TABLE OF CONTENTS

 Introduction
 Provision
 Facts of the case
 Issues before the Hon’ble court
 Arguments
 Evaluating Literal and Mischief Rule of Interpretation in view of the Present Case
 Judgement given by Hon’ble court
 Suggestion
 Rule of interpretation
 References

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Case Name: Smith vs Huges 1960
 Citation ;1960 WRL 830
 Judges Name
I. Justice Lord Parker
II. Justice CJ, Hilbery
II. Justice Donovan JJ.

 Name of Petitioner: Marie Theresa Smith

 Name of Respondent: Huges
 Date of Judgement: 16th June 1960
 CHAPTER II
PROVISION
 Section 1 (1) of the Act of 1959 are in this form; “it shall be an offence for a common
prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution.
 CHAPTER III
FACTS OF THE CASE
The most important facts surrounding the present case were that the defendant was a common
prostitute who used to live at No. 39 Curzon Street, London and used the same premises for
the purposes of prostitution. On November 4, 1959, during the time interval of 8.50 p.m. and
9.05 p.m. the defendant solicited men happen to pass in the street, for the particular purposes
of prostitution, from a first-floor balcony of No. 39 Curzon Street and the balcony was about
some 8–10 feet above street level. The defendant enjoyed the interesting method of soliciting
the men by attracting their attention to her by giving a continuous tap on the balcony railing
with an attractive metal object and by making a hissing sound at them as they passed in the
street beneath her and having so attracted their attention sensually, to chit-chat with them and
ask them to drop in the premises with such words as ‘Would you like to come up here a little
while?’ at the same time as she indicated the correct door of the premises for the soul purpose
of prostitution. So the facts went like some prostitutes were prosecuted for soliciting on the
street. However, they had not actually been soliciting on the street. They had been situated
inside houses and were positioned at windows which overlooked the street. From there they
could contact men who were passing by on the street and made an attempt to solicit business
with them in this way. They were not actually present on the street. However, what they were
doing still essentially boiled down to the same thing. They were convicted of the offence of
soliciting under sexual offences legislation. 1

1
(1960) 1 WLR 830.
 CHAPTER IV
ISSUES BEFORE THE HON’BLE COURT
I. whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is standing in a doorway
or on a balcony, or at a window?
II. whether the window is shut or open or half open?
 CHAPTER V
ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

It was contended for the petitioner that the soliciting has been taken place in a street within
the meaning of the Act. The defendant used to solicit men passing from the street for the
purpose of the prostitution from the first floor from the balcony. The defendant soliciting
method of men was to attract their attention by tapping on the balcony, talk to men and invite
them to come inside. The street that this was an Act intended to clean up the streets, to enable
people to walk along the streets without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes.
The defendants in this case were not themselves physically in the street but were in a house
adjoining the street, on a balcony and she attracted the attention of men in the street by
tapping and calling down to them.

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT

It was contended that the defendant that the balcony the interior of the premises behind or
close half-closed window on the ground floor, and the interior of the building behind a
slightly open window on the first floor were not in a street within the meaning of section 1(1)
of the street offence Act, 1959. It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or
solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution. Observe that it does not say
there specifically that the person who is doing the soliciting must be in the street. They were
not in the street they were at the balcony of their house.
 CHAPTER VI
EVALUATING LITERAL AND MISCHIEF RULE OF
INTERPRETATION IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT CASE

Literal and mischief rule of statutory interpretation are both different from each other. In
literal rule while construing Statutes the cardinal rule is to construe its provisions literally and
grammatically giving the words their ordinary and natural meaning. This rule is also known
as the Plain meaning rule. The first and foremost step in the course of interpretation is to
examine the language and the literal meaning of the statute. The words in an enactment have
their own natural effect and the construction of an act depends on its wording. On the other
hand.2 In Mathew v. Dobbins, the plaintiffs were the owners of the house and the defendant
was the lessee of those premises. The defendant fell sufficiently into the arrears of rent and
consequently the plaintiffs sought to enforce their remedy under section 191 of the country
courts Act, 191 by filing a suit against the defendant for eviction.3
The mischief rule is a rule of statutory interpretation that attempts to determine the
legislator’s intention. Originating from a 16th-century case (Heydon’s case) in the United
Kingdom, its main aim is to determine the “mischief and defect” that the statute in question
has set out to remedy, and what ruling would effectively implement this remedy. When the
material words are capable of bearing two or more constructions the most firmly established
rule or construction of such words “of all statutes, in general, be they penal or beneficial,
restrictive or enlarging of the common law is the rule of Heydon’s case. she being a common
prostitute, did solicit in a street for the purpose of prostitution, contrary to section 1(1) of the
Street Offences Act, 1959. It was found that the defendant was a common prostitute, that she
had solicited and that the solicitation was in a street. The defendants in this case were not
themselves physically in the street but were in a house adjoining the street, on a balcony and
she attracted the attention of men in the street by tapping and calling down to them. At other
part the defendants were in ground-floor windows, either closed or half open. The words of
section 1(1) of the Act of 1959 are in this form: ‘It shall be an offence for a common
prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution.’
Observe that it does not say there specifically that the person who is doing the soliciting must
be in the street. Equally, it does not say that it is enough if the person who receives the
solicitation or to whom it is addressed is in the street. In the case at hand, if we use literal rule
of interpretation. Then prostitutes have committed no offence as they were not even present
in a street or public place. However, if we take into account the use of mischief rule of
interpretation then there exists an offence committed by the prostitutes under the street
offences Act, 1959.4
In Mobarak Ali v. State of Bombay, the supreme court held that ancient statutes must be
constructed according to modern needs. The court stated; “it is not necessary and indeed not
permissible to construe the Indian Penal Code at the present day in accordance with the
notions of criminal jurisprudence prevailing at the time when the code was enacted. The

2
A.B Kafatiya. “Interpretation of Statutes” ,Universal Law publishing (2017), 2 nd edition p18.
3
(1963) 1 WLR 1119;(1963) 1 ALL ER 417.
4
http;//www.e.lawresources.com
notions relating to a criminal matter may have very considerably changed between then and
now. It is legitimate to construe the Code with reference to the modern needs whenever this is
permissible, unless there is anything in the code or in any particular section to indicate the
contrary”. 5

5
AIR 1957 SC 857
 CHAPTER VII
JUDGEMENT GIVEN BY HON’BLE COURT
LORD PARKER CJ.

It was state that she “being a common prostitute, did solicit in a street for the purpose of
prostitution, contrary to section 1(1) of the street offences Act, 1959”. It was found that the
defendant was a common prostitute, that she had solicited and that the solicitation was in a
street. The defendants in this case were not themselves physically in the street but were in a
house adjoining the street, on a balcony and she attracted the attention of men in the street by
tapping and calling down to them. At other part the defendants were in ground floor
windows, either closed or half open. The sole question here is whether in those circumstances
each appellant was soliciting in a street or public place. The words of Section1(1) of the Act
are in this form: "It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street
or public place for the purpose of prostitution." Observe that it does not say there specifically
that the person who is doing the soliciting must be in the street. Equally it does not say that it
is enough if the person who receives the solicitation or to whom it is addressed is in the
street. The matter by considering what is the mischief aimed at by this Act. Everybody knows
that this was an Act intended to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets
without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes. Viewed in that way, it can matter
little whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is standing in a doorway or on a
balcony, or at a window, or whether the window is shut or open or half open; in each case her
solicitation is projected to and addressed to somebody walking in the street and that these
appeals should be dismissed.

HILBERY J.

The Cases Stated, as my Lord has said; in one case by tapping on the window pane with
some metal object as men passed by in the street in front of her, and then openly inviting
them into her room. In the other cases it was done by tapping on the windows of various
rooms occupied by these prostitutes and then, if the window was open, giving invitations by
way of solicitation or signals representing solicitation. In each case signals were intended to
solicit men passing by in the street. They did effect solicitation of the men when they reached
those men. At that moment the person in the street to whom the signal was addressed was
solicited and, being solicited in the street. She was held guilty of an offence against section 1
(1) of the street offense Act.6

CHAPTER VIII
6
StuDocu.com
 SUGGESTION
According to me, the best course of action in this case is taking into use the application of
mischief rule of interpretation of statutes. I approach the matter by considering what is the
mischief aimed at by this Act. Everybody knows that this was an Act intended to clean up the
streets, to enable people to walk along the streets without being molested or solicited by
common prostitutes. Viewed in that way, it can matter little whether the prostitute is
soliciting while in the street or is standing in a doorway or on a balcony, or at a window, or
whether the window is shut or open or half open; in each case her solicitation is projected to
and addressed to somebody walking in the street. I would suggest that the mischief rule fits
best here otherwise the justice will not be delivered. The Mischief Rule is a certain rule that
judges can apply in statutory interpretation in order to discover Parliament’s intention. The
application of this rule gives the judge more discretion than the literal and the golden rule as
it allows him to effectively decide on Parliament’s intent. Legislative intent is determined by
examining secondary sources, such as committee reports, treatises, law review articles and
corresponding statutes. This rule has often been used to resolve ambiguities in cases in which
the literal rule cannot be applied but associated problem is that the fact that this rule helps
achieve that the use of this rule is limited due to Parliamentary intent.
 CHAPTER IX
RULE OF INTERPRETATION
The Defendant were prostitutes who had been charged under the street offences Act 1959
which made it an offence to solicit in a public place. The prostitute was soliciting from
private premises in windows or on balconies so could be seen by the public.
The court applied the mischief rule of interpretation holding that the activities of the
defendant were within the mischief rule Act was aimed at even though under a literal
interpretation they would be in a private place. she was guilty of the offence of soliciting in a
street or public place. the court applied the Mischief rule, it could be seen that her
solicitations took place in a street or public place for the purpose of the Act.
 CHAPTER X
REFERENCES
PRIMARY SOURCE
Kafaltiya A B, “interpretation of statutes”, (universal law publishing, 2nd edition, 2017)
SECONDARY SOURCE
http;//www.lawresources.com. (Visited Date 06/07/22) (Time 20 PM)
StuDocu.com (visited Date 08/07/222) (Time 22 PM)