AD 2010 List
AD 2010 List
AD 2010 List
PAGE - 1 23-Jul-2007
No.
Number Applicability
A/C EQUIP. OF CABIN SAFETY& INTERIOR 1 10-02-009 Type H1-10 AIR Halon (BCF) portable fire extinguishers, SICLI P/N 1708337B4, serial numbers (s/n) as listed in Appendix I of tthis AD.
EASA AD 2009-0278 "Fire Protection - Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers Identificaton / Replacement". This AD to prevent contamination nature of Halon 1211 gas, when used againts a fire, may provide reduced fire suppression, endangering the safety of the aircraft and its occupants. This AD requires the identification and removal from service of certain batches of fire extinguishers and replacement with serviceable units. EASA AD 2010-0229 The affected Aero Seats and System STC modifies the helicopter by introduction of the externally mounted life raft deployment system. Deploying the system is accomplished by means of handle which is accesible to the pilot or co-pilot. Recent hangar testing has result in failures of the deployment handle. This AD to prevent delay or failure of deployment of the life raft.
10-11-024 ASI-500 Life Raft Deployment System System (S-76A, S-76B, S-76C helicopter)
AEROSPATIALE ATR 42 & ATR 72 3 10-01-010 ATR42-200, ATR-42-300, ATR-42-320, ATR42-400, ATR42-500, ATR72-101, ATR72-201, ATR72-102, ATR72-202, ATR72-211, ATR72-212 and ATR72-212A aeroplanes, all serial numbers.
EASA AD 2009-0242 "Time Limits / Maintenance Checks - Certification Maintenance Requirements and Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (Fuel Tank Safety)". The assessment showed that it was necessary to introduce specific fuel system related Maintenance Significant Item (MSIs) and Critical Design Configuration Control Limitation (CDCCL) items in order to preserve the fuel tank system ignition source prevention features from any configuration alterations that could occur during maintenance actions, repair or modifications. Failure to preserve those critical igniton source prevention features could result in a fuel tank explosion. Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs) and Structural Significant Items (SSIs) are requisites of the design approval. Failure to comply with the CMRs and SSIs requirements nullifies the design approval because any noncompliance could result in a catastrophic failure. EASA AD 2009-0276 "Fire Protection - Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers Identification / Replacement". The result of the ongoing investigation have now established that LyonTech Engineering Ltd, a UK-based company, has supplied further consignments of Halon 1211 (BCF) to L'Hotellier that do not meet the required specification. This Halon 1211 has subsequently been used to fill certain P/N 863521-01 portable fire extinguisher that are now likely to be installed in or carried on board ATR aeroplanes. The contaminated nature of this gas, when used against a fire, may provide reduced fire suppression, endangering the safety of the aeroplane and it occupants. In addition, extinguisher activation may lead to the release of toxic fumes, possibly causing injury to aeroplane occupants. This AD requires the identification and removal from service of certain batches of fire extinguisher and replacement with serviceable units.
10-01-011 ATR42-200, ATR42-300, ATR42-320, ATR42-400, ATR42-500, ATR72-101, ATR72-201, ATR72-102, ATR72-202, ATR72-211, ATR72-212, and ATR72212A aeroplanes, all serial numbers, if equipped with L'Hotellier Halon 1211 (BCF) fire extinguishers, Part Number (P/N) 863521-01, serial number (s/n) as listed in L'Hotellier Service Bulletin (SB) 863521-26001.
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Number Applicability 10-01-011R1 ATR42-200, -300, -320, -400, -500, ATR72101, -201, -102, -202, -211, -212, and 212A aeroplanes, all serial numbers, if equipped with L'Hotellier Halon 1211 (BCF) fire extinguishers, Part Number (P/N) 863521-01, serial numbers (s/n) as listed in L'Hotellier Service Bulletin (SB) 863521-26001. 10-04-007-U ATR 72-212A aeroplanes, manufacturer serial numbers (MSN) 886, 897, 901, 902, 903, 904 and 906.
EASA AD 2009-0276R1 " Fire Protection - Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers Identification / Replacement ". This AD to prevent contamination nature of Halon 1211 gas, when used against a fire, may provide reduced fire suppression, endangering the safety of the aircraft and its occupants. This AD requires the identification and removal from service of certain bacthes of fire extinguishers and replacement with serviceable units. This AD has been revised to extend the compliance time. EASA AD 2010-0063-E "Flight Controls Rudder Pedal Rods Inspection / Replacement". This AD is issued to prevent failure of the rudder pedal rod, possibly resulting in reduced control of the aeroplane. In combination with an engine failure or during a landing or take-off under crosswind conditions, such a failure could lead to loss of control of the aeroplane. This Emergency AD requires inspection of the four rudder pedal rods, to detect a lower than acceptable outer diameter at each rod end, and replacement of any rods that fail the inspection criteria. EASA AD 2010-0061 Fire Protection Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers Identification / Replacement . This AD is issued to prevent contamination nature of Halon 1211 gas, when used against a fire, may provide reduced fire suppression, endangering the safety of safety of the aircraft and its occupants. This AD retains the requirements of DGCA AD 10-01-011R1 ( EASA AD 2009-0276R1), which is superseded, and expands the applicability by referencing the corrected LHotellier SB 863521-26-001. EASA AD 2010-0138 Stabilizers Elevator Inboard Hinge Fitting Lower Stop Angles Inspection / Replacement. One ATR operator has experienced in-flight elevator travel limitations with unusual effort being necessary on pitch axis to control the aeroplane, while the pitch mistrim message appeared on the ADU display. The elevators seemed to be jammed. During the post-flight inspection, it was discovered that the LH elevator lower stop assembly was broken at the level of the angles, which may have prevented the elevator to respond normally to the flight control input. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to reduced control of the aeroplane. This AD requires a one-time inspection of the elevator hinge fittings and the reporting of all findings.
10-04-009 ATR42-200, ATR42-300, ATR42-320, ATR42-400, ATR42-500, ATR72-101, ATR72-201, ATR72-102, ATR72-202, ATR72-211, ATR72-212, and ATR72212A aeroplanes, all serial numbers, if equipped with L'Hotellier Halon 1211 (BCF) fire extinguishers, Part Number (P/N) 863521-01, serial number (s/n) as listed in L'Hotellier Service Bulletin (SB) 863521-26001 Revision 2 dated 04 February 2010. 10-07-010 ATR 42-200, -42-300, -42-320, -42-400 and -42-500 aeroplanes, all Manufacturer Serial Number (MSN) up to MSN 643 inclusive, and ATR 72-101, -72-102, -72201, -72-202, -72-211, -72-212 and 72212A aeroplanes, all MSN up to MSN 728 inclusive.
AGUSTA
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Number Applicability 10-04-006-U A119 and AW119 MKII helicopters, all serial number, if equipped with tail rotor 90o gearbox (TGB) Part Number (P/N) 1090440-06-103
EASA AD 2010-0059-E "Tail Rotor Drive - Tail A case of nonformity has been discovered in the tail rotor 90o gearbox installed on an AW119MKII helicopter where a bushing (P/N) 109-0135-14101 was missing, if not detected and corrected, could cause abnormal vibration of the tail rotor controls possibly leading to their damage and consequences loss of the yaw control function. This AD requires an inspection of the TGB (tail rotor gearbox) assembly P/N 109-0440-06-103 to verify the installation of the bushing. If the bushing is not installed, this AD requires the replacement of the TGB assembly with serviceable part, while if the bushing is found installed, this AD requires the re-identification of the TGB P/N by installing an additional nameplate.
AIRBUS A318 A319 A320 AND A321 10 07-10-016R1 Airbus A319, -A320 and -321 aeroplanes.
EASA AD 2007-0276R1 "Equipment / Furnishing - 80VU Rack Attacments Inspection / Repair / Replacement". This AD is issued to resived of DGCA AD No. 09-06-010-U (EASA AD 20090125-E), to introduce the new reinforced lower central support as an optional terminating action to the repetitive inspections. EASA AD 2007-0276R1 "Equipment / Furnishing - 80VU Rack Attachments Inspection / Repair / Replacement". This AD is to prevent damage to the lower laterial fittings and central support fitting of the 80VU rack. In the worst case scenario a complete failure of the 80VU fittings combination with a high load factor or strong vibration could lead to failure of the rack structure or computer or disconnection of the cable harnesses to one or more computers located in the 80VU. During critical phase of flight the multiple system failure/reconfirguration may consitute an unfafe condition. DGCA AD 07-10-016 (EASA AD 2007-0276) has been revised to introduced the new reinforced lower central support as an optional terminating action to the repetitive inspection. EASA AD 2008-0034R1 Hydraulic Power Ram Air Turbine (RAT) Gerotor Pump - Replacement This AD is issued to reduce the Applicability to certain A320 models only, Airbus A318, A319 and A321 series aeroplanes are basically equipped with Sundstrand RATs (per Airbus modification 22803) and there is no option for those aeroplanes to install a Hamilton Sundstrand (formerly Dowty) RAT.
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08-02-022R1 Airbus Model A320-211, A320-212, A320214, A320-215, A320-216, A320-231, A320-232, A320-233 aeroplanes, all manufactures serial numbers, if equipped with Hamilton Sundstrand/ Dowty Ram Air Turbine (RAT) Part Number (P/N) 680203037 with a Serial Number (S/N) from 0101 to 0354inclusive, except aeroplanes which have received Airbus modification 27189 in production or Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) A320-29-1100 in service, and without having received Airbus modification 28413 in production.
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Number Applicability 08-03-006R1 Airbus A320-111,A320-211,A320212,A320-214,A320-231,A320-232,and A320-233 aeroplanes,all certified models, all serial numbers, except aeroplanes that have received Airbus modification 22626 in production or Aibus Service Bulletine (SB) A320-24-1062 at revision 06 in service.
EASA AD 2008-0051R1 Fuel/Electrical Power Prevention of fuel Tank Exploision Risks Electrical Cables Modification. DGCA France AD F-2004-173 was issued to require the modification of the cable route of trailing edge, aft of the rear spar and wing tip, in according with the instruction of the airbus SB A320-24-1062 revision 05. However , additional work introduced by Airbus SB SB A320-24-1062 Revision 05 was not included as part of the normal accomplishment instruction s, and therefore this additional work may not have been accomplished. DGCA AD issued DGCA AD 08-03-006, retaining the requirement of DGCA France AD F-2004-173 (EASA Approval no.2004-10570),which was superseded and required the accomplishment of the additional work in accordance with the instruction of the Airbus SB A320-241062 Revision 06. This AD has been revised to reduce the applicability of this AD and to clarify that the accomplishment of Airbus SB A320-24-1062 Revision 05, including the instruction reference as additional work in paragraph 3.B.(3) or 3.B.(4) of that SB,as applicable to aeroplane configuration , constitutes an acceptable method of compliance with requirements of this AD. EASA AD 2008-0199R1 "Hydraulic Power - Auxiliary Hydraulic Power - Ram Air Turbine (RAT) Ejection Jack - Replacement". To avoid failure of the ejection jack that may prevent the effective deployment and use of the RAT in emergency conditions. EASA AD 2010-0027 "Fuel - Fuel Tank Harness Ring Tags - Inspection". A manufacturing quality non-conformity has been identified that resulted in the under-crimping of ring tags on a batch of In-tank Fuel Harnesses. This AD requires a one time inspection to check the integrity of the ring tags and peformance of corrective actions as necessary. EASA AD 2010-0071 "Time Limits and Maintenance Checks - Damage Tolerant Airworthiness Limitations Items - ALS Part 2 Amendment". This AD retains the requirements of DGCA AD No. 06-06-042 (EASA 2006-0165), which is superseded, and requires the implementation of more restrictive maintenance requirements/airworthiness limitations. EASA AD 2010-0071R1 Time Limits and Maintenance Checks - Damage Tolerant Airworthiness Limitation Items - ALS Part 2 - Amendment". This AD retains the requirements of DGCA AD No. 10-04013 (EASA 2010-0071) which is revised and requires the implementation of more restrictive maintenance requrements/airworthiness limitations as specified in reference AD. This AD has been revised to clarify the special compliance times defined in Table 1 of reference AD.
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10-02-008 Airbus A321 aeroplanes, -211, -212, -231 and -232 models, manufacturer serial number : 3051, 3067, 3070, 3075, 3081, 3098, 3106, 3112, 3120, 3126, and 3130.
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10-04-013 Airbus A319-100 and A320-200 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.
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10-04-013R1 Airbus A319-132, -A320-212, -A320-216, A320-231 and -A320-232 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.
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Number Applicability 10-05-013 Airbus A319-100, A320-200 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.
EASA AD 2010-0091 "Stabilizer Elevators - Inspection". It has been reported that some elevators may have been moved from the aeroplane on which they were originally fitted to another aeroplane, and spare parts may have been installed without being traced with regard to the ALI Document requirements. Consequently, those elevators might not have been inspected within the applicable required time frame as per ALI task 552007 requirements. For the reasons described above, this AD requires the identification of the elevators installed on the aeroplane to determine whether these elevators have been inspected within the applicable required time frame as per ALI task 552007. If this has not been done, this AD requires the accomplishment of that inspection and, depending on findings, associated corrective action(s). EASA 2010-0091R1 Stabilizer Elevator Inspection. This AD revises the requirements of DGCA AD 10-05-013 (EASA AD 2010-0091) which is require the identification of the elevators installed on the aeroplane to determine whether these elevators have been inspected within the applicable required time frame as per ALI task 552007. If this has not been done, this AD requires the accomplishment of that inspection and, depending on findings, associated corrective action(s). EASA AD 2010-0120 "Hydraulic Power - Hamilton Sundstrand Ram Air Turbine Balance Weight Screws - Inspection / Replacement". To avoid loss of RAT functionality, that in combination with double engine failure or a total loss of normal electrical power generation, could result in loss control of the aeroplane. Also, this AD requires the replacement of the set of balance weights screws before the next operational or functional check of the RAT assembly. EASA AD 2010-0149 "Flight Controls - Elevator Aileron Computer (ELAC) System Power Supply - Modification". In case of emergency electrical configuration combined with a green and yellow hydraulic system loss, during landing phase (nose landing gear extended), the roll control would only be provided by the left aileron. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to an asymmetrical landing configuration, resulting in reduced controlof the aeroplane. This AD required a modification of the electrical installation of ELAC2 and THS Motor 1 power supply, restoring the aeroplanes to the pre-mod 38310 configuration.
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10-08-001 Airbus A320-214, -216, -232 and -233 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers on which Airbus Modification (MOD) 38310 has been embodied in production.
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EASA AD 2010-0148 "Equipment & Furnishings - DASELL Lavatory Walls Inspection / Repair". It has been reported that cracks have been detected due to corrosion on the lower part of the lavatory wall. If this corrosion becomes too extensive, the wall onto which one or two cabin attendant seats are attached may not support the required load cases and maylead to injury and/or prevent the attendants from carrying out their safety duties. EASA AD 2010-0164 "Stabilizers - Rudder Side Shell Skin - Inspection". This AD is retains the requirements of DGCA AD 09-07-001 (EASA AD 2009-0141) which is superseded and requires: - a local ultrasonic inspection for reinforced area instead of the local thermography inspection, which is maintaind for nonreinforced areas, and - additional work performance for rudder on which this thermography inspection has been performed in the reinforced are, and - additional work performance for some rudders on which an additional area requiring inspections is defined. This AD also addresses the populations of rudders affected by AOT A320-55-1039 and Airbus SB A320-55-1035, A320-55-1036 and A320-55-1037 were not included in DGCA AD 09-07-001 (EASA AD 20090141). EASA AD 2010-0177 Fuel system Additional Centre Tanks Manhole Cover Seal - Replacement . - Following an automatic ACT fuel transfer failure on an A319 , it was noted that the ACT manhole cover seals were extruded , allowing leakage. - This Condition , if not corrected , can leadto fuel and/ or vapour leakage , possibly resulting in combustible fuel vapour / air mixture in the cargo compartment , which would constitute a fire risk. - DGAC France AD F-2004-038 was issued to require the replacement of the ACT manhole cover and its seal in accordance with SB A320-28-1105, but this modification has proved not to be fully effective. Therefore , it is necessary to replace the seal material and change the installation process in order to prevent such seal material and change the installation process in order to prevent such seal deformation and possibility of leakage. - For the reason described above, this AD supersedes DGCA France AD F-2004-038 ( EASA Approval 2004-2110) and requires the replacement of the existing manhole seal with a new seal.
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10-10-001 Airbus A319-111,A319-112,A319113,A319-114,A319-115,A319-131,A319132,A319-133,A320-211,A320-212,A320214,A320-215,A320-216,A320-231,A320232,A320-233,A321-111,A321-112,A321131,A321-211,A321-212,A321-213,A321231,and A321-232 aeroplane, If equipped with one more Additional Centre Tank(s) (ACT(s)) with a Part Number (P/N) listed in Appendix 1
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EASA AD 2010-0209 Flight Controls / Wings Inboard Flap Trunnion and Sliding Panel - Inspection . Several A320 operators reported wear damage on the unprotected area of the inboard flap trunnion. This wear damage is generated by the hook of the sliding panel which moves out the protection pad during flap operation. The inboard flap trunnion wear associated with a drive failure at flap track 2 or associated with a hard jam at flap track 1 could lead to the loss of inboard flap surface control. Consequently, a free moveable flap could detach from the wing, possibly resulting in damage to the aeroplane and injury to persons on the ground. EASA AD No. 2010-0210 This AD is issued to prevent both left Hand (LH) and Right Hand (RH) off-wing exits being unserviceable which, during an emergency, would impair the safe evacuation of occupants, possibly resulting in personal injuries. this AD requires the modification of the OWS enclosures on both sides and this AD has been republished to delete A321 aeroplanes from the applicability, which included by mistake.
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10-12-004 Airbus A319-131, A319-132, A319-133, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320215, A320-216, A320-231 and A320-232 aeroplanes models, all manufacturer serial numbers, if equipped with Air Cruisers / Aerazur Part Number (P/N) D31865109,P/N D31865-110, P/N D31865-209, or P/N D31865-210 off-wing Escape Slides (OWS).
AIRBUS A330 SERIES 27 09-09-013R1 AIRBUS A330 aeroplanes, all manufactures serial numbers. If fitted with Goodrich Pitot Probes P/N 0851HL, having s/n 267328 through 270714 inclusive
EASA AD 2009-0202R1 "Navigation - Pitot Probe Quick-Disconnect Union - Torque Check". Several reports have recently been receive of loose pneumatic quick-disconnect unions on Goodrich pitot probes P/N 0851HL. These may be the the results of mistorque of the affected unions at equipment manufacturing level. Investigations are still on-going to determine the root cause(s). This condition, if not corrected, could lead to an air leak, resulting in incorrect total pressure measurement and consequent erronous Calibrated Airspeed (CAS)/MACH parameters delivered by the Air Data Computer (ADC). This AD is revised in order to exclude from the torque-check required those pitot probes marked with a red torque checkmark. EASA AD 2009-0237-E "Oxygen - Oxygen Containers - Inspection". In-service experience has shown cases where several oxygen containers could not fully open, investigation have revealed that these events are due to an insufficient clearence between the oxygen container and the adjacent panels (Passenger Service Unit (PSU), space or filler panels). Incorrect opening of the oxygen container could lead to non deployment of oxygen masks, this condition, if not detected and corrected, could prevent passengers from being supplied with oxygen in case of in flight cabin depressurization, which would constitute an unsafe condition. This AD require a one-time inspection of the oxygen container and adjacent panels installation and corrective actions, as necessary, to ensure and adequate clearence between these.
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09-11-013-U Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, 202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, 321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343 aeroplanes. All manufacturer serial numbers on which Airbus modification 48809 has been embodied in production, if delivered before 26 October 2009.
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Number Applicability 10-02-001 Airbus A330-201, -202, -203, -223, -243, 301, -302, -303, -322, -323, -341, -342, 343 aeroplanes models, all manufacturer serial numbers, if equipped with Thales Avionics AoA probe having part number (P/N) C16291AA.
EASA AD 2010-0016 "Navigation - Thales Avionics Angle of Attack (AoA) Probe - Inspection / Replacement". This AD to prevent oil residue on incorrect cleaning of the machining oil during the manufacturing process of the AoA resolvers. At low temperatures, this oil residue becomes viscous (typically in cruise) causing lag of AoA vane movement. If not corrected, and if two three AoA probes were simultaneously affected and provided wrong indications of the AoA to a similar extent, it could lead to a late activation of the angle of attack protection, which in combination with flight at high angle of attack would constitute an unsafe condition. This AD requires a one time inspection of the Thales Avionics AoA probe P/N C16291AA in order to identify the suspect parts and to remove them from service. EASA AD 2010-0016R1 " Navigation -Thales Avionics Angle of Attack (AoA) Probe - Inspection / Replacement". This AD to prevent oil residue on incorrect cleaning of the machining oil during the manufacturing process of the AoA resolvers. At low temperatures, this oil residue becomes viscous (typically in cruise) causing lag of AoA vane movement. If not corrected, and if two or three AoA probes were simultaneously affected and provided wrong indications of the AoA to similar extent, it could lead to a late activitation of the angle of attack protection, which in combination with flight at high angle attack would constitute an unsafe condition.This AD requires a one time inspection of the Thales Avionics AoA probe P/N C16291AA. This AD revision is issued to specify that the indication of the affected AoA probes is also possible in accordance with aeroplanes maintenance records data analisy. EASA AD 2010-0021 " Stabilizers - Rudder Side Shell Skin - Inspection ". Surface defects were visually detected on the rudder of an A319 and an A321 in-service aeroplanes. Investigation has determined that the defects reported on both rudders corresponded to areas that had been reworked in production. The investigation confirmed that the defects were as a result of debonding between the skin and honeycomb core. An extended de-bonding, if not detected and corrected, may degrade the structural integrity of the rudder. The loss of the rudder leads to degradation of the handling qualities and reduces the controllability of the aeroplane. This AD retains the reqiurement of DGCA AD 09-07-007, which is superseded, and in addition requires for the vacum loss hole restoration: a local ultrasonic inspection for reinforced areas instead of the local thermography inspection, which is maintained for non-reinforced areas, and - an additional work for aeroplanes on which this thermography inspection has been performed in the reinforced area.
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10-02-001R1 Airbuss A330-201, -202, -203, -223, -243, 301, -302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, 342 and -343 aeroplanes models, all manufacturer serial number, if equipped with Thales Avionics AoA probe having part number (P/N) C16291AA.
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10-02-002 Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -301, 302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and 343, all manufacturer serial numbers.
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Number Applicability 10-02-003 Airbus A330 aeroplanes, -201, -202, -203, 223, -243, -301, -302, -303, -321, -322, 323, -341, -342 and -343 models, all Manufacturer Serial Numbers, equipped with Part Number (P/N) HTE69000-1 wing tank pressure switches installed at Functional Item Number (FIN) locations 74QA1, 74QA2, 75QA1, and 74QA2.
EASA AD 2010-0018 Fuel- Wing Tank Fuel Pressure Switch Replacement An A330 experienced an uncommented engine #1 in flight spool down, which occurred while applying fuel grafity feed procedure, in response to low pressure indications from all fuel boost pumps, in both left and right wings. The investigation revealed that the wing tank pressure switches P/N HTE69000-1 had frozen due to the water accumulated in their external part, causing spurious low pressure indications. As per procedure, the main pumps are then switched off, increasing the level of unavailable fuel. This, in combination with very low fuel quantity or another independent trapped fuel failure scenarios, can lead to fuel starvation on the affected engine(s). This condition , if not corrected , could lead to a potential unsafe condition. This AD requires the replacement of all four wing tank pressure switches associated to main pumps by new one with a more robust design preventing water accumulation and freezing EASA AD 2010-0024 Wing Centre Wing Box Keel Beam Fastener Holes at Frame FR40 Inspection. This AD, which supersedes DGCA AD No. 06-10-019 (EASA AD 2006-0315R1): - Retains the inspection requirements of DGCA AD No. 0610-019 (EASA AD 2006-0315R1) - Extends the AD applicability to aeroplanes which have embodied Airbus modification 49202, and - Modifies the inspection thresholds and intervals. EASA AD 2010-0034 Landing Gear - Nose Landing Gear (NLG) Main Fitting and Sliding Tube - Inspection During the overhaul of two different Nose Landing Gears (NLG), cracks were found on the main fitting of one and the sliding tube of the other. Investigations concluded that the cracks initiated as a result of residual stress in the parts following damage due to impact during towing incidents. The failure of the main fitting or sliding tube could lead to NLG collapse. To prevent the above unsafe condition, this AD requires a one-time inspection followed by repetitive inspection of the main fitting and sliding tube of the NLG serial numbers listed in the Applicability section of this AD: - One time Magnetic Particle Inspection (MPI) of the affected areas to detect any crack, - Repetitive Detailed Visual Inspection (DVI) of the affected areas to detect any damage of the surface protections or corrosion.
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10-02-007 Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, 202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, 321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343, all manufacturer serial numbers, except those on which Airbus modification 55306 or 55792 has been embodied in production.
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EASA AD 2010-0042-E Fuel - Main Fuel Pump System - Water Scavenge System Deactivation / Dispatch Restriction.
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EASA AD 2010-0048 "Time Limits and Maintenance Checks - Certification Maintenance Requirements - ALS Part 3 - Amendment". This Airworthiness Limitations are currently distributed in the Airbus A330 Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS). The Airworthiness Limitations applicable to the Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMR) are given in Airbus A330 ALS Part 3. The Revision 2 of Airbus A330 ALS Part 3 introduces more restrictive maintenance requirements and/or airworthiness limitations. Failure to comply with this revision constitues an unsafe condition. This new AD retains the requirements of DGCA AD 08-08-002, which is superseded, and requires the implementation of the new or more restrictive maintenance requirements and/or airworthiness limitations as specified in Airbus A330 ALS Part 3 revision 02. EASA AD 2010-0081] "Flight Controls - Elevator Servo Controls Solenoid Valve Oring Seals - Replacement & Airplane Flight Manual / Master MEL - Temporary Revision & Flight Controls - Elevator Servo Controls - Modification & Flight Controls - Primary and Secondary Computers - Modification". This AD is issued to supersedes DGCA AD No. 07-01-010 (EASA AD No. 2007-0009), which this AD requires the embodiment of the latest software standard on the three Flight Control Primary Computers (FCPC) and on the two Flight Control Secondary Computers (FCSC), which cancels the operational requirements of paragraph (3.1) 0f the reference AD. EASA AD 2010-0083 "Fuel - Fuel Pump Non-Return Valve (NRV) - Operation Test". Multiple NRV failures in combination with certain trapped fuel cases could potentially increase the quantity of unusable fuel on the aeroplane, possibly leading to fuel on starvation which could result in engines in flight shut down and would constitute an unsafe condition. - To prevent and detect this condition , EASA AD 2008-0209 ( DGCA AD 08-12-001) required repetitive operational tests to check the correct operation of NRV and to apply the associated corrective actions. - This AD retains the requirements of EASA AD 2008-0209 (DGCA AD 08-12-001) which is superseded, and requires for aeroplanes which have replaced a NRV to perform an additional operational test to confirm that corrective maintenance action has been successful for the affected collector cell. EASA AD 2010-0089 "Indicating & Recording Systems - Flight Warning Computer (FWC) - Software Installation". Require all holders of type certificates for transport aircraft after 01 January 1958 with capacity of 30 passengers or more, or a payload of 3.402 kg or more, to carry out a definition review against explotion hazards. To be compliant with SFAR88/JAA INT/POL 25/12 requirements, this AD requires the installation of the update FWC software standard which ensures correct operation of the APU bleed leak detection system before each flight.
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10-05-002 Airbus A330-243, A330-341, A330-342 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.
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Number Applicability 10-06-001 Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, 202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, 321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343, all manufacturer serial numbers, except those on which the three Airbus modifications 58773 and 55923S18878 and 45968 have been embodied in production.
EASA AD 2010-0086 "Electric and Electronic Common Installation - Hydraulic Pump Electrical Motor Connectors - Modification". Several A330 operators have reported in service occurences of hydraulic pump electrical motor connector internal arching, resulting in : - Either false hydraulic system overheat Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) and And/or hydraulic pump electrical motor malfunction. Investigations have shown that, due to the manufacturing tolerances of the cables and the connectors rear Grommet, there is a possible path for fluid ingress, resulting in connector internal arching and hydraulic system malfunction. In addition, as the connectors are located in areas adjacent to fuel tanks, such arching assocociated with the presence of a fuel leakage could lead to an uncontrolled fire. This AD requires modification of the three hydraulic pump electrical motor connectors associated to the Blue, Yellow and Green hydraulic systems. EASA AD 2010-0086R1 "Electric and Electronic Common Installation - Hydraulic Pump Electrical Motor Connectors - Modification". Several A330 operators have reported in service occurences of hydraulic pump electrical motor connector internal arcing, resulting in : - Either false hydraulic system overheat Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) - And/or hydraulic pump electrical motor malfunction. Investigations have shown that, due to the manufacturing tolerances of the cables and the connectors rear. Grommet, there is a possible path for fluid ingress, resulting in connector internal arcing and hydraulic system malfunction. In addition, as the connectors are located in areas adjacent to fuel tanks, such arcing assocociated with the presence of a fuel leakage could lead to an uncontrolled fire. This AD requires modification of the three hydraulic pump electrical motor connectors associated to the Blue, Yellow and Green hydraulic systems. This revises is issued to delete Airbus modifications 55923S18878 and 55924S19452 from the applicability of this AD.
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10-06-001R1 Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, 202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, 321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343, all manufacturer serial numbers, except htose on which Airbus modifications 58773 and 45968 have been embodied in production.
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No. 42
Number Applicability 10-07-009 Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, 202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, 321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343, all manufacturer serial numbers.
EASA AD 2010-0127 Stabilizers Rudder Side Shell Skin - Inspection. Investigation has determined that the defects reported on both rudders corresponded to areas that had been reworked in production. The investigation confirmed that the surface defects were a result of de-bonding between the skin and honeycomb core. An extended de-bonding, if not detected and corrected, may degrade the structural integrity of the rudder. The loss of the rudder leads to degradation of the handling qualities and reduces the controllability of the aeroplane. This AD addresses the rudder population that has also been reworked in production but is not part of DGCA AD 10-02002 (EASA AD 2010-0021) applicability.
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10-07-022 Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -243, 243F, -341, -342 and -343, all manufacturer serial numbers on which Airbus modification 56966H16199 has been embodied in production or Airbus Service Bulletin A330-28-3105 has been embodied in service.
EASA AD 2010-0132 "Fuel Main Fuel Pump System - Water Scavenge System Deactivation / Dispatch Restriction". During a recent in-service event the flight crew of a Trent 700 powered A330 aircraft reported a temporary Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) shortfall on engine 2 during the takeoff phase of the flight. The ENG STALL warning was set. The flight crew followed the standard procedures which included reducing throttle to idle. The engine recovered and provided the demanded thrust level for the remainder of the flight. Based on previous industry-wide experience, the investigation of the event has focused on the possibility for ice to temporarily restrict the fuel flow. While no direct fuel system fault has been identified,the operation of the water scavenge system at Rib 3 cannot be excluded as being a contributory factor. Testing and analysis are continuing to identify the root cause of the event. The scenario of ice being shed and causing a temporary blockage in the engine fuel system may lead to a temporary fuel flow restriction to the engine. This may result in a possible engine surge or stall condition, and in the engine not being able to provide the commanded thrust. This AD, which supersedes DGCA AD 10-03-011U (EASA AD 2010-0042-E) retaining its requirements, is issued to extend the applicability to the newly certified model A330243F. EASA AD 2010-0109 "Flight Controls - Flight Control Primary Computer (FCPC) Dispatch restriction and Operational Test". To prevent a transient loss of elevator control during takeoff rotation. EASA AD 2010-0131 "Time Limits and Maintenance Checks - Safe Life Airworthiness Limitation Items - ALS Part 1 - Amendment". The revision 04 of Airbus A330 ALS Part 1 introduces more restrictive maintenance requirements and/or airworthiness limitations. Failure to comply with this revision constitus an unsafe condition.
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10-07-023 Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, 202, -203, -223, -223F, -243, -243F, -301, 302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and 343, all serial numbers. 10-07-024 Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, 202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, 321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343, all manufacturer serial numbers.
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EASA AD 2010-0103 "Electrical and Electronic Common Installation - Cable Loom Installation - Modification". It was noticed in production that the distance between the wire harnessess 5376VB/2M and 53377VB/1M which are above left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) DOOR 4, and the air conditioning duct could be too small. This could result in collision between the flexible air conditioning hose and wire harnessess. This condition, if not correctred, could lead to the short circuit of wires dedicated to oxygen, which, in case of emergency, could result in large number of passenger oxygen masks not being supplied with oxygen, possibly causing personal injuries. For the reasons described above, this AD requires the installation of a protective sleeve and and additional bracket to maintain the appropriate distance between wires. EASA AD 2010-0145 "Hydraulic Power - High Pressure Manifold Check Valve Inspection". An A330 operator experienced a low level of the yellow hydraulic circuit due to a loose of check valve part number (P/N) CAR401. During the inspection on the other two hydraulic systems, the other three CAR401 check valves were also found to be loose with their lock wire broken in two instances. Investigations are on-going to determine the root cause of this event. This AD, which supersedes DGCA AD 09-10-014-U (EASA AD 2009-0223-E) retaining its requirements, is issued to extend the applicability to the newly certified models A330-243F. EASA AD 2010-0174 "Time Limits and Maintenance Checks - Damage Tolerant Airworthiness Limitation Items - ALS Part 2 - Amendment". The airworthiness limitations are distributed in the airbus A330 Airworthiness Limitation Section (ALS). The issued 17 of A Airbus A330 ALI Document introduces more restrictive maintenance requirements/airworthiness limitations. Failure to copmly with this issue constituse an unsafe condition. EASA AD 2010-0205 Landing Gear Main Landing Gear (MLG) Retraction Bracket - Replacement. During fatigue testing of the MLG, three failures of the retraction bracket occurred before the calculated life limitation. Further analysis has confirmed that those failures were do to fatigue initiated by fretting between the bush and lug bore. The failure of the retraction bracket, if not detected, could lead to a MLG extension with the no damping resulting in MLG structural damage.
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10-07-030 Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, 202, -203, -223, -223F, -243, -243F, -301, 302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and 343, all manufacturer serial numbers.
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10-09-004 Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, 202, -203, -223, -223F, -243, -243F, -301, 302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and 343, all manufacturer serial numbers.
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10-10-008 Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, 202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, 321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343, all manufacturer serial numbers.
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No. 50
Number Applicability 10-11-002 Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, 201, -203, -223, -223F, -243, -243F, -301, 302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and 343, all manufacturer serial numbers.
EASA AD 2010-0192 Flight Controls Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator Screw/Nut Assembly Inspection / Lubrication. Several cases of transfer tube disconnection from the ball-nut of the trimmable horizontal stabilizer ac Tuator (THSA) part number (P/N) 47172 and 47147-400 were detected on the ground during greasing and maintenance. This condition is caused by water ingress into the ball-nut resulting in the jamming of the ball transfer circuit when the water freezes. EASA AD 2010-0191 Flight Controls Flight Control Primary Computer (FCPC) PRIM 3 Dispatch Restriction / Modification. During a Back-up Control Module (BCM) retrofit campaign in accordance with EASA AD 2006-0313 requirements, some BCMs have been found with loose gyrometer screws. EASA AD 2010-0187 Exhaust Thrust Reverser Opening Mechanism Inspection . During flight tests, unexpected fatigue high loads were measured on the hinges integrated on the 12 oclock beam which form the upper extreme edge of the thrust reverser unit C duct. This situation, if not corrected, could lead to the separation of the thrust reverser from the aeroplane and therefore to damage of the aeroplane and hazards to persons or property on the ground. DGAC AD F-1997-118-047 was issued to prevent structural damage of the thrust reversers. This AD, which supersedes DGAC AD F-1997-118-047R2 retaining its requirements, is issued to extend the applicability to the newly certified model A330-243F. EASA AD 2010-0083-CN -Fuel Fuel Pump Non-Return Valve (NRV) Operational Test -It has been assessed that multiple NRV failures in combination with certain trapped fuel cases could potentially increase the quantity of unusable fuel on the aeroplane, possibly leading to fuel starvation which could result in engines in-flight shut down and would constitute an unsafe condition. To prevent and detect this condition, DGCA issued DGCA AD 10-05-004 (EASA AD 2010-0083). Based on in service experience, mainly on the results of the operational test required by DGCA AD 10-05-004 (EASA AD 2010-0083), Airbus has performed a safety analysis on the NRV to check if the safety objectives are met. This analysis of the Collector Cell motive flow line NRV, taking into account all failure scenarios, concludes that the previous non compliance can be alleviated. Consequently, no unsafe condition exists any more on the affected NRV. For the reasons described above, DGCA AD 10-05-004 (EASA AD 2010-0083) is cancelled..
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10-11-006 Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -243, 243F, -341, -342 and -343 all manufacturer serial numbers.
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10-11-007-CN Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, 202, -203, -243 and -341 all manufacturer serial numbers.
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No. 54
EASA AD 2010-0191 "Flight Control Flight Control Primary Computer (FCPC) PRIM 3 Dispatch Restriction / Modification". During a Back-up Control Module (BCM) retrofit campaign some BCMs have been found with loose gyrometer screws. This AD issued is to prevent a lack of design robustness of the BCM when the aeroplane is in control back up configuration, an oscillation of the BCM output order may cause degradation of the BCM piloting laws, potentially leading to erratic motion of the rudder and possible subsequent impact on the Dutch Roll, which constitutes an unsafe condition. This AD requires the installation of: - A new BCM on A330 series aeroplanes fitted with electrical rudder,and - An improved PFTU on A330 series aeroplanes fitted with an electrical rudder, Which, once installed, eliminate the root cause of the unsafe condition and cancel the operational limitation EASA AD 2007-0070R1 To prevent the aeroplane to deviate from its steered direction and/or allow an uncontrolled corrosion propagation of the main fitting barrel due to presence of water that could freeze the grease and thus jam the gearboxes or the Rotary Variable Differential Transformer (RVDT) of the streering system. EASA AD No.2010-0173R1 -Uncontained APU generator failures on ground have occurred on Airbus A330 Aeroplane in service. Prelimary investigation confirmed that these failures have resulted in structural damage to the APU compartment and, in one case, to the stabilizer compartment. Loose APU generator part can lead to damage to the APU firewall , reducing its fire extinguishing capability and potentially leading to a temporary uncontrolled fire. The investigation showed a sequence of events where a collapse of the Drive End Bearing (DEB) lead to an uncontained failure. -EASA issued Emergency AD 2007-0188-E, requiring repetitive inspections of the APU generator Scavenge filter element and filter housing and the APU generator Drain plug for signs of small debris coming from the APU generator failure. -Consequently , EASA issued AD2008-0017, superseding AD2007-0188R1 and requiring the following additional action : a visual inspection of the APU generator seal plate fitting, and following MMEL item 36-11-01 or 24-22-01 rectification and inspection time a new serviceable APU generator or APU is installed and airplane. - EASA issued AD2008-0017R1 to call the inspection refer to required indicated compliance times,for A330 aeroplanes, when operated within the provision of MMEL item 36-11-01 further to ETOPS certification of A330 APU. -EASA AD2008-0173 retained the requirement of EASA AD2008-0017R1, which was supersedes, and added the rquirment to install secondary housing on the APU generator. -This revision 1 is issued to clarify that both initial and repetitive inspection are not required the installation of secondary APU generator housing on an aeroplane.
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10-12-013 Airbus A330 aeroplanes model A330-200 series and A330-300 series , all manufacture serial number , except those on which Airbus modification 56985 has been embodied in production.
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EASA AD 2010-0253 To prevent an unsafe condition due to failure to comply with the revision 4 of Airbus A330 ALS part 1 and revision 5 of Airbus A340 ALS Part 1 that introduces more restrictive maintenance requirements and/or airworthiness limitations. EASA AD No. 2010-0264 Time Limits and Maintenance Checks Certification Maintenance Requirements ALS Part 3 Amendment This AD supersedes DGCA AD No. 10-03-012 (EASA AD 2010-0048) and requires the implementation of the new or more restrictive maintenance requirements and/or airworthiness limitations are specified in Airbus A330 ALS Part 3 revision 03. EASA AD No. 2010-0267 Flight Control Wing Tip Brakes (WTB) Operational Test From result Inspection by supplier of Wing Tip Brake (WTB) units revealed that the drive shaft was found free to rotate and the braking worn. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could, in some specific failure cases, result in loss of control of the airplane. This AD requires a one-time Operational Test of the Wing Tip Brake (WTB)/Pressure Of Brake (POB) performance on the flap and slat systems to detected any dormant failure and, depending on finding, associated corrective action.
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10-12-027 Airbus A330-243, A330-341 and A330-342 aeroplanes manufacturer serial numbers (MSN), up to MSN 0220 inclusive
AIRTRACTOR Inc 60 10-09-013 Air Tractor AT-802 and AT-802A airplanes, all serial numbers (SNs) beginning with -0001, that are: - Certificated in any category; - Engaged in agricultural dispersal operations, including those airplanes that have been converted from fire fighting to agricultural dispersal or airplanes that convert between fire fighting and agricultural dispersal; - Not equipped with the factory-supplied computerized fire gate (part number (P/N) 80540); - Not engaged in only full-time fire fighting. BAe 146 and AVRO 146-RJ SERIES
FAA AD 2010-17-18 This AD to detect and correct cracks in the wing main spar lower cap at the center splice joint, which could result in failure of the spar cap and lead to wing separation and loss of control of the airplane.
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EASA AD 2009-0070R1 Fuselage External Forward Fuselage Inspection / Repair. During the period 2001/2002, skin cracking was found adjacent to the butt joint forward of frame 19 when unrelated in-service maintenance inspections of the forward fuselage structure were being completed. The cracks emanated from chemically-etched pockets on the internal surface of the skin. The then current MRB inspection requirements were not adequate to address cracking in multiple adjacent bays, which could compromise the structural integrity of the fuselage in the event that the multiple cracks joined into a single crack. This AD is revised to acknowledge the issuance of Bae Systems (Operations) Limited ISB.53-167 Revision 3, which allows the repetitive inspection intervals to be extended and introduces grace periods to carry out the initial inspections.
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09-10-006R1 BAe 146 and AVRO 146-RJ aeroplanes, all serial numbers, except those modified to frighter configuration in accordance with BAe Systems modfication No. HCM50200B.
EASA AD 2009-0205R1 "Flight Control - Aileron Interconnect Cable Pulley Guards Installation". This AD is issued to revises DGCA AD No. 0910-006 (EASA AD 2009-0205). To excude aeroplanes from the Applicability that have been modified to freighter configuration in accordance with BAE System modification No. HCM50200B. This AD requires the installation of additional guards, bolts and nuts on the aileron interconnect cable pulleys atframe 29 (left and right). EASA AD 2010-0072 Landing Gear Nose Landing Gear Main Fitting Inspection/Replacement". To prevent undetected crack was present at the time of embodiment of M-D SB 146-32-150, it could continue to grow while the NLG is in service and could lead to the failure of the main fitting and possible collapse of the NLG. This AD requires the introduction of repetitive NDT inspection on NLG main fitting following embodiment of MD SB 146-32-150.
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10-04-014 BAe 146 and AVRO 146-RJ aeroplanes, all models, all serial numbers, if equipped with a Nose Landing Gear (NLG) which has been modified in accordance with MessierDowty (M-D) Service Bulletin (SB) 146-32150, and which had that modification carried out after the NLG accumulated more than 5000 flight cycle (FC). This AD also applies to aeroplanes with NLG units installed on which M-D SB 14632-150 has been accomplished by Messier Service facility in Sterling, Virginia, USA, only after it has been established on that NLG units, in accordance with the instructions of M-D SB 146-32-173. 10-04-014R1 BAe 146 and AVRO 146-RJ aeroplanes.
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EASA AD 2010-0072R1 "Landing Gear - Nose Landing Gear Main Fitting Inspection / Replacement". This AD is issued to reduce the applicability of the original issue of this AD by referring only to the embodiment of part B or Part C of the M-D SB 146-32150. Indeed, NLGs with M-D SB 146-32-150, Part A, embodied are not affected by this AD.
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No. 65
Number Applicability 10-11-001 BAe 146 and AVRO 146-RJ aeroplanes, all models, all serial numbers.
EASA AD 2010-0201 Landing Gear Main Landing Gear Shock Absorber Lower AttachmentPins Inspection / Replacement. Pin failures were do to corrosion, if not detected and corrected , could lead to a MLG collapse on the ground or during landing and consequently damage to the aeroplane or injury to the occupants. EASA AD 2010-0202 "Landing Gear Nose Landing Gear Main Fitting Inspection / Replacement". This AD issued is to prevent a crack that found at the top of the Nose Landing Gear (NLG) oleo, BAe Systems (Operations) Ltd (BAE Systems) issued Inspection Service Bulletin (ISB) ISB.32-158. Undetected cracks could lead to failure of the NLG Main Fitting and collapse of the NLG. With that view, BAE Systems issued ISB.32-158 to implement this repetitive 300 FC inspection on all NLG main fittings regardless of their modification standard. ISB.32-158 supersedes existing ISBs A32-180 and 32-181, initially with no closing. This AD requires repetitive NDT inspections of all NLG main fittings and. If cracks are found, replacement of the NLG with a serviceable unit.
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EASA AD 2010-0035 "Flight Controls - Aileron and Rudder Tab Hinge Pins Inspection". To avoid restricted movement of the tab control and consequent reduced control of the aeroplane due to migration of a tab hinge pin out of the hinge. EASA AD 2010-0249 To correct design of the lower aileron chain drive sprocket that could result in the loss of the pilot and/or copilot aileron control system and consequently reduce the controllability of the aeroplanes
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No. 69
EASA AD 2010-0263 Stabilizers Elevator Clearance Inspection / Measurement / Report Incidents have been reported concerning ATP aeroplanes where, after the application of thickened anti-icing fluids, increased elevator control forces were experienced during take-off. The ATP elevator has an elliptical nose balance over part of the span (from the root to mid-span and out towards the tip). Investigation of these occurrences showed that thickened antiicing fluid may close the gap between the leading edge of the elevator and the horizontal stabilizer and contaminate the lower surface of the elevator. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to loss of the aerodynamic balance over the affected elevator section, changing the elevator and tab hinge moments and increasing the necessary control forces to achieve rotation. This AD requires an inspection of both elevators for evidence of rubbing, measurement of the gap between elevator and horizontal stabilizer, the reporting of findings to BAE Systems (Operations) Ltd. and, depending on findings, repair actions.
BEECHCRAFT - B 200 & 390 70 10-03-002 Beechcraft King Air B300 and B300C airplanes.
FAA AD 2010-05-10 This AD to detect and correct the installation of an incorrect bus bar, which could result in failure of the pitot heat annunciators to illuminate. This failure could lead to moisture freezing on the pitot tube(s) and cause erroneous flight instrument indication. FAA AD 2010-10-10 To detect and correct improper installation of the MOV and spark gap wiring, which could result in overload of the MOV in a lightning strike and allow electrical energy to continue to the essential bus and disable equipment that received power from essential bus.The disabled equipment could include the autopilot, anti-skid system, hydraulic indicator, spoiler system, pilot primary flight display, audio panel, or the 1 air data computer. This failure could lead to a significant increase in pilot workload during adverse operating conditions. FAA AD 2010-17-15 This AD to detect and replace starter generators with deficient armature insulating materials. This condition could result in the loss of operation of one or both starter generators with consequent loss of all non-battery electrical power.
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10-05-012 Beechcraft Model 390 airplanes, serial numbers RB-248, that are certificated in any category.
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10-10-007 Beechcraft Model 390 airplanes, serial numbers RB-4 through RB-257, RB-259 through RB-265, RB-268, and RB-269, that are certificated in any category.
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Number Applicability 10-03-006 Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 206A, 206B, 206L, 206L-1, 206L-3 and 206L-4 helicopters.
CF-2010-07 "Non-Conforming Tail Rotor Disc Assembly". This AD issued to determined that operating a helicopter with new tail rotor disc assembly P/N 101584-1 or -2 installed may result in loss of control of the helicopter. This directive mandates to removal from service tail rotor disc assembly P/N 101584-1 and -2.
BELL HELICOP. TEXTRON-MODEL 212 74 10-11-022 Bell Helicopter Textron Model 212
FAA AD 2010-24-52 This AD is prompted by a crack found on a fitting after a recent accident. Subsequently, five additional fittings from two different manufacturing lots were found to have the same type crack. A crack fitting could result in failure of the fitting, loss of main rotor blade, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. FAA AD 2010-26-52 -This AD was prompted by another incident which the tail rotor blade (blade) tip weight separated from a blade during flight causing vibration. This unsafe condition lead to the determination that additional blades could be affected and should be added to the applicability. -The action specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of the blade tip weight , loss of a blade , and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter -This AD supersedes FAA AD 2007-19-53 ( DGCA AD 0711-10 ) FAA EAD 2010-25-51 Main Rotor Hub This AD supersedes DGCA AD No.10-11-022 (FAA EAD 2010-24-52), and is prompted by the need to require performing a magnetic particle inspection (MPI) on additional serial-numbered main rotor hub inboard strap fittings. The action specified by ref AD are intended to prevent failure of a fitting, loss of a main rotor blade, and loss of control of the helicopter.
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10-12-019-U Bell Helicopter Textron 204B, 205A, 205A1,205B,212,412,412CF dan 412EP helicopter
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10-12-020-U Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. Model 212 helicopters certificated in any category
BELL HELICOP. TEXTRON-MODEL 407 77 10-10-004 Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Ltd. Model 407 helicopter serial number 53000 through 53990.
CF-2010-33 Over-torque of Tailboom Attachment Hardware. A review of the tailboom attachement installation has determined that the torque value of the tailboom attachment bolts specified in the maintenance manual and applied during manufacturing, exceeded the torque range recommended for the bolts. This situation, if not corrected, can lead to bolt failure, detachment of the tailboom and loss of control of the helicopter. To correct the problem, the tailboom attachment hardware has to be replaced.
BELL HELICOP. TEXTRON-MODEL 412 78 10-05-015 Bell Helicopter Textron Model 412 and 412EP helicopters.
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FAA AD 2010-10-16 This AD to prevent failure of a crosstube and subsequent collapse of the landing gear.
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No.
Number Applicability
BELL HELICOP. TEXTRON-MODEL 427 79 07-09-018R1 Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 427 helicopters serial numbers 56001 through 56073, 56077, 58001 and 58002. 80 10-07-001 Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC), Model 427 Helicopter, All serial numbers.
CF-2007-22R1 "Vertical Fin - Installation Upgrade". This AD is issued to supersedes of DGCA AD No. 07-09-018 (CF-2007-22). CF-2010-17 "Tail Rotor Driveshaft Hanger Bearing Bracket - Cracking Due To Tooling Mark". Tail rotor driveshaft hanger bearing braket part number (P/N) 427-044-223-101 has been found cracked due to fatigue. It has been determined that the fatigue cracking was initiated by a tooling mart left during manufacture. The existence of tooling marks on the bracket could lead to bracket failure, loss of tail rotor drive and, consequently,loss of control of the helicopter. CF-2010-32 Over-torque of Tailboom Attachment Hardware. A review of the tailboom attachment installation has determined that the torque value of the tailboom attachment bolts specified in the maintenance manual and applied during manufacturing, exceeded the torque range recommended for the bolts. This situation, if not corrected, can lead to bolt failure, detachment of the tailboom and loss of control of the helicopter. To correct the problem, the tailboom attachment hardware has to be replaced. CF-2007-21R1 From result reports that balance weight departing from the tail rotor blades during flight. The cause has been narrowed down to missing weight screws. This failure can happen at any time. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to loss of control of the helicopter. This AD is issued to extends applicability of this directive to cover the affected blades.
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10-10-003 Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Ltd. Model 427 helicopter serial number 56001 through 56084, 58001 and 58002.
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10-12-003 Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) helicopter models 206A, 206B, 206L, 206L1, 206L-3, 206-4, 407, 427 and 430
BELL HELICOP. TEXTRON-MODEL 430 83 10-04-012 Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Model 430 helicopters serial number 49001 through 49129.
CF-2010-11 "Transmission Planetary Pinion Gear Damage". Significant mechanical damage to the transmission sungear and planetary pinion gears has been attributed to a planetary system misalignment caused by an excessive mast bending. This condition, if not corrected, may lead to failure of the transmission and loss of control of the helicopter. To prelude excessive mast bending, and consequent damage to the transmission planetary pinion gears and matting gears, revised VNE limits are imposed together with revised restricted center of gravity envelopes and secondary VNE limits. CF-2010-29 "Servo Actuator". It has been determined that the output piston rod assemblies of the hydraulic servo actuators may be corroded and, consequently, prone for corrosion cracking. Also in one case, an unapproved repairs was found on the piston rod. This situation, if not corrected, could result in a loss of control of the helicopter.
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10-09-001-U Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Models 430 helicopters with hydraulic servo actuators Part Number (P/N) 222-382-001-107.
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No.
Number Applicability
BOEING 737-SERIES 85 Boeing Model 737-800, -900 and -900ER series airplane; certificated in any category.
FAA AD 2010-15-06 This AD to detect and correct a loose bearing in the aft lug of the elevator tab control mechanism, which could result in unwanted elevator and tab vibration. The consequent structural failure of the elevator or horizontal stabilizer could result in loss of aircraft control and structural integrity. FAA AD 2010-05-13 This AD to prevent rapid decompression of the airplane due to fatigue cracks resulting from scribe lines on pressurized fuselage structure. FAA 2008-10-10R1 This AD to prevent the potential for ignition sources inside fuel tanks caused by latent failures, alterations, repairs, or maintenance actions, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank fire or explosion and consequent loss of the airplane. FAA 2008-10-09R1 This AD to prevent the potential for ignition sources inside fuel tanks caused by latent failures, alternations, repair, or maintenance action, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane. FAA 2009-20-11 This AD to prevent a potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank fire or explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
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07-03-007 Boeing Model 737-200, -200C, -300, -400 and -500 series airplanes, certificated in any category. 08-05-015R1 Boeing Model 737-800, and -900 series airplanes, certificated in any category, with an original standard airworthiness certificate or original export certificate of airworth issued before March 31, 2006 08-05-016R1 Boeing Model 737-200, -200C, -300, -400 and -500 series airplanes, certificated in any category.
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10-01-004 Boeing Model 737-300, -400 dan -500 series airplanes, certificated in any category, equipped with a digital transient suppresion device (DTSD) installed in accrodance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) ST00127BO. 10-01-007 Boeing Model 737-800 and -900 series airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 737-321376, Revision 2, dated August 6, 2008. 10-01-012 Boeing Models 737-300, -400, -500 series airplanes, Boeing Models 737-800 series airplanes and Boeing Models 747-400 series airplanes. 10-01-014 Boeing Model 737-300, -400 and -500 series airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-53A1301, dated September 3, 2009.
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FAA 2009-26-04 This AD to prevent cracking of the forward trunnion pin, which could result in facture of the pin and consequent collapse of the MLG. FAA 2009-26-03 This AD to prevent a standby static inverter from overheating, which could result in smoke in the flight deck and cabin and loss of the electrical standby power system. FAA AD 2010-01-09 This AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of the fuselage skin panels at the chem-milled steps, which could result in sudden fracture and failure of the fuselage skin panels, and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane.
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Number Applicability 10-01-016 This AD applies to Boeing Model 737-600, 700, and -800 series airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-5A1294, dted April 23, 2007. 10-01-019 Boieng Model 737-800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 73728-1272, dated October 31, 2008. 10-03-007 Boeing Model 737-200, -200C, -300, -400 and -500 series airplane, certificated in any category. 10-03-010 Boeing Model 737-800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes; certificated in any category.
FAA AD 2010-01-08 This AD to prevent cracks from propagating from drill starts in the free flange, vertical web, and radius between the free flange and vertical web of the lower stringers of the wing center section lower stringers, which could cause a loss of structural integrity of the wing center section and may result in a fuel leak. FAA AD 2010-02-04 This AD prevent the failure of the valve in the closed position, open position, or partially open position, which could result in engine fuel flow problems and possible and possible uncontrolled fuel leak or fire. FAA AD 2010-05-13 This AD to prevent rapid decompression of the airplane due to fatigue cracks resulting from scribe lines on pressurized fuselage structure. FAA AD 2010-06-51 this AD to detect and correct a loose bearing in the aft lug of the elevator tab control mechanism, which could result in unwanted elevator and tab vibration. The consequent structural failure of the elevator or horizontal stabilizer could result in loss of aircraft control and structural integrity. FAA AD 2010-09-05 This AD to detect and correct a loose bearing in the aft lug of the elevator tab control mechanism, which could result in unwanted elevator and tab vibration. Consequent structural failure of the elevator or horizontal stabilizer could result in loss of structural integrity and aircraft control. FAA AD 2008-01-01 This AD issue to prevent failure of this feature, which could jeopardize flight safety.
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95
96
97
10-05-001 Boeing Model 737-800, -900 and -900ER series airplanes; certificated in any category.
98
10-07-016 1. Boeing Model 737-200, -300. -400, -500 and -800 series airplanes, Modified in accordance with STC ST01143SE, as identified in Jamco SB 52-2295 Rev.1 dated October 10, 2007. 2. Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes, Modified in accordance with STC ST01194SE, as identified in Jamco SB 522303 Rev.1 dated October 10, 2007. 10-07-028 Boeing Model 737-200, -300, -400 and -500 series airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Special Attention Bulletin 737-35-1099, Rev 1 dated April 23, 2009.
99
FAA AD 2010-14-06 This AD to prevent the in-line flow indicators of the passenger oxygen masks from fracturing and separating, which could inhibit oxygen flow to the masks and consequently result in exposure of the passengers and cabin attendants to hypoxia following a depressurization event. FAA AD 2010-15-08 This AD to detect and correct cracked, corroded, or fractured carriage spindles and to prevent severe flap asymmetry, which could result in reduced control or loss of controllability of the airplane.
100 10-08-004 Boeing Model 737-200, -200C, -300, -400 and -500 series airplanes, certificated in any category.
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No.
Number Applicability
101 10-09-008 Boeing Model 737-300, -400, -500 and -800 series airplanes.
FAA AD 2010-16-06 This AD to prevent inadvertent electrical current, which can cause the low-pressure flex-hoses of the crew oxygen system to melt or burn, resulting in oxygen system leakage and smoke or fire. FAA AD 2010-17-19 This AD to detect and correct discrepancies in the aft attach lugs of the elevator tab control mechanism, which could result in elevator and tab vibration. Consequent structural failure of the elevator or horizontal stabilizer could result in loss of structural integrity and aircraft control. FAA AD 2010-17-14 This AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of certain fuselage frames and stub beams, and possible severed frames, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the frames. This reduced structural integrity can increase loading in the fuselage skin, which will accelerate skin crack growth and result in rapid decompression of the fuselage. FAA AD 2010-17-05 This AD to prevent pump housingburn-through due to electrical arcing, which could create a potential ignition source inside a fuel tank. This condition, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane. FAA AD 2010-24-11 This AD result from a design review of the fuel tank system. This AD is issued to prevent arching at certain fuel tank fastener in the event of a lightning strike or fault current event, which combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane. FAA AD No. 2010-24-01 Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 57: Wings This AD result from reports of cracks emanating from the keyway of the fuel tank access hole. DGCA is issuing this AD to detect and correct such cracking, which could result in the loss of the lower wing skin load path and consequent structural failure of the wing.
102 10-09-009 Boeing Model 737-800, -900 and -900ER series airplanes; certificated in any category.
103 10-09-011 Boeing Model 737-200 series airplanes, certificated in any category; line numbers 1 through 848 inclusive.
104 10-09-014R1 Boeing Model 737-600, -700,-700C, -800 and -900 series airplane, certificated with any category, as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-28A1201, Revision 1, dated May 28, 2009. 105 10-12-010 Boeing Model 737-800 and -900 series airplane, certified in any category
BOEING 747 SERIES 107 10-01-013 Boeing Model 747-400, 747-400D, and 747400F sreies airplanes; certificated in any category. 108 10-01-020 Boeing Model 747-400, and -400D series airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Srevice Bulletin 74753A2484, Revision 1, dated February 12, 2009.
FAA AD 2010-01-01 This AD to prevent the loss of structural integrity of the fuselage, which could result in rapid depressurization of the airplane. FAA AD 2010-01-02 This AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking in the specified fuselage stringers, which, if left undetected, could result in fuselage skin cracking that reduce the structural integrity of the skin panel, and consequent rapid depressuruzation of the airplane.
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No.
Number Applicability
FAA AD 2010-05-03 This AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking at multiple adjacent locations in the subject areas, which could connect to form large cracks and result in reduced structural integrity leading to rapid decompression and consequent loss of control of the airplane. FAA AD 2010-14-07 This AD to prevent fatigue cracking of the body station (BS) 2598 bulkhead structure, which could result in inability of the structure to carry horizontal stabilizer flight loads, and loss of controllability of the airplane. FAA AD 2010-13-12 This AD is issued to prevent damage to the fuel pumps caused by electrical arcing that could introduce an ignition source in the fuel tank which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane. FAA AD 2010-14-08 This AD is issued to prevent uncommanded operation of certain override/jettison pumps which could cause overheat, electrical arcs, or frictional sparks, and could lead to ignition source inside a fuel tank. This condition, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane. FAA AD 2010-14-01 This AD to prevent a potential electrical arc from igniting the BMS 8-39 polyurethane foam insulation on the duct assemblies of the ECS, which could propagate a small fire and lead to a larger fire that could spread throughout the airplane through the ECS.
110 10-07-008 Boeing Model 747-400 airplanes, certificated in any category; line numbers 1 through 1307 inclusive. 111 10-07-017 Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28A2261, dated February 19, 2009. 112 10-07-018 Boeing Company Model 747-400, 747400D, 747-400F series airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28A2280, Revision 1, dated November 25, 2009, and 747-28A2281, Revision 1, dated November 25, 2009. 113 10-07-029 Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 74721A2421, Revision 2, dated December 19, 2006 and 747-400F series airplanes identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 74721A2422, Revision 2, dated November 16, 2006. 114 10-07-031 Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes, certified in any category; as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 74753A2750, dated August 27, 2009. 115 10-08-010 Boeing Model 747-400, -400D and -400F series airplanes, certificated in any category; line numbers 1 through 1229 inclusive. 116 10-11-016 Boeing 747-400 series airplanes, certified in any category; as identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-52-2293, dated September 4, 2009
FAA AD 2010-14-07 This AD to detect and correct such cracking, which could grow and resultin a severed intercostal. If an intercostal is severed, cracks could develop in the adjacent frame structure and skin, resulting in a rapid loss of cabin pressure. FAA AD 2010-16-05 This AD to prevent inadvertent electrical current, which can cause the low-pressure flex-hoses of the crew oxygen system to melt or burn, resulting in oxygen system leakage and smoke or fire. FAA 2009-19-06 From result report that the current design of the flight deck door is defective. This AD is issued to prevent failure of this equipment, which could jeopardize flight safety
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No.
Number Applicability
117 10-11-017 Model 747-400 series airplanes, certified in any category, line numbers 1 through 1419 inclusive, except airplanes that have been modified into 747-400 large cargo freighter configuration. 118 10-11-020 Boeing Company Model 747-400, 747400D, and 747-400F series airplane, certificated in any category; as identified in the service bulletin listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28A2266, Revision 1, dated December 10, 2009 and Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-28A2267, dated December 18, 2008. BOLKOW BO-105 SERIES 119 10-04-003 BO 105 A, BO 105 C, BO 105 D, BO 105 LS A-1, BO 105 LS A-3and BO 105 S helicopters, all variant, all serial number and MBB-BK 117 A-1, MBB-BK 117 A-3, MBB-BK 117 A-4, MBB-BK 117 B-1, MBB-BK 117 B-2, MBB-BK 117 C-1 helicopters, all serial numbers. 120 10-07-002 BO 105 C, BO 105 D and BO 105 S helicopters, all variants as specified in Appendix 1 of reference AD, all serial numbers, if equipped with Roll Royce Corporation (formerly Allison, Detroit Diesel Allison) 250-C20 series engines, except helicopters that have been modified in accordance with ECD VTOL retrofit kit 105-80037.
FAA AD No. 2010-20-08 These AD results from reports of cracked that have been found in the strap and inner chord of the forward edge frame of the number 5 main entry door cutouts, between stringers 16 and 23. This AD issue to detect and correct such cracks, which could damage to the adjacent body structure and could result in depressurization of the airplane in flight. FAA AD No. 2010-20-12 Electrical hot short from a source outside the fuel quantity indicating system (FQIS) to the densitometer wiring from causing failure of the FQIS densitometer resistors, which could result in an ignition source inside the center or horizontal stabilizer fuel tanks.
EASA AD 2010-0049 "Rotor Flight Control Cyclic Stick Locking Device Modification". This AD is issued to supersedes DGCA AD 09-04-006 (EASA AD 2009-0079) and adds the BO 105 LS A-3 helicopters helicopters to the Applicability. This AD has been republished to correct the Applicability, making this consistent with the certified Models as specified in the TCDS EASA R.011. EASA AD 2010-0128 Engine Power Turbine Speed Operational Limitation. Several third stage turbine wheel failures have been reported on Roll Royce Corporation (RRC) 250 series engines. Investigation by RRC has determined that detrimental vibrations can occurs within a particular range of turbine speeds, which are potential contributing factor to these failures. This condition if not corrected could result in loss of engines power, possibly resulting in an emergency landing and consequent injuries to helicopter occupants. To address this unsafe condition, RRC issued Commercial Engine Bulletin (CEB) A-1400, now at Revision 3, to introduce an operational limitation to avoid engine N2 steadystate operation in a certain speed range(86.5% - 95.5%) for more than 60 seconds in single or cumulative events for engines with the third stage turbine wheel P/N 23065833 installed. In response, Eurocopter Deutschland (ECD) issued ASB BO105-60-110, now at revision 1, to introduce the same operating limitation for BO 105 helicopters with the affected engines installed. This AD requires the introduction of a placard and the amendment of the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM).
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No.
Number Applicability
EASA AD 2010-0153 "Time Limits / Maintenance Checks - Main Rotor Blades with Bolted Lead Inner Weight - Life Limitation". T o determine the life limit of 2500 flight hours (FH) for M/R blades due to inner weight deformation during operation.
BOLKOW KAWASAKI-HELICOPTER 122 10-06-002 Model MBB-BK117C-2 Helicopters, all serial numbers, if equipped with a Tail Rotor IGB that has a bevel gear Part Number (P/N) 4639 310 065 installed.
EASA AD 2010-0096 "Airworthiness Limitations - Tail Rotor Intermediate Gear Box (IGB) Bevel Gear - Reduced Life Limit". To prevent significant reduction of the lifetime of IGB bevel gears, potentially resulting in failure of the IGB and consequent loss of control of the helicopter. This AD require the implementation of a revised life limit on the effected bevel gears and adds those s/n by referencing the latest Revision of ECD Alert Service Bulletin (ASB). EASA AD No. 2010-0270-E Auto Flight Three-axis-Autopilot Automatic Level-off Function Revised Flight Manual Procedure This AD issued is to prevent the problem on autopilot of MBB-BK 117 C-2 helicopters, concerning the automatic level-off function, which is normally only triggered upon ground proximity detection. The automatic level-off may erroneously be triggered when radar altitude falls below 2500 feet. When this occurs, the ALT mode reference is wrongly set to either a meaningless high value or to a low value equivalent to 65 feet above ground. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to a descent below the minimum safety altitude. This AD requires operators to amend the applicable Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) Supplement and to inform the flight crews accordingly. EASA AD No. 2010-0268-E Electrical Power Starter/Generator Switch Off Revised Flight Manual Procedure EASA have received reports that on some MBB-BK117 C-2 helicopters, a too high current flow was detected when one generator was deactivated (e.g. during the Engine Power Check). This situation is, if not detected corrected, could lead to failure of the generator, likely resulting in loss of electrical power and inducing loss of systems that are necessary for safe flight. This AD requires the introduction of additional Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) procedures, to include visual monitoring of the electrical power display GEN AMPS on the Vehicle and Engine Mulfunction Display (VEMD) during switching of a generator. This AD is considered to be an interim an interim measure, pending the development of a final solution that will prevent this particular mode of generator failure; further AD action cannot be excluded.
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No.
Number Applicability
125 10-01-018 CFM 56-7B engines in accordance with "applicability" section in reference AD.
FAA AD 2010-01-05 This AD to prevent failure of the LP turbine rear frame from low-cycle-fatigue cracks. Failure of the LP turbine rear frame could result in engine separation from the airplane, possibly leading to loss of control of the airplane. FAA AD 2010-13-09 This AD is issued to prevent uncontained failure of the stage 3 LPT disk and damage to the airplane.
126 10-07-011 CFM International CFM565, 5B, and 7B series turbofan engines with stage 3 low pressure turbine (LPT) disks part number (P/N) 3360020060, installed with the following serial numbers (S/Ns), DE255844, DE256388, DE256622, DE256623, DE256625, DE256627, DE256628, DE256631, and DE256637. The 5 and 5B series engines are installed on, but not limited to, Airbus A318, A319, A320, and A321 airplanes, and the 7B series engines are installed on, but not limited to, Boeing 737 series airplanes. 127 10-12-009 CFM56-5B1/3, CFM56-5B2/3, CFM565B3/3, CFM56-5B4/3, CFM56-5B5/3, CFM56-5B6/3, CFM56-5B7/3, CFM565B8/3, CFM56-5B9/3, CFM56-5B3/3B1, CFM56-5B4/3B1 engines if equipped with Fan Blades Serial Numbers as listed in CFM International Service Bulletin (SB) CFM565B S/B 72-0777. These engines are known to be installed on, but not limited to, Airbus A318, A319, A320 and A321 aeroplanes. DC-9 ( MD..) SERIES 128 10-12-022 McDonnell Douglas Corporation Model DC9-31, DC-9-32 (VC-9C), DC-9-32F (C-9A, C-9B), DC-9-33F, DC-9-34, DC-9-34F, DC9-41, DC-9-51, DC-9-81 (MD-81), DC-982 (MD-82), DC-9-83 (MD-83), and DC-987 (MD-87), MD-88, and MD-90-30 airplanes; certificated in any category as identified in Boeing Service Bulletins DC928-212 and MD 90-28-010, both revision 1, both dated June 16, 2009. 129 10-12-032 McDonnel Douglas Corporation Model DC9-82 (MD-82), DC-9-83 (MD-83), and MD90-30 airplanes; certified in any category; as identified in Boeing Services Bulletin DC928-212 and MD90-28-010, both revision 1, both dated June 16, 2009 DE HAVILLAND DHC-8 SERIES
EASA AD 2010-0212 -Engine Fan Blade Replacement -During quality inspections at blades manufacturer, a nonconforming fan blades geometry was detected. The quality investigation isolated a production batch which is potentially affected by this issue. For those potentially affected fan blades, in case of Foreign Object Damage, it could lead to an In Flight Shut Down of the engine following liberation of fan blade upper panel. -This AD requires replacement of the potentially affected fan blades with a serviceable blade.
FAA AD No. 2010-25-04 Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28: Fuel This AD result from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent possible sources of ignition in a fuel tank caused by an electrical fault in the fuel boost pumps. An ignition sources in the fuel tank could result in a fire or an explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
FAA AD 2010-25-04 This AD is issued to prevent possible sources of ignition in a fuel tank caused by an electrical fault in the fuel boost pumps. An ignition source in the fuel tank could result in a fire or an explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
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No.
Number Applicability
130 02-08-003R1 Bombardier DHC-8 aircraft, Models 301, 311, 314 and 315, serial numbers 003 and subsequent. All installed flap drive actuators, Part Numbers 734181, 734374 and 755216, are subject to this revision, irrespective of serial number.
CF-2002-26R2 Flap Drive Actuator Assembly . - To introduced new lubrication tools and specified the use of Aeroshell 17 grease in order to improve lubrication of the flap actuators and consequently reduce the possibility of component wear, it also revised the applicability and compliance time criteria for the actuator backlash checks. - To provides the following alternative grease and backlash check instructions: a.Alternative grease Syn-Tech NS-5806-G for lubrication of the flap actuators b.Alternative instructions, section 05-50-98 of the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM), for determination of next backlash check interval. c.Alternative instruction, Task Number 2750/18 in the Maintenance Task Card Manual (MTCM), for the repeat backlash checks. CF-2009-46 "Landing Gear Alternate Extension Access Panel - Potential Failure to Open" . There have been reports of failure of the access panel latch assembly as a consuquence of repeated closure of the access panel involving the use of excessive force. Failure of the latch assembly can result in the access panel being jammed in the closed position, and require mechanical prying to open. An undetected or un corrected latch failure condition in the access panel can prevent immediate access the landing gear alternate extension system by the flight crew during an emergency. This AD require the replacement of the existing latch assembly with a stronger modified latch assembly. CF-2009-45 "Aileron Terminal Quadrant Support Bracket Cracking". Several cases of aileron terminal quadrant support bracket that were manufactured using sheet metal have been found cracked on DHC-8 Series 300 aircraft. Investigation revealed that the failure of the support bracket was due to fatigue. Failure of the aileron terminal quadrant support bracket could result in adverse reduction of aircraft roll control. This AD mandate the replacement of the aileron terminal quadrant support bracket with new and improved machined part.
131 10-01-005 DHC-8 Series 100, -200 and -300 with serial numbers 003 through 658.
132 10-01-006 Bombardier Inc. DHC-8 Aircraft, Models 301,311,314, and 315, Serial Numbers 100 through.
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No.
Number Applicability
133 10-06-004 DHC-8 series 300, serial numbers 003 through 566.
CF-2010-16 "Cockpit Windshield Lower Frames - Potential for Corrosion". Trapped water on the bottom of the cockpit windshield frames (or lower windshield frames) that result in either corrosion or water ingress into the cockpit. In one occurrence, the trapped water caused severe corrosion of numerous anchor nuts that secure the windshield to the lower windshield frame, such that the intended fastening function was seriously compromised. Corrosion of the lower windshield frames, including the anchor nuts that secure the windshield to the aircraft structure, can result in a serious structural degradation possibly leading to the loss of the windshield during flight. Also, water could leak into the cockpit and cause either a malfunction or failure of the electrical and electronics system in the area of the cockpit instrument panels. The lower windshield frames do not have drain provisions to prevent moisture of water run-off from the consideration of the windshield from being trapped. The consequences of trapped water in the lower windshield frames can result in unsafe conditions, as noted above. This Directive mandates the installation of a drain system of the lower windshield frames.
EASA AD 2010-0155 "Landing Gear - Main Landing Gear Damper-to-Trailing Arm Joints - Inspection / Replacement". To detect and correct cracks on MLG Damper-to-Trailing Arm Joints that may lead failure of the joint and subsequent damage or malfunction of the MLG, possibly resulting in damage to the aeroplane during landing and injury to occupants. EASA AD 2010-0155R1 "Landing Gear - Main Landing Gear Damper-to-Trailing Arm Joints - Inspection / Replacement". To prevent crack on DA 42 Main Landing Gear (MGL) Damper to Trailing Arm joints during standard maintenance. Depending on environmental-, operating- and runway conditions, the effected Main Landing Gear joints, Part Number (P/N) D603217-23-5X (4 different lengths are available), is susceptible to cracking. This condition, if not detected and corrected, may lead to failure of the joints and subsequent damage or malfunction of the MLG, possibly resulting in damage to the aeroplane during landing and injury occupants. This AD required the repetitive inspection interval has been amended, to allow inspection to be done at the regular 100 flight hours inspections.
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No.
Number Applicability
EASA AD 2010-0235 Doors Rear Passenger Door Retaining Bracket Replacement Diamond Aircraft Industries conducted analyses and structural tests to determine the root cause of the door opening in flight. The conclusions were that the primary locking mechanism provided adequate strength to react to the loads in flight. It was also determined that the root cause was the crew not properly securing the rear passenger door by the main locking mechanism prior to flight. Damage to the hinges has been caused primarily by external loads (wind gust conditions) while the aeroplane was parked. This condition, if not corrected, could result in the rear passenger door opening and departing the aeroplanes in flight. For the reasons described above, this AD requires implementation of amendment of the AFM procedures for flight with the door unlocked/open, and replacement of the passenger door retaining bracket with an improved part
DORNIER AIRCRAFT 137 09-09-007 Dornier Model 328-100 aeroplanes, all serial numbers; and Model 328-300 aeroplanes, all serial numbers.
EASA AD 2009-0194 "Wings - Lower Inner Panel - Inspection / Repair / Modification". Cracks at the lower wing panel rear trailing edge inboard of flap lever arm 1 (rib 5). This condition, if not corrected, could lead to structural failure of the affected wing panel, possibly resulting in the wing separating from the airlane with consequent loss of control. This AD retains the inspection and repair requirements of EASA AD 2008-0087E, adds repetitive inspection and requirement to modify both the LH and RH ing panel rear trailing edges from rib 3 to rib 9. EASA 2010-0054 Flight Control Tab to Actuator Linkage Reduced Inspection Intervals". This AD is issued to reduced inspection interval, specifically for the Flight control tab to actuator link CMR repetitive inspection, which have been identified as mandatory actions for continued airworthiness. Failure of these component or their constituent part could lead reduced control of the aeroplane. This AD requires the implementation of the effected reduced inspection intervals and associated corrective actions into te operators approved maintenance program.
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No.
Number Applicability
EASA AD No. 2010-0134 "Stabilizers-Rudder Tab Fixation Brackets - Inspection". During maintenance, it has been discovered that at the installation of the fixation brackets for rudder spring tabs and trim tabs an incorrect installation of the fixation brackets may have occurred. It is possible that the fixation bracket assembly may be incorrectly orientated and as a result the position of the helicoil inserts on the fixation bracket may be incorrect.If the orientation of the fixation bracket is reversed or upside down the screws may not reach into the helicoil thread to a sufficient depth. An incorrect installation, if not detected and corrected, could lead to an in-flight failure of the fixation brackets for rudder spring tabs and trim tabs resulting in and reduced control of the aeroplane. To address this potential unsafe condition, the TC Holder has developed a one time inspection to detect and correct any incorrect installations of the fixation brackets for rudder spring tabs resulting in and reduced control of the airplane. This AD requires a one-time inspection of all rudder trim and spring tab fixation brckets, the correction of any parts that are incorrectly installed and the reporting of all findings to the TC Holder. This AD is considered to be an interim action and an improved design bracket attechment is expected to be developed. EASA AD 2010-0169 "Equipment & Furnishings - Flight Compartment Door Locking Device - Replacement". An incident has been reported with a Dornier 328-100 aeroplanes, where the righthand (RH) power lever jammed in flight-idle position during the landing roll-out. The aeroplane was stopped by excessive braking.
EUROCOPTER - EC 135 141 142 143 10-01-001 Eurocopter EC 135 P1 (CDS), EC 135 P1 (CPDS), EC 135 P2 (CPDS), EC 135 T1 (CDS), EC 135 T1 (CPDS), EC 135 T2 (CPDS) helicopters, all serial numbers.
EASA AD No. 2010-0213 (Corrected 03 December 2010) EASA AD 2010-0227 EASA 2009-0272 "Main Rotor - Sliding sleeve - Pre-Flight Check Amendment". During two separate pre-flight checks on EC 135 helicopters in 2005, it was detected that one of the plain journal bearings of the sliding sleeve had moved to the outside of the sliding sleeve. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to a complete shift of the plane journal bearing to the inside or outside, creating the possibility of a limited movement of the collective, which could result in reduced control of helicopter. This AD retains the requirements of LBA AD D-2005-233, which is superseded, and altrnative method to comply, by amending the FLM with the appropriate revision that contains the AD requirement with regard to the pre flight check procedures.
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No.
Number Applicability
144 10-04-008 Eurocopter EC 135 P1(CDS), EC 135 P1(CPDS), EC 135 P2(CPDS), EC 135 P2+, EC 135 T1(CDS), EC 135 T1(CPDS), EC 135 T2(CPDS), EC 135 T2+ helicopters, all serial number(s/n), and MBB-BK 117 C-2 helicopters, all s/n.
EASA AD 2010-0058 Rotor Flight Controls Tail Rotor, Cyclic and Collective Control Levers Inspection / Repair . During accomplishment of an inspection on a MBB BK117 C-2, bearings were detected which had not been correctly fixed. This condition, if not detected and corrected, may cause the affected control lever to shift in the axial direction. This AD requires implementation of a modification that introduces new washers and bushings, which allows for extended inspection intervals. In accordance with ECD standard practice, a deviation of up to 10% of compliance time is allowed, although not accumulative. EASA 2010-0183R1 "Equipment / Furnishings - Spectrolab Nightsun XP Searclight - Inspection / Removal". A incident has been reported by a Maintemance Organisation of Vibration associated with the Nightsun XP Searchlight. Investigation revealed that the Gimbal Azimuth Top Hex Nut was loose. To avoid possibly damage to the helicopter or injury to persons on the ground. This AD requires repetitive preflightchecks to verify correct installation and, if discrepancies are detected, the removal of the searchlight unit from the helicopter. EASA AD 2010-0183-E "Equipment / Furnishings - Spectrolab Nightsun XP Searchlight - Inspection / Removal". An incident has been reported by a Maintenance Organisation of vibration associated with the Nightsun XP Searchlight. Investigation revealed that the Gimbal Azimuth Top Hex Nut was loose. To avoid possibly damage to the helicopter or injury to persons on the ground. EASA 2010-0154 "Optional Equipment - External Mounted Hoist System Visual Check / Replacement". During a recent pre-flight check of the external mounted hoist on a MBB-BK 117 C-2 helicopter, cracks were detected on the boom support P/N 44307-500. This condition, if not corrected, would impair the structural strength of the boom, potentially leading to failure of the boom support. This could result in loss of the boom and attached loads, endangering helicopter operation and possibly causing injuries to persons on the ground. Boom supports with P/N 44301-500 and P/N 44307-500-1 are of similar design to P/N 44307-500 on which the cracks were detected and are therefore also affected by this unsafe condition.
145 10-09-002R1 Eurocopter EC 135 series helicopters, if equipped with Spectrolab Nightsun XP Gimbal Assemblies P/N 033295 series used on Nightsun XP System P/N 033338 series.
146 10-09-002-U Eurocopter MBB-BK117 C-2, EC 135 series helicopters and Agusta Model AB139 and AW139 helicopters, if equipped with Spectrolab Nightsun XP Gimbal Assemblies P/N 033295 series used on Nightsun XP System P/N 033338 series. 147 10-09-003 Eurocopter EC 135 and BK 117 C-2 helicopters.
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EASA AD 2010-0207-E Indicating And Recording Systems Instrument Control Panel Flight Limitation/Modification - Recent flight test have revealed that, on certain instrument control panels (ICP), the force required to turn some of the BARO rotary knobs so low that an unintentional turning of these rotary knobs cannot be ruled out. This condition, if not detected and corrected, would likely produce erroneus altitude information, thereby increasing the pilots workload during cross-check with the stand-by instrument and could, during flight under instrument Flight Rules (IFR), possibly results in loss altitude, increasing the risk of flight into terrain. This AD requires, the identification of the affected ICPs, implementation of a flight limitation on helicopter that have these installed, and modification of each affected ICP to correct the friction of The BARO rotary knob. After modification, the flight limitation is no longer required and can be removed from the helicopter EASA AD 2010-0213 Main Rotor Drive Main Transmission Housing Upper Part - Modification. - A recent inspection has show that, on some of housing upper parts for the main transmission FS108, the by pass inlet in the oil filter area has not been manufactured in accordance with applicable design specification . - This condition , if not corrected , could adversely affect the oil filter by pass function , which is essential for continued safe flight. - For the reason described above , this AD requires a temporary modification of each affected P/N 4649 301 034 main transmission upper part by installing a corrugated washer , which will establish an equivalent structural design for the oil supply to the by pass. - This AD required rework of the oil filter area to bring the effected part (back) within the applicable design specification.
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Number Applicability
150 10-11-012R1 Eurocopter EC 135 helicopters: EC135 P1(CDS), EC135 P1(CPDS), EC135 P2(CPDS), EC135 P2+, EC135 T1(CDS), EC135 T1 (CPDS), EC135 T2(CPDS), EC135 T2+, all serial numbers, if equipped with a Main transmission FS108 housing upper part, Part Number (P/N) 4649 301 034.
EASA AD No. 2010-0213 -Main Rotor Drive Main Transmission Housing Upper Part - Modification. -A recent inspection has show that, on some of housing upper parts for the main transmission FS108, the by pass inlet in the oil filter area has not been manufactured in accordance with applicable design specification. This condition , if not corrected , could adversely affect the oil filter by pass function , which is essential for continued safe flight. For the reason described above, this AD requires a temporary modification of each affected P/N 4649 301 034 main transmission upper part by installing a corrugated washer , which will establish an equivalent structural design for the oil supply to the by pass. -This AD required rework of the oil filter area to bring the effected part (back) within the applicable design specification. -This AD has been republished to remove a part serial number (1028) from Appendix 1 of this AD and to correct paragraphs (2) and (3) as stated in Required action and Compliance Time section of the EASA AD No. 2010-0213. EASA AD No. 2010-0213 (Corrected 03 December 2010) Main Rotor Drive Main Transmission Housing Upper Part - Modification A recent inspection has shown that, on some of the housing upper parts for the main transmission FS108, the bypass inlet in the oil filter area has not been manufactured in accordance with the applicable design specification. This condition if not corrected, coult adversely affect the oilfilter bypass function, which is essential for continued safe flight. For the reason described above, this AD requires a temporary modification of each affected P/N 4649 301 034 main transmission upper part by installing a corrugated washer, which will establish an equivalent structural design for the oil supply to the by pass. This AD also requires rework of the oil filter area to bring the affected parts (back) within the applicable design specifications. This revision to remove a part serial number (1028) from Appendix 1 of the reference AD and to correct paragraphs (2) and (3) for consistency.
151 10-11-012R1 EC 135 P1(CDS), EC 135 P1(CPDS), EC 135 P2(CPDS, EC 135 P2+, EC 135 T1 (CDS), EC 135 T1(CPDS), EC 135 T2 (CPDS), EC 135 T2+ helicopters, all serial numbers, if equipped with a Main Transmission FS108 housing upper part, P/N 4649 301 034.
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152 10-12-018-E EC 135 P1 (CPDS), EC135 P2 (CPDS), EC 135 P2+, EC 135 T1 (CPDS), EC 135 T2 (CPDS), EC 135 T2+, serial numbers (s/n) 0642 through 0999 inclusive, if equipped with optional NVG system, and MBB-BK 117 C-2 helicopters, s/n 9004 through 9450 inclusive in, if equipped with the optional NVG system with the secured toogle switch Part Number (P/N) 845UN01F4AD0A (and asssociated wiring changes), either installed during production, or in-service in accordance with ECD Swervice Bulletin (SB) MBB-BK117 C-233-006.
EASA AD No. 2010-0247-E Light Instrument Lightighting Display Brigthness for Flight in Night Vision Google (NVG) Mode - Reduction Recent reviews have revealed that, when the INSTR LIGHT potentiometer is at certain positions, the diodes in the NVG system may overheat. This could lead to failure of the instrument and overhead panel lighting and, depending on the position of the potentiometer, the background lighting of Caution and Advisory Display (CAD), Vehicle and Engine Monitoring Display (VEMD), Primary Flight Display (PFD) and the Navigation Display (ND) may suddenly increase to maximum brightness. This condition, if not corrected, would likely impair the visibility of the flight crew, possibly resulting in loss of control of the helicopter. This AD requires an amandement of the Rotorcraft Flight Manual Supplement (RFMS) to implement a procedure for flights in NVG mode, to set the background lighting of CAD, VEMD, PFD and ND to an acceptable minimum level. EASA AD No. 2010-0237R2 EQUIPMENT/FURNISHINGS SPECTROLAB NIGHTSUN XP SEARCHLIGHT INSPECTION/REMOVAL/REPLACEMENT An incident has been reported by a Maintenance Organisation of vibration associated with the Nightsun XP Searchlight. Investigation revealed that the Gimbal Azimuth Top Hex Nut was loose. If not detected and corrected, could lead to a gap between the rubber edging of the top shroud and the Gimbal frame, resulting in degradation of pointing accuracy and stability performance and pose excessive vibration. If the nut were to entirely disengage, the Searchlight/Gimbal could disconnect from the helicopter and remain attached solely by the internal cable harness or separate totally, possibly resulting in damage to the helicopter or injury to persons on ground.
EUROCOPTER AS-332 SERIES 154 09-12-016R1 Eurocopter AS 332 C, C1, L, L1 and L2 helicopters, all serial numbers, if equipped with emergency flotation gear which have forward and rear cradles not marked with a letter "V" near the plug(s) and have serial number (S/N) as listed in table 1 of reference AD.
EASA AD 2009-0263R1 "Equipment & Furnishings - Emergency Flotation Gear Inpection / Repair /Replacement". The pipes connecting the emergency flotation gear cradle distribution tube to the two compartments which did not inflate were obstructed with the prptective product which is used to protect the inside of the cradle. The original issue of this AD required an inspection of the inlet cones of the supply pipes connected to each of the front and rear emergency flotation gear cradle distribution tubes (hereafter refered to as inflation pipes of each front and rear cradle) and the necessary corrective action, depending on findings. Since this AD was published, the cradle internal protection aplication process has been modified in production. Therefore, this AD is revised to limit its applicability to cradles manufactured prior to this production improvement.
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155 10-01-002 Eurocopter AS 332 C, AS 332 C1, AS 332 L1, and AS 332 L2 helicopters, all serial numbers, if equipped with a hoist beam P/N 330A87-2345 (dash number -00 to -06 inclusive), in combination with a traymounted single or double hoist, and which do not embody modification (MOD) 332A081113.00. SA 330 J helicopters, all serial numbers, if equipped with a hoist beam P/N 330A87-2345 (dash number -00 to -06 inclusive), in combintaion with a traymounted single.
EASA 2009-0271 "Equipment & Furnishings - Hydraulic Hoist Cable Limitation / Modification". An incident has been reported of a hydraulic hoist cable jamming against the base of the supporting strut of a dual hoist tray installation. The jamming occorred during a rescue at sea, while the load was lifted and subject to large oscillations. The load was transferred to the back-up electrical hoist and safely brought onboard. However, when jamming againts the hoist supporting strut, the hydraulic hoist cable damaged the back-up electrical hoist power supply harness which is routed through that area, resulting in a short circuit that fused and ruptured the hydraulic hoist cable. - This condition, if not corrected, could lead to further incidents of hoist cable jamming and consequent cable failure, possibly resulting in personal injuries and/or damage to the helicopter. This AD retain the requirements of DGCA AD No. 2009-08-010-U, which superseded, adds require action (s) for AS 332 helicopters equipped with a RH side sliding door P/N 332A22-1165-01, and extends the complication time to install an approved protection of the base of the hoist assembly for those AS 332 helicopter and for SA 330 J helicopters to 30 June 2010. EASA 2009-0275-E "Fuselage-Intermediate Gear Box (IGB) Fairing Gutter inspection / Replacement". A helicopter experienced separation of the IGB fairing gutter, resulting in interference with the tail rotor inclined drive shaft. This condition,if not corrected,can lead to failure of drive shaft,causing loss of the tail rotor drive and consequent reduced control of the helicopter. DGCA AD 08-12-009-U (EASA AD 208-0219E) superseding DGCA AD O7 -04-006-U (EASA AD 20070090-E) whose requirements were retaind, to expand the applicibility to include other AS 332 helicopter models, and to require more extensive repetitive inspections of the IGB fairing gutter and, in case of discrepencies, replacement of damage parts. In addition, this AD provided an optional terminating action as offered by Eurocopter with in-service modification for improvement of gutter attachment on IGB fairing (SB 53.01.56 for AS332 helicopter respectively) or equivalent production MOD 0726599 and after modification of a helicopter accordingly, the repetitive inspections of AD were no longer required for that helicopter. Since DGCA AD 08-12-009-U (EASA AD 2008-0219-E) was published, crack occurrences on the gutter of two helicopters after embodiment of the terminating action have been reported. This AD, which supersedes DGCA AD 08-12-009-U (EASA AD 2008-0219-E), re-estabilishes the repetitive inspection of the IGB fairing gutter for all helicopters, irrespective of modification status, and reduces the inspection interval. In addition, depending on finding, some corrective actions in accordance with the instructions of Europcopter AS332 SB 53.01.56 have now become part the of required actions of this AD.
156 10-01-003 AS 332 C, AS 332 C1, AS 332 L, AS 332 L1 and AS 332 L2 helicopters, all serial numbers, if modified during production with MOD 0725356 (installation of a gutter on the IGB fairing) or in-service with Eurocopter AS332 Service Bulletin (SB) 53.01.10 (at any revision). EC 225 LP helicopters, all serial numbers.
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157 10-02-006 Eurocopter model AS332, AS365, AS350, SA330, EC155 series, Eurocopter Deuthschland GmbH model EC 135, MBBBK117 helicopter, Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation S-76 series, All serial numbers, if equipped with Lifesaving System D-Lok Hooks with part number (P/N) 410-A or 410-F and identified as part of lot number 208 or 1108.
EASA AD 2009-0183-CN "Equipment / Furnishing - D'Lok Hook of the Rescue Hoist Inspection / Removal from Service / Replacement". This AD to cancel DGCA AD No. 09.07.017-U (EASA AD 20901783-E). The Federal Aviation Administration, which is the state of Design Authority for the lifesavings system Corp. DLok Hook installed on certain Goodrich and Breeze-Eastern rescue hoist assemblies, has issued AD 2010-03-02. EASA has decided to adopt this FAA AD, whose applicablity is broader than DGCA AD No. 09.07.017-U (EASA AD 200901783-E), as it affects all rotorcraft where the D-Lok Hook might be installed. EASA 2010-0043R1-E Hydraulic Power - Hydraulic Pumps - Identification / Replacement . This AD to prevent hydraulic fluid leak from the hydraulic pump casing and has shown that the liner of the compensating piston was incorrectly positioned. It could result in loss of the RH and Left Hand (LH) hydraulic power systems and consequently may lead to the loss of helicopter controllability. This AD is revise to correct which pump can be installed in replacement of the above mentioned deterioration pumps. EASA AD 2010-0043-E "Hydraulic Power - Hydraulic Pumps - Identification / Replacement". From information that loss of the Right Hand (R/H) hydraulic power system on an AS332 L2 helicopter, the pilot saw the hydraulic system "Low Level" warning comes on during the approach phase. Investigation has revealed a hydraulic fluid leak from the hydraulic pump casing and has shown that the liner of the compensasting piston was incorrectly positioned. If this condition occurs on both pumps of a helicopter, it could result in loss of the RH and Left Hand(LH) hydraulic power systems and consequently may lead to the loss helicopter controllability. This Emergency Airworthiness Directive (EAD) requires the identification of the pumps that are currently installed on the helicopters, and the accomplishment of corrective actions (replacement) as necessary.
158 10-03-008R1-U EUROCOPTER AS 332 C, AS 332 C1, AS 332 L, AS 332 L1 and AS332 L2 Helicopters, all serial numbers.
159 10-03-008-U Eurocopter AS 332 C, AS 332 C1, AS 332 L, AS 332 L1 and AS 332 L2 helicopters, all serial numbers.
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EASA AD 2010-0117-E "Rotors Flight Controls-Main Rotor Servocontrols End Fitting Ball Joints-Inspections/Replacement". The slipping of the ball joint of the servocontrol lower end fitting does not significantly affect the service life of this end fitting while the slipping of the ball joint of the servocontrol upper end fitting can lead to a significant reduction in the service life of this end fitting. This last condition, if not corrected, could likely lead to damage of the upper end fitting ball joints of the main rotor servocontrols and possibly resulting in failure of upper end fittings. can lead to a significant reduction in the service life on this end fitting.This last condition, if not corrected, could likely lead to damage of the upper end fitting ball joints of the main rotor servocontrols and possibly resulting in failure of upper end fittings. For the reasons stated above, this AD requires an inspection of the upper end fitting ball joints of the main rotor servocontrols and the necessary corrective action (replacement), depending on findings. EASA AD 2010-0234 -Time Limits / Maintenance Checks Airworthiness Limitations Amendment / Implementation. -The airworthiness limitations applicable to the helicopter models specified in the applicability paragraph of this Airworthiness Directive are given in the following EUROCOPTER and EASA-approved Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) revisions as stated in AD reference reason section. -EUROCOPTER has issued the above ALS normal revision as stated in AD reference reason section to introduce new or more restrictive continued airworthiness requirements. As per the definition of the requirements contained in the ALS, failure to comply with one of these ALS revisions could lead to an unsafe condition. Consequently, compliance with these new Airworthiness Limitations has been identified as mandatory actions for continued airworthiness. For this reason, this AD requires complying with the Airworthiness limitations as specified in EUROCOPTER ALS documents listed in AD reference reason section.
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Number Applicability
162 09-06-006R1 Eurocopter AS 350, EC 130, AS 365, EC 155, SA 330 and AS 332
EASA AD 2010-0122R1 Equipment / Furnishings Load Release Units Inspection / Modification / Limitation Some cases of jamming of the load attachment ring on the cargo hook in the open position have been reported. These events were caused by the use of rings having incorrect size for the SIREN load release units. This condition, if not corrected, can lead to the loss of the hanging load. DGCA AD 09-06-006 which issued on June 2009, required for cargo hook operations the use of rings and shackles within the specified tolerances, in accordance with the instructions of the relevant Eurocopter Alert Service Bulletin (ASB). It also required to affix a locally-made placard on the cargo hook, with instructions on the proper load hang-up under the helicopter and to insert copies of ASB appendices in the applicable Flight Manual pending availability of the relevant revisions.
163 10-01-008 Eurocopter models AS 350 B, BA, B1, B2, B3, BB, D and EC 130 B4 if equipped with P/N 863520-00 portable fire extinguisher, serial numbers (s/n) as listed in L'Hotellier SB 863520-26-001.
EASA 2009-0277 "Fire Protection - Portable Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers Identification / Replacement". The Civil Aviation Authority of the United Kingdom (UK) has informed EASA that significant quantities of Halon 1211 gas, determined to be outside the required specification, have been supplied to the aviation industry for use in fire extingushing equipment. The result of the ongoing investigation have now established that LyonTech Engineering Ltd, a UK-based company, has supplied futrher consignments of Halon 1211 (BCF) to L'Hotellier that do not meet the required specification. This HALON 1211 has subsequently been used to fill certain P/N 863520-00 portable fire extinguishers that or now likely to be installed in or carried on certain Eurocopter helicopters. The Contaminated nature of this gas, when used againts a fire, may provide reduced fire suppression, endangering the safety of the helicopter and its occupants. In addition, extinguisher activation may lead to release of toxic fumes, possibly causing injury to helicopter occupants. This AD requres the indentification and removal from service of certain bacthes of fire extinguishers and replacement with serviceable units. EASA AD 2009-0277R1 "Fire Protection - Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers Identification / Replacement". This AD to prevent contamination nature of Halon 1211 gas, when used against a fire, may provide reduced fire suppression, endangering the safety of helicopter and its occupant. This AD requires the identification and removal from service certain bacthes of fire extinguishers and replacement with serviceable units. Based on a reassessment of the risk of this unsafe condition on helicopters, this AD has been revised to extend the compliance time.
164 10-01-008R1 Eurocopter helicopter models: AS 350 B, BA, B1, B2, B3, BB and D, and EC 130 B4, if equipped with P/N 863520-00 portable fire extinguishers, serial numbers (s/n) as listed in L'Hotellier Service Bulletin (SB) 863520-26-001.
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165 10-01-017 Models AS 350 B, AS 350 BA, AS 350 BB, AS 350 B1, AS 350 B2, AS 350 B3 and AS 350 D helicopters, all serial numbers, if equipped with TR picth-change links having Part Number (P/N) 350A33-2100-00, 350A33-2100-01, 350A33-2100-02, 350A33-2100-03, 350A33-2100-04, 3502121-00, 350-2121-01, 350-2121-02, 3502143-00, 350A33-2145-00 or 350A33-214501.
EASA AD 2010-0006 "Time Limit / Maintenance Checks - Tail Rotor (TR) Pitch Change Links - Inspection". A case has been reported where the pilot of an AS 350 helicopter felt slight vibration in the pedal unit in flight. A few minutes later, vibration level increased and the pilot carried out a precautionary autorotation landing. After landing, it was discovered that one TR pitch-change link was damaged, that the taill-boom cone was missing and there was an impact mark on the tailboom. Further investigation of effected TR pitch-change link has shown extensive wear on the ball-joint and failure of the web of the ball-joint due to fatigue. The wear of effected TR pitch-change link could have been discovered during a regular check for no play in the links, which is scheduled at intervals not exceeding 30 flight hours (FH) and to be accomplished during check after the last flight of the lay (ALF). This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to loss of the anti-torque function, possibly resulting in loss of control of thr helicopter. This AD is requires repetitive inspections for no play in the TR pitch-change links and corrective actions, depending on fendings. EASA AD 2010-0082-E Tail Rotor Drive Tail Gearbox (TGB) Control Levers Inspection / Rework / Replacement . To prevent reduce the structural strength of the TGB control lever, possibly causing failure of the lever, which could result in reduced control of the helicopter. This AD requires repetitive inspections of the affected parts in order to detect cracks and, depending on findings, rework or replacement
166 10-05-003-U AS 350 B, BA, BB, B1, B2, and D helicopters, all serial numbers, if equipped with TGB control lever Part Number (P/N) 350A33-1058-00, P/N 350A33-1058-01, P/N 350A33-1058-02, P/N 350A33-105803, except those marked with an X.
EUROCOPTER AS-365 SERIES 167 10-04-001-U Eurocopter AS365 N3 helicopters, all serial numbers, equipped with external life rafts P/N 245431-0 or 245434-0.
EASA AD 2010-0052-E "Equipment / Furnishings External Life Raft Mooring Line Attachment Inspection / Rework". To prevent the shackle of life raft mooring line was incorrectly attached to life raft securing strap instead of being secured to container fitting. The life craft could drift off, when deployed and consequently prevent the passenger and flight crew from transferring to life raft. This AD requires to check the mooring line attachment point of each external life raft installation and to accomplish the corrective action. EASA AD 2010-0064-E "Fuselage - Frame No. 9 - Inspection / Repair". This AD is issued to retains the requirements of DGCA AD No. 09-06010-U (EASA AD 2009-0125-E), which is supersedes and modifies the action compliance times according to helicopter types.
168 10-04-010-U Eurocopter SA 365 and AS 365 helicopters, all serial numbers.
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EASA AD 2010-0100R1 "Navigation - Vertical Gyro Unit Data Output - Operational Limitation / Operational Procedure / Reinforcement". A slow drift in the roll axis on the pilot's and co-pilot's horizon of the flight control display occurred simultaneously during flight on several helicopters equipped with the GV76-1 vertical gyro unit installation in cargo compartement. Investigation has shown that these drift were caused by a fault in the vertical gyros unit installation in the rear cargo. For the reason described above, DGCA AD 10-06-006-U was issued, retaining the requirements of DGCA AD 09-11-014-U, which was superseded, requiring the embodiment of the modification 365P081895 which require to reinforce the GV76-1 vertical gyro unit upper shelf by adding two attachment points between the cargo floor and the horizontal cross-members of the shelf which support to inforce the GV76-1 units. Embodiment of the modification 365P081895 constitutes a terminating action for the operational limitation imposed by this AD. EASA AD 2010-0100-E Navigation- Vertical Gyro Unit Data Output Operational Limitation/ Operational procedure /Reinforcement. A slow drift in the roll axis on the pilots and co-pilots horizon of the flight control display occured simultaneously during flight on several helicopters equipped with the GV761 vertical gyro unit installation in cargo compartement. Investigation has shown that these drift were caused by a fault in the vertical gyros unit installation in the rear cargo. For the reason described above, this AD retains the requirement of DGCA AD 09-11-014-U, was issued in order to extend the applicability to SA365 N1 and AS 365 N2 helicopters and to any SA365 N1, AS 365 N2 and N3 helicopter equipped with vertical gyro units GV76-1 installed on the rear RH rack.
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Number Applicability
171 10-07-006-U AS 365 N3, EC 155B and B1 and SA 366 G1 helicopters, all serial numbers, if equipped with Main Gearbox (MGB) fitted with dual pump lubrication system that has been subject to removal/installation since 04 November 2004.
EASA AD 2010-0116-E "Main Rotor Drive - Main Gearbox Oil Low Pressure Switch Connection - Inspection / Rework / Operational Procedure". Eurocopter had received a report of crossed connection of the low pressure switches of the MGB main lubrication system and auxiliary lubrication system. To differentiate between both electrical systems, they had been identified by means of labels which, however, may become difficult to read due to aging. In the event of a failure of one of the lubrication systems, crossed connections will lead to illumination of the failure warning light that corresponds to the other system. Any continuation of flights in these conditions could lead to a significant oil temperature increase in the MGB lubrication system and result in damage to the integrity of the MGB. This unsafe condition has been covered by DGCA AD 04-09013 (French (DGAC) AD F-2004-154). It mandated, pending to a Eurocopter modification, to carry out a one-time inspection to make sure that the pressure switches were not cross-connected. Considering that the modification planned initially as part of ALERT TELEX No. 00000197 was not achieved, and to prevent any risk of pressure switch crossconnection, DGAC AD 04-09-013 (French AD F-2004-154) is superseded by this AD which mandates to inspect the connections of the MGB oil pressure switches for helicopters on which pump lubrication system has been subject to removal and installation since 04 November 2004. In addition, this AD requires to temporarily amend the RFM and to inform flight crews accordingly.
EUROCOPTER EC 130 172 10-05-008-U EC 130 B4 helicopters all serial numbers, if delivered before 15 April 2010 and equipped with the floatation gear unit 1G , Part Number (P/N) 350A63256300.
EASA AD 2010-0088-E Equipment and Furnishing Emergency Flotation Gear wiring Modification . To prevent an uncontrolled in-flight deployment of the emergency flotation gear could lead to an unexpected deceleration and pitch down movement of the helicopter, resulting in a deviation from the intended flight path and reduced controllability of the helicopter. This AD requires a visual inspection of the 1G unit and the associated corrective actions, as applicable and modification of the relevant flotation gear units. EASA AD 2010-0258 Windows-Centre Windshield-Inspection/Operating Limitation/Replacement Following report failures of the centre windshield panel in flight the investigations have revealed that this failure was caused by a crack which started in the blending radius between the lower and upper sections of the windshield. This unsafe condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to serious injury of the helicopter occupants.
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Number Applicability
174 10-01-021 Eurocopter SA 330, AS 332, AS 350, SA 365, AS 365 and EC 155 helicopters.
EASA AD 2010-0014 "Equipment and Furnishings - Hoist Operator's Belt Snap Hook - Replacement / Modification". This AD is issued to supersedes DGCA AD No. 06-09-019 (EASA AD No. 20060252) retaining its requirements, except for SE 3160, SA 316 B,C, and SA 319 B helicopters for which it is additionally required to install a modified cable end-piece and a new compliance times has been defined. EASA AD 2010-0147-E "Rotors - Main Gear Box Oil Cooling Fan - Inspection / Replacement". Eurocopter has been informed of the case of rotor burst of the Main Gear Box (MGB) oil cooling fan assembly. The investigation has show that some rotor blades interfered with the upper area of the guide vane bearing housing of the fan. The blade detecthed from the rotor, impacting the MGB compartment environment and causing puncture holes in the transmission deck. This interface was due to internal degradation of the bearings of the fan rotor shaft. This last condition, if not corrected, could lead to fan rotor burst and possibly result to damage hydraulic pipes and flight controls located nearby the MGB cooling fan. The reason of this AD requires an inspection of the play between a fan blade and the guide vane bearing housing. Furthermore, it also requires the necessary replacement of the two bearings of the fan rotor shaft, depending of findings.
EUROCOPTER-EC 155 176 10-04-011 EUROCOPTER EC 155 B and B1 helicopters, all serial numbers, delivered before 01/01/2010 with pilots and copilots doors equipped with jettisoning option post MOD 0752C05.
EASA AD 2010-0040 Doors - Jettisoning System of the Pilots and Co-pilots Doors - Test / Rework. To prevent the pilots and co-pilots door hinge studs is too tight and leads to an abnormally high jettisoning load, which could reduce the ability of flight crew evacuation in the event of an emergency situation. This AD requires to perform a jettisoning test of the pilots and co-pilots doors and the accomplishment of the relevant corrective actions (sanding and greasing the door hinge studs) depending of the outcomes of the test. EASA AD 2010-0254 Fuselage-Rear Structure/Tail Boom-Pre-Flight Check/Inspection/Modification During a pre-flight check on an EC 135 helicopter, a crack was detected on the ring frame that connects the tail rotor Fenestron housing to the rear structure tube (tail boom). The crack ran alongside one rivet row over about one third of the circumference of the ring frame. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to crack propagation remaining undetected, possibly resulting in loss of the Fenestron structure and consequent loss of control of the helicopter. To ensure an adequate safety level, the interval of the visual inspection must be reduced from 100 flight Hours (FH) to 25 FH. In addition, the optional terminating action is to be made mandatory.
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Number Applicability
EASA AD 2010-0257 Windows-Jettisoning System of Hinged Cabin Door Window-Rework During a daily check on an EC155 helicopter under flight test by Eurocopter, it was found that the window jettison load exceeded the required load. This condition, if not corrected, could prevent the jettisoning of a window, possibly affecting the evacuation of passengers in the event of an emergency situation. This AD requires the accomplishment of a modification to reduce the jettison load of the affected windows, the implementation of a system enabling window jettisoning from the outside, and to install exterior marking and standard labels specific to windows jettisoning and use of emergency exits.
179 10-12-021-U SA 365 N, SA 365 N1, AS 365 N2, AS 365 N3, SA 366 G1, EC 155 B and EC 155 B1 helicopters, all serial numbers, fitted with a mast nut Part Number (p/n) 360A31-102020 installed in main rotor mast assemblies. This AD does not apply to helicopters that have modification (MOD) 0762B88 and/or MOD 0762C42 embodied in-production or EUROCOPTER service Bulletin No. 62007 embodied in service as applicable to helicopter type. Embodiment of these modification consist in replacement of mast nut P/N 360A31-1020-20 by mast nut P/N 365A31-2060-20 or P/N 365A31-2060-21, as applicable to helicopter type. FOKKER F 27 SERIES 180 10-06-007 F27 Mark 050, Mark 0502 and Mark 0604 aeroplanes, all serial numbers.
EASA AD 2006-0368 R1 Rotor Rotor Mast Nut Check / Replacement To prevent complete failure of the mast nut, possibly resulting in failure of the rotor mast and consequent loss of control of the helicopter. This Emergency AD require repetitive inspections of the mast nut, depending on findings, corrective action. This AD is republished to correct a typographical error in the replacement mast nut part numbers referenced in this AD.
EASA AD 2010-0113 "Time Limits / Maintenance Checks - Maintenance Requirement - Implementation". To retain the requirements of CAA-NL AD NL-2002-061 R1 which is superseded, and requires the implementation of the inspections and corrective measures as specified in Fokker 50/60 MRB document at revision 15, reports SE-525 and SE-622.
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181 10-08-007 F27 Mark 050, 0502 and 0604 aeroplanes, all serial numbers.
EASA AD 2010-0157 "Fuel - Fuel Quantity Probe & Wiring Installation Inspection / Modification [Fuel Tank Safety]". - This AD has published Special Federation Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88 and JAA has published Interim Policy INT/POL/25/12. The Design review conducted by Fokker Services on the Fokker 50 and Fokker 60 in response to these regulation revealed that, with additional factors, this may result in an ignition source in the wing tank vapour space. - This condition , if not corrected, in combination with flammable fuel vapours could result in a wing fuel tank explotion and consequent lost of the aeroplane .This AD requires a one-time inspection to check for the presence of a rubber sleeve and cable tie near each FQP in both wing tanks nd, depending on findings, the installation of sleeve and cable tie. EASA 2010-0182 Fuel- Fuel Pipes in Engine Nacelles Inspection / Replacement [Fuel Tank Safety]. - This AD has published Special Federation Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88 and JAA has published Interim Policy INT/POL/25/12. The Design review conducted by Fokker Services on the Fokker 50 and Fokker 60 in response to these regulation revealed that the clearance between parts of the main landing gear (MLG) and the Fuel pipes may be insufficient . - This Condition , if not detected and corrected , could lead to chafing , possibly resulting in fuel leakage and, in combination with other factors, a fuel fire. - For the reasons described above, this ADrequires actions to ensure a minimum clearance is maintained between the parts of the MLG and the fuel pipes in both nacelles. EASA AD 2010-0200 Lights - Emergency Lighting Tritium Exit Signs Inspection / Replacement ". - As required by current certification standards, each transport aeroplanes has passenger compartement exit signs and emergency lighting strips installed to locate the emergency exits. A number of these strips and signs are not electrically powered, but are self iluminated by means of a hydrogen isotope, known as Tritium. As this isotope decays over time, these signs will loose their brightness. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in insufficinetly bright exit signs and lighting strips, preventing safe evacuation during an emergency, possibly resulting ininjury to occupants. This AD requires the inspection of the brigthness of all Tritium exit signs and strips aand, depending on findings, repalcement of insufficiently bright signs and lighting strips.
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184 10-11-013 F27 Mark 050 , 500, aero planes , serial number 20133 through 20335, except those with in board fuel tanks installed.
EASA AD 2010-0197 Fuel Fuel Pipes in Engine Nacelles Inspection / Replacement [ Fuel Tank Safety]. - FAA has published Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, and Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has published interim policy INT/POL/25/12. The review conducted by Fokker Service on the Fokker F50 and 60 Type Design in response to these regulation revealed that clearance between parts of the Main landing gear 9MLG) and fuel pipes may be insufficient. - This condition if not detected and corrected , could lead to chafing , possibly resulting in fuel leakage and, in combination with other factor a fuel fire. - EASA issue AD 2010 0182 to required action to ensure that minimum clearance is maintenance between the parts of MLG and the fuel pipes in both nacelles. - Since that AD was issued , it was discovered that aeroplane serial numbers 20133 through 20142 were erroneously omitted in original Fokker Service Bulletins (SB) and consequently the AD did not apply to those aeroplanes. - This condition if not corrected, for the reason this new AD retains the requirements of AD 2010-0182, which is superseded. EASA AD 2010-0195 Fuel Fuel Pilot Valve Wiring - Modification [ Fuel Tank Safety]. FAA has published Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, and Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has published interim policy INT/POL/25/12. The review conducted by Fokker Service on the Fokker F50 and 60 Type Design in response to these regulation revealed , under certain failure conditions, a short circuit can develop in the fuel pilot valve solenoid or in the wiring to the solenoid . Such a short circuit may resulting an ignition source in the wing tank vapor space. EASA AD 2010-0261 Lights Emergency Lighting Tritium Exit Signs Inspection/Replacement As required by current certification standards, each transport aeroplane has passenger compartment exit signs and emergency lighting strips installed to locate the emergency exits. A number of these strips and signs are not electrically powered, but are self illuminated by means of a hydrogen isotope, known as Tritium. As this isotope decays over time, these signs will loose their brightness. To remain compliant with regulations, Tritium exit signs and lighting strips should be replaced when their brightness has deteriorated below accepted levels. Currently, the Maintenance Review Board (MRB) Maintenance Planning Document does not include an inspection task for signs and strips containing Tritium. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in insufficiently bright exit signs and lighting strips, preventing safe evacuation during an emergency, possibly resulting in injury to occupants.
185 10-11-014 F27 mark 050 and F28 Aeroplanes Mark 1000, 3000, 4000 and F28 Mark 0100 all serial number.
FOKKER F 28 SERIES
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EASA AD 2009-0216R1 "Flight Controls - Horizontal Stabilizer Control Unit Doglink Attachement - Modification". During inspection of the vertical stabilizer of F28 Mark 0100 aeroplanes, one of the bolts that connect the horizontal stabilizer control unit actuator with the dog-links was found broken (one on the nut side and one on the head side). In both occasions, the bolt shaft was still present in connection and therefore the horizontal stabilizer function was not affected. If a single dog-link connection fails, the complete stabilizer load is taken up by remaining dog-link connection. Any failed connection should be detected and corrected at the next scheduled inspection. Recent examination revealed that the bolt (P/N 23233-1) failed due to stress corosion, attributed to excessive bolt torque and requires to replace the affected P/N 23233-1 bolts with improved bolts Concurrently, the tie-wrap must be removed. This AD is revises DGCA AD No. 09-10012 (EASA AD 2009-0216) to corrected the require action(s) and compliance time(s) section. EASA AD 2009-0221R1 "Landing Gear - Main Landing Gear (MLG) Piston Inspection / Replacement". To prevent loss of control of the aeroplane during the landing roll-out as a result of MLG failure. EASA AD 2009-0269R1 "Landing Gear - Main Landing Gear (MLG) - Modification / Replacement". This AD is issued to prevent probable both the main fitting and sliding member cracks is high compressive stress during bracking at higher deceleration levels outside the reguler fatigue load spectrum. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to failure of the MLG, possibly resulting in loss of control of the aeroplane during the landing rollout. This AD requires the modification and reidentification of the affected MLG units, or replacement of the affected MLG units with modified units.
189 10-03-009 Fokker F28 Mark 0100 aeroplanes, all serial numbers, if Messier-Dowty (formerly Dowty-Rotol, Dowty Aerospace Gloucester) MLG units with Part Number (P/N) 201072011, P/N 201072012, P/N 201072013, P/N 201072014, P/N 201072015 or P/N 201072016 are installed.
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190 10-06-008 F28 Mark 0070 and Mark 0100 aeroplanes, all serial numbers.
It was discovered that the in-line flow indicators at several oxygen-supply-lines of B/E Aerospace (formerly PuritanBennett) passenger oxygen masks Part Number (P/N) 174080-xx were found broken. Investigation revealed that P/N 118023-02 in line flow indicators, installed on oxygen masks manufactured between 01 January 2002 and 01 March 2006, are weaker and can fracture because of internal residual stresses caused by the flow indicator joint design and manufacturing processes. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to further cases of fracturing and separation of the in-line flow indicators of the passenger oxygen masks, which could inhibit oxygen flow of the masks and consequently result in exposure of the passengers and cabin attendants to hypoxia following a depressurization event. This AD requires the identification of the affected masks and modification of replacement with a serviceable unit. 191 10-07-019 F28 Marks 1000, 1000C, 2000, 3000, 3000C, 3000R, 3000RC and 4000 aeroplanes, all serial numbers, if equipped with a Centre Wing Tank (CWT), and F28 Mark 0100 aeroplanes, serial numbers 11244 through 11441. EASA AD 2010-0139 "Fuel Fuelling Control Panel Cam Inspection / Replacement / Functional Check [Fuel Tank Safety]". Service experience has revealed situations where the power switch of the Fuelling Control Panel (FCP) appeared to be ON with the access panel closed. The cam on the access panel that should operate the power switch, if forgotten by flight crew or maintenance staff, can pivot away during closing of the panel, which may result in the switch staying in the ON position. This condition, if not corrected, could result in a wing fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the aeroplane. For the reasons described above, this AD requires an inspection of the cam and, depending on findings, replacement with an improved part.Subsequently, this AD requires repetitive functional checks of the cam and,depending on findings, the necessary corrective actions.
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Number Applicability
192 10-08-005 F28 Mark 0070 and Mark 0100 aeroplanes, all serial numbers.
EASA AD 2010-0159 "Fuel - Wing Tank Overflow Valve Sence Line- & Wiring Conduit Hose Attachments - Inspection / Modification [Fuel Tank Safety]". Prompted by an accident of Boeing 747-131 (Flight TWA), the Federal Aviation Regulation has published Special Federation Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, and the joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) have published Interim Policy INT/POL/25/12. The review, conducted by Fokker Service on the Fokker 100 and Fokker 70 type design in response to these regulations, revealed that the fuel sense line from the overflow valves may touch the adjacent fuel quantity indication probe. Under certain conditions, this may result in ignition source in the wing tank vapour space. This AD requires a one time inspection to check the route and clamping of the sence line hose and wiring conduit hose to each wing tank overflow valve and depending on the finding, the necessary corective actions. EASA 2010-0156 "Fuel - Outer Wing Upper Skin Panel Reinforcement Structure - Inspection / Rework [Fuel Tank Safety]". Prompted by an accident of Boeing 747-131 (flight TWA), the Federal Aviation Regulation has published Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, and the joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) have published Interim Policy INT/POL/25/12. The dessign review, conducted by Fokker Services on the Fokker 28 type design in response to these regulations revealed that, under certain condition, an ignition source may develop in the wing tank vapour space, due to insuffucient clearance between the wiring along the fuel quantity tank units (FQTU's) and the local reinforcing structure around the upper skin cut-out. This AD requires a one time inspection to investigate if clearance of 3 mm (0.12 inch) or more is available between the FQTU probes wiring and the surrounding reinforcement structure of the wing upper skin and corrective rework actions, depending on finding.
193 10-08-006 FOKKER Mark 3000 and 400 aeroplanes, all serial numbers.
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194 10-08-008 Fokker F28 Mark 0070 and Mark 0100 aeroplanes, serial numbers 11244 through 11585.
EASA AD 2010-0158 "Fuel - Crossfeed Valve System and Fire Shut-off Valve System - Modification". - A recent safety review revealed that the fuel crossfeed valves cannot be controlled when only emergency electrical power available. - This Condition , if not corrected , could ( in combination whit other factors) prevent an in-flight following a doble engine flame-out event, possibly resulting in loss of the aeroplanes. - Another review revealed that an unwanted configuration of the fuel fire shut off valve indication logic had been introduced during production on a limited number of F28 Mark 0100 aeroplanes. - Futhermore , most the current fuel crossfeed indication are based on the crossfeed selection made by the flight crew and not on the actual position of the crossfeed valve actuators. In combination with other factors, the current crossfeed indications may mislead flight crews, possibly resulting in single engine in-flight shutdowns and/or unnecessary precaution landings. - This AD requires modification of crossfeed valve control and power supply , of the crossfeed valve control indication logic and power supply and of the fuel fire shut off valve indication logic. EASA AD 2010-0194 Fuel Collector Tank Level Float Switch Wiring Modification [ Fuel Tank Safety]. - FAA has published Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, and Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has published interim policy INT/POL/25/12. The review conducted by Fokker Service on the Fokker F28 Type Design in response to these regulation revealed that, under certain failure conditions, a short circuit may develop in collector tank level float switch wiring . Such a short circuit may result in an ignition source in the tank vapor space. - This condition if not corrected, could result in a wing fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the aeroplane.
195 10-11-015 Fokker F28 Mark 1000 , 3000, 4000 aeroplanes , all serial numbers.
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196 10-12-006 Fokker 28 Mark 0100 aeroplanes Serial Number 11244 through 11585
EASA AD 2010-0158R1 A recent safety review revealed that the fuel crossfeed valves cannot be controlled when only emergency electrical power is available. This condition, if not corrected, could (in combination with other factors) prevent an in-flight engine relight following a double engine flame-out event, possibly resulting in loss of the aeroplane. Another review revealed that an unwanted configuration of the fuel fire shut-off valve indication logic had been introduced during production on a limited number of F28 Mark 0100 aeroplanes. Furthermore, most of the current fuel crossfeed indications are based on the crossfeed selection made by the flight crew and not on the actual positions of the crossfeed valve actuators. In combination with other factors, the current crossfeed indications may mislead flight crews, possibly resulting in single engine in-flight shutdowns and/or unnecessary precautionary landings. For the reasons described above, this AD requires modifications of the crossfeed valve control and power supply, of the crossfeed indication logic and power supply and of the fuel fire shut-off valve indication logic. EASA AD No. 2010-0217 -This AD has published Special Federation Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88 and JAA has published Interim Policy INT/POL/25/12. The Design review conducted by Fokker Services on the Fokker 28 type design in response to these regulation revealed that, on certain aeroplanes, an interrupted shield contact may exist or develop between the housing of an in-tank Fuel Quantity Indicator (FQI) cable plug and cable shield of the shielded FQI system cables in the main and collector fuel tank which can ,under certain condition ,form a spark gap. -This Condition , if not detected and corrected , may create an inigtion source in the tank vapour space , possibly resulting in a wing fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the aeroplane. -For the reasons described above, this AD requires for certain aeroplanes , a one-time inspection to check for presence of by -pass wire between housing of each in-tank FQI cable plug and the cable shield and, depending on findings , the installation of Critical Design Control Limitations (CDCCL) task to make certain that the by-pass wire remains installed. -On later production aeroplanes, a different plug has been introduced, Souriau (P/N)20P227-2. This plug has an improved shield connection to necessary . This AD only requires the implementation of CDCCL task to make certain that this type of plug remains installed.
GIPPSLAND - GA 8 AIRVAN
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198 10-05-005 All GA8 aircraft serial numbers GA8-00004 and above, and GA8-TC 320 model, all serial numbers.
CASA AUSTRALIA AD/GA8/5 Amdt 3 "Horizontal Stabilizer Inspection". Inspection of a high time aircraft has revealed cracks in the Horizontal Stabilizer rear spar splice plate and inboard main ribs around the area of the Horizontal Stabilizer rear pivot attachment. Additionally, failure of some attach bolts in service may be due to improper assembly. This AD issued to clarify the model applicability. All requirements, accomplishment instructions and illustrations are contained in the service bulletin. CASA AUSTRALIA AD/GA8/5 Amdt. 4 "Horizontal Stabiliser Inspection". Inspection of high time aircraft has revealed cracks in the Horizontal Stabilizer rear spar splice plate and inboard main ribs around the area of the Horizontal Stabilizer rear pivot attachment. Additionally, failure of some attach bolts in service may be due to improper assembly. This AD is issued to include an applicability matrix (Table 1, page 2) in the compliance section of the service bulletin for improved clarity. All requirements, accomplishment instructions and ilustrations are contained in the service bulletin. GA8/3 Amdt2 "Forward Cargo Door Slide". To update the service bulletin to remove any ambiguities that could have existed in the previous revision to the referenced service bulletin. It also provides an improved inspection method and a minor design change to the cargo door slide (inclusion of slide backing plate, castellated nut and split pin).
199 10-05-014 All GA8 aircraft serrial numbers GA8-00004 and above, and GA8-TC 320 variant, all serial numbers.
HONEYWELL INTERN. INC. ENGINE 201 10-04-004 Honeywell International Inc. TFE731-2, TFE731-2A, TFE731-2C, TFE731-3, TFE731-3A, TFE731-3AR, TFE731-3B, TFE731-3BR, TFE731-3C, TFE731-3CR, TFE731-3D, TFE731-3DR, TFE731-3R, TFE731-4, TFE731-4R, TFE731-5, TFE731-5AR, TFE731-5BR, and TFE7315R series turbofan engines with certain second stage low-pressure compressor rotor (LPCR) discs, part number (P/N) 3072396-1 or 3075190-1, and/or certain third stage LPCR disc, P/N 3072397-1 or 3075192-1, installed. These engines are installed on, but not limited to, the airplanes listed in table 1 of reference AD. INTERNATIONAL AERO ENGINE
FAA AD 2010-06-11 This AD is issued to prevent an uncontained failure of second stage LPCR disc and/or a third stage LPCR disc due to cracks in the bore, which could result in damage to the airplane.
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202 10-04-005 International Aero Engines (IAE) V2500A1, V2522-A5, V2524-A5, V2522-A5, V2525-D5, V2527-A5, V2527E-A5, V2527M-A5, V2528-D5, V2530-A5, and V2533-A5 turbofan engines with highpressure (HP) compressor stage 3-8 drums, part numbers (P/Ns) 6A4900, 6A5467, 6A6473, 6A7383, 6A7384, 6A7385, and 6A7401, installed. These engines are installed on, but not limited to Airbus A319, A320, A321 series airplanes and Boeing MD-90 airplanes. IPTN CN235 SERIES 203 10-08-012 CN235 airplanes, Model S/N N001 through N012; N014; N015; N041; N042.
FAA AD 2010-06-18 This AD to inspect for cracks in the vortex reducer. Cracks in the vortex reducer could result in an uncontained failure of the HP compressor stage3-8 drum and subsequent damage to the airplane.
PTDI SB N235-57-213 "Replacement of the Spar and Support on the Out Flap". Cracks have been detected in the internal support P/N. 3515501/0101 and P/N. 35-15501-0201/0202 of Out Board Flap 35-15501-0003/0004 attaching the structure of the outer flaps to their rear supports and in the adjacent structure that can cause failure of the flaps structure support and unsafe condition. This Airworthiness Directives give instruction to replace the Spar P/N 35-15511-0005/0006 with (5) and (6), the Supports P/N 35-15501-0101/0102 and 35-15501-0201/0202 with (1), (2), (3) and (4) on Out Board Flap P/N 35-15501-0003/0004 and new identification the Out Board Flap with new label (7) and (8) as mentioned on the PTDI SB N235-57-213, Issue Original 20 Jul 2010.
LIBERTY 204 10-05-006 Liberty Model XL-2 airplanes, serial numbers 0007, 0009, and subsequent, that are certificated in any category.
FAA AD 2009-08-05R1 To detect and correct cracks in the exhaust muffer, which could result in carbon monoxide entering the cabin heating system. This condition could lead to incapacitation of the pilot.
MD-90 SERIES 205 10-03-001 This AD applies to all McDonnell Douglas Corporation Model MD-90-30 airplanes, certificated in any category.
FAA AD 2010-05-04 "Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 53: Fuselage". This AD result from reports of cracked overwing frames. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct such cracking, Which could sever the frame, increase the loading of adjacent frames, and result in damage to adjacent structure and loss of overall structural integrity of the airplanes. FAA AD 2010-16-11 This AD to prevent corrosion and damage that could compromise the integrity of the retract cylinder support fitting for the MLG, which could adversely affect the airplane's safe landing.
206 10-09-005 MD-90-30 airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in Boeing Service Bulletin MD 90-57-016, Revision 2, dated April 28, 2006.
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207 10-11-018 Model MD-90-30 airplanes, certified in any category, as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MD90-54A003 Revision 2, dated February 12, 2010. 208 10-11-019 MD-90-30 airplanes, certified in any category, as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MD90-29A021, Revision 2, dated March 16, 2010 PIAGGIO P180 209 10-07-003 Model P.180 Avanti and P.180 Avanti II aeroplanes, all serial numbers
FAA AD No. 2010-22-04 This AD issue to prevent loose, cracked, or missing fasteners in the engine aft support mount fittings, which could lead to separation of the support fittings from pylon, and could result in separation of the engine from the airplane. FAA AD No. 2010-21-16 Electrically shorted wires in the right wheel well and evidence o arcing on the auxiliary hydraulic pump power cables, which are routed within the tire burst ares.
EASA AD 2010-0123 Oil Engine Oil Dipstick Inspection / Replacement. Failure of engine oil dipstick installed on PT6A66 and PT6A66B engines, were detected on P.180 aeroplanes, due to moisture penetration into the dipstick and subsequent corrosion, can cause incorrect reading of the engine oil low level on the Refuel/Ground Test panel. If left uncorrected, this situation could lead to in-flight engine failure(s). This AD requires: 1. Repetitive visual checks of the engine oil level to prevent an undetected low level condition; 2. Repetitive inspections of the oil dipsticks to detect faulty units; 3. Replacement of faulty oil dipsticks of visual checks of the oil level at reduced not to exceed intervals, unit replacement of faulty units. The engine TC Holder is currently developing a modification that will address the unsafe condition identified in this AD; once such modification is developed, approved and available, further mandatory actions might be considered. This Correction is issued to amend the AD number heading: it was PAD, it is AD.
210 10-07-004 All model P.180 Avanti and P.180 Avanti II aeroplanes, if equipped with Hose Assembly part number (P/N) 80-337276-001.
EASA AD 2010-0125 "Oil - Oil Cooling System Hose - Inspection / Replacement". A damaged fuel heater caused a fuel leakage in the engine nacelle; investigation revealed that the damage to the fuel heater was due to chafing with an oil cooling system hose. Piaggio Aero Industries (PAI) issued Service Bulletin (SB) 80-0175, which was applicable to all aeroplanes and contained instructions for a repetitive inspection of the affected parts and, if necessary, their replacement and/or for the repositioning of oil/fuel tubing if minimum clearances were not found. ENAC Italy issued PA 2002-335 to require the accomplishment of these corrective actions. This new AD, which supersedes ENAC Italy PA 2002-335, is issued to grant the revised applicability and to include an optional terminating action, which consists in replacing the Hose Assembly P/N 80-337276-001 with the new P/N 80337284-001.
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211 10-07-015 P 180 Avanti II aeroplanes, serial numbers from 1166 up to 1175 inclusive.
EASA AD 2010-0126 "Fuselage - Ceiling Rivets - Replacement". Due to a manufacturing error, some rivets, required by drawings, were not installed in the joints between two ceiling beams and the rear pressurized bulkhead. If left uncorrected, long term fatigue stress could locally weaken the structure, compromising the fuselage structural integrity. This AD requires the accomplishment of Piaggio Aero Industries (PAI) Service Bulletin (SB) 80-0268 original issue, which contains instructions to rework the affected area, thus restoring the fuselage design strength as well as the fatigue specifications of the structure.
212 10-08-003 P.180 Avanti aeroplanes, serial numbers (S/N) from 1004 up to 1033.
EASA AD 2010-0146 "Fuselage - Forward Pressurized Bulkhead - Inspection / Modification". In order to improve the safe fatigue life of the aeroplane, the TC Holder of P.180 Avanti designed and introduced in production a modification of the forward pressurized bulkhead, and issued Piaggio Aero Industries (PAI) Service Bulletin (SB) 80-0081 for retrofit of aeroplanes in service. Piaggio Aero Industries issued SB 800081 Revision 1, and subsequently Revision 2, to include reference drawings and more detailed instructions for the modification.
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213 10-12-024-U P.180 Avanti and Avanti II aeroplanes, serial numbers 1001, 1002, 1004, 1006 through 1204, 1206, 1207, 1209, 1210 and 1212.
EASA AD 2010-0269-E Fuselage - Fuselage Drain Holes - Inspection / Rework / Functional Test Prompted by reports of water accumulated in the lower part of the fuselage on a number of Piaggio Model P.180 aeroplanes, which resulted in jamming of the flight controls, on 17 December 2010, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the authority of the State of Registry of the affected aeroplanes, issued Emergency AD 2011-01-51 to require an immediate functional test of the fuselage drain holes and a report of the results to the FAA. That AD was later superseded, on 20 December 2010, by FAA Emergency AD 2011-01-53. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could, when the aeroplane reaches and holds an altitude where the temperature is below the freezing point, cause the flight controls to freeze and jam, possibly resulting in loss of control of the aeroplane. Since these AD actions were taken, Piaggio Aero Industries, the type design approval holder and manufacturer of these aeroplanes, have published Alert Service Bulletin (SB) 80-0324, which describes the same inspection, testing and correction instructions as contained in the FAA Emergency AD. For the reasons described above, this AD requires the inspection and functional testing of the fuselage drain holes, corrective actions depending on findings, and reporting of the findings to Piaggio Aero Industries. This AD is considered to be an interim measure and, depending on the results provided by operators, further AD action may follow.
PILATUS AIRCRAFT 214 07-12-001R1 PC-6 aircraft, all models, Manufacturer Serial Number (MSN) 101 through MSN 999 inclusive and PC-6 aircraft, all models, manufactured by Fairchil in the United States of America, MSN 2001 through MSN 2092 inclusive.
EASA AD 2007-0241R4 "Wing - Wing Strut Fitting - Inspection / Replacement". Findings of corrosion, wear and cracks in the upper wing strut fittings on some PC-6 aircraft have been reported in the past. It is possible that the spherical bearing of the wing strut fittings installed in the underwing can be loose in the fitting or cannot rotate because of corrosion. In this condition, the joint cannot function as designed and fatigue cracks may then develop. Undetected cracks, wear and/or corrosion in this area could cause failure of the upper attachment fitting, leading to failure of the wing structure and subsequent loss of control of the aircraft.
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215 10-09-006 All model PC-6 series aeroplanes, all Manufacturer Serial Numbers (MSNs) and all PC-6 series aeroplanes, manufactured by Fairchild in the United States of America, all MSNs.
EASA AD 2010-0176 "Time Limits / Maintenance Checks - Airworthiness Limitations Section - Amendment / Implementation". With the latest revision 12 of the AMM, a new chapter 04 has been introduced in the AMM for PC-6 B2-H2 and B2-H4 models. A new document for PC-6 B2-H2 and B2-H4 models has been implemented as well. These documents include the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information (MCAI) which is maintenance requirements and/or airworthiness limitations developed by Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. Failure to comply with these MCAI constitutes an unsafe condition.
PIPER AIRCRAFT 216 10-07-007 PA-32R-301T with Serial Number 3257001 through 3257311 PA-46-350P with Serial Number 4622001 through 4622200 and 4636001 through 4636341 217 10-07-034 PA-28-140, -150, -160, -180, -236, -151, 161, -181, -201T and PA-34-200T, -220T.
FAA AD 2010-13-07 This AD is isued to prevent failure of the V-band exhaust coupling, which could cause the exhaust pipe to detach from the turbocharger and could result in release of high temperature gases inside the engine compartment and possibly cause in-flight fire. An in-flight fire could lead to loss of control. FAA AD 2010-15-10 To detect and correct any incorrectly assembled control wheel shaft. This condition, if left uncorrected, could lead to separation of the control wheel shaft, resulting in loss pitch and roll control.
PRATT & WHITNEY ENGINE 218 10-03-013 Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT8D-209, -217, 217C and -219 turbofan engines with front compressor front hub (fan hub), part number (P/N) 5000501-01, installed. These engines are installed on, but not limited to, McDonnel Douglas MD-80 series airplanes. 219 10-11-021 Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT8D-9,-9A,-11,-15,17, and -17R turbofan engines. These engines are installed on, but not limited to, Boeing 727, Boeing 737-200 series and McDonnell Douglas DC-9 airplanes. ROBINSON R44 - HELICOPTER 220 10-12-002 Model R22, R22 Alpha, R22Beta and R22 mariner helicopters, serial numbers (S/N) 0002 through 3325, that have more than 2200 hours total time in service (TIS) and R44, R44 II helicopters S/N 0001 through 1200, that have more than 2200 hours total TIS, certificated in any category. ROLLS ROYCE ENGINE
FAA AD 97-17-04R1 This AD to prevent fan hub failure due to tierod, counterweight, or bushed hole cracking, which could result in an uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
FAA AD 2010-21-17 This AD results from reports of failed fan blades. This AD is issued to prevent high-cycle fatique cracking at the blade root, which could result in uncontained failures of first stage fan blades and damage to the airplane.
FAA AD No. 2010-24-03 To prevent the tail rotor (T/R) control pedal bearing block support (support) from breaking, which can bind the T/R control pedals, resulting in a reduction of yaw control and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
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221 10-05-007 TAY 650-15 Engines, serial numbers as listed in Rolls-Royce Deutschland NonModification Alert Service Bulletin TAY72-A1524, Revision 3, dated 24 March 2010, with Module M05300AA (LP Turbine Module) installed. These engines are known to be installed on, nut not limited to, Fokker F28 Mark 0100 and Boeing 727 series aeroplanes. 222 10-11-005 RB211 Trent 768-60, 772-60, 772B-60 and 772C-60 engines, all serial numbers, if a HP Compressor Rotor Shaft, P/N FK22745, FK24031, FK26185, FK23313, FK25502, FK32129, FW20195, FW20196, FW20197, FW20638 or FW23711 is installed. These engines are known to be installed on, but not limited to, Airbus A330 series aeroplanes.
EASA AD 2010-0060R1 Engine Low Pressure Turbine Discs Stage 2 and 3 Inspection / Replacement. This AD was revised to clarify that the required initial inspection should be accomplished prior to accumulating 11 700 flight cycles (FC) of disc life and not the engine life. The repetitive inspections must be accomplished at intervals not exceeding 11 700 FC of the disc life as well. This AD correction has been issued to amend one type in Type/Model designation(s). EASA 2009-0073R1 -Engine High Pressure (HP) Compressor Stage 1 to 4 Rotor Discs and HP Compressor Rotor Shafts Inspection -During manufacture of a number of HP Compressor Stage 1 and 2 discs with axial dovetail slots, anomalies at the disc post corners have been found. Fatigue crack initiation and subsequent crack propagation at the disc post may result in release of two blades and the disc post. This may potentially be beyond the containment capabilities of the engine casings. Thus, these anomalies present at the disc posts constitute a potentially unsafe condition. For the reasons described above, this AD requires repetitive inspections of the axial dovetail slots and follow-on corrective action, depending on findings.
SIKORSKY S76 - HELICOPTER 223 10-04-015 Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Model S-76C helicopters, serial numbers 760501 and 760506 through 760761, with Option Code 88051 Flotation System installed by Keystone Helicopter Corporation, certificated in any category. 224 10-05-010 Sikorsky Model S-76A, B, and C helicopters, with a main rotor servo actuator in the reference AD. 225 10-05-011-U Sikorsky Model S-76A, B, and C helicopters, with LITEF LCR-100, part number (P/N) 145130-7100, Attitude Heading and Reference System (AHRS) Unit installed, certificated in any category.
FAA AD 2010-06-08 To determine if a metallic foil shunt is installed in the floatation system, which could prevent the flotation system from deploying and could prevent the helicopter from staying a float long enough to enable emergency evacuation after a water landing. This AD requires inspecting the emergency flotation system squib connector (flotation system connector) to determine if a metallic foil shunt is installed. FAA AD 2010-10-02 "Main Rotor Servo Actuator". To detect leaking in a servo actuator, which could lead to degraded servo actuator performace an subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. FAA Emergency AD 2010-11-52 This AD is prompted by reports of intermittent malfunction of the LITEF Attitude Heading and Reference Syatem (AHRS) units of the navigation system. This condition if not corrected, could result in malfunction of the autopilots, inability to reset the autopilots, an uncommanded roll, reduction in rotorcraft functional capabilities, inability of the crew to perform the required tasks, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. This AD requires installing placards on the instrument panel to prohibit single pilot IFR and singel pilot night flight, and reducing airspeeds to 120 KIAS if both autopilots uncouple during IFR or night flight. FAA AD 2010-17-16 This AD to detect and correct an unbalanced or out-of-track tail rotor, which could lead to increased vibrations, a fatigue crack, loss of a portion of the vertical stabilizer, and subsequent los of control of the helicopter.
226 10-09-012 Sikorsky Model S-76A and S-76C helicopters, with serial numbers 76005 throught 760578.
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227 10-12-001 Model S-70A and S-70C Helicopters with a tail gearbox output bevel gear (gear), part number 70358-06620, certificated in any category. SOCATA TBM 700 SERIES 228 09-11-002R1 TBM 700 aeroplanes, all models, from serial number 331 to 530, 534 and 539 included.
FAA AD No. 2010-23-24 To prevent a tail rotor separating, loss of tail rotor control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
EASA AD 2009-0238R1 "Towing & Taxiing - Towing Bar Foam Pad - Removal / Replacement". It has been discovered that the foam inside the towing bar box is not conformed to the certification specification, and especially the flame resistance properties. In case of fire in the front baggage compartment, the non conformed foam could rapidly propagate the flames and/or emit toxic fumes in the cabin. This AD revision is issued to reduced the original AD applicability and to introduce the optional installation of new foam pads in the tow bar stowage box. EASA AD 2010-0005 "Landing Gear - Main Landing Gear Wheel Axle Inspection / Modification". A loss of braking on a TBM 850 (commercial denomination for TBM 700) due to a main landing gear wheel attaching nut partly unscrewed has been reported to socata. Such incident, if not corrected, could lead to a wheel loss. The investigation revealed that this incident was due to a wheel axle machining issue, concerning a few production batches. This AD is issued to supersedes DGCA Indonesian AD No 07-10-018 (DGCA France AD F-2007015) retaining its requirements, requires the inspection of the main landing gear wheel axle batch number and if necesasry replacement of locking washer. EASA AD 2010-0012 "Fire Protection - Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers Identification / Replacement". This AD to prevent contamination nature of Halon 1211 gas, when used againts a fire, may provide reduced fire suppression, endangering the safety of the aircraft and its occupants. This AD requires the identification and removal from service of certain batches of fire extinguishers and replacement with serviceable units. EASA AD 2010-0090 "Oxygen - Chemical Oxygen Generator - Modification". To avoid risk of generator fault with subsequent lack of oxygen on crew and/or passenger. EASA AD 2010-0130 "Air Conditioning - Alternator and Vapour Cycle Cooling System Compressor Support and Drive Assembly - Removal / Replacement / Inspection / Modification". To address failure that could lead to the loss of alternator and of the vapour cycle cooling system and could also cause mechanical damage inside the power plant compartment.
229 10-01-015 TBM 700 aeroplanes S/N 205, 240, 244 up to 408 included, if equipped with main landing gear wheel axle Part Number (P/N) D67690 and one of the following bacth numbers: CZ49133, CZ52790, CZ58448, CZ62189, CZ64034, CZ66207, CZ68039, CZ70959, CZ72975,CZ77612 nad CZ78218.
230 10-02-005 TBM 700 aeroplanes, all variants, all serial numbers, if equipped with Part Number (P/N) 863520-00 portable fire extinguishers, serial numbers (s/n) as listed in L'Hotellier SB 863520-26-001.
THIELERT ENGINE
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233 10-02-004 TAE125-01, all serial numbers, unless already equipped with blow-by oil separator P/N 02-7250-18310R1, 02-7250R2, 027250-18100R6, 02-7250-18100R7.
EASA AD 2010-0020 "Engine - Blow-by Oil Separator - Replacement". Service experience has shown that the small outlet of the blow-by separators P/N 02-7250-18100R1, 02-7250-18100R2, 027250-18100R3, 02-7250-18100R4, 02-7250-18300R1, 027250-18300R2, 02-7250-18300R3, 02-7250-18300R4, 027250-18300R5 may cause a blow-by gas pressure increase inside the crankcase of the engine in excess of the oil seal design pressure limits. Leaking engine oil may adversely affect the gearbox clutch or the engine lubrication system. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to in flight cases of engine power loss or ultimately shut down. To address and correct this situation, TAE has developed a blow-by separator of large diameter and published the Service Bulletin (SB) TM TAE 125-0019 for the installation of the improved blow-by oil separator. For the reason describe above, This AD requires the accomplishment of the corrective actions in accordance with SB TM TAE 125-0019. EASA AD 2010-0111-E "Engine - Clutch Assembly - Identification /Replacement". In-flight engine shutdown incidents have been reported on aeroplanes equipped with TAE 125 engines. Preliminary investigations showed that it was mainly the result of nonconforming disc spring (improper heat treatment) used in a certain production batch of the clutch. This condition, if not corrected, could result in further cases of engine in-flight shutdown and consequent loss of control of the aeroplanes. This AD requires the identification of the affected P/N clutch assemblies on TAE 125-01 and TAE 125-02-99 engines and replacement with new clutch assemblies. EASA AD 2010-0137 "Engine - FADEC Software - Modification". Service experience has shown that a case of FADEC channel B manifold air pressure (MAP) sensor hose permeability is not always recognised as fault by the FADEC. The MAP value measured by the sensor may be lower than the actual pressure value in the engine manifold, and limits the amount of fuel injected into the combustion chamber and thus the available power of the engine. A change in FADEC software version 2.91 will change the logic in failure detection and in switching to channel B (no automatic switch to channel B if MAP difference between channel A and B is detected and lowerMAP is at channel B). These conditions, if not corrected, could lead to in-flight cases of engine power loss or ultimately shutdown. To address and correct this situation, TAE has developed a new software version 2.91. This AD requires the installation of software version 2.91. EASA AD 2010-0136 "Engine - Timing Chain - Replacement". Service experience has shown that fracture of the timing chain has occured due to chain wear. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to in flight cases of engine shutdown. To correct this situation, TAE has developed reinforced timing chains. This AD requires the replacement of the timing chain.
234 10-07-012-U TAE 125 engines, referred to applicability section of the referenced AD.
235 10-07-020 TAE 125-02-99, TAE 125-02-114, all serial numbers. These engines are known to be installed, but not limited to, Diamond DA 40, DA 42, DA 42M, Apex DR-400, Cessna C172, and Piper PA28
236 10-07-021 TAE 125-02-99, TAE 125-02-114, all serial numbers These engines are known to be installed, but not limited to, Diamond DA 40, DA 42, DA 42M, Apex DR-400, Cessna C172, and Piper PA2
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TURBOMECA ENGINE 237 10-06-005R1 Arriel 1A1,1B,1C, 1C2, 1D1, 1S1 turboshaft engines, all serial number if modified by TU347. Theses engine are known to installed on, but not limited to, the following helicopters : Eurcopter AS350 series, AS365 and SA365 series, Sikorsky S-76A series and C series.
EASA AD 2010-0101R1 "Engine - Module M03 (Gas Generator) - Post-TU347 Second Stage Turbine Disc - Reduced Life Limit". Metallurgical non-conformities have been found when performing quality inspections during production of Arriel 1 Gas Generator (GG) second Stage Turbine Discs introduced by Turbomca Modification TU347 (P/N 0 292 25 040 0). Analysis has concluded that the approved life limit of the post-TU347 GG second Stage Turbine Disc needs to be reduced to 2 500 GG cycles.Exceeding the revised approved life limit could result in a GG second Stage Turbine Disc burst with uncontained high energy debris. This AD requires compliance with the revised life limit of the GG second Stage Turbine Disc by removing the module M03 (Gas Generator) or the GG second Stage Turbine fitted with a GG second stage Turbine Disc which has reached or exceeded the new life limit. Since issuance of AD 2010-0101-E, turbomeca has introduced a reinforced Eddy-current inspection which provides a lower (improved) detection threshold of the metallugircal non-conformities. This Reinforce Eddy-current inspection, named CFR, combined with a revised analysis, allow to increase the limit of the post-TU347 GG second Stage Turbine Discs identified as CFR over the 2500 GG life cycles of the non-CFR Discs. EASA AD 2010-0101-E "Engine _ Module M03 (Gas Generator) - Post-TU347 Second Stage Turbine Disc - Reduced Life Limit". Metallurgical non-conformities have been found when performing quality inspections during production of Arriel 1 Gas Generator (GG) second Stage Turbine Discs introduced by Turbomca Modification TU347 (P/N 0 292 25 040 0). Analysis has concluded that the approved life limit of the post-TU347 GG second Stage Turbine Disc needs to be reduced to 2 500 GG cycles.Exceeding the revised approved life limit could result in a GG second Stage Turbine Disc burst with uncontained high energy debris. This AD requires compliance with the revised life limit of the GG second Stage Turbine Disc by removing the module M03 (Gas Generator) or the GG second Stage Turbine fitted with a GG second stage Turbine Disc which has reached or exceeded the new life limit.
238 10-06-005-U Arriel 1A1,1B,1C, 1C2, 1D1, 1S1 turboshaft engines, all serial number if modified by TU347. Theses engine are known to be installed on, but not limited to, the following helicopters : Eurcopter AS350 series, AS365 and SA365 series, Sikorsky S-76A series and C series.
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239 10-07-005 Arriel 1B turboshaft engines, if modified by TU76 and not modified by TU148 and fitted with repaired second stage Nozzle Guide Vane. These engines are known to be installed on, but not limited to Eurocopter AS350 series helicopters.
EASA AD 2010-0118 "Engine - Module M03 (Gas Generator) - Second Stage Turbine Nozzle Guide Vane - Inspection/Replacement". During quality inspections in repair centre some 2nd stage Nozzle Guide Vanes (NGVs) to be installed on Pre TU148 standard Arriel 1B were found not conforming to the definition. The affected parts had been repaired and were found drilled on the rear flange instead of the front flange. This configuration corresponds to 2nd stage Turbine NGVs to be installed on post-TU148 standard Arriel 1B engines. This non compliance may only be found on post-TU76 standard 2nd stage Turbine NGVs (i.e. with flexible hub). This non compliance would increase hot gas ingestion and generate an increase of temperature in the Gas Generator (GG) turbine rotor, potentially resulting in turbine damage and an uncommanded in-flight shutdown. On a single-engine helicopter, this could ultimately lead to an emergency autorotation landing. To detect and correct this unsafe condition, this AD requires accomplishing a daily check of the engine. Furthermore, it requires contacting Turbomca for checking applicability and, if necessary, to inspect the 2nd stage Turbine NGVs. If non serviceable parts are found, it requires replacement with serviceable ones. EASA AD 2010-0198 Engine Module M03 (Gas Generator) - Turbine Blade. EASA AD 2010-0215 Engine Fuel & Control High Pressure (HP)/Low Pressure (LP) Pump Metering Unit Low Pressure Fuel Pump Impeller Drive - Inspection/Replacement". - The uncoupling of the LP fuel pump impeller and the HP fuel pump shaft report from ARRIEL 2engine which do not incorporate modification TU147() Most cases the low fuel pressure switch enlightened , the pilot active the aircraft booster pump in accordance with the Flight Manual Instructions and . - AD 2009-0184 (DGCA AD 09-08-020) issued to required ensuring that the LP fuel pump impeller was correctly driven by the HP fuel pump shaft, to prevent any detachment of the LP fuel pump impeller from the HP fuel pump shaft. Three additional cases of uncoupling of the LP fuel pump impeller and the HP fuel pump shaft encored in service with post TU147 configuration - This AD supersedes EASA AD 2009-0184 (DGCA AD 0908-020) partially its retaining its requirement [inspection of certain HP/LP pump Metering Units post TU147 to ensure that the LP fuel pump impeller ] is correctly driven by the HP fuel pump any uncoupling. EASA AD No. 2010-0273 -Engine Module M03 (Gas Generator) Second Stage Turbine Nozzle Guide Vane Inspection/Replacement. -This AD extends the applicability of DGCA AD 10-07-005 (EASA AD 2010-0118) to pre-TU148 and post TU-202 Arriel 1B engines.
240 10-11-010 ARRIEL 2 series turboshaft engines. 241 10-11-011 Turbomeca ARRIEL 2 series turboshaft engines.
242 10-12-031 Arriel 1B turboshaft engines, if modified by TU76 or TU202, and not modified by TU148, and fitted with repaired second stage Nozzle Guide Vane. These engines are known to be installed on, but not limited to Eurocopter AS350 series helicopters.
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