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Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraf ATA From If MRO, the
t Associate
Airline

110 VFG Arcing 1712967G Collins A350 24-22 LHT DLH

1726600 Airbus

We are still collecting VFG/generator arcing events during winter seasons on our A350 fleet. This has been
previously reported in 2019 (see AMC item 75 in electrical power).

This effect is obviously caused by runway deicing fluid (spray) sucked into the engine cowl on ground (see TFU
24.22.00.019).

The research and analysis from Rolls Royce and Airbus leads to the development of a cover/clamp (VSB 24-
K462 VFG) also used in the past on B787.

After recent installation of this cover/clamp we see no reduction but additional events on MSNs and VFG positions
(2A) that have been previously not affected.

A redesign of the VFG terminal block, providing a better separation of the phases, is planned but will be not in
time for winter season 21/22. After the long history and the recent experiences with the clamp / cover installation
we are eager to hear about other operator experience as well as a final solution.

Other operators, Collins and Airbus please respond.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate
Airline

111 GEnx-2B electrical Unison

Electrical Harness
harnesses (all harnesses (GE 747-8 73-00 LHT DLH
Bonding Rework
affected) supplier)

History:
SB GENX-2B 73-0065 R01 provides rework instructions to address quality issues affecting the electrical
harnesses bonding requirements. Reason is to address a quality escape at Unison. Non-conformities include 360-
degree shield to backshell terminations and other related shield termination process issues. Non-conformance of
harness shield termination may result in shield to connector/backshell degradation over time. GE and Boeing
classified SB as Flight Safety (CATEGORY 2 – IMPACT A). The offered warranty is limited for engine harnesses
on engines that are below 12000 hours where almost all DLH engines already exceeded this threshold at the time
of SB issuance.

Response expected:
DLH is currently performing an internal risk assessment resulting in a low risk level.
As SB 73-0065 is classified as IMPACT A “flight safety”, DLH would like to understand which assumptions
including the expected numbers of failures have been taken into consideration for the GE/Boeing risk analysis to
determine this risk level.

In addition, DLH does not agree to cover the maintenance and commercial burden for this quality escape.

PNs and pictures:

Refer to SB 73-0065.

Other operators, GE, and Unison please respond.

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Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate
Airline

112 A320 Family Evacuation D30664-xxx Safran A320 25-61-20 LHT DLH
Slide/Rafts Expand While in family
Service
D30665-xxx

There is a check in an A320 family Heavy Maintenance Visit (HMV), to verify that, when the passenger door is
open and locked, there should be clearance between the fuselage and the Evacuation Slide/Raft’s decorative
cover. We have found that these Evacuation Slide/Rafts are prone to expand while on wing and fail this test:

In 2020, three airlines have reported that there was not enough clearance, and, therefore, removed and replaced
the slide. Different MROs, including the OEM, performed the last maintenance of the affected slides.

The AMM installation instructions also call for this check. We have not received any findings at the time of
installation.

The OEM states a not CMM-conform heat cycle of the slides is the root cause. Even though different MROs that
follow the CMM process, maintained the affected slides years before the removal.

Additionally, the OEM is aware of the fact that the slides are prone to expand. They introduced a shipping cover
“to prevent fit problems and expansion of the escape slide”:
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We request an investigation of this issue and troubleshooting guidance for operators.

Other operators, Safran, and Airbus, please comment.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate
Airline

113 Oxygen Supply Solenoid

Valve Inspection/ DVE90-06, Safran A320 35 LHT DLH
Replacement
DVE90-07 Airbus A330
Solenoid Valve A340

Airbus has published SB -35-1096 /-35-3056 / -35-4034 / -35-5026 in conjunction with SBC DVE90-35-348 for the
types A320, A330, A340. These SBs were followed by EADs 2020-0104 (A320) and 2020-0273 (A330, A340).

In each case, a one-time special detailed inspection (SDI) by means of a flow test in the cockpit is required. If the
test is passed, the valve is considered to be AD-compliant. If the installed valve does not pass the test, it is
inspected and overhauled is accomplished to SBC DVE90-35-348 and is then considered to be AD-compliant.

However, if a valve has to be replaced, it is not guaranteed that the valve from the stock is AD compliant.
Another problem from the workshop's point of view is that there are no overhaul limits for the solenoid valves
according to CMM. An overhaul would make the solenoid valves AD-compliant. But overhauling all units for no
reason would cause immensely high costs.

The easiest way would be if Airbus would include the flow test in the AMMs as an additional task when installing a
new solenoid valve. Because the mechanics always work only according to AMM and not according to SB.

All solutions shown have already been addressed to Airbus, but without success.

Questions:

1. Furthermore, the issue raises the question, what exactly is the technical background for the SB?!
2. Why is Airbus of the opinion that an SDI is sufficient here?
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3. Could it be possible that the problem will also occur in the future with younger series?
4. Wouldn't a multiple inspection make more sense here?
5. How do other airlines deal with this issue?

Other operators and Airbus, please comment.