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Psychological egoism and the rhetorical tradition

Don M. Burks

To cite this article: Don M. Burks (1966) Psychological egoism and the rhetorical tradition,
Speech Monographs, 33:4, 400-418, DOI: 10.1080/03637756609375507

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 PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM AND THE RHETORICAL
TRADITION
DON M. BURKS

N the history of ethics psychological In the following discussion he will be

I egoism is a topic that has received
considerable attention. Psychological
referred to from time to time not only
because his work clearly reveals the
egoism is the theory that all rational influence of an egoistic psychology, but
also because the influence of Aristotle's
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interests are self-interests, that all rea-

sonable desires are ultimately egoistic. Rhetoric on Hobbes's thought appears
Essentially, egoism is a theory of human to have been considerable. According to
motivation. As used by philosophers the Hobbes the object of the voluntary acts
term egoism does not connote the op- of every man "is some good to himself."x
probrious self-preoccupation associated Apart from society ". . . the condition
with the word egotism. To say a thinker of man, . . . is a condition of war of
is an egoist is simply to say he subscribes every one against every one."2 To avoid
to the egoistic theory that all rational the chaos of anarchy, men enter into
interests may be traced ultimately to a social contract, but only because a
self-interests. society is mutually advantageous. "All
The influence of egoism can be de- society," Hobbes argued, "is either for
tected in much of the ethical theory gain, or for glory; that is, not so much
of the western world prior to the for love of our fellows, as for love of
eighteenth century. Its influence is to be ourselves."3
found in the ethical theories of Plato The egoistic assumptions of Hobbes's
and Aristotle, as will be noted. This psychology are similar to those of Aris-
paper is concerned primarily with that
1
influence, and its eighteenth-century Thomas Hobbes, The English Works of
Thomas Hobbes, ed. William Molesworth, 11
refutation, in rhetorical theory. The vols. (London, 1839-1845), III, Leviathan, p.
pertinence of such an inquiry is easily 120. Hobbes's italics. Hobbes is sometimes re-
ferred to as a psychological hedonist, but he
established: the rhetorical theorist who was not. Psychological hedonism is the most
holds an egoistic view of human nature common form of psychological egoism; yet
one can be an egoist, maintaining that men
will explain the process of persuasion, are motivated only by self-interest, without also
an essential part of rhetoric, in terms maintaining that all desire is desire for one's
own pleasure. Hobbes did not maintain that
of appeals to a more or less enlightened pleasure is man's only end, but he did main-
self-interest, while the theorist who tain that all actions, so far as they can be
purposefully understood, tend toward meeting
holds an unegoistic view will see per- the needs of the organism's own growth and
suasion, particularly the matter of development. The distinction between egoism
and hedonism is important in this paper, for
motive appeal, in a more inclusive way. while such influential figures in the history
of rhetoric as Aristotle and Cicero reject
Among philosophers Thomas Hobbes hedonism as a theory hardly worthy of serious
consideration, they seldom say anything con-
stands as the great exponent of egoism. trary to the basic egoistic assumption that the
reasoning capacity of man is essentially self-
Dr. Burks is Assistant Professor of Speech, regarding.
2
University of Washington. This article is based 3
Ibid., p. 117.
upon his doctoral dissertation, directed by Pro- Hobbes, Works, II, Philosophical Rudi-
fessor Frederick W. Haberman at the Univer- ments Concerning Government and Society (the
sity of Wisconsin. English translation of De Cive), p. 5.
 PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM AND RHETORICAL TRADITION 401-

totle, though there is a difference. His- The view of human nature suggested
torians of philosophy such as George by later rhetoricians such as George
Brett have noted Hobbes's debt to Book Campbell and James Winans differs
Two of Aristotle's Rhetoric, a debt re- from earlier views in that these writers
flected especially in Leviathan.* Hobbes's do not assume that reason compels
A Briefe of the Art of Rhetorique puts man to act in accord with self-interest,
Aristotle's Rhetoric in Hobbes's own however important self-interest appeals
pungent style while preserving the es- may be in persuasion. These later writ-
sence of the work. The difference be- ers differ also in their recognition that
tween the egoism of Aristotle and of sympathy is of great importance in per-
Hobbes is that whereas Aristotle pre- suasion. Winans goes still farther by
sents statements which mitigate his ego- insisting that whatever holds attention
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istic psychology, and even occasionally can determine action.

appear to contradict it, Hobbes seldom
This paper will focus on three periods
if ever qualifies his egoistic belief. Find-
in the development of rhetorical theory:
ing egoistic implication in the work of
ancient theory, chiefly that of Aristotle;
Aristotle is to some extent a matter of
the refutation of egoism in eighteenth-
interpretation, but Hobbes's work gives
century England, including George
such striking expression to the egoistic
Campbell's incorporation of an unego-
thesis , that a number of writers felt
istic psychology into rhetorical theory;
called upon to refute the doctrine in
modern rhetorical theory, with empha-
general and Hobbes's version in par-
sis on James A. Winans' theory of per-
ticular. Nevertheless, Hobbes was but
suasion. The objectives are to show:
giving a new life to an old belief.
(1) that the influence of the egoistic
The view of human nature presented doctrine may be found in the work of
in Book Two of Aristotle's Rhetoric is classical rhetoricians; (2) that there is
partial, however true it may be as far as presented in George Campbell's The
it goes. There the dominant idea ap- Philosophy of Rhetoric an unegoistic
pears to be that persuasive appeals are theory of persuasion which illustrates the
to be directed almost exclusively to the breadth of rhetorical theory based upon
individual's desire for his own growth an unegoistic psychology; (3) that the
and development. topic of psychological egoism continues
4 to receive consideration from modern
George Sidney Brett, A History of Psy-
chology, 3 vols. (London, 1912), II, 221. Says philosophers, and, although somewhat
Brett: "In the second book of the Rhetoric indirectly, from modern rhetorical the-
we are told how the arts of language may be
employed to gain one's ends. The war of words orists as they concern themselves with
is the highest form of that war of all against questions of motive appeal and self-
all which Hobbes saw around him: it is the
strife that goes on when physical force gives interest.
way to the conflict of wits. Words make for
knowledge, knowledge is power, and the most
fundamental passion of man [according to I
Hobbes] is the desire for power." Brett con-
cludes of Hobbes's social and political theory,
"The phrases are new because previous writers According to the dominant theses of
had not taken them from this source: in re- ancient Greek psychology all rational
ality they are transcribed from that second
book of the Rhetoric of Aristotle" (pp. 221- conduct makes the well-being of the
222). The extensive borrowing from Aristotle's self its end. The cardinal virtues of the
Rhetoric is frequently noted in discussions of
Hobbes's work. For example, see: Gardner Greeks are limited to wisdom, justice,
Murphy, Historical Introduction to Modern fortitude and temperance; benevolence
Psychology (New York, 1949), p. 22; Richard
Peters, Hobbes (Baltimore, 1956), p. 144. or selfless concern for another is not in
 402 SPEECH MONOGRAPHS

the Greek list of virtues.5 If one may Now if we grant, as we must, that Plato thought
judge by the ethical arguments of this [that man pursues only his own good],
we can find in the admission a natural ex-
Socrates, even Plato held an egoistic planation of Plato's desire to prove that just
view, a lofty one to be sure. action will be advantageous. For plainly he
The egoistic aspect of Plato's argu- passionately wanted men to do what is right,
and if he thought that it was only desire of
ment has been well pointed out Dy H. A. some good to themselves which moved them
Prichard, former Professor of Moral in all deliberate action, it would be natural,
Philosophy at Oxford. "Why," asks and indeed necessary, for him to think that
Prichard, "did Plato think it important if men are to be induced to do what is just,
to prove that right action would benefit the only way to induce them is to convince
them that thereby they will gain or become
the agent?"6 Because, he answers, ac- better off.n
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cording to Plato, a man pursues what-

ever he pursues simply as a good to him- In addition to the above statement,
self. . . ."7 Prichard's statement seems Prichard argues that the Sophists in the
strong indeed; for some it may appear Republic presuppose that for an action
to discredit the ethical theory of a great to be just it must be advantageous, and
moral philosopher. that Plato, in attempting to meet the
Nevertheless, see how Prichard sup- Sophists on their own grounds, implies
ports his argument. He says the view along with them, "that it is impossible
that man pursues only his own good for an action to be just, i.e., a duty, un-
comes to light in the sixth book of the less it is for the advantage of the
Republic. There Socrates speaks of the agent."12 What Plato should have said to
good, says Prichard, "as that which every the Sophists, argues Prichard, is that the
soul pursues and for the sake of which advantages accruing to an agent as the
it does all it does. . . ."8 And whenever result of an action have nothing what-
Plato uses the term good or goods here or ever to do with whether the action is
elsewhere in the Republic or in other right or wrong. Advantageousness does
dialogues, argues Prichard, "the context not render an action a duty.13
always shows that he means by a good Careful reflection upon Prichard's
a good to oneself. . . ."» Prichard says argument reveals that he is essentially
this view "emerges most clearly in the correct in his view that the Platonic
Gorgias, where Plato, in order to show moral argument is on the whole one
that rhetoricians and tyrants do not do which appeals to an intelligent and en-
what they really wish to do, maintains lightened self-interest. The argument
that in all actions alike, and even when of Socrates is that one must be just, or
we kill a man or despoil him of his righteous, in order to achieve lasting
goods, we do what we do because we
think it will be better for us to do so."10 11
Ibid.
12
Explaining why Plato uses this ego- 13
Ibid., p. 10.
Ibid., pp. 16-17. See also Prichard's Moral
istic argument, Prichard says: Obligation (Oxford, 1949), p. 2. Prichard says
that both Plato and Bishop Butler, later to be
5
considered in this paper, urge man to act in
See, for example, Edward Meredith Cope, so-called moral ways by showing that to do
A Review of Aristotle's System of Ethics (Cam- so will really be for his happiness. Prichard's
bridge, 1867), p. 52. proof of this point, however, is more convinc-
6 ing with Plato than with Butler. That one's
Harold Arthur Prichard, Duty and In-
terest (Oxford, 1928), p. 20. Prichard's italics. own happiness and benevolent action are seldom
7 in conflict is indeed a part of Butler's argu-
Ibid.
8
Ibid. ment; but for him this is a happy coincidence,
9
Ibid., p. 21. and even if it were not so, man could still be
10
Ibid. expected to perform benevolent acts.
 PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM AND RHETORICAL TRADITION 4«3

peace and insure the health of one's own that reason may be free to engage in
soul. Thus, it is better for a man to high intellectual flights. This leads to
suffer injustice from others than to the still higher intellectual virtue, the
corrupt his soul by committing injustice pure and undisturbed exercise of the in-
himself, a view skillfully argued in the telligence at its best. The good man
Gorgias. We do not usually note the should apply the doctrine of the mean
egoistic aspect of Socrates' argument be- to his life of impulse, finding for himself
cause the self-interest advocated is lofty a balance between a deficiency of vigor
and enlightened. Then too, the ethic he and an excess that might disturb inner
suggests is infinitely more desirable from harmony. Aristotle thus presents a
a social point of view than is the argu- philosophy of self-realization. Such a
ment that the only natural right is the philosophy need not be egoistic, but
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right of the strong to rule and exploit Aristotle's is because he presents self-
the weak, the argument Socrates labors realization as the end-in-view, whereas
to refute. a non-egoistic philosophy would present
Psychological egoism manifests itself self-realization as a consequence of pur-
differently in Aristotle's thought, and is suing other worthy objectives.
more obvious. Let us note the egoistic Aristotle presents his conception of
outlook in Aristotle's ethical theory be- the good or "great souled" man, the man
fore exploring his rhetorical theory. Re- who has attained both moral and intel-
jecting Plato's view that there is a single lectual virtue, in the Nicomachean Eth-
concept of the good, Aristotle argues that ics, and his conception is egoistic.15
the good of anything having a function Such a man must be favored with phys-
is the full realization of that function. ical conditions of well-being, property,
Since the distinctive function of man is good looks, and intelligence. He must
his capacity to reason, his true good himself add the discipline of moral vir-
must consist in the fullest possible exer- tue. While it is a part of his character
cise of his reason. Such a view would not to confer benefits, he hates receiving
in itself imply egoism but with Aristotle them; conferring benefits implies su-
it does. For Aristotle maintains that periority, receiving them implies infe-
man's reasoning capacity is essentially riority. The proud man has a deep voice
sell-regarding; in the Nicomachean and a deliberate way of speaking. He
Ethics he says, ". . . reason in each of never hurries, since he believes there is
its possessors chooses what is best for little or nothing worth his hurrying
itself, and the good man obeys his for. Such a man will not rush into dan-
reason."14 ger but will face it bravely if necessary,
According to Aristotle's ethical theory and will be ready to sacrifice his life
the perfection of the life of impulse con- rather than his honor. Speaking of
sists in its rationally controlled fulfill- Aristotle's description of the "great-
ment, which is moral virtue. More souled" man, W. D. Ross says, "there are
specifically, moral virtue consists in the admirable traits among those here de-
control of volitional life by reason, so picted, but as a whole the picture is an
unpleasing one; it is an anticipation of
14
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1169a, ed. the Stoic sage without his self-abasement
Richard McKeon. The Basic Works of Aris- before the ideal of duty. . . . The passage
totle (New York, 1941), p. 1087. Unless other- simply betrays somewhat nakedly the
wise indicated, all future Aristotelian cita-
tions will be from this abridged edition of the
standard Oxford translations of the complete
works, edited by W. D. Ross. 15
Book IV, Ch. iii.
 4°4 SPEECH MONOGRAPHS

self-absorption which is the bad side of cation of our love of power.21 Censur-
Aristotle's ethics."16. ing and finding fault with one's neigh-
In certain respects, though not in all, bor is pleasant because it implies su-
Aristotle's egoistic outlook is more ap- periority in judgment or virtue.22
parent in the Rhetoric than in the From the principle of "fondness of
Ethics. The general aim of life for every like for like" Aristotle deduces the uni-
individual man and for all men in com- versality of self-love. He asserts that
mon is happiness.17 It follows then that everyone is more or less selfish, saying:
the persuader appeals to this aim. In his "since everything like and akin to oneself
analysis of happiness in the Rhetoric is pleasant, and since every man is him-
Aristotle is nearer to hedonism than in self more like and akin to himself than
his analysis of this subject in the Ethics, anyone else is, it follows that all of us
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but in both the term "well-being" prob- must be more or less fond of our-
ably better conveys his meaning.18 The selves."23
constituents of happiness or well-being
The generally egoistic viewpoint of
as enumerated in the Rhetoric are pre-
the Rhetoric is perhaps best reflected in
sented in terms of what a man of virtue
the analysis of the characters of men of
would want for himself.19 In stating
various ages, for the implied motives in
these constituents Aristotle avoids he-
each of Aristotle's three categories are
donism by recognizing that the goal ol
egoistic. Young men are lustful in char-
life is something more than mere pleas-
acter and are apt to seek the object of
ure. He does not, however, attempt to
their lust. However, "they would always
avoid egoism; in the Rhetoric, where
rather do noble deeds than useful ones:
he presents the popular view of human
their lives are regulated more by moral
nature, and in the Nicomachean Ethics,
feeling than by reasoning; and whereas
where he presents a more definitive
reasoning leads us to choose what is
view, Aristotle rarely suggests any other
useful, moral goodness leads us to choose
principles of rational choice than dis-
what is noble."24 Young men, then,
covery of that which is expedient or
choose honor almost exclusively, for
that which is self-ennobling.
they "have not yet come to value either
In the Rhetoric we are told victory is their friends or anything else by their
pleasant because it gives rise to an im- usefulness to themselves."25 Here the
pression of superiority and superiority implication appears to be that men will
is a noble and right aim.20 The pleasure eventually come to' value everything by
of conferring favors is due to the gratifi- its usefulness to themselves.
16
W. D. Ross, Aristotle (New York, 1959),
21
p. 203. Rhetoric, 1371a, 1371b. See Cope's Com-
17
Rhetoric, 1360b. mentary concerning Book I, Ch. xi, Oxford
18
See W. D. Ross's Aristotle, p . 186. Ross section number 22 (I, 217). Cope notes the
says the word "happiness" does not convey the tendency of Aristotle and of Hobbes to attach
meaning of the Greek word "eudaemonia" as considerable significance to the love of power
used in Aristotle's Ethics. "Aristotle insists," as a spring of action. In an often quoted state-
says Ross, that eudaemonia "is a kind of ac- ment Hobbes says, ". . . in the first place, I
tivity; that it is not any kind of pleasure, put for a general inclination of all mankind,
though pleasure naturally accompanies it." a perpetual and restless desire of power after
Ross recommends the translation "well-being." power, that ceaseth only in death." Leviathan,
19
Rhetoric, 1360b. Works, III, 85-86.
20 22
Rhetoric, 1370b, 1371a, 1368a. See Edward Rhetoric, 1371b. See Cope's Commentary
Meredith Cope, The Rhetoric of Aristotle relating to Book I, Ch. xi, sections 27 and 22.
23
With A Commentary, ed. J. E. Sandys (Cam- Rhetoric, 1371b. See Cope's Commentary
bridge, 1877), 3 vols., especially Cope's com- relating to Book I, Ch. xi, sections 26 and 27.
24
ment concerning Book I, Ch. ii, Oxford sec- Rhetoric, 1389a.
25
tion number 14 (I, 210). Rhetoric, 1389b.
 PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM AND RHETORICAL TRADITION 4°5
Unlike young men, old men are self- marks on the absence of benevolence
ish, always choosing the expedient to from Aristotle's consideration28 and ex-
the exclusion of the honorable, the rel- plains that the kindness or favor of
ative good to the exclusion of the ab- which Aristotle speaks in the Rhetoric29
solute good. The point of interest here is confined to doing a service to a friend
is that the choice is presented as between in need.30 It is appropriate then that
honor or expediency. The possibility of favor or kindness is considered by Aris-
rationally disinterested acts does not totle along with the emotions rather
seem to enter Aristotle's thinking. than the virtues, for while it was recog-
Aware that men may reject the expedi- nized that charitable acts might result
ent, he appears to think their only rea- from impulse, they could hardly be con-
son for doing so is to gain personal sidered noble since they were irrational.
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honor. The least egoistic concept to be found

As for the third category of men in in either the Rhetoric or the Ethics is
their various ages, Aristotle says that friendship. Speaking of Aristotle's dis-
men in their prime wisely choose the cussion of friendship in the Ethics,
mean amount of both expediency and W. D. Ross says:
honor. This is in accord with his ethical T h e discussion is a valuable corrective to an
system in which honor, though admit- impression which the rest of the Ethics tends
tedly not useful in a material sense, is, to make. For the most part Aristotle's moral
nevertheless, sought in a decidedly ego- system is decidedly self-centered. It is at his
istic way, for the individual does the own eudaemonia [well-being] we arc told, that
man aims and should aim. In the account of
honorable thing in order to bring greater justice there is an implicit recognition of the
glory to himself.26 rights of others. But in the whole of the
We may note in passing that Aris- Ethics outside of the books on friendship very
totle's conception of pity as presented in little is said to suggest that men can and
should take a warm personal interest in other
the Rhetoric reveals an egoistic view; people; altruism is almost completely absent.3l
for, by definition, he limits pity to those
sufferings to which we ourselves or our Ross goes on to say that traces of the
friends are exposed. There will be oc- egoistic view are present even in the
casion to return to Aristotle's limited account of friendship; actually, however,
conception in connection with Camp- there are more than traces, for Aristotle's
bell's discussion of pity. conception of friendship is not at all
In the Rhetoric Aristotle considers incompatible with egoism, since it is
favor or kindness among the emotions
Ethics: A Critical Introduction (New York,
rather than among the virtues. Even 1960), p. 104. In preparing this paper I have
though Lane Cooper and others trans- relied heavily on Garnett's book; more than
other philosophers, Professor Garnett has called
late this feeling as "benevolence" it attention to the effects of psychological egoism
should not be confused with a concept on ancient ethical theory and to the signifi-
cance of the eighteenth-century refutation of
such as Christian charity or any truly that doctrine.
disinterested action.27 E. M. Cope re- 28
Commentary, I, 217. Cope says, "Aristotle
neither here [1371b] nor elsewhere takes any
account of the benevolent affections as ele-
26
See, for example, Nicomachean Ethics, ments of human nature."
29
1169a. Also see how J. A. K. Thompson ren- Rhetoric, II, Ch. 7, 1385a, 1385b. See also
ders the passage in The Ethics of Aristotle R. C. Jebb's translation of the Rhetoric (Cam-
(London, 1953), p. 276. bridge, 1909), pp. 88-89.
27 30
The Rhetoric of Aristotle, trans. Lane Commentary, II, 94-95.
31
Cooper (New York, 1932), p. 117 (1385a). Also Ross, Aristotle, p. 223. I have substituted
see Cope's A Review of Aristotle's System of the transliterated word eudaemonia where Ross
Ethics, pp. 46 and 52; A. Campbell Garnett, presents the Greek letters for this word.
 406 SPEECH MONOGRAPHS

based on self-love. A friend is said to be Nicomachean Ethics because the rational

an alter-ego, a second self. aspect of virtue—and therefore the ego-
Aristotle follows Plato in deriving all istic aspect according to much ancient
other types of love and friendship from psychology—is not the dominating con-
the ideal love of self. This becomes ap- sideration in the Rhetoric.
parent in a chapter devoted to self-love It must be admitted that finding
in the Nicomachean Ethics?2 Here, egoism in Aristotle's work is sometimes
Aristotle explains that there are two a question of how one interprets his
kinds of self-love. The one is low, meaning. There is, for example, a dis-
vulgar, and degrading in its self- cussion of liberality in Book Four of
indulgence. The other manifests itself the Ethics wherein Aristotle says, "it is
as a desire for superiority over others, more characteristic of virtue to do good
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as a grasping desire to excel in honor than to have good done to one."34 This
and virtue. In this sense, we are told, would seem a most unegoistic statement,
the good man should be a lover of self. but in keeping with other Aristotelian
This ideal love of self should be ex- statements that have here been noted,
pressed in the individual's aspiration the basic concern appears to be for one's
for higher values, as in the wisdom of own virtue as a noble man, rather than
the philosopher. The concept that Aris- for the well-being of another.
totle advances is essentially similar to Of course interpretations of Aristotle's
the eros of the Symposium and of the meanings have long differed and con-
Phaedrus, that is the divine eros, de- tinue to do so. Thus Professor Randall
scribed in Socrates' second speech. says, when discussing the Rhetoric, it
Werner Jaeger says that Aristotle took is hardly too much to trace back to
the principle of eros from Plato; and, Aristotle the conviction of literary
as Jaeger, Nygren and other scholars humanism, that the study of good writ-
have noted, eros, even in its widest ing and good speaking is ipso facto a
interpretation as a yearning for divine pursuit of humane wisdom.35 On the
perfection, is essentially self-regarding.33
other hand, Professor Oates finds various
statements in the Rhetoric immoral or
There are certain factors which, while
at the very least amoral.36 The main
they do not offset the generally egoistic
objective in the present discussion of
viewpoint of the Rhetoric, do tend to
Aristotle's work has not been to side
mitigate it in some respects, making for
with either of these very capable schol-
a generally plausible and workable
ars as to the ethical level of the Rhetoric,
theory of persuasion. For example, the
but rather to point out that the
comparatively superficial consideration
Rhetoric is limited by an egoistic theory
of virtue in the Rhetoric is less egoistic
than the discussion of this subject in the 34
1120a.
35
John Herman Randall, Aristotle (New
32
Bk. IX, Ch. 8. York, 1960), p . 287. While not in general agree-
33
Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of ment with the interpretation of Aristotle's view
Greek Culture (New York, 1943), 3 vols., II, of motivation presented in this paper, Randall,
190. See also Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros nevertheless, notes the influence of Aristotle
(London, 1957), pp. 179-181. Jaeger and Nygren on Hobbes. Says Randall, "In seventeenth-cen-
present somewhat different interpretations of tury philosophizing, . . . Aristotelian 'desire'
eros. For Jaeger eros at its best is the drive takes the form of Thomas Hobbes's 'endeavor
toward a higher kind of self-fulfillment, the toward or fromward'—in many fundamental
impulse toward education and culture in its respects Hobbes remained a good Ockhamite
truest sense. For Nygren eros is a self-seeking Aristotelian" (p. 72).
love to be distinguished from agape, an all- 36
Whitney J. Oates, Aristotle and the Prob-
giving love. lem of Value (Princeton, 1963), p. 349.
 PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM AND RHETORICAL TRADITION 4<>7

of motivation, a limitation which af- combine chicanery with the commonly

fected not only Aristotle's work but that held egoistic belief, which resulted in a
of other great thinkers as well, not ex- kind of rhetoric that would well justify
cepting even Plato. Ethical implications Plato's reprobation. The best available
can hardly be avoided when dealing statement of this kind of rhetoric is
with the question of egoism, but the Rhetorica ad Alexandrnm. The anony-
remarkable thing, especially with Plato, mous author of this work presents only
is that the moral view suggested is so a superficial analysis of human motives,
lofty even though influenced by egoistic explaining that profit is a prevailing
assumptions. One has only to turn to incentive to action. Therefore, in accu-
Epicurus and his followers to see the sation one should try to prove that it
results of an egoistic psychology where was profitable for the party to commit
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there is a less imaginative mind. the alleged act, "because as most men
The Rhetoric and the Ethics have set the highest value on profit themselves
been considered together in this dis- they think that everybody else too al-
cussion but without intent to equate ways acts from motives of profit."38
two works in which the differences are In keeping with this view we are later
many. We know that one looks to what told that a speaker must show "that
is, the other to what ought to be. We it is to his interest to speak the truth"
are here concerned with a question of about the matters being discussed, the
belief about human motivation, and implication being that no speaker would
nowhere is die connection between otherwise do so.30 As an English trans-
rhetoric and ethics more pronounced lator of this treatise notes, the only
than at those points where motivation concern of its author is the problem of
must be accounted for. What our survey how to persuade an audience; he
has shown is that whether one turns to " . . . gives none of the warnings against
the Rhetoric or the Ethics, there are the abuse of oratory nor any of the
exceptional statements on the part of background of logic, psychology and
Aristotle, but his view of human nature ethics that render Aristotle's Rhetoric
as revealed in these works remains ego- a philosophical work."40 The chicanery
istic when considered on balance. suggested in this work has been pointed
out in detail by E. M. Cope.41
Turning briefly to another writer of
importance in classical rhetoric, one Although morality by Cicero's time,
finds evidence that Isocrates accepted as Cope says, "had made a decided
an egoistic psychology, as when he says, advance beyond the rules laid down by
" . . . I maintain that everyone does Plato and Aristotle,"42 Cicero never
everything which he does for the sake 38
of pleasure or gain or honor; for I Rhetorica ad Alexandrian, trans. H. Rack-
ham (Cambridge, 1937), p. 323, 1428b.
observe that no desire springs up in 39
40
Ibid., p. 343, 1431b.
men save for these objects."37 Never- 41
Ibid., Rackham's introduction, p. 258.
Edward M. Cope, An Introduction to Aris-
theless, as with Plato and Aristotle, there totle's Rhetoric (London, 1867), pp. 401-464.
42
is such regard for justice that one does A Review of Aristotle's System of Ethics,
p. 53. The phrase quoted may make it seem
not find chicanery suggested by that Cope, a man who devoted his life to a
Isocrates. study of the Greeks, thought less of the work
of Plato and Aristotle than the work of Cicero.
Some of the Sophists, however, did This of course was not the case, but the fact
is that by Cicero's time there was a less cir-
cumscribed concept of morality. In the view
37 of the Greeks, as Cope explains, "Barbarians,
Isocrates, trans. George Norlin (New York,
1928), 3 vols., II, 307. "Antidosis," 217. i.e., all except the Greeks, were of an inferior
 408 SPEECH MONOGRAPHS

rejects the egoistic psychology so prev- means of eloquence to persuade others to

alent in the ancient western world. join him in the formation of a more civ-
Whether or not the Stoical concepts pre- ilized way of life. The idea that states
sented in De Finibus Bonorum com- were originally established by orators is
pletely represent Cicero's own ethical repeated in De Oratore (I.viii). The other
theory, he there sets forth the view aspect of the argument, that the state
"that it is love of self which supplies of nature is a state of war, is repeated
the primary impulse to action."43 In in Cicero's defense of Publius Sextius.46
De Officiis, the ethical treatise of his In this speech Cicero says that if laws
maturity, Cicero says that every man is and courts should be suspended, vio-
so strongly impelled in the direction of lence would again reign supreme.
his own advantage "that any other type Cicero's conception of pity as pre-
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of behavior would be unthinkable."44 sented in De Oratore appears as limited

The egoism of Cicero, like that of as Aristotle's. Their definitions of pity
Plato, is of a lofty kind. In the passage will be contrasted presently with that of
just referred to he is arguing that true George Campbell.
expediency and virtue cannot really be Pre-Christian philosophers such as
separated.45 Like the Greek philoso- Plato were not at odds with later Chris-
phers, he finds it necessary to argue that tians when the former assumed that the
the virtuous act is always in the agent's man who is wise and good may have
interest; for, as generally assumed by insight into the basic features of con-
the ancient ethical theorists, the rational duct required for the integrity of per-
man would otherwise not be virtuous. sonality. Both Plato and Aristotle be-
In the second chapter of De Inven- lieved, however, that moral conduct is
tione, Cicero presents a theme he was that which commends itself to reason,
to use more than once, the idea that and that man's reason is necessarily
prior to the formation of governments self-regarding. With this view the early
men lived in a state of nature, their Christian thinkers agreed except that
untamed selfishness resulting in a per- they held by divine grace the Christian
petual war of each against each, an becomes capable of faith, hope, and
argument similar to the one Thomas charity.47
Hobbes was to present more than seven- Certain advocates in every age have
teen centuries later. Cicero argues that asserted that man may act on some-
some wise man, perceiving the advan- thing more than self-interest, and men
tage of community life, was able by have practiced benevolence regardless of
their theories of human nature. How-
race, and might therefore according to Aris- ever, the philosophical refutation of
totle be enslaved, and according to Plato
treated with contempt" (p. 52). Cicero, says psychological egoism, the doctrine main-
Cope, is "so far from allowing of deceit or taining that true and rational benevo-
breach of faith to an enemy [that] he dis-
tinctly, de Off. I.13., lays down the maxim lence is impossible, did not occur until
that faith is to be kept even with them. . . ."
(p. 53). 46
43
Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, Cicero, "The Speech of M. T. Cicero in
trans. H. Rackham (New York, 1914), III.v, Defense of. Publius Sextius," The Orations of
Marcus Tullius Cicero, trans. C. D. Yonge
PP. 233-235- (London, 1891), 4 vols., III, xlii, 196-197.
44
III.xxviii. Brutus, On the Nature of the 47
See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica
Gods, On Divination, On Duties, trans. Huber (New York, 1947), 3 vols., I, 846-857, Questions
M. Poteat (Chicago, 1950), p. 601. 61-63. Also see A. Campbell Garnett, "Good
45
See, for example, his story concerning Reasons in Ethics: A Revised Conception of
Marcus Regulus. De Officiis III.xxvi.xxvii.xxviii. Natural Law," Mind, LXIX (July 1960), 357.
Poteat trans., pp. 599ff.
 PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM AND RHETORICAL TRADITION

the eighteenth century. It was in Eng- not easy reading, but the questions with
land—where Hobbes had in the seven- which they are concerned are by no
teenth century pushed the egoistic doc- means simple. Keenly aware that lan-
trine to an extreme—that a sound philo- guage is imperfect, Butler tried to use
sophical refutation was worked out by it with such painstaking care that, at
such thinkers as Bishop Joseph Butler times, he seems to have defeated his
and David Hume.48 purpose.
In the Sermons Butler argued that
II different propensities can be distin-
Joseph Butler was born in 1692 and guished in human nature. As a consti-
died in 1752, his entire life being spent tution provides for levels and depart-
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in England. A Bishop of the Anglican ments of government, so in man there

Church, his most important published are the reflective and nonreflective levels
works were The Analogy of Religion of behavior. On the reflective level are
Natural and Revealed to the Constitu- the general principles of self-love, benev-
tion and Course of Nature (1736), and olence, and conscience. On the non-
Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls reflective level are the particular affec-
Chapel (1726). The Analogy of tions, passions, and appetites. Ideally,
Religion is a defense of theistic belief all these parts work in harmony with
having no relevance to this essay; how- each other. The egoistic doctrine, Butler
ever, Butler's sermons are relevant be- argued, over-emphasizes the role of the
cause of their concern with the question reflective principle of self-love to the
of egoism. exclusion of the other reflective prin-
Butler's sermons have a place of ciples, conscience and benevolence.
importance in the history of ethical Psychological egoism rests on the as-
theory and are considered in nearly all sumption that because pleasure and sat-
surveys of moral philosophy. They are isfaction are the consequences of the
successful pursuit of an interest, these
48
Other sources such as Shaftesbury, An In- are the ends at which the interest aims.
quiry Concerning Virtue or Merit (1699),
Hutcheson, An Inquiry Concerning the Orig- Egoists such as Hobbes even traced
inal of Our Ideas of Virtue or Moral Good all impulsive conduct to self-love. But,
(1725), Smith, The Theory of Moral Senti-
ments (1759) present refutations of egoism. In- argued Butler, simply because all our
deed, it is said that the germ of the moral- acts must arise from ourselves does not
sense concept later developed by Shaftesbury
and Hutcheson may possibly be found in mean that they are all motivated out
Francis Bacon's discussion of the appetites of of self-interest. That every interest is
the human mind for both public and private
good. See the article on Bacon's works in the an interest of some self does not indi-
Dictionary of National Biography. Even though cate that every interest is an interest
anti-egoistic arguments were in the air, ethical
theorists generally agree that the definitive in the self. One's objective, his aim or
refutation of psychological egoism is contained end-in-view, may be apart from any
in the sermons of Bishop Butler. Butler's refu-
tative arguments may be found in Joseph satisfaction he will get from an act.45
Butler, The Works of Joseph Butler, ed. W. E. In fact, argued Butler, disengagement
Gladstone (Oxford, 1896). Butler's sermons
are in Vol. II of this edition of his works. is necessary to enjoyment. He meant
Another good edition is that of J. H. Bernard that pleasure and satisfaction are not
(New York, 1900), the sermons being in Vol.
I. For convenient reference see Joseph Butler,
Five Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel 49
and A Dissertation Upon the Nature of Virtue Hobbes calls the end of all movement its
(New York, 1950). Butler's refutation is found "fruition," but he never indicates whether this
in the Preface to the Sermons, and in Ser- refers to obtaining the object toward which
mons I, II, III, and XI. movement was directed or the end state of
the person involved. See Peters, Hobbes, p. 141.
 4io SPEECH MONOGRAPHS

the results of their pursuit, as such, but be these ends egoistic, altruistic, or
the consequences of interest and activity whatever. Moreover, Hume points out
concerned with the pursuit of various that man's interests are not bound to be
objectives. Disengagement is necessary to self-centered, that man's interests are
enjoyment because preoccupation with in fact object-centered or object-
self would interfere. directed; that is to say, other people
and even one's own body are perceived
The concept of. disengagement is re-
as objects by the subject which does
lated to the ever-present need in per-
the thinking. The most selfish and the
suasion to gain and hold attention. A
most unselfish interests do not differ in
successful persuader, operating on the
a generic way; they differ with respect
principle that the audience has psycho-
to the end-in-view of the agent whose
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logical resources of disengagement,

interest they are. Human nature is such
somehow capitalizes on the object-
that interest in the well-being of an-
centered or object-directed tendency of
other can be as genuine as interest in
the interest process. What holds atten-
one's own well-being. Accordingly, there
tion disengages from self-preoccupation
is considerable emphasis on benevolence
and determines action. Thus, one can
and sympathy in Hume's philosophy. In
reason from Butler's conception of dis-
effect, Hume replaces a self-centered psy-
engagement to anticipate not only
chology, in which the motives of men
Hume and Campbell but also James
are either rational self-regard or un-
and Winans.
reasoning passion, with an object-
In the years after Butler's work, centered psychology in which reason
David Hume reiterated Butler's argu- functions in an instrumental way
ments against egoism and gave effective whether a motive be selfish or un-
expression to another anti-egoistic argu- selfish.51
ment. Hume's argument, probably de- As ancient rhetoric was influenced by
rived from Francis Hutcheson, main- a self-centered psychology, so George
tains that reason is exclusively an instru- Campbell's rhetoric was influenced by
ment for finding means to ends/'0 With 51
The question of the function of reason is
Plato reason functions to attain the as relevant to rhetoric as to moral philosophy.
good; with Aristotle what is expedient Some years ago Professor Brigance in an article
entitled, "Can We Redefine the James-Winans
and what ennobles one's self become Theory of Persuasion?" (QJS, XXI, Febru-
the bases of reasonable choice. By con- ary 1935), argued that it is a mistake to think
of persuasion so much in terms of attention
trast, with Hume there is no principle as in the Jamcs-Winans theory. Brigance in-
sisted that the "headspring" of persuasion is
in the light of which reason acts; the found in man's desires. The thesis of Brigance's
role of reason is to find means to ends, article is, "the lines of modern research, to say
nothing of common sense, converge to show
that desires are the basic determinant of per-
50
For Hume's refutation see David Hume, suasion." Perhaps the need was not for a re-
Enquiries Concerning the Human Understand- definition of the James-Winans theory of per-
ing and Concerning tlie Principles of Morals, suasion as Brigance suggested, but for a more
ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1902). See An careful examination of its implications. In
Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals any event, the thesis that desires determine
in edition just cited, pp. 295-302 (marginal behavior was not new. Brigance quite rightly
sections 247-254). For an account of Hume's noted that it was suggested by Aristotle;
belief regarding the role of reason in be- strangely, however, he did not in this article
havior, which implies a rejection of egoism, note how basic the thesis is to Campbell's the-
see David Hume, A Treatise of Human Na- ory of persuasion. However true the thesis
ture, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1888). that desires determine behavior, the word
See Book II, "Of the Passions," particularly pp. "desire" carries egoistic connotation, so that
413-418. The Treatise was published in 3 vols. "interest" or "interest in" might better be used
in 1739-40; An Enquiry appeared in 1751. when discussing motivation and persuasion.
 PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM AND RHETORICAL TRADITION 411

the newer, object-centered psychology. The significance which Campbell at-

That Campbell incorporated this psy- taches to sympathy as a basic aspect of
chology in his The Philosophy of human nature amounts to further re-
Rhetoric (1776) is apparent from his jection of egoism. He says sympathy does
analysis of persuasion. Campbell insists not have self for its object; sympathy
there can be no persuasion without ap- is "that quality of the soul which
peal to the passions because knowledge renders it susceptible of almost any
of a fact does not move us unless there passion, by communication 4
from the
is a feeling response to it. The process bosom of another.""' Campbell's posi-
of persuasion, therefore, consists of tion here accords with the views of
arousing passions in the hearer and Hume and various other writers of the
satisfying his judgment that there is a eighteenth century. What is directly
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connection between the given propo- relevant to rhetorical theory is that

sition and gratification of the aroused Campbell clearly points out the im-
passions. Campbell, supposing a hypo- portance of sympathy in persuasion. He
thetical situation, says by way of illus- says "sympathy is one main engine by
tration, "You have proved beyond con- which the orator operates on the pas-
tradiction that acting thus is the sure sions" and adds that whatever weakens
way to procure such an object. I per- sympathy "must do the speaker un-
ceive that your reasoning is conclusive: utterable prejudice in respect of his
but I am not affected by it. Why? I power over t:i
the passions of his audi-
have no passion for the object. . . . ence. . . ."' Campbell explains that sym-
pathy may bring the object, in this
Thus passion is the mover to action,
instance another person, into contact
reason is the guide."52
with oneself; by sympathy one becomes
Campbell, following Hume, maintains
infected with another's passions, unable
that reason plays a strictly instrumental
to distinguish between his own interests
role in motivation. This view in itself
and the other's. Campbell cautions that
constitutes a rejection of the belief, since sympathy is a reflected feeling,
often the basic assumption of egoistic the orator should not place his chief
psychology, that reason compels man to confidence in the sympathetic affections
seek his own well-being. For Campbell "when he hath it in his power to arm
as for Hume, one's ability to reason is the selfish,"50 but this qualification
exclusively an instrumental capacity even further indicates Campbell's rejec-
that may be exercised in the attainment tion of egoism for it plainly recognizes
of any desired objective, whether for that there are both selfish and unselfish
one's self or for another.53 interests.
52
George Campbell, The Philosophy of
Rhetoric, ed. Lloyd Bitzer (Carbondale, 1963). In a chapter concerned with pity and
p. 78. Campbell's analysis of persuasion is the nature of dramatic tragedy, Camp-
found in p p . 77-81. Bitzer has established the
great influence of David H u m e on George bell treats contemptuously the egoistic
Campbell; see Bitzer's introduction to the view that one actually has one's self as
above cited edition and his " T h e Lively Idea:
A Study of Hume's Influence on George Camp- the object when feeling pity for another.
bell's Philosophy of Rhetoric," unpubl. diss. He notes that Hobbes defines pity as
(University of Iowa, 1962). Bitzer is not con-
cerned with the anti-egoistic arguments found
in Campbell's work, b u t they could be in- E. Murphy's The Uses of Reason (New York,
terpreted as further evidence of Hume's in- 1943), pp. 97-135. See particularly pp. 97-125,
fluence on Campbell. 54
Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 131.
53 55
There is a penetrating discussion of the Ibid., p . 96.
Humean view of the role of reason in Arthur 56
Ibid., p . 89.
 412 SPEECH MONOGRAPHS

"imagination or fiction of future calam- is "a participation by sympathy in the

ity to ourselves, proceeding from the woes of others, . . ." and that pity is
sense of another man's calamity."57 a group of passions "united by associa-
Hobbes's definition is at least somewhat tion, and as it were blended by centring
similar to Aristotle's definition of pity [sic] in the same object."60
as "a feeling of pain caused by the sight With the ancients and certainly with
of some evil . . . which we might ex- Hobbes the thought seems to be that
pect to befall ourselves or some friend in order to feel pity one must apply
of ours, and moreover to befall us another's misfortune to himself in an
soon."58 Cicero also presents a similarly egoistic way, imagine himself subjected
self-centered conception of pity in to similar misfortunes. The eighteenth-
De Oratore. "Pity is excited," says century writers we have just been con-
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Antonius, "if he who hears can be sidering insisted that we may feel pity
induced to apply to his own circum- for another who is in a pitiable situ-
stances those unhappy particulars which ation even though we do not think
are lamented in the case of others, par- ourselves liable to such a situation.
ticulars which they have either suffered These writers suggest what was later
or fear to suffer; and while he looks at more clearly stated by John Dewey, that
another, to glance frequently at him- in the ordinary development of an
self."59 In contrast, Campbell says pity interest the thought of the object is
primary, coming as it does before con-
57
Ibid., p . 123. Hobbes's italics. See also The scious thought of the self as end. Re-
English Works of Thomas Hobbes, IV, Human flection upon Dewey's point bears it out;
Nature, p . 44.
58
Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1385b. See also Cope's for, whether selfish or unselfish, inter-
Commentary, II, 94-95. Cope notes the simi- ests are object-directed. This object-
larity between the definitions of Aristotle and
of Hobbes. T h e definition of pity noted by centered or object-directed nature of
Cope is from Leviathan (Works, III, 47) rather interests enables one to see how an
than the one from Human Nature cited
above, D. D. Raphael in his The Paradox of interest the object of which is the well-
Tragedy (Bloomington, Indiana, 1960) is not being of another can be as genuine as
in complete agreement with what is here sug-
gested concerning Aristotle's conception of pity. an interest whose object is the well-
Nevertheless, Raphael notes the influence of being of self.
Aristotle on Hobbes. Says Professor Raphael,
" I t would be going too far to say that foi Campbell indicates an understanding
Aristotle, as for Hobbes, pity is o r always in-
cludes fear of similar calamities for ourselves of the object-centered nature of inter-
(though when we criticize Hobbes, it is worth ests and feelings, particularly of pity,
remembering that his error is simply an exag-
geration of what he found in Aristotle)" (p. when he says:
15). Consider seriously, and you will find that it
59
Cicero, De Oratore, trans. J. S. Watson is not in the smallest degree more manifest,
and George Barnes, in Cicero on Oratory and
Orators (London, 189G), p . 281, I I , Iii. T h e
Sutton and Rackham translation (Cambridge, what relates to you? A man may sympathize
1959), 2 vols., I, 353, renders the definition with a woman in child-bed; though it is im-
in such a way that egoism is less apparent. A possible that he should conceive himself as
kind of self-reference may be necessary in pity suffering her pains in his own proper person
and sympathy; however, eighteenth-century and character." The Theory of Moral Senti-
writers such as Hutcheson, Butler, Smith, ments (London, 1892), p. 466.
60
Hume, and Campbell observed that while Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 132. Campbell
sympathy may arise from an imaginary change notes that the first part of his definition, where
of situations with another, one's concern is he says pity is a participation by sympathy in
still on the other's account. Asks Adam Smith, the woes of others, departs from Aristotle's
"How can that b e regarded as a selfish passion, theory of tragedy; but the observation is an
which does not arise even from imagination off-hand one on Campbell's part. Campbell
of anything that has befallen, or that relates takes little further account of his departure
to myself, in my own proper person and char- from classical rhetorical theory where pity is
acter, b u t which is entirely occupied about concerned.
 PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM AND RHETORICAL TRADITION 413

that another and not ourselves is the object of between one's disinterested pursuit of
our resentment when we are angry, than it is some object and the gratification one
that another and not ourselves is the object
of our compassion when we are moved with may realize as a consequence of its
pity.ei attainment. He could thus insist, as in
the opening statement of his chapter
Campbell's statement, based upon his on the cause of the pleasure we receive
understanding of the psychology of his from objects that excite pity, that "with-
day, signifies a rejection of egoism the out some gratification in hearing . . .
like of which is hardly to be found attention must inevitably flag,"63 and
in the work of classical rhetoricians.62 still not imply an egoistic interpretation
Campbell apparently believed that of human nature. Thus in the final
paragraph of the same chapter he speaks
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there may be an important difference

of the proof of philanthropy—"actual
61
Ibid., p. 128. beneficence, when one seeks out the real
62
In his rhetorical lectures, Lectures on objects of commiseration, not as a mat-
Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, ed. John M.
Lothian (London, 1963), Smith indicates a re- ter of self-indulgence, but in order to
jection of egoism in various places, for exam- bring relief to those who need it, to
ple: "Some philosophers, as [blank], observing
that laughter proceeds sometimes from con- give hope to the desponding, and com-
tempt, have made that the original of all ridic- fort to the sorrowful, for the sake of
ulous perceptions. But we may frequently
laugh at objects that are not at all contempti- which one endures the sight of wretch-
ble. A tall man amongst a number of little edness, when, instead of giving pleasure,
men, or e contra, makes us laugh, but we don't
contemn either. Things that have no sort it distresseth every feeling heart."64
of connection, but where the ideas we have
are strangely contradictory, excite our laugh- Campbell, then, was satisfied that psy-
ter. I remember once a mouse, running across
the area of a chapel, spoilt the effect of an ex- chological inaccuracy underlay egoism.
cellent discourse" (p. 41). Although the editor A reader should have no doubt that
does not attempt to identify the unnamed
philosopher, he may well have been Hobbes. Campbell unequivocally rejected the
According to Hobbes, "laughter is nothing else egoistic thesis that all interest is self-
but sudden glory arising from some sudden
conception of some eminency in ourselves, by interest, even though he points out how
comparison with the infirmity of others, or subtly selfishness can and often does
with our own formerly . . ." (Human Nature,
Works, IV, 46). For Smith's rejection of egoism, elude the call of humanity. Campbell's
with particular reference to Hobbes, see The theory of motivation is pluralistic; it is
Theory of Moral Sentiments, op. cit., pp. 465ff.
Campbell offers a detailed refutation of surprisingly similar to that of the con-
Hobbes's theory of laughter (The Philosophy temporary English philosopher C. D.
of Rhetoric, pp. 28-32). According to Campbell,
the essence of humor is to be found in the Broad, whose view will be considered
incongruous situation. Against the view of
Hobbes, he argues that laughter does not re- in the final part of this survey. It is
sult from contempt but rather from the per- true that Campbell does not consider
ception of oddity, with which contempt may
or may not be combined. In support of his the question of egoism and its relation
argument he offers two points: there may be a to persuasion directly, except for the
great deal of contempt present in a given situ-
ation without there being any tendency to note of caution mentioned above. Nor
laugh, and laughter may be produced by the does he appear to have been aware of
perception of an incongruous situation where
there is no contempt. This, says Campbell, the full implications of his psychological
"shows that Hobbes's view of the matter is insight for a theory of persuasion. Con-
false as well as partial. 'Men,' says he, 'laugh
at jests, the wit whereof always consisteth in cerned with other aspects of rhetoric,
the elegant discovering and conveying to our his analysis of persuasion, is all too
minds some absurdity of another.' I maintain,
that men also laugh at jests, the wit whereof brief; but, had he fully applied his
doth not consist in discovering any absurdity
of another; for all jests do not come within
his description" (p. 29). 63
64
Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 112.
Ibid., p. 138.
 4*4 SPEECH MONOGRAPHS

psychological theory in explaining the focus. Winans' theory is not egoistic;

process of persuasion, he might have for, in effect, he is saying that any
worked out a theory similar to that object that holds attention tends to de-
presented over a century later by James termine action regardless of whether
A. Winans, to whose work we >")w turn. the interest in that object is or is not
egoistic.66
Ill
There is further indication of unego-
In contemporary rhetorical works istic thinking when Winans, like Camp-
there is comparatively little attention bell, observes that sympathy is im-
given to the refutation of egoism in portant to the speaker. "The orator,"
any specific sense, one reason no doubt says Winans, "under all circumstances
being that belief in the doctrine has finds a common ground of interest and
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never been as prevalent as it was just sympathy."67

prior to Campbell's day. Even so, the
influence of self-interest in persuasion Even Winans' treatment of identifi-
is still an issue of real importance in cation indicates his rejection of the
modern speech books, with writers such idea that all interest is self-interest. His
as Winans, Gray and Wise, and others very use of the term "common ground,"
considering this subject. as well as "identification," implies an
unegoistic psychology, for "common
There is in James A. Winans' Public ground" connotes a sharing, a com-
Speaking a rejection of egoism, even monality of interests.68 Although Winans
though it is somewhat indirect. Drawing clearly points out the importance of
on the psychology of William James for identification in persuasion, he keeps
a theory of persuasion, just as Campbell the concept subordinate to attention and
had drawn on Hume, Winans bases his interest, thus indicating that interest in
theory on that aspect of James's psy- a given object precedes identification
chology which maintains that "what with it. Winans apparently recognizes
holds attention determines action."6"' that one does not identify with some-
Winans' conception of attention is, in thing and then become interested in it;
part, based on another aspect of James's rather, he becomes interested and then
psychology, itself derived from Hume, identifies. Winans' rejection of egoism
namely that the self is realized through is in this connection implicit.
the perception of objects, even self re-
gard being a regard for certain objective The rejection is at times explicit, as
things. Following these leads, Winans when Winans cites an editorial in which
discusses various means of getting and a political figure of the day is criticized
holding attention: novelty, familiarity, for overuse of the appeal to self-
imagery, concreteness, etc. Winans elab- interest and for an inability to under-
orates the point that to attract and hold stand the tremendous influence of a
attention a speaker must provide an moral issue on public sentiment. Winans
interesting object or tangible idea, observes that although motives are fre-
something upon which attention can quently mixed, we need not cynically
65 66
James A. Winans, Public Speaking (New 67
Winans, Public Speaking, pp. 54ff.
York, 1917), pp. 191ff. The statement, "What 68
Ibid., p . 119.
holds attention determines action," is a head- Ibid., pp. 260 and 278-279. Also see Dennis
ing which William James added to a section G. Day, "Persuasion and the Concept of
of his chapter on "Will" in the abridged edi- Identification," QJS, XLVI (October 1960), 273.
tion of Principles of Psychology. See William Day points out that Winans keeps the con-
James, Psychology: Briefer Course (New York, cept of identification subordinate to his theory
1892), p. 448. of attention.
 PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM AND RHETORICAL TRADITION 4!5

attribute right actions to selfishness or tempt "to attribute all human behavior
fear of public opinion, and he adds that to self-interest and motives of per-
one should not fear to appeal to the sonal gain arises from oversimplifica-
best sentiments in one's hearers.69 tion. . . ,"73 Gray and Wise as well
In his later book Speech-Making as Winans emphatically approve George
Winans says that the problem in dealing Pierce Baker's statement that an advo-
with opposition arising from self-interest cate should appeal to the highest motive
is not that all men are completely self- to which an audience will respond.74
ish, but that "they do not listen gladly Paraphrasing Baker, Gray and Wise say,
to proposals that seem to threaten their ". . . if the personally oriented motives,
personal interests."70 He consistently those of self-interest, must be used, it
is advisable to link them, if at all
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maintains that the most constant prob-

lem in persuasion is that of gaining possible, to the socially oriented motives,
open-minded attention. For Winans per- those having to do with the welfare of
suasion is the process of inducing favor- others."75
able attention to propositions. With Gray and Wise refer directly to John
Winans as with Campbell, there is rec- Dewey's discussion of the significance
ognition that without some gratification of self-interest in conduct; and, as his
in hearing attention must flag; but also general theory of motivation is quite
like Campbell, Winans makes clear relevant, a brief consideration is ap-
that the gratification need not be propriate at this point.70 Dewey insists
egoistic. According to Winans, then, we that one ought not think of a motive
must always gain favorable attention in as being something which originates
order to persuade; a proposition must action, but rather as something which
be related to some interest of the re- changes the direction of action. Dewey
spondent, but we do not always have would have us see that man's nature is
to show that a proposition is in accord active; he says, "In every fundamental
with personal self-interest. sense it is false that a man requires
In their discussion of the influence a motive to make him do something.
of self-interest in persuasion Gray and To a healthy man inaction is the
Wise say, "In most discussions of the greatest of woes."77 The self should not
problem of motives in relation to speech, be thought of as passive when its normal
it is implied that the 'main-springs of condition is one of activity.
human behavior' lie in the acquisition As for the influence of self-interest,
of some desired pleasure for oneself, the Dewey points out that native impulses
fulfilling of some want, the meeting of are neither egoistic nor altruistic,
some need."71 The authors go on to ". . . not actuated by conscious regard
conclude that frequently ". . . the 73
Ibid., p p . 397-398.
implication is that our motives for 74
George Pierce Baker, Principles of Argu-
acting as we do are entirely selfish."72 mentation
75
(Boston, 1895), p . 351.
Bases of Speech, p. 409.
They admit the great influence of self- 76
Gray and Wise draw from section iii, Part
interest, but they warn that any at- II of Dewey's Human Nature and Conduct
(New York, 1922). An even more specific refu-
tation of egoism begins on p. 134 of this book.
69 Dewey's chapter on "The Place of the Self in
Public Speaking, p. 200.
70 the Moral Life," pp. 364-398 in the 1908 edi-
James A. Winans, Speech-Making (New
York, 1938), p. 377. tion of Ethics, by Dewey and Tufts, also pro-
71 vides a good statement of Dewey's theory of
Giles W. Gray and Claude M. Wise, The
Bases of Speech (New York, 1959), p. 395. motivation.
72 77
Ibid., p. 396. Human Nature and Conduct, pp. 118-119.
 416 SPEECH MONOGRAPHS

for either one's own good or that of pulses have taken under the influence of
others. They are rather direct responses a specific social environment."81 In il-
to situations."78 The fallacy in psycho- lustrating his point Dewey observes that
logical egoism, ". . . consists in trans- the social situation with which Thomas
forming the (truistic) fact of acting as Hobbes was confronted conduced to fear-
a self into the fiction of acting always fulness. And so, says Dewey, "as an ac-
for self."70 count of the psychology of the natural
Even though Dewey presents one of man his [Hobbes's] theory is unsound.
the most cogent refutations of egoism As a report of contemporary social con-
to be found among modern philoso- ditions there is much to be said for
82
phers, he thinks the problem is actually it."
a rather artificial one. Observing that Dewey's view of motivation is sup-
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the problem has been one of the most ported by more recent papers of the
discussed in English ethical literature, Nebraska Symposium on Motivation.
he says it grew out of older theories Dalbir Bindra's book, which summarizes
about the nature of man which supposed many of the findings of the Symposium,
the individual to be isolated, and in presents the thesis, "that it is unneces-
which social arrangements were con- sary and futile to postulate drives, mo-
sidered secondary and artificial. The fact tives, instincts, or any other end-deter-
is, Dewey insists, "selfhood is not some- mining systems in order to account for
83
thing which exists apart from associa- the various motivational phenomena."
80
tion and intercourse." For Dewey C. D. Broad is another contemporary
mind and self are products of social philosopher who has presented well the
interaction. refutative arguments against psycholog-
Dewey insists that the whole con- ical egoism. Broad first treats the ques-
cept of motives is extra-psychological, tion in an essay 84
on Bishop Butler's
an outcome of the attempt to influence ethical theory. This essay might be
human action. Granting that motives read with profit by anyone interested in
may induce a man to alter his course, persuasion, if for no other reason than
he insists this should not lead one to to appreciate Broad's point that "it is
think there must be motives in order not true that all impulses have for their
to evoke or originate action, or that objects states of the self whose im-
85
all motives grow out of self-interest. He pulses they are."
rejects any view of human nature which Broad has also more recently dealt
would maintain that one must appeal with psychological egoism in an essay,
to egoistic and acquisitive desires to stir "Egoism as a Theory of Human Mo-
86
man out of inertness. Although there is tives." Here Broad succinctly presents
truth in that picture of man, according some of the stock arguments for and
to Dewey it is not a truth regarding against egoism. For example, he cites the
original human nature. Rather, it is a 81
Human Nature and Conduct, p . 124.
truth concerning "the form human im- 82
Ibid., p . 133.
83
Dalbir Bindra, Motivation: A Systematic
Reinterpretation (New York, 1959), p . 19.
78 84
John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory
(New York, 1960), p. 156. Dewey's italics. This (Paterson, N.J., 1959), Ch. III.
85
book is a paperback redaction o£ Dewey's por- Ibid., p . 65.
86
tion of the 1932 edition of Ethics by Dewey C. D. Broad, Ethics and the History of
and Tufts. Philosophy (London, 1952), p p . 218-231. As
79
Human Nature and Conduct, p. 136. indicated above, Five Types of Ethical Theory
Dewey's italics. is the earlier of the two of Broad's books cited
80 here, having been first published in 1930.
Theory of the Moral Life, p. 163.
 PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM AND RHETORICAL TRADITION 417

case of a man who subscribes anony- is immune at least to attacks from the
mously to a charity. The motive of such basis of Psychological Egoism."00
a man cannot be that of self-display,
but can we, asks Broad, say that his mo- In an age when thinking people try to
tive is to enjoy the pleasant experience avoid allness statements, the thesis that
of self-approval and of seeing an insti- all interest may ultimately be traced to
tution in which he is interested flour- self-interest probably has few conscious
supporters. Yet those who would reject
ish? The answer is, Broad argues, that
the egoistic thesis only because of its
there may be such motives, but they can
allness, who do not see other fallacies
be neither primary nor the only motives.
involved in it, may imply egoistic be-
Unless the philanthropist wants the in-
lief by default if not by design. The per-
stitution to flourish, there will be
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suasion theorist is especially susceptible

nothing to attract him in the experience to this error, for he must recognize that
of seeing it flourish. That is, he must the influence of self-interest, as repre-
first be interested in an institution be- sented by bodily needs, for example, is
fore deriving satisfaction from what very great. Moreover, in making clear
benefits it. "And [adds Broad] unless that there must be some gratification, to
he subscribes from some other motive use the words of Campbell, if the atten-
than the desire to enjoy a feeling of tion of the listener or reader is to be
self-approval, he will not obtain a feel- maintained, one can easily suggest that
ing of self-approval."87 the gratification must be egoistic.
Broad is inclined to accept an "irre- However, numerous contemporary
ducibly pluralistic view of human mo- authors of speech textbooks have noted
tives."88 He admits, however, that the that man may be motivated and per-
present irreducible plurality of ultimate suaded by appeals that are not egoistic.
motives could have evolved out of fewer For example, some time ago the late
Professor Andrew T. Weaver observed
original motives, either in the history
that there are "differences between the
of each individual or of the human
selfishness of the man who puts his own
race.89 Broad also grants that in most material well-being above that of every-
people at most times other-regarding mo- body else and the 'selfishness' of the
tives are very weak unless stimulated by man who finds his satisfactions in see-
a self-referential stimulus, but his final ing others protected, cared for, and
conclusion, like George Campbell's, is happy!"91 Bryant and Wallace assert,
that ". . . the morality of common sense, "Men act for the sake of others as well
with all its difficulties and incoherences, as for themselves; they are altruistic as

87 90
Ibid., p . 225. Ethics and the History of Philosophy, p.
88
Ibid., p . 230. 231.
89 91
C. L. Stevenson combines a principle of Andrew Thomas Weaver, Speech: Forms
Wundt (law of the heterogony of ends) and and Principles (New York, 1942), pp. 351-352.
one from Allport (functional autonomy of mo- The meaning of the statement is clear enough,
tives) in the following synthesis: ". . . when X though the ambiguity of the word "satisfac-
is first desired as a means to Y, X may later tion" is worth noting. Weaver made his view
be desired, in part, both as an end in itself abundantly clear in a subsequent speech: "All
and as a means to some originally unforeseen too often, I think, we have emphasized the ob-
Z." See Stevenson's Ethics and Language (New jective of manipulating and controlling our
Haven, 1944), p. 197. Here surely is a synthesis fellow man to satisfy our egoistic drives, and
having as many implications for persuasion as have neglected the loftier goals of cooperation
for ethics. One application is seen, for exam- and understanding." Andrew Thomas Weaver,
ple, in the concept of derived interests which "Toward Understanding Through Speech,"
Winans borrowed from James. Vital Speeches, XXVII (February 1, 1961), 244.
 418 SPEECH MONOGRAPHS

well as egoistic."92 These authors go on principle: "What holds attention de-

to urge that proposals be associated with termines action." Although interests
social and altruistic motives as well as which might usually be characterized as
the hearer's self-interest. But while self-interests most easily capture and
there are statements such as these in hold attention, the fact remains that
modern speech textbooks, it is also true, whatever one becomes interested in can
as Gray and Wise say, that in discussions determine action. This truth is illus-
of the problem of motives in relation trated when one unwisely tells a young
to speech, there is frequently the impli- child not to commit some act such as
cation that our motives are entirely scratching a newly polished table top;
selfish. the forbidden act so preoccupies the
Psychological egoism, a topic that has child's attention that he does what even
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been much discussed in ethical theory, he knows is contrary to his own best
is thus not without relevance in rhetor- interests.93
ical theory. If self-referential stimuli are Man is so complex that unlike any
often necessary to the stimulation of other creature he can even become in-
other-regarding motives, as C. D. Broad terested in an interest. A theory of rhet-
suggests and as many others would agree, oric which does not take into account
the student of rhetoric must keep this the infinite capacity of man's interests
ever in mind in both his capacity as must inevitably be limited. Our inquiry
persuasion theorist and as rhetorical has revealed such limitations in classi-
critic. As a persuasion theorist he needs cal rhetorical theory and sketched some
to know what appeals will be ethically of the stages by which increasingly
and artistically appropriate and effect- sophisticated psychological and philo-
tive in a future rhetorical situation. As sophical conceptions have, since the
a critic he needs to know whether par- eighteenth century, released rhetorical
ticular appeals were appropriate and theory from inherited constraints.
effective in a past rhetorical situation.
93
No doubt self-interest appeals will often, See Winans, Public Speaking, p. 193. The
statement, "What holds attention determines
though not always, be found effective action," is corroborated from an unexpected
and appropriate. Not to be forgotten is contemporary source. In a discussion of how
people may prevent themselves from being
Campbell's warning that the persuader brainwashed, the psychiatrist William Sargant
should not place his chief confidence in in Battle for the Mind (New York, 1957), p.
230, says, "Whoever refuses to co-operate in
the sympathetic affections when he has any technique of conversion or brain-washing
it in his power to arm the selfish. At and, instead of paying attention to the inter-
rogator or preacher, manages to concentrate
the same time, however, the persuasion mentally on some quite different problem,
theorist should keep in mind James's should last out the longest." Sargant goes on
to say, "some persons become converted against
their will because they insist on doing what
92
Donald C. Bryant and Karl R. Wallace, they consider to be the 'right thing' and go
Fundamentals of Public Speaking (New York, out to fight what is more wisely avoided or
1960), p. 308. ignored" (p. 232).