SECTION V

NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY

 SECTION 5—NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY

Scope Highlights
5.1 Enrichment Feedstocks Production ........................................ II-5-10
5.2 Uranium Enrichment Processes .............................................. II-5-13 • The design and production of nuclear weapons in 1997 is a far
5.3 Nuclear Fission Reactors ........................................................ II-5-42 simpler process than it was during the Manhattan Project.
5.4 Plutonium Extraction (Reprocessing) .................................... II-5-48 • Indigenous development of nuclear weapons is possible for
5.5 Lithium Production ................................................................. II-5-54 countries with industrial bases no greater than that of Iraq in 1990.
5.6 Nuclear Weapons Design and Development .......................... II-5-58 Given a source of fissile material, even terrorist groups could
construct their own nuclear explosive devices.
5.7 Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing ........................................ II-5-67
• At least two types of nuclear weapons can be built and fielded
5.8 Radiological Weapons ............................................................ II-5-75 without any kind of yield test, and the possessors could have
5.9 Manufacturing of Nuclear Components ................................. II-5-79 reasonable confidence in the performance of those devices.
5.10 Nuclear Weapons Development Testing ................................. II-5-91 • The standing up of elite units to take custody of nuclear weapons or
5.11 Nuclear Weapons Custody, Transport, and Control ............... II-5-109 to employ them would be a useful indicator that a proliferant is
5.12 Heavy Water Production ......................................................... II-5-112 approaching the completion of its first weapon.
5.13 Tritium Production ................................................................. II-5-117 • The acquisition of fissile material in sufficient quantity is the most
formidable obstacle to the production of nuclear weapons.
BACKGROUND
General
This section examines the technologies needed to construct nuclear and radio-
logical weapons and to employ both kinds of weapons either for military purposes or For many decades the Manhattan Project provided the paradigm against which
an act of terror. Since their introduction in 1945, nuclear explosives have been the any potential proliferator’s efforts would be measured. Fifty years after the Trinity
most feared of the weapons of mass destruction, in part because of their ability to explosion, it has been recognized that the Manhattan Project is just one of a spectrum
cause enormous instantaneous devastation and of the persistent effects of the radiation of approaches to the acquisition of a nuclear capability. At the low end of the scale, a
they emit, unseen and undetectable by unaided human senses. The Manhattan Project nation may find a way to obtain a complete working nuclear bomb from a willing or
cost the United States $2 billion in 1945 spending power and required the combined unwilling supplier; at the other end, it may elect to construct a complete nuclear infra-
efforts of a continent-spanning industrial enterprise and a pool of scientists, many of structure including the mining of uranium, the enrichment of uranium metal in the
whom had already been awarded the Nobel Prize and many more who would go on to fissile isotope 235U, the production and extraction of plutonium, the production of tri-
become Nobel Laureates. This array of talent was needed in 1942 if there were to be tium, and the separation of deuterium and 6Li to build thermonuclear weapons. At an
any hope of completing a weapon during the Second World War. Because nuclear intermediate level, the Republic of South Africa constructed six quite simple nuclear
fission was discovered in Germany, which remained the home of many brilliant scien- devices for a total project cost of less than $1 billion (1980’s purchasing power) using
tists, the United States correctly perceived itself to be in a race to build an atomic no more than 400 people and indigenous technology.
bomb.

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 Although talented people are essential to the success of any nuclear weapons pro- experiment. A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was opened for signature and signed at
gram, the fundamental physics, chemistry, and engineering involved are widely under- the United Nations on 24 September 1996 by the five declared nuclear weapon states,
stood; no basic research is required to construct a nuclear weapon. Therefore, a nuclear Israel, and several other states. By the end of February 1998, more than 140 states had
weapons project begun in 1996 does not require the brilliant scientists who were needed signed the accord. The Treaty bans all further tests which produce nuclear yield. In all
for the Manhattan Project.1 probability, most of the nations of greatest proliferation concern will be persuaded to
Acquisition of a militarily significant nuclear capability involves, however, more accede to the accord, although the present government of India has refused to sign.
than simply the purchase or construction of a single nuclear device or weapon. It Rate of Change of Nuclear Weapons Technology
requires attention to issues of safety and handling of the weapons, reliability and pre-
dictability of entire systems, efficient use of scarce and valuable special nuclear mate- American nuclear technology evolved rapidly between 1944 and 1950, moving
rial (SNM) (plutonium and enriched uranium), chains of custody and procedures for from the primitive Fat Man and Little Boy to more sophisticated, lighter, more power-
authorizing the use of the weapons, and the careful training of the military personnel ful, and more efficient designs. Much design effort shifted from fission to thermo-
who will deliver weapons to their targets. nuclear weapons after President Truman decided that the United States should proceed
to develop a hydrogen bomb, a task which occupied the Los Alamos Laboratory from
In contrast, a nuclear device used for terrorism need not be constructed to survive
1950 through 1952.2 From 1952 until the early years of the ICBM era [roughly to the
a complex stockpile-to-target sequence, need not have a predictable and reliable yield,
development of the first multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) in
and need not be efficient in its use of nuclear material. Although major acts of terror-
the late 1960’s], new concepts in both fission primary and fusion secondary design
ism are often rehearsed and the terrorists trained for the operation, the level of training
were developed rapidly. However, after the introduction of the principal families of
probably is not remotely comparable to that necessary in a military establishment en-
weapons in the modern stockpile (approximately the mid 1970’s), the rate of design
trusted with the nuclear mission.
innovations and truly new concepts slowed as nuclear weapon technology became a
Testing of Nuclear Weapons mature science. It is believed that other nations’ experiences have been roughly simi-
lar, although the United States probably has the greatest breadth of experience with
The first nuclear weapon used in combat used an untested gun-assembled design,
innovative designs simply because of the more than 1,100 nuclear detonations it has
but a very simple and inefficient one. The first implosion device was tested on July 16, conducted. The number of useful variations on the themes of primary and secondary
1945, near Alamogordo, New Mexico, and an identical “physics package” (the portion design is finite, and designers’ final choices are frequently constrained by consider-
of the weapon including fissile and fusion fuels plus high explosives) was swiftly ations of weapon size, weight, safety, and the availability of special materials.
incorporated into the bomb dropped on Nagasaki.
U.S. nuclear weapons technology is mature and might not have shown many more
Nuclear weaponry has advanced considerably since 1945, as can be seen at an
qualitative advances over the long haul, even absent a test ban. The same is roughly
unclassified level by comparing the size and weight of “Fat Man” with the far smaller,
true for Russia, the UK, and possibly for France.
lighter, and more powerful weapons carried by modern ballistic missiles.
The design of the nuclear device for a specific nuclear weapon is constrained by
Most nations of the world, including those of proliferation interest, have sub-
several factors. The most important of these are the weight the delivery vehicle can
scribed to the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which requires that nuclear explosions
carry plus the size of the space available in which to carry the weapon (e.g., the diam-
only take place underground. Underground testing can be detected by seismic means
eter and length of a nosecone or the length and width of a bomb bay). The required
and by observing radioactive effluent in the atmosphere. It is probably easier to detect
yield of the device is established by the target vulnerability. The possible yield is set
and identify a small nuclear test in the atmosphere than it is to detect and identify a
by the state of nuclear weapon technology and by the availability of special materials.
similarly sized underground test. In either case, highly specialized instrumentation is
Finally, the choices of specific design details of the device are determined by the taste
required if a nuclear test explosion is to yield useful data to the nation carrying out the
of its designers, who will be influenced by their experience and the traditions of their
organization.
1
When the Manhattan Project began far less than a microgram of plutonium had been made
2
throughout the world, and plutonium chemistry could only be guessed at; the numbers of The “Mike” test of Operation Ivy, 1 November, 1952, was the first explosion of a true
neutrons released on average in 235U and 239Pu fissions were unknown; the fission cross two-stage thermonuclear device. The “George” shot of Operation Greenhouse (May 9,
sections (probabilities that an interaction would occur) were equally unknown, as was the 1951) confirmed for the first time that a fission device could produce the conditions
neutron absorption cross section of carbon. needed to ignite a thermonuclear reaction.

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A Caution on the Use of “Authoritative Control Documents and Tables” achievements are also noted in the area bounded by the heavy curves. A similar chart
could be made for the progress of every other nuclear weapon state, acknowledged or
Authoritative lists of export-controlled and militarily critical equipment and ma-
unacknowledged, if the information were available.
terials used in the construction and testing of nuclear weapons necessarily have flaws:
This chart illustrates several trends which are important to an understanding of the
• They consistently lag the technology actually available on the world market. process by which a proliferator might gain a nuclear capability. At the same time, it
Some items at the threshold of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Dual-Use indicates the few choke points where the control of technologies might be helpful. The
List restrictions may not be available as newly manufactured equipment. On top line shows advances over time in electronic components. The second and third
the other hand, it would be improper to place the thresholds higher, since lines show advances over time in the production of SNM. All five acknowledged
equipment much less sophisticated than can be bought today was used with nuclear weapons states (NWSs) are shown to have tested their first devices before
great success in both the United States and the Former Soviet Union. computer numerically controlled machine tools and four- or five-axis machine tools
• Second, these limits do not always define the limits at which the technologies were generally available.
have utility to proliferators.
Modern computers incorporating large amounts of solid-state fast memory did
OVERVIEW not make their appearance until the early 1970’s, and even fast transistorized (not
integrated circuit chips) computers were not generally available until the early 1960’s.
This section will discuss the fundamentals of nuclear weapons design, engineer- By the time such computers became available to the American design laboratories,
ing, and production including the production of special nuclear materials (uranium most of the fundamental families of modern nuclear weapons had already been con-
enriched to greater than 20 percent in the isotope 235U, 233U, and for plutonium). It will ceived, designed, and tested. Computation brought a new ability to design for nuclear
also look at the other technologies including production of uranium and plutonium weapon safety and a new capability to execute complex designs which might reduce
metal; manufacturing; nuclear testing; lithium production; safing, arming, fuzing, and the amount of fissile materials and other scarce fuels used in the weapons.
firing (SAFF); radiological weapons; the custody, transport, and control of nuclear
weapons; heavy water production; and tritium production. Finally, an inspection of the chart indicates very rapid qualitative progress in the
early years of the U.S. nuclear effort, with new design types and wholly new weapon
It is possible to capture schematically the progress in nuclear weapons technology
families emerging in rapid succession. In part, this occurred because the creative sci-
and the technologies which support nuclear weapons in the following graph (Figure
entists were given permission to try almost any idea which sounded good, and in part
5.0-1). The X axis is time, beginning in 1942 when the Manhattan Project was fully
it is because of the rapid interplay between conceptual advances and all-up nuclear
activated. The top two lines show the development of electronics and the introduction
tests. During the 1958–61 moratorium on testing the rate at which new ideas were
of devices which affected the design of the non-nuclear components of the weapons.
introduced slowed, although a great deal of progress towards ensuring weapon safety
The second pair of lines shows the progress made in preparing special nuclear materi-
was made. By the early 1970’s the era of new concepts in nuclear weapon design had
als, with the processes above the dashed line referring to methods of enriching ura-
virtually come to an end, although qualitative improvements in yield, weight, and the
nium and those below the dashed line referring to plutonium production and the mate-
efficient use of special materials were made.
rials for fusion weapons.
Similar statements, differing in detail but not in outline, could probably be made
The oddly shaped heavy curve shows the rate at which U.S. nuclear weapons
for each of the five NWSs and any threshold states with active weapons projects.
scientists made new discoveries and progress. The distance between the two curves
However, it is unlikely that the evolution of nuclear designs, means of assembly, and
represents the rate of progress, while the area between the curves from 1942 to any
initiation followed the same course in any two countries.
arbitrary date gives an estimate of the total knowledge acquired. The rate of progress
drops almost to zero on 30 October 1958, when the Eisenhower-Khrushchev Morato- More detailed descriptions of the various components of a nuclear weapons pro-
rium on nuclear testing went into effect. gram will be found in the numbered sections below.
Superimposed on the heavy curve are events of historic importance: the first Production of Fuel for Nuclear Weapons
testing and use of nuclear weapons, the first Soviet test along with the dates when
Ordinary uranium contains only 0.72 percent 235U, the highly fissionable isotope,
other nations joined the nuclear club, the evolution of hydrogen weapons and boost- the rest of the material being largely the much less fissionable isotope 238 U (which
ing, the introduction of powerful computers, computerized numerically controlled cannot sustain a chain reaction). The fissile material must be separated from the rest of
(CNC) tools, the year when the IBM PC made its appearance on desktops, tailored the uranium by a process known as enrichment. Several enrichment techniques have
effects weapons such as the x-ray laser, and the end of nuclear testing. Specific U.S.

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been used. The earliest successful methods were electromagnetic isotope separation requires good instrumentation and an understanding of reactor physics, to have enough
(EMIS), in which large magnets are used to separate ions of the two isotopes, 3 and neutrons to irradiate useful quantities of 238 U.4 A typical production reactor produces
gaseous diffusion, in which the gas uranium hexafluoride (UF6) is passed through a about 0.8 atoms of plutonium for each nucleus of 235U which fissions. A good rule of
porous barrier material; the lighter molecules containing 235U penetrate the barrier thumb is that 1 gram of plutonium is produced for each megawatt (thermal)-day of
slightly more rapidly, and with enough stages significant separation can be accom- reactor operation. Light-water power reactors make fewer plutonium nuclei per ura-
plished. Both gaseous diffusion and EMIS require enormous amounts of electricity. nium fission than graphite-moderated production reactors.
More efficient methods have been developed. The plutonium must be extracted chemically in a reprocessing plant. Reprocess-
The third method in widespread use is the gas centrifuge [Urenco (Netherlands, ing is a complicated process involving the handling of highly radioactive materials and
Germany, UK), Russia, Japan] in which UF6 gas is whirled inside complex rotor as- must be done by robots or by humans using remote manipulating equipment. At some
semblies and centrifugal force pushes molecules containing the heavier isotope to the stages of the process simple glove boxes with lead glass windows suffice. Reprocess-
outside. Again, many stages are needed to produce the highly enriched uranium needed ing is intrinsically dangerous because of the use of hot acids in which plutonium and
for a weapon, but centrifuge enrichment requires much less electricity than either of intensely radioactive short-lived fission products are dissolved. Some observers have,
the older technologies. however, suggested that the safety measures could be relaxed to the extent that the
Atomic and molecular laser isotope separation (LIS) techniques use lasers to se- proliferator deems his technicians to be “expendable.” Disposal of the high-level waste
lectively excite atoms or molecules containing one isotope of uranium so that they can from reprocessing is difficult. Any reprocessing facility requires large quantities of
be preferentially extracted. Although LIS appears promising, the technology has proven concrete for shielding and will vent radioactive gases (131 I, for example) to the atmo-
to be extremely difficult to master and may be beyond the reach of even technically sphere.
advanced states. Tritium for thermonuclear weapons is usually produced in a nuclear reactor simi-
The South African nuclear program used an aerodynamic separation technique in lar or identical to that used to make plutonium. Neutrons from the reactor are used to
an indigenously designed and built device called a vortex tube. In the vortex a mixture irradiate lithium metal, and the nuclear reaction produces a triton.
of UF6 gas and hydrogen is injected tangentially into a tube, which tapers to a small Lithium-6, an isotope of lithium, is used in some thermonuclear weapons. When
exit aperture at one or both ends; centrifugal force provides the separation. The Becker struck by a neutron, 6Li (actually the compound 7Li nucleus formed in the collision)
Nozzle Process, also an aerodynamic separation technique, was developed in Ger- frequently disintegrates into tritium and 4He. Thus, the tritium needed for the second-
many. The Becker process is not in common use; the vortex tube was used in South ary of a fusion weapon can be formed in place within the nuclear device and need not
Africa for producing reactor fuel with a 235U content of around 3–5 percent in addition be transported from the factory to the target as heavy hydrogen.
to making 80–93 percent 235U for the weapons program. Aerodynamic enrichment The lighter isotope, 6Li, is separated from the principal isotope, 7Li, in a process
processes require large amounts of electricity and are not generally considered eco- which exploits the fact that the lighter isotope more readily forms an amalgam with
nomically competitive; even the South African enrichment plant has apparently been mercury than does the heavier one. This process is called “COLEX” (Column Ex-
closed. change). Lithium hydroxide is dissolved in water, and the aqueous solution is brought
Uranium enriched to 20 percent or more 235U is called highly enriched (HEU). into contact with the mercury. Lithium-6 ions in the solution tend to migrate into the
Uranium enriched above the natural 235U abundance but to less than 20 percent is called mercury, while 7Li in the amalgam tends to migrate back into the aqueous hydroxide
low-enriched (LEU). solution. The reaction is generally carried out in large columnar processors. While
Plutonium is produced in nuclear reactors by bombarding “fertile” 238U with other processes for separating the lithium isotopes have been tried, the United States
neutrons from the chain reaction. Since each fission produces only slightly more than found COLEX to be the most successful. It is believed that the Soviet Union chose the
two neutrons, on average, the neutron “economy” must be managed carefully, which same process.

3
The first large-scale uranium enrichment facility, the Y-12 plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee,
4
used EMIS in devices called “calutrons.” The process was abandoned in the United States Note, however, that during the Manhattan Project the United States was able to scale an
because of its high consumption of electricity, but was adopted by the Iraqis because of its operating 250 watt reactor to a 250 megawatt production reactor. Although the
relative simplicity and their ability to procure the magnet material without encountering instrumentation of the day was far less sophisticated than that in use today, the scientists
technology transfer obstacles. working the problem were exceptional.

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Figure 5.0-1. Nuclear History

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RATIONALE (sometimes termed “fusionable”) material is compressed by the energy released by a
fission device called a primary. The fusion part of the weapon is called a secondary.
An ordinary “atomic” bomb of the kinds used in World War II uses the process of
nuclear fission to release the binding energy in certain nuclei. The energy release is In the words of Sidney D. Drell, the physics packages of “nuclear weapons are
rapid and, because of the large amounts of energy locked in nuclei, violent. The prin- sophisticated, but not complicated.” The remainder of the weapon may be quite com-
cipal materials used for fission weapons are 235U and 239Pu, which are termed fissile plicated indeed.
because they can be split into two roughly equal-mass fragments when struck by a Storage and Use Control Issues Regarding Nuclear Weapons
neutron of even low energies. When a large enough mass of either material is assem-
bled, a self-sustaining chain reaction results after the first fission is produced. Such a The United States has developed a complex and sophisticated system to ensure
mass is termed critical. If any more material is added to a critical mass a condition of that nuclear weapons are used only on the orders of the President or his delegated
supercriticality results. The chain reaction in a supercritical mass increases rapidly in representative. Some elements of the custodial system are the “two-man rule,” which
intensity until the heat generated by the nuclear reactions causes the mass to expand so requires that no person be left alone with a weapon; permissive action links (PALs),
greatly that the assembly is no longer critical. coded locks which prevent detonation of the weapon unless the correct combination is
entered; and careful psychological testing of personnel charged with the custody or
Fission weapons require a system to assemble a supercritical mass from a sub-
eventual use of nuclear weapons. In addition, U.S. nuclear weapons must be certified
critical mass in a very short time. Two classic assembly systems have been used, gun
as “one point safe,” which means that there is less than a one-in-a-million chance of a
and implosion. In the simpler gun-type device, two subcritical masses are brought
nuclear yield greater than the equivalent of four pounds of TNT resulting from an
together by using a mechanism similar to an artillery gun to shoot one mass (the pro-
accident in which the high explosive in the device is detonated at the point most likely
jectile) at the other mass (the target). The Hiroshima weapon was gun-assembled and
to cause a nuclear yield.
used 235U as a fuel. Gun-assembled weapons using highly enriched uranium are con-
sidered the easiest of all nuclear devices to construct and the most foolproof. Manhat- It is believed to be unlikely that a new proliferator would insist upon one point
tan Project scientists were so confident in the performance of the “Little Boy” uranium safety as an inherent part of pit design; the United States did not until the late 1950’s,
bomb that the device was not even tested before it was dropped on Hiroshima. relying instead upon other means to prevent detonation (e.g., a component of Little
Boy was not inserted until after the Enola Gay had departed Tinian for Hiroshima). It
Because of the short time interval between spontaneous neutron emissions (and,
is also unlikely that a new actor in the nuclear world would insist upon fitting PALs to
therefore, the large number of background neutrons) found in plutonium because of
every (or to any) nuclear weapon; the United States did not equip its submarine-launched
the decay by spontaneous fission of the isotope 240Pu, Manhattan Project scientists
strategic ballistic missiles with PALs until, at the earliest, 1996, and the very first U.S.
devised the implosion method of assembly in which high explosives are arranged to
PALs were not introduced until the mid-1950’s, when American weapons were sta-
form an imploding shock wave which compresses the fissile material to supercriticality.5
tioned at foreign bases where the possibility of theft or misuse was thought to be real.
Implosion systems can be built using either 239Pu or 235U, but the gun assembly only
works for uranium. Implosion weapons are more difficult to build than gun weapons, Nonetheless, any possessor of nuclear weapons will take care that they are not
but they are also more efficient, requiring less SNM and producing larger yields. used by unauthorized personnel and can be employed on the orders of duly constituted
authority. Even—or, perhaps, especially—a dictator such as Saddam Hussein will
The six bombs built by the Republic of South Africa were gun-assembled and
insist upon a fairly sophisticated nuclear chain of command, if only to ensure that his
used uranium enriched to between 80 percent and 93 percent in the isotope 235 U; Iraq
weapons cannot be used by a revolutionary movement. It is also quite likely that even
attempted to build an implosion bomb, also using 235U. In contrast, North Korea chose
the newest proliferator would handle his weapons with care and seek to build some
to use 239Pu produced in a nuclear reactor.
kind of safety devices and a reliable SAFF system into the units.
A more powerful but more complex weapon uses the fusion of heavy isotopes of
hydrogen, deuterium, and tritium to release large numbers of neutrons when the fusile Developing Technologies
On the basis of experience, one might expect to observe significant nuclear plan-
ning activity and the evolution of situation-specific nuclear doctrine on the part of a
new proliferator who would have to allocate carefully the “family jewels.” The devel-
5
The critical mass of compressed fissile material decreases as the inverse square of the density opment of a nuclear strategy might be visible in the professional military literature of
achieved. the proliferator.

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Use Control and Weapons Delivery lable or, at a controllable level, are far more capable than what is required to design
and build a weapon.
Because of the high cost and high value of a new entrant’s first few nuclear weap-
ons, it is likely that the proliferant state would take great care to ensure that the crews FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2)
selected to deliver the special ordnance would be highly proficient in the use of their Five nations, the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China
weapon systems. This requires extensive training in the specialized procedures re- are nuclear weapon states according to the definition in the Non-Proliferation Treaty
quired to place nuclear weapons reliably on target.
(countries that tested a nuclear explosive device before 1 January 1967). All five
Nuclear weapons training may be both distinctive and visible, particularly when it possess all technologies needed to build modern compact nuclear weapons and all
involves those parts of the stockpile-to-target sequence which are explicitly nuclear. have produced both high-enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium.
Some observers believe, however, that such training will be difficult to observe and
India detonated a nuclear device using plutonium implosion in 1974. India has
identify.
held no announced tests since then, although they have on occasion taken steps which
Expected Rates of Progress for New Proliferants would imply that a test is imminent. India does not enrich uranium. It has heavy-water
moderated reactors, not all under international safeguards.
New proliferants with First-World technological bases can probably construct their
first nuclear weapons 3 to 5 years after making a political decision to do so, even Pakistan has an operating uranium enrichment plant. Senior Pakistani officials
including constructing an infrastructure to make special nuclear materials, assuming have alluded to possession of a small nuclear stockpile.
that finances and resources are available.6 The first intellectual steps towards reducing South Africa constructed six simple gun-assembled uranium bombs but dismantled
the size and mass of fission weapons should not take more than another 1 to 2 years to them and signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-weapons state. The HEU for
master. Boosting and multistage weapons may require anywhere from 3 to 10 more these bombs was obtained from an aerodynamic isotope separation technique devel-
years to develop in the absence of yield testing, and some nations may still fail to oped indigenously. South Africa has shut down its aerodynamic enrichment facilities,
succeed. China, however, progressed from a very simple fission design to a two-stage but is developing a molecular LIS (MLIS) process for producing LEU for commercial
weapon by its fifth full-scale test—but one of the intervening tests was an end-to-end nuclear power reactors.
firing of a ballistic missile with a live nuclear warhead in its nosecone. Israel is believed by some to possess nuclear weapons. It operates one
Radiological Weapons unsafeguarded nuclear reactor at Dimona and presumably is capable of reprocessing
spent fuel to extract plutonium. It is a technically advanced state and probably has all
Radioactive isotopes suitable for use as weapons include 137Cs, 60Co, 131I, and other of the electronics needed to build and test nuclear weapons. Its elite air force may be
short-lived, relatively easy-to-produce fission products. The most readily available nuclear trained.
source for the materials of radiological weapons is spent fuel from nuclear reactors;
Iraq had a flourishing nuclear weapons and civilian nuclear program until the
indeed, the spent fuel rods themselves are sufficiently “hot” that they can be used
1991 Gulf War. It was able to enrich uranium using EMIS and was pursuing centrifuge
essentially directly, although chopping or pulverization would be useful. Medical iso-
enrichment as well. It anticipated constructing implosion weapons using HEU as the
topes are another readily available source of radioactive material in quantities suitable
fuel.
for spreading terror.
Iran has many components of a nuclear weapons program in place and has been
Proliferation Implication Assessment attempting to purchase turnkey nuclear reactors on the world market.
Many of the items on which the greatest control efforts have focused, at least in North Korea built and operated CO2-cooled, graphite-moderated reactors and
the public’s perception—computers, switch tubes, capacitors—are either not control- had built and operated a reprocessing facility before agreeing to allow the United States
and South Korea to replace its gas-graphite “power” reactor with a light-water moder-
6
Nations such as Germany and Japan, which have advanced civilian nuclear power programs ated unit less suited to the production of weapons-grade plutonium. The amount of
and stocks of plutonium (either separated or still contained in spent fuel) may be able to plutonium it currently has in hand outside of that contained in its spent fuel storage
produce their first weapons in even less time. Countries which have a nuclear infrastructure facility is not well known by outsiders.
and which have expended considerable effort in learning how to build nuclear weapons Sweden came very close to building nuclear weapons in the late 1960’s and early
while still not crossing the nuclear threshold (e.g., Sweden) also are in a favorable position 1970’s. Many experts judge its weapon designs as sophisticated and efficient; the
to go nuclear in short order.

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country has the industrial base to “go nuclear” in a short period and has adequate Japan is as far advanced as Germany and also operates a reprocessing plant. Ei-
amounts of plutonium contained in stored spent reactor fuel. ther nation could construct nuclear weapons in a short time.
Switzerland had a nuclear weapons program until the early 1970’s. Both Sweden Many other states have capabilities in some or all of the relevant technologies and
and Switzerland are highly industrialized Western nations with broad access to a full could assemble a nuclear weapons program in a short time.
spectrum of modern technology, whether developed indigenously or imported. Both
operate nuclear reactors.
Germany has developed an indigenous uranium enrichment process (not believed
to be currently in use) and has adequate stocks of spent fuel from which to prepare
nuclear weapons.

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 Country Sec 5.1 Sec 5.2 Sec 5.3 Sec 5.4 Sec 5.5 Sec 5.6 Sec 5.7 Sec 5.8 Sec 5.9 Sec 5.10 Sec 5.11 Sec 5.12 Sec 5.13
Enrich- Uranium Nuclear Plutonium Lithium Nuclear Safing, Radiologi- Manufac- Nuclear Nuclear Heavy Tritium
ment Enrich- Fission Extraction Product- Weapons Arming, cal turing of Weapons Weapons Water Produc-
Feed- ment Reactors (Reproc- ion Design Fuzing, Weapons Nuclear Develop- Custody, Produc- tion
stocks Processes essing) and and Firing Compo- ment Transport, tion
Produc- Develop- nents Testing and
tion ment Control
Argentina ♦ ♦♦ ♦♦ ♦ ♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦
Austria ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦♦
Belgium ♦♦♦♦ ♦ ♦ ♦♦
Brazil ♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦ ♦ ♦♦ ♦ ♦♦
Canada ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
China ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
Czech Republic ♦♦
France ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
Germany ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦
India ♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
Iran ♦ ♦♦ ♦♦ ♦ ♦♦
Iraq ♦♦ ♦ ♦♦♦ ♦ ♦♦♦ ♦ ♦♦ ♦ ♦♦
Italy ♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦
Japan ♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦
Netherlands ♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦ ♦
North Korea ♦♦ ♦♦ ♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦
Pakistan ♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦ ♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦ ♦
Russia ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
South Africa ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦
South Korea ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
Sweden ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦
Switzerland ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦
Taiwan ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦♦♦ ♦ ♦
Ukraine ♦♦♦ ♦ ♦ ♦♦ ♦
United Kingdom ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦
United States ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦ ♦♦♦♦

Legend: Sufficient Technologies Capabilities: ♦♦♦♦ exceeds sufficient level ♦♦♦ sufficient level ♦♦ some ♦ limited
Because two or more countries have the same number of diamonds does not mean that their capabilities are the same. An absence of diamonds in countries of concern may
indicate an absence of information, not of capability. The absence of a country from this list may indicate an absence of information, not capability.

Figure 5.0-2. Nuclear Weapons Foreign Technology Assessment Summary

II-5-9
 SECTION 5.1—ENRICHMENT FEEDSTOCKS PRODUCTION

OVERVIEW
This subsection covers technologies utilized in the conversion of uranium ore
Highlights
concentrates to highly purified uranium hexafluoride (UF6) and uranium tetrachloride • UF6 and UCl4 are the principal compounds used as inputs to
(UCl4) for subsequent use as feedstock in a uranium-enrichment process. Gaseous uranium enrichment processes.
UF6 is used as the feed in the gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion processes, and UCl4 • Manufacture of these feedstocks is straightforward industrial
is used as feed in the electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) process. chemistry.
Uranium ore concentrates, also known as yellowcake, typically contain 60– • These processes are unclassified and widely known.
80 percent uranium and up to 20 percent extraneous impurities. There are two com-
mercial processes used to produce purified UF6 from yellowcake. The primary differ-
ence between the two processes—solvent extraction/fluorination (“wet process”) and
fluorination/fractionation (“dry process”)—is whether the uranium is purified by sol-
vent extraction before conversion to UF6 or by fractional distillation of the UF6 after
conversion. The EMIS uranium-enrichment process uses UCl4 for its feed material. Uranium
In the wet process, yellowcake is dissolved in nitric acid (HNO3), and the in- tetrachloride is produced by the reaction of carbon tetrachloride (CCl4) with pure UO2
soluble residue is removed by filtration or centrifugation. Uranium is separated from at 700 °F.
the acid solution with liquid-liquid extraction, the uranyl nitrate product is decom-
posed to uranium trioxide (UO3) via thermal denitration, and the trioxide is reduced to RATIONALE
uranium dioxide (UO2) with hydrogen or cracked ammonia (NH3). In most cases, the A country choosing to join the nuclear weapons community must acquire the nec-
standard Purex process, using tri-n-butyl phosphate (TBP) in a hydrocarbon diluent, essary weapons (fissile) material (235 U or 239 Pu). A state selecting uranium for its weap-
separates uranium from its impurities in the extraction step. ons must obtain a supply of uranium ore and construct an enrichment plant because the
235
In the dry process, the conversion and purification steps occur throughout the U content in natural uranium is over two orders of magnitude lower than that found
process. If the yellowcake was produced by the alkali-leach process (yields Na2U2O7), in weapons grade uranium (>90 percent 235U). Nearly all uranium enrichment plants
the sodium must be removed from the material by partial digestion in sulfuric acid utilize UF6 as their feed. A country may select the EMIS process, which uses UCl4 as
followed by ammonia precipitation of ammonium diuranate [(NH4)2U2O7]. The am- its feed material, for enriching uranium.
monium-containing uranium salt is decomposed to UO3 by heating, and this oxide is
FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2)
reduced to UO2 with hydrogen or cracked NH3.
The remaining steps used to produce UF6 for both processes are similar in that the The processes outlined above are unclassified and have been described exten-
UO2 is converted to UF4 by hydrofluorination (using hydrogen fluoride gas—HF). sively in the literature on the nuclear fuel cycle. Many countries around the world
The UF4 (impure in the dry process) is converted to UF6 using electrolytically gener- have extracted uranium from its ores or from yellowcake. The processes for preparing
ated fluorine gas (F2). In the dry process, the UF6 is purified in a two-stage distillation the feedstocks are basic industrial chemistry.
step. Direct fluorination of UO3 to UF6 has been used, but this procedure is more The enabling technologies are those which use HF, NH3, F2, CCL4, and precursor
amenable to relatively small capacity plants. uranium compounds to prepare UF6 and UCL4.

II-5-10
 Table 5.1-1. Enrichment Feedstocks Production Technology Parameters

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Purification of yellow- Knowledge of liquid-liquid NTL 8F; Yellowcake Filters; centrifuges; Distribution coefficients
cake (wet process) extraction systems NRC J Nitric acid (HNO3) pulse columns; concen- for many elements
Experience in using HNO3 tri-n-butyl phos- tration/thermal denitra- Aqueous solubility for
phate (TBP) tion systems; tanks many compounds
Refined kerosene resistant to HNO3
Purification of yellow- Ability to handle H2 at NTL 8F; Yellowcake (should Furnace; air filtration None identified
cake (dry process: elevated temperature NRC J not contain high equipment; fluidized bed;
produces impure UO2) concentrations of temperature control;
sodium or heat exchangers
magnesium)
H2SO4
See citations below
UO2 preparation Ability to handle H2 at NTL 8F; H2 Moving bed reactor; None identified
elevated temperature NRC J NH3 rotary kiln; air filtration
equipment; fluidized bed;
temperature control
system
UF4 preparation Ability to manage HF at NTL 8F; HF Stirred fluidized bed None identified
elevated temperature NRC J reactors; rotary kiln;
Ability to provide a dry moving bed/screw
environment reactor; air cleaning
equipment (filters,
scrubbers); fluoride-
resistant equipment
UF6 preparation (used in Capability to control NTL 8F; F2 Flame tower reactor; Careful temperature
gaseous diffusion and quantities of fluorine gas. NRC J HF fluidized bed reactor; control is required for
Ability to operate a flame KF • 2HF condensers (cold traps); fluorination
gas centrifuge tower with F2. electrolytic cells (for F2
enrichment processes) Experience in removing H2 production); high-
from electrolytic cells (F2 amperage, low-voltage
production) . supply (for F2 produc-
Experience in operating in an tion); air-cleaning
anhydrous environment equipment; F2-resistant
equipment (Monel);
fluoride-resistant
equipment; UF6 storage
UCl4 preparation (used in Water-free environment must NTL 8F; CCl4 Stirred fluidized bed Reasonable control of
EMIS enrichment be provided NRC H reactors; rotary kiln; temperature
moving bed/screw
process) reactor; air-cleaning
equipment (filters,
scrubbers)

II-5-11
 Table 5.1-2. Enrichment Feedstocks Production Reference Data

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Purification of yellowcake (wet HNO3 solutions are relatively None identified Direct fluorination of UO3
process) hazardous and require moderate care
in handling
Purification of yellowcake (dry H2 presents an explosive hazard None identified Direct fluorination of UO3
process produces impure UO2)
UO2 preparation H2 presents an explosive hazard None identified Step may be bypassed using
direct fluorination
UF4 preparation Inappropriate use of HF can present None identified Step may be bypassed using
health problems. direct fluorination
Improper operation of tower reactors
may cause plugging (caking).
UF6 preparation (used in gaseous Producing F2 is not an easy task. UF6 product is feed to most U None identified
diffusion and gas centrifuge Flame towers can be difficult to enrichment processes
operate.
enrichment processes) Moisture-sensitive material difficult to
handle.
UCl4 preparation (used in EMIS Moisture-sensitive material difficult to UCl4 product is feed to the EMIS None identified
enrichment process) handle enrichment process

II-5-12
 SECTION 5.2—URANIUM ENRICHMENT PROCESSES

OVERVIEW
Highlights
It is generally recognized that the acquisition of fissile material in sufficient quan-
tity is the most formidable obstacle to the production of nuclear weapons. Fissile
material production consumes the vast majority of the technical, industrial, and finan- • The acquisition of fissile material in sufficient quantity is the most
cial resources required to produce nuclear weapons. For example, production of fis- formidable obstacle to the production of nuclear weapons.
sile materials—highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium—accounted for more • Gas centrifuges are today the technology of first choice for
than 80 percent of the $1.9 billion (1945 dollars) spent on the Manhattan Project.7 enriching uranium, based on process economics and minimum
Fissile materials can produce energy by nuclear fission, either in nuclear reactors consumption of electricity.
or in nuclear weapons. The principal fissile materials of interest are 235U, 233U, and • Technologies considered obsolete for commercial uranium
239
Pu. Uranium-235 is of particular interest because it is the only fissile material that enrichment, such as electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS), can
occurs in nature in significant quantity, and it can be used to construct a nuclear explo- be employed by a proliferant state at some added cost in electric
sive device if a sufficient quantity can be acquired. In a typical sample of natural power and labor requirements.
uranium, only 0.72 percent of the atoms are 235U atoms, and it can be assumed that all • Aerodynamic separation processes developed in South Africa and
of the remaining atoms are 238U atoms.8 Higher concentrations of 235U are required for Germany have proven satisfactory for a limited number of nuclear
many applications, and the use of uranium isotope separation processes to increase the weapons, despite their high cost to operate.
assay of 235U above its natural value of 0.72 percent is called uranium enrichment. • Laser isotope separation (LIS) techniques are based on advanced
While low-enriched uranium (LEU) could technically mean uranium with an as- technologies and represent potential uranium enrichment processes
say anywhere between slightly greater than natural (0.72 percent) and 20 percent 235 U, of the future.
it most commonly is used to denote uranium with an assay suitable for use in a light-
water nuclear reactor (i.e., an assay of <5 percent). Similarly, the term “highly en-
riched” uranium (HEU) could be used to describe uranium with an assay >20 percent,
but it is commonly used to refer to uranium enriched to 90 percent 235U or higher (i.e., A method for separating plutonium isotopes could be used to remove the heavier iso-
weapons-grade uranium). The term “oralloy” was used during World War II as a con- topes of plutonium (e.g., 240Pu) from reactor-grade plutonium, thus producing nearly
traction of “Oak Ridge alloy,” and it denoted uranium enriched to 93.5 percent 235 U. pure 239 Pu. Uranium isotope separation techniques [e.g., atomic vapor laser isotope
When plutonium is produced in a nuclear reactor, inevitably some 240Pu (as well separation (AVLIS)] might be applied to this task. However, this would require mas-
as heavier plutonium isotopes, including 241Pu and 242Pu) is produced along with the tery of production reactor and reprocessing technologies (to produce and extract the
more desirable 239Pu. The heavier isotope is not as readily fissionable, and it also plutonium) in addition to isotope enrichment technology (to remove the heavier pluto-
decays by spontaneous fission, producing unwanted background neutrons. Thus, nuclear nium isotopes). In practice, it is simpler to alter the reactor refueling cycle to reduce
weapon designers prefer to work with plutonium containing less than 7 percent 240Pu. the fraction of plutonium which is 240 Pu.
Manhattan Project scientists and engineers explored several uranium-enrichment
7
Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, The New World: A History of the United States technologies, and production plants employing three uranium-enrichment processes—
Atomic Energy Commission, Volume 1, 1939/1946, University of California Press, a 1990 electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS), liquid thermal diffusion, and gaseous dif-
edition of a book originally published by Pennsylvania State University Press in 1962. fusion—were constructed at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, during the period from 1943 to
8
1945. Centrifugation was tried, but the technology needed to spin a rotor at an appro-
Natural uranium typically has a composition of 0.0055 atom % 234U, 0.7205 atom % 235U, priate speed was not then practical on an industrial scale. The aerodynamic separation
and 99.274 atom % 238U. For most purposes, the tiny fraction of 234U can be neglected. processes developed in Germany and South Africa did not exist during World War II;

II-5-13
neither, of course did laser isotope separation or plasma separation. The World War II weapons states have tested or used the EMIS process for uranium enrichment. Even
Japanese nuclear program made some attempts to find a purely chemical process. with the problems associated with using the process, an EMIS facility could be attrac-
tive for a country desiring a limited weapons-grade uranium enrichment program. The
RATIONALE
process might be especially appealing as a method for further enriching partially en-
Methods of Separation riched material. It has been well documented that EMIS was the principal process
pursued by the Iraqi uranium enrichment program. This occurred at a time when EMIS
Electromagnetic Isotope Separation had been discarded and largely forgotten as a method for uranium enrichment because
The EMIS process is based on the same physical principle as that of a simple mass it is both energy intensive and labor intensive, and it is not economically competitive
spectrometer—that a charged particle will follow a circular trajectory when passing with other enrichment technologies.
through a uniform magnetic field. Two ions with the same kinetic energy and electri- Thermal Diffusion
cal charge, but different masses (i.e., 235U+ and 238U+), will have different trajectories,
Thermal diffusion utilizes the transfer of heat across a thin liquid or gas to accom-
with the heavier 238U+ ion having the larger diameter. The different diameters of the
plish isotope separation. By cooling a vertical film on one side and heating it on the
trajectories of the two uranium ions allow for the separation and collection of the
other side, the resultant convection currents will produce an upward flow along the hot
material in receivers or “collector pockets.” EMIS is a batch process that can produce
surface and a downward flow along the cold surface. Under these conditions, the
weapons-grade material from natural uranium in only two stages. However, hundreds
lighter 235 U gas molecules will diffuse toward the hot surface, and the heavier 238U
to thousands of units would be required to produce large quantities of HEU because of
molecules will diffuse toward the cold surface. These two diffusive motions com-
the process’s relatively low product collection rate and the long cycle time required to
bined with the convection currents will cause the lighter 235U molecules to concentrate
recover material between runs.
at the top of the film and the heavier 238 U molecules to concentrate at the bottom of the
In the uranium EMIS process, uranium ions are generated within an evacuated film.
enclosure (called a “tank”) that is located in a strong magnetic field. For the EMIS ion
The thermal-diffusion process is characterized by its simplicity, low capital cost,
source, solid uranium tetrachloride (UCl4) is electrically heated to produce UCl4 vapor.
and high heat consumption. Thermal diffusion in liquid UF6 was used during World
The UCl4 molecules are bombarded with electrons, producing U+ ions. The ions are
War II to prepare feed material for the EMIS process. A production plant containing
accelerated by an electrical potential to high speed and follow a circular trajectory in
2,100 columns (each approximately 15 meters long) was operated in Oak Ridge for
the plane perpendicular to the magnetic field. In the U.S. EMIS separators, the ion
less than 1 year and provided a product assay of less than 1% 235 U. Each of these
beam traverses a 180-deg arc before the ions pass through slit apertures at the collec-
columns consisted of three tubes. Cooling water was circulated between the outer and
tor. A major problem with the EMIS process is that less than half of the UCl4 feed is
middle tubes, and the inner tube carried steam. The annular space between the inner
typically converted to the desired U+ ions, and less than half of the desired U+ ions are
and middle tubes was filled with liquid UF6.
actually collected. Recovery of unused material deposited on the interior surfaces of
the tanks is a laborious, time-consuming process that reduces the effective output of an The thermal-diffusion plant in Oak Ridge was dismantled when the much more
EMIS facility and requires a large material recycle operation. energy-efficient (by a factor of 140) gaseous-diffusion plant began operation in the
1940’s. Today, thermal diffusion remains a practical process to separate isotopes of
In the U.S. EMIS program, production of weapons-grade uranium took place in
noble gases (e.g., xenon) and other light isotopes (e.g., carbon) for research purposes.
two enrichment stages, referred to as the α and β stages. The first (α) stage used
natural or slightly enriched uranium as feed and enriched it to 12–20% 235U. The Gaseous Diffusion
second (β) stage used the product of the (α) stage as feed and further enriched it to The gaseous-diffusion process has been highly developed and employed to pro-
weapons-grade uranium. To allow more efficient use of magnets and floor space, the duce both HEU and commercial reactor-grade LEU. The United States first employed
individual stages were arranged in continuous oval or rectangular arrays (called “race- gaseous diffusion during WWII and expanded its capacity after the war to produce
tracks” or, simply, “tracks”) with separator tanks alternated with electromagnetic units. HEU. Since the late 1960’s, the U.S. facilities have been used primarily to produce
The U.S. EMIS separators are referred to as “calutrons” because the development work commercial LEU, with the last remaining HEU capacity being shut down in 1992.
was carried out at the University of California (Berkeley) during the early 1940’s China and France currently have operating diffusion plants. Russia’s enrichment
using cyclotrons. facilities have been converted from diffusion to centrifuge technology. Britain’s diffu-
Although most applications of the EMIS process have been applied to the sion facility was shut down and dismantled.
commercial production of both stable and radioactive isotopes, all five recognized

II-5-14
 The gaseous-diffusion process depends on the separation effect arising from mo- due to its relatively low-energy consumption, short equilibrium time, and modular
lecular effusion (i.e., the flow of gas through small holes). On average, lighter gas design features.
molecules travel faster than heavier gas molecules and consequently tend to collide In the gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment process, gaseous UF6 is fed into a cylin-
more often with the porous barrier material. Thus, lighter molecules are more likely to drical rotor that spins at high speed inside an evacuated casing. Because the rotor
enter the barrier pores than are heavier molecules. For UF6, the difference in velocities spins so rapidly, centrifugal force results in the gas occupying only a thin layer next to
between molecules containing 235U and 238U is small (0.4 percent), and, consequently, the rotor wall, with the gas moving at approximately the speed of the wall. Centrifugal
the amount of separation achieved by a single stage of gaseous diffusion is small. force also causes the heavier 238UF6 molecules to tend to move closer to the wall than
Therefore, many cascade stages are required to achieve even LEU assays. the lighter 235UF6 molecules, thus partially separating the uranium isotopes. This sepa-
The production of a sustainable, efficient separating membrane (barrier) is the ration is increased by a relatively slow axial countercurrent flow of gas within the
key to the successful operation of a diffusion plant. To obtain an efficient porous centrifuge that concentrates enriched gas at one end and depleted gas at the other. This
barrier, the holes must be very small (on the order of one-millionth of an inch in diam- flow can be driven mechanically by scoops and baffles or thermally by heating one of
eter) and of uniform size. The porosity of the barrier must be high to obtain high flow the end caps.
rates through the barrier. The barrier must also be able to withstand years of operation The main subsystems of the centrifuge are (1) rotor and end caps; (2) top and
while exposed to corrosive UF6 gas. Typical materials for the barrier are nickel and bottom bearing/suspension system; (3) electric motor and power supply (frequency
aluminum oxide. changer); (4) center post, scoops and baffles; (5) vacuum system; and (6) casing. Be-
Diffusion equipment tends to be rather large and consumes significant amounts of cause of the corrosive nature of UF6, all components that come in direct contact with
energy. The main components of a single gaseous-diffusion stage are (1) a large cylin- UF6 must be must be fabricated from, or lined with, corrosion-resistant materials.
drical vessel, called a diffuser or converter, that contains the barrier; (2) a compressor The separative capacity of a single centrifuge increases with the length of the
used to compress the gas to the pressures needed for flow through the barrier; (3) an rotor and the rotor wall speed. Consequently, centrifuges containing long, high-speed
electric motor to drive the compressor; (4) a heat exchanger to remove the heat of rotors are the goal of centrifuge development programs (subject to mechanical con-
compression; and (5) piping and valves for stage and interstage connections and pro- straints).
cess control. The entire system must be essentially leak free, and the compressors
The primary limitation on rotor wall speed is the strength-to-weight ratio of the
require special seals to prevent both out-leakage of UF6 and in-leakage of air. The
rotor material. Suitable rotor materials include alloys of aluminum or titanium,
chemical corrosiveness of UF6 requires use of metals such as nickel or aluminum for
maraging steel, or composites reinforced by certain glass, aramid, or carbon fibers. At
surfaces exposed to the gas (e.g., piping and compressors). In addition to the stage
present, maraging steel is the most popular rotor material for proliferants. With
equipment, auxiliary facilities for a gaseous-diffusion plant could include a large elec-
maraging steel, the maximum rotor wall speed is approximately 500 m/s. Fiber-rein-
trical power distribution system, cooling towers to dissipate the waste process heat, a
forced composite rotors may achieve even higher speeds; however, the needed com-
fluorination facility, a steam plant, a barrier production plant, and a plant to produce
posite technology is not within the grasp of many potential proliferants. Another limi-
dry air and nitrogen.
tation on rotor speed is the lifetime of the bearings at either end of the rotor.
Gaseous diffusion is unlikely to be the preferred technology of a proliferator due
Rotor length is limited by the vibrations a rotor experiences as it spins. The rotors
to difficulties associated with making and maintaining a suitable barrier, large energy
can undergo vibrations similar to those of a guitar string, with characteristic frequen-
consumption, the requirement for procuring large quantities of specialized stage equip-
cies of vibration. Balancing of rotors to minimize their vibrations is especially critical
ment, large in-process inventory requirements, and long equilibrium times.
to avoid early failure of the bearing and suspension systems. Because perfect balanc-
Gas Centrifuge ing is not possible, the suspension system must be capable of damping some amount of
The use of centrifugal fields for isotope separation was first suggested in 1919; vibration.
but efforts in this direction were unsuccessful until 1934, when J.W. Beams and co- One of the key components of a gas centrifuge enrichment plant is the power
workers at the University of Virginia applied a vacuum ultracentrifuge to the separa- supply (frequency converter) for the gas centrifuge machines. The power supply must
tion of chlorine isotopes. Although abandoned midway through the Manhattan Project,
accept alternating current (ac) input at the 50- or 60-Hz line frequency available from
the gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment process has been highly developed and used to the electric power grid and provide an ac output at a much higher frequency (typically
produce both HEU and LEU. It is likely to be the preferred technology of the future 600 Hz or more). The high-frequency output from the frequency changer is fed to the

II-5-15
high-speed gas centrifuge drive motors (the speed of an ac motor is proportional to the The Uranium Enrichment Corporation of South Africa, Ltd. (UCOR) developed
frequency of the supplied current). The centrifuge power supplies must operate at and deployed its own aerodynamic process characterized as an “advanced vortex tube”
high efficiency, provide low harmonic distortion, and provide precise control of the or “stationary-walled centrifuge” at the so called “Y” plant at Valindaba to produce
output frequency. hundreds of kilograms of HEU. In this process, a mixture of UF6 and H2 is compressed
The casing is needed both to maintain a vacuum and to contain the rapidly spin- and enters a vortex tube tangentially at one end through nozzles or holes at velocities
ning components in the event of a failure. If the shrapnel from a single centrifuge close to the speed of sound. This tangential injection of gas results in a spiral or vortex
failure is not contained, a “domino effect” may result and destroy adjacent centrifuges. motion within the tube, and two gas streams are withdrawn at opposite ends of the
A single casing may enclose one or several rotors. vortex tube. The spiral swirling flow decays downstream of the feed inlet due to
friction at the tube wall. Consequently, the inside diameter of the tube is typically
Although the separation factors obtainable from a centrifuge are large compared
tapered to reduce the decay in the swirling flow velocity. This process is characterized
to gaseous diffusion, several cascade stages are still required to produce even LEU
by a separating element with very small stage cut (ratio of product flow to feed flow)
material. Furthermore, the throughput of a single centrifuge is usually small, which
of about 1/20 and high process-operating pressures.
leads to rather small separative capacities for typical proliferator centrifuges. To be
able to produce only one weapon per year, several thousand centrifuges would be Due to the very small cut of the vortex tube stages and the extremely difficult
required. piping requirements that would be necessary based on traditional methods of piping
stages together, the South Africans developed a cascade design technique, called
The electrical consumption of a gas centrifuge facility is much less than that of a Helikon. In essence, the Helikon technique permits 20 separation stages to be com-
gaseous diffusion plant. Consequently, a centrifuge plant will not have the easily iden- bined into one large module, and all 20 stages share a common pair of axial-flow
tified electrical and cooling systems typically required by a gaseous diffusion plant. compressors. A basic requirement for the success of this method is that the axial-flow
Aerodynamic Processes compressors successfully transmit parallel streams of different isotopic compositions
Aerodynamic uranium enrichment processes include the separation nozzle pro- without significant mixing. A typical Helikon module consists of a large cylindrical
cess and the vortex tube separation process. These aerodynamic separation processes steel vessel that houses a separating element assembly, two axial-flow compressors
depend upon diffusion driven by pressure gradients, as does the gas centrifuge. In (one mounted on each end), and two water-cooled heat exchangers.
effect, aerodynamic processes can be considered as nonrotating centrifuges. Enhance- For both of these aerodynamic processes, the high proportion of carrier gas re-
ment of the centrifugal forces is achieved by dilution of UF6 with a carrier gas (i.e., quired in relation to UF6 process gas results in high specific-energy consumption and
hydrogen or helium). This achieves a much higher flow velocity for the gas than could substantial requirements for removal of waste heat.
be obtained using pure UF6.
Laser Isotope Separation
The separation nozzle process was developed by E.W. Becker and associates at In the early 1970’s, significant work began on the development of laser isotope
the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center in Germany. In this process, a mixture of separation technologies for uranium enrichment. Present systems for enrichment pro-
gaseous UF6 and H2 (or helium) is compressed and then directed along a curved wall at cesses using lasers fall into two categories: those in which the process medium is
high velocity. The heavier 238U-bearing molecules move preferentially out to the wall atomic uranium vapor and those in which the process medium is the vapor of a ura-
relative to those containing 235U. At the end of the deflection, the gas jet is split by a nium compound. Common nomenclature for such processes include “first category—
knife edge into a light fraction and a heavy fraction, which are withdrawn separately. atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS or SILVA)” and “second category—
Economic considerations drive process designers to select separation nozzles with molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS or MOLIS).”
physical dimensions as small as manufacturing technology will allow. The curved The systems, equipment, and components for laser-enrichment plants embrace
wall of the nozzle may have a radius of curvature as small as 10 µm (0.0004 in.). (a) devices to feed uranium-metal vapor (for selective photoionization) or devices to
Production of these tiny nozzles by such processes as stacking photo-etched metal feed the vapor of a uranium compound (for photo-dissociation or chemical activation);
foils is technically demanding. (b) devices to collect enriched and depleted uranium metal as product and tails in the
A typical stage consists of a vertical cylindrical vessel containing the separation first category and devices to collect dissociated or reacted compounds as product and
elements, a cross piece for gas distribution, a gas cooler to remove the heat of com- unaffected material as tails in the second category; (c) process laser systems to
pression, and a centrifugal compressor driven by a electric motor. selectively excite the 235 U species; and (d) feed preparation and product conversion

II-5-16
equipment. The complexity of the spectroscopy of uranium atoms and compounds second laser system (infrared or ultraviolet) preferentially dissociate the excited 235UF6
may require incorporation of any number of available laser technologies. to form 235UF5 and free fluorine atoms. The 235UF5 formed from the dissociation pre-
cipitates from the gas as a powder that can be filtered from the gas stream.
AVLIS
MLIS is a stagewise process, and each stage requires conversion of the enriched
The atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) process is based on the fact UF5 product back to UF6 for further enrichment. CO2 lasers are suitable for exciting
that 235U atoms and 238U atoms absorb light of different frequencies (or colors). Al- the 235 UF6 during the first step. A XeCl excimer laser producing ultraviolet light may
though the absorption frequencies of these two isotopes differ only by a very small be suitable for the dissociation of 235UF6 during the second step. However, there is
amount (about one part in a million), the dye lasers used in AVLIS can be tuned so that currently no known MLIS optical system which has been successfully designed to
only the 235U atoms absorb the laser light. As the 235U atom absorbs the laser light, its handle both infrared and ultraviolet. Consequently, most MLIS concepts use an all
electrons are excited to a higher energy state. With the absorption of sufficient energy, infrared optical system.
a 235U atom will eject an electron and become a positively charged ion. The 235U ions
In terms of the gas flow for the MLIS process, gaseous UF6 mixed with a carrier
may then be deflected by an electrostatic field to a product collector. The 238U atoms
gas and a scavenger gas is expanded through a supersonic nozzle that cools the gas to
remain neutral and pass through the product collector section and are deposited on a
low temperatures. Hydrogen or a noble gas are suitable as carriers. A scavenger gas
tails collector.
(such as methane) is used to capture the fluorine atoms that are released as a result of
The AVLIS process consists of a laser system and a separation system. The sepa- the dissociation of 235UF6 molecules.
rator system contains a vaporizer and a collector. In the vaporizer, metallic uranium is
There are many complexities associated with the process, and the United States,
melted and vaporized to form an atomic vapor stream. The vapor stream flows through
UK, France, and Germany have stated that their MLIS programs have been termi-
the collector, where it is illuminated by the precisely tuned laser light. The AVLIS
nated. Japan also has had a small MLIS program. South Africa has recently stated that
laser system is a pumped laser system comprised of one laser used to optically pump a
their MLIS program is ready to be deployed for low-enriched uranium (LEU) produc-
separate dye laser, which produces the light used in the separation process. Dye mas-
tion. Principal advantages of the MLIS process are its low power consumption and its
ter oscillator lasers provide precise laser beam frequency, timing, and quality control.
use of UF6 as its process gas.
The laser light emerging from the dye master oscillator laser is increased in power by
passage through a dye laser amplifier. A total of three colors are used to ionize the 235 U Chemical and Ion Exchange
atoms. Chemical-exchange isotope separation requires segregation of two forms of an
Many countries are pursuing some level of AVLIS research and/or development, element into separate but contacting streams. Since many contacts are required to
and major programs exist in the United States, France, Japan, and probably Russia. achieve the desired separation, the contacting process must be fast and achieve as
Principal advantages of the AVLIS process include a high separation factor, low en- much separation as possible. For heavy elements such as uranium, achieving a suit-
ergy consumption (approximately the same as the centrifuge process), and a small able separation factor involves contact between two valence (oxidation state) forms
volume of generated waste. However, no country has yet deployed an AVLIS process, such as hexavalent [U6+ as in uranyl chloride (UO2Cl2)] and the quadrivalent [U4+ as in
although several have demonstrated the capability to enrich uranium with the process. uranium tetrachloride (UCl4)]. The 235U isotope exhibits a slight preference for the
While conceptually simple, the actual implementation of the process is likely to be higher valence, for example, the hexavalent over the quadrivalent in the Asahi process
difficult and expensive, especially for countries with limited technical resources. The or the quadrivalent over the trivalent (U3+) in the French solvent-extraction process.
AVLIS process requires much sophisticated hardware constructed of specialized ma- The chemical-exchange process, developed by the French, is commonly referred
terials that must be capable of reliable operation for extended periods of time in a harsh to as CHEMEX. It uses the exchange reaction that takes place between two valence
environment. states (U3+ and U4+) of uranium ions in aqueous solution. Isotopic enrichment results
from the tendency of 238U to concentrate in the U 3+ compound while 235U concentrates
MLIS in the U4+ compound. It is therefore possible to obtain enriched uranium by removing
The idea for the molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS) process was conceived the U4+ ions with an organic solvent that is immiscible with the aqueous phase (con-
by a group of scientists at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in 1971. There are two centrated hydrochloric acid). Several possible extractants are available; however,
basic steps involved in the MLIS process. In the first step, UF6 is irradiated by an tributyl phosphate (TBP), the choice of the French, is typically used. TBP is diluted
infrared laser system operating near the 16 µm wavelength, which selectively excites with an aromatic solvent, and this organic phase moves countercurrent to the aqueous
the 235UF6, leaving the 238UF6 relatively unexcited. In the second step, photons from a phase through a series of pulsed columns.

II-5-17
 In the pulse column, the heavier aqueous phase is fed into the top of the column, sputtering off the plate. This in turn displaces electrons from the uranium atoms and
and the lighter organic phase is fed into the bottom of the column. A rapid reciprocat- produces a plasma of 235 U and 238U ions.
ing motion is applied to the contents of the column, providing efficient and intimate The plasma is subjected to a uniform magnetic field along the axis of a cylindrical
contact of the two phases. In an HEU plant, centrifugal contactors might be employed vacuum chamber as the plasma flows from source to collector. The magnetic field is
particularly for the higher assay sections, since the stage times and corresponding spe- produced by a superconducting magnet located around the outside of the chamber.
cific uranium inventory could be reduced significantly. The high-strength magnetic field produces helical motions of the ions, with the lighter
235
After passing through the column, the enriched and depleted uranium streams U ions spiraling faster and having a higher ion cyclotron frequency than the heavier
238
must be chemically treated so that they can be recirculated through the column again U ions. As the ions move toward the collector, they pass through an electric field
(refluxed) or sent to another column for additional enrichment. This requires compli- produced by an excitation coil oscillating at the same frequency as the ion cyclotron
cated refluxing equipment at both ends of the column. frequency of the 235U ions. This causes the helical orbit of the 235U ions to increase in
The ion-exchange process was developed by the Asahi Chemical Company in radius while having minimal effect on the orbit of the heavier 238 U ions. The plasma
Japan and uses the chemical isotope effect between two valences (U4+ and U6+) of flows through a collector of closely spaced, parallel slats, the physical appearance of
uranium. In this process, the organic phase is replaced by a proprietary ion-exchange which roughly resembles a venetian blind. The large-orbit 235 U ions are more likely to
resin. The aqueous phase flows through the stationary resin held in a column, and the deposit on the slats, while the remaining plasma, depleted in 235U, accumulates on an
net effect of all the chemical reactions is a “band” of uranium that moves through the end plate of the collector. PSP is a batch process that would require several stages to
ion-exchange column. The exchange between the unadsorbed uranium flowing through produce HEU from natural feed.
the band and that adsorbed on the resin enhances the isotopic separation. In this con- The only countries known to have had serious PSP experimental programs are the
tinuous separation system, 235U and 238U tend to accumulate respectively at the en- United States and France. PSP became a part of DOE’s Advanced Isotope Separation
trance and exit ends of the adsorption band. In this process, it is economical to regen- research and development program in 1976, but development was dropped in 1982
erate many of the chemicals by reaction with oxygen and hydrogen in separate equip- when AVLIS was chosen as the advanced technology of choice. The French devel-
ment. oped their own version of PSP, which they called RCI. Funding for RCI was drasti-
The development and manufacture of the appropriate adsorbent beads are based cally reduced in 1986, and the program was suspended around 1990, although RCI is
on technology and know-how gained by Asahi in over 25 years of ion-exchange mem- still used for stable isotope separation.
brane development and manufacture. The adsorbent is a spherical bead of porous Proliferation Implication Assessment
anion-exchange resin with a very high separation efficiency and an exchange rate over Uranium gun-assembled weapons are the easiest of all nuclear devices to design
1,000 times faster than the rates obtained in most commercially available resins. and build. It is generally conceded to be impossible to prevent any nation having the
The two exchange processes discussed here are representative of exchange pro- requisite amount of HEU from building one or more gun-assembled weapons. There-
cesses now under study in several countries. At present, no country has built or oper- fore, the acquisition of significant quantities of 235U or a facility in which to separate
ated a full-scale uranium enrichment plant based on an exchange process. The pri- the fissile material is an indicator that the acquiring state could be in the process of
mary proliferation concern is that they are based on standard chemical engineering gaining a rudimentary nuclear capability. Because HEU is used in certain research
technology (except for the proprietary ion-exchange resins). reactors, another interpretation is possible. Because of the weapons potential, the United
Plasma Separation States and France have sought to replace HEU-fueled reactors with ones using a lower
grade (<20% 235 U, for example) of uranium which cannot be so readily converted to
The plasma separation process (PSP) has been studied as a potentially more effi- weapons use. The uranium gun-bomb route was successfully taken by South Africa.
cient uranium-enrichment technique that makes use of the advancing technologies in Any nation having uranium ore in sufficient quantity, a sufficiently well-developed
superconducting magnets and plasma physics. In this process, the principle of ion technological and industrial infrastructure, sufficient electric power, and the desire to
cyclotron resonance is used to selectively energize the 235U isotope in a plasma con- acquire nuclear weapons might well choose the uranium gun technology.
taining 235U and 238U ions. A feed plate of solid uranium serves as the source of neutral
uranium atoms. These atoms are vaporized by bombarding the plate with energetic FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2)
ions in a process called sputtering. A microwave antenna located in front of the plate All five nuclear weapon states have demonstrated the ability to enrich uranium to
energizes free electrons which collide with neutral uranium atoms in the vapor weapons grade. In addition, enrichment is a commercial process in The Netherlands

II-5-18
and Japan. Germany has also demonstrated the ability to enrich uranium; the South The nozzle enrichment process was to be used in Germany and in a plant to be
African nuclear weapons were made from 80–90% 235U produced indigenously. Bra- built in Brazil by NUCLEBRAS (a Brazilian firm) in cooperation with a German com-
zil and Argentina sought to build enrichment plants but have abandoned the effort. pany, Interatom. Neither plant appears to have been completed and placed in commer-
Iraq used EMIS to enrich uranium prior to the Gulf War and was in the process of cial service.
building a centrifuge enrichment cascade. Iraq produced some enriched uranium (not Germany operates a commercial centrifuge enrichment plant for its nuclear power
weapons grade) before the Gulf War terminated its program. Iran has invested large industry. The Becker nozzle process is not believed to be in use anywhere in the world
sums in various enrichment schemes, some of which appear to have been clever scams today.
by outsiders, without achieving any significant enrichment capability. Pakistan has
built a gas centrifuge enrichment facility, believed to produce material for nuclear
weapons.

II-5-19
 Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
ELECTROMAGNETIC ISOTOPE SEPARATION
Ion Source Single or multiple uranium ion NTL B5; Uranium chloride, None identified Validated ion source
sources consisting of a vapor NDUL 3; graphite, stainless models including 3-
source, ionizer, and beam steel, copper, dimensional solution of
accelerator. Capable of NRC H tantalum, tungsten Poisson's equation for
providing a total ion beam multiple species and
current of ≥50 mA taking into account the
effect of the accelerating
structure.
Ion Collectors Collector plates of two or NTL B5; Graphite, stainless None identified Validated ion beam
more slits and pockets for NDUL 3; steel, copper dynamics software and
collection of enriched and algorithms that optimize
depleted uranium ion beams, NRC H isotope separation
minimize sputtering design from ion source
through vacuum and into
collector.
Vacuum Housings Large enough for 1–2 meter NTL B5; Nonmagnetic None identified None identified
orbit radius, multiple orbits, NDUL 3; materials (e.g.,
operation at pressures of stainless steel)
0.1 Pa or lower NRC H
Magnet pole pieces Diameter >2 meters, able to NTL B5; Low resistance Precision field Validated 3-dimensional
maintain a time-invariant NDUL 3; wire, magnet iron measurement and singly (predominant) and
magnetic field within a adjustment. Precision multiply charged high
separator, ability to transfer NRC H shaping of pole tips, current ion beam
magnetic field between precisely controlled dynamics codes and
adjoining separators. windings. algorithms
High-voltage DC power Capable of continuous NTL B5; None identified None identified None identified
supplies operation, output voltage NDUL 3;
≥20,000 V , output current
≥1 Å, voltage regulation NRC H
<0.01% over 8-hour interval
DC magnet power Capable of continuously NTL B5; None identified None Identified None identified
supplies producing a voltage ≥100 V, NDUL 3;
current ≥500 Å, and current
or voltage regulation <0.01% NRC H
over 8-hour interval.

(cont’d)

II-5-20
 Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Vacuum pumps Input throat size ≥38 cm, NDUL 3; Pumping fluid, such Fast-acting shutoff None identified
pumping speed CCL Cat 2B as a hydrocarbon oil valves to protect
≥15,000 liters/sec, vacuum system and
vacuum <10–4 Torr minimize downtime
(1.33 x 10–4 mbar), oil-
diffusion pump systems of
sufficient capacity to provide
minimum downtime when
removing collectors.
Uranium recovery Extract enriched uranium in NTL B3; Cadmium (neutron Mass spectrometers None identified
small batches without going NRC I poison) used to
critical, efficient chemical prevent criticality.
processes to extract Must be removed at
enriched uranium from end of process
graphite collector
THERMAL DIFFUSION
Thermal Diffusion Tall columns (10–15 meters in NTL B5 UF6 corrosion- Thermal diffusion test Thermal diffusion
Columns height) consisting of three resistant materials columns for optimizing coefficients and
concentric tubes: inner tube performance performance models
copper, middle nickel, outer
iron. Small annular gap
maintained between inner and
middle tube.
Product and Tails Header Arrays of pipes made of or NTL B5 UF6 corrosion- None identified None identified
Piping Systems lined with UF6-resistant resistant materials
materials, fabricated for
containment of UF6 liquid at
pressures of 7 MPa, and for
interconnection of individual
thermal diffusion columns at
the top and bottom ends.
Liquid UF6 Transfer Pumps capable of pressuriz- NTL B5 Materials resistant None identified None identified
Pumps ing liquid UF6 to 7 MPa , leak to UF6 corrosion.
tight and corrosion resistant
to UF6.
Product and Tails Expansion valves and heat NTL B5 UF6 corrosion- UF6 mass spectrom- None identified
Withdrawal Systems exchangers for cooling liquid resistant materials eters/ion sources. UF6-
UF6 to 65 °C and for removal compatible flow, mass,
into product and tails pressure and tempera-
cylinders. ture instrumentation.

(cont’d)

II-5-21
 Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Cooling Water Systems Cooling water systems for CCL EAR 99 None identified None identified None identified
removal of 200 MW at
temperatures of 67–70 °C
Steam Plant Large steam plant needed CCL EAR 99 None identified None identified None identified
even for small uranium
enrichment capacity (200 MW
for 5,000 SWU/yr in U.S.
thermal diffusion plant)
GASEOUS DIFFUSION
Barrier material Thin, porous filters with small NTL B5; UF6-corrosion Scanning or Barrier performance
pore size (100 to 1,000 Å), NRC C resistant metallic, transmission models
thickness of ≤5 mm, diameter polymer or ceramic microscope, x-ray
≤25 mm, sufficient materials. Com- diffraction system, and
mechanical strength, stable, pounds and powders other test equipment for
chemically inert to UF6 including nickel or measuring the following
alloys containing barrier properties:
≥ 60% nickel, mechanical strength,
aluminum oxide, corrosion resistance,
fully fluorinated porosity, and
hydrocarbon permeability
polymers, etching
acid such as HNO3.
Diffuser Housings Hermetically sealed cylin- NTL B5; Nickel-plated steel, None identified None identified
drical vessels >20-cm diam. NRC C aluminum, or nickel
and >70-cm length (or alloys containing
comparable rectangular ≥ 60% nickel;
vessel) having inlet and special UF6-
outlet connections all >5-cm compatible gaskets
diameter, designed for for bolted flanges
operation at high vacuum,
designed for horizontal or
vertical installation
Gas blowers and Axial, centrifugal, or positive NTL B5; Nickel or high nickel UF6 test loop and Compressor design and
compressors displacement compressors/ NRC C alloy casing or instrumentation to performance models and
blowers with suction capacity plating on casing; determine compressor blade design codes for
≥ 1 m /min of UF6 and with
3
rotor blades and performance heavy gases.
discharge pressure up to impellers of same characteristics
100 psi designed to operate material or Al alloys.
in UF6 environment. Pressure
ratio between 2:1 and 6:1

(cont’d)

II-5-22
 Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Rotary shaft seals Vacuum seals with seal feed NTL B5; Materials resistant Instrumentation to Seal design and
and seal exhaust connec- NRC C to UF6 corrosion. measure seal feed and performance models for
tions. Seals designed for a exhaust pressures and heavy gases.
buffer gas inleakage of flows to check seal
<1,000 cm3/min. Adaptable performance.
to wide range of gas
pressures and pressure
disturbances, ease of
maintenance, and UF6
corrosion resistance.
Heat Exchangers Heat exchangers made of, or NTL B5; UF6 corrosion- Test loop to determine Heat transfer codes for
lined with UF6-corrosion NRC C resistant materials heat transfer compact heat transfer
resistant materials, and coefficients and surfaces and heavy
intended for a leakage pressure drop. gases.
pressure change rate
<10 N/m2 (0.0015 psi) per
hour under a pressure
difference of 100 kN/m2
(15 psi).
Feed systems Process systems including NTL B5; UF6 corrosion- UF6 mass spectrom- None identified
feed autoclaves for passing NRC C resistant materials. eters/ion sources.
UF6 to the gaseous diffusion Autoclaves. UF6-
cascades and capable of compatible flow, mass,
operating at pressures pressure, and tempera-
≤ 300 kN/m2 (45 psi). ture instrumentation.
Cylinders and autoclaves
~ 3-m long and 1.8-m in
diameter, and UF6 corrosion
resistant.
Product and Tails Compression liquefaction or NTL B5; Nickel, high-nickel UF6 mass spectrom- Compressor design
Withdrawal Systems desublimation (cold traps) NRC C alloys, aluminum, or eters/ion sources. UF6- codes and heat transfer
systems for withdrawal. copper compatible flow, mass, design codes applicable
Cylindrical equipment is ~1 m pressure, and tempera- to UF6
in diam. when insulated, and ture instrumentation.
2–3 m long. For HEU: diam.
<12.5 cm, may include Boron
alloys to preclude criticality.

(cont’d)

II-5-23
 Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Header piping systems Arrays of pipes ≥5 cm in NTL B5; Materials resistant None identified None identified
diam. made of or lined with NRC C to UF6 including
UF6-resistant materials, stainless steel,
normally of the double header aluminum, aluminum
system type, fabricated to alloys, nickel, or
very high vacuum and alloys containing
cleanliness standards, for ≥60% nickel.
handling UF6 within the
gaseous diffusion cascades,
Vacuum systems Large vacuum manifolds, NTL B5; Aluminum, nickel, or None identified None identified
vacuum headers, and NRC C alloys bearing ≥60%
vacuum suction pumps nickel. Hydrocarbon
having a suction capacity of or fluorocarbon
5m3/min or more. UF6 vacuum pump oils.
corrosion-resistant positive
displacement vacuum pumps
that may have special
working fluids.
Shut-off and control Manually or automatically NTL B5; UF6-resistant None identified None identified
valves operated, 5 mm or greater in NDUL 3; materials. Bellows
nominal size, made of UF6- seals rather than
resistant materials. NRC C; packing glands to
CCL Cat 0B isolate the process
vacuum system
from the
atmosphere.
Product storage and Cylinders designed for CCL EAR 99 Valves and None identified None identified
sampling cylinders operation up to 30 atmos- connectors
pheres, with appropriate resistant to
diameter and length to avoid corrosion from UF6.
criticality with HEU

(cont’d)

II-5-24
 Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
GAS CENTRIFUGE
Rotating Component: Thin-walled cylinders (>30 cm NTL B5; High strength-to- Equipment to manufac- Rotor dynamics/stress
Complete Rotor in length) or interconnected NRC B density ratio (HSD) ture, assemble, and analysis software
Assemblies thin-walled cylinders up to materials: maraging balance complete rotor
15 m in length made from high steel, high-strength assembly.
strength-to-density ratio aluminum alloys,
material. filamentary
materials suitable
for use in composite
structures.
Rotating Component: Thin-walled cylinders w/ NTL B5; HSD materials: Equipment to manufac- Rotor dynamics/stress
Rotor Tubes thickness ≤12 mm, diameter NRC B maraging steel, ture and balance rotor analysis software
75 to 400 mm, made from high high-strength tubes; spin-forming and
strength-to-density material, aluminum alloys, flow-forming machines,
length-to-diameter ratio filamentary filament winding
typically >2 materials suitable machines. Spin-testing
for use in composite equipment.
structures.
Rotating Component: Cylinder of wall thickness NTL B5; HSD materials: Equipment to manufac- Rotor dynamics/stress
Rings or Bellows ≤3 mm, diameter 75 to NRC B maraging steel, ture and balance rings analysis software
400 mm, made of high high-strength and bellows. Spin-
strength-to-density ratio aluminum alloys, testing equipment.
material, and having a filamentary
convolute. Used to provide materials suitable
local support to rotor tube or for use in composite
to join rotor tubes. structures.
Rotating Component: Disc-shaped high strength- NTL B5; HSD materials: Equipment to manufac- Rotor dynamics/stress
Baffles to-density ratio components, NRC B maraging steel, ture and balance baffles. analysis software
60 to 500 mm in diameter, high-strength Spin-testing equipment.
designed to be mounted in aluminum alloys,
rotor tubes to isolate take-off filamentary
chamber of rotor tube and/or materials suitable
to assist UF6 gas circulation for use in composite
in main separation chamber. structures.
Rotating Component: Disc-shaped or cup-shaped NTL B5; HSD materials: Equipment to manufature Rotor dynamics/stress
top caps/bottom caps HSD components, 75 to NRC B maraging steel, and balance end caps. analysis software
400 mm in diameter, designed high-strength Spin-testing equipment.
to fit the ends of rotor tubes, aluminum alloys,
contain the UF6 within the filamentary
rotor, and support the upper materials suitable
bearing elements or to carry for use in composite
rotating elements of motor structures.
(cont’d)
II-5-25
 Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Static Component: Homogeneous ring-shaped NTL B5; Ring magnet: Precision balancing and None identified
Magnetic Suspension annular magnet suspended NRC B samarium-cobalt, magnetic properties
Bearings (includes ring within UF 6-resistant housing, Alnico measuring equipment.
magnets) deviation of the magnetic
axes from the geometrical
axes limited to very small
tolerances
Static Component: Bearing comprised of pivot/ NTL B5; Hardened steel, None identified None identified
Bearings, Dampers (for cup assembly mounted on a NRC B stainless steel,
lower end of rotor tube) damper. Pivot is normally aluminum having
hardened steel shaft polished high-quality
into a hemisphere. Cup has a machined surface.
hemispherical indentation in
one surface. Shaft may
have hydrodynamic bearing.
Static Component: Cylinders having internally NTL B5; Steel, stainless Precision manufacturing None identified
Molecular Pumps helical grooves and internally NRC B steel, aluminum and mensuration
machined bores. Grooves equipment.
are typically rectangular in
cross section.
Static Component: Ring-shaped stators having NTL B5; Low-loss iron core Precision manufacturing Motor design software
Motor Stators multiphase windings on low- NRC B of laminated structure, for unusual motor
loss laminated iron core for coil winding and geometries and high
synchronous operation of AC mounting. frequency operation.
hysteresis motors in vacuum.
Power range is 50 to 1,000
VA for frequencies 600 to
2,000 Hz.
Static Component: Tubes up to 12 mm (0.5 in) NTL B5; UF6-resistant None identified CFD codes for heavy
Scoops internal diameter for NRC B materials gases in strong rotation
extraction of UF6 from within with shocks.
the rotor tube by Pitot tube
action and capable of being
fixed to the central gas
extraction system.
Feed Systems/Product Feed autoclaves that pass NTL B5; UF6-resistant Mass spectrometers/ion Heat transfer codes
and Tails Withdrawal UF6 to centrifuge cascades, NRC B materials used in sources. Autoclaves. applicable to UF6
Systems desublimers that remove UF6 piping UF6-compatible flow, desublimers.
from the cascades, product mass, pressure, and
and tails stations for trapping temperature
UF6 into containers. instrumentation.

(cont’d)

II-5-26
 Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Machine Header Piping Piping network normally of NTL B5; UF6-resistant Fabrication techniques None identified
System the “triple” header system NRC B materials used in applicable to very high
with each centrifuge piping vacuum and cleanliness
connected to each of the standards.
headers. Line connections at
the centrifuge may be
individually flanged or
combined in a single flange.
Frequency changers Multiphase output capable of NTL B5; None identified None identified None identified
(also called converters providing an output of ≥40 W, NRC B;
or inverters) operating in the range of 600
to 2,000 Hz, high stability NDUL 3;
with frequency control CCL Cat 3A
≤0.1%, harmonic distortion
≤10%, high efficiency, large
MTBF, ability to drive one or
more centrifuges.
AERODYNAMIC SEPARATION
Separator elements: Nozzle: slit-shaped, curved NTL B5; UF6-resistant Test facility to measure CFD software for nozzle
nozzles, jets and vortex channels with a radius of NRC D materials isotopic separation design and performance
tubes curvature less than 1 mm, performance, pressure
knife-edge to separate the drops, etc.
gas flow. Vortex tubes:
cylindrical or tapered, 0.5-cm
to 4-cm diameter, length to
diameter ratio of ≤20:1, one
or more tangential inlets
UF6/carrier gas Designed to reduce UF6 NTL B5; UF6-resistant None identified None identified
content in carrier gas to NRC D materials
separation systems ≤1 ppm. Use of cryogenic
heat exchangers and
cryoseparators, cryogenic
refrigeration units, separation
nozzle or vortex tube units,
or UF6 cold traps.
Separation element Cylindrical vessels >30 cm in NTL B5; UF6-resistant None identified None identified
housings diameter and 90 cm in length, NRC D materials
or rectangular vessels of
comparable dimensions.
Made of or protected by UF6-
resistant materials.

(cont’d)

II-5-27
 Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
UF6-hydrogen (or helium) Axial, centrifugal, or positive NTL B5; UF6-resistant UF6 -hydrogen test loop Compressor and seal
gas compressors, gas displacement compressors or NRC D materials and instrumentation to design and performance
blowers, and rotary shaft gas blowers, suction volume determine compressor models. Blade design
seals capacity of ≥ 2 m3/min, typi- performance character- codes.
cal pressure ratio between istics. Instrumentation
1.2:1 and 6:1. Seals with to measure seal feed and
feed and exhaust connec- exhaust pressures and
tions, provide a reliable seal flows to check seal
against outleakage or performance.
inleakage.
Heat Exchangers Provide adequate gas NTL B5; UF6-resistant Test loop to determine Heat transfer codes for
cooling, made or protected by NRC D materials heat transfer compact heat transfer
materials resistant to UF6 coefficients and surfaces.
pressure drop.
Shut-off, control, and Manually or automatically NTL B5; UF6-resistant None identified None identified
bellows-sealed valves operated, 40 to 1,500 mm in NRC D materials; bellows
diameter, made of or seals rather than
protected by UF6 resistant packing glands
materials
Feed systems/product Feed autoclaves to pass UF6 NTL B5; UF6-resistant Mass spectrometers/ion None identified
and tail withdrawal to the enrichment process; NRC D materials sources. Autoclaves.
systems desublimers (cold traps) or Flow, mass, pressure.
solidification or liquefaction and temperature
stations for removal of UF6 instrumentation.
from the process, product
and tails stations for
transferring UF6 into
containers
Process piping systems Piping network normally of NTL B5; UF6-resistant None identified None identified
and header systems the “double” header design NRC D materials
with each stage or group of
stages connected to each
header.
Vacuum systems and Vacuum systems having a NTl B5; UF6-resistant None identified None identified
pumps suction capacity of ≥ 5 m3/ NRC D materials. Hydro-
min with vacuum manifolds, carbon or fluoro-
headers, and pumps carbon vacuum
designed for service in corro- pump oils.
sive atmosphere. Pumps
may have fluorocarbon seals
and special working fluids.

(cont’d)

II-5-28
 Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
CHEMICAL EXCHANGE AND ION EXCHANGE
Liquid-liquid exchange Ability to produce pipes of NTL B5; Corrosion resistant Mechanical power None identified
columns various diameters and NRC E pipes and their inter- systems.
lengths which are internally nals made of or Sieve plates, recipro-
coated with material resistant protected by cating plates. or internal
to HCl and have mechanical suitable plastic turbine mixers
power input systems to pro- materials (such as
vide mixing of two immiscible fluorocarbon
liquids with residence times polymers) or glass
of ≤ 30 seconds.
Liquid-liquid centrifugal Capability to build and NTL B5; None identified Contactors made of or None identified
contactors operate centrifuge systems NRC E are lined with suitable
which disperse and then plastic materials (such
separate two immiscible as fluorocarbon
liquids with stage residence polymers) or with glass
times of ≤ 30 seconds and
are corrosion resistant to
concentrated HCl.
Electrochemical Skills in the design, produc– NTL B5; Parts in contact with Potentiometers Precise control of
reduction systems and tion, and operation of NRC E process stream: uranium valence
reduction cells reduction cells that are suitable materials
corrosion resistant to (glass, fluorocarbon
concentrated HCl and polymers,
prevent the reoxidation of U3+ polyphenyl sulfate,
to U4+ . polyether sulfone,
and resin-impreg-
nated graphite) to
avoid contamination
of aqueous stream
with certain metal
ions. Electrodes
(graphite).

(cont’d)

II-5-29
 Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Feed preparation Ability to prepare high-purity NTL B5; Parts in contact with Analytical equipment to None identified
systems aqueous solutions of uranium NRC E final feed solutions: monitor purity of
chloride. Concentration of suitable materials solutions
certain metal ions such as (glass, fluorocarbon
chromium, iron, vanadium, polymers, poly-
molybdenum, and other phenyl sulfate, poly-
bivalent or higher multivalent ether sulfone, and
cations must be more than a resin-impregnated
few parts per million. graphite) to avoid
contamination of the
aqueous stream with
certain metal ions.
Uranium oxidation Knowledgeable in the NTL B5; For portions of Potentiometers Accurate control of
systems operation of systems for the NRC E system processing uranium valence
3+ 4+ 3+
oxidation of U to U . high-purity U
Familiarity with the handling streams: suitable
of chlorine and oxygen gases materials (glass,
and distillation of HCl fluorocarbon
solutions. polymers, poly-
phenyl sulfate,
polyether sulfone,
and resin-impreg-
nated graphite) to
avoid contamination
Ion exchange columns Ability to design, construct, NTL B5; Fast-reacting ion Provide characteristics Physical and chemical
and operate cylindrical NRC E exchange resins or of glass substrate and characteristics of resin
columns >1 m in diameter adsorbents resin
made of or protected by
materials resistant to con-
centrated HCl and are capa–
ble of operating at a temper–
ature of 100 °C to 200 °C and
pressures >0.7 MPa (102 psi)
Ion exchange reflux Knowledgeable in the chem- NTL B5; Elements (e.g., Ti, Potentiometers, Careful control of
systems ical and electrochemical NRC E Fe, V) which Spectrometers solution chemistry
reduction systems for possess the proper
regeneration of chemical electrochemical
reducing agent(s) in ion behavior to be used
exchange in the regeneration
steps

(cont’d)

II-5-30
 Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
ATOMIC VAPOR LASER ISOTOPE SEPARATION (AVLIS)
Laser systems Systems designed for NTL B5; Laser gases, laser Lasers, laser amplifiers, Software for laser safety
separating uranium isotopes, NDUL 3; dyes and oscillators: copper systems, timing systems
usually consisting of copper vapor, argon ion,
vapor lasers and dye lasers. NRC F; neodymium-doped (other
A spectrum frequency CCL Cat 6 than glass), dye laser
stabilizer is required for amplifier and oscillators.
operation over extended
periods of time.
Uranium vaporization Melting and casting NTL B5; Filaments: tungsten Electron beam guns Interlocks between
systems technologies. Vaporization NRC F electron beam gun power
systems containing high- and magnetic field
power strip or scanning
electron beam guns with
delivered power on the target
of >2.5 kW/cm.
Liquid uranium metal Ability to handle molten NTL B5; Copper, tantalum, Water-cooled copper None identified
handling systems uranium or uranium alloys, NRC F yttria-coated crucibles
consisting of crucibles and graphite, graphite
cooling equipment for coated with other
crucibles. Made of or rare earth oxides.
protected by materials of
suitable corrosion and heat
resistance.
Product and tails Handle uranium metal in liquid NTL B5; Tantalum, yttria- None identified None identified
collector assemblies or solid form. May include NRC F coated graphite,
pipes, valves, fittings, graphite coated with
“gutters,” feed-throughs, other rare earth
heat exchangers and oxides
collector plates.
Separator module Cylindrical or rectangular NTL B5; Austenitic steel Protection from x-rays None identified
housings vessels with multiplicity of NRC F generated by electron
ports for electrical and water beam guns
feed-throughs, laser beam
windows, vacuum pump
connections, and
instrumentation diagnostics
and monitoring.

(cont’d)

II-5-31
 Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
MOLECULAR LASER ISOTOPE SEPARATION (MLIS)
Laser Systems Systems designed for NTL B5; Lasing medium: Pulsed CO2 lasers, Software for laser
separating uranium isotopes, NDUL 3; CO2, N2, He, Ar, Kr, pulsed excimer lasers, system frequency
usually consisting of CO2 or Xe, HCl, Cl2, F2 para-hydrogen Raman control, timing, and
excimer lasers and para- NRC F; shifters safety
hydrogen Raman shifters. A CCL Cat 6
spectrum frequency
stabilizer is required for
operation over extended
periods of time.
Supersonic expansion Nozzles capable of cooling NTL B5; UF6 corrosion- Test facility to measure CFD software for
nozzles mixtures of UF6 and carrier NRC F resistant materials diffuser pressure compressible gas flow
gas to ≤150 K and which are Ar, N2 recovery with shocks and
corrosion resistant to UF6 significant viscous
effects
UF5 product collectors Uranium pentafluoride (UF5) NTL B5; UF5 / UF6 corrosion- Test facility to measure None identified
solid product collectors NRC F resistant materials pressure drop as a
consisting of filter, impact, or function of collector
cyclone-type collectors, or loading
combinations thereof.
UF6 /carrier gas Compressors designed for NTL B5; UF6 corrosion- UF6/carrier gas test Compressor design and
compressors and rotary long term operation in UF6 NRC F resistant materials facility and instrumenta- performance models and
shaft seals environment. Seals with feed tion to determine com- blade design codes.
and exhaust connections; pressor performance Seal performance and
provide a reliable seal against characteristics. Instru- design models.
outleakage or inleakage. mentation to measure
seal feed and exhaust
pressures and flows to
check seal performance.
Fluorination systems Systems designed for NTL B5; Fluorinating agent Equipment for storage Safety systems, thermal
fluorinating UF5 (solid) to UF6 NRC F (e.g., ClF3), and transfer of fluorina- control
(gas) for subsequent corrosion-resistant ting agent and for collec-
collection in product materials tion and transfer of UF6.
containers or for transfer for Reaction vessel (e.g.,
additional enrichment. fluidized-bed reactor,
screw reactor, flame
tower), temperature and
pressure probes, cold
traps. Equipment for in-
situ fluorination.

(cont’d)

II-5-32
 Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Feed systems/product Feed autoclaves to pass UF6 NTL B5; UF6 corrosion- Mass spectrometers/ion None identified
and tail withdrawal to the enrichment process; NRC F resistant materials sources. Autoclaves.
systems desublimers (cold traps) or UF6-compatible flow,
solidification or liquefaction mass, pressure, and
stations for removal of UF6 temperature
from the process, product instrumentation.
and tails stations for transfer-
ring UF6 into containers
UF6/carrier gas Systems designed to NTL B5; UF6 corrosion- Cryogenic heat None identified
separation systems separate UF6 from carrier gas NRC F resistant materials exchangers or cryo-
(N2, Ar). separators, cryogenic
refrigeration units, or UF6
cold traps.
PLASMA SEPARATION PROCESS
Microwave power Producing or accelerating NTL B5; None None identified Validated algorithms and
sources and antennae ions and having the following NRC G related computer pro-
characteristics: >30 GHz grams to compute the
frequency and >50 kW mean flow and trajectories of
power output for ion U-235 and U-238 ion
production. isotopes in rf-heated
plasma
Product and tails Assemblies for collecting NTL B5; Tantalum, yttria- None identified Validated algorithms and
collector assemblies uranium metal in solid form. NRC G coated graphite related computer pro-
Made of or protected by grams to compute the
materials of suitable corro- flow and trajectories of
sion and heat resistance to U-235 and U-238 ion
uranium metal vapor. isotopes in rf-heated
Graphite shop, uranium plasma
recovery and recycle support
facilities.
RF ion excitation coils Frequencies of more than NTL B5; None None identified Particle dynamics,
100 kHz and capable of NRC G particle interactions
handling >40 kW mean power.
Liquid uranium handling Ability to handle molten NTL B5; Tantalum, yttria- None identified None identified
systems uranium or uranium alloys, NRC G coated graphite,
consisting of crucibles and graphite coated with
cooling equipment for cruci- other rare earth
bles. Made of or protected by oxides
materials of suitable corro-
sion and heat resistance.

(cont’d)

II-5-33
 Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Plasma generation Systems for the generation of NTL B5; Uranium metal Electron beam guns None identified
systems uranium plasma. May contain NRC G
high-power strip or scanning
electron beam guns with a
delivered power on the target
of >2.5 kW/cm.
Superconducting Superconducting solenoidal NDUL B3; Liquid He, liquid N2 Liquid He and N2 control- None identified
magnets electromagnet with an inner CCL Cat 3A lers and monitors, cryo-
diameter of >30 cm, providing thermometers, cryogenic
a very uniform magnetic field tubing
of high strength (>2 teslas).

II-5-34
 Table 5.2-2. Uranium Enrichment Processes Reference Data

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

ELECTROMAGNETIC ISOTOPE Production of HEU for use in nuclear Other uranium enrichment
SEPARATION (EMIS) weapons, naval propulsion, research technologies
reactors
Ion source Obtaining high U+ beam currents from None identified Several types of ion source exist.
source, controlling expansion of
beam, properly focus ion beam on
collector slits, heater life, insulator
breakdown, damage to source
components due to high energy ions
Ion collectors Retain and measure collected None identified None
uranium, retain shape over wide
temperature range, resist sputtering,
conduct heat, permit recovery of
deposited uranium.
Vacuum housings Leakage rate; opening and closing None identified None
with minimum downtime
Magnet pole pieces Maintain low magnetic field ripple None identified Superconducting magnets
High-voltage power supplies Maintain stable voltage None identified None
DC magnet power supplies Maintain stable current None identified None
Vacuum pumps Maintain high vacuum in large Other isotope separation processes None
evacuated region (e.g., AVLIS, PSP)
Uranium recovery Substantial chemical processing None identified None
facility required, labor intensive
THERMAL DIFFUSION Production of uranium enriched up to Other uranium enrichment
1.2% 235U as feed to electromagnetic technologies
separators enriching to weapons
grade uranium.
Thermal Diffusion Columns Precisely machined tubing. Operation None identified None identified
at high pressures and temperatures
without leaks. Maintaining a small gap
between hot and cold walls. UF6
freezing and plugging.
Product and Tails Header Piping Minimize leakage and corrosion, None identified None identified
Systems sealing and welding technologies
Liquid UF6 Transfer pumps Minimize leakage and corrosion, None identified None identified
sealing technology

(cont’d)

II-5-35
 Table 5.2-2. Uranium Enrichment Processes Reference Data (cont’d)

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Product and Tails Withdrawal Minimize leakage and corrosion, None identified None identified
Systems sealing and welding technologies
Cooling Water Systems Temperature control None identified None identified
Steam Plant Large steam plant needed even for None identified None identified
small uranium enrichment capacity
GASEOUS DIFFUSION Production of LEU (fuel for nuclear Other uranium enrichment
power reactors) or HEU (nuclear technologies
weapons, naval propulsion, research
reactors)
Barrier Materials Fabrication of barrier. Maintain fine None identified None identified
pore size, high permeability, and
structural integrity over long periods of
operation. Control nonseparative flow
mechanisms.
Diffuser Housings Procurement of large quantities None identified None identified
required, sealing and welding tech-
nologies, aerodynamic efficiency,
minimum leakage and corrosion.
Gas Blowers and Compressors Procurement of large quantities None identified None identified
required, blade design, nozzle design,
lubrication system for bearings,
minimum leakage and corrosion.
Rotary Shaft Seals Procurement of large quantities None identified Hermetically sealed compressors
required, minimize inleakage and with UF6 gas bearings
outleakage, long-term running
reliability
Heat Exchangers Minimize leakage and corrosion, None identified None identified
cooling tower design
Feed Systems Maintain material balance: reveal None identified None identified
cascade leakage, consumption on
surfaces or material freeze-outs
Product and Tails Withdrawal Maintain material balance: reveal None identified None identified
Systems cascade leakage, consumption on
surfaces or material freeze-outs.
Criticality concerns with HEU.
Vacuum Systems Minimize leakage. Containment and None identified None identified
cleanliness.

(cont’d)

II-5-36
 Table 5.2-2. Uranium Enrichment Processes Reference Data (cont’d)

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Vacuum Systems Minimize leakage. Containment and None identified None identified
cleanliness.
Shutoff and Control Systems Procurement of large quantities None identified None identified
required, minimize leakage and corro-
sion, provide proper pressure drop to
move UF6 inventory and minimize
stage efficiency losses, isolation of
stages for maintenance
Product Storage and Sampling Maintain operational integrity with None identified None identified
Cylinders minimum leakage and corrosion.
Criticality concerns with HEU.
GAS CENTRIFUGE Production of LEU (fuel for nuclear Other uranium enrichment
power reactors) or HEU (nuclear technologies
weapons, naval propulsion, research
reactors)
Rotating Component: Complete Rotor dynamics, critical frequencies, None identified None identified
Rotor Assemblies proper balancing and damping,
continuous operation
Rotating Component: Rotor Material properties, balancing, resis- None identified None identified
Tubes tance to corrosion attack, continuous
operation, uniformity of manufacture
Rotating Component: Rings or Material properties, balancing, resis- None identified None identified
Bellows tance to corrosion attack, continuous
operation, uniformity of manufacture
Rotating Component: Baffles Material properties, balancing, resis- None identified None identified
tance to corrosion attack, continuous
operation, uniformity of manufacture
Rotating Component: top Material properties, balancing, resis- None identified None identified
caps/bottom caps tance to corrosion attack, continuous
operation, uniformity of manufacture
Static Component: Magnetic Homogeneity of magnet material, None identified None identified
Suspension Bearings (includes deviation of magnetic axes
ring magnets)
Static Component: Bearings, Prope damping to control rotor vibra- None identified None identified
Dampers (for lower end of rotor tion and restrain lateral movement
tube)
Static Component: Molecular Maintain low pressure in casing None identified None identified
Pumps

(cont’d)

II-5-37
 Table 5.2-2. Uranium Enrichment Processes Reference Data (cont’d)

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Static Component: Motor Stators Provide low-loss, high speed, high None identified None identified
frequency, synchronous and
uninterrupted service.
Static Component: Scoops Aerodynamics and materials None identified None identified
Feed Systems/Product and Tails Maintain material balance. Criticality None identified None identified
Withdrawal Systems concerns with HEU.
Machine Header Piping System Minimize leakage and corrosion, None identified None identified
sealing, and welding technologies
Frequency Changers (also called Trouble-free operation for extended Drive high-speed spindle motors for None identified
converters or inverters) periods of operation, no maintenance grinders and machine tools.
requirements
AERODYNAMIC SEPARATION Production of LEU (fuel for nuclear Other uranium enrichment
power reactors) or HEU (nuclear technologies
weapons, naval propulsion, research
reactors)
Separator elements: nozzles, Precision in fabricating very small None identified None identified
jets and vortex tubes nozzles, sophisticated machine shop
UF6 carrier-gas separation Large building ventilation system, H2 None identified None identified
equipment generating site, explosive mixture
concerns
Separation element housings Sealing and welding technologies, None identified None identified
aerodynamic efficiency, minimum
leakage and corrosion.
UF6-hydrogen (or helium) gas Aerodynamics, rotor dynamics, lubri- None identified None identified
compressors, gas blowers, and cation, blade/vane stress and vibra-
tion, minimize leakage, corrosion,
rotary shaft seals failure rates
Heat Exchangers Substantial waste heat, cooling tower None identified None identified
design
Shut-off, control, and bellows- Minimize leakage and corrosion Valves could be used in other flow None identified
sealed valves systems.
Feed Systems/Product and Tail Maintain material balance. Criticality None identified None identified
Withdrawal Systems concerns with HEU.
Process piping systems and Minimize leakage and corrosion, None identified None identified
header systems sealing and welding technologies
Vacuum Systems and Pumps Minimize leakage. Containment and Other vacuum systems None identified
cleanliness.

(cont’d)

II-5-38
 Table 5.2-2. Uranium Enrichment Processes Reference Data (cont’d)

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

CHEMICAL AND ION Production of LEU (fuel for nuclear Other uranium enrichment
EXCHANGE power reactors) or HEU (nuclear technologies
weapons, naval propulsion, research
reactors)
Liquid-liquid exchange Judicious handling of columns to pre- None identified Use mixer/settlers or centrifugal
columns vent breaching of interior coating or contactors.
lining. The instability of U3+ in aqueous
solution demands expertise in uranium
solution chemistry.
Liquid-liquid centrifugal Protection of corrosion resistant lining None identified Use mixer/settlers or liquid-liquid
contactors is paramount. The instability of U3+ in exchange columns.
aqueous solution demands expertise in
uranium solution chemistry.
Electrochemical reduction Must prevent reoxidation of uranium None identified May use other chemicals (zinc) for
systems and reduction cells reduction
Feed preparation systems Product must be of very high-purity with None identified None identified
little metallic contamination.
Uranium oxidation systems Chlorine gas is highly toxic and must be None identified May oxidize systems
handled with extreme care. Pure electrolytically but process will be
oxygen gas may bring about rapid more expensive.
combustion and fire.
Ion exchange columns The preparation of the resin / adsorbent None identified None identified
is the key and has proven very difficult.
Ion exchange reflux systems The appropriate metals to use in the None identified None identified
regeneration system have not been well
identified.
ATOMIC VAPOR LASER Production of LEU (fuel for nuclear Other uranium enrichment
ISOTOPE SEPARATION (AVLIS) power reactors) or HEU (nuclear technologies
weapons, naval propulsion, research
reactors), Pu separation, Li
enrichment
Laser systems Precise tuning, control and modulate Lidar None identified
wavelengths, sufficient pulse repetition Guidestar
frequency and pulse length, laser
power per pulse, beam quality, beam
propagation, optics
Uranium vaporization systems High power density None identified None identified

(cont’d)

II-5-39
 Table 5.2-2. Uranium Enrichment Processes Reference Data (cont’d)

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Liquid uranium metal handling Withstanding heat from electron beam None identified None identified
systems gun and corrosive effects of liquid
uranium
Product and tails collector Uranium corrosion at high None identified None identified
assemblies temperatures
Separator module housings Maintaining a very high vacuum, None identified None identified
reliability of large pump system
MOLECULAR LASER ISOTOPE Production of LEU (fuel for nuclear Other uranium enrichment
SEPARATION (MLIS) power reactors) or HEU (nuclear technologies
weapons, naval propulsion, research
reactors)
Laser Systems High energy pulses, high repetition None identified None identified
rates, beam quality, beam propaga-
tion, optics, para-hydrogen Raman
cells, high capacity gas flow systems
for lasing gas, gas cleanup systems
Supersonic expansion nozzles Specially contoured to produce uni- None identified None identified
form gas flow in irradiation chamber,
provide efficient utilization of laser
light, corrosion resistance
UF5 product collectors High UF5 collection efficiency, critical- None identified None identified
ity concerns with HEU collection,
corrosion resistance
UF6 /carrier gas compressors and Aerodynamics, rotor dynamics, lubri- None identified None identified
rotary shaft seals cation, blade/vane stress and vibra-
tion, minimize leakage, corrosion,
failure rates
Fluorination systems Efficient removal of UF5 enriched None identified None identified
product in a timely manner, corrosion
resistance
Feed systems/product and tail Criticality concerns for HEU, corrosion None identified None identified
withdrawal systems resistance
UF5 /carrier gas separation Protection of carrier gases from None identified None identified
systems chemical contamination by processing
equipment, removal of reaction
products, rebalancing process gas
composition, corrosion resistance

(cont’d)

II-5-40
 Table 5.2-2. Uranium Enrichment Processes Reference Data (cont’d)

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

PLASMA SEPARATION PROCESS Production of LEU (fuel for nuclear Other uranium enrichment
SYSTEMS power reactors) or HEU (nuclear technologies
weapons, naval propulsion, research
reactors)
Microwave power sources and Power input and voltage, plasma None identified None identified
antennae density, electron temperature
Product and tails collector Criticality concerns for HEU, corrosion None identified None identified
assemblies resistance
RF ion excitation coils Collisional effects, orientation of None identified None identified
electric fields, 235U selectivity
Liquid uranium handling systems Throughput, corrosive effects of liquid None identified None identified
uranium
Plasma generation systems High plasma density None identified None identified
Superconducting magnets Strength and uniformity of magnetic None identified None identified
field, cryogenic refrigeration

II-5-41
 SECTION 5.3—NUCLEAR FISSION REACTORS

OVERVIEW
Highlights
This subsection discusses nuclear fission reactors in general, but emphasizes that
the types which have been found most suitable for producing plutonium are graphite-
moderated nuclear reactors using gas or water cooling at atmospheric pressure and • Plutonium, used in many nuclear weapons, can only be made in
with the capability of having fuel elements exchanged while on line. sufficient quantities in a nuclear reactor.
• The graphite-moderated, air- or gas-cooled reactor using natural
The first nuclear reactor, CP-1, went critical for the first time on 2 December 1942
in a squash court under Stagg Field at the University of Chicago. Construction on CP- uranium as its fuel was first built in 1942. Scale-up of these types
1 began less than a month before criticality was achieved; the reactor used lumped of reactors from low power to quite high power is straightforward.
uranium metal fuel elements moderated by high-purity graphite. Within 2 years the • Reactors have been built in many countries of the world,
United States first scaled up reactor technology from this essentially zero-power test including some of real proliferation concern.
bed to the 3.5 MW (thermal) X-10 reactor built at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and then • Reactors using natural uranium can make relatively high quality
again to the 250-megawatt production reactors at Hanford. The Hanford reactors sup- plutonium.
plied the plutonium for the Trinity test and the Nagasaki war drop. Clearly, reactor • Reactors are generally purpose-built, and reactors built and operated
technology does not stress the capabilities of a reasonably well-industrialized state at for plutonium production are less efficient for electricity production
the end of the twentieth century. than standard nuclear electric power plants because of the low
Some problems did arise with the scale-up to hundreds of megawatts: the graph- burnup restriction for production of weapons grade plutonium.
ite lattice changed crystal state, which caused some deformation, and the buildup of a
neutron-absorbing xenon isotope poisoned the fission reaction. This latter problem
was curable because of the foresight of the duPont engineers, who built the reactor
modest. Some research reactors can be refueled while operating, and such
with many additional fuel channels which, when loaded, increased the reactivity enough
reactors are of special concern for plutonium production because they can
to offset the neutron absorption by the xenon fission product.
limit fuel burnup, which enhances the quality of the plutonium compared to
Finally, the problem of spontaneous emission of neutrons by 240 Pu produced in that obtained from reactors that require high burnup before shutdown and
reactor plutonium became apparent as soon as the first samples of Hanford output refueling.
were supplied to Los Alamos. The high risk of nuclear pre-initiation associated with
240 (2) Power reactors. These are used to generate electric power. Few use fuel
Pu caused the abandonment of the notion of a gun-assembled plutonium weapon
enriched to greater than 5–7% 235U. Practical power levels range from a few
and led directly to the adoption of an implosion design.
hundred MW(e) (three times that in terms of thermal power output) to 1,000
Several distinct classes of reactor exist, each optimized for one purpose, generally or 1,500 MW(e)—meaning 3,000–4,000 MW(t). Power reactors designs have
using fuel carefully chosen for the job at hand. These classes include the following: included water cooled-graphite moderated (the Soviet RBMK used at
(1) Research reactors. Usually operates at very low power, often only Chernobyl), boiling (light) water, pressurized (light) water, heavy water-mod-
1–2 MW or less. Frequently uses high-enriched uranium fuel, although most erated and cooled, graphite-moderated/helium cooled, and liquid metal-mod-
newer models use no more than 20-percent enrichments to make the theft of erated. Most power reactors operate under pressure and cannot be refueled in
fuel less attractive. Fertile material (238U for Pu, 6Li for tritium) can be encap- operation. The RBMK and CANDU reactors are notable exceptions to this
sulated in elements known as “targets” for insertion into the reactor core. The rule. The CANDU reactor was developed for the Canadian nuclear power
reactor can also employ a fertile blanket of 238U in which plutonium can be program and is a deuterium oxide (heavy water) moderated reactor which can
bred. Cooling requirements and shielding requirements are relatively operate on natural uranium fuel.

II-5-42
 (3) Production reactors. These are used to make plutonium (and often tritium) possible, and experiments to develop its potential have been started, but the feasibility
efficiently. Production reactors are frequently graphite-moderated and either of large-scale production by the process has not been demonstrated.
air-, CO2-, or helium-cooled. The longer a given sample of fuel is irradiated, In addition to production of plutonium, nuclear reactors can also be used to make
the greater the build-up of 240Pu, an isotope which decays by spontaneous tritium, 3H, the heaviest isotope of hydrogen. Tritium is an essential component of
fission and which should be minimized in weapon fuel. Consequently, pluto- boosted fission weapons and multi-stage thermonuclear weapons. The same reactor
nium production reactors usually are designed to be refueled while operating design features which promote plutonium production are also consistent with efficient
(on-line refueling) so that relatively little 240Pu is found in the “spent” fuel. tritium production, which adds to the proliferation risk associated with nuclear reac-
(4) Breeder reactors. These reactors generate plutonium at a rate greater (num- tors.
bers of nuclei per unit time) than they burn their fissile fuel (numbers of The “size” of a nuclear reactor is generally indicated by its power output. Reac-
nuclei per unit time). Normally, breeders use fast neutrons and irradiate a tors to generate electricity are rated in terms of the electrical generating capacity, MW(e),
fissile 238U blanket. Plutonium produced in the fuel generally has a higher meaning megawatts of electricity. A more important rating with regard to production
fraction of 240Pu than that produced in other reactors, but the Pu made in the of nuclear explosive material is MW(t), the thermal power produced by the reactor. As
blanket of uranium surrounding the core is usually of a high quality, contain- a general rule, the thermal output of a power reactor is three times the electrical capac-
ing very little 240Pu . ity. That is, a 1,000 MW(e) reactor produces about 3,000 MW(t), reflecting the inef-
(5) Propulsion reactors. Primarily found on submarines and large-surface com- ficiencies in converting heat energy to electricity.
batant ships, nuclear reactors have given new operational freedom to the un- A useful rule of thumb for gauging the proliferation potential of any given reactor
derwater navy and deliver increased time on station combined with high speed is that 1 megawatt-day (thermal energy release, not electricity output) of operation
for both the submarine service and the surface navy. The United States and produces 1 gram of plutonium in any reactor using 20-percent or lower enriched ura-
Russia have built most of the world’s shipboard reactors. The world’s first nium; consequently, a 100 MW(t) reactor produces 100 grams of plutonium per day
nuclear powered cargo ship was the U.S.N.S. Savannah; however, nuclear and could produce roughly enough plutonium for one weapon every 2 months. Re-
propulsion power has not been particularly successful in the commercial world. search reactors using nearly 100-percent enriched material produce almost no pluto-
Today, the only operating commercial vessels using nuclear propulsion are nium in their fuel because the fertile species, 238 U, has been removed. These reactors
Russian icebreakers. To keep the core size small, propulsion reactors gener- can, however, be built with a surrounding “blanket” of natural or depleted uranium in
ally use highly enriched uranium as fuel. In principle, a propulsion reactor which plutonium can be bred efficiently. The Osirak reactor built in Iraq and de-
core could be surrounded with a fertile blanket and used to produce pluto- stroyed by Israeli aircraft was of this type.
nium. In practice, this has never been done.
A typical form of production reactor fuel is natural uranium metal encased in a
(6) Space reactors and mobile power systems. Nuclear reactors have been used simple steel or aluminum cladding. Because uranium metal is not as dimensionally
from time to time, usually by the former Soviet Union, to provide on-orbit stable when irradiated as is uranium oxide used in high burnup fuel, reactors fueled
electrical power to spacecraft. In principle, they will use HEU as fuel to keep with the uranium metal must be confined to very low burnup operation, which is not
the core mass and volume small. Other spacecraft have been powered by the economical for electricity production. This operational restriction for uranium metal
heat released by the radioactive decay of 238Pu. fuel results in the production of plutonium with only a small admixture of the undesir-
RATIONALE able isotope, 240Pu. Thus, it is almost certain that a reactor using metallic fuel is in-
tended to produce weapons grade plutonium, and operation of such a reactor is a strong
Plutonium, one of the two fissile elements used to fuel nuclear explosives, is not indicator that proliferation is occurring.
found in significant quantities in nature. Instead, it must be “bred,” or produced, one
Many technologies are useful in the construction and operation of nuclear reac-
atomic nucleus at a time by bombarding 238U with neutrons to produce the isotope 239 U,
tors. The following are nuclear reactor related technologies:
which beta decays (half-life 23 minutes), emitting an electron to become the (almost
equally) radioactive 239Np (neptunium). The neptunium isotope again beta decays (half- • Conversion of uranium to the appropriate chemical form (e.g., UO2,) from
life 56 hours) to 239Pu, the desired fissile material. The only proven and practical source fluorides or from yellowcake.
for the large quantities of neutrons needed to make plutonium at a reasonable speed is • Fuel fabrication including conversion, melting or casting, alloying, and the
a nuclear reactor in which a controlled but self-sustaining 235 U fission chain reaction production of rods or billets. Operations would include machining, heat treat-
takes place. Accelerator-based transmutation to produce plutonium is theoretically ment, extrusion, and rolling.

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 • Fuel rod cladding. The risk associated with a power reactor program is that some of the technology
• Control systems and appropriate instrumentation. Cooling systems including legitimately acquired for the electricity-producing power reactor could be transferred
those for use in emergencies and, for power reactors, coupling to electrical without detection to the construction and operation of a plutonium production reactor.
generation equipment. To reduce such risk of nuclear proliferation, nations that supply nuclear-related
• Containment/confinement structures to minimize fission product release from equipment and materials have joined in an organization known as the Nuclear Suppli-
the reactor site. ers Group (NSG). The NSG, through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
has published guidelines which trigger the requirement for full scope safeguards to be
• Refueling equipment.
in place in the receiving nation before the nuclear reactor components of interest can
• Reprocessing facilities including facilities to chop highly radioactive fuel rods be exported by member nations. These guidelines are referred to as the “Trigger List”
into small pieces, dissolve the fuel in acid, and extract plutonium from the and are designated “NTL” in the “Export Control Reference” column of Table 5.3-1.
radioactive liquid process streams. (IAEA INFCIRC/254/Rev. 2/Part 1, 17 June 1996. )
• Spent fuel storage (temporary or permanent) including facilities to cool the
FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2)
discharged fuel.
Six countries are known to have detonated nuclear explosive devices. Of these
Proliferation Implications Assessment
six, five elected to test a plutonium device before experimenting with uranium-based
It is unlikely that any nuclear state or threshold state has produced nuclear weap- weapons. Only China chose to go the uranium route. Of the suspected threshold states
ons by diverting material from a safeguarded nuclear reactor or from other safeguarded and former threshold states (Iraq, North Korea, Israel, South Africa, Pakistan) which
parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. This result is due in part because the typical power have not exploded a device, three are believed to have pursued the plutonium route as
reactor uranium fuel is enriched to only 3 percent to 5 percent, and it is not usable their first choice. South Africa and Pakistan appear to have preferred enriching ura-
directly in a nuclear weapon; most such reactors cannot be refueled without extended, nium; after the Osirak reactor was destroyed, Iraq switched to a uranium-based design.
easily detected shutdowns. While the large quantity of low-quality plutonium pro- Although uranium enrichment (see Section 5.2, Uranium Enrichment Processes) is
duced in civilian nuclear power reactors is of concern because even high-burnup plu- one way of obtaining the special materials to join the nuclear club, nuclear reactors
tonium containing more than 10 percent 240Pu can be used in a nuclear explosive, indi- provide an equally satisfactory route in the event the path to enrichment is blocked or
vidual power reactors provide little opportunity for the proliferator to obtain fuel for a rejected.9 Indeed, in a well-designed production reactor, one uranium fission is likely
weapon. It is difficult to irradiate fertile material in power reactors and uneconomical to produce on average about 0.8 plutonium nuclei, and many fewer atoms of pluto-
to shut down frequently to extract the fuel at the low burnup levels that yield high- nium than 235 U atoms are required to make a fission device.10
quality plutonium. Many nations (see Figure 5.0-2) have the ability to design, build or operate nuclear
The existence of a nuclear power industry in a country is, however, proof that the reactors. In addition to U.S. firms, Swiss and Swedish (ASEA-Brown Boveri, ABB),
state has the necessary skilled manpower to design and build large parts of the infra- French, British, and Chinese enterprises have sold power or research reactors on the
structure for a nuclear weapons program. The experience gained operating a civilian international market.
power reactor would be valuable should a country elect to pursue nuclear weapons.

9
Lack of an adequate supply of electricity is one obstacle to a sucessful enrichment program;
inability to acquire uranium or specialized technologies can be another.
10
Plutonium and uranium densities are nearly the same, but the critical mass of plutonium is
only about 20 percent that of HEU because of plutonium's greater reactivity.

II-5-44
 Table 5.3-1. Nuclear Fission Reactors Technology Parameters

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Power Reactors (Fast): Ability to extract plutonium NTL B1; Fuel: stainless steel Equipment specially None Identified
Liquid Metal Fast from irradiated fuel or targets. NRC A clad UO2 /PuO2 fuel designed to extract
Breeder Reactor Liquid metal handling pellets. enriched uranium and/or
(LMFBR) systems, oxide fuel Coolant : usually plutonium fuel sources
fabrication, uranium liquid metal (e.g., from reactor core; fuel
enrichment capability. sodium). fabrication techniques
specially designed for
fast reactors.
Equipment for handling
solid and liquid sodium.
Power Reactors Control criticality, establish NTL B1; Fuel: basic fission Methods for producing None Identified
(Thermal): uniform temperature rise in NRC A fuels-U-235, U-233, cylindrical fuel elements
Pressurized Water reactor core, ability to Pu-239; U-238 (for by compacting and
Reactor (PWR), Boiling remove fuel elements and use in creating Pu- sintering cylindrical
Water Reactor (BWR), extract enriched uranium 239), natural pellets(e.g., uranium
Heavy Water Reactor and/or plutonium. Heavy uranium, enriched oxide); zirconium alloy
(HWR) water production. Oxide fuel uranium, uranium (Zircaloy) tube about
fabrication. BWR and PWR oxide, alloys of 13 mm in diameter and
require uranium enrichment. uranium-plutonium, 3.7 m long (typical);
mixtures of uranium- equipment specially
plutonium oxides designed to extract fuel
and carbides, from reactor core.
thorium-232 (for use
in creating U-233);
Moderator: ordinary
(light) water, heavy
water (deuterium
oxide); Coolant:
ordinary (light)
water, heavy water
(deuterium oxide).
Power Reactors Fabrication of refractory fuel NTL B1; Fuel: usually Low Specially designed None Identified
(Thermal): elements from high-purity NRC A Enriched Uranium production equipment to
High Temperature Gas graphite. High pressure, high (LEU); Moderator: fabricate special fuel
Cooled Reactor (HTGR), volume coolant gas graphite. assemblies. High
Advanced Gas Reactor circulating pumps (turbines). Coolant: Helium pressure CO2 or He gas
(AGR) (HTGR), carbon handling equipment.
dioxide (AGR)

(cont’d)

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 Table 5.3-1. Nuclear Fission Reactors Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Production Reactors Target and fuel reprocessing NTL Fuel: natural or Fuel and target None Identified
facilities to extract plutonium slightly enriched reprocessing facilities
or tritium. High purity uranium for pluto- usually located at the
graphite. Heavy water nium production, same site or nearby. Hot
production. Uranium metal HEU and 6Li - cell facilities. Specially
production. enriched target for designed equipment for
tritium production. fabrication of fuel
Moderator: heavy elements and targets for
water, can be breeding plutonium
graphite. and/or tritium.
Coolant: air, light
water, heavy water
Research Reactors Fuel technology spans light NTL Fuel: HEU or LEU; Equipment configured for None Identified
water, heavy water, graphite, Moderator: graphite, frequent shutdowns
organic, and hydride hydrides, organic associated with insertion
moderated types. materials (hydro- withdrawal of target
carbons), light elements. Hot cell
water, heavy water. facilities to support
Coolant: light water, research and
heavy water development.

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 Table 5.3-2. Nuclear Fission Reactors Reference Data

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Power Reactors (Fast) Pu-239 extraction (reprocessing). Nuclear weapons Enrichment technologies, thermal
Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Ability to design and fabricate contain- power reactors, production
(LMFBR) ment vessels and operate safely for reactors, research reactors.
extended periods. Availability of HEU
or plutonium. Liquid metal (e.g.,
sodium) handling.
Power Reactors (Thermal): Ability to design and construct Nuclear weapons Enrichment technologies, fast
Pressurized Water Reactor pressure vessels and cooling power reactors, intermediate
(PWR), Boiling Water Reactor systems. Ability to process highly power reactors, production
(BWR), Heavy Water Reactor radioactive spent fuel assemblies reactors, research reactors
(HWR)
Power Reactors (Thermal): High Removal of refractory cladding from Nuclear weapons Enrichment technologies, fast
Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor fuel. Reprocessing facilities. power reactors, intermediate
(HTGR), Advanced Gas Reactor power reactors, production
(AGR) reactors, research reactors
Production Reactors Methods for extracting Pu-239 and/or Nuclear weapons Enrichment technologies, fast
tritium from fuel or targets. power reactors, thermal power
reactors, research reactors.
Research Reactors Methods for extracting enriched Nuclear weapons Enrichment technologies, fast
uranium and/or Pu-239 and/or tritium power reactors, thermal power
from fuel or targets. Facility for reactors, production reactors
irradiating quantities of fertile material.

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 SECTION 5.4—PLUTONIUM EXTRACTION (REPROCESSING)

OVERVIEW
Highlights
This subsection covers technologies involved in the recovery and purification of
uranium and plutonium in spent (irradiated) reactor fuel and irradiated targets. Unlike
• Plutonium is extracted from spent reactor fuel and irradiated
fuel from fossil plants that discharge ash with negligible heat content, fuel discharged
from nuclear reactors contains appreciable quantities of fissile uranium and plutonium targets.
(“unburned” fuel). These fuel elements must be removed from a reactor before the • Fuel choppers can be as simple as a power-driven saw. The most
fissile material has been completely consumed, primarily because of fission product challenging technical component of a reprocessing plant is the
buildup. Fission products capture large numbers of neutrons, which are necessary to separation system (mixer/settlers, extracted columns, or centrifugal
sustain a chain fission reaction. In the interest of economic utilization of nuclear fuels contractors). Flow rates must be monitored precisely, the chemistry
and the conservation of valuable resources, several countries have constructed repro- must be exact, and a critical excursion must be prevented.
cessing plants to recover the residual uranium and plutonium values, utilizing a vari- • Although the steps used in reprocessing are standard chemical
ety of physical and chemical methods. operations and the literature on the chemistry and equipment
Plutonium is one of the two elements which have been used in fission explosives. required has been widely disseminated, the successful separation of
It does not exist naturally in any significant quantities but must be made nucleus by uranium and plutonium is a formidable task.
nucleus in a nuclear reactor by the process of neutron absorption on 238U followed by
two beta decays producing first neptunium and then plutonium. The plutonium is
removed from the spent fuel by chemical separation; no nuclear or physical separation
(as for example in uranium enrichment) is needed. To be used in a nuclear weapon, • Heavy industrial construction. All operations are performed in a facility
plutonium must be separated from the much larger mass of non-fissile material in the that is usually divided into two structural sections (hardened and nonhardened)
irradiated fuel. and two utility categories (radiation and ventilation/contamination). The hard-
After being separated chemically from the irradiated fuel and reduced to metal, ened portion of the building (reprocessing cells) is designed to withstand the
the plutonium is immediately ready for use in a nuclear explosive device. most severe probable natural phenomena without compromising the capabil-
If the reactor involved uses thorium fuel, 233U, also a fissile isotope, is produced ity to bring the processes and plant to a safe shutdown condition. Other parts
and can be recovered in a process similar to plutonium extraction. of the building (i.e., offices and shops), while important for normal functions,
The first plutonium extraction (reprocessing) plants to operate on an industrial are not considered essential and are built to less rigorous structural require-
scale were built at Hanford, Washington, during the Manhattan Project. The initial ments. Radiation is primarily addressed by using 4- to 6-ft thick, high-den-
plant was built before the final parameters of the extraction process were well defined. sity concrete walls to enclose the primary containment area (hot cells). A
Reprocessing plants are generally characterized by heavy reinforced concrete con- proliferator who wishes to reprocess fuel covertly for a relatively short time—
struction to provide shielding against the intense gamma radiation produced by the less than a year would be typical—may use concrete slabs for the cell walls.
decay of short-lived isotopes produced as fission products. Plutonium extraction and Holes for periscopes could be cast in the slabs. This is particularly feasible if
uranium reprocessing are generally combined in the same facility in the civilian nuclear the proliferator cares little about personnel health and safety issues.
fuel cycle. Although the United States no longer reprocesses civil reactor fuel and • Fuel storage and movement. Fuel is transported to the reprocessing plant in
does not produce plutonium for weapons, other countries have made different choices. specially designed casks. After being checked for contamination, the clean
Britain, France, Japan, and Russia (among others) operate reprocessing plants. fuel is lowered into a storage pool via a heavy-duty crane. Pools are normally
A brief description of the main features/processes (and related technology) of a 30-ft deep for radiation protection and contain a transfer pool, approximately
reprocessing plant follows.

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 15-ft deep, that provides an underwater system to move the fuel into an adja- • Metal preparation. Plutonium may be precipitated as PuF3 from aqueous
cent hot cell. nitrate solution by reducing its charge from +4 to +3 with ascorbic acid and
• Fuel disassembly. Fuel elements are breached (often chopped) to expose the adding hydrofluoric acid (HF). The resulting solid is separated by filtration
fuel material for subsequent leaching in nitric acid (HNO3). Fuel cladding is and dried. Reprocessed uranium is rarely reduced to the metal, but it is con-
frequently not soluble in nitric acid, so the fuel itself must be opened to chemi- verted to the oxide and stored or to the hexafluoride and re-enriched. Pluto-
cal attack. nium (and uranium) metal may be produced by the reaction of an active metal
(calcium or magnesium) with a fluoride salt at elevated temperature in a sealed
• Fuel dissolution. Residual uranium and plutonium values are leached from
metal vessel (called a “bomb”). The metal product is freed from the slag,
the fuel with HNO3. The cladding material remains intact and is separated as
washed in concentrated HNO3 to remove residue, washed with water, dried,
a waste. The dissolver must be designed so that no critical mass of plutonium
and then remelted in a high temperature furnace (arc).
(and uranium) can accumulate anywhere in its volume, and, of course, it must
function in contact with hot nitric acid, a particularly corrosive agent. Dis- • Waste treatment/recycle. Reprocessing operations generate a myriad of waste
solvers are typically limited-life components and must be replaced. The first streams containing radioactivity. Several of the chemicals (HNO3) and streams
French civilian reprocessing plant at La Hague, near Cherbourg, had serious (TBP/kerosene mixture) are recycled. All streams must be monitored to pro-
problems with leakage of the plutonium-containing solutions. tect against accidental discharge of radioactivity into the environment. Gas-
eous effluents are passed through a series of cleaning and filtering operations
Dissolvers may operate in batch mode using a fuel basket or in continuous mode before being discharged ,while liquid waste streams are concentrated by evapo-
using a rotary dissolver (wheel configuration). ration and stored or solidified with concrete. In the ultimate analysis, the
• Fissile element separation. The PUREX (Plutonium Uranium Recovery by only way to safely handle radioactivity is to retain the material until the activ-
EXtraction) solvent extraction process separates the uranium and plutonium ity of each nuclide disappears by natural decay.
from the fission products. After adjustment of the acidity, the resultant aque- Early plants used “mixer-settler” facilities in which the two immiscible fluids
ous solution is equilibrated with an immiscible solution of tri-n-butyl phos- were mixed by a propeller, and gravity was used to separate the liquids in a separate
phate (TBP) in refined kerosene. The TBP solution preferentially extracts chamber. Successful separation requires that the operation be conducted many times
uranium and plutonium nitrates, leaving fission products and other nitrates in in sequence. More modern plants use pulse columns with perforated plates along their
the aqueous phase. Then, chemical conditions are adjusted so that the pluto- length. The (heavier) nitric acid solution is fed in at the top and the lighter TBP-
nium and uranium are reextracted into a fresh aqueous phase. Normally, two kerosene from the bottom. The liquids mix when they are pulsed through the perfora-
solvent extraction cycles are used for the separation; the first removes the tions in the plates, effectively making a single reactor vessel serve to carry out a series
fission products from the uranium and plutonium, while the second provides of operations in the column. Centrifugal contractors using centrifugal force have also
further decontamination. Uranium and plutonium are separated from one been used in place of mixer-settlers. The process must still be repeated many times,
another in a similar second extraction operation. TBP is a common industrial but the equipment is compact. New plants are built this way, although the gravity-
chemical used in plasticizers and paints. Solvent extraction usually takes based mixer-settler technology has been proven to be satisfactory, if expensive and
place in a pulse column, a several-inch diameter metal tube resistant to nitric space-consuming.
acid and used to mix together the two immiscible phases (organic phase con-
taining TBP and an aqueous phase containing U, Pu, and the fission prod- A single bank of mixer-settler stages about the size of a kitchen refrigerator can
ucts). The mixing is accomplished by forcing one of the phases through the separate enough plutonium for a nuclear weapon in 1–2 months. A bank of eight
other via a series of pulses with a repetition rate of 30 to 120 cycles/minute centrifugal contactors can produce enough plutonium for an explosive device within a
and amplitudes of 0.5 to 2.0 inches. The metal tube contains a series of per- few days and takes up about the same space as the mixer-settler.
forated plates which disperses the two immiscible liquids. Hot cells with thick radiation shielding and leaded glass for direct viewing, along
• U & Pu product purification. Although plutonium and uranium from sol- with a glove box with minimal radiation shielding, are adequate for research-scale
vent extraction are nearly chemically pure, additional decontamination from plutonium extraction, are very low technology items, and would probably suffice for a
each other, fission products, and other impurities may be required. Large plants program designed to produce a small number of weapons each year. The concrete
use additional solvent extraction cycles to provide this service, but small plants canyons housing many smaller cells with remotely operated machinery are character-
may use ion exchange for the final purification step (polishing). istic of large-scale production of plutonium.

II-5-49
 Different organic extraction reagents and different acids may be used. Ion ex- RATIONALE
change can be substituted for solvent extraction, but the exchange materials are sus-
The production of weapons-grade uranium is a formidable task because the con-
ceptible to radiation damage.
centration of the fissile isotope 235U in natural uranium (0.7 percent) is much lower
Nonaqueous technologies have also been studied, including pyrochemical pro- than the concentration normally used in fission weapons (>90 percent), and the enrich-
cesses in advanced development in the US for EBR-II. Russia and Japan are appar- ment of 235U is difficult because of the very slight differences in the physical and chemical
ently also interested. properties of the uranium isotopes.
Proliferation Implication Assessment Alternatively, 239 PU may be selected as weapons material. The problems associ-
ated with enrichment are replaced with those of acquiring plutonium—a man-made
Roughly five times as many nuclei of 235U as of 239 Pu are required to make a
element. The element can be produced from 238 U during the fissioning process and can
critical mass. A proliferator can choose between laboriously extracting the fissile ura-
be separated chemically from undesirable waste products.
nium isotope from the 99.3 percent of natural uranium which is not useful in a fission
bomb, or laboriously breeding the necessary plutonium, nucleus-by-nucleus, in a reac- FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2)
tor and then extracting the plutonium from the spent fuel. Intense radiation emitted by
Reprocessing plants have been operated by all five declared nuclear powers. In-
certain components in spent reactor fuel makes this separation especially difficult and
dia reprocessed spent fuel for its one nuclear explosion. It is believed that North Korea
hazardous. The processing equipment must be surrounded by massive shielding; pro-
reprocessed spent fuel from one of its reactors. Iraq reprocessed at least gram-quanti-
vision must be made to remove substantial amounts of heat that are associated with
ties of plutonium according to IAEA inspection reports. Sweden and Switzerland at
this radioactivity; and in some instances, damage to chemicals and construction mate-
least considered the design of reprocessing plants for their (now defunct) weapons
rials become an impediment to a successful separation campaign. However, several
programs.
hundred metric tons (MT) of both weapons-grade and reactor-grade plutonium have
been separated, and present worldwide reprocessing capacity is >3,000 MT of fuel per Germany and France operate reprocessing facilities for civilian nuclear fuel;
year (>27 MT of plutonium). Japan is constructing such a facility.
Plutonium-fueled weapons must be assembled by implosion.

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 Table 5.4-1. Plutonium Extraction (Reprocessing) Technology Parameters

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Heavy industrial Ability to fabricate a facility NTL B3; High-density Radiation monitoring Shielding software
construction which will protect workers and NDUL 1; concrete (applies to all processes) Criticality software
the environment from radio- Fuel storage pool Radiation generation/
activity and hazardous NDUL 8; Cranes depletion software
materials (note: some CCL Cat 2B Hot cells
countries may have different Remote manipulators
criteria than the United High-density radiation
States in this regard). shielding windows
Radiation-hardened TV
cameras
Air filtration
Evaporators
Fuel storage and Sufficient storage pool NTL B3; None identified Remotely operated None identified
movement capacity and depth. NRC A cranes
Ability to move radioactive Specially designed
material. shipping casks
Criticality control
Fuel disassembly Capability to separate NTL B3; None identified Cut-off wheel None identified
(breaching) cladding from fissile material NRC A Shear dissolver (for Al
mechanically or chemically. cladding)
Laser
Fuel dissolution Ability to handle highly NTL B3; Nitric acid (HNO3) Analytical chemistry None identified
corrosive liquids containing NRC A Hydrogen fluoride facility for fission
radioactivity. (HF) products, U and Pu
Adequate knowledge of HNO3 resistant
uranium, plutonium, and tanks of a specific
fission product chemistry. configuration to
prevent a nuclear
excursion
Fissile element Familiar with liquid-liquid NTL B3; None identified Mixer/settlers Distribution coefficients
separation (solvent extraction systems. NRC A Pulse columns for many elements.
extraction) Understand distribution of Centrifugal contactors Aqueous solubility for
uranium, plutonium, and many substances.
fission products between two
immiscible liquids.

(cont’d)

II-5-51
 Table 5.4-1. Plutonium Extraction (Reprocessing) Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
U and Pu product Cognizant of liquid-liquid NTL B3; Tri-n-butyl phos- Mixer/settlers Distribution coefficients
purification extraction systems NTL 3; phate (TBP) Pulse columns for many elements
Familiar with ion exchange Refined kerosene Centrifugal contactors Aqueous solubility for
resin systems NRC A Ion exchange resins Chemical holding or many substances
storage vessels
Metal preparation (Pu Ability to handle plutonium in NTL B3; HF Reducing agents Drying Furnace; Fluoride None identified
exclusively) glove boxes NDUL 2; (high-purity Ca or resistant (Monel)
Mg) Furnace capable of
CCL Cat 1C; CaF2 or MgF2 (used reaching 600 °F
NRC A as liner for reduction Sealed reaction tube
bomb) Temperature
Iodine (serves as control/measurement
catalyst in reduc- High temperature
tion) furnace (arc)
Waste treatment/recycle Ability to recycle valuable NTL B3; Resistant to HNO3 Chemical storage tanks None identified
components (TBP, HNO3) NRC A (stainless steel,
Ability to process streams titanium alloys)
containing high levels of
radioactivity and hazardous
materials

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 Table 5.4-2. Plutonium Extraction (Reprocessing) Reference Data

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Heavy industrial construction Ability to construct a thick-walled, Provides shielded facility for all May not be needed if nation
relatively sealed structure with reprocessing operations unconcerned about its workers or
adequate shielding. the environment and reprocessing
is to be a short-term endeavor.
Fuel storage and movement Adequate depth of storage pool to None identified Use reactor storage pool if close
shield spent fuel. proximity to reprocessing facility.
Sufficient storage capacity for fuel. Possible storage (dry) in specially
Cranes of sufficient capacity to handle designed casks.
shipping casks.
Fuel disassembly (breaching) Capability to remove as much None identified None identified
extraneous material from fuel element
as possible.
Knowledgeable in the construction and
use of one of the breaching tools.
Fuel dissolution Ability to prevent a nuclear excursion None identified Several nonaqueous processes
have been developed but most
are complicated (pyro-
metallurgical, pyrochemical, and
fluoride volatility)
Fissile element separation Ability to prevent a nuclear excursion. None identified Use one of the nonaqueous
(solvent extraction) Aqueous solution from separation processes.
process contains extremely Replace solvent extraction with
hazardous radioactive materials. ion exchange process.
Use a precipitation process
(bismuth phosphate).
U and Pu product purification Ability to obtain a pure product. None identified Use one of the precipitation
Availability of ion exchange resins and processes (peroxide, oxalate)
sufficient knowledge of their use.
Metal preparation (Pu exclusively) Capability to handle molten Pu metal. Produces metallic Pu Electrolytic process (requires
molten salts—1,300 °F).
Reduction of other halides
Waste treatment/recycle High level radioactive waste must be None identified Discharge all aqueous waste
handled with extreme care. solutions to the environment.
Minimal recycling (expensive but
may be used for limited
production).

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 SECTION 5.5—LITHIUM PRODUCTION

OVERVIEW
Highlights
This subsection discusses chemical methods for separation of 6Li from natural
lithium, which is predominantly composed of the isotope 7Li. 6Li is a critical material
• Lithium-6, combined with deuterium, is a key ingredient of modern
for the manufacture of the secondaries of so-called dry thermonuclear devices, which
do not require the use of liquid deuterium and tritium. It is inconvenient to carry thermonuclear weapons.
deuterium and tritium as gases in a thermonuclear weapon, and certainly impractical • Lithium-6 can be separated from the more common 7 Li isotope by
to carry them as liquefied gases, which requires high pressures and cryogenic tempera- purely chemical means using the fact that 6 Li will migrate to a
tures. Instead, one can make a “dry” device in which 6Li is combined with deuterium mercury amalgam and 7 Li to a lithium hydroxide solution when the
to form the compound 6Li D (lithium-6 deuteride). Neutrons from a fission “primary” amalgam and hydroxide solutions are intimately mixed.
device bombard the 6Li in the compound, liberating tritium, which quickly fuses with • The presence of a 6 Li enrichment facility is a good indicator that a
the nearby deuterium. The α particles, being electrically charged and at high tempera- proliferant state has confidence in its fission primaries and seeks
tures, contribute directly to forming the nuclear fireball. The neutrons can bombard more powerful weapons.
additional 6Li nuclei or cause the remaining uranium and plutonium in the weapon to • The United States ceased the production of 6 Li in 1963 because it
undergo fission. This two-stage thermonuclear weapon has explosive yields far greater had acquired an adequate stockpile of the material for the
than can be achieved with one point safe designs of pure fission weapons, and thermo-
foreseeable future.
nuclear fusion stages can be ignited in sequence to deliver any desired yield. The
largest nuclear device ever detonated was a multi-stage Soviet product with a yield of
nearly 60 megatons. It was exploded at only half of its design maximum yield of about
100 megatons.
nucleus. In a relatively crude sense, 6Li can be thought of as consisting of an alpha
Lithium enriched in the isotope 6Li remains a controlled material because of its particle (4He) and a deuteron (2H) bound together. When bombarded by neutrons, 6Li
utility in the production of compact and highly efficient thermonuclear secondaries. disintegrates into a triton (3H) and an alpha:
Two-stage nuclear weapons incorporating a lithium-deuteride-fueled component can
deliver greater nuclear yield from a smaller and lighter package than if a pure fission
6
Li + Neutron → 3H + 3He + Energy.
device were used. The tradeoff is that the design and construction of reliable two- This is the key to its importance in nuclear weapons physics.
stage “dry” weapons may require significant knowledge of nuclear weapons physics The nuclear fusion reaction which ignites most readily is
and technology, knowledge which is hard to acquire without a program involving full- 2
H + 3H → 4He + n + 17.6 MeV,
yield testing of the fission primary to be used and measurement of its production of
x-rays and their transport through a case surrounding both primary and secondary stages. or, phrased in other terms, deuterium plus tritium produces 4He plus a neutron plus
Therefore, 6Li is more likely to be of interest to a state with nuclear weapons experi- 17.6 MeV of free energy:
ence than it is to a beginning nuclear state. D + T → 4He + n + 17.6 MeV.
Lithium is a very low-density silvery metal, prone to spontaneous combustion. Lithium-7 also contributes to the production of tritium in a thermonuclear second-
On the periodic table of the elements it lies directly beneath hydrogen and has but ary, albeit at a lower rate than 6Li. The fusion reactions derived from tritium produced
three protons. It is the lightest solid element. The most common stable isotope is 7Li, from 7Li contributed many unexpected neutrons (and hence far more energy release
consisting of three protons and four neutrons; less common, comprising than planned) to the final stage of the infamous 1953 Castle/BRAVO atmospheric test,
7.4 percent of normal lithium, is 6Li, which has three protons and three neutrons in its nearly doubling its expected yield.

II-5-54
RATIONALE a thermonuclear device until long after it has developed its first family of compact
primaries. Accordingly, it is likely that no new proliferator would embark on a hydro-
Lithium-6 is most often separated from natural lithium by the COLEX (Column gen weapon as its first priority or seek separated lithium isotopes before having an
exchange) electrochemical process, which exploits the fact that 6Li has a greater affin- assured supply of HEU or plutonium. Therefore, an attempt by a potential proliferant
ity for mercury than does 7Li. A lithium-mercury amalgam is first prepared using the state to acquire 6Li or the technologies to produce it might well be taken as an indicator
natural material. The amalgam is then agitated with a lithium hydroxide solution, also that the state has already progressed at least a long way toward obtaining a nuclear
prepared from natural lithium. The desired 6Li concentrates in the amalgam, and the capability.
more common 7Li migrates to the hydroxide. A counter flow of amalgam and hydrox-
ide passes through a cascade of stages until the desired enrichment in 6Li is reached. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2)
The 6Li product can be separated from the amalgam, and the “tails” fraction of 7Li Russia, the UK, France, and China are all believed to be capable of making 6Li in
electrolyzed from the aqueous lithium hydroxide solution. The mercury is recovered the quantities needed for the manufacture of large nuclear stockpiles. Russia exploded
and can be reused with fresh feedstock. a device making use of 6Li before the United States did; however, the Soviet device
Proliferation Initiation Assessment: was not a “true” thermonuclear weapon capable of being scaled to any desired yield.
Thermonuclear weapons require the acquisition of reliable, compact, and predict- United States production of 6Li ceased in 1963.
able fission primaries. It is unlikely that a proliferator will reach the point of designing

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 Table 5.5-1. Lithium Production Technology Parameters

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Electrolysis Supply large d.c. currents at NDUL 8; Mercury Electrolysis cells Voltages needed for
low and variable voltages. NRC 110.8 Lithium salts Liquid flow and pressure electrolysis.
Provide adequate Nickel control Variation of solubility of
temperature control. Carbon steel lithium in mercury with
Produce pure lithium salts temperature.
for feed material.
Experience in fabricating
columns, trays, etc.
Sufficient knowledge of the
chemistry of lithium
hydroxide aqueous solutions
and mercury and its
amalgams.
Enrichment Experience in liquid-liquid NDUL 8; Mercury Packed liquid-liquid Lithium distribution data
extraction systems. NRC 110.8 Lithium hydroxide exchange columns. (amalgam/aqueous)
Expertise in the chemistry of Pumps resistant to
mercury-lithium distribution mercury.
coefficients. Analytical chemistry
Capability in cascade theory laboratory.
and operations. Mass spectrometer.
Valves resistant to
mercury.
Decomposition of Knowledgeable in disposing NDUL 8; Graphite Packed columns. Voltages needed for
amalgam of hydrogen gas. NRC 110.8 Pumps for mercury. decomposition
Experience in using packed- Metallic filters.
bed columns. Evaporators for mercury
amalgam.
Mercury recycle Experience in purifying NDUL 8; Mercury Mercury cleaning None identified
mercury NRC 110.8 Nitric acid system

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 Table 5.5-2. Lithium Production Reference Data

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Electrolysis Ability to control large d.c. currents at Fusion weapons None
low voltages
6
Enrichment Adequate supply of high purity lithium LiD (lithium-6 deuteride) used as Electroexchange (ELEX) process
salts and mercury. fusion weapon fuel. using a series of stirred tray
6
Knowledge of lithium hydroxide/ Li used as target material in tritium contactors.
mercury/aqueous chemistry production Liquid-liquid extraction systems
using marcrocyclic compounds
(i.e., benzo-15-crown-5 and
cryptands) in a diluent
Decomposition of amalgam Availability of high-purity graphite. Fusion weapons Utilization of newer liquid-liquid
Expertise in preventing hydrogen extraction systems
explosion.
Mercury recycle Ability to handle corrosive liquids Fusion weapons Discard mercury when it is no
longer effective

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 SECTION 5.6—NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT

OVERVIEW
Highlights
Weapons • Nuclear weapons operate on the well-known principles of nuclear
Nuclear weapons are small, light, and inexpensive compared to the conventional fission and nuclear fusion.
ordnance needed to destroy large area targets. Although the infrastructure for a nuclear • If fissile material is available, subnational or terrorist groups can likely
enterprise is complex, the weapons themselves use relatively straightforward designs. produce an “improvised nuclear explosive device” which will detonate
Nuclear explosives enable a single missile or aircraft to destroy an entire city, giving with a significant nuclear yield.
great leverage to a state or subnational group with even a small stockpile of such • High explosives or propellants can be used to assemble the “pit” of a
devices. Nuclear weapons were first developed more than a half century ago with nuclear weapon, and there are several ways to accomplish the task.
technology and knowledge of physics far less than available today. • Neutron generators to initiate the fission chain reaction can be
Identifying some of the key technologies needed to acquire a nuclear weapons purchased or made indigenously.
capability may allow effective intervention and/or identification of trends of concern.
Although a great deal of information, much of which is not correct, on the principles of
nuclear explosives is available in the public domain, development of nuclear weapons,
even in the early stages, requires an understanding and mastery of the relevant physi- whatever. Several ways to produce neutrons at the appropriate moment have been
cal principles. Such an understanding, which is necessary even to plan a program to developed.
achieve a nuclear weapon capability, contains elements from fields not generally fa-
miliar to today’s scientists. A number of steps are necessary to develop nuclear weap- Technologies Particularly Appropriate to a Subnational Group
ons, and if these steps are not well understood, false starts will be made, and valuable Terrorism has become nearly as much of a public and governmental concern in
resources will be allocated to inappropriate tasks. In the worst case, skilled personnel the last few years as proliferation by nations hostile to the United States. Subnational
may be lost to radiation or to other accidents. Misallocation of resources can delay, groups of concern may be independent actors (e.g., the bombing of the Federal Build-
and in some cases prevent, achievement of the goals of a weapons program. ing in Oklahoma City), those acting to promote a cause with foreign roots (e.g., the
The nuclear weapons publicly known to have been fielded use only two funda- World Trade Center bombing), or surrogates for hostile states themselves (e.g., the
mental principles for releasing nuclear energy: fission and fusion. bombing of Pan Am 103). This section will examine nuclear techniques useful to
Under these major categories, “boosting,” “staging,” and the use of either high- subnational adversaries.
explosive-driven implosion or a propellant-powered gun mechanism to assemble a In recent years terrorist acts have escalated from pipe bombs to many tons of high
supercritical mass constitute the major elements of the taxonomy of known nuclear explosives (e.g., the bombing of major U.S. targets including the embassy and Marine
weapon types. The various systems may be combined in many different ways, with barracks in Lebanon as well as U.S. forces’ residences at the Khobar Towers in Riyadh,
the single requirement that a fission chain reaction is needed to ignite nuclear fusion in Saudi Arabia, as well as domestic incidents in Oklahoma City and at the World Trade
a weapon. Center) and to the explicit use of chemical warfare agents, as in Aum Shinrikyo’s Sarin
attack on the Tokyo subway system. For many years it was generally believed that
Nuclear Weapon Neutron Initiator Design terrorist groups did not seek to kill large numbers of people at a time but rather wished
One of the key elements in the proper operation of a nuclear weapon is initiation to demonstrate that they could execute attacks at will against civilian (and military)
of the fission chain reaction at the proper time. To obtain a significant nuclear yield of targets. In the wake of the use of Sarin gas in Tokyo as well as the Oklahoma City, Pan
the nuclear explosive, sufficient neutrons must be present within the supercritical core Am, and Riyadh bombings, it is no longer possible to assume that genuine mass mur-
at the right time. If the chain reaction starts too soon, the result will be only a “fizzle der is not an intended component of subnational forces—particularly if they are acting
yield,” much below the design specification; if it occurs too late, there may be no yield as state surrogates.

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 Since chemical weapons have already been used by terrorists, it may be simply a essential. This assembly can be accomplished in a linear fashion, as in a gun-assembled
matter of time before some form of nuclear attack is employed by similar groups. In weapon, or it can be accomplished in a spherical fashion, as in an implosion weapon.
this context,“nuclear weaponry” includes radiological weapons as a subset. In the first case, two subcritical masses of the fissile material are rapidly assembled
into a supercritical mass, one mass being fired by the gun at the other mass. In the
RATIONALE
second case, the fissile material is initially in a subcritical configuration, and then
Weapons energy contributed by conventional explosives is concentrated on the fissile material
to achieve a supercritical mass. The fissile materials will be driven to high pressure/
This subsection describes the general process and the capabilities required for high energy conditions by the high-explosive energy. This will require calculations of
understanding and designing nuclear weapons. Some of the information and compu- initial, intermediate, and final configurations, using hydrodynamic programs and ap-
tational tools may be controlled, and some may be generally available on the open propriate equations of state for these regimes of temperature and pressure.
market. The paths a proliferator might take can be quite different than the paths that
HE or propellants are the means of choice for assembly of most nuclear weapons.
the nuclear powers have taken in the past.
Given this, the potential proliferator must understand and master the data and design
The first part of this subsection will focus on the design milestones for nuclear of systems to accomplish such assembly. Propellants are used to assemble gun-type
weapons, and on key elements to be achieved. The next part describes neutron initia- weapons, and are usually relatively slow burning. Much useful data from conven-
tors, a particular technology necessary for many nuclear weapons and for some tech- tional artillery tube-fired weapons development is generally available. Much data
nologies unique to nuclear weapons. Finally, the question of nuclear terrorism is briefly concerning implosion is also available from the development of modern conventional
discussed and some relevant technologies identified. HE weapons including shaped charges.
The tables accompanying this subsection are designed around the following top- Special considerations applicable to nuclear weapons development involve shock
ics, which have been identified by some as being among the more important areas of wave propagation and focusing. Such considerations go beyond much of conven-
technology a proliferator must master to be able to convert a supply of special nuclear tional explosive design work, and would require specialized programs, equations of
material into actual nuclear explosives: state in HE pressure and temperature regimes, and data on detonation velocities and
• Fast-fission chain reaction theory and practice, strengths.
• Fast assembly of critical and supercritical masses of fissile material, Initiation of the main charge of a nuclear explosive in such a way as to provide the
• High explosive (HE) and propellant characteristics and design, desired final configuration of the fissile material often proves to be a major design
challenge. Traditionally, this challenge has been met by initiating the charge at a num-
• HE initiation,
ber of discrete points, and then tailoring the converging shock wave through the use of
• Firing sets for HE initiation, lenses consisting of slower and faster burning explosives. Such initiation can be ac-
• Thermonuclear boosting of fission primary, and complished either by electrical signals or by fuze trains, both ending at a detonator
• Thermonuclear/second stage of nuclear weapons. which initiates the shock wave at the lens charge.
The fission reactions commonly studied in nuclear reactor physics use thermal Firing sets for nuclear devices, the means for activating the initiation of the main
neutrons, and the cross sections usually tabulated are those for low-energy particles. charge of HE for a nuclear weapon, can also have performance characteristics which
In a nuclear weapon, the time scales dealt with do not allow full thermalization of the lie outside the range of conventional engineering. If the proliferator is relying on
neutrons, hence “fast” neutrons, that is, the neutrons emitted and interacting at higher initiation at a discrete number of points, then these points must be activated nearly
energies must be considered. Thus, the important neutron interactions for the weapons simultaneously to have a smooth implosion. The simultaneity required depends on the
designer are those which occur at roughly MeV energies. In addition, reactor neutron internal design of the explosive, but it is common to require a higher degree of simul-
transport codes need to be modified to fully account for the different physical regimes. taneity than is usually the case for conventional explosives. Thus, high energy must be
A comprehensive understanding of the similarities and differences between nuclear delivered to all the detonators at nearly the same time. This will require high-energy,
reactor physics and nuclear weapon physics is essential to make progress in nuclear low-impedance capacitors, and high-current, high-speed switches.
weapon design. Once the potential proliferator has begun to understand the operation of a simple
For a nuclear weapon to release its energy in a time which is short compared to fission weapon, he may well want to increase the yield to make more efficient use
the hydrodynamic disassembly time, rapid assembly to form a supercritical mass is of his special nuclear material. One way to do this is to boost the fission yield by

II-5-59
incorporating thermonuclear reactions into the design of the weapon. Introduction of amounts of neutrons. Typically, deuterium nuclei are accelerated to an energy suffi-
the neutrons from thermonuclear reactions at the time of supercriticality of the fissile cient to cause a fusion reaction when they strike a deuterium- or tritium-rich target.
material can have a dramatic effect on the yield. The usual fusion material used for This impact can result in a short pulse of neutrons sufficient to initiate the fission chain
this purpose is a mixture of deuterium and tritium gas. reaction. The timing of the pulse can be precisely controlled. Similar devices are used
When the proliferator begins to think in terms of greatly increasing the yield of his in oil well logging.
nuclear weapons, he may consider design and development of thermonuclear and/or Technologies Particularly Appropriate to a Subnational Group
second stages. To do this, he would have to obtain and master hydrodynamic com-
puter programs which correctly describe regimes of extremely high temperatures and Nuclear Explosives
pressures. He would show interest in equations of state of special nuclear materials
For most of the nuclear era, it was accepted dogma that acquisition of a nuclear
under these conditions. He would also be interested in neutron and reaction cross
weapon required the construction of either an enrichment plant for uranium or a reac-
sections for both fissionable materials and thermonuclear materials at these high tem-
tor and reprocessing unit for plutonium. Great care was taken in the design of U.S.-
peratures and pressures. Finally, he would attempt to obtain lithium (and/or lithium
supplied nuclear facilities to ensure that neither 235U nor plutonium could be surrepti-
deuteride), tritium and deuterium.
tiously diverted from the nuclear fuel cycle to be used in a weapon, whether built by a
Finally, the actual coupling of the nuclear weapon primary with a thermonuclear/ state or by a subnational group. One hoped that such measures could severely con-
boosted-fission secondary will require mastery of a complex set of physical principles. strict the illicit or unsafeguarded supply of special nuclear material of a quality useful
The proliferator will not only have to understand hydrodynamic calculations under in a weapon. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the safeguarding of hundreds
extreme physical conditions, he will have to obtain and understand the flow of energy of metric tons of fissile material has broken down so seriously that in one famous court
from the primary to and around the secondary. Energy flow and the behavior of mate- case a Russian judge remarked (in jest, one hopes), “In the Murmansk area potatoes
rials under these extreme conditions of temperature and pressure comprise a complex are more carefully guarded than enriched uranium.” Further, recent arrests in the Fed-
set of problems, well beyond the experience of most of today’s physicists. eral Republic of Germany (FRG) have yielded up gram and larger size quantities of
Nuclear Weapon Neutron Initiator Design partially enriched uranium and may also have resulted in the seizure of other fission-
able materials, including plutonium.
In a gun-assembled weapon, the assembly speed is relatively slow. This requires Thus, it is wrong to discount the possibility of a terrorist nuclear weapon on the
a strong source of alpha particles such as 210Po or some similarly active alpha emitter. grounds that subnational groups cannot gain access to the fissile material needed to
The South African uranium gun-assembled devices did not use any neutron source make a device. It is entirely possible that special nuclear material (or even an entire
other than background radiation. nuclear weapon) may, indeed, become available on the nuclear black market in the
An implosion weapon may require a source which can produce a precisely timed foreseeable future. Since 90 percent11 of the overall difficulty in making a nuclear
burst of neutrons. weapon lies in the production of special nuclear material (if no outside source is readily
The type of neutron initiator used in early implosion devices utilized the emission available), a terrorist nuclear device is no longer an impossibility, particularly if SNM
of neutrons caused by bombardment of 9Be or some other light element by alpha par- can be obtained on the black market and the terrorist group itself need not steal SNM
ticles. This requires a strong source of alpha particles, something of the order of from a poorly guarded facility.
10 curies of 210Po or a similarly active alpha emitter. This isotope of polonium has a
Types of Nuclear Design Useful for a Terrorist
half life of almost 140 days, and a neutron initiator using this material needs to have
the polonium replaced frequently. Since the 210Po is made in a nuclear reactor, this Uranium Gun-Assembled Devices
means that potential proliferators need either to have a nuclear reactor of their own, or
to have access to one. To supply the initiation pulse of neutrons at the right time, the A terrorist with access to >50 kg of HEU would almost certainly opt for a gun-
polonium and the beryllium need to be kept apart until the appropriate moment and assembled weapon despite the inherent inefficiencies of such a device, both because of
then thoroughly and rapidly mixed. its simplicity and the perceived lack of a need to test a gun assembly. Building an
One of the ways to make an external neutron generator is by using an electroni-
cally controlled particle accelerator called a pulse neutron tube. Such a system might 11
More than 90 percent of the entire Manhattan Project budget went to the production of
use the deuterium-deuterium or deuterium-tritium fusion reactions to produce large fissile materials; less than 4 percent went to the weapon laboratory at Los Alamos.

II-5-60
effective gun assembly is certainly easier than demonstrating that a simple “implosion assembled nuclear devices. Many countries, including Iran, Iraq, and North Korea,
system” will actually work. are believed to have active or recently dormant nuclear programs based generally on
The disadvantage of a gun design is that it needs significantly more fissile mate- older technologies. Taiwan, South Korea, Sweden, and Switzerland explored the pos-
rial than an efficient implosion device of similar yield. This may be important to a sibilities of going nuclear during the 1960’s and 1970’s, and they, Japan, and Germany
subnational group intending to explode a series of devices, but would be of much less are generally credited with the ability to build a bomb in a relatively short time. Spain,
importance if only one blast were contemplated. Brazil, and Argentina, among other nations, have pursued the idea of constructing
nuclear weapons but have apparently abandoned their programs. Many countries have
Implosion assembly the necessary expertise in nuclear technologies to build weapons using their domestic
If the subnational group had only 239Pu or needed to be economical with a limited nuclear power experience.
supply of HEU, then it would likely turn to an implosion assembly. The simplest Nuclear Weapon Neutron Initiator Design
design of an implosion weapon places a solid plutonium (or HEU) pit at the center of
a sphere, surrounded by a certain amount of tamper material such as 238 U, to be com- Few nations other than the five nuclear weapons states have mastered the tech-
pressed by the large amount of high explosive filling the sphere. In the design chosen niques of constructing initiators. Presumably the three nuclear threshold states have;
for the first U.S. and Soviet devices tested, the necessary imploding moving shock Iraq made substantial progress, and South Africa elected not to use an initiator.
wave was produced by the use of explosive lenses made of appropriately shaped fast- Technologies Particularly Appropriate to a Subnational Group
and slow-detonating HE. It is generally asserted in the open literature that 32 lens
charges were used for the Fatman device, the charges arranged in much the same way Efforts directed at preventing the acquisition of fissile material are the first line of
as the segments on a soccer ball. defense against nuclear terrorism. The technical problems confronting the designer of
an implosion-assembled improvised nuclear device (IND) are relatively simple in com-
FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT parison to obtaining special nuclear materials, particularly if the IND does not have to
be very safe or predictable in yield.
Weapons
Despite fictional accounts to the contrary, it is most unlikely that a terrorist group
Six nations are known to have exploded nuclear devices: the United States, Rus- could fabricate a boosted or thermonuclear device on its own.
sia, the UK, France, China, and India. Some suspect that Pakistan and Israel have built
nuclear weapons. It is known that South Africa built and then dismantled six gun-

II-5-61
 Table 5.6-1. Nuclear Weapons Design and Development Technology Parameters

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
WEAPONS
Fast fission chain Operational understanding; WA ML 4; Special nuclear General machining Validated fast nuclear
reaction; prompt neutron transport theory; USML IV materials, reliable capability, dimensional reactor operations soft-
criticality; high-energy high explosive means of high explosives and mensuration capability; ware, neutron cross-
neutrons device assembly detonators fast neutron and gamma sections (fission,
counters capable of scattering and absorp-
handling in excess of tion) as a function of
one million events total neutron energy,
per microsecond. neutrons per fission as a
Fast streak and framing function of energy.
cameras (see NDUL) and
oscilloscopes.
Reflector design Understanding of effects of WA ML 4; Beryllium, uranium, Fast neutron counters, Validated nuclear reactor
reflectors on reactivity; USML IV tungsten, special gamma counters to software, neutron cross-
ability to cast or machine machining capabili- measure effects of sections (scattering and
beryllium or other suitable ties for refractory reflector parameters. absorption) as a function
reflector material materials of energy.
Fast assembly of critical For simple designs the ability WA ML 4; Beryllium, uranium Fast neutron counters, High pressure/energy
mass of fissile material to construct simple implosion USML IV (>20% U-235) gamma counters; streak equations of state.
systems, understanding of U-233, or plutonium, and framing cameras;
interplay of nuclear energy tungsten, special flash x-ray cameras;
release disassembling machining pinhole gamma or
device, and continuing HE capabilities for neutron cameras.
energy input refractory materials;
energetic high
explosives;
detonators and firing
sets
High explosives and Ability to assemble propellant NDUL 6; High-energy, high HE test sites, high- Validated shock-wave
propellants: character- or implosion systems incor- CCL Cat 3A explosives and speed photography, propagation programs,
istics and design porating explosives such as detonators. flash x-rays, high-speed detonation velocities, HE
baratol and composition B. Common propellants mechanical and pressure regime
Fabrication with few voids/ including, e.g., electronic diagnostics equations of state
bubbles. Possible vacuum propellant for gun- including pin-domes.
casting or isostatic pressing. assembled devices. Fractional microsecond
Propellant for gun-assembled timing.
devices
High explosive initiation Understanding of HE NDUL 6; Explosives of HE test sites, high- Validated shock-wave
systems CCL Cat 3A varying types and speed photography, propagation programs,
sensitivities; bridge flash x-rays, high-speed detonation velocities, HE
wires; slappers mechanical and pressure regime
electronic diagnostics equations of state

(cont’d)

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 Table 5.6-1. Nuclear Weapons Design and Development Technology Parameters (cont’d)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Firing sets Understanding of and NDUL 6; High-energy, low- High-speed simul- Electronic circuit
procurement of firing sets. CCL Cat 3A impedance capaci- taneous measurement performance software
NDUL: 15 microsec pulse, tor banks; high devices (e.g., high-
100 Å output; rise <10 micro- current, high-speed speed oscilloscopes,
sec into load <40 ohms. switches (e.g., streak cameras, etc.)
thyratrons, kry-
trons, sprytrons).
Thyratrons date
from the 1940’s.
Thermonuclear boosting Ability to construct or obtain WA ML 4; Tritium, high- High pressure gauges, Validated thermonuclear
of fission primary fission devices capable of USML IV pressure gas bottles pin dome diagnostics, fusion programs,
being boosted; tritium and fill systems, flash x-ray diagnostics, deuterium-tritium
supplies. both design and neutron diagnostics reaction cross-section
utilization capabili- tables. Equations of
ties. Welds satis- state for hydrogen and
factory for hydrogen Helium-3 at very high
gas transfer sys- densities.
tems. Materials
compatible simul-
taneously with
fissile metals and
hydrogen.
Thermonuclear second Understanding of transport WA ML 4; Enriched uranium, General machining Validated thermonuclear
stage of nuclear physics. Construct compact USML IV plutonium, lithium capability, dimensional fusion programs,
weapons and efficient fission primary. deuteride/tritide, mensuration capability, deuterium-tritium
natural/depleted ability to handle and reaction cross-sections,
uranium, lithium-6. machine special nuclear neutron cross sections
materials. See NDUL, for various isotopes of
Wassenaar Arrange- uranium and
ment, and MCTL, Part II, transuranics
sections on machine
tools and mensuration/
metrology
INITIATORS
Alpha-induced neutron Identification of performance NDUL 8; Radioactive alpha General machining capa- Beryllium alpha-n cross-
emission (crushable characteristics of alpha-n CCL Cat 3A emitting materials bility, dimensional men- sections. Alpha range in
initiators such as the one initiators. (e.g., Po-210 and suration capability, abili- various component
used at Trinity). Pu-238). Target ty to handle and machine materials.
materials (e.g., radioactive nuclear
beryllium). materials, fast neutron
counters for demon-
strating successful
operation.
(cont’d)

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 Table 5.6-1. Nuclear Weapons Design and Development Technology Parameters (cont’d)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Miniature linear Identification of performance NDUL 8; Tritium, deuterium, Fast neutron detectors, Validated ionization and
accelerator to generate characteristics of linear CCL Cat 3A titanium, plating precision machining acceleration software,
DD/DT reactions and accelerator neutron initiators. equipment, capability, precision DT reaction rates as a
resultant neutrons. miniature power mensuration capability function of center of
(Deuteron beam usually supplies/capacitors mass energy
bombards tritiated
plastic target)
Dense plasma focus to Identification of performance NDUL 8; Tritium, deuterium, Fast neutron detectors, Validated plasma
generate DD/DT characteristics of dense CCL Cat 3A miniature power precision machining ionization and
reactions and resultant plasma focus neutron supplies/capacitors capability, precision acceleration software,
neutrons. initiators. mensuration capability DT reaction rates as a
function of center of
mass energy

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 Table 5.6-2. Nuclear Weapons Design and Development Reference Data

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

WEAPONS
Fast fission chain reaction; Obtaining fissile material of adequate Fundamental technology of nuclear None identified
prompt criticality; high energy purity and (for uranium) enrichment. explosive devices. Provides simple
neutrons. Determination by computation and fission weapons.
experiment that proposed geometry
and fissile material mass are
sufficient.
Reflector design Understanding of neutron transport; Reduces requirements for special Use additional fissile material and
absorption cross sections and nuclear materials; increases accept significantly lower
scattering cross sections of reflector efficiency with which fission fuel is performance.
material; computation of contribution “burned.”
of reflected neutrons to the chain
reaction.
Fast assembly of critical mass of Design of gun system for U-235; The critical mass of a nuclear None identified
fissile material design and fabrication of predictable, explosive device must be rapidly
reliable, and compact implosion assembled from a subcritical
system for plutonium weapons. configuration in order to produce an
Neutron background and spontaneous explosion and not a “fizzle.”
fission rate in fuel. Introduction of
neutrons at correct moment.
High explosives and propellants: Safety; energy content; shaping of See section on high explosives in None identified
characteristics and design charges in order to achieve efficient MCTL Part I.
implosion without disruption of the
fissile pit.
High explosive initiation Obtaining adequate simultaneity See section on detonators in MCTL, Various forms of detonators have
among many detonators; reliability of Part I. been successfully used.
detonators.
Firing sets Storage of electrical energy; rapid Initiates the detonation of HE used for Different types of firing sets have
delivery of sufficient current to fire all implosion or the deflagration of the proven usable.
detonators simultaneously; pulse rise propellant in a gun-assembled device.
time.
Thermonuclear boosting of fission Mixing of pit material and boost gas. Reduces the weight and the fissile No obvious alternative for
primary materials requirements for a (primarily) achieving compact, efficient, high
fission weapon; improves yield to yield primaries.
weight ratio.
Thermonuclear/second stage of Compressing and heating of By using a fission stage plus one or No lower technology substitutes
nuclear weapons secondary. more thermonuclear stages, the for achieving device yields in the
designer can scale the weapon to any megaton and above range.
desired yield, no matter how large.
Useful for attacking hard targets with
highly accurate delivery systems or
for annihilating large area soft targets.

(cont’d)

II-5-65
 Table 5.6-2. Nuclear Weapons Design and Development Reference Data (cont’d)

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

INITIATORS
Alpha-induced neutron emission Need to understand physics of alpha-n Neutron initiator capability. Starts Other suitable technologies are
(crushable initiators such as the reactions and neutron yields from neutron chain reaction at correct time. more difficult.
one used at Trinity). such reactions. Procurement of
suitable alpha-source isotope; ability
to replace short half-life materials;
mixing of source and target materials
on crushing. Heat dissipation.
Miniature linear accelerator to Need to understand yield of neutrons Miniaturized, high output neutron Alpha-induced neutron initiators;
generate DD/DT reactions and from DD/DT reactions initiator; permits more precise timing of dense plasma focus device.
resultant neutrons. neutron pulse than crushable initiator. Similar devices are used in oil well
Does not take up space within the pit logging.
itself, simplifying design, testing, and
development of the device.
Dense plasma focus to generate Need to understand yield of neutrons Miniaturized, high-output neutron Need to obtain materials and/or
DD/DT reactions and resultant from DD/DT reactions initiator fabricated devices
neutrons.

II-5-66
 SECTION 5.7—SAFING, ARMING, FUZING, AND FIRING

OVERVIEW
This subsection describes technologies to (1) prevent an unwanted nuclear deto- Highlights
nation and (2) initiate a nuclear explosion in response to proper orders. It also ad- • All nuclear weapon possessors will find it important to control
dresses one part of the set of command and control technologies, permissive action access to their weapons.
links (PALs), which are peculiar to nuclear weapons in U.S. practice.
• Safing, arming, fuzing, and firing (SAFF) problems generally have
Nuclear weapons are particularly destructive, with immediate effects including simple engineering solutions.
blast and thermal radiation and delayed effects produced by ionizing radiation, neu-
trons, and radioactive fallout. They are expensive to build, maintain, and employ,
requiring a significant fraction of the total defense resources of a small nation. In a
totalitarian state the leader must always worry that they will be used against the gov-
ernment; in a democracy the possibility of an unauthorized or accidental use must
never be discounted. A nuclear detonation as the result of an accident would be a local In later years, the United States developed mechanical safing devices. These were
catastrophe. later replaced with weapons designed to a goal of less than a 1 in a 1 million chance of
the weapon delivering more than 4 pounds of nuclear yield if the high explosives were
Because of their destructiveness, nuclear weapons require precautions to prevent detonated at the single most critical possible point. Other nations have adopted differ-
accidental detonation during any part of their manufacture and lifetime. And because ent safety criteria and have achieved their safety goals in other ways.
of their value, the weapons require reliable arming and fuzing mechanisms to ensure
that they explode when delivered to target. In the 1950’s, to prevent unauthorized use of U.S. weapons stored abroad, permis-
sive action links (PALs) were developed. These began as simple combination locks
Therefore, any nuclear power is likely to pay some attention to the issues of safing and evolved into the modern systems which allow only a few tries to arm the weapon
and safety, arming, fuzing, and firing of its nuclear weapons. The solutions adopted and before disabling the physics package should an intruder persist in attempts to de-
depend upon the level of technology in the proliferant state, the number of weapons in feat the PAL.
its stockpile, and the political consequences of an accidental detonation.
From the very first nuclear weapons built, safety was a consideration. The two RATIONALE
bombs used in the war drops on Hiroshima and Nagasaki posed significant risk of The ability of a country or extranational organization to make effective use of a
accidental detonation if the B-29 strike aircraft had crashed on takeoff. As a result, nuclear weapon is limited unless the device can be handled safely, taken safely from
critical components were removed from each bomb and installed only after takeoff storage when required, delivered to its intended target, and then detonated at the cor-
and initial climb to altitude were completed. Both weapons used similar arming and rect point in space and time to achieve the desired goal. Although the intended sce-
fuzing components. Arming could be accomplished by removing a safety connector narios for use of its weapons and the threat a proliferator perceives (or the region it
plug and replacing it with a distinctively colored arming connector. Fuzing used re- wishes to dominate) will strongly influence specific weaponization concepts and ap-
dundant systems including a primitive radar and a barometric switch. No provision proaches, functional capabilities for safing, arming, fuzing, and firing (SAFF) will be
was incorporated in the weapons themselves to prevent unauthorized use or to protect fundamental. The generic requirements for these functions are described below.
against misappropriation or theft.

II-5-67
 SAFF Subsystem Generic Functions Firing To ensure nuclear detonation by delivering a precise level of precisely
Subsystem Generic Functions timed electrical or pyrotechnic energy to one or more warhead detonat-
ing devices.
Safing To ensure that the nuclear warhead can be stored, handled, deployed, and A variety of techniques are used, depending on the warhead design and
employed in a wide spectrum of intended and unintended environmental type of detonation devices.
and threat conditions, with assurance that it will not experience a nuclear
Depending on the specific military operations to be carried out and the specific
detonation.
delivery system chosen, nuclear weapons pose special technological problems in terms
In U.S. practice, safing generally involves multiple mechanical interrup- of primary power and power-conditioning, overall weapon integration, and operational
tions of both power sources and pyrotechnic/explosive firing trains. The control and security.
nuclear components may be designed so that an accidental detonation of
This subsection also includes technologies for PALs required to enable the use of
the high explosives is intrinsically unable to produce a significant
these subsystems, as well as primary power sources and power conditioning, and tech-
(>4 pounds TNT equivalent) nuclear yield; it is simpler to insert me- nologies for packaging and integration. In particular, one must address component
chanical devices into the pit to prevent the assembly of a critical mass and subsystem technologies for safing, arming, fuzing, and firing a nuclear weapon.
into the pit or to remove a portion of the fissile material from inside the In describing the technologies which can be used for nuclear device weaponization, it
high explosives.12 All U.S. weapons have been designed to be intrinsi- is important to distinguish among requirements for different objective levels of capa-
cally one-point safe in the event of accidental detonation of the high bility. Not all weapons possessors will face the same problems or opt for the same
explosives, but it is not anticipated that a new proliferator would take levels of confidence, particularly in the inherent security of their weapons. One must
such care. take care to avoid mirror imaging U.S. or other decisions at any time from 1945 until
Arming Placing the nuclear warhead in a ready operational state, such that it can the present.
be initiated under specified firing conditions. The operational objectives will in turn dictate the technological requirements (see
Arming generally involves mechanical restoration of the safing inter- table below) for the SAFF subsystems.
rupts in response to conditions that are unique to the operational envi-
Nominal Operational Requirements
ronment (launch or deployment) of the system. A further feature is that
the environment typically provides the energy source to drive the arming Objectives Requirements could be met by:
action. If a weapon is safed by inserting mechanical devices into the pit Minimal Surface burst (including impact fuzing of relatively slow moving
(e.g., chains, coils of wire, bearing balls) to prevent complete implosion, warhead) or crude preset height of burst based on simple timer or
arming involves removal of those devices. It may not always be possible barometric switch or simple radar altimeter.
to safe a mechanically armed device once the physical barrier to implo- Modest More precise HOB (height of burst) based on improved radar trig-
sion has been removed. gering or other methods of measuring distance above ground to maxi-
Fuzing To ensure optimum weapon effectiveness by detecting that the desired mize radius of selected weapons effects (see section on weapons
conditions for warhead detonation have been met and to provide an ap- effects), with point-contact salvage fuzing. Parachute delivery of
propriate command signal to the firing set to initiate nuclear detonation. bombs to allow deliberate laydown and surface burst.
Fuzing generally involves devices to detect the location of the warhead
Substantial Variable HOB, including low-altitude for ensured destruction of pro-
with respect to the target, signal processing and logic, and an output
tected strategic targets. Possible underwater or exoatmospheric ca-
circuit to initiate firing.
pabilities.
12
Mechanical safing of a gun-assembled weapon is fairly straightforward; one can simply
insert a hardened steel or tungsten rod across a diameter of the gun barrel, disrupting the Whether to protect their investment in nuclear arms or to deny potential access to
projectile. Because few gun-assembled weapons are believed to be in use anywhere in the and use of the weapons by unauthorized persons, proliferators or subnational groups
world, and are conceptually easy to safe, this section will only discuss implosion-assembled will almost certainly seek special measures to ensure security and operational control
systems unless specifically stated. The safing of the electronics and arming systems is com- of nuclear weapons. These are likely to include physical security and access control
mon to both types of weapons.

II-5-68
technologies at minimum and may include use control. The techniques used today by in specific component technologies. SAFF technologies of other nuclear powers—
the existing western nuclear weapon states represent the culmination of a half-century notably Russia and China—do not compare. Japan and Germany have technological
of evolution in highly classified military programs, and proliferators may well choose capabilities roughly on a par with the United States, UK, and France, and doubtless
simpler solutions, perhaps by adapting physical security, access, and operational con- have the capability to design and build nuclear SAFF subsystems.
trols used in the commercial sector for high-value/high-risk assets. Reliable fuzing and firing systems suitable for nuclear use have been built since
Preventing access to the development of a minimal SAFF capability will not be 1945 and do not need to incorporate any modern technology, although the substitution
feasible. Experts have surmised that barometric pressure switching may have been of integrated circuit electronics for vacuum tubes will almost certainly occur. Many
employed to fuze the bomb used to destroy Pan Am Flight 103. Such a sensor would kinds of mechanical safing systems have been employed, and several of these require
meet the basic requirements for one potential terrorist use of nuclear explosives. nothing more complex than removable wires or chains or the exchanging of arming/
The requirements to achieve a “modest” or “substantial” capability level are much safing connector plugs. Safing a gun-assembled system is especially simple.
more demanding. Both safety and protection of investment demand very low prob- Arming systems range from hand insertion of critical components in flight to ex-
ability of failure of safing and arming mechanisms, with very high probability of proper tremely sophisticated instruments which detect specific events in the stockpile to tar-
initiation of the warhead. The specific technologies associated with each of the key get sequence (STS). Fuzing and firing systems span an equally great range of techni-
elements of SAFF and weapons physical and operational security are addressed in the cal complexity.
technology and reference data tables. This level of technology meets the criterion of Very few, if any, countries approach the ability of the United States, UK, and
“sufficiency” for achieving a usable military capability. The items required to meet France in terms of safety and reliability of SAFF functions. However, a proliferator
this criterion are generally specially designed or not widely available. Licensing may would not necessarily seek to “mirror-image” U.S. practice and may adopt different
be ineffective as a mechanism for monitoring proliferant activity. By contrast, alterna- techniques and criteria. Any country with the electronics capability to build aircraft
tive technologies which might require the proliferator to accept greater risk of failure radar altimeter equipment should have access to the capability for building a reason-
or misappropriation of his weapons are generally available to any organization desir- ably adequate, simple HOB fuze. China, India, Israel, Taiwan, South Korea, Brazil,
ing to obtain a minimal nuclear capability. Singapore, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine, and South Africa all have built
FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2) conventional weapons with design features that could be adapted to more sophisti-
cated designs, providing variable burst height and rudimentary Electronic Counter
Virtually any country or extranational group with the resources to construct a Counter Measure (ECCM) features.
nuclear device has sufficient capability to attain the minimum SAFF capability that
With regard to physical security measures and use control, the rapid growth in the
would be needed to meet terrorist or minimal national aims. All of the recognized
availability and performance of low-cost, highly reliable microprocessing equipment
nuclear weapons states and many other countries have (or have ready access to) both
has led to a proliferation of electronic lock and security devices suitable for protecting
the design know-how and components required to implement a significant capability.
and controlling high-value/at-risk assets. Such technology may likely meet the needs
In terms of sophistication, safety, and reliability of design, past U.S. weapons pro-
of most proliferant organizations.
grams provide a legacy of world leadership in SAFF and related technology. France
and the UK follow closely in overall SAFF design and may actually hold slight leads

II-5-69
 Table 5.7-1. Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Technology Parameters

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
SAFING DEVICES
Mechanical devices Any capability is a concern. WA ML 3; None identified None identified None identified
designed to provide for USML III;
positive interruption and
connection of explosive MTCR 2;
or pyrotechnic devices USML 121.16
Mechanical techniques Any capability is a concern. WA ML 3; None identified None identified None identified
and devices for prevent- USML III;
ing assembly or high
order (nuclear) detona- USML 121.16
tion of nuclear explosive
devices
Devices designed to Simple barometric sensor WA ML 3; None identified None identified None identified
detect one or more of the Low-cost accelerometer USML III
following phenomena:
- air flow
- linear or angular
acceleration
- barometric pressure
ARMING DEVICES
Precision mechanical Externally powered (spring or WA ML 4; Long-life lubricating None identified None identified
devices designed to use electrical) switches enabled USML IV fluids
any of the following: by one or more of the stimuli
- air flow listed in Technology Column
- linear or angular
acceleration
- barometric pressure

(cont’d)

II-5-70
 Table 5.7-1. Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Technology Parameters (cont’d)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
FUZING
Radar altimeter sensors, Radar altimeter with simple WA ML 3, 4; Specially fabricated Specially designed pro- None Identified
having unambiguous height-measuring capabilities USML III, IV; high thermal diffus- grammable microwave
range measurement ivity (e.g., beryllium delay lines
capability at ranges CCL Cat 7A; oxide) components.
>100 ft. MTCR 11
Active IR/EO altimeter For low-velocity approach, WA ML 3, 4; Solid state laser and Semiconductor detector None identified
for low HOB low-power laser ranging USML III, IV; optical detector and laser manufacturing
device materials.
MTCR 11; IR window materials
CCL Cat 2A to withstand erosion
from rain particles,
stagnation tempera-
tures, and aero-
dynamic erosion
associated with
ballistic reentry.
Primary and reserve Aerospace qualified primary WA Cat 3A; Proprietary electro- None identified None identified
(including thermal batteries could be acquired CCL Cat 3A lyte additives and
reserve) batteries and installed as part of the catalysts for thermal
operational deployment batteries.
sequence
Barometric switch Barometric altimeters None identified None identified None identified None identified
Power conditioning Aerospace qualified conven- NDUL 6; High permeability None identified None identified
systems, for producing tional power supply CCL Cat 3A magnetic materials,
high voltage d.c. and designed or chara-
pulsed power for fuzing terized for use in
applications low-loss trans-
formers operating at
frequencies above
120 Hz.
Microwave antennas Standard microwave horn WA ML 5AP1; Low-loss dielectric Antenna and ECM test Empirically validated
antenna CCL Cat 5A P1 materials designed facilities engineering models and
to withstand temper- design databases for
atures in excess of waveguide antennas
125 °C.

(cont’d)

II-5-71
 Table 5.7-1. Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Technology Parameters (cont’d)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Compact, high- Conventional stripline design None Identified Low-loss dielectric Swept frequency None identified
performance stripline or techniques substrate materials analyzers
microstrip microwave Engineering models
components, including--
- low-noise balanced
mixers
- high ratio circulators
FIRING SETS
Capacitive discharge Conventional high-voltage NDUL 6; None identified None identified None identified
units (>300 V) capacitors, with CCL Cat 3A
capacitance greater than
25 nanofarads
Cold cathode tubes and Anode delay: <10 micro- NDUL 6; None identified None identified None identified
switches seconds; CCL Cat 3A
Peak voltage: 2,500 V;
Peak current: >100 Å
Pyrotechnic logic and Any capability is a concern. NDUL 6; None identified None identified None identified
delay devices CCL Cat 3A
Detonators and initiator Conventional weapons NDUL 6; None identified Specially designed None identified
couplers and squibs. CCL Cat 3A explosive component
connectors, including: test facilities or load
- exploding bridge wires simulators which do not
require the use of
- exploding foil explosives
- hot wire
- semiconductor bridge
OPERATIONAL SECURITY
Lock systems Electronic or physical keyed None identified None identified None identified Encryption
incorporating combined system.
electronic and positive
mechanical "keying,"
useful but not necessary
Physical security Fences and guard dogs; None identified None identified None identified None identified
commercial intrusion
detectors.

II-5-72
 Table 5.7-2. Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Reference Data

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

SAFING DEVICES
Mechanical devices designed to Ensured reliability of precision For some delivery methods, com- Electrical switching
provide for positive interruption mechanical and electromechanical ponents and technologies could be
and connection of explosive or devices common to conventional bombs and
pyrotechnic devices cluster/canister munitions.
Mechanical techniques and None identified None. Techniques unique to nuclear None Identified
devices for preventing assembly explosives.
or high order (nuclear) detonation
of nuclear explosive devices
Devices designed to detect one or Selection and design of sensor For some delivery methods, com- Spring- or electrically powered
more of the following phenomena: systems for unique operational ponents and technologies could be mechanical timing devices
- air flow conditions common to conventional bombs and
cluster/canister munitions.
- linear or angular acceleration
- barometric pressure
ARMING DEVICES
Precision mechanical devices de- Mechanical reliability For some delivery methods, com- Externally powered mechanisms,
signed to use any of the following: ponents and technologies could be operator enabled (including those
- air flow common to conventional bombs and designed to be powered by
cluster/canister munitions. chemical, electrochemical, or
- linear or angular acceleration mechanical energy sources).
- barometric pressure
FUZING
Radar altimeter sensors, having Hermetic sealing of high-voltage Possible use as high-altitude fuzing Barometric switch
unambiguous range measurement (>300 V) subsystems for canister weapons.
capability at ranges >100 ft
Active IR/EO altimeter for low Thermal management techniques Conventional free-fall and smart Point contact
HOB weapons.
Primary and reserve batteries Hermetic sealing, and thermal Other high altitude fuzing and one- Commercial primary batteries
management, particularly in high- shot power applications (e.g., torpedo
energy density lithium thermal guidance sets).
batteries
Power conditioning systems Efficient transformation of low voltage Aircraft and other space/weight con- Larger, heavier transformers
(<50 V to high-voltage >1 kV) d.c.-d.c. strained power conditioning require-
conversion. ments.

(cont’d)

II-5-73
 Table 5.7-2. Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Reference Data (cont’d)

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

MIcrowave antennas Antenna must conform to delivery Communications and ECM systems Needed only for radar altimeter
system packaging constraints. fuzing
Must retain r.f. characteristics after
exposure to rain erosion and aero-
dynamic heating effects
Compact, high-performance Techniques to extend operating band- Communications and ECM systems Coaxial or waveguide components
stripline or microstrip microwave width of low-noise balance mixers and (at severe space and weight
components, including: high ratio isolation circulators penalty).
- low-noise balanced mixers Alternative system concepts.
- high ratio circulators
Barometric switch None identified Detonation at specific altitude All other fuzing systems
FIRING SETS
Capacitive discharge units Energy density and one-shot reliability Conventional weapons fuzing None identified
Cold cathode tubes and switches Energy density and one-shot reliability Directed energy weapons; None identified
High pulse power, x-ray machines
Pyrotechnic logic and delay Characterization of detonation Device design will most likely be None identified
devices velocity in end configurations specific to nuclear weapon design
Detonators and initiator couplers Reliability and precision of initiation Technology common to some aimable Detonating devices derived from
and connectors, including: vs. safety ordnance warhead concepts commercial civil explosives
- exploding bridge wires
- exploding foil
- hot wire
- semiconductor bridge
OPERATIONAL SECURITY
Lock systems incorporating Balancing ease of use and reliability Elements of technology may be Single-keyed, mechanical system
combined electronic and positive against security and probability of common to conventional physical
mechanical or physical "keying" unauthorized penetration security of highly classified or high
value/high risk assets
Physical security Probability of detection vs. false alarm Elements of technology may be Conventional passive infrared and
rate common to conventional physical ultrasonic detection, manual
security of highly classified or high backup
value/high risk assets

II-5-74
 SECTION 5.8—RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

OVERVIEW
Radiological weapons use the beta rays, neutrons, and gamma rays emitted by the
Highlights
decay of highly radioactive isotopes to kill or incapacitate. In general, the latency
period between exposure to high doses of radiation and the onset of symptoms is long • Radiological weapons are more apt to cause civil disruption than
(hours to weeks, depending upon dose), but it may be as short as minutes if neutron destruction.
doses on the order of several thousand rads (whole body dose) can be delivered. How- • They can be made in almost any kind of nuclear reactor and require
ever, there is no practical way to transport enough radioactive material to provide far less engineering and research than do nuclear explosives.
doses this high because the amounts of isotopes necessary to inflict reasonably prompt • Radiological agents in quantities great enough to cause prompt-
casualties (hours to days) over a large area (square kilometers) on a foe may produce lethal or prompt-incapacitating effects on the battlefield will likely
so much heat that it melts even steel bomb cases. be too thermally hot to transport.
Because of the long latency period, radiological weapons are probably of little
tactical use on the battlefield except that fear of radiation on the part of the opponent
may act to deny areas to him. For area denial to be effective, the opponent’s troops
must be notified of the presence of the agent, because the radiation does not cause are inhaled, they tend to lodge in the tissue of the lung where they deposit their energy
prompt casualties. Radiological weapons may have the potential for use against rear in a very localized region. This can lead to lung cancer, but with a decades-long la-
areas. The isotopes of greatest concern are those normally produced as fission prod- tency period.
ucts in nuclear reactors or which are copiously produced when “fertile” material is
One might conceive of a long-duration radiological weapon suitable only for pro-
irradiated in a reactor (e.g., 137Cs, 60Co). More rapidly decaying, and hence more po-
ducing terror and forcing the evacuation of an area by exploiting the dangers of in-
tent, radioisotopes generally have short half lives (a year or less), complicating the
haled radioisotopes. Any cancers will be produced with a very long latency period
problem of stockpiling them for later use.
(years), but the mere possibility of such personal catastrophes may be strategically
Gamma-ray and neutron-emitting isotopes in quantities needed to cause injuries important.
to opposing troops are likely to be very dangerous for the attacker’s troops to handle.
An alternative scenario would be to conceal a very intense radioactive gamma
The mass of the required shielding will greatly exceed that of the agent.
source such as 60Co in an area to which many people return on a regular basis, such as
On the other hand, public fear of radiation is so great that small quantities of a theater, restaurant, or mess hall. If the source were radioactive enough and remained
radioactive materials dispersed about a city may well induce considerable panic in the concealed for sufficient time the extended exposures could produce direct casualties
populace. Such use of radiological agents would most likely be announced by the with complicated epidemiology. For this to be used as a weapon with shock value, the
attacking force, because the material may not otherwise be detected. exposed population would have to be informed of the presence of the source.
Alpha radiation (4He nuclei) is normally not dangerous unless it enters the body
RATIONALE
and lodges there. Because they are massive (two neutrons and two protons) and slow
moving, the particles produced in normal alpha decay stop so quickly that a single Although radiological weapons have little or no tactical importance on the battle-
thickness of paper is usually a sufficient shield. They also carry a charge of +2, which field, the fear of radiation has become so widespread and ingrained that if an opponent
doubles the force they exert on the electrons in target material compared to a beta ray spreads even small, harmless but detectable amounts of radioactive material in rear
(electron).13 If, however, correctly sized particles containing alpha-emitting isotopes
13
The rate at which a heavy charged particle loses energy is proportional to the square of its
charge.

II-5-75
echelon areas, the action may force U.S. troops to don full protective garb and attempt spent fuel from those reactors has the potential to produce material suitable for use in
to operate under that handicap. radiological weapons. The fundamental tool for producing radioisotopes, a nuclear
It is not possible to dispose of radiological agents by burning; they will merely be reactor, can be found in very many countries. The 44 nations identified in the 1996
transferred to the effluent. Neither can radiological agents be “sterilized” by heat or Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as having safeguarded reactors and other fuel facili-
other chemicals. Decontamination is usually accomplished by a wash-down, with the ties provide a good start at identifying possible sources for radiological warfare agents.
waste water becoming low-level radioactive waste. Only time—the passing of many Actually turning the radioisotopes into weapons may require special techniques
half-lives of the isotopes in question and their radioactive daughters—can totally elimi- for handling the material safely. Similarly, those crews chosen to disperse the
nate the hazard posed by radioactive contamination. material will require protective gear or, alternatively, must be ready to become human
sacrifices. Efficient use of radiological material requires converting it from bulk form
FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2) into a dust or aerosol which can be inhaled and then finding methods to spray the
Radiological agents can be conveniently and secretly made in any research reac- material. These technologies may not be present in every state which can produce
tor designed to irradiate material samples. Spent fuel from any reactor can be cut up radioactive isotopes. On the other hand, they are not required if the aim is merely to
and the material dispersed without further chemical treatment. Thus, any nation with cause panic or to force troops to work in protective clothing.
a research reactor or with civilian power reactors and the capability of discharging

II-5-76
 Table 5.8-1. Radiological Weapons Technology Parameters

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Irradiation of fertile Ability to make millions of NTL A1, B1; Fertile elements Reactor refueling Reactor design and
material curies of radioactive material NRC A, L such as Co, Cs to be equipment; remote operating software with
irradiated handling equipment. capability to simulate
Nuclear reactor for presence of neutron-
irradiation. absorbing nonfissile
material; activation
cross-sections.
Transportation and Shielding against gamma NDUL 8; Lead and borated None identified Shielding software.
handling of intensely photons with energies up to CCL Cat 1A; materials for radi- Much of this is publicly
radioactive material 3–5 MeV; ability to reduce ation shielding; available.
surface field to safe levels, CCL Cat 2B hermetic seals for
circa 1 mr/hr in contact with container; radiation-
package. Ability to cool damage-resistant
isotopes to prevent melting. seals and contain-
ers. Absence of
plastics likely.
Dispersal of agent Ability to reduce bulk material WA ML 4; Radioactive iso- Corrosion- and radiation- Plume prediction soft-
to fine powder or to liquid USML IV topes; shielding; resistant sprayers, ware. Much of this is
solution for aerosol or other spraying equipment pumps, etc. Absence of publicly available.
spraying operation; ability to resistant to corro- unshielded plastic com-
transport material in combat sion by solvents ponents likely because
aircraft or UAVs. used to dissolve of their rapid degradation
radioactive com- in presence of intense
pounds. Absence of photon irradiation.
unshielded plastic Personnel protection as
and rubber parts necessary.
probable.
In situ preparation of Neutron bomb NTL 1 Fertile materials; Sprayers for fertile None
radiological agent SNM; tritium material solutions

II-5-77
 Table 5.8-2. Radiological Weapons Reference Data

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Reactor irradiation of fertile Construct reactors; extract fission Prepare radiological agents for use in Use of high-level waste from
material products or irradiated target material area denial civilian power reactors
Transport of radiological agents Shielding; concealment; cooling of Bring agent to place of employment Accept "kamikaze" tactics for
large quantities; provision of seals not personnel delivering agent
affected by irradiation
Dispersal of agent Aerosolization of solid agent or Employ weapon Accept "kamikaze" tactics for
dissolving and then aerosolizing of personnel delivering agent
liquid. Spreading of powder
In-situ preparation of radiological Spray area with solution containing Deny area to foe; provide inherently All other methods of obtaining
agent activatable material, e.g., cobalt safe transport of agents radioactive material
chloride. Then detonate enhanced
radiation weapon at appropriate
altitude

II-5-78
 SECTION 5.9—MANUFACTURING OF NUCLEAR COMPONENTS

OVERVIEW
Highlights
This subsection describes the technologies required for the production of equip-
ment used to manufacture nuclear weapons. In most cases, the technologies, the equip-
ment, and the know-how are dual-use and affect civilian applications where, for ex- • Computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools may speed
ample, considerations of costs, flexibility, and competitiveness have become major construction of components of nuclear weapons and reduce the
concerns. In some cases, the technologies described here are neither state of the art, labor costs of such manufacture.
nor is the United States the world leader in the technology. The concerns of the United • Robotic manufacture may reduce personnel exposure to radiation.
States with respect to the spread of nuclear weapons are no longer directed at the • Precision metrology may make manufacture to tighter tolerances
technologically advanced Warsaw Pact countries, but more at developing countries feasible.
that are attempting to produce weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, the United • When testing is not possible, parts made as closely matched to
States must adjust its level of concern to the control or monitoring of that machine tool theory as possible provide some assurance of attaining the desired
technology actually necessary to meet the U.S. antiproliferation goals, a level which is
results in nuclear weapons.
often significantly less than the state of the art.
A number of different technologies associated with a modern industrial base are
addressed in this subsection, including many types of machine tools and processing
equipment, certain inspection equipment, and certain robots.
At the state of the art, however, factories producing the nuclear components (and
Manufacturing Equipment
some nonnuclear components) of modern devices must be capable of carrying out
This section encompasses both machine tools and equipment for fabricating struc- dimensional measurements which are both precise and accurate. Relative thicknesses
tures by means of various advanced manufacturing techniques. Machine tools include must be measured to high precision, and the absolute values of those measurements
NC (numerically controlled) machines in which the motions of the various axes are must be compared to a set of standards with extreme accuracy.
simultaneously and continually coordinated, thereby maintaining a predetermined (pro- It is common, of course, for the most technically advanced nuclear powers to
grammed) path. This includes turning, milling, and grinding machines and electrical employ all of the modern tools of computer-assisted fabrication, including computer
discharge machines (EDM). numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools.
Advanced manufacturing technique equipment includes spin, flow, and shear form- Shapes which can be manufactured with a modern 5-axis CNC machine tool can
ing machines; filament-winding machines; hot isostatic presses; high-temperature fur- be approximated on a simpler machine if the work can be repositioned during machin-
naces and heaters; equipment for the manufacture of centrifuge rotors; vibration/shaker ing or if the component can be made in parts which are later joined together. Signifi-
systems; and flash x-ray systems. It is often suggested that all or even most of these cant hand work is usually required in either case. The accuracy of the approximation
manufacturing and mensuration systems are required to build weapons of mass de- depends upon the precision with which the work can be repositioned or with which the
struction in general and nuclear weapons in particular. separate components can be joined and in both instances, on the skills of the
A nuclear weapon is a sophisticated device, and depending upon the complexity engineers/machinists. The history of American nuclear efforts is illustrative. The first
of the design and the constraints on the designer—such as size, weight, and amount of thermonuclear bomb was produced in the 1951–1952 time frame; the first use of
special nuclear materials which can be used—may or may not require very precise 3-axis machine tools occurred in 1952, and the first 5-axis machine tools were used in
manufacture. 1954.

II-5-79
Metrology in the machining of hemi-shells for nuclear weapons; spin, flow, and shear forming
machines are required for the fabrication of thin-walled, long, concentric hollow bod-
Metrology covers technologies for dimensional measuring systems and equip-
ies, such as rotors for centrifuge devices used in uranium enrichment. Superplastic
ment needed for precise determination of the dimensions of manufactured parts, ma-
forming/diffusion bonding equipment is used for the fabrication of sheet metal struc-
chine tools, and inspection machines. Included are systems for in-process measure-
tures of advanced alloys (e.g., titanium, nickel, and aluminum), in which reliability
ment, as well as post-manufacture inspection. This technology area is of paramount
and cost are important factors, and high-temperature furnaces are used for casting
importance for the construction of systems incorporating mechanical or electrical com-
uranium and plutonium, both key weapons materials.
ponents built to exacting tolerances, whether such hardware is military or civil. It is
highly dependent on sensors, positioners, feedback systems, digital computers, and Metrology
associated components and hardware. Included in the list of metrology equipment are
Modern precision manufacturing depends upon being able to make a large num-
coordinate, linear, and angular measurement machines using laser, standard light, and
ber of dimensional measurements precisely and accurately, and to know that measure-
noncontact techniques. The tolerances of parts measured range from ±1 nm (corre-
ments made at each site can be referred to a set of secondary standards which can, if
sponding to an optical surface finish prepared by diamond turning with ion beam pol-
necessary, be calibrated against the international standards. A centimeter measured in
ishing) to ±10 µm(corresponding to more traditional metal machining).
one laboratory must be the same as a centimeter measured with different equipment at
Robots another laboratory, and that equality must be demonstrable quickly and economically.
In many ways, technological progress has been demarcated by our ability to make
The term “robots” covers the technology for the general category of robots, con-
precision, standard measurements and to transfer this ability from the laboratory to the
trollers, and end-effectors, which are used in conjunction with other manufacturing
production floor. This is the science of metrology.
equipment for the production or testing of critical hardware. Robots can essentially be
separated into four distinct disciplines, the robot, the controller (computer), sensors Accurate dimensional inspection is essential for the design, development, manufac-
(the “eyes” of the robot), and end-effectors (the “gripper”). Robots have found a wide ture, and use of a wide range of military hardware. Dimensional inspection
range of applications in manufacturing, including welders, sprayers, assemblers, load- machines are used for the measurement of centrifuge and nuclear weapons parts;
ers/unloaders, etc. They have also found use in handling hazardous or radioactive linear inspection machines are used for the measurement of bearing races or shafts
materials, transporting explosive weapons, and performing tasks in space. In this sub- (used in advanced machine tools), centrifuges, and nuclear weapons parts. Special-
section, only those robots designed for use in radiation environments are addressed. ized measuring equipment is critical for measuring hemi-shells.
RATIONALE Robots
Manufacturing technologies are fundamental to the national industrial base. As In most advanced manufacturing plants robots have replaced humans in many
much as any other technology, they are vital for the manufacture of military and civil operations which are repetitive and do not require human intervention. Such applica-
hardware, and they either enable the manufacture of vital military systems or are es- tions include welding, painting, surveillance, and pick-and-place assembly. This type
sential for the design and manufacture of future military systems. Without some level of robot is commonplace in industrial countries and is not included in this document.
of manufacturing equipment capability, it would be impossible to produce the military Robots are indispensable in many hazardous military operations, including the han-
systems used by the world’s military forces. In particular, the technologies listed in dling of munitions, operating in highly radioactive or electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
this subsection are necessary for the manufacture of modern nuclear weapons. Many environments, and performing tasks in space. The use of robots in these applications
listed technologies are far more advanced than those available to the first several nuclear extends the military capability much further than what could be accomplished with
weapon states when they built their first nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, weapons “protected” humans.
generally considered quite satisfactory for their avowed purposes of deterrence and FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2)
warfighting.
Since manufacturing is so fundamental to the industrial base of any country, the
Manufacturing Equipment availability of machines necessary to produce both military and civil hardware is world-
Modern weapon systems require a variety of processing equipment to manufac- wide. As a result, the technology level of the major industrial countries is very high,
ture necessary components. For example, machine tools or precision casting are used with the United States, Japan, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, France, the UK, the

II-5-80
Netherlands, and Sweden all having considerable expertise. The technology level in Metrology
Russia and China is increasing markedly, with some rudimentary 5-axis machine tools
A number of foreign countries have developed sophisticated metrology capabili-
becoming available in those countries. France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and the
ties. Germany and the UK have capabilities across the spectrum of the technology,
UK are the leading countries with expertise in metrology. Japan is the major competi-
while France, Japan, and Switzerland have advanced capabilities in most of the tech-
tor to the United States in robotics. France has a significant robotics capability, and
nologies associated with metrology. A large number of countries have niche capabili-
Italy is a worldwide competitor.
ties.
Manufacturing Equipment
Robots
Japan, Germany, France, and Switzerland are comparable to the United States in
A number of other countries have developed sophisticated robotics. Japan, in
certain machine tool capabilities. Indeed, Japan and Switzerland surpass the United
particular, and Germany have emerged as world leaders in industrial robots. Most all
States in some categories. Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK have extensive
other heavily industrialized countries have capabilities in this area. The United States
capabilities in some of the niche areas. China has developed capabilities in 4- and
and Japan are the world leaders in military/nuclear/space robotics. Russia and the
5-axis machines, although the degree of their capability, relating to quality and quan-
Ukraine have considerable capability in robots designed for use in nuclear environ-
tity, is still unknown.
ments, as used for example in the monitoring of the Chernobyl nuclear plant.
Japan, Germany, France, and the UK are comparable to the United States in ad-
vanced manufacturing.

II-5-81
 Table 5.9-1. Manufacturing of Nuclear Components Technology Parameters

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
MANUFACTURING EQUIPMENT
Numerically controlled Such equipment is useful, but WA Cat 2B; Spindles with low None identified Control algorithms for the
machine tools for not necessary, to build a NDUL 1; run-out, tilting manufacture of specific
removing or cutting nuclear weapon and might spindles, linear and items of concern.
metals, ceramics, or allow a proliferator to CCL Cat 2B rotary position
composites by grinding. construct more intricate feedback units, and
devices than would otherwise compound spindles
be possible. Therefore, any and tables.
capability is a concern.
Numerically controlled Such equipment is useful, but WA Cat 2B; Spindles with low None identified Control algorithms for the
machine tools for not necessary, to build a NDUL 1; run-out, linear and manufacture of specific
removing or cutting nuclear weapon and might rotary position items of concern.
metals, ceramics, or allow a proliferator to CCL Cat 2B feedback units.
composites by turning. construct more intricate
devices than would otherwise
be possible. Therefore, any
capability is a concern.
Numerically controlled Such equipment is useful, but WA Cat 2B; Spindles with low None identified Control algorithms for the
machine tools for not necessary, to build a NDUL 1; run-out, tilting manufacture of specific
removing or cutting nuclear weapon and might spindles, linear and items of concern.
metals, ceramics, or allow a proliferator to CCL Cat 2B rotary position
composites by milling. construct more intricate feedback units, and
devices than would otherwise compound spindles
be possible. Therefore, any and tables.
capability is a concern.
Numerically controlled Such equipment is useful, but WA Cat 2B; Spindles with low None identified Control algorithms for the
turning machines or not necessary, to build a NDUL 1; run-out, tilting manufacture of specific
combination turning/ nuclear weapon and might spindles, linear and items of concern.
milling machines allow a proliferator to CCL Cat 2B rotary position
construct more intricate feedback units, and
devices than would otherwise compound spindles
be possible. Therefore, any and tables.
capability is a concern.
Numerically controlled Such equipment is useful, but WA Cat 2B; Rotary axes None identified Control algorithms for the
electrical discharge not necessary, to build a NDUL 1; manufacture of specific
machines (EDM) of nuclear weapon and might items of concern.
nonwire type allow a proliferator to CCL Cat 2B
construct more intricate
devices than would otherwise
be possible. Therefore, any
capability is a concern.

(cont’d)

II-5-82
 Table 5.9-1. Manufacturing of Nuclear Components Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Numerically controlled Such equipment is useful, but NDUL 1; Rotor-forming None identified Control algorithms for the
spin, flow, and shear not necessary, to enrichment MTCR 3; mandrels designed manufacture of specific
forming machines devices and might allow a to form cylindrical items of concern.
proliferator to construct more WA Cat 2B; rotors of inside
intricate devices than would CCL Cat 2B diameter between
otherwise be possible. 75 mm and 400 mm
Therefore, any capability is a
concern.
Numerically controlled Such equipment is useful, but NDUL 3; Glass and carbon None identified None identified
composite filament not necessary, to enrichment WA Cat 1B; fiber
winding equipment devices and might allow a
proliferator to construct more CCL Cat 1B
intricate devices than would
otherwise be possible.
Therefore, any capability is a
concern.
Vacuum or controlled Such equipment is useful, but NDUL 1; Specially designed None identified None identified
environment induction not necessary, to build a CCL Cat 2B power supplies with
furnaces nuclear weapon and might power output of
allow a proliferator to ≥5 kW.
construct more intricate
devices than would otherwise
be possible. Therefore, any
capability is a concern.
Vacuum or controlled Any capability for arc melting NDUL 1; None identified None identified None identified
atmosphere metallurgical and casting, electron beam CCL Cat 2B
melting and casting melting, plasma atomization
furnaces or high temperature
(>600 K) melting furnaces is a
concern.
Hot isostatic presses Such equipment is useful, but WA Cat 2B; None identified Control units None identified
not necessary, to build a NDUL 1;
nuclear weapon and might
allow a proliferator to CCL Cat 2B
construct more intricate
devices than would otherwise
be possible. Therefore, any
capability is a concern.

(cont’d)

II-5-83
 Table 5.9-1. Manufacturing of Nuclear Components Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Electrodynamic vibration Reliability may be of little con- NDUL 1; None identified Closed loop test Special algorithms to
test system cern to certain adversaries. CCL Cat 2B equipment, digital generate specific g
However, the following capa- controllers, and vibration levels and vibrations that
bilities would be of value in thrusters. corresponds to weapon
developing reliable weapons: system.
vibrating a system at ≥15 g
RMS, between 20 Hz and
2,000 Hz, imparting forces of
≥30kN (5,625 lb)
Digital controllers Any capability is a concern. NDUL 1; None identified None identified None identified
MTCR 15;
CCL Cat 9B;
WA Cat 9B
Vibration thrusters Reliability may be of little con- NDUL 1; None identified Closed loop test Special algorithms to
cern to certain adversaries. MTCR 15; equipment generate specific g
However, the capability of levels and vibrations that
imparting a force ≥30 kN CCL Cat 9B; corresponds to weapon
(5,625 lb) would be a WA Cat 9B system.
concern.
Rotor assembly Any capability is a concern. NDUL 3; None identified Mandrels, clamps, and None identified
equipment CCL Cat 2B shrink fit machines.

Rotor-straightening Any capability is a concern. NDUL 3; None identified Pneumatic rams None identified
equipment CCL Cat 2B
Bellows-forming Any capability is a concern. NDUL 3; None identified Mandrels and dies None identified
mandrels and dies for CCL Cat 2B
producing single-
convolution bellows
Centrifugal multiplane Any capability is a concern. NDUL 3; None identified None identified Control algorithms for the
balancing machines for CCL Cat 2B testing of specific items
flexible rotors of concern.
Centrifugal multiplane Any capability is a concern. NDUL 3; None identified None identified Control algorithms for the
balancing machines for CCL Cat 2B balancing of specific
hollow cylindrical rotor items of concern
components

(cont’d)

II-5-84
 Table 5.9-1. Manufacturing of Nuclear Components Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Flash x-ray machines or Having either of the following: NDUL 5; None identified None identified None identified
pulsed electron an accelerator peak electron CCL Cat 3A
accelerators energy ≥300 keV, but
<25 MeV; and
with a figure of merit (K) of
≥0.25, where K = 1.7 ×
103V2.65Q; or
an accelerator peak electron
energy ≥15 MeV and a peak
power >40 MW.
Remote manipulators Such equipment is useful, but NDUL 8; Able to provide None identified Control algorithms for the
not necessary for nuclear CCL Cat 2B; mechanical manufacture of specific
programs. translation of human items of concern.
WA Cat 2B operator actions by
electrical, hydraulic
or mechanical
means to an
operating arm and
terminal fixture.
METROLOGY
Numerically controlled Accurate computer controlled WA Cat 2B; Measurement Accurate machine tools Control algorithms for the
dimensional inspection coordinate measuring NDUL 1; probes, sensors, are required for the dimensional inspection
machines machines (CMM) would be a etc. manufacture of such of specific items of
concern. equipment, and precise concern.
metrology equipment is
required to verify
measurement capability.
Linear displacement Non-contact type with a WA Cat 2B; Measurement None identified None identified
(non-contact) measuring resolution ≤0.5 µm within a NDUL 1 probes, sensors,
devices measuring range of 0.2 mm etc.
Linear measuring Having both: linearity ≤0.5% WA Cat 2B; Measurement None identified None identified
machines using linear within a measuring range up NDUL 1 probes, sensors,
voltage differential to 5 mm; and drift ≤0.2% per etc.
transformer systems day at a standard ambient
room temperature ±1 K.

(cont’d)

II-5-85
 Table 5.9-1. Manufacturing of Nuclear Components Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Linear measuring Having both: a laser, and the WA Cat 2B; Measurement None identified None identified
machines capability to maintain, for at NDUL 1 probes, sensors,
least 8 hours, over a temper- and lasers
ature range of ±1 K around a
standard temperature and
pressure, both: a resolution
≤0.4 µm over full scale and a
measurement uncertainty
≤(0.2 L/2,000 µm)
Angular displacement Having an angular position WA Cat 2B; Measurement None identified None identified
measuring devices deviation ≤0.001 deg NDUL 1 probes, sensors,
etc.
Systems for simulta- Capable of measuring hemi- NDUL 1; Measurement None identified None identified
neous linear-angular shells with both a measure- CCL Cat 2B probes, sensors,
inspection of hemishells ment uncertainty equal to or etc.
less than 5.0 µm per 5 mm
and an angular position
deviation equal to or less
than 0.05 deg
ROBOTICS
Robots (designed to Any capability of operation in WA Cat 2B; Sensors, end-effec- Machine tools, inspec- Control algorithms for the
operate in explosive or an explosive environment is a NDUL 1; tors, ruggedized tion equipment, and all motion and operation of
EMP environments), concern. hydraulic lines (e.g., necessary equipment to the robots
controllers, and end- CCL Cat 2B self-sealing lines), manufacture sensors,
effectors hydraulic fluids with cameras, etc.
flash points > 839 K
(565 °C) and closed
or open loop servo-
devices
Robots designed for Designed to operate in a WA Cat 2B; Sensors, end-effec- Machine tools, inspec- Control algorithms for the
nuclear environments, radiation environment greater NDUL 1; tors, electronics tion equipment, and all motion and operation of
controllers, and end- capable of operating necessary equipment to the robots
effectors than 105 rad (Si) CCL Cat 2B in radiation levels of manufacture sensors,
5 × 104 grays [5 × cameras, etc.
106 rad (Si)] and
open or closed loop
servo-devices

II-5-86
 Table 5.9-2. Manufacturing of Nuclear Components Reference Data

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

MANUFACTURING
Numerically controlled machine The technical issues of general NC grinding machines are an enabling Numerically controlled, accurate
tools for removing or cutting equipment use are well-known. technology for munitions and weapons machine tools are essential for
metals, ceramics, or composites However, proliferants would need to systems. Nuclear applications include the manufacture of advanced
by grinding develop experience in machining machining hardened materials used in nuclear weapons.
nuclear materials. fixturing.
Numerically controlled machine The technical issues of general NC turning machines are an enabling Numerically controlled, accurate
tools for removing or cutting equipment use are well-known. technology for munitions and weapons machine tools are essential for
metals, ceramics, or composites However, proliferants would need to systems. Nuclear applications include the manufacture of advanced
by turning develop experience in machining the manufacture of hemishells, rotors nuclear weapons.
nuclear materials. and end-caps.
Numerically controlled machine The technical issues of general NC milling machines are a key enabling Numerically controlled, accurate
tools for removing or cutting equipment use are well-known. technology for munitions and weapons machine tools are essential for
metals, ceramics, or composites However, proliferants would need to systems. the manufacture of advanced
by milling develop experience in machining nuclear weapons.
nuclear materials,.
Numerically controlled turning The technical issues of general NC turning/milling machines are a key Numerically controlled, accurate
machines or combination turning/ equipment use are well-known. enabling technology for munitions and machine tools are essential for
milling machines However, proliferants would need to weapons systems. Nuclear applica- the manufacture of advanced
develop experience in machining tions include the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
nuclear materials. hemishells.
Numerically controlled The technical issues of general NC nonwire EDM machines are a key Numerically controlled, accurate
electrodischarge machines (EDM) equipment use are well-known. enabling technology for munitions and machine tools are essential for
of nonwire type However, proliferants would need to weapons systems. the manufacture of advanced
develop experience in machining nuclear weapons.
nuclear materials.
Numerically controlled spin, flow, The technical issues of general Capability to manufacture thin-walled Numerically controlled, accurate
and shear forming machines equipment use are well-known. curvilinear or cylindrical cross-section machine tools are essential for
However, proliferants would need to parts for use in seamless rocket the manufacture of advanced
develop experience in producing motors, nose cones, rocket launcher nuclear weapons.
centrifuge tubes to the accuracies tubes, rotor tubes for gas centrifuge
necessary for uranium enrichment. uranium enrichment systems, and
contour shapes in nuclear weapons.
Numerically controlled composite The technical issues of general Used in the manufacture of fiber Numerically controlled, accurate
filament-winding equipment equipment use are well-known. composite rotor assemblies for gas machine tools are essential for
However, proliferants would need to centrifuges used in uranium the manufacture of advanced
develop experience in producing enrichment. nuclear weapons.
centrifuge tubes to the accuracies
necessary for uranium enrichment.

(cont’d)

II-5-87
 Table 5.9-2. Manufacturing of Nuclear Components Reference Data (cont’d)

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Vacuum or controlled environment The technical issues of general equip- Used for casting either enriched or Some type of controlled environ-
induction furnaces ment use are well-known. However, unenriched uranium and for ment furnace would be necessary
proliferants would need to develop processing plutonium for key weapon to cast the nuclear materials. In
experience in working with uranium parts. lieu of an induction furnace, a
and/or plutonium. plasma, e-beam, or electric
furnace might be used.
Vacuum or controlled atmosphere The technical issues of general equip- Used for casting either enriched or Some type of controlled environ-
metallurgical melting and casting ment use are well-known. However, unenriched uranium and for ment furnace would be necessary
furnaces proliferants would need to develop processing plutonium for key weapon to cast the nuclear materials. In
experience in working with uranium parts. lieu of an induction furnace, a
and/or plutonium. plasma, e-beam, or induction
furnace might be used.
Hot isostatic presses The technical issues of general equip- Used to increase the density of Pneumatic presses might be
ment use are well-known. However, uranium fuel, cladding reactor fuel used; however, the results would
proliferants would need to develop rods, pressing plastic-bonded be much inferior.
experience in working with uranium, explosives (PBXs) and compacting
lithium compounds and explosive lithium hydride and lithium deuteride.
materials.
Electrodynamic vibration test The technical issues of equipment use Testing the effects of shock and Analog vibration systems with
system using digital control are well-known. There would be no vibration is critical in developing less stringent requirements could
techniques major difficulty in transferring reliable nuclear weapons, arming and be used to test smaller warheads
knowledge from standard industrial safing systems. or manufacture could proceed
experience to the nuclear arena. without vibration testing.
Digital controllers The technical issues of equipment use Testing the effects of shock and Analog equipment could be used.
are well-known. There would be no vibration is critical in developing
major difficulty in transferring reliable nuclear weapons, arming and
knowledge from standard industrial safing systems.
experience to the nuclear arena.
Vibration thrusters The technical issues of equipment use Testing the effects of shock and Smaller thrusters could be used
are well-known. There would be no vibration is critical in developing for smaller loads.
major difficulty in transferring reliable nuclear weapons, arming and
knowledge from standard industrial safing systems.
experience to the nuclear arena.
Rotor assembly equipment The technical issues of equipment use This equipment is used for the Not applicable
are well-known. There would be no assembly of gas centriguge rotor tube
major difficulty in transferring sections, baffles, and end-caps.
knowledge from standard industrial
experience to the nuclear arena.
Rotor-straightening equipment The technical issues of equipment use This equipment is used for the align- Not applicable
are well-known. There would be no ment of of gas centrifuge rotor tube
major difficulty in transferring sections to a common axis.
knowledge from standard industrial
experience to the nuclear arena.
(cont’d)

II-5-88
 Table 5.9-2. Manufacturing of Nuclear Components Reference Data (cont’d)

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Bellows-forming mandrels and While bellows, per se, are common These bellows are components of the Less sophisticated bellows could
dies for producing single- industrial products, bellows of this gas centrifuge equipment used for be used .
convolution bellows design, and made of these materials, uranium enrichment.
are not common. The technology to
construct them is not common
knowledge.
Centrifugal multiplane balancing The technical issues of equipment use Used to balance rotors, rotor sections, Although the balance of the rotors
machines for flexible rotors are well-known. There would be no and rotor assemblies used in gas is critical, smaller and/or lower
major difficulty in transferring centrifuges for uranium enrichment. rpm balncing machines could be
knowledge from standard industrial used.
experience to the nuclear arena.
Centrifugal multiplane balancing The technical issues of equipment use Used to balance rotors, rotor sections, Although the balance of the rotors
machines for hollow cylyndrical are well-known. There would be no and rotor assemblies used in gas is critical, smaller and/or lower
rotor components major difficulty in transferring centrifuges for uranium enrichment. rpm balancing machines could be
knowledge from standard industrial used.
experience to the nuclear arena.
Flash x-ray machines or pulsed Flash x-ray systems have limited non- Used in developing nuclear weapon There may be no alternate
electron accelerators military use. However, it would not be implosion systems. They provide technology to duplicate what can
difficult to transfer knowledge from the diagnostic data on non-nuclear be done with the flash x-ray.
nonmilitary applications to nuclear hydrodynamic tests of the implosion Howver, high-speed rotating
uses. system. Smaller systems are used in mirror cameras may perform some
developing precision high-explosive of the required tests.
implosion systems.
Remote manipulators The technical issues of equipment use Provide mechanical translation of Not applicable
are well-known. There would be no human operator actions by electical,
major difficulty in transferring hydraulic or mechanical means to an
knowledge from standard industrial operating arm and terminal fixture,
experience to the nuclear arena. used to provide remote actions in
radiochemical separation operations
or “hot cells.”
METROLOGY
Computer or stored program Most nuclear applications would not Allows for precision measurements of Satisfactory results could be
controlled dimensional inspection involve measurement of radioactive low volume, high precision com- obtained using uncontrolled
machines [coordinate measuring materials. Therefore, the technical ponents used in weapons, weapons CMMs; e.g., they are manually
machines (CMMs)] issues of concern would be program- control, etc. Nuclear applications operated, and they have greater
ming, operation, and interpretation of include measurement of centrifuge uncertainty in measurement.
data, and these are well-known in the and nuclear weapons parts.
industrial world.
Linear displacement (non- Most nuclear applications would not Essential for the measurement of very Many things could be used as
contact) measuring devices involve measurement of radioactive precise parts with simple geometries, alternate technologies: e.g.,
materials. Therefore, the technical such as bearing races or shafts and uncontrolled CMMs, gauge blocks
issues of concern would be program- centrifuge and nuclear weapon parts. and indicators, height gauges, V-
ming, operation, and interpretation of They also offer improved allignment of blocks, micrometers (including
data, and these are well-known in the components of optical and radar depth micrometers), bore gauges,
industrial world. system and sighting mechanisms. etc.
II-5-89 (cont’d)
 Table 5.9-2. Manufacturing of Nuclear Components Reference Data (cont’d)

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Linear measuring machines using Most nuclear applications would not Essential for the measurement of very Many things could be used as
linear voltage differential involve measurement of radioactive precise parts with simple geometries, alternate technologies: e.g.,
transformer systems materials. Therefore, the technical such as bearing races or shafts and uncontrolled CMMs, gauge blocks
issues of concern would be program- centrifuge and nuclear weapon parts. and indicators, height gauges, V-
ming, operation, and interpretation of They also offer improved allignment of blocks, micrometers (including
data, and these are well-known in the components of optical and radar depth micrometers), bore gauges,
industrial world. system and sighting mechanisms. etc.
Linear measuring machines Most nuclear applications would not Essential for the measurement of very Many things could be used as
involve measurement of radioactive precise parts with simple geometries, alternate technologies: e.g.,
materials. Therefore, the technical such as bearing races or shafts and uncontrolled CMMs, gauge blocks
issues of concern would be program- centrifuge and nuclear weapon parts. and indicators, height gauges, V-
ming, operation, and interpretation of They also offer improved allignment of blocks, micrometers (including
data, and these are well-known in the components of optical and radar depth micrometers), bore gauges,
industrial world. system and sighting mechanisms. etc.
Angular displacement measuring Most nuclear applications would not Essential for the measurement of very Many things could be used as
devices involve measurement of radioactive precise parts with simple geometries, alternate technologies: e.g.,
materials. Therefore, the technical such as bearing races or shafts and uncontrolled CMMs, gauge blocks
issues of concern would be program- centrifuge and nuclear weapon parts. and indicators, height gauges, V-
ming, operation, and interpretation of They also offer improved allignment of blocks, micrometers (including
data, and these are well-known in the components of optical and radar depth micrometers), bore gauges,
industrial world. system and sighting mechanisms. rotary heads, etc.
Systems for simultaneous linear- Although this is specialized equip- Specialized device used in the Alternate technologies could
angular inspection of hemishells ment, the operation and interpretation manufacture of nuclear weapon include uncontrolled CMMs and
would be straightforward. The impos- components rotary heads and measuring
ing technical issue would be the know- indicators.
how and interpretation of test results.
ROBOTICS
Robots designed to operate in Since robots, per se, are universally Such robots can be used both as There are two alternatives to the
explosive or EMP environments, used, the operation of such equipment replacements for military forces or in use of these robots: (1) using
controller and end-effectors would be straightforward. The main hot cells. commercial type robots, with the
technical issue would be either the understanding that there will be a
difficulty in procuring such robots or short mean time to failure, or
the having technology to design and (2) using humans, with the under-
build them. standing that they would be
expendable.
Robots designed for nuclear Since robots, per se, are universally Such robots are used in nuclear There are two alternatives to the
environments used, the operation of such equipment reprocessing and nuclear production use of these robots: (1) using
would be straightforward. The main reactor facilities. they may also be commercial type robots, with the
technical issue would be either the used in nuclear facilities to reduce understanding that there will be a
difficulty in procuring such robots or occupational radiation exposure. short mean time to failure, or
the having technology to design and (2) using humans, with the under-
build them. standing that they would be
expendable.

II-5-90
 SECTION 5.10—NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT TESTING

OVERVIEW
Highlights
Nuclear weapons, to quote Sidney D. Drell, are “sophisticated but not compli-
cated.” That is, the working principles are straightforward, although the equipment • It is possible to make a credible nuclear weapon without ever
needed to make a device function, and function reliably, is quite sophisticated and testing the nuclear parts of the device or producing any nuclear
requires high-quality engineering to design and build. Although it is generally be- energy release.
lieved that a proliferator need not test a conservatively designed device at full yield to • Hydrodynamic nuclear experiments using flash x-ray cameras
have confidence in it, some experimentation and testing along the way is necessary to
to image the imploding material that simulates plutonium or
demonstrate the behavior of the non-nuclear components including the firing set, deto-
nators, and neutron generators. If there is not to be a full-yield nuclear test, then the uranium are necessary.
non-nuclear experiments must be carried out with greater care and competence. • American-style underground nuclear testing requires some
sophisticated equipment, but bare bones experiments are also
One reason for believing that a full-yield nuclear test is unnecessary is that each of
the six states known to have tested nuclear devices has achieved a nuclear detonation feasible and useful.
on the first try. • The 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty prohibits the testing
of nuclear weapons. Signatories include all five declared nuclear
The term “nuclear testing” as used here encompasses all experiments in which
special nuclear material (or a simulant) is placed in contact with high explosives, which weapons states, Israel, and Iran. India, Pakistan, North Korea,
are then detonated, or with a propellant, which is ignited. This limitation deliberately Iraq, and Libya have not signed the Treaty.
excludes activities which are more scientific in nature and not intimately connected
with the progression from fissile material and/or fusion fuel to a nuclear explosive
device.14 This definition is far broader than that of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty the CTBT, a prohibited test of an explosively assembled device from one which is
(CTBT) of 1996, which prohibits only nuclear weapon test explosions and other nuclear allowed.
explosions.15 Many states of concern for nuclear proliferation16 have subscribed to the The spectrum of nuclear devices which a proliferant organization could field po-
CTBT, and may, therefore, find it difficult to conduct full-yield tests either under- tentially spans everything from simple devices which scatter radioactive waste (see
ground or in the atmosphere. India, however, has served notice that it will not sign the Section 5.8, Radiological Weapons) to sophisticated weapons incorporating boosted
CTBT; in 1974 India detonated what it called a “peaceful nuclear explosive device.” primaries and adjustable yield secondaries. The device actually built by any given
Even under the CTBT, most non-nuclear hydrodynamic implosion testing17 will proliferator depends on the technological sophistication; size; available budget; avail-
be permitted. At the lowest end of the nuclear yield distribution from hydronuclear ability of special nuclear materials; time scale; strategic or tactical intent; and a host of
tests, some states might reckon that the knowledge gained from a small explosive other exogenous and endogenous considerations, political, economic, and social.
release of nuclear energy would be worth the risk of getting caught. Generally, within
There is little doubt that technologically sophisticated nations with well-educated
the U.S. Government, the condition of prompt nuclear criticality distinguishes, under
populations and large GDPs, and having an indigenous reactor industry as well as

17
14 In a hydrodynamic test, inert material (e.g., 238U or a simulant for plutonium) is imploded to
For example, laser and particle beam fusion.
determine how well the high-explosive system functions. In a hydronuclear test, fissile
15
The CTBT, signed by President Clinton on 24 September 1996, obligates each signatory not material is imploded, but a supercritical mass is not maintained for a long enough time to
to conduct “nuclear weapons test explosions” or “any other nuclear explosions” on any permit the device to deliver “full” nuclear yield. Depending upon the conditions of the test,
territory under its control. nuclear energy releases may range from the unmeasurably small (milligrams or less) to
16
India, Iraq, and Pakistan are not CTBT signatories; all five nuclear weapons states are. kilograms or even metric tons of TNT equivalent yield.

II-5-91
enrichment and reprocessing facilities, could produce nuclear weapons in a very short Implosion Devices
time. The strategic or tactical doctrine for their use would be vastly different from
The testing program for a simple fission device using plutonium must be more
those of a subnational group developing nuclear capability and probably different from
a third world proliferator. extensive than that for a gun-assembled device using enriched uranium. For example,
the constructor must know that his fissile “pit” will be uniformly compressed and that
The general design of a gun-assembled device is straightforward and based on the compression will be rapid enough to minimize the chances for a pre-initiation
well-understood principles of artillery weapons; however, the technology for obtain- “fizzle,” that any neutron generator present will fire at the correct moment, and that
ing enriched uranium is complex. On the other hand, implosion-assembled devices compression is likely to be maintained long enough to result in significant nuclear
using plutonium—which could be extracted simply using chemical techniques from yield.
reactor rods—are more difficult to manufacture.18 If a nation had an indigenous reac-
tor industry, such extraction would be straightforward. A proliferator hoping to demonstrate its technical prowess may elect to pursue an
implosion device despite the availability of enriched uranium. Alternatively, it may
The testing programs required to accomplish the goals of proliferators spread out choose implosion to achieve greater efficiency in the use of special material. It can be
along the spectrum of technical sophistication and available resources are as diverse as presumed that this type of proliferator will forego the development of thermonuclear
the goals of the proliferant states themselves and the programs to develop the weap- weapons.
ons. At the most primitive end of the spectrum, if the device were stolen, yield testing
would not be required, but circumvention of possible use controls would be. If the Hydrodynamic Testing
weapon were “legitimately” acquired from a nuclear power, presumably use control The testing program for an unboosted implosion device primarily ensures that the
information would be passed on to the purchaser. In neither case is testing required. hydrodynamic behavior of the implosion (particularly of a hollow pit) is correct.
If, however, a nuclear device is indigenously designed and built, the question to be
answered by a full-scale nuclear test is likely to be how much nuclear yield a specific The simplest way to do hydrodynamic testing is to implode inert pits made of a
device will deliver, and not necessarily whether it will produce nuclear yield. simulant for fissile material (e.g., natural uranium instead of HEU) while using any of
several “old fashioned” means to observe the behavior of the heavy metal. One such
RATIONALE technique is to use a pin-dome, essentially nothing more than a precisely machined
insulating “champagne cork” with a large number of protruding radial pins of different
Fundamentally, test programs can be divided into two major categories: those for
distances placed at the center of the implosion region.
an HEU-fueled, gun-assembled device and those for an implosion device using either
plutonium or HEU. The first Chinese test was of an HEU implosion device, Iraq Pin dome experiments are probably the easiest hydrodynamic diagnostics avail-
intended to develop just such a weapon, and the South Africans conducted no nuclear able. However, backlighting the pit with a flash x-ray or neutron source to obtain an
tests of their gun-assembled devices. actual picture of the imploding material is also a possibility. Generally, the flash x-ray
source needed has to have very high peak power available in a single pulse, and the
Gun-Assembled Devices timing and firing of the source in concert with the implosion of the device requires
The testing program for a gun-assembled device is moderately complex, but it is very sophisticated system design. Backlighting the imploding system with a neutron
essential to realize that nothing nuclear need be tested to verify the probable operation source is a bit more straightforward, but requires very sophisticated neutron optics and
of such a device—only its conventional components. The design of Little Boy, the imaging capability, which could be difficult to obtain. Iraq used flash x-ray diagnos-
bomb dropped on Hiroshima, had not been proof tested before the war shot. tics.
The Radio Lanthanum (RaLa) method, which does permit time-dependent mea-
18
Some analysts believe that the difficulties of enriching uranium are offset by the simpler surements of the symmetry of an implosion, should be mentioned because of its con-
weapon designs which enriched uranium allows. In the United States, HEU is considered less ceptual simplicity. RaLa was used extensively during the Manhattan Project, but has
expensive to use in a weapon than plutonium. Operation of a reactor to produce plutonium probably not been employed very often since then. An intensely radioactive sample of
requires the extraction and purification of uranium and, in some cases, at least modest the element lanthanum was prepared in an accelerator or reactor and then quickly
enrichment. Given international safeguards on reactors using enriched uranium obtained from inserted into the center of the implosion test device. Highly collimated Geiger-Mueller
another nation or heavy water moderated reactors, a proliferant may be forced in any case to counters observed the behavior of the material as it imploded. The RaLa technique is
construct an enrichment facility. The choice is likely to be determined by the indigenous inherently fairly crude in its ability to detect asymmetries and environmentally unap-
availability of uranium and the national surplus (or shortage) of electricity. pealing because the radioactive material is scattered about the test stand. However, the

II-5-92
isotopes have half lives of only a few hours to a few days, so the residual radioactivity The development of the fireball and the propagation of a shock wave proceed
decreases significantly in a week or so. quite differently when the device is tightly tamped at the bottom of a borehole than
when it is detonated in free air. However, when the borehole or mine shaft have been
Hydronuclear Testing
properly stemmed,19 underground experiments have the advantage of not releasing
Hydronuclear experiments, as distinguished from hydrodynamic ones, use actual significant amounts of radioactive debris. It is also simpler to place large masses of
fissile material assembled to form a supercritical mass in which a chain reaction be- experimental apparatus close to an underground shot than to locate the same hardware
gins. Normally, hydronuclear experiments are designed to use nuclear devices modi- next to a balloon gondola or on the platform of a slender tower, either of which has a
fied in one of several ways, including substituting inert material or less-fissile material limited carrying capacity. In any event, very few atmospheric tests have been carried
for some of the HEU or plutonium in the pit, so that very little nuclear energy release out during the last three decades, and even the French and Chinese abandoned their
occurs. Yields in experiments described as “hydronuclear” by various countries have atmospheric test programs.
ranged from much less than 1 kg TNT equivalent to many tons. Only with a large collection of data derived from yield tests of different types of
Nuclear Yield Testing devices can a weapons designer be confident that he understands the behavior of dif-
ferent possible designs within what is termed the nuclear weapons “design space,” and
The CTBT has created a new international norm against the testing of nuclear only then can he be confident that the computer programs used to predict device per-
weapons. Nonetheless, it has not yet entered into force, and some of the states of formance deliver reliable results. This may be the strongest motivation for a proliferator
greatest concern are unlikely to sign it in the near future. Therefore, the possibility of to test at full yield. However, even a series of full-yield tests may not provide all of the
a proliferant state carrying out a nuclear explosion with a significant yield remains information needed for weapons design.
moderately high.
Rudimentary Testing
From 1945 through much of 1991, the United States detonated more than 1,200
nuclear devices with yields from a few pounds to about 15 megatons. Until the middle Most nuclear weapon states have constructed underground testing facilities simi-
of 1963, most U.S. (and Soviet) tests took place in the atmosphere; some were con- lar to the U.S. Nevada Test Site. That is, weapons development and proof tests are
ducted underground, a few were below the surface of the ocean, and roughly a dozen usually carried out in vertical shafts stemmed to prevent the escape of radioactive
American shots took place at altitudes above 10 km. The largest test ever conducted, debris. Power and signal cables for the device are routed up the shaft and fanned out to
that of a 60-megaton device, was carried out in the Arctic by the USSR. Since the several instrumentation trailers outside the probable cratering zone. Nuclear weapons
Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) was signed in 1963, all U.S., UK, and Soviet nuclear effects tests are primarily carried out in horizontal mine shafts sealed to prevent the
detonations have been underground. The French and Chinese, while not parties to the escape of debris; instrumentation cables are connected to the surface through a vertical
LTBT, gradually moved their testing from the open atmosphere to subterranean sites— bore hole. In both cases, the tests are characterized by the large amount of electronic
in boreholes, mine shafts, and in drill holes beneath the ocean floor. instrumentation used to study the details of the functioning of the implosion assembly
Atmospheric tests are easier to carry out—although impossible to conceal—and and of the nuclear phases of the explosion. A beginning nuclear power opting for
for technically less-sophisticated powers provide more information in a more direct simpler weapons may well choose not to employ sophisticated diagnostic instrumen-
manner than do underground explosions. A weapon detonated from a several hundred tation, selecting instead to determine the approximate yield with seismographs.
foot high tower or suspended from a tethered balloon permits photography of the evo- The most accurate measurement of yield is through the radio-chemistry studies of
lution of the nuclear fireball and the cloud. The shock wave in air can be observed, and device debris—the radioactive isotopes produced in the detonation. No electronics are
one can determine the effects of the weapon on real targets such as structures and used to gather the data for such analyses; it is only necessary to drill back into the
vehicles. device chamber and to extract samples for lab examination. A faster but less accurate
It appears likely that the drilling technology needed to emplace nuclear devices yield determination can be done using seismographs to measure ground motion, but
and instruments at the bottom of a deep borehole is the most difficult for a proliferator
to acquire and use. Such boreholes are frequently a kilometer or more deep and 19
Radioactive debris from an atmospheric test or from an underground shot which vents can
2 meters or more in diameter. The specialized drilling machinery required for such be analyzed by other nations. Much information about the design and performance of the
construction is not commonly available and exceeds what is found in the oil industry. test device can be inferred from the debris.

II-5-93
such a test would not collect a large quantity of data usually considered desirable by India has the technologies needed to conduct nuclear yield tests. Brazil drilled a bore-
U.S. weapon designers and testers. hole for a nuclear test, but that shaft was closed with great ceremony. The country has
the capability to instrument a nuclear explosion to some degree. Sweden carried out
FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2)
some planning for a nuclear test in the 1960’s, but apparently those plans were aban-
All five nuclear weapons states have tested nuclear devices and presumably retain doned along with its nuclear weapons program. Most advanced industrial nations
the technologies needed to conduct underground nuclear explosions should the CTBT have the technology to conduct underground nuclear weapons tests which could be
be abandoned. South Africa prepared two boreholes in which it could have tested its instrumented well enough to aid a weapons program.
nuclear devices; those shafts have been filled and the site abandoned. India conducted Very little advanced technology is required by a proliferator wishing to conduct
one instrumented underground nuclear explosion and is believed to have been ready- useful atmospheric nuclear tests, but virtually all nations of concern are States Parties
ing a site for additional tests during 1996. That effort may have been abandoned, but to the LTBT banning tests except those conducted underground.

II-5-94
 Table 5.10-1. Nuclear Weapons Development Testing Technology Parameters*

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
HYDRODYNAMIC TESTING
Pin domes Positioning to better than CCL EAR 99 Steel domes, pins None identified None identified
.001 in. ; time resolution to
10 ns
HE pressure, tempera- Pressure upper limit on the CCL EAR 99 Semiconductor Clean room environ- Understanding of device
ture, and shock order of 2–5 megabar; grade quartz; ments common in semi- assembly dynamic range
transducers temperature on the order of manganin metal conductor assembly, and timing from model
3,000 K. Rise time most transducers avail- predictions
<<1 microsec. able off the shelf (OTS).
Pulse generators to Output voltages >6 V into CCL EAR 99 None identified None; these instruments None, although computer
calibrate cables, etc. <55 ohm resistive load with can be manufactured modeling codes for high
pulse transition times less domestically with speed circuit perform-
than 500 ps (defined as the advanced understanding ance would be advanta-
time interval between 10% of high-speed circuits or geous (SPICE Code, for
and 90% voltage amplitude). be purchased OTS. example)
Coaxial cables Satellite TV technology. CCL EAR 99 None identified None; cables will be None identified
Cables with 1–5 dB attenu- procured from the open
ation per 100 ft at 1 GHz market. Continuity
readily available. testers and fast pulse
generators used to
calibrate
Cable connectors Satellite TV technology. CCL EAR 99 None identified None; connectors will be None identified
N, C, HN, or LC series procured from the open
connectors standard. market. Continuity
testers used to quality
check.
Fast oscilloscopes, For hydro testing subnano- NDUL 7; None identified None; available None, but ability to
usually with storage second scopes are not CCL Cat 3A commercially OTS forecast device
features required. Many types of performance from
digitizing scopes with models to set dynamic
1–10 ns recording times are range of data acquisition
available. is critical.
Oscilloscope cameras Standard OTS cameras with CCL EAR 99 None identified None identified None, but ability to
triggerable shutters. forecast device
performance from
models to set trigger
times is critical.

* Values identical to those in the NDUL do not necessarily reflect the normal TWG process.

(cont’d)

II-5-95
 Table 5.10-1. Nuclear Weapons Development Testing Technology Parameters (cont’d)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Transient recorders 100 MHz digitizer speed with NDUL 7; None identified None; available None identified
(flash digitizers) 10–100 microseconds of CCL Cat 3A commercially OTS
memory and 8 bits of dynamic
range sufficient for hydro
testing.
Time delay generators Available OTS, but single CCL EAR 99 None identified None identified None identified
cable lengths would be
sufficient.
Flash X-ray generators Peak energy of few hundred NDUL 5; Oxygen-free copper For megavolt machines Solutions of Poisson's
KeV and a figure of merit, CCL Cat 3A for linear accelerator based on linear acceler- equation in two or three
K = 1.7 x 103 x V 2.65 Q greater (mega-volt opera- ators, ability to machine dimensions, validated
than about 0.25. tion); low loss special copper to near against experiments.
Special equipment to halt the capacitors. For optical finish. Radiation shielding
propagation of physical bomb smaller units marx codes.
debris. generator and
cables. Dielectric
oils, pref. PCB-free.
X-ray recording systems Medical x-ray technology CCL EAR 99 Medical x-ray None identified None identified
(photo) scaled up to suit size of phosphors available
image. from several
suppliers.
Mechanical framing Framing rates greater than NDUL 5; None identified None identified None, but ability to fore-
cameras 250,000 per second CCL Cat 3A cast device performance
from models to set
trigger times is critical.
Mechanical streak Writing speeds greater than NDUL 5; None identified None identified None, but ability to fore-
cameras 0.5 mm per microsecond. CCL Cat 3A cast device performance
from models to set
trigger times is critical.
X-ray recording systems Arrays of photodiodes CCL EAR 99 Inorganic crystals, None; crystals and PD Data acquisition system
(digital) coupled to inorganic crystals such as CsI, BGO, arrays available commer- capable of reading
or fiber optic coupled to CCD LSO or equivalent cially. Photomultiplier 1,000+ channels of data
if imaging is required. Large tubes for big crystals to form an image. Some
inorganic crystals for flux also available. systems commercially
measurements. available if imaging is
required.
X-ray recording systems Heavy gas proportional CCL EAR 99 Heavy gases such None identified None identified
(analog) chambers as xenon.

(cont’d)

II-5-96
 Table 5.10-1. Nuclear Weapons Development Testing Technology Parameters (cont’d)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Multistage light gas guns Acceleration of projectiles to NDUL 5; None identified None identified None identified
or other high-velocity 2 km per second or greater CCL Cat 2B
gun systems (coil,
electromagnetic,
electrothermal or other
advanced systems).
HYDRONUCLEAR TESTING (up to few ton yield range)
Neutron pinex (pinhole) None available CCL EAR 99 Machinable tung- Ability to machine tung- Ability to forecast device
photography sten alloy for pinhole sten to high precision at performance for dynamic
fabrication. small dimensions, range and timing and
Standard fluors for electro machining, for shock propagation in
detectors. example. Fast video local geology for stand-
cameras for image off time for data
recording. acquisition.
Gamma pinex (pinhole) None available CCL EAR 99 Machinable tung- Ability to machine tung- Ability to forecast device
photography sten alloy for pinhole sten to high precision at performance for dynamic
fabrication. small dimensions, range and timing and
Inorganic crystals electro machining, for shock propagation in
for detectors. example. Fast video local geology for stand-
cameras for image off time for data
recording. acquisition.
Gamma detectors (e.g., Standard OTS detectors CCL EAR 99 Large inorganic None; detectors are None identified
sodium iodide, GeLi, used in well logging or basic crystals commercially available.
etc.) research Calibration by use of
standard radioactive
sources.
Compton current gamma Pulsed power design tech- CCL EAR 99 None identified None identified Ability to forecast device
detectors niques performance for dynamic
range and timing and
basic pulsed power
codes for modeling
instrument response
characteristics.

(cont’d)

II-5-97
 Table 5.10-1. Nuclear Weapons Development Testing Technology Parameters (cont’d)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Neutron detectors, Standard OTS detectors CCL EAR 99 None identified None; detectors are None identified
standard nuclear used in basic research commercially available.
approaches Calibration by use of
standard neutron
sources or generators.
Cable crush yield Standard drilling techniques CCL EAR 99 None identified None identified None, but ability to fore-
measurement and time domain cast device performance
reflectometry with fast from models and under-
pulsers. standing of shock propa-
gation in local geology is
critical.
X- and gamma-ray Standard OTS detectors CCL EAR 99 None identified None; detectors are None identified
detectors used in basic research. commercially available.
Calibration by use of
standard radioactive
sources.
Photomultiplier tubes On the order of few ns rise CCL EAR 99 None identified None identified None identified
time; tube face larger than
20 cm2
Coaxial cables Satellite TV technology. CCL EAR 99 None identified None identified None, but ability to carry
Cables with 1–5 dB attenu- higher currents is
ation per 100 ft at 1 GHz essential.
readily available.
Cable connectors Satellite TV technology. N, CCL EAR 99 None identified None identified None, but ability to
C, HN, or LC series support connections at
connectors standard higher currents is
essential.
Transient recorders 100 MHz digitizing speed CCL EAR 99 None identified None identified None, but ability to
(flash digitizers) sufficient if local data forecast device
buffering of high-speed performance from
events is available in models to set trigger
instrumentation times is critical.

(cont’d)

II-5-98
 Table 5.10-1. Nuclear Weapons Development Testing Technology Parameters (cont’d)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
NUCLEAR YIELD TESTING (Underground)
Drilling machinery Capability to drill holes CCL EAR 99 Hardened drill bits of Bits, shaft casing, drill Validated codes to
approximately 2 m in diameter large diameter. Drill rigs capable of drilling simulate pressures and
to depths on the order of string material large diameter holes to stresses on very deep
several hundred meters to capable of function- great depths. The com- shafts.
2 kilometers in deep holes. bination of diameter and
depth is larger than
common in the oil
business.
Hole stemming tech- Knowledge of soil perme- CCL EAR 99 None, although near None identified Validated models of the
nologies to ensure ability; ability to seal bore- device and detector mechanical and thermo-
acceptable containment shaft gas-tight even after the package special dynamic properties of
passage of the shockwave material like mag- the shaft and its stem
from the nuclear explosion. netite with known during the passage of
neutron absorption the nuclear shockwave.
cross sections
could be required.
Neutron detectors Standard OTS detectors as CCL EAR 99 None identified None; detectors are None identified
used in basic nuclear physics commercially available.
research, but with larger Calibration by use of
standoff distance and standard neutron
dynamic range. sources or generators.
Gamma detectors (e.g., Standard OTS detectors CCL EAR 99 Large inorganic None; detectors are None identified
sodium iodide, GeLi, used in well logging or basic crystals commercially available.
etc.) research. Calibration by use of
standard radioactive
sources.
Compton current gamma Pulsed power design CCL EAR 99 None identified None identified Ability to forecast device
detectors techniques performance for dynamic
range and timing and
basic pulsed power
codes for modeling
instrument response
characteristics.
Photomultiplier tubes Rise time order of 5 ns or NDUL 7; None identified None identified None identified
better; area > 20 cm2 CCL Cat 6A
Microchannel plates Rise time order of 1 ns or WA Cat 6A; None identified None identified None identified
faster; area > 20 cm2 CCL Cat 6A

(cont’d)

II-5-99
 Table 5.10-1. Nuclear Weapons Development Testing Technology Parameters (cont’d)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Fast frame-rate vidicon Vidicon cameras or CCL EAR 99 None identified None, but cameras are Detailed understanding
equivalent with 4-ms frame special order of device performance
times or faster. commercially from modeling
calculations
Fiber-optic cables Standard OTS cables from WA Cat 5A P1; None identified Optical assembly and None identified
many suppliers. CCL Cat 5A P1 test equipment common
in communication
industry.
Gamma and X-ray Set-up as for basic research CCL EAR 99 None identified Precision alignment Detailed modeling
scattering stations experiment. Precision survey equipment, understanding of device
alignment for lines of sight. calibration sources for performance and
Fast data acquisition. detector performance. scattering cross
sections for modeling
detector response.
Neutron scattering Set-up as for basic research CCL EAR 99 None identified Precision alignment Detailed modeling under-
stations experiment. Precision survey equipment, standing of device per-
alignment for lines of sight. calibration sources for formance and scattering
Fast data acquisition. detector performance. cross sections for
modeling detector
response.
Neutron pinex (pinhole) Spatial resolution 4–10 times CCL EAR 99 None identified Precision alignment Detailed modeling under-
photography smaller than expected pit survey equipment, standing of device per-
diameter at maximum com- calibration sources for formance for dynamic
pression. Time resolution on detector performance. range. Detailed under-
the order of 20 ns. Longer standing of local geology
stand-off range than for for shock stand-off
hydronuclear testing. distance.
X-ray pinex (pinhole) Spatial resolution 4–10 times CCL EAR 99 None identified Precision alignment Detailed modeling under-
photography smaller than expected pit survey equipment, standing of device per-
diameter at maximum com- calibration sources for formance for dynamic
pression. Time resolution on detector performance. range. Detailed under–
the order of 10 ns. Longer standing of local geology
stand-off range than for for shock stand-off
hydronuclear testing. distance.
Fireball cameras Ability to coat film with three CCL EAR 99 None identified Modern photographic None identified
(including special 3-layer layers with different sensi- emulsions useful but not
films) tivities and to embed color necessary.
couplers in each layer.
Sensitivities range from the
order of ISO .0001 to ISO
100. Most useful with atmos-
pheric testing but possible
underground.
(cont’d)
II-5-100
 Table 5.10-1. Nuclear Weapons Development Testing Technology Parameters (cont’d)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Streak cameras Cameras capable of 50 ns or NDUL 5; None identified None identified None, but ability to fore-
better time resolution. CCL Cat 3A cast device performance
from models to set
trigger times and dynam-
ic range is critical.
Framing cameras Cameras capable of 50 ns or NDUL 5; None identified None identified None, but ability to fore-
better frame resolution time. CCL Cat 3A cast device performance
from models to set
trigger times and dynam-
ic range is critical.
Local seismic systems Basic seismographs and CCL EAR 99 None identified None identified None, but ability to fore-
recording instruments for cast device performance
ground motion. from models and under-
standing of shock propa-
gation in local geology is
critical.
Radiochemical tracer Basic radiochemistry CCL EAR 99 Special isotopes, Hot cell handling None, but detailed under-
isotopes laboratory equipment some commercially capability and detailed standing of neutron
common in reactor analysis available but rare. radiochemistry fluxes at distances from
institutions. Some materials instrumentation. device from model pre–
available from medical dictions and neutron
radioisotopes. cross sections for rare
isotopes.
Analysis of uncontained Basic radio and analytic CCL EAR 99 None identified None identified None identified
gases chemistry laboratory
equipment
Oscilloscopes Many types of digitizing NDUL 7; None identified None; available None, but ability to fore–
scopes with 1–10 ns record- CCL Cat 3A commercial OTS cast device performance
ing times; bandwidths greater from models to set
than 1 GHz will give better dynamic range of data
alpha data. acquisition is critical.
Coaxial cables Satellite TV technology using CCL EAR 99 None identified None identified None identified
cables with 15 dB attenuation
per 100 ft at 1 GHz, but
higher current capability than
satellite TV cable may prove
necessary.

(cont’d)

II-5-101
 Table 5.10-1. Nuclear Weapons Development Testing Technology Parameters (cont’d)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Cable connectors Satellite TV technology. N, CCL EAR 99 None identified None identified None identified
C, HN or LC series connec-
tors appropriate, but with
higher current capability than
normal in satellite TV
receiving equipment.
Analog-to-digital 100 MHz digitizer rates suffi- MTCR 14; None identified None identified None, but detailed
converters cient if down hole buffering of CCL Cat 3A; device performance
data is available in instru- characteristics from
mentation package. WA Cat 3A model is essential for
dynamic range and
timing specification.

II-5-102
 Table 5.10-2. Nuclear Weapons Development Testing Reference Data

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

HYDRODYNAMIC TESTING
Pin domes Electrical connections, readouts. Assuring proliferator that implosion Simplest diagnostic currently
Uncertainty of timing after HE initiation system works. used; radio-lanthanum may be
substituted. Also the electro-
magnetic technique could be
used.
HE pressure, temperature, and Speed, reliability, accuracy Verifying operation of complex None, although primitive arrays of
shock transducers implosion designs crushable or frangible materials
could be used for coarse
measurements
Pulse generators to calibrate Repeatability Facilitating analysis of experiments by None, pulse generators are
cables, etc. allowing detailed calibration of cable readily available or could be
performance and delays manufactured domestically
Coaxial cables Low loss over very long runs; Required to bring signal from test None, but older type cables may
consistent impedance; low dispersion. apparatus to data recording be satisfactory in some cases,
Cables with 1–5 dB attenuation over particularly if the cable length is
100ft kept small.
Cable connectors Low loss at connections; low Required to link cables None, but older connectors may
dispersion; repeatability provide adequate performance if
the number of joints is minimized.
Fast oscilloscopes, usually with Sweep speed, sensitivity, rise time Principal extreme speed data Modern oscilloscopes are
storage features recording device necessary for precision testing of
advanced design weapons, but it
must be remembered that most
weapon types ever manufactured
were tested using oscilloscopes
which are no better than those
found in commercial applications
today.
Oscilloscope cameras Triggerable shutter with film cassette Data recording of fast transient events Flash digitizers or storage scopes
from scope screen
Transient recorders (flash Speed, memory capability, computer Data recording of fast transient events Scope cameras
digitizers) data acquisition system using digital recording
Time-delay generators Accuracy, predictability, and Synchronizing recording devices None, but adequate generators
repeatability are found in TV stations. In some
cases simple cable lengths could
be used

(cont’d)

II-5-103
 Table 5.10-2. Nuclear Weapons Development Testing Reference Data (cont'd)

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Flash x-ray generators Photon energy and spectrum; power Observing interior of imploding system Energy below the 500 KeV of the
output; rise time; pulse length; NDUL will probably be satisfactory
repeatability
X-ray recording systems (photo) Sensitivity; uniformity of response Observing interior of imploding system Digital radiographic arrays of
over film surface scintillating crystals with photo-
diodes attached
Mechanical framing cameras Speed; repeatability; frame-to-frame Recording one or more frames from x- Fast video recorders with MCP
uniformity ray burst. gating for time elapsed images
Mechanical streak cameras Speed; repeatability Observing high speed phenomena Electronic streak cameras
X-ray recording systems (digital) Linearity of response; response time Observing interior of imploding Photographic approaches
systems and recording information for
computer analysis
X-ray recording systems (analog) Linearity of response; response time Observing interior of imploding Fast video recorders with MCP
systems and recording information for gating for time elapsed images or
off-line analysis framing cameras
Multistage light gas guns or other “Muzzle” velocity; repeatability; Determining the equation of state of EOS data for uranium were
high velocity gun systems (coil, precision of adjustment; sensors in or fissile materials at values of pressure, published in open literature in
electromagnetic, electrothermal, on test samples. temperature and density found in 1947.
or other advanced systems). nuclear explosive devices.
HYDRONUCLEAR TESTING (up to few ton yield range)
Neutron pinex (pinhole) Pinhole size, location from device, Observing onset of nuclear reactions None identified
photography data recording system and shuttering in imploding device and imaging the
imploding system to assess uniformity
and deviations from symmetry
Gamma pinex (pinhole) Pinhole size, location from device, Observing onset of nuclear reactions None identified
photography data recording system and shuttering in imploding device and imaging the
imploding system to assess uniformity
and deviations from symmetry
Gamma detectors (e.g., sodium Size (large enough to prevent escape Observing onset of nuclear reactions Triggered wire proportional
iodide, GeLi, etc.) of photons); crystal quality; coupling in imploding device chambers; spark chambers. If
of output signal from detector to the yield is large enough simple
photomultiplier or other light-to- Compton current detectors can be
electrical transducer. used
Compton current gamma Yield must be high enough for Observing time development of Crystal gamma detectors
detectors significant Compton currents to be gamma rays from nuclear event
generated

(cont’d)

II-5-104
 Table 5.10-2. Nuclear Weapons Development Testing Reference Data (cont'd)

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Neutron detectors, standard Efficiency, uniformity, repeatability, Determining rate of multiplication of None. If the yield is big enough,
nuclear approaches high-speed response chain reaction in order to assess simple faraday cups measuring
degree of implosion and probable the proton current from (n,p)
yield. reaction in a CH foil could be used
Neutron detectors, faraday cup Efficiency, uniformity, repeatability, Determining rate of multiplication of Neutron detectors, standard
approach high-speed response chain reaction in order to assess nuclear approaches
degree of implosion and probable
yield.
Cable crush yield measurement Time domain reflectometry of cable Measurement of shock-wave propa- Neutron measurements or rad-
during event. gation in material near event site chem techniques
X- and gamma-ray detectors Size (large enough to prevent escape Determining rate of multiplication of Triggered wire proportional
of photons); crystal quality; coupling chain reaction in order to assess chambers; spark chambers. If
of output signal from detector to degree of implosion and probable the yield is large enough, simple
photomultiplier or other light-to- yield. (n,gamma) reactions may be Compton current detectors can be
electrical transducer. easier to measure than direct used
neutrons. Determine temperature of
nuclear reaction.
Photomultiplier tubes Rise time, transit time, noise level, UV Sensor used in many of the detectors None, but satisfactory PM tubes
sensitivity; reliability in high radiation used for particle counting are commonly available, most
environment from Japan.
Coaxial cables Low loss over very long runs; Link test device to electronic data Older cables with poorer dielectric
consistent imepdance low dispersion. recording instruments. properties, particularly if cable
Cables with 1–5 dB attenuation over lengths can be minimized. Fiber-
100 ft optic cables.
Cable connectors Low loss at connections; low Link cables to one another and to Older connectors may be used.
dispersion; repeatability. device and recording instruments
Fast oscilloscopes, usually with Sweep speed, sensitivity, rise time Principal extreme speed data Modern oscilloscopes are neces-
storage features recording device sary for precision testing of
advanced design weapons, but
most weapon types ever manu-
factured were tested using
oscilloscopes which are no better
than those found in commercial
applications today.
Transient recorders (flash Speed, memory capability, computer Data recording of fast transient events Scope cameras
digitizers) data acquisition system using digital recording

(cont’d)

II-5-105
 Table 5.10-2. Nuclear Weapons Development Testing Reference Data (cont'd)

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

NUCLEAR YIELD TESTING (Underground)
Drilling machinery Bit diameter; ability to drill to great Prepare site for installation of nuclear Convert existing mines; use dedi-
depths. test device cated horizontal shafts
excavated with conventional
techniques
Hole stemming technologies to Gas tightness; ability to withstand Close borehole so that debris from Many types of stemming will
ensure acceptable containment ground shock and effects of device on nuclear test does not escape. probably be reasonably effective.
base of the stem. Ability to contain Preventing the escape of radioactive This is a civil construction issue,
debris for extended period. debris denies adversaries a valuable and has been moderately well
look at the performance of the test documented in the open literature.
device. Needed to comply with Limited Fundamental technologies are not
Test Ban Treaty. exotic.
Neutron detectors Efficiency, uniformity, repeatability, Determining rate of multiplication of None; if the device yield is great
high speed response; calibration and chain reaction in order to assess enough simple faraday cups
calibration stability degree of implosion and probable measuring the proton current from
yield. (n,p) reactions in a polyethylene
(CH) foil could be used.
X- and gamma-ray detectors Size (large enough to prevent escape Determining rate of multiplication of Triggered wire proportional
of photons); crystal quality; coupling chain reaction in order to assess chambers; spark chambers. If
of output signal from detector to primary performance. (n,gamma) the yield is large enough, simple
photomultiplier or other light-to- reactions may be easier to measure Compton current detectors can be
electrical transducer. than direct neutrons. Determine used.
temperature of nuclear reaction.
Estimate ability of primary to drive
secondary.
Photomultiplier tubes Rise time, size of output pulse, Sensor used in many of the detectors Older-design tubes with >1 ns
linearity of output pulse size vs. input used for particle counting risetime may be useful,
signal. particularly for unboosted fission
devices. Interstage timing
requires higher speed.
Microchannel plate Rise time, size of output pulse, Faster-responding photomultiplier PM tubes with slower responses
linearity of output pulse size vs. input
signal.
Fast frame-rate vidicon Phosphor type for persistence, Obtaining images of exploding device CCD or CID cameras
readout electronics
Fiber-optic cables Loss; dispersion, band width of Transmitting large amounts of data Coaxial cables
transmitters and receivers from down-hole to recording facility.
Also for direct transmission of optical
output of detectors for up-hole
recording.

(cont’d)

II-5-106
 Table 5.10-2. Nuclear Weapons Development Testing Reference Data (cont'd)

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Gamma and x-ray scattering Fluxes, detector response for dynamic Observing developing radiation Not needed for many types of
stations range and bandwidth. without overloading sensors. Scatters tests. Increasing standoff
small fraction of primary radiation to a distance of detector package
sensor which cannot “see” device allows for other approaches
directly.
Neutron scattering stations Fluxes, detector response for dynamic Observing developing radiation Not needed for many types of
range and bandwidth. without overloading sensors. Scatters tests. Increasing standoff
small fraction of primary radiation to a distance of detector package
sensor which cannot “'see” device allows for other approaches
directly.
Neutron pinex (pinhole) As above, but for much larger neutron Image device during nuclear explosion X-ray pinex
photography fluences period
X-ray pinex (pinhole) photography As above, but for much larger photon Image device during nuclear explosion Neutron pinex
fluences period
Fireball cameras (including Shutter; film advance mechanism Photograph fireball for conventional None, but most underground tests
special 3-layer films) viewing. Special film has 3 layers with do not photograph fireball
different sensitivities, typically
between ISO 0.001 and 1,000 so that
both early and late stages of explosion
can be recorded on the same film.
Streak cameras Device performance forecast Photograph high-speed events during None, but commercial hardware
explosion may suffice
Framing cameras Device performance forecast Photograph high-speed events during None, but commercial hardware
explosion may suffice
Local seismic systems Understanding of local geology Make first determination of yield None. Standard seismographic
techniques
Radiochemical tracer isotopes Placement of tracers, drill back Make most accurate determination of Neutron or photon flux
technology, radiological hazard yield measurements
handling of materials
Analysis of uncontained gases Placement of sample collecting Supplements radiochemical analysis Radiochemical analysis of debris
devices and may give details of the in shot hole
performance of a complex device.

(cont’d)

II-5-107
 Table 5.10-2. Nuclear Weapons Development Testing Reference Data (cont'd)

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Fast oscilloscopes, usually with Sweep speed, sensitivity, rise time Principal extreme speed data Modern oscilloscopes are
storage features recording device necessary for precision testing of
advanced design weapons, but
most weapon types ever
manufactured were tested using
oscilloscopes which are no better
than those found in commercial
applications today.
Coaxial cables Low loss over very long runs; Link test device to electronic data Older cables with poorer dielectric
consistent impedance low dispersion. recoridng instruments. properties, particularly if cable
Cables with 1–5 dB attenuation over lengths can be minimized.
100 ft. Fiberoptic cables.
Cable connectors Low loss at connections; low Link cables to one another and to Older connectors may be used.
dispersion; repeatability. device and recording instruments.
Analog-to-digital converters Time response, dynamic range, event Convert readily made analog Scopes with scope cameras and
performance forecast measurements to digital values for digitizing of film
post-shot computer analysis.

II-5-108
 SECTION 5.11—NUCLEAR WEAPONS CUSTODY, TRANSPORT, AND CONTROL

OVERVIEW
The enormous destructive power and the small physical size of many modern
Highlights
nuclear weapons has led to the development of stringent measures to ensure against
theft or unauthorized use. In addition, much effort has gone into the development of • Nuclear weapons must be protected against theft or damage during
safe and secure methods of transporting nuclear weapons and into the development of transport; this function is frequently accomplished by an adequate
training and operational concepts so that, if needed, nuclear weapons will be used to guard force.
the greatest effect. Generally, these technologies and related processes are not unique • Technologically based security is provided by a mix of
to nuclear weapons or necessarily lie on a path to nuclear weapons. The technologies technologies, no one of which is extremely sensitive. Taken in the
for the custody, transport, and control of nuclear weapons are all commercially avail- aggregate, the methods of securing nuclear weapons are highly
able. sensitive. Most of the technologies themselves are unclassified.
DoD’s approach to maintaining the physical security of nuclear weapons is man- • Standing up of elite forces to deliver and secure nuclear weapons
power intensive. Large numbers of security personnel accompany the vehicle(s) actu- might be an intelligence indicator that a proliferant was on the
ally transporting nuclear weapons. Civil law enforcement personnel lead the convoy, verge of obtaining nuclear weapons.
while a considerable number of military vehicles—on the land and in the air—are
added to handle physical security. Constant secure radio contact is maintained with a
home base that is ready to respond with additional security personnel should the need
arise. With routings varied and classified, and with massive amounts of physical secu- Monitoring many of these technologies is difficult, and their acquisition only means
rity, DoD ensures that each nuclear weapon is kept safe and secure while en route to be that the acquiring state or subnational group has something very important to pro-
mated with its corresponding delivery system. Once mated, DoD provides multiple tect—but it does not have to be a nuclear weapon. Also, procedural changes in secu-
layers of protection, often including roving patrols for nuclear-loaded aircraft. In rity forces which identify uniquely nuclear operations are equally difficult to deter-
addition, when missiles were not in hardened silos, multiple guards were required for mine.
missiles carrying nuclear weapons. The DoD requires more than one guard for any Since the new proliferant or subnational actor will most likely have a very limited
maintenance actions on nuclear-loaded missiles. number of nuclear weapons, increased security would be required for protection of the
Two-man control and no-lone zones apply in nuclear-weapon-related activities; in weapons as well as to prevent the use of the weapon
U.S. practice such operations are unique to nuclear operations. Increased security is FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2)
also the rule when dealing with nuclear weapons. When moving nuclear weapons on
DoD sites, the routes are typically swept and “sanitized” before the move. The fundamental technologies for custody, transport, and control of nuclear weap-
ons can be found in essentially every military in the world, for they simply involve the
RATIONALE provision of a well-disciplined guard force in adequate strength to defend against any
As noted previously, all of the technologies involved are commonly available in- likely threat. The assessed security requirement will depend upon the country in ques-
dustrial technologies fundamental to security operations worldwide. The entire spec- tion.
trum of sensor technology and communications technology—both secure and The United States has a long lead over most other countries in technology-
nonsecure—can be included in the custody, transport, and control of nuclear weapons. intensive ways of protecting nuclear weapons.

II-5-109
 Table 5.11-1. Nuclear Weapons Custody, Transport, and Control Technology Parameters

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Motion Detection Any level which impedes the None identified None identified None identified None identified
Sensors/Alarms operations of EOD teams
seeking access to IND.
Laser Detection Any level which delays or None identified None identified None identified None identified
Systems denies access to IND.
Temperature Sensitive Any level. None identified None identified None identified None identified
Sensors/Alarms
Radios and Trans- Systems engineered to be None identified Encryption chip None identified None identified
ceivers. Systems, sub- difficult to detect or which do manufacture
systems or equipment not transmit in plain language
developed or modified for and where decrypting cannot
security communications be done in real time.
networks or C4I systems
that perform integrated
C4I system security
communications network
functions
Acoustic detection Any level which impedes the None identified None identified None identified None identified
sensors/alarms operations of EOD teams
seeking access to IND.
Pressure sensitive Any level which impedes the None identified None identified None identified None identified
detectors/alarms operations of EOD teams
seeking acess to IND.

II-5-110
 Table 5.11-2. Nuclear Weapons Custody, Transport, and Control Reference Data

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Motion Detection Sensors/Alarms None identified Security and defensive only. May be None identified
used to protect emplaced devices.
Laser Detection Systems None identified Security and defensive only. May be None identified
used to protect emplaced devices.
Temperature Sensitive Sensors/ None identified Security and defensive only. May be None identified
Alarms used to protect emplaced devices.
Radios and Transceivers. Sys- Encryption level required to gain tac- For this application, security and None identified
tems, subsystems or equipment tical security (decrypt time circa 2–4 defensive only. However, any C4I
developed or modified for security hours for someone not in possession capability can be used offensively to
communications networks or C4I of the key). coordinate attacks. Encryption used
systems that perform integrated to gain tactical OPSEC.
C4I system security communi-
cations network functions.
Acoustic Detection Sensors/ None identified Security and defensive only. May be None identified
Alarms used to protect emplaced devices.
Pressure Sensitive Sensors/ None identified Security and defensive only. May be None identified
Alarms used to protect emplaced devices.

II-5-111
 SECTION 5.12—HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION

OVERVIEW
Highlights
Heavy water, D2O, is water in which both hydrogen atoms have been replaced
with deuterium, the isotope of hydrogen containing one proton and one neutron. It is
present naturally in water, but in only small amounts, less than 1 part in 5,000. Heavy • Heavy water is separated from ordinary water by enrichment
water is one of the two principal moderators which allow a nuclear reactor to operate cascades.
with natural uranium as its fuel. The other moderator is reactor-grade graphite (graph- • The separation factor at each stage is higher for heavy water than for
ite containing less than 5 ppm boron and with a density exceeding 1.50 gm/cm3). The uranium, but heavy water must be enriched far more than uranium.
first nuclear reactor built in 1942 used graphite as the moderator; German efforts dur- • Practical heavy water plants use chemical exchange processes such
ing World War II concentrated on using heavy water to moderate a reactor using natu- as H2 S/H2 O (Girdler Sulfide) or NH3 /H 2 .
ral uranium. • Distillation columns to “finish” heavy water enrichment to >99.75%
The importance of heavy water to a nuclear proliferator is that it provides one are similar to those used in distilling brandy from wine.
more route to produce plutonium for use in weapons, entirely bypassing uranium en-
richment and all of the related technological infrastructure. In addition, heavy-water-
moderated reactors can be used to make tritium. Separation methods include distillation of liquid hydrogen and various chemical
Although one speaks of “making” heavy water, deuterium is not made in the pro- exchange processes which exploit the differing affinities of deuterium and hydrogen
cess; rather, molecules of heavy water are separated from the vast quantity of water for various compounds. These include the ammonia/hydrogen system, which uses
consisting of H2O or HDO (singly deuterated water), and the “dross” is discarded. potassium amide as the catalyst, and the hydrogen sulfide/water system (Girdler Sul-
Alternatively, the water may be electrolyzed to make oxygen and hydrogen containing fide process).
normal gas and deuterium. The hydrogen can then be liquefied and distilled to sepa- Separation factors per stage are significantly larger for deuterium enrichment than
rate the two species. Finally, the resulting deuterium is reacted with oxygen to form for uranium enrichment because of the larger relative mass difference. However, this
heavy water. No nuclear transformations occur. is compensated for because the total enrichment needed is much greater. While 235U is
0.72 percent of natural uranium, and must be enriched to 90 percent of the product,
RATIONALE
deuterium is only .015 percent of the hydrogen in water and must be enriched to greater
The production of heavy water in significant amounts requires a technical infra- than 99 percent.
structure, but one which has similarities to ammonia production, alcohol distillation, If the input stream has at least 5 percent heavy water, vacuum distillation is a
and other common industrial processes. One may separate heavy water directly from preferred way to separate heavy from normal water. This process is virtually identical
natural water or first “enrich” the deuterium content in hydrogen gas. to that used to distill brandy from wine. The principal visible difference is the use of a
It is possible to take advantage of the different boiling points of heavy water phosphor-bronze packing that has been chemically treated to improve wettability for
(101.4 °C) and normal water (100 °C) or the difference in boiling points between deu- the distillation column rather than a copper packing. Most organic liquids are non-
terium (–249.7 °C) and hydrogen (–252.5 °C). However, because of the low abun- polar and wet virtually any metal, while water, being a highly polar molecule with a
dance of deuterium, an enormous amount of water would have to be boiled to obtain high surface tension, wets very few metals. The process works best at low tempera-
useful amounts of deuterium. Because of the high heat of vaporization of water, this tures where water flows are small, so wetting the packing in the column is of particular
process would use enormous quantities of fuel or electricity. Practical facilities which importance. Phosphor-bronze is an alloy of copper with .02–.05 percent lead,
exploit chemical differences use processes requiring much smaller amounts of energy .05–.15 percent iron, .5–.11 percent tin, and .01–.35 percent phosphorus.
input.

II-5-112
 The Bruce Heavy Water Plant in Ontario, Canada, is the world’s largest producer and the material is export controlled. In addition, a source of deuterium is essential for
of D2O. It uses the Girdler Sulfide (GS) process which incorporates a double cascade the production of tritium and 6LiD, two ingredients of thermonuclear weapons. A
in each step. In the upper (“cold,” 30–40 °C) section, deuterium from hydrogen sul- nation seeking large quantities of heavy water probably wishes to use the material to
fide preferentially migrates into water. In the lower (“hot,” 120–140 °C) section, deu- moderate a reactor, and may be planning to produce plutonium. However, CANDU
terium preferentially migrates from water into hydrogen sulfide. An appropriate cas- (CANadian Deuterium Uranium) reactors designed and built in Canada are used for
cade arrangement actually accomplishes enrichment. commercial electric power production.
In the first stage the gas is enriched from 0.015% deuterium to 0.07%. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2)
The second column enriches this to 0.35% , and the third column
Heavy water is produced in Argentina, Canada, India, and Norway. Presumably,
achieves an enrichment between 10% and 30% deuterium. This
all five declared nuclear weapons states can produce the material. The first commer-
product is sent to a distillation unit for finishing to 99.75% “reactor-
cial heavy water plant was the Norsk Hydro facility in Norway (built 1934, capacity
grade” heavy water. Only about one-fifth of the deuterium in the
12 metric metric tons per year); this is the plant which was attacked by the Allies to
plant feed water becomes heavy water product. The production of a
deny heavy water to Germany. As stated above, the largest plant, is the Bruce Plant in
single pound of heavy water requires 340,000 pounds of feed
Canada (1979; 700 metric tons/year). India’s apparent capacity is very high, but its
water.20
program has been troubled. Accidents and shutdowns have led to effective limitations
Proliferation Implication Assessment on production.
Heavy water is the key to one type of reactor in which plutonium can be bred from
natural uranium. As such, the production of heavy water has always been monitored,

20
Isotope Enrichment, Office of Nonproliferation and National Security, U.S. Department of
Energy, Nuclear Nonproliferation Workshop. K/NSP-121/PT 5/R3, May 1996 (Unclassified).

II-5-113
 Table 5.12-1. Heavy Water Production Technology Parameters

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Pumps for potassium Hermetically sealed; capacity NDUL 4; Forgings to All parts contacting None identified
amide/liquid ammonia >8.5 cubic meters per hour. NRL-K withstand pressure solutions must be free of
Concentrated potassium hydrocarbons and
amide (>1%) operating at fluorocarbons
15–600 atm.
Dilute potassium amide (<1%)
operating at 200–600 atm.
Water-hydrogen sulfide Effective assembled NTL B6; Blowers and com- None identified None identified
exchange tray columns diameter of 1.8 m or greater. NRC-K; pressors for H2S
Fabricated from fine carbon circulation.
steel (e.g., ASTM A516) with NDUL 4; Throughput capacity
diameters from 6 m to 9 m CCL Cat 1B greater than or equal
capable of operating at to 56 cubic meter/s
pressures greater than or while operating at
equal to 2 MPa (200 atm) and pressures greater
with a corrosion allowance of than or equal to
6 mm or more. Note that a 1.8 MPa (260 psi)
“sufficient” tower may be suction with seals
smaller but probably must designed for wet H2S
operate in a similar pressure service. Note that
range. “sufficient” pumps
may have less capa-
city but probably
operate in a similar
pressure range.
Ammonia-hydrogen 35 m or more in height with NRL-B6; Stage pumps and None identified None identified
exchange towers diameters of 1.5–2.5 m capa- NRC-K contactors to
ble of operating at pressures promote intimate
>15 MPa (2,225 psi). These gas/liquid contact.
towers have at least one Pumps must be
flanged axial opening of the submersible.
same diameter as the cylin-
drical part of the tower in
order to insert or withdraw
tower internals.
Infrared absorption On-line analysis of hydrogen/ NTL-B6; None identified None identified None identified
analyzers deuterium ratios where NRC-K
deuterium concentrations are
greater than or equal to 90%

(cont’d)

II-5-114
 Table 5.12-1. Heavy Water Production Technology Parameters (cont'd)

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
Catalytic burners for Possession of catalysts; NTL-B6; None identified None identified None identified
conversion of deuterium alternatively, can use simple NRC-K
gas into heavy water combustion
especially following the
ammonia-hydrogen
exchange process
Phosphor-bronze mesh Possession NDUL 4; None identified None identified None identified
packings for use in CCL Cat 1A
vacuum distillation of
heavy water and
chemically treated to
improve wettability
Cryogenic distillation Operate at temperatures NDUL 4; Fine-grain austenitic None identified None identified
towers <35 K and at pressures of CCL Cat 1B stainless steel with
0.5–5 MPa (5–50 atm). an ASTM or equiva-
Generally >1 m in diameter lent standard grain
and with effective length of at size number of 5 or
least 5 m. greater
Ammonia converters or Operating pressure of NDUL 4; Stainless steel lining None identified None identified
synthesis units 20–60 MPa, typically 3–5 m in CCL Cat 1B
diameter and 9–12 m long.

II-5-115
 Table 5.12-2. Heavy Water Production Reference Data

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Pumps for potassium amide/liquid None identified Preparation of heavy water for Hydrogen sulfide process;
ammonia plutonium or tritium production vacuum distillation
reactors
Water-hydrogen sulfide exchange None identified Preparation of heavy water for Ammonia hydrogen exchange
tray columns plutonium or tritium production process; vacuum distillation
reactors
Ammonia-hydrogen exchange None identified Preparation of heavy water for Hydrogen sulfide process;
towers plutonium or tritium production vacuum distillation
reactors
Infrared absorption analyzers None identified Analysis of products from heavy water None identified
plants
Catalytic burners for conversion None identified Preparation of heavy water for Conventional burning
of deuterium gas into heavy water plutonium or tritium production
especially following the ammonia- reactors
hydrogen exchange process.
Phosphor-bronze mesh packings None identified Preparation of heavy water for Ammonia-exchange or hydrogen
for use in vacuum distillation of plutonium or tritium production sulfide processes
heavy water and chemically reactors
treated to improve wettability
Cryogenic distillation towers None identified Preparation of heavy water for Ammonia-exchange or hydrogen
plutonium or tritium production sulfide processes
reactors
Ammonia converters or synthesis None identified Preparation of heavy water for None identified
units plutonium or tritium production
reactors

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 SECTION 5.13—TRITIUM PRODUCTION

OVERVIEW
Tritium (3H) is essential to the construction of boosted-fission nuclear weapons. Highlights
A boosted weapon contains a mixture of deuterium and tritium, the gases being heated
and compressed by the detonation of a plutonium or uranium device. The D-T mixture • Tritium is essential for producing boosted-fission weapons.
is heated to a temperature and pressure such that thermonuclear fusion occurs. This • Practical quantities of tritium must be produced in a nuclear reactor
process releases a flood of 14 MeV neutrons which cause additional fissions in the or in an electronuclear breeder.
device, greatly increasing its efficiency.
The tritium beta decay to 3He (mean beta particle energy 5.7 keV; decay energy
18.6 keV) can be easily detected or can cause some other compound to fluoresce.
Tritium is therefore used as a radioactive tracer element in biological research in the Most tritium is produced by bombarding 6Li [6Li(n, a)3H] with neutrons in a reac-
form of tritiated water (HTO or T2O) and also used in capsules surrounded by a fluo- tor; it is also produced as a byproduct of the operation of a heavy-water-moderated
rescing compound (e.g., zinc sulfide) to provide illumination which must be indepen- reactor when neutrons are captured on the deuterons present. It has been suggested
dent of the electricity supply. For example, it is used in emergency exit signs, self- that it may be feasible to produce tritium in an accelerator (electronuclear breeder) in
luminous airport runway and helicopter pad lights, and light wands for use in directing which protons bombard an appropriate target.
traffic. The amounts of tritium in runway lights, helipad lights, and light wands are
Tritium can be stored and shipped as a gas, a metal hydride (e.g., of titanium) or
sufficiently great that they meet the NSG Dual-Use Annex specifications. Emergency
tritide, and trapped in zeolites (hydrated aluminum silicate compounds with uniform
exit signs and aircraft emergency exit lights do not contain sufficient tritium to meet
size pores in their crystalline structure). Stainless-steel cylinders with capacities up to
the NDUL specifications for control.
5.6 × 107 GBq (1.5 MCi) of tritium gas are used for transportation and storage and
The low energy of the beta decay means that tritium is not an external radiation must be constructed to withstand the additional pressure which will build up as tritium
hazard because the charged decay products are stopped by 0.2 mil of water or a similar gradually decays to 3He.
shield. However, tritium can pose an internal radiation hazard if tritiated water vapor
Tritium is used in boosted fission devices and in some designs for thermonuclear
is inhaled or absorbed through the skin. Because of its higher mass and consequent
weapons.
lower chemical activity, tritium gas is less strongly absorbed by the body, whether
through the lungs or the skin. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2)
Nuclear physics experiments in which tritium is compared to 3He have been im- All five declared nuclear weapon states must have the underlying capability to
portant to our understanding of fundamental properties of the nuclear force. manufacture and handle tritium, although the United States has shut down its produc-
RATIONALE tion reactors due to safety considerations. Canada manufactures tritium as a byproduct
of the operation of CANDU reactors. In principle, limited amounts of tritium could be
Tritium is rare in nature because of its 12.4-year half-life. It is produced by cos- made in any research reactor with the ability to accept a target to be irradiated.
mic radiation in the upper atmosphere where it combines with oxygen to form water.
It then falls to earth as rain, but the concentration is too low to be useful in a nuclear
weapons program.

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 Table 5.13-1. Tritium Production Technology Parameters

Sufficient Technology Export Control Critical Unique Test, Production, Unique Software
Technology Level Reference Materials and Inspection Equipment and Parameters
6
Elemental tritium Any pure quantity NDUL 8; Li for production Production reactor or None identified
NRC L target; heavy water electronuclear breeder.

Storage and shipping Stainless steel cylinders None identified Stainless steel; None identified None identified
capable of withstanding at titanium or uranium
least twice the initial tritium fill for hydriding tritium.
pressure. Also metal hydride
storage cylinders.
6
Production reactor Nuclear reactor operating NTL B1; Li targets for None identified Nuclear reactor codes
with a surplus of neutrons NRC A irradiation specially modified to
suitable for irradiating a take into account
target. Frequently heavy- neutron absorption in a
water-moderated. fertile target.
Electronuclear breeder High current proton None identified High-purity copper Special accelerator; Accelerator design and
accelerator (>1 mA or superconducting equipment for construc- operating software
continuous at >100 MeV) (usually niobium) tion and test of (usually specially adapted to the
accelerator niobium) superconduct- case of high current
cavities); 6Li ing RF cavities; operation
extremely rapid-acting
vacuum valves. Cooled
lithium neutron target;
neutron production
target.

Table 5.13-2. Tritium Production Reference Data

Technology Technical Issues Military Applications Alternative Technologies

Elemental tritium Production; transport; use; Thermonuclear and boosted fission None identified
weaponization weapons
Storage and shipping Hydriding of metals; pressure vessels; Gas storage and handling for weapons None identified
knowledge of properties of hydrogen
and hydrides; pressure-testing
equipment
Production reactor Operation of research or production Production of materials for TN and Electronuclear breeder
reactors with fertile targets boosted fission weapons
Electronuclear breeder Design, development, and test of Production of materials for TN and Reactor; usually heavy-water-
accelerator and target systems; boosted fission weapons moderated
supply of electricity; fabrication of
copper components or
superconducting cavities; target
design and construction.

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