Journal of Economics and Management

ISSN 1732-1948 Vol. 35 (1) • 2019

Israa Ali Mahmoud Ali Hebatallah Ghoneim

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6993-1730 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4161-7467
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Faculty of Management Technology Faculty of Management Technology
German University in Cairo, Cairo, Egypt German University in Cairo, Cairo, Egypt
[email protected] [email protected]

The effect of microfinance on income inequality:

Perspective of developing countries
doi: 10.22367/jem.2019.35.03
Accepted by Editor Ewa Ziemba | Received: June 13, 2018 | Revised: October 21, 2018; November 5,
2018 | Accepted: November 9, 2018.

Abstract

Aim/purpose – Studying the impact of microfinance on income inequality from a macro-

-economic perspective.
Design/methodology/approach – Cross-sectional regression analysis is used to measure
the effect of microfinance on the Gini index in a sample of 30 developing countries from
across Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Europe. A set of control variables are added to
the model including: inflation, educational attainment, democracy, population growth,
percentage of arable land to strengthen the model’s reliability.
Findings – Results indicate that neither a positive nor a negative impact of microfinance
on Gini index could be significantly proved for the sample countries.
Research implications/limitations – Due to lack of data availability, research is con-
ducted on a small sample of 30 countries. Therefore, to obtain more generalisable re-
sults, it is recommended for future research to use a larger sample.
Originality/value/contribution – Microfinance is becoming a focal issue in alleviating
poverty and inequality, and this paper’s main contribution is that it explores this matter
from a macro-economic perspective by looking at the holistic impact of microcredit on
a sample of developing countries. Hence, the paper provides further investigation and
suggestions for a better implementation of microfinance policies.

Keywords: developing countries, income inequality, microcredit, microfinance.

JEL Classification: D14, O16.
 The effect of microfinance on income inequality… 41

1. Introduction

“We believe that poverty does not belong in a civilised human society. It
belongs in museums. This [Microcredit] Summit is about creating a process
which will send poverty to the museum... sixty-five years after this Summit, we
will create a poverty-free world” (Microcredit Summit, 1997, p. 11). With that
enthusiasm, Muhammad Yunus, leader of microfinance and Nobel Prize laureate,
started the microcredit movement and remarkably participated in the universal
collective effort to eradicate poverty and inequality. Throughout the last dec-
ades, poverty has been a major concern of the world (Hermes, 2014). Particular-
ly, the universal effort to combat poverty has been clearly demonstrated with the
launch of the Millennium Project in 2000 that aimed at achieving the eight Mil-
lennium Development Goals (MDGs) by the year 2015; when the ‘Eradication
of Extreme Poverty’ was the first of the 8 goals. By the end of the year 2015, the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) replaced the Millennium Project with
17 new aims including the ‘Reduced Inequality’ goal as well as the ‘No Poverty’
goal coming, again, on the top of the list (United Nations, 2015).
In an attempt to actively contribute to the universal collective effort to erad-
icate poverty and inequality, the modern model of microfinance has emerged
and rapidly disseminated throughout the world representing an extremely power-
ful tool in the face of destitution and hence, gaining a lot of supporters among
the public and academics (Buera, Kaboski, & Shin, 2012; Littlefield, Morduch,
& Hashemi, 2003).
Although there are various success stories of microfinance, it has been sub-
ject to several critiques raising an important debate among academics and practi-
tioners about its impact and sustainability (Ghosh, 2013; Hermes, 2014; Sample,
2011; Săvescu, 2010). The lack of consensus about the impact of microfinance
has made it essential to explore that topic further. Therefore, the purpose of this
paper is to investigate the effect of microfinance activity on income inequality.
In an attempt to answer this research question, this paper will be organised
as follows: The first section will review the literature on microfinance, its defini-
tions, importance, emergence, development, critiques and challenges, as well as
the impact of microfinance on income inequality. The following section will
focus on the research methodology including the model and variables’ specifica-
tions to test for a main hypothesis: Microfinance has a negative impact on (re-
duces) income inequality. And finally, the main findings, interpretations, and
policy recommendations will be presented.
42 Israa Ali Mahmoud Ali, Hebatallah Ghoneim

2. Literature review

This part will review the definition and concept of microfinance, its im-
portance and main objectives, the emergence and development of microfinance
institutions (MFIs), some critique of microfinance, and finally some challenges
facing microfinance.

2.1. Defining and understanding the concept of microfinance

It has been argued in several studies that the lack of access to credit by
a country’s poor population is one of the most considerable obstacles that hinder
that country from reducing its level of poverty and income inequality. Conse-
quently, it can be argued that microfinance plays an utterly crucial role in
a country’s economic development (Hulme & Mosley, 1996; McKenzie & Wood-
ruff, 2008). Accordingly, microfinance is defined as the provision of small, free
of collateral loans as well as other financial assets and insurance services to the
poor segment of the society to enhance their standard of living. That poor popu-
lation could not otherwise get access to such small-scale loans and financial
services because of the lack of collateral (Chowdhury, Ghosh, & Wright, 2005;
Taiwo, Yewande, Edwin, & Benson, 2016).
Săvescu (2010) provides another definition that links microfinance to small
enterprises and entrepreneurship. It defines microfinance as a means of financial
security for small entrepreneurs, that allows them to access small loans and basic
financial services that help them develop small businesses and thus escape pov-
erty through generating income for themselves and their families. The link be-
tween microfinance and small entrepreneurs has been also incorporated in a more
comprehensive definition of microfinance by Electrin et al. (2013) who defined
microfinance as an empowerment tool for low-income populations that grants
them small loans without collateral and with relatively low interest rates. This
should enable them to engage in small entrepreneurial activities and will ulti-
mately increase their welfare through better access to the funds necessary for
their children’s education and for better houses. They can also benefit from other
financial services such as micro-insurance and micro-mortgage offered by the
MFIs that are tailored to perfectly suit the needs of the underprivileged.
The aforementioned definitions of microfinance can be complemented by
what is stated by Rahman & Nie (2011); they have indicated that microfinance
means granting remittance, savings, as well as opportunities for better education,
 The effect of microfinance on income inequality… 43

healthcare, skill training and insurance services that help the underprivileged
reach a better social standard, and to escape their cruel social situations due to
the lack of access to credit.
It is utterly important while reviewing the literature to distinguish between
two terms: microfinance and microcredit since they are often used interchangea-
bly (Fishman, 2012). As stated earlier, microfinance is the provision of versatile
financial services including small loans, thrift, micro-insurance, micro-savings
deposits and others in order to boost the poor population’s well-being. This will
essentially help curtail poverty and lead to economic development. On the other
hand, microcredit can be defined as the provision of micro-loans to the poor or
micro-entrepreneurs. Accordingly, it can be concluded that the microfinance
term is a broader and a more inclusive term than microcredit (Electrin et al.,
2013; Sengupta & Aubuchon, 2008; Taiwo et al., 2016).

2.2. Importance and objective of microfinance

The importance of microfinance can be observed from two perspectives; the

first one is the social perspective. Women empowerment, for instance, is highly
correlated to microfinance. The access to credit increases women’s self-
employment opportunities and access to education (Fishman, 2012; Kabeer,
2005). Furthermore, Kumar (2016) has provided a more thorough investigation of
the effect of microfinance on women empowerment through the ‘Triple I Model’
that he built based on the analysis of the effect of JEEViKA1 (a microfinance
project in India supported by the World Bank). In that model, he described
women empowerment (measured by the level of women Insecurity) as a function
of Income and Identity. Before the introduction of JEEViKA project, women’s
identity and income were at extremely low levels resulting in a high level of
insecurities whereas after the introduction of JEEViKA, the opposite occurred.
From the economic perspective, microfinance is considered as an influential
player in the eradication of poverty that was one of the (MDGs) until the year
2015. Numerous models in the literature consider microfinance as a develop-
ment tool that has positive micro-economic and macro-economic effects that
include: increased GDP per capita, higher level of per capita expenditures, im-
proved access to education on the micro level leading to lower illiteracy on the
macro level, lower unemployment and increased total factor productivity (Buera

1
JEEViKA means livelihoods (Kumar, 2016).
44 Israa Ali Mahmoud Ali, Hebatallah Ghoneim

et al., 2012; Littlefield et al., 2003). The microfinance’s ability to promote the
social inclusion of the marginalised members of the society such as immigrants,
the poor, women, etc. … is the main determinant of its economic importance. It
can simply fill the gap of the demand on micro-loans that is generally in excess
of the supply of micro-loans. Accordingly, the poor’s living standards will defi-
nitely be enhanced in terms of employment and income, education, and social
empowerment which ultimately promote economic development (Hermes, 2014;
Săvescu, 2010).

2.3. Emergence and development of microfinance and MFIs

The idea of microcredit started when Muhammad Yunus wanted to experi-

ment the effect that a small collateral-free loan may have on some people resid-
ing in a Bangladeshi village. Thus, he founded Grameen Bank under a special
contract from the Bangladeshi government as a formal independent micro-
financial institution (Chowdhury et al., 2005)
The Grameen Bank has quickly grown up and succeeded in what was
a failure for the traditional banking sector because of the group-lending and joint
liability model. The model works as follows: Borrowers first have to construct
groups of five ‘solidarity groups’ and present themselves to the bank requesting
loans. The first two members of the group receive their small loans. If the first
2 members repay their loans, the second 2 members receive their loans, then the
last member. If any member during the process defaults, the whole group will be
deprived from future credit. Each 8 solidarity groups should then form a ‘center’
that holds a ‘center meeting’ in which repayments are collected transparently in
public (Rahman & Nie, 2011; Sengupta & Aubuchon, 2008).
The joint liability model ensures the avoidance of two concerns of lenders.
The first problem is the ‘moral hazard’2. This problem is non-existent in the
group-lending model of Grameen Bank, since members of a solidarity group will
strive to avoid it especially that the whole group’s eligibility to future credit
depends on each member’s commitment in his/her loan’s repayment. The second
problem is that of ‘adverse selection’3 which is similarly minimised in the

2
Moral hazard is a problem caused by asymmetric information that involves the risk of having
the borrower use the borrowed money in un-preferred or ‘immoral’ activities from the lender’s
perspective. Since these activities increase the probability that the borrower may default and
therefore lenders may stop giving out loans to avoid that risk (Mankiw & Rashwan, 2012).
3
Adverse selection is another problem caused by asymmetric information that makes lenders
refrain from giving out loans as they lack information about the borrowers and whether they are
 The effect of microfinance on income inequality… 45

Grameen Bank’s model because safe members who intend to repay their loans
will not enter in a solidarity group whose members are not safe. Besides, mem-
bers of a group will not accept un-safe peers who are likely to default. Once the
two aforementioned concerns are avoided, the risk is significantly transferred
from the lender to the borrowers. Hence, the need to charge high interest rates to
compensate the risk of defaulting members disappears, and the Grameen Bank
can, opposite to other banks, charge low interest rates on all members (Sengupta
& Aubuchon, 2008).

Table 1. Main characteristics of Grameen Bank

Particular 5 members
Group function Weekly conference, allocation of information and conversations
Loans Group and individual
Liability Group and individual
Collateral Free, no group members are accountable to pay on behalf of others
Usually, weekly in the central meeting. Field staff sometimes visit borrower’s house
Repayment
in case of failure to pay
Interest rate Varies (0-15%) flat rate
Source: Rahman & Nie (2011, p. 216).

Table 1 includes a summary of the key features of Grameen Bank in terms

of the mechanism and functionalities, interest rates, and types of loans.

2.4. Critique of microfinance

Several academics argue that microfinance, may lead to the reproduction of

poverty and social inequalities instead of poverty reduction. This mainly origi-
nates from the intrinsic feature of the group lending model that requires peer-
monitoring. That is, to minimise the risk of being deprived from future credit,
each group member must ensure that all his peer-members are able to repay their
loans. Therefore, better-off borrowers who are likely to repay their loans mainly
select similar low-risk peers in their groups. This eventually increases the proba-
bility that the extremely poor and marginalised members of the society will be
disproportionately excluded (Copestake, 2013; Ghosh, 2013; Shakya & Rankin,
2008).

likely to repay their loans or to default; especially that borrowers who are likely to default –
generate bad credit risks – are the ones that most actively demand credit and are likely to be
selected. Therefore, although there may be good borrowers, lenders do not want to give out
loans (Mankiw & Rashwan, 2012).
46 Israa Ali Mahmoud Ali, Hebatallah Ghoneim

Another critique of microfinance is the high interest rates. A large percent-

age of micro-borrowers used loans for consumption purposes such as school
fees, medicaments, and food; not in asset-creation such as the development of
micro-enterprises or other income-generating activities. This has generally de-
creased the repayment rates, therefore, MFIs started to introduce individual
loans where there is no peer-monitoring. In exchange of bearing the costs of
screening borrowers, MFIs had to charge higher interest. It is obvious that the
borrowers are the losers of that scheme as they eventually have to pay off their
loans at excessively higher interest rates which sometimes leaves them worse-off
(Copestake, 2013; Hulme, 2000; Ladman & Afcha, 1990; Shakya & Rankin, 2008).
Bateman & Chang (2012) examined the macro-level impact of micro-
finance. They suggested that microfinance may be an enormous barrier to the
sustainable social and economic development. This is based on two arguments:
first, that microfinance disregards the importance of scale economies, i.e. the
cost reduction as the scale of production and investments increase. Second, that
microfinance overlooks the ‘fallacy of composition’ assuming that the creation
of thousands of micro-enterprises having similar or quasi-similar activities will
improve the macro-economic development in the same way as each micro-
enterprise improves the well-being of individual micro-entrepreneurs. Conse-
quently, as the economy gets saturated by micro-enterprises with modest activi-
ties and no synergy between them, the local economy may be deindustrialised
and productivity improvements may not occur.

2.5. Challenges hindering growth of MFIs

Due to the success of microfinance, MFIs have become widespread in sev-

eral countries which generated a fierce competition between them, such that in
some villages, in India for instance, it is not unusual to find up to eight micro-
finance institutions competing to serve the same clients. Thus, some mature mi-
crofinance markets are said to experience saturation with regards to the supply of
microfinance which introduced patterns of ‘loan swapping’. That is, one borrower
can borrow micro-loans from more than one microfinance institution to enable
him or herself to repay the original loan from the new loan, and so forth (Ghosh,
2013; Sample, 2011). Loan-swapping often leads to the over-indebtedness of
borrowers and hence, a reduction in repayment rates. Consequently, MFIs find
themselves with less savings deposits and get obliged to increase their interest
rates to obtain higher returns and be able to get loans from other banks. This is
 The effect of microfinance on income inequality… 47

considered as a significant barrier to MFIs’ sustainability and efforts to reduce

income inequality (Fishman, 2012; Shakya & Rankin, 2008).
Furthermore, some MFIs exhibit a lack of accountability and transparency
as they tend to not fully disclose their interest rates or their repayment rates to
the public. This problem is magnified due to the poor accounting capabilities of
such MFIs and their inadequate financial auditing and control. Moreover, the
shortage in government regulations may allow some unethical institutions to
enter the microfinance market seeking profits at the expense of the poor. Those
market intruders generally take savings, disburse a few loans at unreasonably
high interest rates, they allow loans for non-income generating purposes, they
provide no support for loan repayments, and then they disappear which leads to
worsening the status of the severely destitute clients. Such unethical practices
jeopardize the microfinance sustainability and curtail microfinance’s aspirations
of saving the severely underprivileged society members. Therefore, it is utterly
essential to have MFI-friendly governmental policies or even self-regulatory
policies among MFIs (Sample, 2011).
Finally, the lack of financial backing of MFIs represents an obstacle to ena-
bling them to impact a wide base of clients by giving out more loans to a larger
number of poor people. But MFIs often encounter a trade-off; either to expand by
disbursing more loans at higher interest rates or not to expand and leave their in-
terest rates and customer base unchanged (Fishman, 2012; Rahman & Nie, 2011).

2.6. Effect of microfinance on income inequality

Income inequality has an adverse effect on human capital and labour produc-
tivity as it hinders the poor’s ability to attain the adequate education. Income ine-
quality also obstructs the economic growth from benefitting the poorest quintiles
of the population (Dabla-Norris, Kochhar, Suphaphiphat, Ricka, & Tsounta,
2015). Microfinance impacts income inequality indirectly by tapping on such
education, employment, and poverty problems and thus lifts up the poor in com-
parison with the richer segments so that the gap between them shrinks.
Baldi & Šipilova (2014), in a study conducted in Latvia, prove that there is
a positive impact of microfinance on participants’ employment level. It was con-
cluded that individuals who had access to loans supported micro-entrepreneurs to
develop their micro-enterprises and thus aided them to break their unemploy-
ment and poverty cycle which ultimately contributed to Latvia’s economic de-
velopment.
48 Israa Ali Mahmoud Ali, Hebatallah Ghoneim

Another social aspect that reflects the microfinance’s positive impact on in-
come inequality is its influence on education. Amin & Sheikh (2011) contended –
based on a study of ASA, BRAC, and Grameen – that access to micro-loans
remarkably contributed to the households’ affordability of educating their children.
Moreover, Bruhn, & Love (2014) in a study of the economic consequences
of opening a new microfinance bank in Mexico, pointed out that the introduction
of microcredit services has considerably impacted low-income individuals in
terms of incomes, savings, and poverty reduction by helping them develop their
informal micro businesses. It also helped existing micro-enterprises improve
their businesses and incomes. McKenzie & Woodruff (2008) provide an expla-
nation to that increase in income by pointing out that micro-entrepreneurs highly
benefit from microcredit because even small capital investments remarkably
improve their businesses and increase incomes as they have a relatively higher rate
of return on capital. Consistently, findings from Rahman, Luo, & Minjuan’s
(2015) study in China show that, as a result of the availability of microfinance
services in a Chinese poor county, asset ownership of microcredit households
was significantly enhanced. Considering all the aforementioned findings, it can
be argued that microfinance can contribute to the alleviation of income inequality
through its positive upward push for incomes of the population’s poorest quintiles.

3. Research methods and procedure

After exploring the literature about microfinance and its effect on income
inequality, it has been noticed that there is a gap in exploring the effect of micro-
finance on income inequality in direct manners through the examination of the
Gini-coefficient or any other quantitative index of income inequality. The major-
ity of the existing research is focused on other factors such as poverty reduction,
income per capita growth, increase in savings, increase in education and em-
ployment that in turn may affect income inequality. The gap particularly exists
in examining the impact of microfinance on income inequality in the developing
countries. This topic is rarely undertaken and requires further research. There-
fore, the exact hypothesis that will be tackled in this paper is: microfinance has
a negative effect on (reduces) income inequality in developing countries.
Table 2 contains a list of countries included in the sample ordered alphabet-
ically. The sample consists of 30 developing countries from across Africa, Asia,
Latin America, and Europe.
 The effect of microfinance on income inequality… 49

Table 2. List of countries included in the sample

Armenia Congo, Democratic Republic Pakistan
Bangladesh Ecuador Panama
Benin El Salvador Philippines
Bolivia Ethiopia Russia
Brazil India South Africa
Cameroon Indonesia Sri Lanka
Chile Kenya Sudan
China Mexico Turkey
Columbia Morocco Vietnam
Costa Rica Nigeria Tunisia

This paper pursues a methodology that follows the past literature investigat-
ing the relationship between microfinance and macro-economic variables such
as financial development, poverty, and income inequality. For example, Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine (2007) have examined the cross-sectional relation-
ship between income inequality (Gini) and financial development (private credit).
They also specified some control variables affecting income inequality including
inflation, education, and trade openness. Similarly, Clarke, Xu, & Zou (2006)
assessed the cross-sectional relationship between Gini and financial sector de-
velopment (credit by both private sector firms and non-financial domestic sector).
The control variables included the inflation rate, non-agricultural sector share of
GDP, and several others. Furthermore, Bangoura, Mbow, Lessoua, & Diaw
(2016) examined the relationship between poverty and microfinance measured
by either the share of active borrowers in total population or the value of micro-
finance loans as a percentage of the GDP. Moreover, Kai & Hamori (2009) stud-
ied the effect of microfinance on income inequality. They used the number of
MFIs and the number of borrowers to capture microfinance intensity and includ-
ed inflation rate, democracy, and trade openness as control variables. Whereas
Hermes (2014) used the number of active borrowers and the value of micro-
finance loans to capture microfinance intensity and included inflation rate, per-
centage of arable land and rural population, democracy, schooling, and others as
control variables.
Accordingly, this paper follows the most relevant comprehensive model in
the context of the research question, which is the model used by Hermes (2014).
However, unlike the model used by Hermes (2014), this paper’s model will use
a more equally divided sample among Africa, Asia, and Latin America with an
average of 9 countries from each; while taking only 2 countries from Europe
since it is the least continent of interest due to its relative better economic situa-
50 Israa Ali Mahmoud Ali, Hebatallah Ghoneim

tion. The model represents income inequality as a function of microfinance and

some other control variables as follows:
= + 1 + 2 +

where:
Gini is the Gini-coefficient of country i,
α is the intercept term,
MFi is the microfinance intensity measure,
CVi is a vector of control variables that affect income inequality other than mi-
crofinance, Ɛi is the error term.

The model’s dependent variable, which is the Gini-coefficient, is a measure

of the extent to which a country’s distribution of income among households and
individuals differs from the situation of a perfectly equal distribution. Gini is
expressed as the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality
as a percentage of total area under the line taking a value between 0 and 100; the
closer to 100 the higher income inequality. Gini values for the sample countries
are obtained from UNDP Human development report for the year 2016.
The main explanatory variable is the microfinance intensity variable and it
is the variable of interest. It is measured either by:
MF_1: The total value of issued microfinance loans in a country divided by the
country’s GDP; or
MF_2: The number of active microloans borrowers in a country divided by the
country’s total population.
Data about the number of active borrowers and microfinance loans is ob-
tained from Microfinance Information Exchange MIX website. And data for GDP
and population is obtained from the 2016 UNDP human development report.
The control variables include: inflation rate measured as the growth in
a country’s GDP deflator; rural population measured as the percentage of the
population living in rural areas from the total population; arable land measured
as the percentage of arable land from a country’s total land area; democracy
level which is an eleven-point scale from 0 to 11 with the higher values indicat-
ing more democracy; population growth rate which is the percentage change in
a country’s total population from a year to another; openness capturing the
economy’s openness and measured by a country’s trade level, that is the sum of
its exports and imports, expressed as a percentage of GDP; and finally enroll-
ment measuring the level of human capital and captured by the gross secondary
enrollment ratio, that is, the total enrollment in secondary education expressed as
a percentage of population of secondary education age.
 The effect of microfinance on income inequality… 51

Data for all control variables is obtained from the World Bank Develop-
ment Indicators (WBDI) website, except the democracy variable, it is obtained
from the Center for Systematic Peace website, the Integrated Network for Socie-
tal Conflict Research (INSCR) data page. All data is collected for a sample of 30
developing countries from Africa, Latin America, Europe, and Asia. Gini data is
one-year observation assumed to be for the year 2015. Microfinance data include
the most recent data available expressed as cumulative numbers from 2013-
2015. All control variables are average numbers for the data of the most recent
available five years.
It is hypothesised that microfinance affects the Gini index negatively, which
means that; as microfinance intensity increases, there should be more financial
inclusion of the lowest-income groups, hence, less income inequality. Inflation
rate is expected to have a positive relation with Gini, since it decreases the pur-
chasing power of the population’s income. Moreover, it is expected that human
capital reflected in the secondary enrollment ratio has a negative coefficient
since educational attainment helps create more employment and financial inclu-
sion opportunities. There is some uncertainty about the impact of trade openness.
The literature studying the effect of trade openness on Gini provides mixed re-
sults; indicating that the relationship varies according to the sample countries as
well as the type of exports and imports in each country (Calderon & Chong,
2001; Mahesh, 2016). Similarly, the expected effect of the ruralisation ratio,
percentage of arable land, cannot be decided as it depends greatly on the nature
of the sample countries; for example if a country has a high percentage of arable
land, then ruralisation ratio will be negatively related to Gini. Similarly, popula-
tion growth may be positively or negatively related to Gini depending on wheth-
er this growth is in rural or urban population, and whether the country’s income
depends on agricultural or urban activities. As for the democracy variable, it is
expected to have a negative impact on Gini as higher democracy means better
policies that ensure more equal distribution of income.

4. Research findings and results

First, an analysis of the descriptive statistics for the dependent and all inde-
pendent variables is shown in Table 3. The analysis mainly helps evaluate the
skewness of the data in order to choose the correct functional form and to decide
whether it is more appropriate to log the variables or to use them directly in the
regression analysis.
52 Israa Ali Mahmoud Ali, Hebatallah Ghoneim

Table 3. Descriptive statistics

Population Rural Arable Democ- Enroll-
Statistic Gini MF_1 MF_2 Inflation Openness
Growth Population Land racy ment
Mean 2.77667 0.006766 0.029410 6.003167 62.94603 1.926667 45.69181 17.36155 3.973333 77.40182
Median 2.15000 0.001928 0.014941 4.707740 57.86793 1.400000 43.77920 13.04954 6.80000 84.33204
Maximum 63.40000 0.045529 0.126357 28.51602 166.5729 13.80000 81.68360 59.13190 10.0000 114.1126
Minimum 30.70000 1.17E-05 0.000211 0.609153 24.02416 0.000000 10.83260 1.493321 –50.0000 36.87581
Std. Dev. 7.405109 0.011228 0.034760 5.218633 30.21516 2.372680 19.71714 14.47090 10.65959 21.54919
Skewness 0.491747 2.186447 1.451109 2.908805 1.797516 4.344035 0.183639 1.382559 –4.51970 –0.446649
Kurtosis 3.324017 7.000675 4.275540 12.82797 6.742357 22.41239 2.023757 4.365494 23.46828 2.028659
Jarque-Bera 1.340312 43.90949 12.56235 163.0420 33.66187 565.4044 1.359930 11.88807 625.8267 2.104295
Probability 0.511629 0.000000 0.001871 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.506635 0.002621 0.000000 0.349187
Sum 1283.300 0.202991 0.882304 180.0950 1888.381 57.80000 1370.754 520.8464 119.2000 2244.653
Sum Sq. Dev. 1590.234 0.003656 0.035039 789.7899 26475.71 163.2587 11274.20 6072.801 3295.179 13002.30
Obser-vations 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 29

Results of the descriptive statistics shown in Table 3 indicate that the varia-
bles do not have remarkably high skewness values which indicate that data are
nearly normally distributed and hence, the unlogged data can be used in the re-
gression analysis.
Secondly, a correlation matrix, shown in Table 4, has been examined to
check for possible multicollinearity problems.

Table 4. Correlation matrix

Correlation Population Rural Arable Enroll-
MF_1 MF_2 Inflation Openness Democracy
Probability Growth Population Land ment
1.000
MF_1
–
0.64169 1.000
MF_2
0.0002 –
−0.16018 −0.2663 1.000
Inflation
–0.4065 0.1625 –
0.18411 0.1073 0.45311 1.000
Openness
0.3390 0.5793 0.0139 –
Population 0.49925 0.51266 –0.02354 0.10264 1.000
Growth 0.0058 0.0045 0.9035 0.5962 –
Rural Popula- −0.07156 −0.0692 0.36274 −0.28124 0.07292 1.000
tion 0.7122 0.7210 0.0531 0.1394 0.7070 –
−0.178579 0.25004 −0.01760 −0.20074 –0.01514 0.439303 1.000
Arable land
0.3540 0.1908 0.9278 0.2964 0.9378 0.0171 –
0.109213 0.03619 −0.03730 −0.26055 0.03408 0.001074 −0.020533 1.000
Democracy
0.5728 0.8521 0.8477 0.1722 0.8607 0.9956 0.9158 –
0.115609 0.08066 −0.43880 0.21589 −0.14071 −0.655679 −0.412879 0.020115 1.000
Enrollment
0.5504 0.6774 0.0173 0.2607 0.4666 0.0001 0.0260 0.9175 –

The correlation matrix in Table 4 indicates that only the two variables ‘en-
rollment’ and ‘rural population’ are significantly correlated with each other with
a P-value of 0.0001 and therefore, should not be included in the same regression.
As for the two microfinance measures, they are significantly correlated as they
both measure microfinance intensity, however, they are not essentially intended
to be used simultaneously. Thus, the regression will be run four times, two times
 The effect of microfinance on income inequality… 53

including MF1 with either of enrollment and rural population; then, similarly for
MF2.
In order to decide on the best model that includes the most relevant varia-
bles with significant impact on income inequality, two simple regressions have
been run to test the direct and separate effect of microfinance on Gini. Then,
a series of seven multiple regressions have been run; each included Gini as de-
pendent variable with only two explanatory variables: microfinance and one of
the control variables. This process has been repeated twice for each of the micro-
finance measures ‘MF_1’ and ‘MF_2’ with a total of 14 regressions. After that,
the coefficients’ P-values and t-statistics for the involved variables in all the
previously mentioned regressions have been analysed. Variables that have been
proved insignificant, i.e. having a P-value less than 0.10, were decided to be
eliminated from the analysis. Using MF_1, all control variables were significant
except trade openness; however, using MF_2, all control variables were significant
except trade openness and population growth. Accordingly, a decision has been
made to run 4 final regressions considering the above significance results and
the multicollinearity between enrollment and rural population. The regressions
that yielded the most adequate results are as follows:
1) Regress Gini on MF_1, enrollment, inflation, democracy, arable land, and
population growth. Results are in Table 5.
2) Regress Gini on MF_1, rural population, inflation, democracy, arable land,
and population growth. Results are in Table 6.
3) Regress Gini on MF_2, enrollment, inflation, democracy, and arable land.
Results are in Table 7.
4) Regress Gini on MF_2, rural population, inflation, democracy, and arable
land. Results are in Table 8.

Table 5. Regression results: Gini on MF_1, enrollment, inflation, democracy,

arable land, and population growth
Dependent Variable: Gini
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/02/17 Time: 19:17
Sample (adjusted): 1 29
Included observations: 29 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
1 2 3 4 5
C 48.91345 6.360375 7.690341 0.0000
MF_1 22.68681 105.1527 0.215751 0.8312
Enrollment 0.026940 0.059123 0.455653 0.6531
Inflation −0.376418 0.217397 −1.731484 0.0974
Democracy 0.196494 0.091980 2.136269 0.0440
54 Israa Ali Mahmoud Ali, Hebatallah Ghoneim

Table 5 cont.
1 2 3 4 5
Arable Land −0.269561 0.077368 −3.484163 0.0021
Population Growth −1.082912 0.487352 −2.222035 0.0369
R-squared 0.614452 Mean dependent var 42.95517
Adjusted R-squared 0.509303 S.D. dependent var 7.470207
S.E. of regression 5.232865 Akaike info criterion 6.354300
Sum squared resid 602.4233 Schwarz criterion 6.684337
Log likelihood –85.13735 Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.457664
F-statistic 5.843605 Durbin-Watson stat 2.834992
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000914

In the regression results shown in Table 5, all estimated coefficients are

significant except the coefficients of both microfinance variable “MF_1” and
secondary enrollment variable “enrollment” with P-values equal 0.8218 and
0.1327 respectively.

Table 6. Regression results: Gini on MF_1, rural population, inflation, democracy,

arable land, and population growth
Dependent Variable: Gini
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/02/17 Time: 19:19
Sample: 1 30
Included observations: 30
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 53.83666 2.507039 21.47421 0.0000
MF_1 22.11094 97.08081 0.227758 0.8218
Rural Population −0.089516 0.057426 −1.558798 0.1327
Inflation −0.307374 0.197238 −1.558392 0.1328
Democracy 0.202302 0.086577 2.336676 0.0285
Arable Land −0.234034 0.073872 −3.168093 0.0043
Population Growth −1.045786 0.445061 −2.349760 0.0277
R-squared 0.646636 Mean dependent var 42.77667
Adjusted R-squared 0.554455 S.D. dependent var 7.405109
S.E. of regression 4.942850 Akaike info criterion 6.234725
Sum squared resid 561.9306 Schwarz criterion 6.561671
Log likelihood −86.52087 Hannan–Quinn criter. 6.339318
F-statistic 7.014795 Durbin–Watson stat 2.768106
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000245

In regression results shown in Table 6, the coefficients of MF_1, rural pop-

ulation, and inflation are all insignificant. However, the coefficients of democra-
cy, arable land, and population growth are all significant.
 The effect of microfinance on income inequality… 55

Table 7. Regression results: Gini on MF_2, enrollment, inflation, democracy,

and arable land
Dependent Variable: Gini
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/02/17 Time: 19:28
Sample (adjusted): 1 29
Included observations: 29 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 44.50189 6.433096 6.917647 0.0000
MF_2 −44.44769 33.41880 −1.330021 0.1966
Enrollment 0.064060 0.061790 1.036741 0.3106
Inflation −0.379971 0.232757 −1.632481 0.1162
Democracy 0.195699 0.097446 2.008281 0.0565
Arable Land −0.221932 0.084066 −2.639970 0.0146
R-squared 0.543105 Mean dependent var 42.95517
Adjusted R-squared 0.443779 S.D. dependent var 7.470207
S.E. of regression 5.571295 Akaike info criterion 6.455124
Sum squared resid 713.9045 Schwarz criterion 6.738012
Log likelihood −87.59929 Hannan–Quinn criter. 6.543721
F-statistic 5.467949 Durbin–Watson stat 2.611832
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001852

As for regression results shown in Table 7, all coefficients are insignificant

except democracy and arable land.

Table 8. Regression results: Gini on MF_2, rural population, inflation, democracy,

and arable land
Dependent Variable: Gini
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/02/17 Time: 19:21
Sample: 1 30
Included observations: 30
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 53.62366 2.683392 19.98354 0.0000
MF_2 −43.99643 29.91539 −1.470696 0.1544
Rural Population −0.105596 0.060708 −1.739430 0.0948
Inflation −0.346040 0.210536 −1.643618 0.1133
Democracy 0.197725 0.091738 2.155321 0.0414
Arable Land −0.197934 0.079230 −2.498221 0.0197
R-squared 0.582627 Mean dependent var 42.77667
Adjusted R-squared 0.495674 S.D. dependent var 7.405109
S.E. of regression 5.258805 Akaike info criterion 6.334541
Sum squared resid 663.7208 Schwarz criterion 6.614781
Log likelihood −89.01812 Hannan–Quinn criter. 6.424192
F-statistic 6.700502 Durbin–Watson stat 2.538961
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000489

And finally, the regression results in Table 8 show that all coefficients are
significant except MF_2 and inflation.
56 Israa Ali Mahmoud Ali, Hebatallah Ghoneim

5. Discussion

When running the regression, with enrollment (without rural population)

included, both MF_1 and MF_2 yielded near results (Table 5 and 7). Both mod-
els R-squared were adequately high ranging from 0.54 with MF_2 and 0.61 with
MF_1, which means that those independent variables explained about 54% to
61% of the Gini variations. Also, the adjusted R-squared that adjust for the num-
ber of parameters have high values ranging from 0.44 with MF_2 and 0.51 with
MF_1. Moreover, the P-value for the F-statistic is nearly zero for both MF_1 and
MF_2. Accordingly, the used models can be argued to be reliable.
With both MF_1 and MF_2, the inflation coefficients are significantly
negative (−0.38) and (−0.31), respectively, with 10% significance level. This
means that as inflation increases, income inequality decreases. This could be
explained by the fact that across the sample countries, inflation mainly harms the
high-income groups rather than low-income groups. In other words, the high-
income segments that likely own savings and accumulate wealth are more nega-
tively affected by the increased inflation since it decreases the value of their
wealth and shrinks their savings. Thus, the gap between the high-income and
low-income segments seems to shrink with increased inflation for this sample of
countries.
As for the democracy coefficient, both MF_1 and MF_2 yield a significant
positive coefficient (≈ 0.196). This means that, for the sample countries, as de-
mocracy increases income inequality increases. A potential reason behind this
relationship is that the sample countries may have high corruption levels and
consequently, any gains from democracy are likely reaped by the higher income
segments. Thus, the democracy index is no more a sufficiently reflective index
for this sample of developing countries.
Regarding the arable land coefficients with both MF_1 and MF_2, they
were both significantly negative (≈ −0.22). This indicates that as the percentage
of a country’s arable land increases, income inequality decreases. A possible
explanation is that the majority of a country’s population may be poor and de-
pendent on the arable land as one of the main sources of income. Therefore, for
this sample of countries, as the percentage of arable land increases, their income
per capita improves which leads to a better distribution of income.
The population growth variable is only included in the MF_1 regression and
has a significant negative coefficient (≈ −1.08). This shows that, for this sample,
countries with higher population growth are the countries witnessing lower in-
 The effect of microfinance on income inequality… 57

come inequality. A potential reason for this relationship may be that the growth
in population mainly occurs among the high income segments, therefore, the
income accruing to this segment is divided on a larger number of people; i.e.
their income per capita decreases which helps reduce the gap between high and
low-income segments. Also, countries with higher population growth may be
more alert to the income inequality problem and thus direct more attention and
adopt more equality-oriented policies which help decrease their Gini index. Al-
ternatively, this relationship could simply mean that higher population growth
means an increasing population size and labour supply which raises the coun-
try’s production, income, and income per capita leading to lower income ine-
quality.
The enrollment coefficients are negative yet insignificant with both MF_2
and MF_2. This could be caused by the fact that the regression is for a cross-
-sectional sample, where the effect of secondary education attainment could not
be reflected in the Gini.
When running the regression, with rural population (without enrollment),
both MF_1 and MF_2 yielded very near results to those of the regressions that
included the enrollment variables regarding the R-squared, adjusted R-squared,
Coefficients, P-values, and the F-statistics P-values (Table 6 and 8).
Throughout the 4 regressions, microfinance has not been proved significant.
When observing the P-value for the estimated microfinance coefficients, we can
find that MF_1 has a positive coefficient indicating a direct relation with income
inequality, i.e. as microfinance intensity (measured as a country’s total value of
MF loans divided by the GDP) increases, income inequality increases. Neverthe-
less, this positive relationship is insignificant and holds whether the accompany-
ing control variables include enrollment or rural population. As for the alterna-
tive measure of microfinance, that is, MF_2 (Total number of a country’s
microfinance borrowers divided by the total population) has negative coefficient
indicating an inverse relation with income inequality, i.e. as microfinance inten-
sity increases, income inequality decreases which conforms to the theory’s ex-
pectations. Yet, this relationship holds insignificant whether the accompanying
control variables include enrollment or rural population.
The insignificance of the microfinance variable’s effect on income inequali-
ty was unexpected. Instead, microfinance was expected to act as a major devel-
opment tool that contributes in curtailing the reasons for income inequality be-
tween the high and low-income segment of the society. This may be the result of
the relatively small customers’ base of microfinance or that the microfinance
58 Israa Ali Mahmoud Ali, Hebatallah Ghoneim

loans do not reach the truly underprivileged deserving segments in the sample
countries. Moreover, the regression did not consider the effect of loan-swapping
and over-indebtedness that the micro-borrowers may have suffered from in the
sample countries; which may have worsened the borrowers’ situation leading to
a positive yet insignificant effect of microfinance on income inequality (Ghosh,
2013; Sample, 2011).
Therefore, it is recommended that the sample countries’ governments en-
hance their supervisory role by enforcing a set of clear regulations to organize
the microfinance activities, preserve its transparency and goal achievement, en-
sure an ethical competition which prevents unethical practices that lead to wors-
en the status of the low-income segments instead of improving it, and to make
sure that micro-loans and other microfinance services reach the truly low-
income deserving segments.
Furthermore, it is recommended that countries adopting the group-lending
model restructure their lending process to accommodate a larger customer base.
One of the crucial shortcomings of the group lending model is that borrowers
who have high probability to repay their loans tend to choose group members
with similar high repayment probability to avoid being deprived from future
credit; while potentially excluding some other needy people. Thus, this model
could have a reverse effect and lead to more financial exclusion of the poor
which widens the gap between the rich and the poor. A proposed restructuring
solution is to adopt a lending model similar to the Islamic banks’ musharakah
motanaqisa or ‘diminished partnership’ concept: MFIs can provide a type of
contracts that allows low-income candidates to take an interest-free loan on
a condition to use it in a micro-business. The MFI should have a set of loan ap-
proval restrictions and should review the candidates’ profiles to assess whether
they deserve the loan. Once the contract is concluded, the MFI (capital owner
and partner) should monitor, supervise, and guide the borrower (partner contrib-
uting with management efforts) to ensure the sustainability of his micro-business
and thus, ensuring loan repayments. Profits are shared between the MFI and the
borrower; however, the borrower should make periodical payments along with
periodical profits in order to gradually purchase the MFI’s share in equity until it
reaches zero (Hassan & Lewis, 2007; Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2011; Manan & Kama-
luddin, 2010). This way, the borrower is allowed to improve his income while
contributing to the whole economy’s development, and the MFI benefits from
the partnership by investing its savings deposits in income-generating activities.
Diminished partnerships may represent an efficient solution to avoid any poten-
 The effect of microfinance on income inequality… 59

tial financial exclusion that may reverse the effect of microfinance on income
inequality from negative to positive; and it is also suitable for both Islamic and
non-Islamic countries.

6. Conclusions

In conclusion, microfinance, as argued, is a critical instrument in the eco-

nomic development process that has disseminated throughout the world and
gained a lot of advocators. It allowed the marginalised members of the society to
access collateral-free small loans that enabled them to start small businesses and
weed out their abject poverty. Despite critiques of microfinance, it remains an
appealing issue to examine whether its micro-level influence is further translated
into macro-level benefits, e.g. reduced income inequality across the developing
countries.
To study the direct effect of microfinance, a cross-sectional regression of
the Gini index on 2 alternative measures of microfinance intensity and a set of
control variables has been done. Regression results show that for both measures
of microfinance, neither a positive nor a negative impact of microfinance on
Gini could be significantly proved. Most of the other control variables proved
significant. A strengthened governmental supervisory role, as well as, a restruc-
turing of the traditional group lending model is recommended to ensure financial
inclusion of the poor segments of the society and hence reducing inequality.
Some limitations have been faced during this research: First, there was a re-
markable difficulty in finding recent data for the Gini index especially when it
comes to the developing countries. The problem has been overcome by obtain-
ing the data from the 2016 human development report while assuming that the
Gini stated in the report are for the year 2015. It is also recommended for future
similar research to re-check for heteroskedasticity to obtain more accurate re-
flective results.

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