reyes v larlar gr 232579

Facts:

On May 1, 2008, Rosie Larlar Treyes (Rosie), the wife of petitioner

Treyes, passed away.9 Rosie, who did not bear any children with
petitioner Treyes, died without any will.10 Rosie also left behind seven
siblings, i.e., the private respondents Antonio, Emilio, Heddy, Rene,
Celeste, Judy, and Yvonne.

At the time of her death, Rosie left behind 14 real estate

properties,11 situated in various locations in the Philippines, which she
owned together with petitioner Treyes as their conjugal properties
(subject properties).

Subsequently, petitioner Treyes executed two Affidavits of Self-

Adjudication dated September 2, 200812 and May 19, 2011.13 The first
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication was registered by petitioner Treyes with the
Register of Deeds (RD) of Marikina City on March 24, 2011, while the
second Affidavit of Self-Adjudication was registered with the RD of San
Carlos City, Negros Occidental on June 5, 2011. In these two Affidavits
of Self-Adjudication, petitioner Treyes transferred the estate of Rosie
unto himself, claiming that he was the sole heir of his deceased spouse,
Rosie.14

As alleged by the private respondents, they sent a letter dated February

13, 2012 to petitioner Treyes requesting for a conference to discuss the
settlement of the estate of their deceased sister, Rosie. The private
respondents maintain that they never heard from petitioner Treyes
regarding their request.15 Undaunted, the private respondents again
wrote to petitioner Treyes on April 3, 2012, requesting for the settlement
of their sister's estate, but this request fell on deaf ears.16

The private respondents then alleged that sometime during the latter
part of 2012, they discovered to their shock and dismay that the TCTs
previously registered in the name of their sister and petitioner Treyes
had already been cancelled, except TCT No. M-43623 situated in Tanay,
Rizal and TCT No. T-627723 situated in Cabuyao, Laguna. New titles
had been issued in the name of petitioner Treyes on the basis of the two
Affidavits of Self-Adjudication.17

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Hence, the private respondents filed before the RTC a
Complaint18 dated July 12, 2013 (Complaint) for annulment of the
Affidavits of Self-Adjudication, cancellation of TCTs, reconveyance of
ownership and possession, partition, and damages against petitioner
Treyes, the RD of Marikina, the RD of the Province of Rizal, and the RD
of the City of San Carlos, Negros Occidental. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. RTC-1226.

In their Complaint, the private respondents alleged that petitioner Treyes

fraudulently caused the transfer of the subject properties to himself by 
executing the two Affidavits of Self-Adjudication and refused to reconvey
the shares of the private respondents who, being the brothers and
sisters of Rosie, are legal heirs of the deceased. Aside from asking for
the declaration of the nullity of the Affidavits of Self-Adjudication, the
private respondents also prayed for the cancellation of all the TCTs
issued in favor of petitioner Treyes, the reconveyance to the private
respondents of their successional share in the estate of Rosie, the
partition of the estate of Rosie, as well as moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, and other litigation expenses.

Ruling:

The Transmission of the Rights of Heirs at

the Precise Moment of Death of the
Decedent under the Civil Code

That the private respondents do not really seek in their Complaint the
establishment of their rights as intestate heirs but, rather, the
enforcement of their rights already granted by law as intestate heirs finds
basis in Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that the rights of
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent.

The operation of Article 777 occurs at the very moment of the decedent's
death – the transmission by succession occurs at the precise moment of
death and, therefore, the heir is legally deemed to have acquired
ownership of his/her share in the inheritance at that very moment,
"and not at the time of declaration of heirs, or partition, or distribution."78

2
Hence, the Court has held that the "[t]itle or rights to a deceased
person's property are immediately passed to his or her heirs upon death.
The heirs' rights become vested without need for them to be declared
'heirs.'"

In fact, in partition cases, even before the property is judicially

partitioned, the heirs are already deemed co-owners of the property.
Thus, in partition cases, the heirs are deemed real parties in interest
without a prior separate judicial determination of their
heirship.82 Similarly, in the summary settlement of estates, the heirs
may undertake the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the decedent
amongst themselves through the execution of a public instrument even
without a prior declaration in a separate judicial proceeding that they are
the heirs of the decedent.83 If there is only one legal heir, the document
usually executed is an affidavit of self-adjudication even without a prior
judicial declaration of heirship.

The Civil Code identifies certain relatives who are deemed compulsory
heirs and intestate heirs. They refer to relatives that become heirs by
virtue of compulsory succession or intestate succession, as the case
may be, by operation of law.

In the instant case, Article 1001 states that brothers and sisters, or their
children, who survive with the widow or widower, shall be entitled to one-
half of the inheritance, while the surviving spouse shall be entitled to the
other half:

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
(953-837a).

Hence, subject to the required proof, without any need of prior judicial

determination, the private respondents siblings of Rosie, by operation of
law, are entitled to one-half of the inheritance of the decedent. Thus, in
filing their Complaint, they do not seek to have their right as intestate
heirs established, for the simple reason that it is the law that already
establishes that right. What they seek is the enforcement and protection
of the right granted to them under Article 1001 in relation to Article 777 of
the Civil Code by asking for the nullification of the Affidavits of Self-
Adjudication that disregard and violate their right as intestate heirs.

As correctly explained by Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-

Bernabe (Justice Bernabe) in her Separate Opinion, "a prior declaration
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of heirship in a special proceeding should not be required before an heir
may assert successional rights in an ordinary civil action aimed only to
protect his or her interests in the estate. Indeed, the legal heirs of a
decedent should not be rendered helpless to rightfully protect their
interests in the estate while there is yet no special proceeding."84

To stress once more, the successional rights of the legal heirs of Rosie
are not merely contingent or expectant — they vest upon the death of
the decedent. By being legal heirs, they are entitled to institute an action
to protect their ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession and are
thus real parties in interest in the instant case. To delay the enforcement
of such rights until heirship is determined with finality in a separate
special proceeding would run counter to Article 777 of the Civil Code
which recognizes the vesting of such rights immediately — without a
moment's interruption — upon the death of the decedent.

Jurisprudential Support on the Institution of

an Ordinary Civil Action by Legal Heirs
arising out of a Right based on Succession
without the Necessity of a Previous Judicial
Declaration of Heirship

To be sure, even prior to the promulgation of Litam which, as already

explained, does not actually support the doctrine that a determination of
heirship in a prior special proceeding is a prerequisite for the resolution
of an ordinary civil action, the Court had already pronounced that the
legal heirs may commence an ordinary civil action arising out of a right
based on succession without the necessity of a previous and separate
judicial declaration of their status as such.

To reiterate, once again, the Court's holdings

in Cabuyao and Marabilles that an heir may assert his/her right to the
property of the decedent without the necessity of a previous judicial
declaration of heirship are decisions of the Court En Banc that cannot be
reversed by a ruling of a Division of the Court. Ypon, Yaptinchay,
Portugal, and Reyes, which are all decisions of the Court's Divisions, in
so far as they hold that a prior special proceeding for declaration of
heirship is a prerequisite for the assertion by an heir of his/her ownership
rights acquired by virtue of succession in an ordinary civil action, did not,
as they could not, overturn the Court En Banc's holdings in De Vera,
4
Cabuyao, Atun, and Marabilles that heirs should be able to assert their
successional rights without the necessity of a previous judicial
declaration of heirship.

Inasmuch, however, as succession takes place, by operation of law,

"from the moment of the death of the decedent" and "(t)he inheritance
includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death," it follows that if his heirs were included as
defendants in this case, they would be sued, not as "representatives" of
the decedent, but as owners of an aliquot interest in the property in
question, even if the precise extent of their interest may still be
undetermined and they have derived it from the decent. Hence, they
may be sued without a previous declaration of heirship x x x.108

The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution,

dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead person has no legal
personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code
provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of
the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property,
subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be
deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by
law. The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs
acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or
contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in
them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or
intestate proceedings. When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her
claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was
not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her
death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation
and became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason
for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in
interest for the deceased plaintiff.

It is not disputed that Paulina Baranda died intestate without leaving any
direct descendants or ascendants, or compulsory heirs. She was
survived, however, by two brothers, namely, Pedro and Teodoro, and
several nephews and nieces, including the private respondents, as well
as petitioners Flocerfina Baranda, Salvacion Baranda, and Alipio
Baranda Villarte, children of two deceased brothers and a sister. The
above-named persons, together with Pedro Baranda, who was not
joined as a petitioner because he is the father of the private

5
respondents, and the children of another deceased sister, are the
legitimate intestate heirs of Paulina Baranda.

The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are the following:

[]Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate

children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.

[]Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews
and nieces, who are the children of the descendant's brothers and
sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter
per stirpes

[]Art. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct

descending line, but never in the ascending.

[]In the collateral line it takes place only in favor of the children or
brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood.[]

As heirs, the petitioners have legal standing to challenge the deeds of

sale purportedly signed by Paulina Baranda for otherwise property
claimed to belong to her estate will be excluded therefrom to their
prejudice. Their claims are not merely contingent or expectant, as
argued by the private respondents, but are deemed to have vested in
them upon Paulina Baranda's death in 1982, as, under Article 777 of the
Civil Code, "the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent." While they are not compulsory
heirs, they are nonetheless legitimate heirs and so, since they "stand to
be benefited or injured by the judgment or suit," are entitled to protect
their share of successional rights.

This Court has repeatedly held that "the legal heirs of a decedent are the
parties in interest to commence ordinary actions arising out of the rights
belonging to the deceased, without separate judicial declaration as to
their being heirs of said decedent, provided that there is no pending
special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate."

As similarly viewed by Justice Bernabe, the "more recent strand of

jurisprudence correctly recognize the legal effects of Article 777 of the
Civil Code, and thus, adequately provide for remedies for the heirs to
protect their successional rights over the estate of the decedent even
prior to the institution of a special proceeding for its settlement"125

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By this Decision now, the Court so holds, and firmly clarifies, that the
latter formulation is the doctrine which is more in line with substantive
law, i.e., Article 777 of the Civil Code is clear and unmistakable in stating
that the rights of the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent even prior to any judicial determination of heirship.
As a substantive law, its breadth and coverage cannot be restricted or
diminished by a simple rule in the Rules.

To be sure, the Court stresses anew that rules of procedure must always

yield to substantive law.126 The Rules are not meant to subvert or
override substantive law. On the contrary, procedural rules are meant to
operationalize and effectuate substantive law.

Hence, even assuming arguendo that the Rules strictly provide that a

separate judicial determination of heirship in a special proceeding is a
precondition in an ordinary civil action wherein heirship is already
established by compulsory succession or intestacy and is only sought to
be enforced, which, as already discussed at length, is not the case, the
Rules must still yield to the specific provisions of the Civil Code that
certain relatives of the decedent attain their status as either compulsory
or intestate heirs and that their successional rights are transmitted and
enforceable at the very moment of death without the need of such
separate judicial determination.

Indeed, the Rules shall always be construed in order to promote their

objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding.127

Hence, it would be highly inimical to the very purpose of the Rules to

dispose of matters without the unnecessary and circuitous procedures
created by a misreading of the requirements of said Rules, i.e, they still
require a separate and lengthy special proceeding for the solitary
purpose of establishing the private respondents' status as legal heirs of
Rosie, when their heirship has already been deemed established by
virtue of civil law, with petitioner Treyes not seriously and substantially
refuting that the private respondents are siblings of the decedent. If the
Court will subscribe to petitioner Treyes' arguments and grant the instant
Petition, it would sanction superfluity and redundancy in procedure. To
accept petitioner Treyes' stance will necessarily mean that, moving
forward, heirs will not even be able to extra-judicially and summarily
settle the estate of a decedent without a prior judicial declaration of
heirship in a special proceeding. Ironically, even petitioner Treyes'
Affidavits of Self-Adjudication would be legally baseless as he himself

7
has not previously established in a prior special proceeding his status as
the husband and heir of Rosie.

Recapitulation

Given the clear dictates of the Civil Code that the rights of the heirs to
the inheritance vest immediately at the precise moment of the
decedent's death even without judicial declaration of heirship, and the
various Court En Banc and Division decisions holding that no prior
judicial declaration of heirship is necessary before an heir can file an
ordinary civil action to enforce ownership rights acquired by virtue of
succession through the nullification of deeds divesting property or
properties forming part of the estate and reconveyance thereof to the
estate or for the common benefit of the heirs of the decedent, the Court
hereby resolves to clarify the prevailing doctrine.

Accordingly, the rule laid down in Ypon, Yaptinchay, Portugal, Reyes,

Heirs of Gabatan v. Court of Appeals, and other similar cases, which
requires a prior determination of heirship in a separate special
proceeding as a prerequisite before one can file an ordinary civil action
to enforce ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession,
is abandoned.

Henceforth, the rule is: unless there is a pending special proceeding for

the settlement of the decedent's estate or for the determination of
heirship, the compulsory or intestate heirs may commence an ordinary
civil action to declare the nullity of a deed or instrument, and for recovery
of property, or any other action in the enforcement of their ownership
rights acquired by virtue of succession, without the necessity of a prior
and separate judicial declaration of their status as such. The ruling of the
trial court shall only be in relation to the cause of action of the ordinary
civil action, i.e., the nullification of a deed or instrument, and recovery or
reconveyance of property, which ruling is binding only between and
among the parties.

Therefore, the Court is in total agreement with the CA that the RTC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying petitioner Treyes' second Motion to Dismiss.

8
Mitra v. Sablan, G.R. No. 213994, Apr. 18, 2018
Ruling:
The substantial compliance rule is embodied in the Civil Code as Article
809 thereof, which provides that:

Article 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and
improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form
of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will
invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.

What is imperative for the allowance of a will despite the existence of

omissions is that such omissions must be supplied by an examination of
the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence.
"However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by
evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause
and ultimately, of the will itself."37

An examination of the will in question reveals that the attestation clause

indeed failed to state the number of pages comprising the will. However,
as was the situation in Taboada, this omission was supplied in the
Acknowledgment. It was specified therein that the will is composed of
four pages, the Acknowledgment included.
In sum, Legaspi's last will and testament has substantially complied with
all the formalities required of a notarial will. It has been proven that
Legaspi and the instrumental witnesses signed on every page of the will,
except on the last, which refers to the Acknowledgment page. With
regard to the omission of the number of pages in the attestation clause,
this was supplied by the Acknowledgment portion of the will itself without
the need to resort to extrinsic evidence. Contrary to the CA conclusion,
such omission does not in any way serve as hindrance to probat

9
Villaflor v. Juico, L- 15737, Feb. 28, 1962
Ruling:
We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the testator,
as manifested in clause 8 of his testament, was to invest his widow with
only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties described in the seventh
clause, subject to the further condition (admitted by the appellee) that if
the widow remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even during her
own lifetime. That the widow was meant to have no more than a life
interest in those properties, even if she did not remarry at all, is evident
from the expressions used by the deceased "uso y posesion mientras
viva" (use and possession while alive) in which the first half of the
phrase "uso y posesion" instead of "dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces
the second ("mientras viva"). The testator plainly did not give his widow
the full ownership of these particular properties, but only the right to their
possession and use (or enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is in contrast
with the remainder of the estate in which she was instituted universal
heir together with the testator's brother (clause 6). 1äwphï1.ñët

The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as

reversionary legatee, could succeed to the properties bequeathed by
clause 7 of the testament only in the event that the widow remarried, has
unwarrantedly discarded the expression "mientras viva," and considered
the words "uso y posesion" as equivalent to "dominio" (ownership). In so
doing, the trial court violated Article 791 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, as well as section 59 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court.

ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation

which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one
which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two
modes of interpreting a will, that one is to be preferred which will
prevent intestacy." .

SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all

provisions. — In the construction of an instrument where there are
several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible,
to be adopted as will give effect to all." .

10
Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions
contained in clause 7 of his testament should not be allowed to obscure
the clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain words, which are over
the primary source in ascertaining his intent. It is well to note that if the
testator had intended to impose as sole condition the non-remarriage of
his widow, the words "uso y posesion mientras viva" would have been
unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry during her own
lifetime.

The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889),
expressly enjoins the following: .

ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and
grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another
sense can be gathered, and that other can be ascertained." .

Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense,

unless the context clearly indicates a contrary intention, or unless it
satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely by the testator,
and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense. (675a)

In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in
In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil., 233, that the intention and wishes of
the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of
interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its
execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith,
following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless
it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. The same rule is
adopted by the Supreme Court of Spain (TS. Sent. 20 Marzo 1918; 28
Mayo 1918; 30 Abril 1913; 16 Enero 1915; 23 Oct. 1925).

11
Uriarte v. CFI of Negros Occidental, 33 SCRA 252.
Ruling:
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the
distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in
accordance with the law on intestate succession or in
accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding
for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that
in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction,
testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings
for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if
in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of
first instance it is found it hat the decedent had left a last will,
proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the
intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had
already been appointed, the latter being required to render final
account and turn over the estate in his possession to the
executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood
to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be
rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an
intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that
proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings.

12
Bellis v. Bellis, 20 SCRA 358
Ruling:

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss,
the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen
Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent
where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of
another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was
both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing
that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same
would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would
still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule
adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the
law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise,
since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the
absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it
should not be presumed different from ours. 3 Appellants' position is
therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never
invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue
that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the
national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions,
with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will;
and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to

the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with

respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the

nation of the decedent.

13
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the
Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and

those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-
quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article"
when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the
new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the
second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It
must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16
a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and
intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent,
Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that
capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may

be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to
extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has
specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights,
to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over
general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills —
one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate —
arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine
estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled
in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to
the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his
national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10
— now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern.

14
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the
State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no
forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be
applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

15