LINGUISTIC CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION

(MAXIMS, RULES OF LANGUAGE, CANONS OF INTERPRETATION)

J.Bell and G.Engle- Cross-Statutory Interpretation. (p.132)

“it is hardly correct to speak of maxims as rules of language for they simply refer to the way
in which people speak in certain contexts. They are no more than rough guides to the
intention of the speaker.”

Randal Graham
“Maxims are handy interpretative guidelines ...............which helps to understand the patterns
of language found in legislative text”

 Why maxims are there?

- To throw light on meaning generally- not just in a legal context
o Husband asking a wife to buy a phone
o Husband asking a wife to buy a phone, laptop, ipod and anything else she
needs
o Husband asking a wife to
- Not confined to statues or law but based on the rules of logic, grammar syntax,
punctuation etc.
- These are used to arrive at the literal meaning of an enactment.
- Rough guide as to the intention of the speaker or writer.
-

Maxims

 Ejusdem generis (of the same kinds, class, or nature)

 Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the express mention of one thing excludes all
others)
 Noscitur a sociis (the meaning of a word may be known from accompanying words)
 Ut res magis valeat quam pereat (that the thing may rather have effect than be
destroyed)
 Generalia specialibus non derogant (the general does not detract from the specific)
1) Ejusdem generis (of the same kind, class, or nature)

“A fuller statement of the ejusdem generic doctrine is found in the decisions, namely that
where general words are found, following an enumeration of persons, things all
susceptible of being regarded as specimens of a single genus or category, but not
exhaustive thereof, their construction should be restricted to things of that class or
category, unless it is reasonably clear from the context or the general scope and purview
of the Act that Parliament intended that they should be given a broader sense.”
E. A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, Butterworths, Toronto, (2nd Ed.) 1983.p.116

Bindra, Interpretation of Statues (9th edition)

(a) the statute enumerates the specific words;
(b) the subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category ;
(c) that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration;
(d) the general terms following the enumeration; and
(e) there is no indication of a different legislative intent."

 Where a specific enumeration of words (people or things) is followed by more general

words, the meaning of the general words is restricted to the same kind or class as
those specifically mentioned in the list.
o ‘Any person who brings into the country a tree, pen, motorcar or any other
object needs an import permit’.
The underlined words are general words and must according to the literal rule
receive a general meaning. ‘Any other object’ means just that – any object at
all. It follows that if one wants to bring into the country a radio or a kettle, one
will need an import permit.

o ‘Any person who brings into the country an ostrich, turkey, duck, chicken,
pigeon or any other bird, needs an import permit’.
The words ‘any other bird’ are the general words. But, the list of items forms a
category/class/genus as they are all edible birds. The list forms a category and,
because a specific category is present, the general words now ‘take on the
colour’ of the list of items preceding them. Thus, in this case, the phrase ‘any
other birds’ refers only to edible birds. If you want to import a parrot, canary
or hawk, you will not need an import permit as these birds are not eaten by
man. If you want to import a pheasant though, you will need a permit as a
pheasant is an edible bird.

o automobiles, trucks, tractors, motorcycles and other motor-powered vehicles

"vehicles" would not include airplanes, since the list was of land-based
transportation

o “wages and other benefits” -whether compensation falls within this definition-
Eksath Kamkaru Samithiya v. Commissionerr of Labour (2001) 2 Sri LR 137

 Words having literally wide meaning if taken isolation (eg: ‘other’, ‘any case”) are
treated as reduced in scope.
  To apply this rule there must be a reasonable/sufficient indication of a category that
can be described as class or genus.
 Clearer the language is lesser likelihood of applying the maxim.
 Devernish- this is a contextual device that can be employed to restrict the meaning of
general words by reference to specific words in their immediate vicinity.
 Whether a general word precedes, appear in the middle of or follows specific words
the maxim can be applied. (S v. Nolte 1928 AD 377 decided otherwise but Devernish
believes such a conclusion is irrelevant)
 The application of the rule is limited by the basic duty of the court to give effect to the
purpose of the statutory provision.
o Skinner v Shew [1893] 1 Ch 413
o Deversnish- p.70
 The maxim must be applied only to give effect to the unequivocal
object or purpose of the statute when there is no doubt about the
intention of the legislature

Why it is necessary to have this maxim?

 Saves the legislature from having to spell out in advance every contingency to which
the statute could apply.
 If the general words are to be given their ordinary meaning the specific enumeration
would be pointless.
 Avoid the possibility of missing out something.
 Harmonize specific words and general words.

United Kingdom

Re Stockport Ragged, Industrial and Reformatory Schools [1898] 2 Ch 687

- Charitable Trusts Act 1853
- Proviso to S.62- 'cathedral, collegiate, chapter or other schools’ did not require the
consent of the Charity Commissioners to enter in to a mortgage.
- Whether it was necessary to obtain the consent of the Charity Commissioners to a
mortgage of to be obtained by an Industrial School.
- All types of schools explicitly listed had association with the Christian Religion and
specifically of the Church of England and this is the specific class which will be
applicable to the words ‘other schools’. To fall within this class the school must have
a link with the Church of England.
Powell v. Kempton Park Racecourse Co. [1899] AC 143

 Betting Act 1853

 Section 1 of the Act prohibited the keeping of a 'house, office, room or other place'
for the purpose of betting,
 Whether this applied to Tattersall's Ring, which was an outdoor area at the racecourse.
 The court said it did not, as the specific places were all indoors. However, if the
words 'other place' had been followed by a word like 'wheresoever' or 'whatsoever',
the rule would not apply. The rule is really a presumption, which can be displaced by
a contrary intention shown in the legislation. In the example given, adding the words
'wheresoever' or 'whatsoever' would show that the words 'other place' should not be
limited to places which were indoors.
Quazi v. Quazi [1980] AC 744
 Recognition of Foreign Divorces and Legal Separations Act of 1971
 Sec.2 -Recognition to be given to foreign divorces and legal separations obtained by
means of “judicial or other proceedings”
 A husband married in UK went to Pakistan and obtained a “thalak divorce”, which is
necessarily a religious ceremony.
 Lord Scarman
“If the legislative purpose of a statute is such that a statutory series should be read
ejusdem generis, so be it; the rule is helpful. But, if it is not, the rule is more likely to
defeat than to fulfil the purpose of the statute. The rule, like many other rules of
statutory interpretation, is a useful servant but a bad master.”

South Africa
S v. Buthelezi 1979 (3) SA 1349 (N)
 A statute referred to "any place of entertainment, café, eating-house, race course or
other premises or place to which the public are granted or have access”.
 The general phrase "or other premises or place to which the public are granted or have
access” was held not to refer to a court or police station.

*Sacks v. City Council of Johannesburg 1931 TPD 443

 In this case the traffic by-law provided that “no person shall sit or lie down on any
street nor shall any person stand, congregate, loiter or walk or otherwise act in such a
manner as to obstruct free traffic.” The obstruction was caused by a crowd gathered to
listen to the accused who was speaking during industrial dispute from a car in a public
street.
 The accused himself had not obstructed anything. The words “otherwise act in such a
manner as to obstruct traffic” were restricted to the same character and it was held
that they refer to obstruction by direct physical act.
 Judicial sympathy towards liberal values like freedom of assembly.
S v. Sayed 1962 (2) SA 128 (C)
 A Statute prohibited the obstruction of free passage along a public street ‘by means
of any wagon , cart or other thing whatsoever’
 Court refused to apply the maxim and held that the boxes of vegetables kept in the
middle of the street were an obstruction intended to be covered by the statue.

United States
U.S. v. Alpers , 338 U.S. 680
 Section 245 of the Criminal Code
 This section forbids the interstate shipment of any obscene "book, pamphlet, picture,
motion-picture film, paper, letter, writing, print, or other matter of indecent
character.”
 Mr. Alpers was charged with selling obscene phonograph records. He admitted he
was selling the records and admitted that they were obscene, but argued that the
records did not fall under “other matters” in the legislation, which prohibited
interstate shipment of any obscene “book, pamphlet, picture, motion picture film,
paper, letter, writing, print, or other matter of indecent character”.
  Obscene pornographic records comprehended by the sense of hearing.
 The rule of ejusdem generis may not be applied when to do so would defeat the
obvious purpose of the legislation.

India
K.K. Kochuni v. State of Madras and Kerala, [AIR 1960 SC 1080]

Amar Chandra Chakraborty v. The Collector of Excise, Govt. of Tripura, Agartala and
others, AIR 1972 SC 1863, p.1868
Justice Dua,

“…The ejusdem generis rule strives to reconcile the incompatibility between specific
and general words. This doctrine applies when (i) the statute contains an enumeration
of specific words; (ii) the subjects of the enumeration constitute a class or category;
(iii) that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration; (iv) the general term
follows the enumeration; and (v) there is no indication of a different legislative
intent.”

Sri Lanka
 Eksath Kamkaru Samithiya v. Commissioner of Labour 2001 (2) Sri LR 137
 Rahulan v. AG 2006 (3) Sri LR 253
Section 2 (1) (h) is as follows: Any person who - by words either spoken or intended to be
read or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise causes or intends to cause
commission of acts of violence or religious, racial or .communal disharmony or feeling
of ill will or hostility between different communities or racial or religious groups

 Shiyam v. O.I.C Narcotics Bureau and Others 2006 2 Sri. LR 156

Bail Act s.3(1)
-says it applies to all acts except: PTA; PSO regulations and any other written law
which makes express provision for bail. The argument was that these two laws come
under the category of security. The argument was that the exception to the Bail Act in
s 3(1) only applied to Acts which were on security.

Issue was, here there were two genuses. One is security. Other is express provision for
bail. One is narrow, other is broad. Which one do you choose?
-PTA, PSO – are related to security. Both make explicit provision with respect to
Bail. Which one do you choose? argument that any other written law means laws that
are related to security. Therefore, this applies to Poisons, Opium and Dangerous
Drugs Act. So, Bail prevails over it.
-other side said, this is general. It is not limited to security related legislature. So
Posions, Opium, Dangerous Drugs also comes under it.

 Can a single species followed by a general word create a genus?

o General understand it that it is not possible
 Alexander v. Tredgar Iron & Coal Co.Ltd [1944] KB 390
 S v. Makandigona 1981 (4) SA 439
o But,
 Quazi v. Quazi [1980] AC 744 -“judicial or other proceedings
  Parkes v. Secretary of State for the Environment [1979] 1 All ER
211-‘building or other operations’

2) Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the express mention of one thing excludes all
others)

 This means the express mention of one thing excludes all others.
o If a statute stated it applies to lions and tigers (without stating and other) it
would only apply to lions and tigers and not leopards and cheetahs.
o If a statute stated ‘No lorries or buses may use this road.’ This excludes cars,
pick-up vans, bicycles, motorbikes, etc.

 Though statutory provisions contain list of specific words , such words are not
accompanied by general terms.
 Allowance must be made for the fact that “exclusio” may have been accidental.

 But the court will not apply the expessio unius rule in instances where the use of the
rule will lead to injustice, or lead to an absurd result

R v Inhabitants of Sedgely (1831) 2 B & Ad 65

A statute raised taxes on ‘lands, houses and coalmines’. The court held that it did not apply to
limestone mines as these were not specifically mentioned nor did the statute suggest that it
would apply to other types of mines.

Dimbleby & Sons Ltd v. NUJ [1984] 1 All ER 751

 Employment Act 1980
 Section 17(3) and (4)
 “immunity given to “associated employee”
 Maxim was applied

Dean v. Wiesengrund [1955] 2 W.L.R

 Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920
 Section 14-excesss rent paid should be recoverable by the tenant from the landlord or
his personal representative. Statue did not provide for the personal representative of
the tenant.
 After the death of the tenant of a rent-controlled flat, who had paid to the defendant
landlord as rent a sum in excess’ of his standard rent, her executor claimed to recover
that excess rent from the landlord.
 His action was dismissed by the county court judge on the ground that the Increase of
Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920, S. 14 (1), while giving the tenant
a right to recover the excess rent from the landlord or his legal personal
representative, restricted that right to the tenant by whom the excess had been paid,
and that, therefore, the right was destroyed by the death of the tenant.
 It was held by the court of Appeal that the statute conferred on a tenant a right which
prima facie would on his death pass to his personal representative unless there was in
the statute words which clearly indicated that the right was not so to pass; and that the
 wording of Section 14 (1) was not sufficient to deprive the tenant’s estate of an asset
given to the tenant by a statute.

Maithripala Senanayake v. Mahindasoma 1998 2 Sri LR 333

Maseehudeen v. Returning Officer and Others 2002 2 Sri LR 189
Merchant Bank of Sri Lanka Limited v. Francisge Dona Violet Perera and others
S.C.Appeal No.81/2010, SC minutes 15th February 2012

3) Noscitur a sociis (the meaning of a word may be known from accompanying words)

 Where two or more words are associated together, they should take their meaning
from one another.
 This rule is more colloquially known as “birds of a feather flock together”.
 A thing known by its associates.
 When general words are juxtaposed with specific words, general words cannot be
read in isolation. Their colour and their contents are to be derived from their context.
Words can be used in either in the same sentence or within the same Act read as a
whole.
 Word to be construed according to its surrounding.
 The surrounding or the context can also prevent the words being coloured by their
associates
o Letang v. Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232

Bourne v, Norwich Crematorium Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 691

 Income Tax Act of 1952
 Section 271 (1)(c) -An industrial building is a one which is “use for the purpose of a
trade which consists in the manufacture of goods or services or materials or the
subjection of goods or materials to any process”
 Crematorium- Is it an industrial building?
 ‘Materials’ was associated with ‘goods’ that were to be sold and used in
manufacturing and the consumption by fire of the moral remains of homo sapiens is
not the subjection of goods/ materials to a process within the definition of industrial
building.
 Stamp J
“English words derive colour from those which surround them. Sentences are not
merely collections of words to be taken out of the sentence, defined separately by
reference to the dictionary or decided cases and then put back into the sentence with
the meaning which you have assigned to them as separate words.”

Pengelly v. Bell Punch Co. Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 1055

 The Factories Act 1961,
 'Floors, steps, stairs, passageways and gangways' had to be kept free from obstruction.
  The court had to decide whether a floor used for storage came under the above section
 The court held that as all the other words were used to indicate passage, a floor used
exclusively for storage did not fall within the Act.

Bromley London Borough Council v. Greater London Council [1983] 1 AC 768

 Transport (London) Act 1969
 Section 1(1) The general duty of the G.L.C is to develop and encourage measures
which will promote the provision of “integrated, efficient and economic transport
facilities and services for Greater London."
 The Council of the London Borough of Bromley challenges the lawfulness of a
decision by the Greater London Council to lower fares on London transport by an
overall 25%.
 Whether such decision is falling within the word “economic’?
 Lord Scarman
“As a matter of English usage, the term " economic " (as also the noun " economy ")
has several meanings. They include both that for which the appellants contend and
that for which Bromley contends. It is a very useful word:—chameleon-like, taking its
colour from its surroundings”.
 Therefore, it was decided that the ‘word’ economic meant ‘being run on business
principles’.

R v. Greenland 1962 (1) SA51 (SR)

 ‘recklessly or negligently’

Rv. Charles and another 1966 (4) SA 682 (R)

 ‘copper section’

Lanka Multi Moulds (Pvt) Ltd v. Wimalasena, Commissioner of Labour and others
(2003) 1 Sri LR. 143

Don Albert v. Municipal Revenue Director 65 NLR

Gunapala v. Wilson De Silva 71 NLR 233

4. Rule of Rank

 This is a particular application of the maxim ‘noscitur a sociis.’

 It is applied where a string of items of a certain level is followed by general words.
Then it is presumed that the general words are not intended to include items of a
higher rank.
 A statute which treats things or persons of an inferior rank cannot by any general
words be extended to those of a superior.

Gregory v Fearn (1953) I WLR 974

The string of “tradesman, artificer, workman, labourer and other person whatsoever” was
held not to include persons above artisan class.
Casher v Holmes (1831) 2B & Ad 592
The string of “copper, brass and tin and all other metals” was not taken to include precious
metals such as gold and silver.

5. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat (that the thing may rather have effect than be
destroyed).

 A court need to presume that the legislature put every provision in a statute for a
purpose, and to construe the statute to give effect to each provision of the statute.

Whitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1925) 10 T.C. 88, 110

 Lord Dunedin
" A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court should
be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end
unattainable. "

Curtis v. Stovin, (1889) 22 Q.B. 513

W.R Wickramasinghe v. AG CA (PHC) APN: 39/2009

Umbichy Ltd. V. HEDE Navigation (Pte) Ltd. 2000 2 Sri LR 15

Sriyani Silva v Iddamalgoda

Article 13(4) – “death or” – exclude it, or not.

6. Generalia specialibus non derogant (the general does not detract from the specific)

 A general act is not to be construed to repeal a previous particular act, unless there is
some express reference to the previous legislation on the subject, or unless there is a
necessary inconsistency in the two acts standing together.
 The reason is that the legislature having had its attention directed to a special subject,
and having observed all the circumstances of the case and provided for them, does not
intend by a general enactment afterwards to derogate from its own act when it makes
no special mention of its intention so to do.
 "If the legislature makes a special act dealing with a particular case and later makes a
general act, which by its terms -would. include the subject of the special, act and is in
conflict with the special act; nevertheless unless it is clear that in making the general
act the legislature has had the special act in mind and has intended to abrogate it; the
provisions of, the general act do not override the special act", Bindra-interpretation of
Statutes, 7th Ed. 149

Abeykoon and another v. National Savings Bank 1999 3 Sri LR 144

Eksith Fernando v. Manawadu and others 2000 1 Sri LR 78

Ghouse v.Grouse 1986 1 Sri LR 48

The Muslim law postulates consanguinity to qualify oneself for intestate succession. The,
Adoption of Children Ordinance being a general law does not abrogate the special law set out
in the Muslim Intestate Succession Ordinance which prescribes that intestate succession to
any deceased Muslim domiciled in Sri Lanka or owning immovable property in Sri Lanka
shall be governed by the Muslim Law applicable to the sect to which the deceased Muslim
belonged. The maxim generalia specialibus non derogant applies and the claim of an adopted
child to succeed. to the estate of his adoptive Muslim parent fails as the Muslim law does not
recognise adoption, but only birth in` lawful wedlock for intestate succession