CRPC II Project
CRPC II Project
CRPC II Project
Project
CrPC - II
Submitted To Submitted
By
Assistant Professor Rajat Gupta
Ms. Divya Salim 2013 BA LLB
103
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to express my heart full gratitude to Assistant Professor Ms. Divya Salim for
giving me a great opportunity to work on this interesting topic and for her precious advice
which was always helpful to me throughout this work. I would also like to thank my friends
INTRODUCTION
Taking cognizance of offence is an essential stage in criminal proceedings. Taking
cognizance is sine qua non for trial and it means taking notice of the matter judicially with a
view to initiate prosecution preliminary to the commencement of proceedings. 1 A Magistrate
taking cognizance of an offence has to apply his mind to proceed for examination under
Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘Code’). 2 Section
190 provides that a Magistrate of First Class may take cognizance of an offence either upon
receiving complaint of facts which constitute offence, police report or suo motu upon
receiving information from a person other than a police officer. However, there are some
exceptions provided under Sections 195 – 199 where a Magistrate cannot take cognizance as
provided u/s 190. These provisions provides how cognizance has to be taken if the offence is
one relating to interference in administration of justice.
“The dignity and prestige of Courts of law must be upheld by their presiding officers, and it
would never do to leave it to parties aggrieved to achieve in one prosecution gratification of
personal revenge and vindication of Court’s honor and prestige. To allow this would be to
sacrifice deliberately the dispassionate and impartial calm of Tribunals and to allow a
Court’s prestige to be the sport of personal passion.”
The court has to exercise judicial discretion before initiating prosecution u/s 195 of the Code.
Every incorrect information does not make it incumbent upon the Court to order prosecution.
In a case4 a person was asked to produce a minor girl in his custody before the Madras High
Court. He produced a substituted girl identifying her and asserting her to be the same girl.
High Court acting u/s 195 of the Code, lodged a complaint against that person for giving false
evidence and misleading the High Court.
Another change which has been seen in Section 195 is that the words “by a party to any
proceeding in any Court” occurring in the Clause (c) of Section 195 of the old Code have
4
R. Rathinam v. Kamla Vaiduriam, 1993 Cr LJ 2661 (Mad).
5
M. S. Ahlawat v. State of Haryana, AIR 2000 SC 168.
6
Durgacharan Naik v. State of Orissa & ors, AIR 1966 SC 1775.
Page |3
been omitted in the present Code. Under the present Code the scope of Clause (b) (ii) would
not be restricted to offences committed by the parties to the Court proceedings. It was
observed by the Law Commission, “Witnesses need as much protection against vexatious
prosecutions as parties and the Court should have as much control over the acts of witnesses
that enter as a component of judicial proceedings, as over the acts of parties.”
The provision under the old Code raised several controversial questions such as what would
be the case if the offence is one of abetment and the offender is not party to the proceedings,
can private complaint be maintainable in that case. Many High Courts had taken contrary
view that in case of persons who are not parties to the proceedings and are alleged to have
abetted the commission of forgery by a party, a complaint by the Court is not necessary for
prosecuting them. Thus, to avoid this conflict, Law Commission proposed to enlarge the
scope of Section 195. It was observed by the Commission, “Taking an overall view of the
matter and keeping in mind the object of the Section, we consider that the scope of Clause (c)
should not be restricted to offences committed by the parties to the proceeding. The clause
should apply when any of the specified offences is alleged to have been committed by any
person in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in any proceeding.”
In case of contempt of lawful authority of any Public Servant, this section states that
complaint may be filed by the concerned Public Servant or by the Public Servant to whom he
is administratively subordinate. The word “subordinate” means inferior and bound to obey
lawful orders of his superior official. Although police officers in a district are generally
subordinate to the District Magistrate, the subordination contemplated by this section is not
such subordination rather it is subordination of some superior officer of police.
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BAR ON COGNIZANCE
Section 195 is an exception to the general principle regarding taking of cognizance of an
offence which is stated in Section 190 of the Code. The prohibition contained in the Section
195 does not squarely applies to the two categories of offences stated under Section 195. It
has to be seen in light of facts and circumstances of the case whether the bar u/s 195 would
be applicable or not.
In a case12, the Gujarat High Court quashed the complaint and inquiry initiated on the basis of
FIR and set aside the criminal proceedings stating that the cognizance of the case cannot be
taken pursuant to the bar u/s 195. The decision was set aside by the Apex Court stating that
High Court could not interfere and quash the proceedings by an elaborate discussion on the
7
Virendra Kumar Satyawad v. State of Punjab, (1955)2 SCR 1013.
8
Id.
9
Bhibhootibhooshan Adhikari v. Khemchand Chururia, (1934) 61 Cal 792.
10
Manju Gupta v. M. S. Paintal, 1982 CrLJ 817 (Del).
11
Iqbal Singh Narang v. Veeran Narang, AIR 2012 SC 466.
12
Manohar M. Galani v. Ashok N. Advani & Anr, AIR 2002 SC 202.
Page |5
merits of the matter and in coming to the conclusion that Section 195 of the Code will be a
bar. Thus, bar does not apply to investigation initiated on a complaint and comes into picture
only when the Court takes cognizance.
Section 211 of the Indian Penal Code punishes false charge of offence with intent to injure a
person. Section 211 r/w Section 195 of the Code states that if the offence mentioned under
Section 211 is committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any Court, then a private
complaint for that offence will be barred.
It was stated by the High Court that the proceedings u/s 156(3) of the Code were terminated
when the application was rejected. Thus, the offence of giving false information as mentioned
u/s 211, IPC was committed in relation to proceedings u/s 156(3) of the Code. This fulfills
the requirement of Section 195(1)(b) of the Code and thus private complaint for the offence
u/s 211 is barred.
At this stage, it would be relevant to consider the ruling of the Apex Court in the case of
M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur and Anr.14 In this case, a F.I.R. was lodged against Respondent
no. 1 charging him with commission of certain cognizable offence and during pendency of
investigation, he filed a complaint before a Judicial Magistrate against the Appellant for
commission of an offence under Section 211, I.P.C. On his complaint, the Magistrate took
cognizance. Subsequent to this cognizance the respondent no. 1 was arrested and charge-
sheeted by the police. The Apex Court had held that the question about legality of cognizance
is to be judged in relation to the date on which cognizance was actually taken and as on that
date, there was no proceeding pending in any Court in which or in relation to which offence
under Section 211, I.P.C. was alleged to have been committed and, therefore, the Magistrate
13
Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of U.P. and Anr., (2001) ILR 2 All 15.
14
M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur and Anr, 1967 Cr LJ 528.
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was not barred from taking cognizance of the offence on such a complaint by the provisions
of Section 195(1) (b), Cr. P.C.
Where the Court choses to file a complaint for any offence mentioned under Section 195(1)
(b), it has to follow the procedure laid down in the Section 340 of the Code. The Court may
act suo motu or on application made before it in writing, but it is not incumbent upon the
Court to hold a preliminary inquiry in every case before starting prosecution. The Courts
cannot direct police to register FIR and investigate an offence relating to a proceeding in the
Court as it would be gross illegality. 15 The only course open to the Court was to make an
enquiry into the offence, and if it was established, then make a complaint in writing to
Magistrate having jurisdiction.
Preliminary enquiry mentioned under this section is not mandatory in nature but regard has to
be given to interest of justice and in that light it has to be decided whether enquiry should be
made or not.
CASE LAWS
Babita Lila and Ors. V. Union of India16
RELEVANT FACTS
Appellants are husband and wife and are resident of both Bhopal and Aurangabad. A
search operation was carried out by the Income Tax authorities under the Income Tax
Act, 1961 at both the places.
It was found by the Income Tax Officer (assessing authority) that statements made by
appellants were false and misleading.
Consequently, the Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation) - I, Bhopal made a
complaint as prescribed by the Section 195(1)(b), before the Chief Judicial Magistrate
Bhopal.
The Trial Court took cognizance of the matter and initiated proceedings against
appellants under Sections 191, 193 and 200 of the Indian Penal Code.
15
Paras Ram v. State of Haryana, 1995 Cr LJ 1603 (P&H).
16
Babita Lila and Ors. V. Union of India, MANU/SC/0967/2016.
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Appellants moved the High Court for quashing of proceedings on the ground that the
Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation) was not appropriate authority to file
the complaint as it was not the appellate authority within the meaning of Section
195(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
ISSUE
Whether the Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation) was appropriate authority
within the meaning of Section 195(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
It is not disputed between the parties that the search operation did constitute a proceeding
under the Act before the Income Tax authority and therefore the same is deemed to be a
judicial proceeding within the meaning inter alia of Sections 193 and 196 Indian Penal Code
and that every income tax authority for the said purpose would be deemed to be a civil Court
for the purposes of Section 195.
52. “…the decisive and peremptory prescription of Section 195(4) of the Code is not merely
the levels of the rank inter se but the recognized appellate jurisdiction ordinarily exercised
by the authority or the forum concerned for a complaint to be validly lodged by it, if in a
given fact situation, the initiation of prosecution is sought to be occasioned not by the court
Page |8
in the proceedings before which the contemplated offence(s) had been committed, but by a
court to which ordinarily appeals therefrom would lie.”
It was further observed by the Supreme Court that the word ‘ordinarily’ as used in Section
195(4) denote developments which are likely to occur, exist or ensue in the regular or normal
course of events as logically and rationally anticipated even though not set out or expressed
in categorical terms. This is a compendious expression to encompass all events reasonably
expected to occur in the usual and common course of occurrences and are expected to so
happen unless prohibited, prevented or directed by some express and unexpected
interventions to the contrary.
The Income Tax Act does not specifically states that the Deputy Director of Income Tax is
the appropriate authority to which appeals would lie from the orders of the assessing
authority. In the teeth of such mindful and unequivocal module of the Act, recognition of the
Deputy Director of Income Tax to be a forum to whom an appeal would ordinarily lie from
any decision or action of the assessing officer/income tax officer would not only be
inferential but would also amount to unwarranted judicial legislation by extrinsic additions
and doing violence to the language of the law framed. Conferment of appellate jurisdiction on
the Deputy Commissioner of Appeals from the orders/decisions of the assessing officers as is
apparent from Section 246 of the Act, has to be construed as a conscious statutory mandate.
The present is thus not a case where this Court can premise that the statute suffers from casus
omissus so as to recognise the Deputy Director of Income Tax as such an appellate forum.
“67. The Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation)-I Bhopal, (M.P.), in our unhesitant
opinion, therefore cannot be construed to be an authority to whom appeal would ordinarily
lie from the decisions/orders of the I.T.O’s. involved in the search proceedings in the case in
hand so as to empower him to lodge the complaint in view of the restrictive preconditions
imposed by Section 195 of the Code.”
In the result, the impugned order of the High Court was set aside as the complaint was
unconstitutional in law having been filed by inappropriate authority, incompetent in terms of
Section 195 of the Code.
17
Rit Lal Khatway v. State of Bihar, 2007 CriLJ 593 (Pat).
Page |9
RELEVANT FACTS
Appellant had filed a written report before the Dy. S. P alleging abduction of his
daughter-in-law and also theft of some household articles against ten persons.
He had also filed a protest-cum-complaint petition before the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate which was found to be false after the inquiry conducted by the CJM.
Complaint petition was dismissed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and he
filed a complaint petition against the appellant for having committed the offence
under the Sections 182, 193 and 211 of the Indian Penal Code.
The said Complaint was filed by the CJM in his own Court.
The appellant was convicted under Sections193, 211 and 182 or the Penal Code.
ISSUE
Does the law permit that complaint can be made by the CJM in his own Court?
How a complaint has to be filed by a Court acting under Section 195?
OBSERVATIONS
CJM has not addressed the Complaint to any Magistrate. It was initially filed in his own court
and was sent to SDJM for taking cognizance and initiating proceedings. For the purpose of
Section 195, ‘complaint has to be given same meaning as given under Section 2(d) of the
Code. On the question of complaint by CJM to his own Court, the Patna High Court stated:
“7. The judicial discipline required that if the Chief Judicial Magistrate himself was the
complainant he should not have lodged the complaint petition in his own court. As a matter
of fact this complaint petition should have been lodged by some other court to which the
court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate was subordinate since the complaint petition to begin
with has to be lodged in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate. This has not been done.”
Another defect which was observed by the High Court is that the CJM has made a Complaint
under Section 182 of the IPC which according to Section 195(1)(a)(i) has to be filed by the
Public Servant concerned or by some other Public Servant to which he is administratively
subordinate.
P a g e | 10
On the second issue the Court stated that it is well settled that a complaint under Section 195
of the Code must be a regular formal complaint in writing the procedure for which has been
given in Section 340 of the Code. If no proper complaint has been filed the conviction will
have to be set aside. It is well settled that a regular complaint petition as required by law
should be filed under Section 195 of the Code. A Court has judicial discretion to file
complaint but that judicial discretion has to be exercised keeping in mind all the relevant
circumstances. Court must be satisfied that there is prima case of deliberate falsehood on a
matter of substance and there is reasonable foundation for the charge and also it is expedient
in the interest of justice to file a complaint.
“10. From this it would appear that before lodging a complaint as provided by Section 340
of the Code, the court has to record a finding of any (i) prima facie case and deliberate
falsehood on a matter of substance (ii) there is reasonable foundation for the charge and (iii)
it is expedient in the interest of justice that a complaint should be filed.”
The High Court set aside the Conviction of the Appellant under Section 193, 182 and 211 on
above-mentioned grounds. Appellant was thus acquitted.
RELEVANT FACTS
Appellant no. 1 & 2 were real brothers of one Mukhtar Singh and the Respondent no.
1 & 2 are his widow and son respectively.
Appellants had filed a probate petition against the will allegedly executed by the
Mukhtar Singh Marwah.
Said petition was contested by the respondents on the ground that the appellants have
forged the will. Pursuant to this, the appellant no. 1 filed the original will in the Court.
Respondents moved an application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. requesting the Court to
file a criminal complaint against appellant no.1 as the will set up by him was forged.
Before the said application under Section 340 could be disposed, the respondents filed
criminal complaint against appellants under Sections 192, 193, 463, 464, 465, 467,
469, 471, 499 and 500 IPC on the ground that the will of Mukhtar Singh Marwah set
up by the appellants is a forged and fictitious document.
18
Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Minakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370.
P a g e | 11
The said complaint was dismissed by the Metropolitan Magistrate stating that Court
could not take cognizance of the said offence in view of bar laid under Section 195(1)
(b). The decision was reversed in the revision and the High Court also upheld the
view taken by the Additional Sessions Judge in revision.
Hence, the appellants filed the present Special Leave to Appeal.
ISSUE
The principle question is of interpretation of the expression “when such offence is
alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in
evidence in a proceeding in any Court” occurring in clause (b)(ii) of sub-section (1) of
Section 195 Cr.P.C.
OBSERVATIONS
Section 195(1)(b)(ii) is capable of two interpretations. One is when the alleged offence under
this section is alleged to be committed in relation to a document which is subsequently
produced or is given in a proceeding in any Court, a complaint by the Court would be
necessary. The other possible interpretation is that once the document has been produced or
given in evidence, thereafter an offence as described is committed in respect thereof, a
complaint by the Court would be necessary.
The Supreme Court noted that if the first interpretation is given to Section 195(1)(b)(ii), it
may be subjected to misuse. As observed by the Supreme Court:
“20. …after preparing a forged document or committing an act of forgery, a person may
manage to get a proceeding instituted in any civil, criminal or revenue court, either by
himself or through someone set up by him and simply file the document in the said
proceeding. He would thus be protected from prosecution, either at the instance of a private
P a g e | 12
party or the police until the Court, where the document has been filed, itself chooses to file a
complaint. The litigation may be a prolonged one due to which the actual trial of such a
person may be delayed
“23. That apart, the section which we are required to interpret is not a penal provision but is
part of a procedural law which elaborately gives the procedure for trial of criminal cases.
The provision only creates a bar against taking cognizance of an offence in certain specified
situations except upon complaint by Court. A penal statute is one upon which an action for
penalties can be brought by a public officer or by a person aggrieved…The principle that a
penal statute should be strictly construed, as projected by the learned counsel for the
appellants can, therefore, have no application here.”
In the present case, the will had been produced subsequently. It was nobody’s case that any
offence as enumerated in Section 195(b)(ii) was committed in respect to the said will after it
had been produced or filed in the Court of District Judge. Therefore, the bar created by
Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. would not come into play and there is no embargo on the power
of the Court to take cognizance of the offence on the basis of the complaint filed by the
respondents.
RELEVANT FACTS
Present case is brought before the High Court by way of Writ Petition.
Respondent no. 3 produced a will before the Registrar for its registration. He also
produced a letter which is said to have been issued by the consulate at Jeddah in Saudi
Arabia.
Petitioner alleged said letter to be forged and thus filed an application under Section
340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Registrar for taking appropriate
action.
19
Masood Pravej v. State of U.P. and ors, MANU/UP/1065/2016.
P a g e | 13
ISSUE
CrPC Section 340 - (1) When, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any
Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be
made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub- section (1) of Section 195, which
appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case
may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court,
such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary-
(a) …
(2), (3) …
(4) In this section, “Court” has the same meaning as in section 195.
Section 195 (3) - In Clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term “Court” means a Civil, Revenue
or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or
State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section.
High Court considered the meaning of the word ‘Court’ under Section 195 with reference to
the meaning given to the term under to old Code of 1898. The material difference lies in the
words used in both the Codes. Whereas, the old Code uses the word ‘include’, the new Code
uses the word ‘mean’. Court has interpreted both these terms differently as they have
different meanings. Court observed that the word ‘mean’ gives hard and fast definition and
no other meaning can be attached to it except what is provided. It is an exhaustive definition.
P a g e | 14
However, the word ‘include’ is generally used to enlarge the meaning of the words and
phrases occurring in the statute.
“24. … The Supreme Court highlighted the difference between the definitions of ‘court’
under
sub-section (2) of Section 195 of 1898 Cr.P.C. and the definition of ‘court’ under sub-section
(3) of Section 195 of 1973 Cr.P.C. and pointed out that the term ‘court’ had a wider meaning
under the old Code but the new Code has given it a restricted meaning. The word ‘court’ in
Section 195 of the new code does not include all the judicial bodies constituted for
administration of justice and that the ‘courts’ contemplated under Section 195 (3) of the new
code are only Civil Courts, Revenue Courts and Criminal Courts and those Tribunal which
are required by Acts constituting them to be Courts for the purpose of Section 195.”
The High Court also cited observation made by the law Commission in its 41 st report
whereby it said that specific exclusion of Registrars and Sub-Registrars is unnecessary, as
they cannot be regarded as Civil Courts for the purposes of Section 195.
The decision of Keshab Narayan Banerjee and others v. State of Bihar20 was brought before
the Court for determining the above stated issue. There the question was whether a
Compensation Officer appointed could be said to be a “Court”. The Court noticed that though
the Compensation Officer possesses certain powers which a Civil Court possesses under the
Code of Civil Procedure, but he does not possess all the attributes of a Civil Court. The
amount of compensation is to be determined by finding out the rent and then making certain
additions, subtractions and multiplications as provided in the concerned Act, but he cannot
determine the question of title or rights of the rival claimants except for the purposes of
determining who should be paid compensation. The Compensation Officer was not held to be
‘Court’ for the purpose of Section 195.
The Court finally held that though the Chapter XIV of the Registration Act, 1908 provides
Registrar to impose penalties, still it cannot be treated as ‘Court’ under Section 195(3) of the
Code. The definition of ‘Court’ under sub-section (3) of Section 195 of 1973 Cr.P.C. is an
exhaustive definition and does not admit of any enlargement. Thus, the Petition was
dismissed.
20
Keshab Narayan Banerjee and others v. State of Bihar, (2000) 1 SCC 607
P a g e | 15
CONCLUSION
From the above study, it is concluded that before analyzing whether bar under Section 195
would operate or not, careful regard has to be given to the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. It has to be decided keeping in mind the object of the provision i.e. to prevent
vengeance on part of the private persons. Further, it can be said that sanction of the Court is
required in only those cases which cause misadministration in justice. Thus, even if an
offence has been committed in a proceeding in any Court, it would not come within the
purview of this section until it falls under any of the three categories mentioned under this
section.
P a g e | 16
BIBLIOGRAPHY
N. D. Basu, Commentary on CrPC, 10th Edn, vol. 1, Ashoka Law House, New Delhi.
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Code of Criminal Procedure, 21st Edn., Lexis Nexis (2014).
41st Law Commission Report, vol.1, 1969.
https://indiankanoon.org/.
http://www.manupatrafast.in/pers/Personalized.aspx.