Inside the Cave: The Banality of I.R.

Studies
Author(s): James Kurth
Source: The National Interest , Fall 1998, No. 53 (Fall 1998), pp. 29-40
Published by: Center for the National Interest

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/42897158

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 Inside the Cave
The Banality of LR. Studies

produced about America's international role,

certainly been among the and about international relations generally,
THE most certainlymostTWENTIETH
- if not the -most
if not been the most among century - grand the has
- grand would be commensurably rich and grand. But
and dramatic centuries in the history of inter- of course, we know that this is not the case.
national relations. In the military sphere, Most readers of The National Interest will have
there was the First World War, the Second only a vague idea of what is being written by
World War, and the Cold War (really a third leading academics about international affairs,
world war). In the economic sphere, there was and this with good reason. In the sole super-
the Great Depression of the 1930s, the long power, the higher learning about internation-
boom of the 1950s-60s, and the oil shocks and al relations does not loom large on the intel-
world inflation of the 1970s. History doesn't lectual landscape. Its practitioners are not
get any more grand and dramatic than this. only rightly ignored by practical foreign poli-
And at the end of the story comes the tri- cy officials; they are usually held in disdain by
umphal conclusion: the United States as the their fellow academics as well.
sole superpower, as the hegemon of the global This essay will offer a map of the land-
economy, and as the first universal nation - scape of international relations thinking in the
bestriding the world more grandly than any United States. In general, it is a view of a
empire since that of Rome. great American desert. It will point to a few
In the same century, the universities of refreshing and enlivening oases, however, and
the United States have become the greatest it will suggest how these oases might grow to
and richest academic institutions in the histo- reclaim the desert and make it bloom.
ry of intellectual life. Part of this is the result
of the numerous services that the universities
The Two Great Traditions
performed for the U.S. government during
the Cold War. Part of it is the result of great
national wealth. And part of it is due to the THERE ditions
ditionsHAVE
in the ininterpretation
the BEEN interpretation
of two great tra- of
numerous scholars that have flocked to the international relations. One tradition empha-
universal nation - the nation made up of peo- sizes such ideas as the autonomous actions of
ples from everywhere and representing every sovereign states, the anarchy of international
culture - from all over the world. relations, the importance of national power,
Surely then, we might reasonably think, and the pursuit of national interests. For the
the theories that American academics have past half century this perspective has been
known as realism. The other tradition empha-
James Kurth is professor of political science atsizes such ideas as the necessity for states to
Swarthmore College. engage in international cooperation, the har-

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mony of interests, the importance of interna- Kennan has been the native-born American
tional economic exchanges, and the erosion of with the most sensitive and profound under-
the nation-state. For the past quarter century, standing of the reality and the tragedy of
this perspective has been known as liberalism. Central Europe in the twentieth century.
Each perspective has its strengths (otherwise it It is no accident that the great representa-
could not have continued to exist decade after tives of the realist tradition have been either
decade). Each has its weaknesses (and, taken Germans or Americans intimately familiar
seriously, these could have dire consequences with Germany. The realist tradition was com-
for America's role in international affairs). pletely natural and logical for Continental
There is also a third perspective that we powers operating within a balance of power
should consider. It is not yet really a great tra- system, particularly for a power at the center
dition in the interpretation of international of the continent, i.e., Germany. As we shall
relations, but rather a major tradition in the see, however, it has not been so natural and
study of comparative politics. In the future, logical for a great maritime power, even one
however, it may prove to be the most useful, on a continental scale, i.e., the United States.
even if the most demanding, perspective from The realist perspective was very good at
which Americans can view their role in the explaining the great wars of the first half of
world. It emphasizes the distinctive cultural the twentieth century. The scramble for
characteristics of different societies, as they are colonies, the arms races, the competitive
expressed by different kinds of states in the mobilizations of 1914 - all of these events
international arena. Many of these cultural leading up to the First World War fit realist
characteristics derive from the great religions. concepts, especially the concept of the securi-
A few of these societies are nation-states (e.g., ty dilemma. Similarly, the ruthless pursuit of
Britain, France, Germany, and Japan). Others national interest, the brutal display of military
are multicultural states (e.g., the United power, and the fatal consequences of neglect-
States, Canada, and Russia). And others are ing realist precepts - all of these factors lead-
entire civilizations largely under the rule of ing up to the Second World War fit realist
one government (e.g., China and India). concepts, especially the emphasis on the
prime importance of national power.
Even within these successes of the realist
The Realist Tradition : Power & Tragedy
interpretation, however, there could be found
some anomalies. In regard to the First World
THE realist FOUNDING
realist tradition
tradition was wasasThucydides, father of the as
Thucydides, War, it could be argued (and was argued by
he developed this distinct perspective in his President Woodrow Wilson and other
great book, The Peloponnesian War. Written Americans) that the sudden outbreak and pro-
twenty-four centuries ago, this awesome longed stalemate of that horrendous war, the
achievement has never been surpassed in its very Great War itself, was a result of the fail-
rich and lucid understanding of the reality, ure , not the success, of realist concepts and
and the tragedy, of relations and wars between precepts. Surely the balance of power system
independent states. and the dual-alliance system, so much in
In the modern era, the realist tradition keeping with realist notions, made the war as
was developed in Europe by Carl von great as it was.
Clausewitz in On War , Leopold von Ranke in Similarly, in regard to the Second World
The Primacy of Foreign Policy , and Friedrich War, it was all very well to say that realist
Meinecke in Reason of State. In America, it has concepts and precepts like balance of power
been ably represented by Hans Morgenthau, and containment (as were advocated by
Henry Kissinger, and George Kennan. The Winston Churchill) could have prevented
first two were refugees from Nazi Germany; the war. But, as it happened, the leading

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 British academic realist of the time, E.H. cy of containment and the strategy of nuclear
Carr, writing in his influential 1939 book The deterrence. Even within this success of the
Twenty Years ' Crisis , 1919-1939 , gave an realist interpretation, however, there again
extremely comprehensive and sophisticated could be found some anomalies. In regard to
argument for the policy of appeasement. If the division of Europe, it could be argued
realist concepts and precepts could lead to (and was argued by that eminent realist,
such opposite policies as containment and George Kennan) that U.S. national interests
appeasement on an issue of such importance would better be served by a policy of disen-
as what to do about Nazi Germany, then gagement that would create a neutral buffer
they hardly could be of much practical use to zone in Central Europe. Similarly, in regard
statesmen trying to make decisions. to the Vietnam War, a prime example of com-
In between the two great world wars, petition for influence in the Third World,
there was a great economic calamity. The Hans Morgen thau argued against the U.S.
Great Depression clearly resulted from the intervention, while Henry Kissinger was in
economic disruption caused by the First favor of it. Again, if realist concepts and pre-
World War and it even more clearly resulted cepts could lead to such opposite policies as
in the Second World War. However, realists containment and disengagement in regard to
had virtually nothing to say about it. Their the Soviet Union and to such opposite poli-
concepts and precepts, focused almost exclu- cies as intervention and non-intervention in
sively upon military ("security") issues, could the Vietnam War, then they hardly could be
not encompass economic ones, even if these of much practical use to statesmen (even
had the gravest of consequences for interna- Kissinger) trying to make decisions.
tional security. In the midst of the Cold War and at the
Eventually (forty years later), there was end of the Vietnam War, there came the
developed a power-centered interpretation of breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and
the origin of the world depression. This was the oil price revolution. The first clearly
the account by Charles Kindleberger of MIT resulted from the decline in the dollar gener-
in his 1973 book, The World in Depression , ated by the Vietnam War, and the second was
1929-1939. But Kindleberger was a distin- accelerated and deepened on account of the
guished economic historian, not a realist the- October 1973 Middle East war. In turn, they
orist of international affairs. Further, while he created instability in important military
argued for the necessity of an "economic spheres, such as U.S. containment of the
hegemon" that would ensure the smooth Soviet Union and U.S. influence in the Middle
operation of the international economy, real- East. Despite this, academic realists had virtu-
ists have always argued that a hegemon is ally nothing to say about these momentous
what every other power would, or at least international occurrences. Again, their con-
should, strive to prevent. cepts and precepts, founded almost exclusively
upon military issues, could not encompass
economic ones, even if these had serious con-
THE century SECOND
century was thewasreally
the half really of the American twentieth
American sequences for international security.
part of the century. How did realist concepts Finally, near the end of the twentieth
and precepts fit the major military and eco- century came one of the greatest, and the
nomic occurrences of this period? strangest, events in the history of internation-
The realist perspective could readily al relations, the sudden collapse of the Soviet
explain the Cold War. The division of Europe Union and the end of the Cold War. What
into two blocs, the competition for influence did this event tell us about the validity and
in the Third World, and the competitive arms vitality of realist concepts and precepts?
race all fit realist concepts, especially the poli- On the one hand, a central cause of the

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Soviet collapse was the determined policies of heights. They understand Thucydides, and
containment and military buildup of President like Thucydides they also understand
Ronald Reagan. Ironically, however, at the Sophocles. Thucydides would recognize each
time that Reagan was pursuing these policies, of them to be one of his own.

most distinguished realists, including Kennan

and even Kissinger, criticized them. They did Structural Realism: The Academic
not think of Reagan as being a realist but
Revision of the Realist Tradition
rather as an ideologue, even a simplistic ideal-
ist (and "idealism" had always been soundly
condemned by realists). MORGENTHAU, Kissinger,
Kissinger, of course,ofwere
course, Kennan, were very and dif-
very dif-
On the other hand, as Reagan himself ferent in the degree to which they actually
knew, his military policies could only work made or influenced U.S. foreign policy in the
because of the basic economic weaknesses of course of their careers. Morgenthau was a
the Soviet economy, particularly the inability well-known commentator, Kennan a promi-
of the Soviet Union to compete in interna- nent diplomat, and Kissinger a famous nation-
tional markets. This was the second central al security advisor and secretary of state. But
cause of the Soviet collapse. And on this the they were all prolific in their writings in the
realists had nothing to say. leading opinion journals that dealt with inter-
The realist perspective, thus, has had a national affairs at the time, such as Foreign
rather checkered record in interpreting the Affairs , Foreign Policy , and The New Republic .
great international occurrences of the twenti- They were also very different in the
eth century. In the first half of the century, extent that they were academics in the course
when Europe and its balance of power were of their careers. Morgenthau taught for many
central to international affairs, realism at best years at the University of Chicago, Kennan
could account for the two world wars, but wrote from the Institute for Advanced Study
even there its interpretation was ambiguous near Princeton, and Kissinger taught for
and underdetermining. In the second half of about a decade at Harvard. But none of them
the century, when America and the bipolar saw himself as an academic; they were in the
system were central to international affairs, academic world, but not of it. For such men,
realism's record was even less impressive. It the fact that their writings were characterized
could account for the beginning and continu- as being more about reality and tragedy than
ing of the Cold War, but it could not account about rigor and theory was not a serious criti-
in important cases (like Vietnam) for how the cism. This was also true of two other distin-
Cold War was conducted and how it came to guished realists, Robert W. Tucker and
an end. Robert Osgood, both of Johns Hopkins
The real strengths of realism do not lie in University. Although principally academics,
its concepts and precepts, in its clear and they too published extensively in the leading
accurate understanding of the reality of inter- opinion journals.
national affairs. Rather, they lie in its attitudes Most academics, however, are only acade-
and sensibilities, in its mature and profound mics. In the course of their careers, they have
understanding of the tragedy of international been paid a salary only by a university; they
affairs. This is ironic, of course, given the are one-dimensional people. They therefore
general disdain that most realists have for have not had the breadth of experience to
such "soft" phenomena as attitudes and sensi- give them a sense of the reality of interna-
bilities. But these and the understanding of tional relations; nor have they had the depth
tragedy that they bring are the very qualities of experience to give them a sense of its
that lift the writings of Morgenthau, tragedy. These are the hollow men, and the
Kissinger, and, above all, Kennan to the shallow men, too.

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 For such people, there are only a few tional relations, such as International Security
kinds of achievements possible in regard to and World Politics , and never in the policy
international relations. One of them is to sit journals such as Foreign Affairs , The National
down and spin out theories that fellow acade- Interest , Foreign Policy , and World Policy
mics will praise as being rigorous and origi- Journal. But in the academic literature it has
nal. (Merely being realistic and responsible, been cited profusely.
in contrast, will not evoke their praise.) In When Waltz applied his abstract theory
truth, most academics are only concerned to policy issues, he demonstrated why he was
about the good opinion of about a dozen ignored by policy professionals. Waltz argued
other academic specialists in their particular that international stability would be increased
sub-sub-field. by nuclear proliferation; more nuclear powers
It was only a matter of time before the would make for less international aggression.
realist tradition would be appropriated by the There probably has not been a single foreign
theoretical academics. The result was struc- policy professional in the U.S. government
tural realism. who has found this notion to be helpful.
Realism had often assumed a balance of
power system, one composed of several great
International Security Studies : The
powers. This was indeed realistic up through
Highest Stage of Academic Realism
the first half of the twentieth century. With
the advent after 1945 of the bipolar system
consisting of the United States and the Soviet BUT beingbeing onlyonly
Waltz an academic
should aneccentric. He be eccentric. dismissed He as
academic not
Union, however, a main assumption of real- also mentored about two dozen younger acad-
ism ceased to be realistic. emic specialists in international relations and
One of the first scholars to think system-security studies. They have written in the
atically about the special dynamics of a bipolar1980s and 1990s a large number of useful (and
system was Kenneth Waltz, who in 1964 pub-
realistic) books on such topics as the dynamics
of multipolar systems, alliance formation,
lished an important article on "the stability of
a bipolar world", and who became one of two arms races, offensive versus defensive strate-
gies, and stable versus unstable deterrence.
leading international relations scholars at the
University of California at Berkeley (the The international security scholars also pub-
other, whom we will mention later, was Ernstlish and debate extensively in the leading aca-
Haas). Waltz continued to develop the idea demic journal in their field, which is appropri-
that different international systems were dis-ately titled International Security.
tinguished by different numbers of leading The most distinguished of these interna-
powers and different distributions of power tional security scholars is John Mearsheimer
among them, i.e., by different international of the University of Chicago. His book
structures. These different international Conventional Deterrence (1983) presented an
analysis, with historical cases, of how deter-
structures of power give rise to different kinds
of international behavior (including stabilityrence based upon conventional (non-
or instability). In 1979, he published nuclear)
his weapons had worked or had failed.
thoughts about international structures Inin the mid-1980s, this book was highly rele-
vant and applicable for senior U.S. military
Theory of International Politics , thus becoming
the founding father of structural realism. officers, who were then developing non-
Waltz's theory was so general and nuclear deterrence strategies against the
abstract that it could be seen as more a taxon-
Soviet Union (e.g., the Air-Land Battle
omy or a tautology than a true theory. It is Doctrine
no of the army and the Maritime
accident that his book normally is only cited
Strategy of the navy).
in the academic journals dealing with interna- There are other distinguished scholars

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who have been part of the structural realist The Liberal Tradition : Wealth & Harmony
school, but who have developed theories and
analyses of international security that have
been informed and sophisticated in their use THE no founding
no foundingLIBERAL father TRADITION
father comparable to comparable has to
of history, as well as relevant and applicable to Thucydides. But liberals themselves nominate
contemporary issues in U.S. foreign policy as their early authors such figures as Hugo
and military strategy. They are Barry Posen of Grotius (the general good of international
MIT, Jack Snyder of Columbia, and Stephen law), Immanuel Kant (the peaceful nature of
Walt of the University of Chicago. Together republics), and Adam Smith (the beneficial
with Mearsheimer, they have made the con- consequences of free trade).
temporary American academic version of real- It is no accident that Grotius was Dutch
ism worthy of the great tradition. and that Adam Smith was British. (Kant was
However, even the international security technically a Prussian, but the least-Prussian
version of realism has had difficulty in inter- Prussian in history.) The liberal tradition was
preting the post-Cold War world and completely natural and logical for maritime
America's role within it. In 1990, powers operating within an international trad-
Mearsheimer published a major articleingenti-
system. This was the case with the
Netherlands and Britain - and the United States.
tled "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe
More subtly, the liberal tradition, espe-
after the Cold War", which argued that the
cially in its harmony-of-interests form, has
new multipolar system would produce greater
beenenti-
instability than the old bipolar one (he useful for two particular kinds of hege-
monic powers.
tled another version of this article "Why WeOne is the leading maritime
and commercial
Will Miss the Cold War"). A little later, he power in the world, a role
became especially concerned about the played
threat successively by the Netherlands,
that Russia posed to Ukraine and arguedBritain,that
and the United States. Such powers
Ukraine should remain a nuclear power. are naturally
Thisin a position to shape and
enforce
fidelity to the notions of the stability of an international
a law of the sea that
serves their maritime interests, and an inter-
bipolar world and to the stability of nuclear
national
multipolarity doubtless was consistent with law of trade that serves their com-
mercial
the theories of Kenneth Waltz. But it was interests.
remote from the realities of the new interna- The liberal tradition has also been useful
tional system. for a second kind of hegemonic power. This is
the dominant power within a particular region.
The international security version of real-
Such powersof
ism remains useful in interpreting the cases rarely existed alone, and never
military confrontations between states. existed
At for long, on the European continent. In
the
present time, these are largely those old the world beyond Europe and across the seas,
famil-
iar conflicts in the Middle East (involvinghowever, Britain was the dominant power in
much of Africa, the Middle East, and South
Israel, Iraq, or Iran) and in South Asia (involv-
ing India and Pakistan). In the futureAsia.they
Even more indisputably, the United
States
may come to include conflicts between China has been the dominant power in the
and the United States. But such militaryAmericas.
con- Such dominant powers naturally and
frontations are not now among the central
logically develop the notion that their views -
realities of contemporary international obviously
rela-broader and higher than those of the
lesserrole
tions and U.S. foreign policy. And on the powers in their region - and the interna-
tional organizations
of the United States as the sole superpower, as that implement these views
the hegemon of the global economy, and(and are dominated
as by the dominant power)
the first universal nation, academic realists of being in the common good,
have the quality
have had nothing to say. the general interest, indeed the harmony-of-

34

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interests of all the powers of the region. ous. And, given the realities and the tragedies of
How good has the liberal tradition been in the international situation at mid-century, what
interpreting the great international occur- the realists thought about the liberals was right.
rences of the twentieth century? Given its basic The second half of the twentieth century
concepts, it was hardly capable of predicting was the really American part of the century.
the outbreak and prolonged stalemate of the How did liberal concepts and precepts fit the
First World War (indeed, liberals are notori- major military and economic occurrences of this
ous for having predicted perpetual peace on period? Is it possible that, as the century became
the very eve of that war). Once the war more American, the American and liberal per-
occurred, however, liberals like Woodrow spective became more valid (even more realistic)?
Wilson developed their own distinctive expla- The liberal tradition had a hard time deal-
nations for why it happened (i.e., too much ing with the Cold War. Liberals could say that
realism on the part of European leaders) and if the Soviet Union would only dismantle its
how such wars could be prevented in the future command economy, its autarchic system, and
(i.e., by such means as international organiza- its totalitarian regime, then there would be no
tion, international law, and collective security). Cold War - but this obviously was not very
Of course, these means then proved to be utter useful policy advice during the Cold War itself.
failures in preventing the Second World War. The liberals had a much better record in
The liberal tradition might have been dealing with the American-led side of the bipo-
expected to do better in the realm of the inter- lar conflict, especially in regard to Western
national economy. However, believing in the Europe. Here, the liberal concepts and pre-
smooth operation of free markets, it failed to cepts of free markets and liberal democracies
predict the Great Depression. Once that were established, and they operated and suc-
occurred, however, liberals like Secretary of ceeded superbly. But they only did so because
State Cordell Hull developed their own dis- Western Europe was American-led, because
tinctive explanations for why it happened (tariff the United States was the hegemonic economic
barriers and trade blocs) and how such depres- and military power there. Once again, the lib-
sions could be prevented in the future (a more erals found it almost impossible to articulate a
free market in the international economy). But concept of hegemony and the necessity for it.
such prescriptions were fruitless until, as a Instead, liberal accounts of international
result of the Second World War, the United relations in the 1950s and 1960s focused upon
States was in a position to become the eco- international organizations, first upon the
nomic hegemon of the international economy. United Nations and then, when that had
That was hardly a liberal idea until Charles demonstrably failed, upon regional economic
Kindleberger developed it. organizations, especially the European
In short, as a theory of international rela- Economic Community. At the same time, most
tions, liberalism was pretty much a total failure liberals carefully managed to ignore regional
during the first half of the twentieth century. military organizations, such as NATO. To have
Of course, there could always be found many done otherwise would have forced them to
Americans who said that if only Wilson's or accept the reality and the necessity of the
HulPs plans had been realized, then we could United States as a military hegemon.
have prevented the Great Depression and the
Second World War. But to most Europeans Structural Liberalism : The Academic
and to realist (and European-minded) Revision of the Liberal Tradition
Americans, it was no accident that these plans
had not been realized; they were indeed unreal-
istic. To the realists, the liberals seemed at best THE nomicnomic
FOCUS organizations
organizations uponpro-
was very international was very pro- eco-
simple and silly and at worst stupid and danger- nounced among academic liberals. For a time

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in the 1960s, "regional integration" seemed to liberals had discovered American hegemony at
be their preferred solution for just about any the very moment that it seemed to be on the
international problem. verge of disappearing. What was to be done?
The founding father of regional integra- For liberals, the answer was inevitable.
tion studies was Ernst Haas, the other leading There was, they reassuringly announced, life
international relations scholar at the after hegemony. It was to be found in some
University of California at Berkeley. newHaas'version of their old friend, international
major books were The Uniting of Europe organization.
(1958) One such version was put for-
ward by Robert Keohane of Harvard in his
and Beyond the Nation-State (1964), whose
aptly
titles nicely expressed his fondest hopes. Inentitled book, After Hegemony (1984).
later years, he continued to write, but about acknowledged that American hege-
Keohane
this or that obscure UN agency - that mony
is, heand power had originally been necessary
wrote more and more about less and less.to set up important international economic
organizations such as the International
With the international economic disrup-
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and
tions of the 1970s - not only the breakdown
of the Bretton Woods system, but the the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
oil
price revolution and worldwide inflation(GATT).
- But once these organizations became
liberal theorists of international relations established and institutionalized, their salutary
finally had some important events aboutprinciples and practices could assume a life of
which they had something useful - or at least their own and could carry on even in the
interesting - to say, and about which the real- absence of American power. Liberal structures,
ists were silent or ignorant. This was the time or structural liberalism, could maintain the sta-
of the birth of the academic field of interna- bility of the international economy "after hege-
tional political economy. Writers on the poli- mony." Keohane thus became the founding
tics of the international economy began tofather of structural liberalism.
dominate the old liberal academic journal,
International Organization , which hitherto had
International Regime Studies : The
devoted itself to studies of the United
Lowest Form of Academic Liberalism
Nations, the European Community, and a
variety of meaningless regional organizations
in the Third World. THE practices notion
practices - thatstructures
- liberal liberal liberal
- in structures principles - and in
The liberals recognized that international international relations could carry on in the
economic organizations by themselves were absence of American power was captivating to
not enough to prevent worldwide economic academic liberals. They had always avoided
turmoil. (Indeed, one such organization, (and some had energetically hated) the reali-
OPEC, had mightily helped to produce that ties of American power anyway. In the 1980s,
very turmoil.) They were told by
they enthusiastically developed a new sub-sub-
field called "international regime studies."
Kindleberger that some sort of economic
hegemon was necessary to maintain stability The use of the word "regime" in this context
in the international economy, and many had ofnothing to do with previous usages which
them now acknowledged (at least temporarily)referred to independent governments (e.g.,
that this was the case, giving birth to a new"authoritarian regime"); quite the contrary,
sub-sub-field of international relations called
"international regimes" were those liberal
principles and practices that were willingly,
"hegemonic stability studies." However, the
United States, which had been that hegemon,even automatically, followed by states who
was now in economic decline relative to thecooperated with each other in regard to a large
number of international issues and interna-
rising economic powers of the European
tional arenas. These were said to range all the
Community, Japan, and OPEC. The academic

36-

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way from "the international non-proliferation them to ignore each other, to revile each other,
regime" (dealing with nuclear proliferation), or even to plot against each other. The realists
through "the international monetary regime", revile the liberals for being naive, even pusillan-
to "the international human rights regime." imous, about the realities of power. The liber-
In the 1990s, American power has not only als revile the realists for being simplistic, even
returned but has risen to new heights. Now, primitive, about the subtleties of cooperation.
there would seem to be no doubt that there is Like other academic wars, the war
an American hegemon supporting and advanc- between ISS and IPE will end not with a bang
ing all those liberal principles and practices in but with a whimper. More exactly, it will end
all those international issues and arenas. But with the denial of tenure. Although the lead-
international regime studies carries on, analyz- ers of ISS and IPE have dominated the study of
ing in minute detail the intricacies of "norms", international relations at the leading
"rules", and "procedures" among states, while American universities for more than two
never discussing the power that makes them all decades, they no longer dominate the tenure
work. Regimes without regimens, norms with- process in their academic departments; they
out the normal behavior of states, rules without thus are not reproducing themselves unto the
rulers, procedures without prowess, above all, next generation of tenured professors.
banalities without even truisms - it doesn't get Realists, who claim to understand power, and
any worse than this. Most of this academic liberals, who claim to understand process,
make-work is done by people who are with sec- have lost power over the tenure process to
ond-rate universities, third-rate minds, and two other sub-fields of international relations.
fourth-rate temperaments. We have not even mentioned these sub-fields
up to this point because of their utter lack of
The War Between the Sub-Fields interest and relevance to anyone outside of
themselves. One is Rational Choice theory;
the other is Post-Modern theory.
IN thatthat
THE neither 1990s, structural
neither then, it becamerealism
structural realism evident
nornor
The first is hyper-rationalist; the second
structural liberalism, neither international
is anti-rationalist; they both are unreadable.
security studies (īss) nor international political
But because they are in accord with the more
economy (IPE), had much to say that was
general fads and fashions in the social sciences
interesting and relevant about the centralin the 1990s (Rational Choice in economics,
realities of international relations in this Post-Modernism in history and sociology),
decade - the United States as the sole super-they dominate the new tenured appointments
power, as the hegemon of the global econo- in political science. This means that in most
my, and as the first universal nation. Given American universities in the future, the study
this general incapacity, one might reasonablyof international relations will be even more
have expected that a certain humility might uninteresting and irrelevant than it is now.
have developed within the two sub-fields of
international relations and even a certain har-
The Union of Realism and Liberalism
mony between them. But of course, since we
are talking about academics, we know that this
has not been the case. Academics may be RISING bles havebeen
bles have ABOVE
a fewbeen
(too afew)
these few (too squalid few) squab- schol-
schol-
petty, but they are never humble. ars who have been able to understand and to
For the most part, the two academic sub- use both the realist and the liberal perspec-
fields of ISS and IPE loathe each other. On occa- tives, even to integrate both the security and
sion, I have heard a scholar in one of the sub-the economic modes of analysis. Since in the
fields say a good thing about a scholar in the real world of international relations both
other. It is much more common, however, for power and wealth, both security and economy

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are integral and at the center, these scholars necessity for international cooperation. The
have been the true realists. And, in being able paradox and the subtlety of his analysis are
to appreciate more than one perspective, they expressed in the title of his major book, The
also have been the true liberals. Anarchical Society (1977).
One of these is Robert Gilpin, who taught
for many years at Princeton. His major books
The Cultural Perspective: Faith & Identity
have masterfully integrated security and eco-
nomic analysis: U.S. Power and the
Multinational Corporation (1975), War and AN tionaltional
INTERPRETATION relations
relations that is based that is based of upon interna- the
upon the
Change in World Politics (1981), and The Political union of realism and liberalism, upon the inte-
Economy of International Relations (1987). Gilpin gration of security and economic modes of
also quickly followed Kindleberger in explain- analysis, is well suited to comprehend such
ing the central importance of U.S. hegemony, central realities as the United States as the sole
not only in ordering the international economy superpower and the hegemon of the global
but also the international system more general- economy. But it is not enough. By itself, a
ly. Another such scholar has been David Calleo focus upon these two features of the U.S. hege-
of Johns Hopkins University. His major books monic role will lead to a rather linear view of
likewise have masterfully integrated security the future of international relations: U.S. mili-
and economic analysis and described the cen- tary power and economic leadership will con-
tral importance of U.S. hegemony: America and tinue to shape the rest of the world in their
the World Political Economy (1973) and The own way for a long time to come. This is a
Impervious Economy (1982). The integrated view of the future that is widely held among
mode of analysis exemplified by Gilpin and American political and economic elites in the
Calleo provides a way of interpreting two of late 1990s. At the end of one American
the three features of the contemporary U.S. Century, they look forward to a second.
role in international relations that we have However, if we view international rela-
been noting. These are the United States as tions with a third perspective, that of culture,
the sole superpower and as the hegemon of thewe arrive at a more complex prospectus. The
global economy. American role in the world in fact will be
It was probably no accident that bothgreatly determined by the interaction between
Gilpin and Calleo were also very knowledge-American culture and the culture of other
able about particular continental European major states and societies. The culture of the
nations. Gilpin's works included France in the first universal nation is not as universal as that
Age of the Scientific State (1968); Calleo'snation's liberal elites like to think. When the
included The German Problem Reconsidered : United States deploys its military superpower
Germany and World Order (1978). Their abili- and economic hegemony to promote and
ty to rise above the one-dimensional qualities spread its distinctive culture, other cultures
of their colleagues probably owed something can be expected to resist and react. The result
to their European understanding. is "the clash of civilizations" that has been so
The third scholar who masterfully inte- famously described by another great American
grated realism and liberalism was Hedley Bull, scholar, Samuel Huntington of Harvard.
who was probably the best international rela- Huntington is widely recognized as being
tions theorist of his generation in the British the most distinguished political scientist of
Commonwealth. Although Bull did not the last third of the twentieth century. He has
emphasize economic issues, he did magnifi- written masterly works in comparative politics
cently combine an appreciation, even a tragic ( Political Order in Changing Societies , 1968),
sense, of both the reality of international American politics {American Politics : The
anarchy and, despite and because of this, the Promise of Disharmony, 1981), and now inter-

38

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national relations {The Clash of Civilizations reason why there is a conflict between the
and the Remaking of World Order , 1996). He West and the rest.
has been extensively cited in the academic lit-
erature. But he has also periodically served as The Universal Culture and the
an adviser to prominent U.S. policymakers, Liberal Tradition
and he has been prolific in his writings in the
leading opinion journals dealing with interna-
tional relations. WHAT this supposedly ARE
this supposedly the universal
universal culture? main features culture? of
As is well known, Huntington argues that It turns out that they are very similar to what
the main conflicts of the twenty-first century we have been describing as the liberal tradi-
will not be the ideological conflicts of the tion in international relations. Universal cul-
twentieth century or the national conflicts of ture is largely liberal ideology.
the nineteenth century. They instead will be Four decades ago, Louis Hartz wrote
cultural conflicts, conflicts between the great about the peculiar quality of the American
civilizations. worldview in his renowned The Liberal
Almost all cultures are derived from prior Tradition in America (1955). Two decades ago,
religions, even those cultures of today that Samuel Huntington expanded on this theme
think of themselves as secular (e.g., the with his account of the American Creed in
Western). Cultural conflicts thus are about American Politics : The Promise of Disharmony.
faith and identity; they are fundamental and Now, the true believer in the liberal tradition,
therefore often involve "fundamentalists." the United States, is trying to make it the uni-
Huntington emphasizes several great civiliza-versal creed of the entire world.
tions: Western, derived from Latin The fundamental elements of the liberal
tradition and American Creed are free markets
Christianity; Orthodox, derived from Greek
Christianity; Islamic; Hindu; Sinic, derivedand equal opportunity, free elections and lib-
from Confucianism; and Japanese. (He alsoeral democracy, and constitutionalism and the
rule of law. The core element is individualism.
mentions Latin American, Buddhist, and
African civilizations.) There have been con- Most of these elements were already in place
flicts between these different civilizations in in the United States by the early nineteenth
ages past, and they will continue for ages to century. They were well described by Alexis
come. But the fundamental conflict of our era, de Tocqueville in Democracy in America (1835).
he maintains, will be the conflict between The liberal tradition and American Creed
Western civilization and the others - "the definitely do not include as elements hierarchy,
West versus the Rest." community, tradition, and custom. This has
For most of the American Century, the
meant that they have been in fundamental oppo-
leading power of Western civilization has
sition to almost all of the great religious tradi-
been the United States. It is now also the sole tions, for whom both hierarchy and community
superpower and the hegemon of the global are integral (e.g., Roman Catholicism, Eastern
economy. This means that the United States Orthodoxy, Islam, Hinduism, Confucianism,
is capable of promoting and spreading not and even, to a degree, Buddhism). The one reli-
only its conception of world order and global gion that is not based upon these is
economy, but also the culture of the first uni- Protestantism, especially the Reformed versions
versal nation. Many of America's elites of Protestantism (e.g., Calvinism, Puritanism,
believe this culture to be universal; many of Presbyterianism, and Congregationalism) that
the elites of other states and societies believe so much shaped the origins of the United
it to be distinctively Western (or even States. Alone among the great religions,
American) and therefore in some degree alien Reformed Protestantism totally rejects hierar-
to their own culture. This is the fundamental chy, community, custom, and tradition.

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 When American Protestantism underwent Cold War. Conversely, when the nation is
secularization, it took a unique form that was enjoying peace and prosperity (never more so
unlike the secularization of other religions. than in the 1990s), liberalism will be tri-
The liberal tradition, the American Creed, and, umphant if not also triumphalist.
more recently, the Human Rights ideology And so the first universal nation is now
have been the result. Although in the last gen- poised to enter into a great clash of civiliza-
eration American political and intellectual tions, into what will really be a war between a
elites may appear to have replaced the religious heresy (secularized Protestantism)
American Creed with the universal conception and all other religions. It is the liberal tradi-
of Human Rights, Human Rights really carries tion, with its presumption of harmony and its
the American Creed to a logical conclusion and resulting heedlessness, that could get us into
to a universal extent. Although not themselves this war. It is the realist tradition, with its
Protestant, the liberal tradition, the American sense of tragedy and its resulting attitude of
Creed, and the Human Rights ideology are the prudence, that could keep us out. But we
product of a Protestant culture and are a secu- already know which of these two traditions
larized version of Protestantism.1 will prevail. The liberal tradition is not only in
The liberal tradition in America and the America, it is America. The realist tradition,
liberal tradition in international relations have in contrast, is not only rarely in America, it is
always had much in common. This explains un-American. The tragedy of America could
why in America the long war between the be that America is incapable of a sense of
realist tradition and the liberal tradition has tragedy - and the tragedy of the American
never been an equal one. The liberal tradition discipline of international relations is that few
is comfortably in the American grain; the of its practitioners would make any sense of
realist tradition is sensed as being somehow such a proposition. □
un-American. The only time the realist tradi-
tion can receive a wide hearing is when the iSee my article, "The Protestant Reformation and
security of the American nation is in peril, American Foreign Policy", Orbis (Spring
e.g., during the two World Wars and the 1998).

Mr. Cooli
far from
keeps Mr.
ty, with s
consciento
gram with
for a soft

- Wal

40

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