CURRENT HISTORY

November 2009

“Isolation is perhaps the most dangerous situation in multipolarity, so states will pay close
and constant attention to the game of coalition building.”

Emerging Multipolarity:
Why Should We Care?
Barry R. Posen

A
report titled Global Trends 2025: A The Global Trends 2025 finding that unipolarity
Tranformed World, issued last year by the is on the wane, to be slowly replaced by multi-
US National Intelligence Council, advises polarity, is premised on the notion that polarity
us that a multipolar world—that is, a world matters. The notion of polarity as an important
characterized by multiple centers of power—is causal variable emerges from the realist school
gradually emerging. The report attributes this of international relations. Realist theory depicts
to “the rise of emerging powers, a globalizing international politics as a self-help system. With
economy, an historic transfer of relative wealth no sovereign to adjudicate disputes and impose
and economic power from west to east, and the settlements, each actor must look to its own inter-
growing influence of non-state actors.” Given ests relative to those of others. Each state can, if
these trends, it seems appropriate to ask whether it has the power, despoil or conquer others. Thus
a diffusion of power is indeed occurring, why each looks to its own capabilities relative to the
we should care if it is, and what the implications others in order to defend itself.
may be for international politics. Realists observe that the structure of world
The description of the present structure of power has followed various patterns at various
world power as “unipolar”—a characterization times and believe that these patterns naturally
that emerged quickly after the collapse of the have consequences: Since security is the preemi-
Soviet Union and that has gained wide currency nent issue in an anarchic world, the distribution
since—remains difficult to dispute, even now. of capabilities to attack and defend should matter.
The United States still enjoys a very comfortable Some base this belief on observation, others on
margin of superiority over other nations in both deduction. Regardless, it is important to remember
military power and the economic underpinnings that structural realism is a theory of environmen-
that make those capabilities possible. Additionally, tal constraints and incentives. Structures con-
America has the global diplomatic and mili- strain. They push and they pull. The combination
tary presence—and the diplomatic and military of global anarchy and the distribution of capabili-
skills—necessary to manage and sustain a truly ties creates fields of force that affect all the states
global foreign policy, if not always successfully. No in the system but do not determine anything.
other nation-state can do so at this time. It is dif- Different international structures do appear,
ficult for the moment to envision a plausible com- however, to encourage different patterns of behav-
bination of nation-states that could truly stand ior. Modern international politics has mainly been a
against the United States in a hot war (whatever multipolar affair, featuring a handful of states with
that would look like under present conditions), or significant capabilities, all of them warily watching
even sustain the costs of a cold war. one another. During the cold war, we saw for the
first time in modern history a bipolar structure of
power, which lasted perhaps four decades.
Barry R. Posen is a professor of political science and direc-
tor of security studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech- The post–cold war world has seen an equally
nology. rare unipolar structure of power, which now

347
348  •  CURRENT HISTORY  •  November 2009

seems unlikely to last longer than the cold war’s States, the most powerful war machine of World
bipolar order lasted. Current discourse seems to War II, had distilled very little before the war.
expect that the structure of power will, if any- Today the United States uses 4 to 5 percent of
thing, revert quickly to bipolarity with the rise its GDP for military purposes. None of the other
of China. It seems plausible, however, that a pro- major powers allocates this much, though some
longed period of multipolarity will occur before could. America’s high propensity to distill, com-
bipolarity reemerges, if indeed it ever does. pared to that of the rest of the world, contributes
substantially to the current pattern of politics
Measuring power that we describe as unipolar. Yet it is plausible
Although political science strives for objective that fiscal imbalances will over the next 10 or 15
measures of power, they are elusive. In interna- years require a significant reduction in the share
tional politics it is the powerful who measure of GDP that the United States devotes to military
relative power, and their assessments, though not spending.
fully auditable, are the ones that matter. This is The existence of a bipolar world during the
not to say that statesmen spend their days specu- cold war was seldom questioned, but in retro-
lating on the polarity of the international system spect one marvels a bit that the Soviet Union
they inhabit. Rather, they respond to the con- stayed in the game as long as it did. Its latent
straints and possibilities they perceive. Over time power—its GDP—only briefly surpassed half that
their behaviors tell us which powers they believe of the United States. The Soviets simply distilled a
matter, and why. greater percentage of their economic capacity into
Two examples serve to demonstrate the dis- military power. This effort probably helped drive
junction between seemingly objective measures the Soviet economy into its ultimate downward
of polarity and statesmen’s behaviors. The Soviet spiral. By the early 1980s even Japan’s economic
Union was only barely in the output surpassed that of the
league of the United States Soviet Union. The world was
for most of the cold war in bipolar, but the Soviet grip
Diplomacy becomes a respected
terms of economic capacity, on its position was not very
yet we think of the era as a career again under multipolarity. firm.
bipolar order. Likewise, the The last multipolar world
United States was far and also looks quite unequal
away the most economically capable state in the when economic power, which translates into
international system on the eve of World War II, latent war potential, is examined. Various mea-
yet we view that period as one of multipolarity. sures of economic capability and war potential in
Analysts typically measure polarity by the dis- the late 1930s show the United States to be wildly
tribution of states’ capabilities, but capabilities superior to other great powers. This world was
can be imminent or latent, and patterns of politi- multipolar because the United States spent a tiny
cal behavior can deviate from seemingly objec- percentage of its wealth on military power, and
tive measures. And polarity is not synonymous involved itself only haltingly and episodically in
with equality. In any given historical period there relations among the great powers in Europe and
seems to be a murky threshold that separates most Asia. (We should also note that once the United
nation-states from the handful that constitute the States did mobilize for war, the capabilities of
great powers. The great powers themselves vary in the “balancing” coalition—America, the United
their capabilities. Kingdom, and the Soviet Union—dwarfed those
Since the industrial revolution, military power of the Axis powers; yet the reversal of German and
has depended on the economic power from which Japanese gains proved a difficult, costly, bloody,
it is distilled. Yet most states typically do not distill and time-consuming business.)
as much as, in extremis, they could. The Second So history tells us that equal capabilities are
World War showed what industrial powers can do not required for states and statesmen to treat each
when they really care, with the United States spend- other as important strategic actors. Nor can we
ing roughly 40 percent of gross domestic product easily predict what ratios of material power will
(GDP) on the war effort at its peak, and other com- induce them to do so. All we can suggest is that
batants spending an even greater share. Peacetime the cold war, when it ended, left the world with a
expenditures seldom rise to this level. The United very skewed distribution of capabilities—unipo-
 Emerging Multipolarity  •  349

larity, which does seem to have led to a distinct Although some predicted the demise of one or
pattern of international politics. That distribution the other superpower, theorists did not anticipate
of power seems destined to change over the next the unipolar world. Scholars had to figure it out as
several decades, and I suspect at some point we it unfolded. The United States is the only “unipole”
will begin to see a different, distinct pattern of we have ever seen, and it is difficult when evaluat-
international politics. ing predictions regarding the unipolar world to
distinguish between deductions from realist theory
Bipolar and unipolar and observations of what has actually occurred.
Putting aside real-world strategic factors such Different schools of realism would offer differ-
as geography and military technology, different ent predictions for unipolarity. “Offensive realists”
systems of polarity should produce different pat- would expect the single pole to try to take advan-
terns of behavior. Kenneth Waltz famously argued tage of its moment of superiority to consolidate
for the stability of the bipolar world, though that moment: In an anarchical world, permanent
some of that stability probably arose from mat- top-dog status provides as much security as
ters beyond his abstract depiction of the system. one can reasonably expect. “Defensive realists”
The two major powers in a bipolar system face expected the United States to lose its interest in
no security threats remotely as significant as each international politics, and simply do less. The
other. They can find no allies in the world that structure of power offers no imminent threat, so
can consequentially alter the balance of power why divert significant resources from consump-
with the other. The prediction then is that they are tion to foreign affairs, including war?
obsessed with one another’s behavior, internally What has actually transpired deviates some-
and externally. Because allies do not add much, what from the predictions of both schools. The
the superpowers focus on “internal balancing.” unipole has thrown its weight around as the offen-
They are obsessed with their relative economic sive realists would expect, and has tried to shape
and technical prowess, but more specifically they the system according to its perceived interests. On
focus on the military balance. the other hand, lacking the discipline provided by
Despite the arithmetical fact that, for the two an imminent threat, the United States has engaged
powers in a bipolar system, allies do not add abroad capriciously, and with limited energy,
much capacity relative to the other major power, which the defensive realists might expect.
each power carefully watches the other’s external Other powers could not make heads or tails of
behavior just in case an external move produces the American orientation. Close and capable cold
an improvement in the other’s overall power war allies—NATO, Europe, and Japan—feared that
position. Even gains that are not very cumulative Washington would do too little or do too much,
are presumed to be cumulative, unless and until abandon them or drag them into adventures.
proven otherwise. Thus peripheries disappear. Broadly speaking, they hugged the United States
Finally, because the two watch each other so close and simultaneously hedged against its exit,
carefully, one expects their understanding of the even as they tried, however haltingly and unsuc-
power balance, and of the costs of war, to be cessfully, to discipline US behavior. Other middle
quite good at any given time. Since they do not powers worried more about an excess of US energy,
depend much on allies for their power, miscal- and have done what they could to throw monkey
culations about relative power associated with wrenches in the works. Their weakness, however,
the possible defection of allies are minimized. has constrained their efforts and induced caution.
Although Waltz contended that all this made These patterns of behavior make sense from
the bipolar world stable, its short duration sug- a realist perspective. They are consistent with
gests otherwise. In fact, bipolarity is a system of a unipole that finds many opportunities in the
chronic overreaction, internal and external. In international system, but little necessity. Other
retrospect it seems that such a structure was des- powers are forced to focus on the unipole’s real
tined to exhaust one or both of the players. That and potential behavior, but they have few options
it did not erupt in war may be attributable to the to address either. Nevertheless, they try.
fact that the structure of power provided limited
scope for miscalculation of power and interest; The multipolar moment
or it may be a function of the nuclear balance, or Theorists and historians know multipolarity
a combination. better than they do the other two structures of
350  •  CURRENT HISTORY  •  November 2009

power, but there are no active statesmen today logical, economic, and social equals, an ongoing
with experience of a multipolar system. The revolution in military information technology—
relatively equal distribution of capabilities in including surveillance and precision targeting—
a multipolar world, with three or more conse- will make it harder to attack than to defend. It
quential powers, produces one basic pattern of should be more difficult to take ground than to
behavior: The arithmetic of coalitions influences hold it, and more challenging to cross oceans
matters great and small. The overall balance of with men and materiel and land them on a hostile
capabilities, and the military balance in particular, shore than to prevent amphibious attack. All of
are easily altered in a significant way depending these factors, added to a somewhat more equitable
on who sides with whom. Internal efforts cannot distribution of military power, should tend to
accomplish nearly as much change, at such a low mute great power military competition.
cost, in such a short time. Some competition for power is to be expected,
Thus states are slower to react to others’ inter- however. The experience of the United States
nal military developments, because allies can be as the unipole should be a cautionary one—an
had to redress the balance. In a multipolar system, extremely secure state nevertheless reached out
states should lack confidence that significant mili- to expand its power and influence. A great deal of
tary buildups can help them much, because other American behavior overseas was elicited by some
states can combine against them. Autonomous combination of fear about the future and tempta-
military power does remain important, and states tion presented by a power vacuum. We can expect
will look to their own military capabilities, but national security establishments to worry about
diminishing returns should set in sooner than the future: So long as anarchy permits predation,
they would in other structures of power. they will ensure against the possibility.
Diplomacy becomes a respected career again Uncertainty about power relationships also will
under multipolarity. Hans Morgenthau, a great remain. States in normal times may distill eco-
admirer of multipolarity, was also a great admirer of nomic power into military power at only a frac-
diplomacy. Isolation is perhaps the most dangerous tion of the level they could achieve under other
situation in multipolarity, so states will pay close conditions, and none can truly know the oth-
and constant attention to the game of coalition ers’ possible energy or efficiency to distill in the
building. They will try to find and secure allies for future. Thus, they will seek some comfort margin
themselves, and will eye warily the efforts of others in the military capabilities that matter most to
to do the same. All will try to improve their own them, which will in turn discomfit others.
coalitions and erode those of others. Moreover, some natural resources will seem
If indeed the distribution of capabilities among scarce. Even if market-oriented states eschew
great powers is slowly evolving toward multipolar- direct control of foreign production, they will
ity, what behaviors might we predict? As we try to wish to maintain privileged influence over these
say something about real matters in a real world, producers, as we have seen in the case of energy
a problem quickly emerges: Other facts of the supplies. States also will continue to worry about
case begin to complicate our analysis, even if we the strategic value of key geographic features,
stick largely to security matters. The United States locally and globally. All members of the system
is buffered by oceans from much of the world’s likely will continue to compete, therefore, to
traditional security competition and remains well improve their position and simultaneously under-
endowed with the human and material resources mine that of their brothers and sisters.
to go it alone. Indeed, many of the world’s conse-
quential powers are buffered by geography from The diffusion of power
one another. All but two of the consequential The emerging era’s great powers, beyond their
powers possess significant nuclear forces, which direct concerns with one another, are likely to
makes them difficult to conquer or even coerce. face a phenomenon that some are calling “the
Japan and Germany are excluded from the nuclear diffusion of power.” This concept remains a bit
club, but could enter it quickly. airy but it encompasses several trends that appear
Arguably, even among great powers, a close to be real and meaningful. First, despite Western
examination of conventional capabilities might military-technological prowess, the gap appears to
show an emerging “defense dominant” world. It be narrowing between the great powers’ military
seems plausible that, among proximate techno- capabilities and those of middle powers, small
 Emerging Multipolarity  •  351

states, and non-state groups that choose to oppose selves at war with domestic political factions, or
them—at least when it comes to military forces as willing or unwilling hosts to violent non-state
pertinent to conquest and occupation. actors. Even before the Al Qaeda attacks on New
One reason for this was the collapse of the York and Washington on September 11, 2001, the
Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, which permitted great powers were uneasy about these weak or
a vast outflow of infantry weapons. At the same failing states. They loathed the human rights vio-
time, some of the former Soviet republics and East lations that are a hallmark of civil war. And they
European Warsaw Pact states inherited arms pro- feared the negative externalities of refugee flows
duction capabilities in search of markets. China and criminal enterprises. The 9/11 attacks added a
will soon begin to produce and export moderately concern that these poorly governed spaces would
sophisticated military equipment. In addition, prove hospitable to terrorist groups. Most great
some new producers have entered the market, power military intervention since the end of the
with Iran perhaps the most noteworthy. More cold war has been driven by the problem of weak-
states are able to make medium-quality military ened central governments.
equipment than has previously been the case. This Finally, there is particularly great concern about
has the effect of making small states and non-state states that are capable enough to build advanced
actors more independent of great power influence weapons, especially nuclear weapons, but never-
than they once were, and more able to inflict costs theless weak enough to risk collapse and the loss
on great powers that attack them. of control over said weapons. Pakistan is again the
Military skill also seems to have diffused. most troubling example. The diffusion of power
The spread of literacy and the freer flow of in this case thus creates a strange combination—
people, goods, and information associated with major threats to the safety of the strong emanating
globalization may permit states and non-state from the weak.
groups that are willing to In such an environment,
fight larger powers to share we can expect that the great
lessons and improve their The pattern of competition will powers will continue to view
overall military expertise. the developing world as a
look much like an endless series of
Moreover, across the devel- source of security threats,
oping world, weapons and games played for small stakes. meriting intervention. But
expertise can be combined not all great powers in a mul-
with significant numbers of tipolar system will agree on
motivated young men. The upshot is that great any given project, so some will view the “defensive”
powers may have to pay a higher premium to push projects of others as having ulterior motives. Some
the smaller ones around than has been true in the states will have an incentive to hinder the efforts
recent past. of their peers to pacify ungoverned spaces. Their
Although comparison is tricky, it is striking that direct interest may be engaged, or the interven-
the Americans’ effort in Iraq has been about as tion may prove a tempting opportunity to “bleed”
time-consuming and costly in dollar terms as their other great powers. Their capabilities to do so will
effort in Vietnam, and the adversary in Iraq did not improve, particularly given the growing military
have a superpower patron, or even a particularly skill of the indigenous peoples they can assist.
good cross-border sanctuary. The United States did States organizing interventions will therefore be
deploy many fewer people for the Iraq operation very concerned about costs. They will seek allies
than it did in Vietnam, and suffered fewer deaths. to spread the costs around, and will attempt to dis-
A comparison of overall casualties, however, awaits suade others from helping the locals.
clearer information about the range and duration
of less visible physical and psychological injuries Persistent competition
that US forces have suffered. The less visible human What general patterns of great power behavior
costs appear to be significant. could emerge in a multipolar environment, based
The diffusion of power has another meaning. on the situation discussed above? First, the com-
Across much of the developing world, central petition for power is likely to persist, though this
governments weakened more or less as the cold is more a statement of general realist religious
war ended. Pakistan is only the scariest example. conviction than an inference from the multipolar
Weakening central governments may find them- structure of power. Second, because of “defense
352  •  CURRENT HISTORY  •  November 2009

dominance,” the pattern of competition will look military power will likely narrow. As this occurs,
much like an endless series of games played for the other principal powers will find themselves
small stakes. States will want more, but will not better able to tilt with the United States, but also
wish to court disaster. more dependent on themselves. A multipolar
Third, and consequently, states will look for order may gradually creep up on us, rather than
ways to “measure power” without war. The diplo- emerge with a crash.
macy of making and breaking coalitions, and Many theorists have debated whether one kind
counting allies, will present itself as an attractive, of power structure is more “stable” than another.
if complex, alternative. Fourth, competitors likely But definitions of stability are fluid. Some mean
will believe that the safe way to improve one’s rela- peace, others mean only the absence of great war,
tive position is to pursue policies that weaken oth- and still others merely mean persistence. Some
ers. Increasing others’ costs when they undertake believe multipolarity is more stable, while others
initiatives will seem wiser than undertaking one’s assert the stability of bipolar worlds.
own adventures. John Mearsheimer’s “bait and We have experienced long periods of relative
bleed” strategies may become more common. peace in multipolar systems. Some scholars refer
Fifth, the diffusion of power will continue to to the period between the end of the Napoleonic
seduce great power adventures. Yet the capabili- Wars and the outbreak of the First World War as
ties of local actors, and the potential intervention, the “hundred years’ peace.” In that time crises
even if indirect, of other great powers, will raise erupted and major powers fought limited wars,
the potential costs of those adventures. Therefore, but no truly great war took place. That period
these projects too will increase the importance was, of course, followed by a bloodbath.
of other powers. Diplomacy will be required to The bipolar era lasted a little less than half a
discourage opposition, encourage alliance, or at century, and no superpower war occurred. But
least elicit neutrality. Sixth, in general, geography the cold war was characterized by vast military
may matter more. If capabilities are more equal, spending, numerous dangerous crises, horren-
states will have to make harder choices about the dous proxy wars, and a nuclear arms race that left
kinds of military power they generate. Land pow- tens of thousands of warheads on both sides, an
ers will be land powers, and sea powers will be sea absurd accumulation of destructive power. It also
powers, and thus to tilt with each other they will probably exhausted the Soviet Union.
require allies of the other type. The National Intelligence Council’s Global
Trends 2025 report warns that multipolar systems
The question of stability are “more unstable than bipolar or unipolar sys-
The transition from bipolarity to unipolar- tems.” This sentence is difficult to decode. I find
ity was marked by dramatic events. Perhaps the it more accurate to speak simply of the differ-
intense nature of the bipolar competition natu- ences among these systems. Bipolarity is a tightly
rally led to a stark finish of one kind or another: a coupled, simple, and intensely competitive sys-
preventive war, or a national collapse. Unipolarity tem. Opportunities for creative expansionists
seems destined for a different kind of transition. are few, but life is very tense. Multipolarity is
The United States has many attributes that con- complex, flexible, and full of options, and these
tribute to its power advantage and its security, very qualities seduce the creative expansionist
and that have made the world unipolar. It seems into a search for opportunities, which occasion-
unlikely that all of these advantages would sud- ally exist.
denly disappear. Direct competition with the Unipolarity is still the least understood struc-
United States will appear daunting for quite some ture of power. Leadership by a single very great
time to come. power with an incentive to manage the system
The costs of US efforts to make the world over limits competition among the others through a
in its image, relative to the benefits of such efforts, combination of deterrence and reassurance, but
will ultimately begin to tell, however. America we do not have a good sense of just how superior
will gradually be inclined to do less. At the same that power needs to be to sustain this happy out-
time, uneven growth will alter the basic balance come. If multipolarity is indeed on the horizon,
of capabilities among the principal powers. The all I can suggest is that the pattern of international
American capability advantage in economic power politics ahead will likely be quite different from
will diminish, and concomitantly its advantage in that of the past 65 years. ■