Vda de Manalo v.

CA, 349 SCRA 135 (2001)

Facts:

Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on
February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children,
namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita
Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo
and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age. 1âwphi1.nêt

At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located
in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's
Machine Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at NO. 45
General Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the
late Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and
Imelda filed a petition 6 with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila 7 of the judicial
settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their
brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.

On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on
February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail
of the said order upon the heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned
therein.

On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order
'declaring the whole world in default, except the government," and set the reception of evidence
of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, the trial court upon motion of set this
order of general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De
Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted then (10) days within which to file their
opposition to the petition.

Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in
the filling of an Omnibus Motion8 on July 23, 1993 seeking; (1) to seat aside and reconsider the
Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the motion for additional extension of
time file opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for
dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.

Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court
of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after the trial court in its Order  10 dated
September 15, 1993. In their petition for improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was
included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward
compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no certification of non-forum shopping
was attached to the petition.

Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its
Resolution11 promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the motion for
reconsideration of the said resolution was likewise dismissed. 12
Issue:
whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the
respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for
judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest
efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the
filling of the petition but that the same have failed.

Ruling:

Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil
action involving members of the same family. They point out that it contains certain averments,
which, according to them, are indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:

The instant petition is not impressed with merit.

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments15 and the character of the relief sought 16 in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at
bar, shall be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim
that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient
jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as
the fat of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the
City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his
residence within he country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in
the administration of the estate rest.17 The petition is SP.PROC No. 92-63626 also contains an
enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the
deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's
prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners
therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased
father, Troadio Manalo, to wit;

It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially
valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as
irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as
a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction  20 and cannot hear and dispose of collateral
matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In
addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the
concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the
defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case
either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem. 21 So it should
be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.

It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC.
No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was imploded therein. The Petition
for issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No.
92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein
seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.  26 the petitioners therein (private
respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fat of death of their father and subsequently to
be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise
their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent
with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court.
1âwphi1.nêt
Tabuada v. Ruiz, GR 168799, June 27, 2008

Facts:
The very simple issue raised for our resolution in this case surfaced when the parties in Sp. Proc.
No. 5198 (the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Jose and
Paciencia Calaliman) manifested to the RTC their desire to amicably settle the case. In light of
the said manifestation, the trial court issued the following Order 3 on December 6, 2004:

The RTC, however, on March 2, 2005, invoking Section 3,5 Rule 17, of the Rules of Court,
terminated the proceedings on account of the parties' failure to submit the amicable settlement
and to comply with the afore-quoted December 6, 2004 Order. The trial court, in the challenged
order of even date, likewise denied all the motions filed by the parties

Petitioner, the administratrix of the estate, and private respondents separately moved for the
reconsideration of the March 2, 2005 Order arguing, among others, that the termination of the
case was premature, there being yet no payment of the debts and distribution of the estate, and
that they had already prepared all the necessary papers for the amicable settlement. 7 Despite the
said pleas for reconsideration, the trial court remained firm in its position to terminate the
proceedings; hence, in the assailed May 20, 2005 Resolution, 8 it affirmed its earlier order.
Dissatisfied, petitioner scuttles to this Court via Rule 45.

Ruling:

The petition is granted.

While a compromise agreement or an amicable settlement is very strongly encouraged, the

failure to consummate one does not warrant any procedural sanction, much less provide an
authority for the court to jettison the case.10 Sp. Proc. No. 5198 should not have been terminated
or dismissed by the trial court on account of the mere failure of the parties to submit the promised
amicable settlement and/or the Motion for Judgment Based On An Amicable Settlement. Given
the non-contentious nature of special proceedings 11 (which do not depend on the will of an actor,
but on a state or condition of things or persons not entirely within the control of the parties
interested), its dismissal should be ordered only in the extreme case where the termination of the
proceeding is the sole remedy consistent with equity and justice, but not as a penalty for neglect
of the parties therein.12

The third clause of Section 3, Rule 17, which authorizes the motu propio dismissal of a case if
the plaintiff fails to comply with the rules or any order of the court,13 cannot even be used to justify
the convenient, though erroneous, termination of the proceedings herein. An examination of the
December 6, 2004 Order14 readily reveals that the trial court neither required the submission of
the amicable settlement or the aforesaid Motion for Judgment, nor warned the parties that should
they fail to submit the compromise within the given period, their case would be
dismissed.15 Hence, it cannot be categorized as an order requiring compliance to the extent that
its defiance becomes an affront to the court and the rules. And even if it were worded in coercive
language, the parties cannot be forced to comply, for, as aforesaid, they are only strongly
encouraged, but are not obligated, to consummate a compromise. An order requiring submission
of an amicable settlement does not find support in our jurisprudence and is premised on an
erroneous interpretation and application of the law and rules.
Lastly, the Court notes that inconsiderate dismissals neither constitute a panacea nor a solution
to the congestion of court dockets. While they lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to records of
individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the
absence of clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance,
trial on the merits, and final disposition of the cases before the court.
Hilado v. CA, GR 164108, May 8, 2009

Facts:

The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was
survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and
his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. 1 At the time of his death, there were two pending
civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was
then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner
Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then
pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and
First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein. 2

On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge
Amor A. Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be ₱5
Million, "net of liabilities."3 On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private
respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of
administration in her favor.4 In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the
Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased
husband.5 In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included as
among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated before the
Bacolod City courts.6 Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the
two cases as ₱136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and ₱35,198,697.40 for Civil Case
No. 11178.7 Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and
updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate. 8

On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex

Abundanti Cautela,9 praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders
pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion,
disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband.
Even before the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus
motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of
the required inventory of the decedent’s estate. 10 Petitioners also filed other pleadings or motions
with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of the
estate, and assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete
and inaccurate.

On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the
ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to
intervene in the intestate proceedings.11 After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in
general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto
Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.

On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision 12 dismissing the petition and
declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to
intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene,
according to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of
Appeals cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent
or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.
Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in denying
them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto.
Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on
intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings.

Ruling:

Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure
necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased
persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court, 18 not the Rules on
Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the absence of special provisions,
the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special
proceedings."

We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth
under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent
claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent
claims.

In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any
person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate
proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act
in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the
petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not
explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their
interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can
be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.

The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in
connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of
the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would
be duly alerted of the developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the
assets of the estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate
remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to
complain to the intestate court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently
conveyed.

At the same time, the fact that petitioners’ interests remain inchoate and contingent
counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate proceedings. We are mindful of
respondent’s submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes
and pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent
or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of
merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would mandate the service of all
court processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent
claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately
offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases.
The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on
intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter
in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court x x x" While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from
intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest
required of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply
contingent and expectant."
Garcia Fule v. CA, 74 SCRA 109 (1976)

Facts:

On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at
Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of administration,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G.
Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving
real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May
2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending
that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without
jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served
upon all persons interested in the estate.

On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1)
jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the
court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as
she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.

During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge
Malvar,   Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that
2

his residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia
presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months
before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that
Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he
was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.

On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action
for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge
Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the alternative,
to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying
their motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss the criminal
and supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the three
others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of certain properties to the special
administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.

Issue:
Ruling:

1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance
of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court,
in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With
particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised
Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the
existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the
necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the
existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and
the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or
otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence
within the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in
the administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant
of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction
is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration. 

2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to
the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down
the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed.   In the application of venue
7

statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
— residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses
the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."   In other words, "resides" should be
8

viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence
in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.   Residence simply
9

requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile.   No particular
10

length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary.
San Luis v. San Luis, February 6, 2007

Facts: