Nuclear Weapons 5 PDF
Nuclear Weapons 5 PDF
Nuclear Weapons 5 PDF
org
Presentation to
Introduction to WMD Nonproliferation Course
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Washington, D.C.
February 8, 2016
www.fas.org
Grades of Plutonium:
Plutonium buion (lej) allegedly used in Nagasaki bomb.
For weapons purposes the Pu-239 percentage should be Plutonium ring (right) used for storage.
as large as possible:*
• Weapon-grade: < 6% Pu-240 and other non-Pu-239
isotopes;
• Fuel-grade: from 6 to 18% Pu-240;
• Reactor-grade: > 18% Pu-240.
• “Super-grade”: < 3% Pu-240.
• “Weapon-usable” refers to plutonium that is in
separated form and therefore rela4vely easy to fashion
into weapons. Plutonium core produc4on model allegedly photographed by
Mordechai Vanunu inside the Israeli Dimona reactor complex
* But all plutonium is poten4ally useable for a weapon.
Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide 7
www.fas.org
1 3 1.5 1 8 4 2.5
10 5 3 2 13 7 4
20 6 3.5 3 16 9 5
* Reproduced from Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, The Amount of Plutonium and Highly-Enriched
Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Natural Resources Defense
Council, Revised April 13, 1995, p. 9.
Downtown Hiroshima days ajer air burst of 13.5 kt HEU gun-type bomb
Grable test (15 kt), Opera4on Upshot-Knothole, Nevada, May 25, 1953
Source: Countering ProliferaMon of Compounding It?, NRDC 2003 Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide 16
www.fas.org
Counter-force: employs nuclear nuclear forces “to destroy the military capabili4es of an enemy or
render them impotent. Typical counter force targets include: bomber bases, ballis.c missile
submarine bases, intercon.nental ballis.c missile (ISBM) silos, an.ballis.c and air defense
installa.ons, command and control centers, and weapons of mass destruc.on storage facili.es.
Generally, the nuclear forces required to implement a counter-force targe.ng strategy are larger and
more accurate than those required to implement a counter-value strategy. Counter-value targets
generally tend to be harder, more protected, more difficult to find, and more mobile than counter-
value targets.”
Counter-value: directs the “destruc4on or neutraliza4on of selected enemy military and military-
related targets such as industries, resources, and/or ins.tu.ons that contribute to the ability of the
enemy to wage war. In general, weapons required to implement this strategy need not be as
numerous nor as accurate as those required to implement a counter-force targe.ng strategy because
counter-value targets tend to be sojer and less protected than counter-force targets.”
Obama administra4on did not change counter-force focus: The 2013 Nuclear
Employment Strategy “requires the United States to maintain significant counterforce
capabili4es against poten4al adversaries. The new guidance does not rely on a ‘counter-
value’ or ‘minimum deterrence’ strategy.”
Source: Nuclear Deterrence, Nuclear War Planning, and Scenarios of Nuclear Conflict, FAS/NRDC, 2014
Source: The Nuclear War Plan: A Time For Change, NRDC 2001
Nuclear Arsenals: Trends With more than 90% of world inventory, US and Russia have
special responsibility to reduce
Note: re4red, but s4ll intact, warheads awai4ng dismantlement are not shown US cut only 396 warheads in 2010-2014, compared with
3,457 warheads cut in 2005-2009
A Borei SSBN captured in the Kola Bay on 20 July 2014 with the aircraj carrier
Admiral Kuznetsov. Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide 29
www.fas.org
SS-N-15 (Vyuga) 1969: 47 years old. For subs/ships. All warheads in central storage; not with/on
SS-N-16 (Vodopad) 1981: 33 years old. For subs. delivery vehicles.
SS-N-19 (Granit) 1980: 34 years old. For ships. Of current force, only three types are being
SS-N-21 (Granat) 1987: 27 years old. For subs. modernized. Future plans are unknown.
SS-N-22 (Moskit) 1981: 22 years old. For ships.
Torpedoes (550/650 mm) For subs. “The general purpose forces – to include dual-use
Depth Bombs For ASW aircraj and helicopters. nonstrategic nuclear forces – will continue to
acquire new equipment for the near-term, but
Army
deliveries will be small and largely consist of
SS-21 (Tochka) 1981: 33 years old. modernized Soviet-era weapons.”
SS-26 (Iskander-K) 2005: Replacing SS-21.
US Defense Intelligence Agency, 2013
Defense
S-300/A-135/coastal Nuclear status of newer systems uncertain.
Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide 33
www.fas.org
Nuclear Arsenals: Russia (Tac.cal) Over the past three years Russian exercises
“include simulated nuclear aiacks on NATO
Allies (eg, ZAPAD) and on partners (eg, March
2013 simulated aiacks on Sweden)…”
NATO Secretary General Annual Report 2015
Nuclear Arsenals
Nuclear Arsenals: USA
ICBM
• Minuteman III life-extension comple4ng
• Warhead fuzes/interoperable warhead planned
• GBSD (ICBM replacement) in development
SSBN / SLBM
• Trident II D5 SLBM life-extension development
• SSBN replacement development (12 planned)
• W76-1 warhead life-extension deploying
• W88-1 warhead life-extension development
Bombers
• Upgrade of B-2 and B-52 underway
• LRS-B next-genera4on bomber in development
• B61-12 guided standoff bomb in development
• LRSO (ALCM) replacement in development
Tac4cal
• F-35A nuclear capability in development
• B61-12 guided standoff in development
Infrastructure
• Uranium Processing Facility (secondaries) construc4on
• Plutonium produc4on facili4es (primaries) construc4on
• Warhead surveillance/simula4on facili4es upgrade
Nuclear Arsenals:
China (MRBM)
Shaheen-II mobile launcher. Detected TELs firng out at Na4onal Defense Complex. Not yet deployed in 2009, but probably
now part of 110-130 warhead es4mate. Extended-range Shaheen-III in development.
* Reported by news media but denied by officials. US public intelligence reports omit
references to Israeli nuclear forces
SSBN/SLBM
• SSBN/SLBM in early development
• Faked SLBM launch
Cruise Missiles
• KN-09 coastal defense cruise missile in development ?**
Infrastructure
• Yongbyon plutonium produc4on reactor re-start
• Uranium enrichment produc4on construc4on
* Despite three underground nuclear tests, there is no known public evidence that North Korea has miniaturized its test
devices sufficiently for delivery by ballis4c missiles
** Listed by 2013 AFGSC briefing but not in 2013 NASIC report. 2014 update of AFGSC does not list KN-09
QUESTIONS?