Common Law and Legislation

Author(s): Roscoe Pound

Source: Harvard Law Review , Apr., 1908, Vol. 21, No. 6 (Apr., 1908), pp. 383-407
Published by: The Harvard Law Review Association

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1325404

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 HARVARD

LAW REVIEW.
VOL. XXI. APRIL, 1908. No. 6.

COMMON LAW AND LEGISLATION.

NOT the least notable characteristics of Am

are the excessive output of legislation in all
and the indifference, if not contempt, with wh
regarded by courts and lawyers. Text-writer
gather up from every remote corner the most o
cite all of them, seldom cite any statutes excep
which have become a part of our American comm
do refer to legislation, do so through the judici
apply it. The courts, likewise, incline to ignore
tion; not merely deciding it to be declarato
assuming silently that it is declaratory with
reasons, citing prior judicial decisions and ma
the statute.1 In the same way, lawyers in th
conceive it more expedient to make of a statute
leaving details of the most vital importance to
cial law-making.2 It is fashionable to point out
legislation and to declare that there are thin
cannot do try how they will.3 It is fashiona

1 See address of Amasa M. Eaton, Proceedings of Seventee

of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 45.
2 E. g., the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, also Senator Knox's
Liability Act.
8 For examples from the juristic literature of the past two
Its Origin, Growth and Function, 3; Parker, The Congest
Bar Ass'n, 383; Parker, Address as President of the Am. B
Bag 58I; Dos Passos, The American Lawyer, 169; Hughes,
o06; 2 Andrews, Am. Law, 2 ed., 1190.

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384 HARVARD LAW REVIEW.

superiority of judge-made law.1 It may be

judges and lawyers to remember that there
science of legislation and that modern statut
posed of lightly as off-hand products of a cru
thing, but represent long and patient study
consideration by conferences or congresses o
discussions in which public opinion is focussed
details, and hearings before legislative com
well to remember also that while bench and ba
of pointing out the deficiencies of legislation, t
cies of judge-made law are no less apparent.
sociologists, judicial attempts to force Bentham
freedom of contract and common law concepti
upon the public of today are no less amusing
- than legislative attempts to do away with
these conceptions are to bench and bar. The
legislative attempts is not regarded by lay sch
placent satisfaction 2 with which lawyers are w
They do not hesitate to say that " the judicial
pace with the strides of industrial developm
the opinion that "belated and anti-social" d
a fruitful cause of strikes, industrial discord,
lessness.4 They charge that " the attitude of
responsible for much of our political immoralit

1 An excellent example may be seen in the Introduction (by

Centuries' Growth of American Law.
2 E.g., a recent writer, assuming that certain common law doctrines as to procedure
inhere in nature, points out that despite legislative attempts to get away from them
courts have preserved them. This is assumed to show that the legislature had attempte
the impossible. 2 Andrews, Am. Law, ?? 646,684. Of course, one might answer that ther
are jurisdictions where such legislation has been given effect by the courts. Gartner v
Corwine, 57 Oh. St. 246; Rogers v, Duhart, 97 Cal. 200. One might also say that
courts had been as zealous to enforce the spirit of the New York Code of I848 as
they were to graft common law upon it and to show that its leading ideas could not b
carried out, the cases might tell another story.
8 Kelley, Some Ethical Gains through Legislation, I42. See also Seager, Introduc-
tion to Economics, ? 236.
4 Ibid. I44, 156.
5 Smith, Spirit of Am. Gov., c. xii. Professor Smith says: " By protecting the cap
italist in the possession and enjoyment of privileges unwisely and even corrupt
granted, they have greatly strengthened the motive for employing bribery and other
corrupt means in securing the grant of special privileges. If the courts had all alon
held that any proof of fraud or corruption in obtaining a franchise or other legislati
grant was sufficient to justify its revocation, the lobbyist, the bribe-giver and t
' innocent purchaser' of rights and privileges stolen from the people, would have foun

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 COMMON LAW AND LEGISLATION. 385

There are two ways in which the courts impede or thwar

legislation demanded by the industrial conditions of tod
first is narrow and illiberal construction of constitutio
visions, state and federal. "Petty judicial interpretations
Professor Thayer, " have always been, are now, and will alw
a very serious danger to the country." 1 The second is a
and illiberal attitude toward legislation conceded to be co
tional, regarding it as out of place in the legal system, as a
element to be held down to the strictest limits and not to be
applied beyond the requirements of its express language.
second is by no means so conspicuous as the first, but is n
that account the less unfortunate or the less dangerous. L
see what this attitude is, how it arose, and why it exists
industrial community and an age of legislation.
Four ways may be conceived of in which courts in such a
system as ours might deal with a legislative innovation. (i)
might receive it fully into the body of the law as affordin
only a rule to be applied but a principle from which to re
and hold it, as a later and more direct expression of the ge
will, of superior authority to judge-made rules on the same ge
subject; and so reason from it by analogy in preference to the
(2) They might receive it fully into the body of the law
reasoned from by analogy the same as any other rule of l
regarding it, however, as of equal or co-ordinate authority in
respect with judge-made rules upon the same general sub
(3) They might refuse to receive it fully into the body of the
and give effect to it directly only; refusing to reason from it
analogy but giving it, nevertheless, a liberal interpretation to c
the whole field it was intended to cover. (4) They might
only refuse to reason from it by analogy and apply it directly
but also give to it a strict and narrow interpretation, hold
down rigidly to those cases which it covers expressly. The fou
hypothesis represents the orthodox common law attitude to
legislative innovations. Probably the third hypothesis, how
represents more nearly the attitude toward which we are tend
The second and first hypotheses doubtless appeal to the com
law lawyer as absurd. He can hardly conceive that a rule of
statutory origin may be treated as a permanent part of the general

the traffic in legislative favors a precarious and much less profitable mode of acquiring
wealth." 329-330.
1 Thayer, Legal Essays, 159.
25

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386 HARVARD LAW REVIEW.

body of the law. But it is submitted that t

development upon which we have entered alrea
adopt the method of the second and eventually
first hypothesis.
Strict or liberal interpretation of statutes
whole question. Even when statutes are not
strict construction, as being in derogation o
courts refuse to treat the rules established by
of the law. They are conceded to be applica
because the legislature clearly said so, but they
as entering into the legal system as an orga
not regarded as at all co-ordinate with comm
materia. If any piece of legislation has becom
mon law jurisdictions, it is Lord Campbell's
has been in force long enough to have been t
rated into the law. But the Supreme Court o
still thinks of it as introducing a sort of tempor
is not at all to be thought of as on the same fo
law doctrines.' And in the same spirit the
Missouri lays it down that while every physica
the person of another short of killing is presu
and calls for justification, a killing is not pres
but must be shown to have been wrongful by
ing, because it gave rise to no action at commo
struction is only a feature, therefore, although
feature, of the common law attitude toward leg
We are told commonly that three classes o
construed strictly: penal statutes; statutes in d
mon right; and statutes in derogation of t
eminent authority has objected to all of thes
pointed out that all classes of statutes ought to
a sole view of ascertaining and giving effect to
maker.3 But there is more justification for som

1 Chambers v. B. & 0. R. Co., 207 U. S. 142, 149.

2 Nichols v. Winfrey, 79 Mo. 544. In the same way, if a
contract void upon grounds not declaratory of the common
that ground must plead it specially. Finley v. Quirk, 9 Min
otherwise be a contract is void at common law or because o
common law, advantage of the defense may be taken under
yon v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261.
8 ", The idea that an act may be strictly or liberally constr
the legislative intent, according as it is viewed either as a p

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 COMMON LAW AND LEGISLATION. 387

than for others. For the rule that penal statu

strued strictly something may be said. When act
penal and are to be visited with loss or impairme
or property, it may well be argued that political
clear and exact definition of the offense. So also the rule that
statutes in derogation of common right are to be construed stri
has some excuse in England where there are no constitutional r
strictions. There it is really another form of stating Blackston
tenth rule, that interpretations which produce collaterally abs
or mischievous consequences are to be avoided.' In the Uni
States it means that interpretations which would make an act
constitutional are to be avoided, or else it is equivalent to B
stone's tenth rule. Whenever it is applied beyond these limi
is without excuse and is merely an incident of the general atti
of courts toward legislation. The proposition that statutes
derogation of the common law are to be construed strictly has
such justification. It assumes that legislation is something
deprecated. As no statute of any consequence dealing with
relation of private law can be anything but in derogation o
common law, the social reformer and the legal reformer, under
doctrine, must always face the situation that the legislativ
which represents the fruit of their labors will find no sympath
those who apply it, will be construed strictly, and will be mad
interfere with the status quo as little as possible. The New
Code of Civil Procedure of 1848 affords a conspicuous exa
of how completely this attitude on the part of courts may nu
legislative action.2 Some regard this attitude toward legislation
a basic principle of jurisprudence.3 Others are content to make

either as in derogation of the common law or as a beneficial innovation, is in it

nature delusive and fallacious." Sedgwick, Construction of Const. and Stat
c. viii,fim.
1 Bl. Comm. 91.
" You have the State of New York before you as a terrible example. I
our practice today is infinitely more technical than that in New Jersey. E
attempt to abolish forms of action and especially the attempt to abolish the di
between law and equity practice have been dismal failures. The distinction
trover and assumpsit is today even more rigidly observed than under the comm
practice. It is impossible to amend upon a trial from trover to assumpsi
versa." W. B. Hornblower, quoted in 2 Andrews, Am. Law, 2 ed., ? 635, n
the impossibility of amendment spoken of and the rigid distinction were in
into code practice by the judges in the teeth of express code provisions upon
law considerations. De Graw v. Elmore, 50 N. Y. I. See N. Y. Code Civ.
I848, ?? 69, I73, 176.
8 Robinson, Am. Jurisp., ? 301.

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388 HARVARD LAW REVIEW.

it an ancient and fundamental principle of the

either event they agree in praising it as a wise an
tion.2 It is not difficult to show, however, that it i
and inherent in a legal system; that it is not an an
mental doctrine of the common law; that it had its
notions of interpretation generally, now obsolete,
its present form because of judicial jealousy of th
ment; and that it is wholly inapplicable to and
American law of today.
That the attitude of our courts toward legislation
to and inherent in a legal system is apparent w
great legal system in which it is wholly unknown
view of legislation unknown to Roman law,3 but q
doctrine was established in Roman law countries e
enacted codes.4 "Where a gap has been left by
rule, it is filled up, according to this method,
another rule, contained in the same statute, in connection with
which a point left open in the first mentioned rule is expressly
provided for, and the ratiojuris of the last mentioned expression is
taken to be a general rule of law applicable to all cases." 5 In
other words, statutes are taken to be parts of the law for all pur-
poses. The courts reason from them by analogy the same as
from any other legal rules.6
Legislation has not been regarded always as a mere supplement
to or eking out of common law or customary law. On the con-
trary, an older view was that enacted law was the normal type, and
customary law a mere makeshift to which men resorted for want
of enactment to prevent a failure of justice. As Roman law after
Justinian was a body of enactments, this idea is very prominent
from the sixth century to the rise of the school at Bologna in the

1 E. g., Carter, Law, Its Origin, Growth and Function, 308.

2 Dr. Robinson says of the proposition that statutes in derogation of the common
law are to be construed strictly that it is "a positive but reasonable rule." Am.
Jurisp., ? 301. Mr. Carter says that judges "displayed their wisdom " by adopting it.
8 See, for example, Digest, I, 3, 12, I, 3, 13, and I, 3, 27.
4 Dernburg, Pandekten, I, ? 35.
6 Schuster, German Civil Law, ? 17.
6 Salkowski, Institutionen, ? 5; Windscheid, Pandekten, 8 ed., ?? 20, 22. This is
true also of the canon law. The canonist " did not mean to exclude from his common
law all rules imposed by a legislator. Far from it. Before the middle of the thir-
teenth century the most practically important part of his common law was statute law,
law published by a legislator in a comprehensive statute book." Maitland, Canon
Law in the Church of England, 4.

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 COMMON LA W AND LEGISLATION. 389

twelfth. Whereas Gaius 1 wrote, " constant autem ju

bus," etc., classing statutes as one form of law, w
(statute) has become the living word and that enactm
be the true law.2 After the revival of legal studies i
century there were nearly five hundred years durin
empire at least, the Corpus Juris, as legislation o
Justinian, was supposed to be binding statute law.3
law or enactment was regarded as the type of law, a
said to be a certain kind of law which is taken for enactment when
enactment is wanting.4 The title De Legibus et Consuetudinibu
borne both by Glanvill's treatise and by Bracton's, and the arg
ment Glanvill feels compelled to make to show that England h
laws although the rules administered by the king's judges are not
enacted,5 make it evident that continental ideas as to the nature
of law were taken for granted. Even after the theory on the Conti
nent had changed, Hale shows the influence of the older notion in
arguing that the rules of the common law had their origin in for
gotten statutes.6 But the rise and development of a vigorous body
of judge-made law in the king's. courts and the feebleness and
paucity of legislation from Edward II until Henry VIII, render
such a theory wholly inapplicable to England; and the seventeenth
century, which saw not a little vigorous legislation in England, sa
also the end of the theory of statutory force of the Corpus Juri
upon the Continent. As legislation was in point of fact a rel
tively unimportant element throughout the growing period of ou
legal system, it was natural that statutes should come to be regard
as furnishing rules for particular, definite situations, but not princ

1 Gaius, I, ? 2.
2 See the formulas of Isidore, 2 Bruns, Fontes Iuris Romani Antiqui, 83, adopte
by Gratian, CC. 2-5, Dist. r. See also the formulas in the Expositio Terminorum ap
pended to Petri Exceptiones and in the related Libellus de Verbis Legalibus, Fitting
Juristische Schriften des friiheren Mittelalters, 164, I8i.
8 2 Stintzing, Geschichte der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft, I65-I88.
4 Thus Gratian, C. 5, Dist. I. Of course I am speaking here of juristic theory
The facts were doubtless otherwise. See Jenks, Law and Politics in the Middle
Ages, c. i.
6 Glanvill, Preface, Beale's edition, xxviii-xxix.
6 "And doubtless many of those Things that now obtain as Common Law had
their Original by Parliamentary Acts or Constitutions . . . though those Acts are now
either not extant or, if extant, were made before Time of Memory. . . . And were the
rest of those Laws extant, probably the footsteps of the Original Institution of many
more laws that now obtain merely as Common Law, or Customary Laws by immemo-
rial Usage, would appear to have been at first Statute Laws or Acts of Parliament."
Hale, History of the Common Law, c. i.

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390 HARVARD LAW REVIEW.

ples for cases not within their tenor, or from

analogy.1 And the tendency to conceive of a s
exceptional and more or less foreign to the bo
which legislation had endeavored to insert i
trine fostered, was furthered by the growth of
upon legislation which, through our doctrine o
unconstitutional legislation, has become very
Independent of express constitutional limita
forms in which the courts have considered th
tions upon legislative power: (I) conflict of leg
ral law; (2) interference of a temporal legi
affairs; (3) attempts of Parliament to derog
prerogative prior to the Bill of Rights; (4) con
with rules of international law; and (5) frictio
of a statute and the doctrines or principles
Each of the four first deserves attention in co
In the thirteenth century the Germanic prin
was bound to act by law, coming in contact wi
cal idea that the state exists of natural necess
welfare, toward which law is but a means, so
law instead of merely recognizing it, led men
the distinction of natural law and positive law
the creature of the sovereign. But all sover
natural law, and their enactments in conflict t
void. This philosophical theory, made over
accord with theology, was given currency b
Coke, in Bonham's Case,4 cites two cases of th
as deciding that an act of Parliament agains
reason is void. As natural law " is called by th
in the law of England the law of reason,"5
that these were early attempts to put the the

1 The phrase "common law " was borrowed from the ca

century, meaning, both in its lay and in its ecclesiastical
local, law and custom. The use of "common law " in co
later, arising from the circumstance that statutes were ra
the Church of England, 4.
2 Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, 73, 74.
8 Summa Theologiae, I, 2, q. 9I, art. 2, and q. 93, art. I.
4 8 Reports Ii8 a.
5 Doctor and Student, Introduction. This follows Thom
" that part of the eternal law which man's nature reveals
Summa Theologiae, I, 2, q. 91, art. I.

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 COMMON LA W AND LEGISLATION. 391

theory into practice. But it seems pretty clear that th

bear the construction which Coke gave to them. In
Tregor's Case 1 (1334), Herle, J., said: " Some statut
against law and right, which when those who made th
ing, would not put them in execution." 2 *' Statutes m
law " looks very like statutes made against the law of
the refusal of " those who made them " to execute them shows
rather a sort of crude dispensing power, such as administrativ
officers exercise even today with respect to unpopular legislation.
In the other,3 a case of 33 Edward III (I359), Coke tells us
Bonham's Case that the judges decided contrary to an expres
provision of the Statute of Westminster Second " because it would
be against common right and reason." The statutory provision
however, does not seem to be express on the point decided, an
one must feel that the explanation given in the Second Institute,
namely, that " otherwise the act should be contrary to itselfe, whic
in all expositions is to bee avoided," 6 is preferable. Fortescu
(between 1453 and 1471) concedes the universal validity of natural
law,6 and feels bound to demonstrate jury trial " legi divino no
repugnare." 7 In Doctor and Student (before I563) it is lai
down absolutely that " if any general custom were directly agains
the law of God, or if any statute were made directly against it, a
if it were ordained that no alms should be given for no necessity,
the custom and statute were void." 8 Two cases of the reign o
Elizabeth are cited by Coke in Bonham's Case as holding void
statute of Edward VI 9 because " it would be against common
right and reason." But these cases evidently refused to apply a
reservation in the statute according to its literal terms because of
a mischievous and absurd result involved. In other words, th
court applied Blackstone's tenth rule. The dicta in Bonham's
Case that " when an act of Parliament is against common right an
reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common
law will control it and adjudge such act to be void," 10 appear to b
the first expositions of this theory in the reports. In Finch's Law
(I636), however, it is set forth dogmatically: "Therefore Lawe
1 Y. B., 8 Ed. III, 30.
2 Bonham's Case, 8 Reports o08 a, II8 a.
8 Fitzh. Abr., Cessavit, 42; Fitzh., Natura Brevium, 209 F.
4 Stat. Westm. II, cap. 21. 6 2 Inst. 402.
6 De Laudibus Legum Angliae, cap. i6.
7 Ibid. cap. 32. 8 Dial. I, c. 6.
9 I Edward VI, cap. 14. 10 8 Reports 107 a, 118 a.

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392 HARVARD LAW REVIEW.

positive, which are directly contrary to the

reason] lose their force, and are no Lawes at al
are contrary to the law of Nature. Such is that
to turne women to merchandize and commonwealth affaires and
men to keepe within dores." 1 Lord Holt (I701) in City of Lond
v. Wood 2 approves the dicta in Bonham's Case and puts as
illustration that "an act of Parliament may not make adult
lawful." Finally, Blackstone (1765) begins by laying down
theory of natural law emphatically. He says: " This law of natu
being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, i
course superior in obligation to any other . . . no human laws
of any validity if contrary to this." 3 But when he comes to a
it to legislation, he retracts. He cannot accept the dicta in B
ham's Case nor Lord Holt's approval thereof, but admits that "
the Parliament will positively enact a thing to be done whi
unreasonable, I know of no power in the ordinary forms of
constitution to control it." 4 It has been shown that this ch
of view was a result of the revolution of I688.5 Since that even
courts " have no authority to act as regents over Parliament o
refuse to obey a statute because of its rigor." 6
Except as constitutional limitations are infringed, the same
trine obtains in America.7 But there are dicta that the sup
obligation of the law of nature must be given effect,8 and an
nent judge has declared that there are, apparently apart from
stitutional restrictions, individual rights to which courts must
effect " beyond the control of the state." 9 The example whic
gives, however, that " no court . . . would hesitate to declare v
a statute which enacted that A and B who were husband and wife
to each other should be so no longer, but that A should thereafter

1 Finch, Law, B. I, c. 6. 2 12 Mod. 669, 687.

8 I B1. Comm. 41. 4 I B1. Comm. 9I.
6 Coxe, Judicial Power and Unconst. Legislation, 179.
6 Willes, J., in Lee v. Bude & T. J. R. Co., L. R. 6 C. P
7 Cooley, Const. Lim., 200; Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N.
N. H. 211.
8 Jeffers v. Fair, 33 Ga. 367; Lanier v. Lanier, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 572.
9 Miller, J., in Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 655, 662. Cf Marshal
in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch (U. S.) 87: '" The estate having passed into th
of a purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, the state of Geo
restrained either by general principles which are commoon to our free institutio
the particular provisions of the constitution of the United States from passi
whereby the estate of the plaintiff in the premises so purchased could be const
ally and legally impaired and rendered null and void."

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 COMMON LAW AND LEGISLATION. 393

be the husband of C, and B the wife of D," is v

Lord Holt in City of London v. Wood,1 who s
" may make the wife of A to be the wife of B,
that there are natural law limitations on leg
This striking example of the purely personal an
acter of all natural law theories,2 demonstrates
of maintaining any such doctrine as that laid
Bonham's Case. But there are those who mai
there are extra-constitutional limitations upon
and some such feeling on the part of judges
little to the current attitude toward legislation.
Judicial limitations upon interference of the
in spiritual affairs and upon attempts of Par
from the royal prerogative prior to the establish
of parliamentary supremacy in I688 have been d
by Mr. Coxe.4 The decisions he sets forth are
American doctrine of judicial power over leg
that prior to the Reformation a distinction bet
spiritual powers was recognized and unquestione
poral legislation in purely spiritual matters
anyone because it dealt with matters over w
no power -it was impartinent d'estre observe
courts had no power over such matters eithe
these cases proceed, not on any inherent quality
upon a separation of powers similar to that prov
can constitutions. So also in the matter of legis
with the royal prerogative prior to I688. The
king's courts, administering his justice in his n
So long as his prerogative existed, they were bo
to it quite as much as they were to give effect
the power of judging as to the validity of legisla

1 12 Mod. 669.
2 " Nous pensons, qu'h part le droit positif, il n'existe que
qui repondent plus ou moins aux besoins de la societe." A
Fiore, Nouveau Droit Internat. Public, ii. Cf Bentham, Pr
Legislation, 17, n. I.
8 Hughes, Datum Posts of Jurisp. (I907), Io6.
4 Judicial Power over Unconst. Legislation, I2I-164, I65-
6 This distinction, recognized in the Constitutions of C
Charta, is stated very graphically in the Sachsenspiegel, B
6 Fitzh. Abr., Annuity, 41.
7 Godden v. Hales, Show. 475.

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394 HARVARD LAW REVIEW.

two situations gave rise contributed to prod

there is an indefinite, judicial, supervisory pow
International law stands to the law of each state in a relation
quite analogous to that which the canon law occupied with respe
to matters spiritual before the Reformation. It is a universal law
dealing with matters not of ordinary legal concern, although ru
ning into questions with which the local courts have to do so of
and so closely that we hold it a common element of the municip
law of states. But in the same way the canon law, treating
matters which were not for the lay courts, at the same time fou
the lines between such matters and matters temporal hazy a
difficult to draw, and may be said to have been to no less exten
a common element in the municipal law of medieval Europ
International law is in a sense a superior body of rules, no
depending upon the will of any particular state, but imposed
all states, according to the theory one may adopt, by natural la
or by the moral sentiment and public opinion of the civili
world. In the same way the canon law was a body of rules
of superior authority, having behind it the sanctions of the church
and of religion. But the separation of powers between national
and international has not proceeded so far that courts are able
to pronounce legislation contrary to the rules or principles of inter-
national law to be void or " impertinent to be observed." They
have the power only to produce, so far as interpretation will allow,
a-harmony between the law of the state and the Law of Nations,
just as lay courts formerly, without refusing to apply temporal
legislation, "were willing to co-operate with the canonists in pro-
ducing an harmonious result."2 There are common law dicta that
legislation cannot change a rule of international law.3 These ap-
pear to proceed upon the theory that international law is the law
of nature applied to international relations and hence is of superior
authority to positive law.4 To that extent, Lord Mansfield's dictum

1 Maitland, Canon Law in the Church of England, cc. ii, iii, and iv.
2 Ibid. 75.
8 In Heathfield v. Chilton, 4 Burr. 2015, Lord Mansfield said that Parliament not
only did not intend to alter but "could not alter " the law of nations by stat. 7 Anne,
c. 12. In The Scotia, 14 Wall. (U. S.) I70, Strong, J., said: "Undoubtedly no single
nation can change the law of the sea. That law is of universal obligation, and no
statute of one or two nations can change the law of the world."
4 And as none of these states will allow a superiority in the other, therefore
neither can dictate or prescribe the rules of this law to the rest; but such rules must
necessarily result from those principles of natural justice in which the learned of every

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 COMMON LA W AND LEGISLA TION. 395

may be the last echo in England of Coke's doctrin

Case. The view which has prevailed, however, is t
are to prevent interference of legislation with inter
interpretation; that to avoid a conflict between inte
and a statute, the courts will resort, if need be, to s
forced constructions.1 On the Continent, where diffe
the relation of courts to legislation obtain, it is s
instead of discussing the duty of interpreting st
accord with international law, as do English and Am
text-writers consider the duty of states to cangtge th
bring them into harmony with the just demands of
In other words, conflict between municipal law and
law may be avoided in any of three ways: (I) by h
legislation of a state at variance with international l
construing legislation in derogation of international
avoiding departure therefrom by interpretation; (3)
local laws whenever at variance with the received us
In the analogous case of the canon law, the cour
second mode was not open, adopted the first.3 W
tional law is involved, with some suggestion that th
missible, they have come to take the second. Con
adopt the third. It is evident that the case of sta
gation of international law is not analogous to th
in derogation of the common law. In the former
bodies of rules dealing with different relations which
margin of contact. In the latter we have two forms
ing with the same relations and making up one bo
the question is how they shall be adjusted to each ot
may claim any superior authority, it is the legislati

nation agree; or they depend upon mutual compacts or treaties bet

communities; in the construction of which there is also no judge t
law of nature and reason, being the only one in which all the con
equally conversant, and to which they are equally subject." 4 B1.
1 Le Louis, 2 Dods. 210, 239; The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranc
Hence if the statute leaves no room for interpretation, internationa
An interesting example may be seen in the Scotch case of Mort
Scots L. T. 227. See Gregory, The Recent Controversy as to the B
over Foreign Fishermen more than Three Miles from Shore, I
410.

2 I Fiore, Nouveau Droit Internat. Public, 351-354.

a Prior of Castle Acre's Case, Y. B., 21 Hen. VII, i. Lyndwood asserts expr
that a statute upon a matter of spiritual cognizance without the approval of the c
is invalid. Provinciale, 1679 ed., 263, n. i. The judges seem to have agreed.

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396 HARVARD LAW REVIEW.

later and more direct expression of the general will. But

false analogy has not assisted directly in keeping up the com
law attitude toward legislation, the further example of judi
imposed limitations upon statutes has not been without e
With respect to each of the four cases we have been consi
it may be noted that the legislator was attempting to act be
his province or to derogate from rules of superior auth
Hence his mandates were " impertinent to be observed."
fifth case, friction between the terms of a statute and doctr
principles of the common law, the case is otherwise. H
legislator is within his own undoubted province, and his rul
the superior authority. Hence the courts could not enter
suggestion that legislation contrary to the doctrines of the c
law is invalid. Granting its validity, they have to consider wh
they will interpret it liberally, giving full and free developm
its policy and spirit, or narrowly and strictly, refusing to suffer
suspension or modification of the existing judge-made law b
what the letter of the enactment dictates. " A statute is said to be
construed strictly when it is not extended to cover anything that is
not clearly within its express terms." 1 Such is the construction
which our courts have been exhorted to apply2 and have said they
would apply to statutory intruders.3 In other words, courts assume
that legislatures are in the quiescent stage, as Dicey calls it,4
although that stage has never obtained in America. We have seen
certain analogies that contribute to the attitude this false assump-
tion is invoked to justify. It remains to see how the doctrine as to
statutory innovations upon the common law arose and what. has
kept it alive.
Archaic interpretation, like any other feature of archaic law, is
formal, rigid, and arbitrary.5 "In the barbarous stages of law,

1 Terry, Common Law, 8.

2 Carter, Law, Its Origin, Growth and Function, 308.
8 E. g.: "This statute is an innovation on the common law, and therefore will not
be extended farther than is required by its letter." Look v. Miller, 3 Stew. & P.
(Ala.) 13 (statute allowing a party to testify). "The courts will construe strictly laws
in modification or derogation thereof, assuming that the legislature has in the terms
used expressed all the change it intended to make in the old law, and will not by con-
struction or intendment enlarge its operation." Hollman v. Bennett, 44 Miss. 322.
Dr. Robinson cites this in I900 as stating an elementary principle of American juris-
prudence. Elements of Am. Jurisp, ? 301.
4 Law and Public Opinion in England, Lect. V.
5 " The oldest law of the Romans recognized no will as in existence other than the
spoken will, the dictum. What is not spoken is not willed, and vice versa only that is

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 COMMON LA W AND LEGISLATION. 397

courts thwart the intention of parties to transactions

restrictions which are not based on considerations of p
tage, but are formal, arbitrary, and often of a quasi-s
acter." 1 What Mr. Justice Holmes has styled "the
the seventeenth century common law to understan
pleading that did not exclude every misinterpretati
occurring to an intelligence fired with a desire to p
characteristic phase of the archaic conception of all leg
tions and transactions. Applied generally to legislation
it has left a monument in the elaborate elucidations of the obvious
in the first three sections of the English Interpretation Act.3 In-
carnate in a special, arbitrary rule of statutory construction, it has
left a descendant in the doctrine we are considering. That rule is
stated thus by Coke: " There is also a diversity betweene an act
of Parliament in the negative, and in the affirmative; for an afirma-
tive act doth not take away a custome, as the statutes of wills of 32
and 34 H. 8. doe not take away a custome to devise lands, as it
hath beene often adjudged. Moreover there is a diversity betweene
statutes that be in the negative; for if a statute in the negative be
declarative of the ancient law, that is in affirmance of the common
law, there aswell as a man may prescribe or alledge a custome
against the common law, so a man may doe against such a statute;
for as our author saith, consuetudo etc. privat communem legem. As
the statute of Magna Charta provideth that no leet shall be holden
but twice in the yeare, yet a man may prescribe to hold it oftener,
and at other times; for that the statute is but in affirmance of the
common law." 4 It will be noted that there are two parts to this
statement. The first is an arbitrary rule for construing a statute
without regard to intent, according to the form in which the intent
is expressed. The second is an equally arbitrary rule for deter-
mining whether an act declaratory of the common law precludes
immemorial custom without regard to intent, according to the form

willed that is spoken. Therefore, in legal transactions the words take effect entirely
independent of the intention they are to express. The verba are efficacious, not merely
to the extent that they express the voluntas, but, for the law, their literal meaning
stands for voluntas itself." 2 Danz, Geschichte des Rimischen Rechts, ? 142.
1 Gray, Restraints Alien., 2 ed., ? 74 b.
2 Paraiso v. United States, 207 U. S. 368, 372.
8 Thring, Practical Legislation, o09. For legislative attempts to provide against
this type of interpretation in advance with respect to particular statutes, see 38 Hen.
VIII, c. 7, ? 28; 22 Car. II, c. I, ? I3; N. Y. Code Civ. Proc. I848, ? i.
4 Co. Lit. 15 a.

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398 HiARVARD LAW REVIEW.

of words used. Magna Charta, the example gi

declaratory. Hence the form of expression, w
affirmative, was not the criterion for determinin
statute.

The first rule is very common in the books in the sixteenth

seventeenth centuries. Thus, in Earl of Southampton's Cas
Bromley, Serjeant, said: " If it be enacted by Parliament that t
youngest son shall have appeal of the death of his father, that s
not exclude the eldest from his suit, because there are no word
of restraint." In Townsend's Case,2 Walpole, Catline, and D
argued to the same effect that " the words being spoken affir
tively here, may no.t obstruct the common law in its operation
Gerrard, Prideaux, and Dallison, contra, admitted the rule but sa
that the words used-" making a new ordinance (although they
spoken affirmatively) contain in themselves a negative." The co
took the latter view. In other words, the fact that the act was
innovation was a circumstance calling for a more liberal ru
This more liberal statement of the rule by admitting that t
may be an implied negative is to be found also in the argumen
Stradling v. Morgan,4 in Elmes's Case,5 and in Jones v. Smith.6
But the original, strict form of statement is to be found as
as 1695 in Oldis v. Donmille.7 And in 1760, in Rex v. Morel
the stricter form of the rule reappears under very peculiar circ
stances. The question arose upon a rule for a certiorari to remo
certain orders under the Conventicle Act, with which Lord Man
field evidently had very little sympathy. The statute9 prov
that " no other court whatsoever shall intermeddle with any c
or causes of appeal upon this Act; but they shall be finally det
mined in the quarter sessions only." Also: "This act and all
clauses therein shall be construed most largely and beneficially for
the suppressing of conventicles, and for the justification and en-

1 I Dyer 50 a.
2 I Dyer III.
3 Coke afterward stated the rule in this more liberal form with respect to statutes
not declaratory: "A statute made in the affirmative without any negative expressed or
implied, doth not take away the common law." 2 Inst. 200.
4 I Plowd. I99, 206.
6 I And. 71.
6 2 Bulstr. 36.
7 Show. P. C. 58, 64. Here counsel say, arguendo: "'T is an affirmative Law and
that seldom or never works any Change or Alteration in what was before."
8 2 Burr. o04I.
9 22 Car. II, c. I, ?? 6, 13.

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 COMMON LAW AND LEGISLATION. 399

couragement of all persons to be employed in

thereof; and that no record, warrant or mittinus
virtue of this act shall be reversed, avoided or in an
peached by reason of any default in form." The rule
on the ground of these provisions. But, as the court
the certiorari would not try the merits but onl
whether the magistrates had exceeded their jurisd
be granted without allowing anything in the nature
without passing on any "default of form." Hence
rected that it issue. Counsel argued further, howeve
general jurisdiction of this court is not taken away
tive words in an act of Parliament." To this the court assented,
saying: "The jurisdiction of this court is not taken away unless
there be express words to take it away." The statute here was so
clear that if it was possible for legislation to take away the power
of the court over a case by anything short of saying so in unequiv-
ocal terms, it surely had that effect. But on the rule for certiorari
that was not the question. On the other hand, the rule in ques-
tion was not universally conceded. In Lord Lovelace's Case1 the
question was whether a prescription to cut wood without view of
the forester could be allowed. Coke's doctrine was cited, but the
court refused to apply it. The report says: "And my Lord Rich-
ardson denyed that difference taken by my lord Coke in Com. on
Litt. fol. 15, as betweene negative statutes declaratorie of the
common law and negative statutes introductory of a new law, and
he held against my lord Coke that in neither of the cases a pre-
scription can be against a negative statute." On the whole, we
may say that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there was
an arbitrary rule of construction requiring negative words to take
away the effect of immemorial custom or the operation of common
law,2 which, however, was not universally admitted and was con-
strued more liberally by many who held that the negative might
appear from the general tenor of the act without an express state-
ment thereof; that the portion of the rule relating to declaratory
statutes did not afford a criterion for determining when a statute
is declaratory, but a mode of construing a statute otherwise shown

1 W. Jones 270.
2 This rule was not confined to conflicts between statute and common law. In Bod-
well v. Bodwell, Cro. Car. 170, 172, Noy says, arguendo, "and a statute in the affirm
tive doth not take away a former statute, but they stand together." Here is a crud
statement of the law as to repeal by implication.

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400 HARVARD LAW REVIEW.

to be of that character, and that the fact that

an innovation was regarded by those who ad
entitling it to more liberal construction. In the
the rule is announced obiter in its stricter form. In the nineteenth
century, these cases are cited for the doctrine that statutes are to
be taken so far as possible to be declaratory of the common
law, and hence, when in derogation thereof, are to be construed
strictly.
Another class of old authorities is also cited today as support-
ing the doctrine in question; namely, those which construe to-
gether common law and statute upon the same general subject as
rules in pari materia. For instance, Coke says: "The surest
construction of a statute is by the rule and reason of the common
law." 1 In other words, it should be construed so as to fit into the
legal system of which it is a part. Statute and common law
should be construed together, just as statute and statute must be.
This is what the minority judges had in mind in the much-quoted
passage in Stowel v. Lord Zouch.2 Exactly the same arguments
were made as to the necessity of construing one statute by
another.3 It is apparent that these authorities do not require and
are no warrant for a doctrine of judicial antipathy toward legisla-
tive innovation. The interpretation of these authorities as estab-
lishing a presumption of legislative intent not to interfere with the
common law is a nineteenth-century one.4 Such a presumption
may in fact have been perfectly justified in a period of rare and
scanty legislation. It may have been assumed as a known fact
that the legislature did not profess to make considerable and
sweeping changes in the law. But that does not make of it and
the courts did not then take it to be a conclusive presumption,
established by law, which a period of legislative activity could not
affect.

But one reported case in England prior to the nineteenth

century lays down the doctrine as it is stated today. Ash v.
Abdy5 was decided in 1678, but was not reported till I8I9. It
involved the question whether the Statute of Frauds was to be
applied retroactively. The statute did not require any such con-

1 Co. Lit. 272 b.

2 I Plowd. 353. See infra, p. 401, n. 2. Cf. Shipman v. Henbest, 4 T. R. Io9.
8 Bodwell v. Bodwell, Cro. Car. 170, 172.
4 It appears first in i Kent Comm. 464 (1826).
5 3 Swanst. 664.

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 COMMON LA W AND LEGISLA TON. 401

struction, and the ordinary criterion of the intrinsic meri

sible interpretations, or Blackstone's tenth rule, would su
justify the decision that it was not to be so applied. B
Nottingham is reported to have come to this conclus
rather because all acts which restrain the common law oug
selves to be restrained by exposition." It is curious th
dictum first saw light, nearly a century and a half aft
uttered, in the beginnings of the reform movement in E
when, in face of strong opposition from individual judges
ment was beginning to take a vigorous hand in making
law. In this country the first announcement of it is in Br
Barry,1 in I797. A statute of I789 had provided that th
of a repealing act should not revive the act repealed, and
decided was that an act suspending a former act for a lim
was not a repealing act within this statute. In coming
obvious conclusion, Ellsworth, C. J., said: "The act of I789,
being in derogation of the common law, is to be taken strictly."
Nor does the doctrine appear in institutional writers till the nine-
teenth century. In Wood's Institutes (1722) the dicta in Bon-
ham's Case are set out as a rule of construction, and it is laid
down that " the surest construction is by the reason of the com-
mon law."2 As we have seen, the latter statement meant, in the
authorities from which it was taken, no more than that common
law and statute in pari materia were to be construed together.
Blackstone (1765) discusses interpretation of statutes at some
length and sets out ten rules. He refuses to accept the dicta in
Bonham's Case and makes no mention of statutes in derogation of
the common law or of any rules with reference thereto. Kent
(I826) says that statutes are to be construed with reference to the
principles of the common law because it is not to be presumed
"that the legislature intended to make any innovation upon the
common law further than the case absolutely required," and
cites the argument of the minority judges in Stowel v. Lord Zouch.
Finally in 1854 in Bouvier's Institutes we find it stated as a funda-
mental principle that "statutes in derogation of the common law

1 3 Dall. (U. S ) 365. The dictum in this case has been applied by the Supreme
Court of the United States in McCool v. Smith, I Black (U. S.) 459, 490, and Show
v. Railroad Co., IOI U. S. 557, 565.
2 Wood, Inst. 9, citing 2 Inst. 148, 301 a.
3 I Comm. 464. It should be remembered that Chancellor Kent had had some
experience of democratic legislative activity, and was not at all in sympathy with it
Memoirs and Letters of Chancellor Kent, 178.
26

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402 HARVARD LAW REVIEW.

are to be strictly construed." 1 From this t

cisions and dicta runs steadily. The rule is n
findamenta of American law.2 In other wo
ancient rule of the common law is, in substance, an American
product of the nineteenth century. The English institutional
writers of modern times, Broom, Stephen, and Campbell, are
unaware of it.3 It does not appear in any institutional writer till
I854, and does not appear in any edition of Blackstone till I870.4
With quite as much warrant one may cite as the true and ancient
doctrine of the common law the classical statement in Heydon's
Case,5 wherein a sound and liberal canon of construction was laid
down for all statutes " be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or
enlarging of the common law."
American courts, unrestrained by any doctrine of parliamentary
supremacy, such as was established in England in I688, found
themselves opposed to legislatures, just as English courts of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had been opposed to the
crown. They found in the books, over and above express con-
stitutional limitations, vague doctrines of inherent limitations upon
every form of law-making and of the intrinsic invalidity of certain
laws. They soon wielded a conceded power over unconstitutional
legislation. The great American institutional writer was an ardent
federalist and had little faith in a popular legislature. The great-
est of American judges, a man of like political sentiments, was not
sure that "by general principles " legislatures were not bound to
respect a bona fide purchaser for value as would a court of equity,
and refuse to assert against him the rights of a defrauded people.6
Thus American courts were predisposed to look doubtfully upon
legislative innovations. But the determining factor in the attitude
of our courts toward legislation is doubtless to be found in the co-
incidence of a period of development through judicial decisions
with one of great legislative activity. Usually legislative activity
1 I Bouvier, Inst., ? 88. Citing three cases: Melody v. Reab, 4 Mass. 471; Gibson
v. Jenney, 15 Mass. 205; Look v. Miller, 3 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 13. The first of these
deals with a penal statute. The second is a dictum. The third is a typical case.
2 The American editors of Blackstone were slow in recognizing it. Sharswood
(I859) added five to Blackstone's ten rules without mentioning this point. Its first
appearance in this connection is in Cooley's note to Blackstone's seventh rule,
I Cooley's Blackstone, 88, n. I (1870).
3 It is not mentioned in Terry, Common Law (g9o6).
4 See notes I and 2, supra.
6 3 Reports 93.
6 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch (U. S.) 87.

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 COMMON LAW AND LEGISLATION. 403

has succeeded juristic or judicial activity. With us t

to be coincident. Roughly speaking, the first century
judicature was taken up with determining the applica
several doctrines of the common law to this country
out the potential applications of common law princip
can conditions. Hence it was marked by fresh and
thought and vigorous judicial law-making. For onc
had to contend with living and growing law of t
type instead of with the feeble offspring of a per
decadence.
If, however, we should concede that an attitude of antip
toward legislative innovation is a fundamental common law p
ple, we should have to inquire whether that principle is appli
to American conditions and is a part of our American com
law. " The capital fact in the mechanism of modern states
energy of legislatures."' American legislatures have been cons
uously active from the beginning. Moreover, our constitu
polity expressly contemplates a complete separation of legisla
from judicial power. And this is in accord with the whole
of legal history.2 Not only is a doctrine at variance with that
ity inapplicable to American conditions, but if it ever was
cable, the reasons for it have ceased and it should be abandone
For one thing, the political occasions for judicial interference
legislation have come to an end. In the sixteenth and seventee
centuries the judiciary stood between the public and the c
It protected the individual from the state when he required t
protection. Today, when it assumes to stand between the le
ture and the public and thus again to protect the individual f
the state, it really stands between the public and what the pu
needs and desires, and protects individuals who need no prote
against society which does need it. Hence the side of the c
is no longer the popular side. Moreover, courts are less an
competent to formulate rules for new relations which require
lation. They have the experience of the past. But they do
have the facts of the present. They have but one case be

1 Maine, Early History of Institutions, Lect. xiii.

2 "As the development of law goes on, the function of the judge is confined w
ever narrowing limits; the main source of modifications in legal relations com
more and more exclusively the legislature." Sidgwick, Elements of Politics
203. This is well illustrated in Campbell, Principles of English Law (1907), in
more than half the references are to statutes.

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404 HARVARD LAW REVIEW.

them, to be decided upon the principles of the

of the one situation, and the prejudices which th
common law institutional writers, the dogmas le
course in economics, and habitual association with
professional class, must inevitably produce.1 It is
in the community that objects to the settlement
highest social import in private litigations betwe
Richard Roe. It is a sound instinct that objects
view of industrial legislation.2 Judicial law-maki
of means to get at the real situation, operates un
tably in a complex social organization. One might
one illustration in the conflict between judicial d
legislation. But Dicey has pointed out a strikin
operation of the equitable doctrines of separate p
the married women's acts. " The daughters of
says, "were when married, protected under the r
the enjoyment of their separate property. The d
ingmen possessed little property of their own. T
protected. The other would, it seemed, gain li
tion."3 Whether the state exists only to secu
alistic minimum of legal duty," or to interfere wi
sane adults along paternal or even socialistic lines
of the community at large, legislative law-making
reliance of modern society.4
But it is objected that statutes " have no roots "
and inconsiderately adopted "; 5 that they are cru
to the cases to which they are to be applied, an
and incapable of enforcement;6 and that they " b
whereas, supposedly free from the foregoing def
laws " rest on principles of right" and " are the sl
fought controversies between opposing intere
reflection is needed to show hdw ill-founded these

1 " It is not to be expected from human nature that the few s

tive to the interests of the many." 4 B1. Comm. 379. One mus
sel on both sides belong to the same class and have had the
judges.
2 Kelley, Some Ethical Gains through Legislation, I42.
8 Law and Public Opinion in England, 382.
4 Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, 2 ed., 343-344.
6 Baldwin, Introduction to Two Centuries' Growth of Am. Law, 2.
6 Carter, Law, Its Origin, Growth and Function, 3.
7 Hornblower, A Century of Judge-Made Law, 7 Colum. L. Rev. 460.
8 Two Centuries' Growth of Am. Law, 2.

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 COMMON LAW AND LEGISLATION. 405

ments are in fact. Dicey has shown that the mar

acts had very deep roots in the equity doctrines
property.1 Can we say that homestead and ex
mechanics' lien laws, bankruptcy laws, divorce la
statutes abolishing the common law disqualifications
permitting accused persons to testify, and allowing a
inal causes, had no roots? Do any judge-made doctrin
firmly upon principles of right than these statutes,
Campbell's Act or Lord St. Leonards' Act or the Nego
ments Law? Do the refinements of equity and th
impossibilities which the chancellors imposed upon
deeper roots or represent right and justice better tha
lief acts? Are any judicial decisions more deliberately
or more carefully adjusted to the circumstances to w
to be applied than the draft acts proposed by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws or the Nation
Uniform Divorce Legislation? What court that passes
trial legislation is able or pretends to investigate cond
ufacture, to visit factories and workshops and see the
and to take the testimony of employers, employees,
cial workers, and economists as to the needs of work
public, as a legislative committee may and often d
are not confined to legislative law-making. The fate
servant rule, of the doctrine of assumption of risk, a
judge-made law of employers' liability, the Taff-Val
land,3 and the fate of judicial adjustment of water-rig
should make lawyers more cautious in criticizing
Freaks of judicial law-making are abundant.5 Spendt
1 Law and Opinion in England, 369-393.
2 See Kelley, Some Ethical Gains through Legislation, I56.
8 [I9oI] A. C. 426. See 5-6 Edw. VII, c. 47, ? 4.
4 See Long, Irrigation, ?? 95, 98.
6 It has been held that a verdict of guilty in the " fist" degree is o
dridge v. State, 13 Tex. App. 443, and this decision has been deeme
tance to be published as a leading case, 44 Am. Rep. 708. Also that
punishment in the "state penty" is fatally defective. Keeller v.
527. Also that a verdict of "guity " is ineffectual. Taylor/v. State
Wilson v. State, I2 Tex. App. 48I; Harwell v. State, 22 Tex. App.
of "guilly" or "guily " or "guitty" is good. Partain v. State, 22 Te
v. State, 7 Tex. App. 91; Stepp v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 753. Wha
legislation that required such absurdities ? For some further instan
future interests in land in almost any of our jurisdictions may be re
Determinable Fees, 17 HARV. L. REV. 297, 306.
In Indiana the plaintiff was required by judicial decision to nega

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406 HARVARD LAW RE VIEW.

as out of line with right and justice as any statute-m

ever was.1 The Exchequer rule as to reversal for er
of evidence, our American judge-made law of instru
our practice of new trials on the slightest provocatio
pitfall-bestrewn practice in appellate courts are war
possibilities even of judicial law-making. In shor
carelessness have too often characterized Ameri
both legislative and judicial. They do not inher
the one any more than in the other.
Formerly it was argued that common law was sup
lation because it was customary and rested upon th
governed.2 Today we recognize that the so-call
custom of judicial decision, not a custom of pop
recognize that legislation is the more truly democra
making. We see in legislation the more direct an
pression of the general will.3 We are told that law-
future will consist in putting the sanction of socie
been worked out in the sociological laboratory.4 Th
not conduct such laboratories is self evident Courts are fond of

negligence in his pleading. Mt. Vernon v. Dusouchett, 2 Ind. 586; Railroad Co. v.
Burton, I39 Ind. 357. This had to be changed by statute. Burns, Annotated Stat.,
? 359 a. In Edmiston v. Herpolsheimer, 66 Neb. 94, it was held that presentment of a
check through the clearing house was not presentment in a reasonable time. The legis-
lature, in response to the demand of business men, changed the rule at its next session.
See Reporter's note to case cited. Such instances might be multiplied indefinitely and
are no less suggestive than the cases conventionally cited where statutes have failed of
effect. Lists of overruled cases, moreover, are quite as long and quite as formidable
as schedules of repealed statutes.
If the public refuse to obey statutes, it is no less true that juries systematically re-
fuse to obey the rules of judge-made law laid down for their guidance in actions against
carriers, against employers, and for personal injuries generally. See some statistics on
this point in my paper, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 Green Bag 607.
Judges have been known to lay down rules which were quite as unsuited to those
who had to obey them as any statutes have been. To take remote and therefore non-
controversial examples, see Petheram, English Judges and Hindu Law, 14 L. Quar.
Rev. 392, 404, and 15 L. Quar. Rev. 173, 184; Petheram, The Mohammedan Law of
Wakf, 13 L. Quar. Rev. 383; Andrews, Connecticut Intestacy Law, Select Essays in
Anglo-Am. Legal History, 431, 446. It is instructive to note that the points made
against the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the articles cited are made
against our supreme courts today. Kelley, Some Ethical Gains through Legislation,
142-I56.
1 See Gray, Restraints Alien., 2 ed., ?? 262-264.
2 I Wilson's Works, Andrews' ed., 183 (written 1790).
8 Bosanquet, Philosophical Theory of the State, 20o-123.
4 Ward, Applied Sociology, 338.

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 COMMON LAW AND LEGISLATION. 407

saying that they apply old principles to new si

times they must apply new principles to situati
new. The new principles are in legislation. The
are in common law. The former are as much to
made effective as the latter - probably more so as
improves. The public cannot be relied upon perman
ate judicial obstruction or nullification of the s
which more and more it is compelled to be com
Roscoe Pound.
CHICAGO.

1 E.g., Rensselaer Glass Factory v. Reed, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 587, which has been
quoted repeatedly.

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