[No. 6969. December 20, 1911.

VICENTE REYES, plaintiff and appellant, vs. JOSE GREY

ET AL., defendants and appellees.

1. USUFRUCTUARY RlGHT; SALE UNDER EXECUTION;

"PROPERTY," UNDER SECTION 450, CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, DEFINED.—The term "property," in
section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure, comprehends
every species of title, inchoate or complete, legal or
equitable. The said code authorizes the sale, under
execution, of every kind of property and every interest in
property which is, or may be, the subject of private
ownership and transfer. It deals with equitable rights and
interests, as it deals with legal, without anywhere
expressly recognizing or making any distinction between
them.

2. ID.; ID.; RIGHTS OF USUFRUCTUARY, UNDER THE

CIVIL CODE.—Article 480 of the Civil Code provides that:
"The usufructuary may personally enjoy the thing in
usufruct, lease it to another person, or alienate his right to
the usufruct, even for a good consideration * * *."

3. ID.; ID.; A USUFRUCTUARY RIGHT is AN "INTEREST"

IN LAND.—If the usufructuary right is one which may be
leased or sold, it must logically follow that such a right is
an "interest" in real property, within the meaning of
section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

4. ID.; ID.; ATTACHMENT; REAL TEST AS TO WHETHER

PROPERTY CAN BE ATTACHED AND SOLD.—The real
test, as to whether or not property can be attached and
sold upon execution is: Does the judgment debtor hold
such a beneficial interest in the property that he can sell
or otherwise dispose of it for value? If he does, then the
property is subject to execution and to the payment of his
debts. The right of usufruct is such an interest and when
the sheriff, in this case, sold the plaintiff's usufructuary
right by virtue of an execution, the plaintiff had no further
interest in the property.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Lobingier, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Ramon Salinas, for appellant.
D. R. Williams, for appellees.

74

74 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Reyes vs. Grey.

TRENT, J.:

Judgment having been rendered by the Court of First

Instance of the city of Manila, the Hon. Charles S.
Lobingier presiding, dismissing the complaint in this case
upon its merits, the plaintiff appealed.
The only question raised by this appeal is purely one of
law.
Remedios Grey, wife of the plaintiff, died intestate in
1905 without ascendants or descendants, leaving a
surviving husband and one sister and three brothers.
Under the law, the sisters and brothers are called to inherit
all of the estate of the deceased, subject only to the right of
the surviving husband, the plaintiff, to a usufructuary
interest in one-half thereof.
Administration proceedings in the estate of the deceased
wife were not taken out until June 15,. 1907, when Jose
Grey, one of the defendants, was appointed administrator.
In these administration proceedings, the Court of First
Instance of this city issued a decree on December 3, 1910,
declaring that each one of the defendants in the case at bar
was entitled to one-fourth part of the estate of the deceased
Remedios Grey, subject to the plaintiff's (Vicente Reyes')
right to the usufruct.
Prior to the appointment of the administrator for the
estate of the deceased Remedios Grey, and as the result of
certain judicial proceedings had against her surviving
husband (the plaintiff in the case at bar), his usufructuary
interest in the estate of his deceased wife was sold under
execution and deeds issued therefor to the purchaser, the
defendant Jose Grey. Such deeds still subsist in full force
and effect, no steps ever having been taken either to annul
or set them aside or to redeem the interest of the plaintiff
thus sold.
The plaintiff, as surviving husband of the deceased
Remedios Grey, now sues the sister and brothers of his
deceased wife, claiming of them the payment of his
usufructuary interest in the property of the deceased,
basing his claim upon two grounds: first, that the execution
sale and the

75

VOL. 21, DECEMBER 20, 1911. 75

Reyes vs. Grey.

sheriff 's deeds executed pursuant thereto did not divest

him of his usufructuary interest in the property and that
the defendants still remain charged with its payment; and
second, the defendants having failed to appeal from the
order of the probate court dated December 3, 1910, which
order was issued some three years after an attempt was
made to sell under execution the plaintiff's usufructuary
interest, and that order having become final, it settled the
plaintiff's right to a usufructuary interest, and the
defendants can not now deny this fact.
Counsel for the plaintiff now insists that a usufructuary
interest in real property is not such an interest or right as
can be sold under execution. With this contention we can
not agree. Section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides as follows:

"SEC. 450. Property liable to execution.—All goods, chattels,

moneys, and other property, both real and personal, or any
interest therein of the judgment debtor, not exempt by law, and
all property and rights of property seized and held under
attachment in the action, shall be liable to execution. Shares and
interests in any corporation or company, and debts, credits, and
all other property, both real and personal, or any interest in
either real or personal property, and all other property not
capable of manual delivery, may be attached on execution, in like
manner as upon writs of attachment."

The term "property" as here applied to lands comprehends

every species of title, inchoate or complete; legal or
equitable. This statute authorizes the sale under execution
of every kind of property, and every interest in property
which is, or may be, the subject of private ownership and
transfer. It deals with equitable rights and interests as it
deals with legal, without anywhere expressly recognizing
or making any distinction between them.
Article 480 of the Civil Code reads:

"The usufructuary may personally enjoy the thing in usufruct,

lease it to another person, or alienate his right to the usufruct,
even for a good consideration; * * *."
 76

76 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Reyes vs. Grey.

If the usufructuary right is one which may be leased or

sold, it must logically and necessarily follow that such a
right is an "interest" in real property within the meaning of
section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure, above quoted. It
was the plaintiff's usufructuary right in real property
which was sold under execution. This right was conferred
upon him at the death of his wife by operation of law, and
by virtue of such a right he was entitled to receive all the
natural, industrial, and civil fruits of said real property in
usufruct. He was entitled to hold the actual, material
possession of such property during his lifetime, and was
obligated only to preserve its form and substance. In other
words, he was entitled, subject to this restriction, to use the
property as his own. He was the real owner of this interest,
and article 480, supra, conferred upon him the right to
enjoy the possession of the property or lease it to another or
to sell such interest outright. We think the real test, as to
whether or not property can be attached and sold upon
execution is—does the judgment debtor hold such a
beneficial interest in such property that he can sell or
otherwise dispose of it for value? If he does, then the
property is subject to execution and payment of his debts.
The right of usufruct is such an interest, and when the
sheriff sold the plaintiff's usufructuary right by virtue of an
execution, he had no further interest in said property.
The plaintiff's second contention that the defendants, by
failing to appeal from the order of the court in the
administration proceedings dated December 3, 1910,
wherein the right of plaintiff to a usufructuary interest in
the property was recognized, have lost their right to refuse
such payment to him at this time, is not well founded. The
plaintiff had no interest in this property at the time the
probate court issued this order. The order only set out the
fact that under the law the plaintiff was entitled to a
usufructuary interest in one-half of the estate of his
deceased wif e. It was not a finding that in the meantime
the plaintiff had not sold, leased, or otherwise disposed of
or
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VOL. 21, DECEMBER 20, 1911. 77

 Requepo vs. Judge of First Instance and Rosales.

lost such right of participation. This order merely fixed the

legal status of the plaintiff and did not have the effect of
canceling or annuling the sale made by the sheriff. Again,
the plaintiff instituted the action in the case at bar on June
1, 1910, several months prior to the order of December 3,
1910. The right to recover was traversed by the defendants
on July 1 of that same year, and the question was pending
and undetermined at the time the probate court issued its
order.
The validity of the execution sale was not an issue in
those administration proceedings, and the order of
December 3rd cannot, under any circumstances, be held to
affect the validity of such a sale.
The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed, with
costs against the appellant.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and

Moreland, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed.

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