain its national
security must balance against any rival state that develops nuclear weapons by gaining access to a
nuclear deterrent itself. This can produce two policies. First, strong states do what they can: they can
pursue a form of internal balancing by adopting the costly, but self-sufficient, policy of developing
their own nuclear weapons. Second, weak states do what they must: they can join a balancing
alliance with a nuclear power, utilizing a promise of nuclear retaliation by that ally as a means of
extended deterrence.

Although nuclear weapons could also be developed to serve either as deter- rents against
overwhelming conventional military threats or as coercive tools to compel changes in the status quo,
the simple focus on states' responses to emerging nuclear threats is the most common and most
parsimonious explanation for nuclear weapons proliferation

From this perspective, one can envision the history of nuclear proliferation as a strategic chain
reaction.

The nuclear weapons decisions of other states can also be explained within the same framework.
London and Paris are seen to have built nuclear weapons because of the growing Soviet military
threat and the inherent reduction in the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee to NATO allies once
the Soviet Union was able to threaten retaliation against the United States.9 China developed the
bomb because Beijing was threatened with possible nuclear attack by the United States at the end of
the Korean War and again during the Taiwan Straits crises in the mid-1950s.

EXPLAINING NUCLEAR RESTRAINT: The major recent cases of nuclear weapons restraint can also be
viewed through the lens provided by the security model if one assumes that external security threats
can radically change or be reevaluated.

South Africa destroyed its small nuclear weapons arsenal in 1991, the theory suggests, because of the
radical reduction in the external security threats to the regime.
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus-decided to give up their arsenals because of a mixture of two realist
model arguments: their long-standing close ties to Moscow meant that these states did not perceive
Russia as a major military threat to their security and sovereignty, and increased U.S. security
guarantees to these states made their possession of nuclear weapons less necessary.17 In short, from
a realist's perspective, nuclear restraint is caused by the absence of the fundamental military threats
that produce positive proliferation decisions.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE SECURITY MODEL: The nuclear states will not use their weapons
against non-nuclear states-can also be helpful in the short-run but will likely not be effective in the
long-term given the inherent suspicions of potential rivals produced by the anarchic international
system. Under the security model's logic, the NPT is seen as an institution permitting non-nuclear
states to overcome a collective action problem. Each state would prefer to become the only nuclear
weapons power in its region, but since that is an unlikely outcome if it develops a nuclear arsenal, it is
willing to refrain from proliferation if, and only if, its neighbors remain non-nuclear.

Under realist logic, however, U.S. nonproliferation policy can only slow down, not eliminate, the
future spread of nuclear weapons. First, the end of the Cold War creates a more uncertain multipolar
world in which U.S. nuclear guaran- tees will be considered increasingly less reliable; second, each
time one state develops nuclear weapons, it will increase the strategic incentives for neigh- boring
states to follow suit.

The security model is parsimonious. Vested interest in explaining that the choices they made served
the national interest; and second, a correlation in time between the emergence of a plausible
security threat and a decision to develop nuclear weapons.

THE DOMESTIC POLITICS MODEL: NUCLEAR PORK AND PAROCHIAL INTERESTS

A second model of nuclear weapons proliferation focuses on the domestic actors who encourage or
discourage governments from pursuing the bomb. Whether or not the acquisition of nuclear
weapons serves the national interests of a state, it is likely to serve the parochial bureaucratic or
political interests of at least some individual actors within the state. Three kinds of actors commonly
appear in historical case-studies of proliferation: the state's nuclear energy establishment (which
includes officials in state-run laboratories as well as civilian reactor facilities); important units within
the professional military.

often within the air force, though sometimes in navy bureaucracies interested in nuclear propulsion);
and politicians in states in which individual parties or the mass public strongly favor nuclear weapons
acquisition. When such actors form coalitions that are strong enough to control the government's
decision- making process-either through their direct political power or indirectly through their control
of information-nuclear weapons programs are likely to thrive

The basic logic of this approach, however, has been strongly influenced by the literature on
bureaucratic politics and the social construction of technology concerning military procurement in
the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

In this literature, bureaucratic actors are not seen as passive recipients of top-down political
decisions; instead, they create the conditions that favor weapons acquisition by encouraging extreme
perceptions of foreign threats, promoting supportive politicians, and actively lobbying for increased
defense spending.

Finally, such a coalition builds broader political support within the executive or legislative branches by
shaping perceptions about the costs and benefits of weapons programs.

Realists recognize that domestic political actors have parochial interests, of course, but argue that
such interests have only a marginal influence on crucial national security issues.

In contrast, from this domestic politics perspective, nuclear weapons programs are not obvious or
inevitable solutions to international security problems; instead, nuclear weapons programs are
solutions looking for a problem to which to attach themselves to justify their existence.

In this model, international threats are seen as being more malleable and more subject to
interpretation and can therefore produce a variety of responses from domestic actors.

PROLIFERATION REVISITED: ADDRESSING THE INDIA PUZZLE: The historical case that most strongly
fits the domestic politics model is the Indian nuclear weapons experience. Indian program reveals
that there was no consensus among officials in New Delhi that it was necessary to have a nuclear
deterrent as a response to the 1964 Chinese nuclear test. If that had been the case, according to
realist logic, one of two events would likely have occurred. f Indian nuclear energy at the time, such
an effort could have produced a nuclear weapon by the mid-to-late 1960s, relatively soon after the
Chinese test, instead of in 1974. Second, leaders in New Delhi could have made a concerted effort to
acquire nuclear guarantees from the United States, the Soviet Union, or other nuclear powers. Indian
officials, however, did not adopt a consistent policy to pursue security guarantees: in diplomatic
discussions after the Chinese test, officials rejected the idea of bilateral guarantees because they
would not conform with India's non- aligned status, refused to consider foreign bases in India to
support a nuclear commitment, and publicly questioned whether any multilateral or bilateral
guarantee could possibly be considered credible.

New Delhi political elite and nuclear energy establishment, between actors who wanted India to
develop a nuclear weapons capability as soon as possible and other actors who opposed an Indian
bomb and supported global nuclear disarmament and later Indian membership in the NPT.

Several observations about the decision, however, do suggest that addressing domestic political
concerns, rather than countering international security threats, were paramount.

Indeed, the domestic consequences of the test were very rewarding: the nuclear detonation occurred
during the government's unprecedented crackdown on the striking railroad workers and contributed
to a major increase in support for the Gandhi government.

But they do constitute stronger evidence than what has been offered in the literature to support a
security model explanation, and provide an answer to what is otherwise the very puzzling occurrence
of a state (India) not developing the bomb for ten years after one rival (China) tested a weapon, and
then changing its proliferation policy and developing and testing a weapon less than three years after
it attacked and dismembered its other rival state (Pakistan).

Considering the domestic politics model, the unusual nature of Indian nuclear weapons policy since
the 1974 test also becomes more understandable; it appears less like a calculated strategy of nuclear
ambiguity and more like a political rationalization for latent military capabilities developed for other
reasons.

DEVELOPMENT AND DENUCLEARIZATION: SOUTH AFRICA REVISITED:

From the domestic model's perspective, one would expect that reversals of weapons decisions occur
not when external threats are diminished, but rather when there are major internal political changes.
There are several reasons why purely internal changes could produce restraint: a new government
has an opportunity to change course more easily because it can blame failed policies of the previous
regime; actors with parochial interests in favor of weapons programs may lose internal struggles to
newly empowered actors with other interests; and the outgoing government may fear that the
incoming government would not be a reliable custodian over nuclear weapon.

A quite different interpretation of the South African weapons program emerges when one
reexamines the history with a focus on domestic political interests rather than national security. For
example, President de Klerk's public explanation for the program stressed that it was caused by the
need to deter "a Soviet expansionist threat to Southern Africa," especially after Cuban military forces
intervened in Angola in October 1975.

The timing and details of actions concerning the decision to dismantle and destroy the existing bomb
stockpile also suggest that domestic political considerations were critical. Klerk's action was
considered by officials in South Africa as a sign that he had already decided to abandon the weapons
program.

The weapons components were dismantled before IAEA inspections could be held to verify the
activities, and all the nuclear program's plans, history of decisions, and approval and design
documents were burned prior to the public announcement of the program's existence.

Domestic politics can also be seen as playing critical roles in other cases of nuclear restrain. Indeed, a
traditional realist view would predict that the experience of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War-in
which Argentina was defeated by a nuclear power, Great Britain-would have strongly encouraged
Argentina's nuclear ambitions. Instead, the important change was the emergence of liberalizing
domestic regimes in both states, governments supported by coalitions of actors-such as banks,
export-oriented firms, and state monetary agencies-who value unimpeded access to international
markets and oppose economically unproductive defense and energy enterprises.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOMESTIC POLITICS MODEL:

With respect to U.S. nonproliferation policy, a domestic politics approach both cautions modest
expectations about U.S. influence and calls for a broader set of diplomatic efforts. A variety of
activities could be included in such a domestic-focused non- proliferation strategy.

Providing technical information and intellectual ammunition for domestic actors-by encouraging
more accurate estimates of the economic and environmental costs of nuclear weapons programs and
highlighting the risks of nuclear accidents40-could bring new members into anti-proliferation
coalitions. In addition, efforts to encourage strict civilian control of the military, through educational
and organizational reforms, could be productive, especially in states in which the military has the
capability to create secret nuclear programs (like Brazil in the 1980s) to serve their parochial interest.

A different perspective on the role of the NPT also emerges from the domes- tic politics model. The
NPT regime is not just a device to increase states' confidence about the limits of their potential
adversaries' nuclear programs; it is also a tool that can help to empower domestic actors who are
opposed to nuclear weapons development.

According to this model, the U.S. commitment under Article VI to work for the eventual elimination of
nuclear weapons is important because of the impact that the behavior of the United States and other
nuclear powers can have on the domestic debates in non-nuclear states.

THE NORMS MODEL: NUCLEAR SYMBOLS AND STATE IDENTITY

A third model focuses on norms concerning weapons acquisition, seeing nu- clear decisions as serving
important symbolic functions-both shaping and reflecting a state's identity According to this
perspective, state behavior is determined not by leaders' cold calculations about the national security
interests or their parochial bureaucratic interests, but rather by deeper norms and shared beliefs
about what actions are legitimate and appropriate in international relations. Given the importance of
the subject, and the large normative literature in ethics and law concerning the use of nuclear
weapons, it is surprising that so little attention has been paid to "nuclear symbolism" and the
development of international norms concerning the acquisition of nuclear.

From this sociological perspective, military organizations and their weapons can therefore be
envisioned as serving functions like those of flags, airlines, and Olympic teams: they are part of what
modern states believe they must possess to be legitimate, modern states.

Similarly, normative beliefs about chemical weapons were important in creating legal restrictions
against their use in war; yet, the norm was significantly reenforced at critical moments by the fear of
retaliation-in-kind and by the availability of other weapons that were believed by military leaders to
be more effective on the battlefield.46 The sociologists' arguments highlight the possibility that
nuclear weapons programs serve symbolic functions reflecting leaders' perceptions of appropriate
and modern behavior.

Why, for example, was nuclear testing deemed prestigious and legitimate in the 1960s, but is today
considered illegitimate and irresponsible? An understanding of the NPT regime is critical here, for it
appears to have shifted the norm concerning what acts grant prestige and legitimacy from the 1960s
notion of joining "the nuclear club" to the 1990s concept of joining "the club of the nation’s adhering
to the NPT." Moreover, the salience of the norms that were made explicit in the NPT treaty has
shifted over time.

PROLIFERATION REVISITED: FRENCH GRANDEUR AND WEAPONS POLICY:

According to realist theory, the French decision to develop nuclear weapons has a very simple
explanation: in the 1950s, the Soviet Union was a grave military threat to French national security,
and the best alternative to building an independent arsenal.

1956 Suez Crisis, when Paris was forced to withdraw its military intervention forces after a nuclear
threat from Russia and under U.S. economic pressure. "The Suez humiliation of 1956 was decisive,"
writes David Yost. "It was felt that a nuclear weapons capability would reduce France's dependence
on the U.S. and her vulnerability to Soviet blackmail.

Lawrence Scheinman has argued, it is by no means clear why French leaders would think that the
traumatic Suez experience could have been avoided if there had been an independent French nuclear
arsenal, since Great Britain had also been forced to withdraw from the intervention in Egypt under
U.S. and Soviet pressure, despite its possession of nuclear weapons.

France appears alone on the nuclear proliferation side of the ledger; West Germany, the
Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, Norway, and Sweden were all on the nuclear restraint side.

A stronger explanation for the French decision to build nuclear weapons emerges when one focuses
on French leaders' perceptions of the bomb's symbolic significance. The belief that nuclear power
and nuclear weapons were deeply linked to a state's position in the international system was present
as early as 1951, when the first French Five-Year Plan was put forward with its stated purpose being
"to ensure that in 10 years' time France will still be an important country. When the French nuclear
weapons arsenal is viewed as primarily serving symbolic functions, a number of puzzling aspects of
the history of French atomic policy become more understandable.

RESTRAINT REVISITED: THE NPT AND THE UKRAINE CASE:

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, an independent Ukraine was "born nuclear" with more
than 4,000 nuclear weapons on or under its soil. In November 1994, however, the Rada in Kiev voted
overwhelmingly to join the NPT as a non-nuclear state, and all weapons were removed from
Ukrainian territory by June 1996. This decision to give up a nuclear arsenal is puzzling from the realist
perspective.

The disarmament decision is also puzzling from a traditional domestic politics perspective. De- spite
the tragic consequences of the Chernobyl accident, public opinion polls in Ukraine showed rapidly
growing support for keeping nuclear weapons in 1992 and 1993.

An understanding of Ukraine's decision to eliminate its nuclear arsenal requires that more attention
be focused on the role that emerging NPT non- proliferation norms played in four critical ways.
Ukrainian officials insisted that renunciation of nuclear weapons was now the best route to enhance
Ukraine's international status.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE NORMS MODEL:

If the norms model of proliferation is correct, the key U.S. policy challenges are to recognize that such
norms can have a strong influence on other states' nuclear weapons policy, and to adjust U.S. policies
to increase the likelihood that norms will push others toward policies that also serve U.S. interests.
Recognizing the possibility that norms can influence other states' behavior in complex ways should
not be difficult. After all, the norms of the NPT have already influenced U.S. nuclear weapons policy in
ways that few scholars or policymakers predicted ahead of time.

Adjusting U.S. nuclear policies in the future to reenforce emerging nonproliferation norms will be
difficult, however, because many of the recommended policies derived from the norms perspective
directly contradict recommendations derived from the other models. Focusing on NPT norms raises
especially severe concerns about how existing U.S. nuclear first-use doctrine influences potential
proliferators' perceptions of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of nuclear weapons possession and use.68
To the degree that such first-use policies create beliefs that nuclear threats are what great powers do,
they will become desired symbols for states that aspire to that status.
Similarly, the norms perspective suggests that current U.S. government efforts to maintain the threat
of first use of nuclear weapons to deter the use of biological or chemical weapons would have a
negative impact on the nuclear nonproliferation regime.69 Leaders of non-nuclear states are much
less likely to consider their own acquisition of nuclear weapons to deter adversaries with chemical
and biological weapons illegitimate and ill-advised if the greatest conventional military power in the
world cannot refrain from making such threats. Other possible policy initiatives are less problematic.
For example, if norms concerning prestige are important, then it would be valuable for the United
States to encourage the development of other sources of international prestige for current or
potential proliferation.

NPT might further remove nuclear weapons possession from considerations of international prestige.
Finally, the norms model produces a more optimistic vision of the potential future of
nonproliferation.

In the short run, therefore, norms can be a brake on nuclear chain reactions: in contrast to more
pessimistic realist predictions that "proliferation begets proliferation," the norms model suggests that
such nuclear reactions to emerging security threats can be avoided or at least delayed because of
normative constraints.

STRATEGIC CHAIN / CHAIN REACTION: US (1945) – USSR(1949) – UK(1952) – FRANCE(1960)

-CHINA(1964) -ISRAE(1967)L – INDIA – SOUTH AFRICA(1979) – PAKISTAN(1987) – DPRK(2006)

The logic of the nuclear market suggests that suppliers will compete to sell technologies and
materials that could make it easier for states to develop nuclear weapons. Not only did it play a key
role in India’s nuclear program, but it also appeared that other countries would follow suit.

I base my analysis on a theory of proliferation that posits that the spread of nuclear weapons is
largely a function of the interactions among suppliers, buyers, and thwarters in the nuclear market. In
the absence of a supplier cartel that can regulate transfers of nuclear material and technology, more
suppliers will enter the market and the level of the competition among them will increase, as they vie
for market share. This facilitates the spread of nuclear material and technology because buyers can
play suppliers off against each other. The ensuing transfers help countries either acquire nuclear
weapons or become hedgers.

The thwarters are the great powers; they seek to counter proliferation by limiting what suppliers can
sell and by putting safeguards on potentially dangerous technologies that can be sold. Their success
depends on two key structural factors: the global distribution of power and the intensity of their
security rivalry. The thwarter’s success at countering proliferation is most likely in unipolarity, least
likely in multipolarity, and falls somewhere in between when the system is bipolar. Moreover, the
more intense the rivalry among the great powers in bipolarity and multipolarity, the less effective
thwarting will be, and thus the more likely it is that nuclear weapons will spread.

As the world is now moving into multipolarity, my theory predicts that the great powers will have
difficulty cooperating to regulate the market, thus leading to an increase in proliferation.
PATHWAY TO THE BOMB: Six pathways are available to a state seeking to build a nuclear weapons
capability. First, it can develop the necessary materials and technologies indigenously. Second, it can
engage in multinational cooperation, whereby several countries collaborate to develop a particular
nuclear technology. Third, it can purchase these materials and technologies from another country in
the nuclear market, commonly understood as nuclear trade.9 Fourth, states may resort to smuggling
rings. Fifth, a state might capture the nuclear facilities of a vanquished enemy. Sixth, international
organizations created to aid countries in developing their civilian nuclear programs can inadvertently
help those interested in proliferating by providing materials, technology, or both that can be used in a
weapons program.

Capturing an enemy’s nuclear facilities has rarely happened, and while the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) helps countries develop nuclear programs, it is also the world’s nuclear
watchdog. Illicit smuggling networks helped Pakistan and North Korea build nuclear weapons, but the
black market is not nearly as robust as the licit one. Indigenous means, multinational cooperation,
and nuclear trade are the most common pathways to the bomb.

This tight interdependence, however, limits a proliferator’s flexibility in its nuclear pursuits. A nuclear
market populated by multiple suppliers competing for market share allows buyers to maximize the
benefits they obtain regarding the quality of the product, price, and, most importantly for
proliferation purposes, terms of use. In short, the nuclear market is a significant pathway to
proliferation.

The more suppliers there are, the more competition there is among them, and the easier it is for
buyers to obtain nuclear transfers that could be used to develop and maintain a nuclear weapons
program.

A market with multiple suppliers works to the buyer’s advantage in three related ways. First, buyers
have finite resources and cannot buy all the goods that all the sellers are offering.

Second, intense competition among multiple suppliers allows buyers to play them off against one
another. A supplier in a competitive market fear that its rivals will steal a customer by offering a
better deal.

Third, a competitive market allows buyers to obtain better prices, products, and terms of use—all of
which facilitate proliferation. Suppliers will want to make their offers to potential buyers as attractive
as possible by lowering the costs of nuclear materials and technology.

In January 1976, the NSG adopted governing guidelines designed to curb competition among its
members and to ensure that nuclear transfers could not be diverted to military uses. The thwarters
demanded that NSG members refrain from selling ENR facilities to countries that did not have them.
If such a sale took place, it was subjected to intrusive inspections by the IAEA.

Cartels change the market in ways that reduce the likelihood of proliferation but do not necessarily
prevent states from aspiring to become NWS or hedger. Such cartels can therefore also reduce the
number of suppliers in the market; not all suppliers, however, join cartels, given the considerable
economic benefits that they can accrue in the market
9-ETHNIC CONFLICT
WHAT IS ETHNICITY?

“A subjective belief in common decent” (Weber)

“Ethnicity involves individuals identifying with each other based on shared characteristics such as
appearance, language, religion, or traditions” (Horowitz)

According to Anthony Smith (1986) a group is an ethnic group if its members share the following
traits.

Common name /common believed descent / elements of shared culture / common historical
memories / attachment to territory

CRITERIA:

We can call a group an "ethnic group" when it Self-perpetuates

Shares core cultural values.

Serves as a sphere for communicating and interacting.

Has a membership that can be self-identified and identified by others based on the group’s
commonalities.

CONTENDING EXPLANATIONS:

Where does ethnicity come from?

Primordialism: ethnicity has always existed; humanity = divided into primordially existing groups
connected by kinship and biological heritage.

Perennialism: ethnic communities = short-lived, constantly changing

Constructivism: ethnic groups = the product of human social interaction (social constructs)
Modernism: ethnic pride = modern invention

Instrumentalism: ethnic identities = devices to unify, organize and mobilize populations to achieve
larger goals

WHAT IS ETHNIC CONFLICT?

Riots

Armed conflicts/civil wars

HOW CAN WE APPROACH ETHNIC CIVIL WARS?

1-INSTRUMENTALIST APPROACH:

What provides the opportunity for rebels to act?

Weak governments

Large populations

Inaccessible terrains

Extremist leaders

Extremist media

Instrumentalist approaches start with what creates the opportunity for rebels to act: weak
governments, large populations and inaccessible terrain create the opening extremists. need to act
(Fearon and Laitin 2003). Also important in many instrumentalist arguments are extremist leaders
seeking to grab or hold onto power, who stir up ethnic disagreements and provoke violence to create
a ‘rally around the flag’ effect, uniting their group around their own leadership (Gagnon 1995). A key
role, from this perspective, is played by extremist media, which seek popularity by appealing to group
loyalties, presenting the news in terms of ‘us’ against ‘them. A prominent example of this kind of
leader is Slobodan Milosevic, who led the upsurge of Serbian national identity that led to the break-
up of Yugoslavia in 1991.

2-SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY APPROACH:

Why do people follow these extremist leaders?

Group myths and fears

Belief that the group is in danger of extinction

Social psychological approaches (e.g. Horowitz 1985) focus on a different puzzle: why do followers
follow these extremist leaders? Even if people mobilize as ethnic groups to look out for their
interests, why do they follow extremist leaders who want violence, instead of following moderate
leaders who will work for peace? One answer is proposed by symbolic politics theory, which
emphasizes the roles of group myths, prejudices, and fears. Remembering that a group is defined by
its myth-symbol complex – the stories it tells about the group’s history and identity – symbolic politics
theory suggests that, when the group’s myth-symbol complex points to the other group as an enemy,
prejudice is a likely result and group members will for that reason be predisposed to be hostile to the
other group.
3-SOCIAL MOBILIZATION APPROACH

How do members of the group get together the people and resources needed for collective action?

Existing social organizations and networks (political parties; labor unions)

Brokers

Social mobilization approaches consider both opportunity and leadership, but are they also
interested in how ethnic groups mobilize – that is, how do members of the group get together the
people and resources needed for collective action? The answer, these theorists point out, is that
people use social organizations and networks that already exist, such as political parties and religious
sects. Successful mobilization efforts find ‘brokers’: people who can link different groups and
networks together to help them cooperate in a single movement.

ETHNIC GROUPS AND CIVIL WARS

Grievances fall along ethnic lines if ruling elites disproportionately favor their own ethnic group at the
expense of others.

Living together in concentrated spaces, sharing the same language and customs, and enjoying deep
ties with ethnic kin allows ethnic groups to mobilize support to demand change.

Ethnic identity = less elastic than other types of identities −→ difficult bargaining challenges (less
credible commitments to solutions).

HOW FREQUENT IS ETHNIC CONLFICTS?

Ethnic civil wars take longer to resolve than non-ethnic civil wars.

The mean duration for ethnic civil war between 1946 and 2005 was 13.7 years while the average non-
ethnic civil war lasted 8.3 years

INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS OF ETHNIC CONLICTS

Empower diasporas

Refugees

International diplomacy (second image reversed) -- DOMESTIC

Violent interventions

R2P

HOW DO ETHNIC CIVIL WARS END?

Ethnic separation

Temporary suppression of the conflict by third party military occupation

Reconstruction of ethnic identities

Power-sharing (consociational democracy)

State-building

Most ethnic conflicts are peaceful, however: while political issues inevitably arise when different
linguistic and religious groups mix, they are usually managed peacefully. The Soviet Union, for
example, included an estimated 120 ethnic groups; yet, when the Soviet Union collapsed, there were
only a handful of cases of violent ethnic conflict.

In the twentieth century, ethnic civil wars – indeed, civil wars of all kinds – were more important than
ever before. In fact, civil wars were more common than inter - national wars throughout the
twentieth century.

On one list of the 10 deadliest civil wars of the twentieth century (Sarkees 2000), half of the cases
were ethnic conflicts. Ethnic conflict is therefore a central issue for security studies. Even ethnic riots
can grow into threats to international security.

For an anthropologist, what these cases all have in common is that the groups involved are primarily
ascriptive – that is, membership in the groups is typically assigned at birth and is difficult to change.

There is another, more complicated side to ethnic identity, however. Most people have multiple
identities that are either ‘nested’.

Furthermore, identities do sometimes change, with new ones emerging and old ones disappearing,
especially in times of crisis. From this perspective, people follow ‘ethnic’ leaders when it is in their
interests to do so, and leaders try to create ethnic solidarity when it works for them. This view of
ethnic identity implies that ethnic conflict can be blamed primarily on selfish leaders who mislead
their followers in pursuit of their own power. A third point of view about ethnic identity mixes the
other two views by emphasizing the degree to which people create their identities.

this view points out that ethnic identities are ‘socially constructed’. They are not ‘natural’ in the sense
that a simple primordialist view would assume; even racial distinctions are just a matter of custom.

Furthermore, constructivists pointed out, the source of these customs was ‘invented traditions’:
writers or scholars who created what Anthony Smith calls a ‘myth-symbol complex’. This myth-symbol
complex establishes the ‘accepted’ history of the group and the criteria for distinguishing who is a
member; identifies heroes and enemies; and glorifies symbols of the group’s identity.

A conflict is ethnic only if the sides involved are distinguished primarily based on ethnicity. Often one
or both sides in an ethnic conflict will be a coalition of ethnic groups, rather than one, but the conflict
is still ethnic because the people involved choose sides based on their ethnic group membership.

What are these violent conflicts about? The simplest answer is political power in a disputed territory.
In most of the recent conflicts, including Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, the combatants are fighting to
dominate the entire country. Often the goals and stakes are unclear, as rebels may disagree with each
other. For example, some Palestinians want to establish their own state alongside Israel, which would
make that a separatist conflict, but other Palestinians are fighting to take over Israel as well.

Another misconception is that ethnic conflicts are ‘merely’ economic. Some scholars argue that the
statistical link between ethnic diversity and civil war is weak, and that the main causes of civil war are
poverty, weak governments and other factors that make it easy to start a guerrilla campaign (e.g.
Fearon and Laitin 2003). The truth, however, is that, while economic grievances are usually present,
in ethnic conflicts they are expressed in ethnic terms.

In the statistics about ethnic conflicts quoted above, the violent conflicts fell into two broad
categories: riots, and armed conflicts or civil wars. Once they begin, they mushroom in size, yielding
widespread violence across a city or an entire country.

Sudan had the preconditions for ethnic war from every perspective. Instrumentalists would note that
its large population, huge land area (the biggest in Africa), hostile neighbors and weak government
provided ample opportunity for rebel groups to form. Symbolists point out that northerners’ myth-
symbol complex glorifies the Mahdiyya as a basis for an Islamic identity for Sudan, and that blatant
racial pre - judice against southerners was common. At the same time, southerners saw Islamist rule
as a disaster for themselves, and they feared northerners’ efforts to spread Islam as a threat to their
own identities. North and south were thus primed for mutual hostility.

Ethnic conflicts often have important international effects. The Bosnian case illustrates a wide range
of such effects. First, the politics of ethnic conflict transcends national boundaries, with ethnic
diasporas often playing an important role. For example, the Croatian émigré community in the US
provided lavish funding for national leader Franjo Tudjman in Croatia, giving his party a significant
edge over moderate rivals in Croatia’s first free elections in 1990.

A second international effect of ethnic civil wars is the creation of refugees. Any warfare generates
displacement, as civilians sensibly flee for their lives from combat areas. Ethnic civil wars, however,
produce especially large numbers of refugees because such wars are often about which group will
control disputed lands, so massacres and evictions – ethnic cleansing – are frequently used weapons.

If, however, they do cross international borders, refugees may be seen as threats to international
security in several different ways. For example, when Serbia began an ethnic cleansing campaign in
Kosovo in 1999, the hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanian refugees who flooded across the
border into Macedonia threatened to destabilize the tenuous ethnic balance between ethnic
Macedonians and the Albanians already there. The result was to bring the US and its NATO allies into
the conflict.

Another effect of ethnic civil wars is that they often become a major issue for international
diplomacy. As the crises in Croatia and Bosnia grew in 1991 and 1992, respectively, diplomats
wrangled over how best to avoid war.

When diplomacy alone is not enough, international actors sometimes resort to sending peacekeepers
to try to manage ethnic violence. If there is a ceasefire in place, peacekeepers can be effective in
helping to maintain it, especially if the warring fact - ions are physically separated with the
peacekeepers posted in between.

Because international interest in ethnic conflicts is often intense, and because peace - keepers are not
always effective, international actors often resort to violent intervention.
Sometimes these interventions are purely opportunistic rather than ethnically based. For example, in
the war in the Mountainous Karabagh region of the former Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan in the early
1990s, Russia switched back and forth between aiding the (Muslim) Azerbaijanis and the (Christian)
Armenians, depending on which side was more pro-Russian at the time.

Because of the danger that ethnic civil wars may spread, international intervention is not always
violent; it is often aimed at stopping the fighting or even at resolving the underlying disputes. Some
theorists argue that the best way to stop an ethnic conflict is to arrange a compromise settlement,
usually with a mixture of power-sharing in the central government and regional autonomy for
disgruntled minority groups (Lijphart 1985). Others maintain that ethnic civil wars end only when a
rebel minority is either repressed by military force or granted its own separate state by partitioning –
dividing up – the existing country (Kaufmann 1996).

10-TERRORISM/COUNTERTERRORISM/COUNTERINSURGENCY
HOW DOES TERRORISM COMPARE TO OTHER CAUSES OF HUMAN SUFFERING SUCH POVERTY,
NATURAL DISASTERS, WARS, CRIMES, DISEASE?

+Terrorism as a cause of death

WHAT IS TERRORISM?

+Violent actions of non-state actors

“the threat of violence and the use of fear to coerce,persuade and gain public attention”

“premediated, politically motivated violence perpetrted against non-combatant targets by

subnational groups or clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience.”

(US DEP OF STATE)

WHAT DO TERRORIST GROUPS WANT?

Fundamental Change

Particular Change

Worldwide Political Change / Regime Change / Territorial Change / Policy Change / Maintain Stat Quo

WHAT IS DIFFERENT TODAY (TRENDS IN TERRORISM)

Reaction to regime change (Terrorism + Insurgency)

Internationalism: Worldwide reach of terrorits organizations like ISIS growing

Suicide Terrorism: More frequent

Speed of Learning

Media Developments

Economic Targeting: More sophisticated

Mass casualty attacks and weapons of mass destruct,on increased fears of WMD use

The 9/11 attacks the issue of terrorism to the forefront of Western security thinking. There are three
elements that together offer some degree of explanation for this concentration. One is that the 9/11
attacks were deeply shocking to the United States in that a small group armed only with parcel knives
could use civil aircraft as flying bombs to destroy a world-class financial center and attack the
headquarters of the US military. Moreover, the attacks came as a complete surprise to most people
and their effects were witnessed live on television. The second element that helps explain the
response is that the Bush administration in mid-2001 was beginning to pursue its vision of a New
American Century with some success. Unilateral stances on some key issues were being developed
and there seemed every prospect that the rest of the world would come to accept American
leadership as being essential for international security – a ‘benign imperium’ was said to be no bad
thing (Krauthammer 2001). Finally, the almost inevitable focus of state-centered security, given the
status of the United States as the world’s sole military superpower, was that it was essential to regain
control by destroying a dangerous sub-state movement and any state sponsors, not least because the
al-Qaida movement and its presumed sponsors were based in the Middle East and South-West Asia.

DEFINITION:

the threat of violence and the use of fear to coerce, persuade, and gain public attention’ (NACCJSG
1976).

Both latter definitions are concerned with the intention to influence an audience that is larger than
the group targeted. It follows that terror - ism works through fear, but it is also the case that acts of
terror may have distinct political aims rather than being, for example, acts of revenge. Moreover, the
specific inducement of fear in a larger audience may be intended to ensure that a particular political
response ensues, when it might not be stimulated by an act that does not elicit a wider response.

STATE AND SUB-STATE TERROR:

There is one fundamental difference between the definition given by Wardlaw and that used by the
United States government in that the latter is concerned with sub-state actors, even if they may be
supported or sponsored by a state, whereas Wardlaw’s definition embraces the actions of states
against their own populations. In broad terms, state terrorism is actually far more widespread in its
effects, both in terms of direct casualties and in the inducing of fear. Some of the most grievous
examples of state terrorism have been the purges of Stalin’s Soviet Union in the 1930s and Mao’s
China in the 1950s, but most colonial powers have used terror tactics to maintain control of colonies,
especially during the early phases of colonization but also in response to the demands for
independence in the early post-war years.

Sub-state terrorism can originate in very different societies and with highly variable motivations and
underlying drivers. One is terrorism that seeks fundamental change in a state or in society. Such
revolutionary terrorism might be based on a political ideology of a radical persuasion that may be
either left- or right-wing in nature, or it might be based on religious commitment.

The other form of terrorism seeks change for an identifiable community. This rarely has international
ambitions but may link up with similar groups elsewhere. It is frequently separatist in nature but may
have elements of revolutionary politics embedded in its thought.

RESPONDING TO TERRORISM:

There are three broad approaches to responding to sub-state terrorism (see also Chap - ter 27). The
approach most used might best be described as traditional counterterrorism rooted principally in
policing, intelligence, and security. Paramilitary groups are identified and taken into custody before
they can carry out attacks, or if this fails then those responsible for attacks are detected, detained,
and subsequently brought to justice.

The second approach is more overtly military and involves direct military action against paramilitary
organizations, especially when they have distinct physical locations. If they are clearly seen to be
sponsored by a state, then that state may itself be targeted for punitive action or even regime
termination. The third approach concentrates on the underlying motivations of terrorist groups and
the environment from which they draw support. While there may be a belief that the leaders and the
most dedicated cadres of a paramilitary organization may have a degree of motivation and
determination that is difficult to undermine, this approach is rooted in the idea that most
paramilitary groups have evolved and are operating within a much wider context.

In the long-running Northern Ireland conflict, the British authorities adopted all three approaches to
counterterrorism. Intensive policing and intelligence-gathering, in Northern Ireland and in Britain,
were accompanied by new legal regulations, including courts that sat without juries and, for one
period, internment without trial. These methods were paralleled by an intensive counterinsurgency
posture by the British Army and local Northern Ireland forces, mainly in Northern Ireland itself but
sometimes in cooperation with the Republic of Ireland.

SUICIDE TERRORISM: As with internationalism, suicide attacks as a facet of terrorism are not new, but
the intensity of the attacks in many countries, and the willingness of so many people to engage in
martyrdom, is novel. Suicide attacks are intrinsically more difficult to counter as an aspect of any form
of political violence.

SPEED OF LEARNING: Most paramilitary groups in the past have been relatively conservative in their
operations, tending to stay with methods that they have developed and have become experienced in
using. There is abundant evidence that these learning environments have combined with the
internationalization of terrorism to allow the far more rapid spread of tac - tics than in the past

MEDIA DEVELOPMENTS: Regional satellite TV news channels, the use of the Internet, CDs, DVDs and
smartphones have all increased the ability of paramilitary groups to promote their causes.

ECONOMIC TARGETING: The development of sophisticated economic targeting strategies by groups

such as the Provisional IRA (see Box 26.1) and insurgents in Iraq has provided a new avenue of
influence and effect. Given the numerous nodes of power and economic activity in
urban/industrialized societies, it is probable that this development is still in its early stages.

MASS CASUALTY ATTACKS: Although there has been no single instance of the large-scale use of
nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapons, the increased use of mass casualty attacks and
the sporadic use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war has raised fears that weapons of mass
destruction will ultimately be used by some terrorist organizations.

COUNTERRORISM:
Responses to terrorism
+ Policing, Intelligence and security (domestic approach)

+Direct Military Action

+Cosmopolitan Approach to Counterrorism (commonality with terrorists and state , deep causes)

DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM

Protection of individual site sor events (Office, build, military basis)

Security provided to entire systems (civil aviation,public transit,banking)

Protection of an entire country (border control,immigration control)

LIMITATIONS

Expensive

Impossible achieve perfect security

Security greater than liberty

INSTRUMENTS

Diplomacy

Intelligence

Financial Controls

Criminal Justice System

Military Force

Understanding counterterrorism requires awareness of such swings in public mood and attention, but
it also requires focusing on the essential elements and issues of counterterrorism that are present
regardless of the political environment.

Counter - terrorism has become primarily an effort directed against non-state terrorist groups. Most
of the principles of counterterrorism, however, apply to both state and non-state varieties of
terrorism.

BASIC ELEMENTS: Counterterrorist policies that reflect the different ways of looking at the causes of
terrorism mentioned above are not mutually exclusive. A government may, for example, promote
political and social change to weaken what it regards as roots of terrorism as well as waging a battle
of ideas against extremist ideologies.
Another fundamental element of counterterrorism focuses on decisions by groups on whether to
conduct more terrorism. Here the idea is to shape incentives for groups to use peaceful rather than
violent means to pursue their objectives.

In some instances, however, a negotiated resolution of issues in conflict can be a major part of
inducing a group to cease terrorism. The most conspicuous case is the Good Friday Agreement in
Northern Ireland reached in 1998. Despite many fits and starts over the subsequent decade, the
peace process centered on that agreement was instrumental in inducing the leadership of the
Provisional Irish Republican Army to give up the use of violence. In some other cases, bargaining
directly with a terrorist group may be beyond consideration but negotiations for new political
arrangements can affect how much terrorist groups retain any popular appeal.

Management includes communications or negotiations with the terrorists. Expertise has been
developed over the years (and has been applied by police services and private security firms to
terrorist as well as non-terrorist hostage situations) on how best to deal with hostage-takers.

Defensive security measures (which sometimes bear the label ‘antiterrorism’) are applied at several
different levels. Most specific is the protection of individual sites, be they office buildings, military
bases, embassies, or any other facility that could become a target of terrorist attack.

The next level of defensive measures is security provided to entire systems. The systems-level security
that has played the greatest role in counterterrorism is that surrounding civil aviation. The inherent
vulnerabilities and mobility of airliners will always make them tempting terrorist targets. The
protection given to commercial aviation today demonstrates two principles of systems-level security.

Defensive security measures have several inherent limitations. They are expensive. The costs are
measured not just in direct monetary expenditures for security, although some commonly used
methods – such as machines that are both effective and efficient in screening large volumes of
luggage of air passengers – are indeed expensive. The less measurable but still significant costs come
in the form of unavoidable inefficiencies imposed on the people being protected and higher costs of
doing business stemming from such things as longer travel time.

COUNTERINSURGENCY
INSURGENCY: Organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the
use of subversion and armed conflict (UK MIN. OF DEFENSE)
COUNTERINSURGENCY: “Those military, paramilitary, political, economic psychological and civic
actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (DOD 2007)

WHAT IS COIN STRATEGY?

Counterinsurgency (COIN) is "the totality of actions aimed at defeating irregular forces".

The Oxford English Dictionary defines counterinsurgency as any "military, or political action taken
against the activities of guerrillas or revolutionaries" and can be considered war by a state against a
non-state adversary.

During insurgency and counterinsurgency, the distinction between civilians and combatants is often
blurred. Counterinsurgency may involve attempting to win the hearts and minds of populations
supporting the insurgency. Alternately, it may be waged in an attempt to intimidate or eliminate
civilian populations suspected of loyalty to the insurgency through indiscriminate violence

Isolate the insurgents from the population

Fight in Urban Areas

Fight Multiple Groups At Same Time

Military must work together with civilian agencies + private sec.com+ aid agencies+ NGO’s + Media

Gain Support Of People (HEARTS AND MINDS)

HEARTS AND MINDS MEANING?

Make people feel like, trust government

Combination of efforts

WHAT IS ROLE OF MILITARY IN COIN?

80 PERCENT POLITICS

20 PERCENT MILITARY