98. G.R. No.

147437               May 8, 2009

LARRY V. CAMINOS, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

The case is rooted on a vehicular collision that happened on the night of 21 June 1988 at the intersection of Ortigas
Avenue and Columbia Street in Mandaluyong City, right in front of Gate 6 of East Greenhills Subdivision. The
vehicles involved were a Mitsubishi Super Saloon driven by petitioner and a Volkswagen Karmann Ghia driven by
Arnold Litonjua (Arnold). 

Arnold, who had earlier passed by Wack Wack Subdivision, was traversing Ortigas Avenue toward the direction of
Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue. He prepared to make a left turn as he reached the intersection of Ortigas Avenue
and Columbia Street, and as soon as he had maneuvered the turn through the break in the traffic island the
Mitsubishi car driven by petitioner suddenly came ramming into his car from his right-hand side. Petitioner, who was
also traversing Ortigas Avenue, was headed towards the direction of San Juan and he approached the same
intersection from the opposite direction.

The force exerted by petitioner’s car heaved Arnold’s car several feet away from the break in the island, sent it
turning 180 degrees until it finally settled on the outer lane of Ortigas Avenue. It appears that it was the fender on
the left-hand side of petitioner’s car that made contact with Arnold’s car, and that the impact—which entered from
the right-hand side of Arnold’s car to the left—was established on the frontal center of the latter vehicle which thus
caused the left-hand side of its hood to curl upward.

Arnold’s testimony established that his vehicle was at a full stop at the intersection when the incident happened.  He
executed a sketch which showed that his car had not yet invaded the portion of the road beyond the median line of
the island and that the path taken by petitioner’s car, depicted by broken lines, came swerving from the outer lane of
the road to the left and rushing toward the island where Arnold’s car was executing a turn.

Petitioner in an effort to exonerate himself from liability, he imputed negligence to Arnold as the cause of the
mishap, claiming that that he, moments before the collision, was actually carefully traversing Ortigas Avenue on
second gear. He lamented that it was Arnold’s car which bumped his car and not the other way around and that he
had not seen Arnold’s car coming from the left side of the intersection—which seems to suggest that Arnold’s car
was in fact in motion or in the process of making the turn when the collision occurred. His speed at the time,
according to his own estimate, was between 25 and 30 kph because he had just passed by the stoplight located
approximately 100 meters away at the junction of Ortigas Avenue and EDSA, and that he even slowed down as he
approached the intersection.

ISSUE:

WON the offended party’s own negligence was the principal determining factor that caused the mishap?

HELD:

NO.

The Court denies the petition.

Reckless imprudence generally defined by our penal law consists in voluntarily but without malice, doing or failing to
do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

Imprudence connotes a deficiency of action. It implies a failure in precaution or a failure to take the necessary
precaution once the danger or peril becomes foreseen. Thus, something more than mere negligence in the
operation of a motor vehicle is necessary to constitute the offense of reckless driving, and a willful and wanton
disregard of the consequences is required. Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within the
meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which injures
another, either with knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge of facts which would disclose
the danger to any reasonable person

 Hence, in prosecutions for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, whether or not one of the drivers
of the colliding automobiles is guilty of the offense is a question that lies in the manner and circumstances of the
operation of the motor vehicle, and a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt requires the concurrence of the
following elements, namely, (a) that the offender has done or failed to do an act; (b) that the act is voluntary; (c) that
the same is without malice; (d) that material damage results; and (e) that there has been inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the offender.

Among the elements constitutive of the offense, what perhaps is most central to a finding of guilt is the conclusive
determination that the accused has exhibited, by his voluntary act without malice, an inexcusable lack of precaution
because it is that which supplies the criminal intent so indispensable as to bring an act of mere negligence and
imprudence under the operation of the penal law.
We proceed from petitioner’s contention that at the time the collision took place, he was carefully driving the car as
he in fact approached the intersection on second gear and that his speed allegedly was somewhere between 25
and 30 kph which under normal conditions could be considered so safe and manageable as to enable him to bring
the car to a full stop when necessary.

Aside from the entry in the TAIR, however, which noted petitioner’s speed to be beyond what is lawful, the physical
evidence on record likewise seems to negate petitioner’s contention. The photographs taken of Arnold’s car clearly
show that the extent of the damage to it could not have been caused by petitioner’s car running on second gear at
the speed of 25-30 kph. The fact that the hood of Arnold’s car was violently wrenched as well as the fact that on
impact the car even turned around 180 degrees and was hurled several feet away from the junction to the outer lane
of Ortigas Avenue—when in fact Arnold had already established his turn to the left on the inner lane and into the
opposite lane—clearly demonstrate that the force of the collision had been created by a speed way beyond what
petitioner’s estimation.

Rate of speed, in connection with other circumstances, is one of the principal considerations in determining whether
a motorist has been reckless in driving an automobile, and evidence of the extent of the damage caused may show
the force of the impact from which the rate of speed of the vehicle may be modestly inferred.

We find, however, that petitioner has not been able to discharge that burden inasmuch as the physical evidence on
record is heavy with conviction way more than his bare assertion that his speed at the time of the incident was well
within what is controllable. Indeed, the facts of this case do warrant a finding that petitioner, on approach to the
junction, was traveling at a speed far greater than that conveniently fixed in his testimony. 

What is reasonable speed, of course, is necessarily subjective as it must conform to the peculiarities of a given case
but in all cases, it is that which will enable the driver to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others
using the highway. This standard of reasonableness is actually contained in Section 35 of R.A. No. 4136. It states:

SEC. 35. Restriction as to speed.—(a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a
careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the
width of the highway, and of any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall drive any motor vehicle
upon a highway at such speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than
will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.

Even apart from statutory regulations as to speed, a motorist is nevertheless expected to exercise ordinary care and
drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the conditions encountered  which will enable him to
keep the vehicle under control and, whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others
using the highway.

It is must be stressed that this restriction on speed assumes more importance where the motorist is approaching an
intersection. Ordinary or reasonable care in the operation of a motor vehicle at an intersection would naturally
require more precaution than is necessary when driving elsewhere in a street or highway. A driver approaching an
intersection is generally under duty, among others, to be vigilant and to have the vehicle under control as to be able
to stop at the shortest possible notice, that is, he must look for vehicles that might be approaching from within the
radius that denotes the limit of danger.

Since compliance with this duty is measured by whether an approaching motorist has exercised the level of
precaution required under the circumstances, then with more reason that he exhibit a relatively higher level of care
when the intersection is blind at the point where the roads meet. 

On this score, what brings certain failure in petitioner’s case is his own admission that he had not seen Arnold’s car
making a left turn at the intersection. On this score, what brings certain failure in petitioner’s case is his own
admission that he had not seen Arnold’s car making a left turn at the intersection. 

It can only be surmised at this point that petitioner had inexcusably fallen short of the standard of care in a situation
which called for more precaution on the highway in failing to make an observation in the interest at least of his own
safety whether or not it was safe to enter the crossing. Since he is chargeable with what he should have observed
only had he exercised the commensurate care required under the circumstances of the case, the inescapable
conclusion is that he had inexcusably breached the elementary duties of a responsible, prudent and reasonable
motorist.

In general, the degree of care and attention required of a driver in a particular case in exercising reasonable care
will vary with and must be measured in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, such that it must be
commensurate with the dangers which are to be anticipated and the injuries which are likely to result from the use of
the vehicle.In other words, he must observe a sense of proportionality between precaution and the peculiar risks
attendant or even inherent in the condition of the road which are open to ordinary observation.

The ultimate test, in other words, is to be found in the reasonable foreseeability that harm might result if
commensurate care is not exercised. It is not necessary, however, that a motorist actually foresee the probability of
harm or that the particular injury which resulted was foreseeable; it would suffice that he, in the position of an
ordinary prudent man, knowing what he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of a general nature as
that suffered was to materialize.

In his petition, he theorizes that the negligence of Arnold, which according to the Court of Appeals was incipient in
character, was actually the principal determining factor which caused the mishap and the fact that the TAIR
indicated that Arnold had no right of way, it is he himself who had the status of a favored driver. The contention is
utterly without merit.

In traffic law parlance, the term "right of way" is understood as the right of one vehicle to proceed in a lawful manner
in preference to another approaching vehicle under such circumstances of direction, speed and proximity as to give
rise to a danger of collision unless one of the vehicles grants precedence to the other.

In our setting, the right of way rule is governed by Section 42 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4136, which materially
provides:

Section 42. Right of Way.

(a) When two vehicles approach or enter an intersection at approximately the same time, the driver of the
vehicle on the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right, except as otherwise hereinafter
provided. The driver of any vehicle traveling at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any right which he might
otherwise have hereunder.

(b) The driver of a vehicle approaching but not having entered an intersection shall yield the right of a way to
a vehicle within such intersection or turning therein to the left across the line of travel of such first-mentioned
vehicle, provided the driver of the vehicle turning left has given a plainly visible signal of intention to turn as
required in this Act.

Whether two vehicles are approaching the intersection at the same time does not necessarily depend on which of
the vehicles enters the intersection first. Rather, it is determined by the imminence of collision when the relative
distances and speeds of the two vehicles are considered. It is said that two vehicles are approaching the
intersection at approximately the same time where it would appear to a reasonable person of ordinary prudence in
the position of the driver approaching from the left of another vehicle that if the two vehicles continued on their
courses at their speed, a collision would likely occur, hence, the driver of the vehicle approaching from the left must
give the right of precedence to the driver of the vehicle on his right.
1a

Nevertheless, the rule requiring the driver on the left to yield the right of way to the driver on the right on approach to
the intersection, no duty is imposed on the driver on the left to come to a dead stop, but he is merely required to
approach the intersection with his vehicle under control so that he may yield the right of way to a vehicle within the
danger zone on his right. He is not bound to wait until there is no other vehicle on his right in sight before
proceeding to the intersection but onlyuntil it is reasonably safe to proceed.
99. [G.R. No. 125134. January 22, 1999.]

XERXES ADZUARA Y DOTIMAS, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of the

PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

FACTS:

On 17 December 1990, at half past 1:00 o’clock in the morning, petitioner Xerxes Adzuara y
Dotimas, then a law student, and his friends Rene Gonzalo and Richard Jose were cruising in a 4-
door Colt Galant sedan with plate number NMT 718 along the stretch of Quezon Avenue coming from
the direction of EDSA towards Delta Circle at approximately 40 kilometers per hours. 1 Upon
reaching the intersection of 4th West Street their car collided with a 1975 4-door Toyota Corona
sedan with plate number PMD 711 owned and driven by Gregorio Martinez. Martinez had just
attended a Loved Flock meeting with his daughter Sahlee 2 and was coming from the eastern portion
of Quezon Avenue near Delta Circle. He was then executing a U-turn at the speed of 5 kph at the
north-west portion of Quezon Avenue going to Manila when the accident occurred.

The collision flung the Corona twenty (20) meters southward from the point of impact causing it to
land atop the center island of Quezon Avenue. The Galant skittered southward on Quezon Avenue’s
western half leaving its left rear about four (4) meters past the Corona’s right front side. The
principal points of contact between the two (2) cars were the Galant’s left front side and the Corona’s
right front door including its right front fender.

Both petitioner and Martinez claimed that their lanes had green traffic lights 3 although the
investigating policeman Marcelo Sabido declared that the traffic light was blinking red and orange
when he arrived at the scene of the accident an hour later.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner’s post-collision conduct does not constitute sufficient basis to convict where there are
no factual circumstances warranting a finding of negligence?

HELD:

We find no merit in the petition.

The Court finds that the defense version cannot prevail against the prosecution version satisfactorily
demonstrating that the subject accident occurred because of Xerxes’ reckless imprudence consisting
in his paying no heed to the red light and making V-1 (Galant car) proceed at a fast clip as it
approached and entered the intersection. Gregorio’s basic claim, substantially corroborated by
Sahlee’s testimony — in sum to the effect that when he made V-2 (Corona car) proceed to turn left,
the left-turn arrow was lighted green or go for V-2 and it was red light or stop for V-1 — is the same
basic version he gave in his written question-and-answer statement to the police investigator on 13
December 1990; certainly, the clear consistency of Gregorio’s posture respecting such crucial, may
decisive, material circumstance attending the subject accident underscores the veracity of the
prosecution version, even as it tends to indicate the scant measure of faith and credence that can be
safely reposed on the defense version 

In the instant case, nothing on record shows that the facts were not properly evaluated by the court
a quo. As such, we find no reason to disturb their findings. It bears to stress that the appreciation of
petitioner’s post-collision behavior serves only as a means to emphasize the finding of negligence
which is readily established by the admission of petitioner and his friend Renato that they saw the car
of Martinez making a U-turn but could not avoid the collision by the mere application of the brakes.
Negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an
absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care
and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. 

What degree of care and vigilance then did the circumstances require? At half past 1:00 o’clock in the
morning along an almost deserted avenue, ordinary care and vigilance would suffice. This may
consist of keeping a watchful eye on the road ahead and observing the traffic rules on speed, right of
way and traffic light. The claim of petitioner that Martinez made a swift U-turn which caused the
collision is not credible since a U-turn is done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and
overturning, compared to running straight ahead. Nonetheless, no evidence was presented showing
skid marks caused by the car driven by Martinez if only to demonstrate that he was driving at a fast
clip in negotiating the U-turn. On the other hand, the speed at which petitioner drove his car appears
to be the prime cause for his inability to stop his car and avoid the collision. His assertion that he
drove at the speed of 40 kph. is belied by Martinez who testified that when he looked at the opposite
lane for any oncoming cars, he saw none; then a few seconds later, he was hit by Adzuara’s car. 17
The extent of the damage on the car of Martinez and the position of the cars after the impact further
confirm the finding that petitioner went beyond the speed limit required by law and by the
circumstances. 

It is a rule that a motorist crossing a thru-stop street has the right of way over the one making a U-
turn. But if the person making a U-turn has already negotiated half of the turn and is almost on the
other side so that he is already visible to the person on the thru-street, the latter must give way to
the former. Petitioner was on the thru-street and had already seen the Martinez car. 19 He should
have stopped to allow Martinez to complete the U-turn having, as it were, the last clear chance to
avoid the accident which he ignored. In fact, he never stopped. Rather, he claimed that on the
assumption that he was negligent, the other party was also guilty of contributory negligence since his
car had no lights on. 20 The negligence of Martinez however has not been satisfactorily shown.
100. G.R. No. 128474             October 6, 2004

ARNEL GABRIEL, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

The mishap occurred on the stretch of the Maharlika Highway located in Barangay San Vicente, San Pablo City.
The highway is a two-lane, two-way road. The prosecution alleged that on the night of the accident, the Beetle and
the six-wheeler were both traveling on the same lane of Maharlika Highway, proceeding towards the direction of
San Pablo City. The six-wheeler was behind the Beetle. The jeepney, on the other hand, was travelling the opposite
lane on the way to Atimonan, Quezon, purportedly at high speed. After negotiating a curve, the jeepney veered out
of its lane, swerving into the lane occupied by the Beetle and the six-wheeler.

The jeepney collided with the left side of the Beetle, forcing the latter out of the road and into the right shoulder of
the highway. The collision with the Beetle also forced the jeepney to turn turtle and thereafter hit the front portion of
the truck, which was then fifteen (15) meters behind the Beetle. The second impact forced the jeepney into the
same right shoulder lane where the stricken Beetle had rested. The six-wheeler meanwhile moved into the opposite
side of the road and parked on the left shoulder of the highway.

Gabriel, in defense, admitted driving the jeepney on the night in question at the Maharlika Highway, on his way to
Quezon. While negotiating a curve near the scene of the accident, Gabriel noticed the headlights of an oncoming
vehicle focused towards his direction. He maneuvered his jeepney to the right of the road, and switched to low gear.
Despite the defensive moves which had put the jeepney’s right front and rear wheels on the road shoulder,
according to Gabriel, his jeepney was bumped by the Beetle still.

The left front wheel burst, causing the jeepney to swerve to the right, fall on its right side, and slide towards the
center of the highway. At that point, the jeepney was placed on the other direction — towards San Pablo City. In that
position, the jeepney was hit by the six-wheeler, causing some of the occupants of the jeepney to be thrown out.
One of them, Menandro Marquez, testified for the defense. He claimed that he was seated at the front seat of the
jeepney, adding that the jeepney, while on the extreme right of the Quezon-bound lane, was bumped by a brightly
lighted vehicle.

ISSUE:
WON Gabriel’s negligence was the proximate cause of the collision?

HELD:

YES.

Just as the claims of Gabriel and Marquez on the point of impact are devoid of credence, the damage sustained by
the Beetle is not necessarily inconsistent with the defense’s position that the accident occurred on the Quezon-
bound lane and not on the San Pablo-bound lane. Assuming the Beetle had veered the San Pablo-bound lane while
overtaking, it could have very well been struck on the side by the incoming jeepney. Indeed, the question on which
lane the first collision occurred is the most crucial at hand, as it determines which vehicle was on the wrong side of
the road. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals concluded that the collision occurred on the San Pablo-bound lane
and that it was the jeepney which veered to the wrong side. Such findings are supported by clear and convincing
evidence.

Consequently, two confirmed findings of fact militate against Gabriel’s defense. First, it was the Beetle which was
struck by the jeepney. Second, this collision occurred on the San Pablo–bound lane, thus showing that it was the
jeepney which veered from the correct lane. Gabriel, who was not attempting to overtake any vehicle, had no
reason to veer to the other lane.

Moreover, as Macabuhay testified, the jeepney was travelling fast as it negotiated a curve, causing it to swerve and
hit the Beetle. The very fact of speeding is indicative of imprudent behavior, as a motorist must exercise ordinary
care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions encountered, which will enable him
or her to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the highway. It is elementary in traffic school
that a driver slows down before negotiating a curve.

The motorist, in approaching or rounding a curve, must reasonably anticipate that another vehicle may appear from
the opposite direction at any moment. Excessive speed, combined with other circumstances such as the occurrence
of the accident on or near a curve may constitute negligence. By failing to slow down, Gabriel acted recklessly and
imprudently. His behavior was the proximate cause of the fatal accident.

However, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Gabriel was guilty of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple
Homicide, and not Double Homicide. This erroneous finding follows the appellate court’s observation that the RTC
omitted in its findings the fact that the death of jeepney passenger Banes was likewise brought about by the
collision. Yet, the charges in the Information only seek to hold Gabriel liable for the deaths of Pitargue and Asistido.
No mention at all was made of Banes in the Information. Still, it is settled that the real nature of the criminal charge
is determined, not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the law alleged to
have been violated—these being conclusions of law—but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information.Thus, the original designation of the offense as made by the RTC is correct. 

101. G.R. No. 202692               November 12, 2014

EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

On or about June 11, 2006, P/Insp. Manuel Aguilar (Aguilar), SPO4 Bodino, PO3 Benedict Cruz III and another
officer were manning a checkpoint established along Roxas Boulevard corner Quirino Ave., Malate, Manila when,
from about twenty (20) meters away, they spotted a swerving red Ford Ranger pick up with plate number XAE-988.
Petitioner was behind the wheel. The team members, all inuniform, flagged the vehicle down and asked the
petitioner to alightfrom the vehicle so he could take a rest at the police station situated nearby,before he resumes
driving.  Petitioner, who the policemen claimed was smelling of liquor, denied being drunk and insisted he could
11

manage to drive. Then in a raised voice, petitioner started talking rudely to the policemen and in fact yelled at
P/Insp. Aguilar blurting: "P…g ina mo, bakit mo ako hinuhuli." Atthat remark, P/Insp. Aguilar, who earlier pointed out
to petitioner that his team had seen him swerving and driving under the influence of liquor, proceeded to
arrestpetitioner who put up resistance. Despite petitioner’s efforts to parry the hold on him, the police eventually
succeeded in subduing him who was then brought to the Ospital ng Maynila where he was examined and found to
be positive of alcoholic breath per the Medical Certificate issuedby that hospital, marked as Exh. "F". Petitioner was
then turned over to the Malate Police Station for disposition.

Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed tobe a victim in the incident in question, adding in this regard that he has in
fact filed criminal charges for physical injuries, robbery and arbitrary detention against P/Insp. Aguilar et al. In his
Counter-Affidavit  and his Complaint-Affidavit  appended thereto, petitioner averred that, in the early morning of
13 14

June 12, 2006, he together with Joenilo Pano and Josie Villanueva, cook and waitress, respectively, in his
restaurant located along Macapagal Ave., Pasay City, were on the way home from on board his pick-up when
signaled to stop by police officers at the area immediately referred to above. Their flashlights trained on the inside of
the vehicle and its occupants, the policemen then asked the petitioner to open the vehicle’s door and alight for a
body and vehicle search, a directive he refused to heed owing to a previous extortion experience. Instead, he
opened the vehicle window, uttering, "plain view lang boss, plain view lang." Obviously irked by this remark, one of
the policemen, P/Insp. Aguilar, as it turnedout, then told the petitioner that he was drunk, pointing to three cases of
empty beer bottles in the trunk of the vehicle. Petitioner’s explanation about being sober and that the empty bottles
adverted to came from his restaurant was ignored as P/Insp. Aguilar suddenly boxed him (petitioner) on the mouth
and poked a gun at his head, at the same time blurting, "P…g ina mo gusto mo tapusin na kita dito marami ka pang
sinasabi."

The officers then pulled the petitioner out of the driver’s seat and pushed him into the police mobile car, whereupon
he, petitioner, asked his companions to call up his wife. The policemen then brought petitioner to the Ospital ng
Maynila where they succeeded in securing a medical certificate under the signature of one Dr. Harvey Balucating
depicting petitioner as positive of alcoholic breath, although he refused to be examined and no alcohol breath
examination was conducted. He was thereafter detained from 3:00 a.m.of June 12, 2006 and released in the
afternoon of June 13, 2006. Before his release, however, he was allowed to undergo actual medical examination
where the resulting medical certificate indicated that he has sustained physical injuries but negative for alcohol
breath. Ten days later, petitioner filed his Complaint-Affidavit against Dr. Balucating, P/Insp. Aguilar and the other
police officers.

ISSUE:

WON The CA erred in upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties by the police officers?

HELD:

YES.

In the case at bar, the men manning the checkpoint in the subject area and during the period material appearednot
to have performed their duties as required by law, or at least fell short of the norm expected of peace officers. They
spotted the petitioner’s purported swerving vehicle. They then signaled him to stop which he obeyed. But they did
not demand the presentation of the driver’s license orissue any ticket or similar citation paper for traffic violation as
required under the particular premises by Sec. 29 of RA 4136.

In fine, at the time of his apprehension, or when he was signaled to stop, to be precise, petitioner has not committed
any crime or suspected of having committed one. "Swerving," as ordinarily understood,refers to a movement
wherein a vehicle shifts from a lane to another or to turn aside from a direct course of action or movement.  The act
25

may become punishable when there is a sign indicating that swerving is prohibited or where swerving partakes the
nature ofreckless driving, a concept defined under RA 4136.

Swerving is not necessarily indicative of imprudent behavior let alone constitutive of reckless driving. To constitute
the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor
vehicle, and a willful and wantondisregard of the consequences is required. Nothing in the records indicate that the
area was a "no swerving or overtaking zone."
Moreover, the swerving incident, if this be the case, occurred at around 3:00 a.m. when the streets are usually clear
of moving vehicles and human traffic, and the danger to life, limb and property to third persons is minimal. When the
police officers stopped the petitioner’s car, they did not issue any ticket for swerving as required under Section 29 of
RA 4136. Instead, they inspected the vehicle, ordered the petitioner and his companions to step down of their pick
up and concluded that the petitioner was then drunk mainly because of the cases of beer found at the trunk of the
vehicle. 

Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the confrontational stand-off between the police team, on
one hand, and petitioner on the other, was the latter’s refusal to get off of the vehicle for a body and vehicle search
juxtaposed by his insistence on a plain view search only. Petitioner’s twin gestures cannot plausibly be considered
as resisting a lawful order.

He may have sounded boorish or spoken crudely at that time, but none of this would make him a criminal. It
remains to stress that the petitioner has not, when flagged down, committed a crime or performed an overt act
warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity. He did not try to avoid the road block established. He came to
a full stop when so required to stop. The two key elements of resistance and serious disobedience punished under
Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1) That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or
gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person or his agent.

There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are persons in authority or agents of a
person in authority manning a legal checkpoint. But surely petitioner’s act of exercising one’s right against
unreasonable searches  to be conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience
30

let alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC.

Moreover, there is, to stress, nothing in RA 4136 that authorized the checkpoint-manning policemen to order
petitioner and his companions to get out of the vehicle for a vehicle and body search. And it bears to emphasize that
there was no reasonable suspicion of the occurrence of a crime that would allow what jurisprudence refers to as a
"stop and frisk" action. As SPO4 Bodino no less testified, the only reason why they asked petitioner to get out of the
vehicle was not because he has committed a crime, but because of their intention toinvite him to Station 9 so he
could rest before he resumes driving. But instead of a tactful invitation, the apprehending officers, in an act
indicative of overstepping of their duties, dragged the petitioner out of the vehicle and, in the process of subduing
him, pointed a gun and punched him on the face.

None of the police officers, to note, categorically denied the petitioner’s allegation about being physically hurt before
being brought to the Ospital ng Maynila to be tested for intoxication. What the policemen claimed was that it took the
three (3) of them to subdue the fifty-five year old petitioner. Both actions were done in excess of their authority
granted under RA 4136. 
110. G. R. No. 91378 June 9, 1992

FIRST MALAYAN LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CRISOSTOMO B. VITUG and ESTATE OF VICENTE TRINIDAD,
Represented by Widow GLORIA D. TRINIDAD, respondents.

FACTS:

On June 26, 1984, Crisostomo B. Vitug filed Civil Case No. 84-25186 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Branch
XLIII, against the defendant. First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation (FMLFC for short), to recover
damages for physical injuries, loss of personal effects, and the wreck of his car as a result of a three-vehicle
collision on December 14, 1983. involving his car, another car, and an Isuzu cargo truck registered in the name of
FMLFC and driven by one Crispin Sicat.

The evidence shows that while Vitug's car was at a full stop at the intersection of New York Street and Epifanio
delos Santos Avenue (EDSA) in Cubao, Quezon City, northward-bound, the on-coming Isuzu cargo truck bumped, a
Ford Granada car behind him with such force that the Ford car was thrown on top of Vitug's car crushing its roof.
The cargo truck thereafter struck Vitug's car in the rear causing the gas tank to explode and setting the car ablaze.

Stunned by the impact. Vitug was fortunately extricated from his car by solicitous bystanders before the vehicle
exploded. However, two of his passengers were burned to death. Vitug's car, valued at P70,000, was a total loss.

When he regained consciousness in the hospital, Vitug discovered that he had lost various personal articles valued
at P48,950, namely a necklace with a diamond pendant, a GP watch, a pair of Christian Dior eyeglasses. a gold
Cross pen and a pair of Bally shoes. Vitug also suffered injuries producing recurring pains in his neck and back.
Upon his physician's advice, he received further medical treatment in the United States which cost him US$2,373.64
for his first trip, and US$5,596.64 for the second.

At the time of the accident on December 14, 1983, the Isuzu cargo truck was registered in the name of the First
Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation (FMLFC).

However, FMLFC denied any liability, alleging that it was not the owner of the truck. neither the employer of the
driver Crispin Sicat, because it had sold the truck to Vicente Trinidad on September 24. 1980, after the latter had
paid all his monthly amortizations under the financing lease agreement between FMLFC and Trinidad.

ISSUE: WON FMLFC can be held liable ?

HELD:

YES.

In the first place, the factual finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the Isuzu vehicle which figured in
the mishap was still registered in the name of FMLFC at the time of the accident is not reviewable by this Court in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of Rules of Court.

This Court has consistently ruled that regardless of who the actual owner of a motor vehicle might be, the registered
owner is the operator of the same with respect to the public and third persons, and as such, directly and primarily
responsible for the consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the
employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer being considered merely as his agent

Were the registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it
would be easy for him by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to
an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury
done (Erezo vs. Jepte, 102 Phil 103.)

. . . The registered owner or operator of record is the one liable for damages caused by a vehicle regardless of any
alleged sale or lease made thereon."

In order for a transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle to be valid against third persons. it must be recorded in the
Land Transportation Office. For, although valid between the parties, the sale cannot affect third persons who rely on
the public registration of the motor vehicle as conclusive evidence of ownership. In law, FMLFC was the owner and
operator of the Izusu cargo truck, hence, fully liable to third parties injured by its operation due to the fault or
negligence of the driver thereof.
112. G.R. No. 162267             July 4, 2008

PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC., petitioner,

vs.
UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC., respondent.
117. G.R. No. L-57493 January 7, 1987

BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND ROMAN MARTINEZ, respondents.

FACTS:

Two passenger bus lines with similar buses and similar routes were being operated by firm names "Baliwag Transit'
and "Baliwag Transit, Inc." (BTI) the herein petitioner. The former was owned by the late Pascual Tuazon who
continued to operate it until his death on January 26, 1972, while the latter was owned by petitioner corporation,
incorporated in the year 1968 and existing until the present time. Both bus lines operate under different grants of
franchises by the Public Service Commission but were issued only one ID Number 03-22151 by the Social Security
System.

Private respondent claiming to be an employee of both bus lines with one ID Number, filed a petition with the Social
Security Commision on August 14, 1975 which was docketed as SSC Case No. 3272 to compel BTI to remit to the
Social Security private respondent's SSS Premium contributions for the years 1958 to March, 1963 and from 1967
to March 1971. He alleged that he was employed by petitioner from 1947 to 1971 as conductor and later as
inspector with corresponding salary increases and that petitioner deducted from his salaries, premium contributions,
but what was remitted to the SSS was only for a period covering June, 1963 to 1966, at a much lesser amount.

In its answer, BTI denied having employed private respondent Ramon Martinez, the truth being that he was
employed by Pascual Tuazon who since 1948 owned and operated buses under the trade name Baliwag Transit
which were separate and distinct from the buses operated by petitioner company owned by Mrs. Victoria Vda. de
Tengco. Both bus lines had different offices, different maintenance and repair shops, garages, books of account,
and managers.

The employment of private respondent lasted until 1971 when his employer Pascual Tuazon became bankrupt. It
was the latter which deducted from private respondent the amount corresponding to his SSS contributions for the
years in question but allegedly did not remit the same. Finally, herein petitioner BTI claims that private respondent
allowed 17 years to elapse and at a time when Pascual Tuazon was already dead before filing the subject petition
with the Social Security Commission which denied the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Is whether or not the issuance by the Social Security System of one SSS-ID-Number to two bus lines necessarily
indicates that one of them, operates his buses under the "Kabit System?

HELD:

THE COURT RULED IN NEGATIVE

The "Kabit System" has been defined by the Supreme Court as an arrangement "whereby a person who has been
granted a certificate of convenience allows another person who owns motor vehicles to operate under such
franchise for a fee."

The determining factor, therefore, is the possession of a franchise to operate which negates the existence of the
"Kabit System" and not the issuance of one SSS ID Number for both bus lines from which the existence of said
system was inferred.

In the instant case, the findings of the Court of Appeals are as follows:

... It is very obvious from the foregoing narration of facts that the late Pascual Tuazon, during the
time material to this case, operated his buses under the "kabit" Syetem; that is, while actually he was
the owner and operator of public utility buses, maintaining his own drivers, conductors, inspectors
and other employees, his buses were not registered with the Public Service Commission (now the
Bureau of Land Transportation) in his own name. Instead, his buses were absorbed and registered
as owned and operated by the "Baliwag Transit," which was the firm name owned and used by his
niece, Victoria Vda. de Tengco.

That Victoria Vda. de Tengco and Pascual Tuazon were granted separate franchises to operate public utility
buses, while it is admitted that petitioner was the one who remitted the SSS premiums of private respondent, it has
also been established by testimonies of witnesses that such arrangement was done purposely to accommodate the
request of the late Pascual Tuazon, the uncle of Victoria Vda. de Tengco and the money came from him.

It was established during the hearings that petitioner Roman Martinez was employed by, worked for and took orders
from Pascual Tuazon and was authorized to get "vales" from the conductors of the trucks of Mr. Tuazon. This was
admitted got "vales" from the buses of Pascual Tuazon. On the other hand, there is no evidence introducted to show
that petitioner ever received salaries from respondent or from Mrs. Victoria Vda. de Tengco and neither had he been
under the orders of the latter.
It is, therefore, clear that even long before the incorporation of the Baliwag Transit in 1968 petitioner was already an
employee of the late Pascual Tuazon who despite having separate office, employees and buses which were
operated under the line of the Baliwag Transit did not report him for coverage to the SSS. 

Thus, the employer-employee relationship between the late Pascual Tuazon and herein private respondent, having
been established, the remittance of SSS contributions of the latter, is the responsibility of his employer Tuazon,
regardless of the existence or non-existence of the "Kabit System."

Moreover, private respondent having allowed seventeen (17) years to elapse before filing his petition with the Social
Security System, has undoubtedly slept on his rights and his cause of action has already prescribed under Article
1144(2) of the Civil Code .
118. G.R. No. 125817            January 16, 2002

ABELARDO LIM and ESMADITO GUNNABAN, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DONATO H. GONZALES, respondents.

FACTS:

Sometime in 1982 private respondent Donato Gonzales purchased an Isuzu passenger jeepney from Gomercino
Vallarta, holder of a certificate of public convenience for the operation of public utility vehicles plying the
Monumento-Bulacan route. While private respondent Gonzales continued offering the jeepney for public transport
services he did not have the registration of the vehicle transferred in his name nor did he secure for himself a
certificate of public convenience for its operation. Thus Vallarta remained on record as its registered owner and
operator.1âwphi1.nêt

On 22 July 1990, while the jeepney was running northbound along the North Diversion Road somewhere in
Meycauayan, Bulacan, it collided with a ten-wheeler-truck owned by petitioner Abelardo Lim and driven by his co-
petitioner Esmadito Gunnaban. Gunnaban owned responsibility for the accident,

Petitioner Lim shouldered the costs for hospitalization of the wounded, compensated the heirs of the deceased
passenger, and had the Ferroza restored to good condition. He also negotiated with private respondent and offered
to have the passenger jeepney repaired at his shop.  Under the circumstances, negotiations had to be abandoned;
hence, the filing of the complaint for damages by private respondent against petitioners.

In his answer Lim denied liability by contending that he exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of
his employees. He further asserted that as the jeepney was registered in Vallarta’s name, it was Vallarta and not
private respondent who was the real party in interest.

ISSUE:

WON does the new owner have any legal personality to bring the action, or is he the real party in interest in the suit,
despite the fact that he is not the registered owner under the certificate of public convenience?

HELD:

YES.

The Court explained that one of the primary factors considered in the granting of a certificate of public convenience
for the business of public transportation is the financial capacity of the holder of the license, so that liabilities arising
from accidents may be duly compensated.

The kabit system renders illusory such purpose and, worse, may still be availed of by the grantee to escape civil
liability caused by a negligent use of a vehicle owned by another and operated under his license. If a registered
owner is allowed to escape liability by proving who the supposed owner of the vehicle is, it would be easy for him to
transfer the subject vehicle to another who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage
done.

Thus, for the safety of passengers and the public who may have been wronged and deceived through the
baneful kabit system, the registered owner of the vehicle is not allowed to prove that another person has become
the owner so that he may be thereby relieved of responsibility.

In the present case it is at once apparent that the evil sought to be prevented in enjoining the kabit system does not
exist. 

First, neither of the parties to the pernicious kabit system is being held liable for damages. 

Second, the case arose from the negligence of another vehicle in using the public road to whom no representation,
or misrepresentation, as regards the ownership and operation of the passenger jeepney was made and to whom no
such representation, or misrepresentation, was necessary. Thus it cannot be said that private respondent Gonzales
and the registered owner of the jeepney were in estoppel for leading the public to believe that the jeepney belonged
to the registered owner. 

Third, the riding public was not bothered nor inconvenienced at the very least by the illegal arrangement. On the
contrary, it was private respondent himself who had been wronged and was seeking compensation for the damage
done to him. Certainly, it would be the height of inequity to deny him his right.

In light of the foregoing, it is evident that private respondent has the right to proceed against petitioners for the
damage caused on his passenger jeepney as well as on his business. Any effort then to frustrate his claim of
damages by the ingenuity with which petitioners framed the issue should be discouraged, if not repelled.
119. G.R. No. L-64693 April 27, 1984

LITA ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
SECOND CIVIL CASES DIVISION, INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, NICASIO M. OCAMPO and
FRANCISCA P. GARCIA, respondents.

FACTS:

Sometime in 1966, the spouses Nicasio M. Ocampo and Francisca Garcia, herein private respondents, purchased
in installment from the Delta Motor Sales Corporation five (5) Toyota Corona Standard cars to be used as taxicabs.
Since they had no franchise to operate taxicabs, they contracted with petitioner Lita Enterprises, Inc., through its
representative, Manuel Concordia, for the use of the latter's certificate of public convenience in consideration of an
initial payment of P1,000.00 and a monthly rental of P200.00 per taxicab unit. To effectuate Id agreement, the
aforesaid cars were registered in the name of petitioner Lita Enterprises, Inc, Possession, however, remained with
tile spouses Ocampo who operated and maintained the same under the name Acme Taxi, petitioner's trade name.

About a year later, on March 18, 1967, one of said taxicabs driven by their employee, Emeterio Martin, collided with
a motorcycle whose driver, one Florante Galvez, died from the head injuries sustained therefrom. A criminal case
was eventually filed against the driver Emeterio Martin, while a civil case for damages was instituted by Rosita
Sebastian Vda. de Galvez, heir of the victim, against Lita Enterprises, Inc., as registered owner of the taxicab.

This decision having become final, a writ of execution was issued. One of the vehicles of respondent spouses with
Engine No. 2R-914472 was levied upon and sold at public auction for 12,150.00 to one Sonnie Cortez, the highest
bidder. Another car with Engine No. 2R-915036 was likewise levied upon and sold at public auction for P8,000.00 to
a certain Mr. Lopez.

Thereafter, in March 1973, respondent Nicasio Ocampo decided to register his taxicabs in his name. He requested
the manager of petitioner Lita Enterprises, Inc. to turn over the registration papers to him, but the latter allegedly
refused. Hence, he and his wife filed a complaint against Lita Enterprises, Inc., Rosita Sebastian Vda. de Galvez,
Visayan Surety & Insurance Co. and the Sheriff of Manila for reconveyance of motor vehicles with damages,
docketed as Civil Case No. 90988 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

ISSUE:

WON Ocampo can legally recover the registration papers?

HELD:

NO.

Unquestionably, the parties herein operated under an arrangement, comonly known as the "kabit system", whereby
a person who has been granted a certificate of convenience allows another person who owns motors vehicles to
operate under such franchise for a fee. A certificate of public convenience is a special privilege conferred by the
government . Abuse of this privilege by the grantees thereof cannot be countenanced.

The "kabit system" has been Identified as one of the root causes of the prevalence of graft and corruption in the
government transportation offices. In the words of Chief Justice Makalintal,  "this is a pernicious system that cannot be too severely
condemned. It constitutes an imposition upon the goo faith of the government.

Although not outrightly penalized as a criminal offense, the "kabit system" is invariably recognized as being contrary
to public policy and, therefore, void and inexistent under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, It is a fundamental principle
that the court will not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract.

It was flagrant error on the part of both the trial and appellate courts to have accorded the parties relief from their
predicament. Article 1412 of the Civil Code denies them such aid. It provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£

ART. 1412. if the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal
offense, the following rules shall be observed;

(1) when the fault, is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given
by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other's undertaking.

As this Court said in Eugenio v. Perdido,   "the mere lapse of time cannot give efficacy to contracts that are null
2

void."

The principle of in pari delicto is well known not only in this jurisdiction but also in the United States where common
law prevails. Under American jurisdiction, the doctrine is stated thus: "The proposition is universal that no action
arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to
recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or damages for its property agreed to be sold or delivered, or
damages for its violation. The rule has sometimes been laid down as though it was equally universal, that where the
parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the other."   Although certain
3

exceptions to the rule are provided by law, We see no cogent reason why the full force of the rule should not be
applied in the instant case.
120. G.R. No. 119500 August 28, 1998

PAGUIO TRANSPORT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION and WILFREDO MELCHOR,

FACTS:

Complainant Wilfredo Melchor was hired by respondent company as a taxi driver on 25

December 1992 under the "boundary system. He was engaged to drive the taxi unit assigned to
him on a 24-hour schedule per trip every two (2) days, for which he used to earn an average
income from P500 to P700 per trip, exclusive of the P650.00 boundary and other deductions
imposed on him.

On 24 November 1993, complainant allegedly met a vehicular accident along Quirino Avenue
near the PNR Station and Plaza Dilao when he accidentally bumped a car which stopped at the
intersection even when the traffic light was green and go. After he submitted the traffic accident
report to the office of respondents, he was allegedly advised to stop working and have a rest.
After several days[,] he allegedly reported for work only to be told that his service was no longer
needed. Hence, the complaint for illegal dismissal, among others.

Respondent[s] for their part maintained that complainant was not illegally dismissed, there
being in the first place no employer-employee relationship between them. In amplification, it
was argued that the element of control which [was] a paramount test to determine the existence
of such a relationship [was] lacking. So too, it argued the element of the payment of
compensation.

Considering that in lieu of the latter, payment of boundary is instead made allegedly makes the
relationship between them of a "wase-agreement" [sic]. Respondents then argued that even if
an employer-employee relationship were to be presumed as present, still complainant's
termination arose out of a valid cause and after he refused to articulate his stand on the
investigation being conducted on him.

ISSUE:

WON THERE IS A EMPLOYEE-EMPLOYER RELATIONSHIP IN A BOUNDARY SYSTEM?

HELD:

YES.

Under the "boundary system," private respondent was engaged to drive petitioner's taxi unit on
a 24-hour schedule every two days. On each such trip, private respondent remitted to petitioner
a "boundary" of P650. Whatever he earned in excess of that amount was considered his income.

Petitioner argues that under said arrangement, he had no control over the number of hours
private respondent had to work and the routes he had to take. Therefore, he concludes that the
employer-employee relationship cannot be deemed to exist.

Petitioner's contention is not novel. In Martinez v. National Labor Relations Commission, 11 this

Court already ruled that the relationship of taxi owners and taxi drivers is the same as that
between jeepney owners and jeepney drivers under the "boundary system." In both cases, the
employer-employee relationship was deemed to exist, viz.:

The relationship between jeepney owners/operators on one hand and jeepney drivers on the
other under the boundary system is that of employer-employee and not of lessor-lessee. . . . In
the lease of chattels[,] the lessor loses complete control over the chattel leased . . . . In the case
of jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers, the former exercise supervision and control
over the latter. The fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but get only the excess of
that so-called boundary they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to withdraw the
relationship between them from that of employer and employee. The doctrine is applicable in the
present case. Thus, private respondents were employees. . . because they had been engaged to
perform activities which were usually necessary or desirable in the usual trade or business of the
employer.
121. G.R. No. 119268. February 23, 2000]

ANGEL JARDIN, DEMETRIO CALAGOS, URBANO MARCOS, ROSENDO MARCOS, LUIS DE

LOS ANGELES, JOEL ORDENIZA and AMADO CENTENO, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) and GOODMAN TAXI (PHILJAMA INTERNATIONAL,
INC.), Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners were drivers of private respondent, Philjama International Inc., a domestic corporation
engaged in the operation of "Goodman Taxi." Petitioners used to drive private respondents taxicabs
every other day on a 24-hour work schedule under the boundary system. Under this arrangement,
the petitioners earned an average of P400.00 daily. Nevertheless, private respondent admittedly
regularly deducts from petitioners daily earnings the amount of P30.00 supposedly for the washing
of the taxi units. Believing that the deduction is illegal, petitioners decided to form a labor union to
protect their rights and interests.
chanrobles virtual law library

Upon learning about the plan of petitioners, private respondent refused to let petitioners drive their
taxicabs when they reported for work on August 6, 1991, and on succeeding days. Petitioners
suspected that they were singled out because they were the leaders and active members of the
proposed union. Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the labor arbiter a complaint against private
respondent for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and illegal deduction of washing fees. In a
decision dated August 31, 1992, the labor arbiter dismissed said complaint for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

WON THERE IS A EMPLOYER- EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP IN THIS CASE?

HELD:

YES.

In a number of cases decided by this Court we ruled that the relationship between jeepney
owners/operators on one hand and jeepney drivers on the other under the boundary system is
that of employer-employee and not of lessor-lessee.

We explained that in the lease of chattels, the lessor loses complete control over the chattel
leased although the lessee cannot be reckless in the use thereof, otherwise he would be
responsible for the damages to the lessor. In the case of jeepney owners/operators and jeepney
drivers, the former exercise supervision and control over the latter. The management of the
business is in the owners hands.

The owner as holder of the certificate of public convenience must see to it that the driver follows
the route prescribed by the franchising authority and the rules promulgated as regards its
operation. Now, the fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but get only that in excess of
the so-called "boundary" they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to withdraw the
relationship between them from that of employer and employee.

We have applied by analogy the above stated doctrine to the relationships between bus
owner/operator and bus conductor, auto-calesa owner/operator and driver, and recently
between taxi owners/operators and taxi drivers. Hence, petitioners are undoubtedly employees of
private respondent because as taxi drivers they perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of their employer. chables virtual law library
122.

124. G.R. No. L-30115 September 28, 1973

FE PEREZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JOSEFINA GUTIERREZ, defendant third-party plaintiff-appellee, PANFILO ALAJAR, third-party defendant-
appellee.

FACTS:

The complaint (later amended) filed on October 29, 1959 by Fe Perez with the Court of First Instance of Davao
against Josefina Gutierrez, for breach of contract of carriage, alleges that on September 6, 1959 while she, together
with nine co-teachers, was a passenger of an AC jeepney registered under the name of the defendant Gutierrez, the
said vehicle, due to the reckless negligence of its driver Leopoldo Cordero, met with an accident, resulting in injuries
to herself which required her hospitalization. In her answer, Josefina Gutierrez averred that if the claim of Fe Perez
is at all justified, responsibility therefor should devolve on one Panfilo Alajar, the actual owner, by purchase, of the
said passenger jeepney when the accident occurred and against whom she has filed a third-party complaint.

In his answer to the third-party complaint, Panfilo Alajar disclaimed responsibility for the accident, alleging that (a)
the mentioned deed of sale is null and void because it has not been registered with the Public Service Commission
despite repeated demands on the 3rd-party complainant to do so; (b) the said passenger jeepney remained in the
control of the 3rd-party complainant who, together with her lawyer-husband, had been collecting rentals from him for
the use of the said vehicle; and (c) by express agreement, title to the said vehicle remained with the 3rd-party
complainant pending approval of the sale by the Public Service Commission.

The present appeal questions the correctness of the dispositive portion of the decision a quo which adjudged
Panfilo Alajar, instead of Josefina Gutierrez, as the party liable to her for the payment of the damages adjudicated in
her favor. Specifically, Fe Perez argues that the registered owner of a motor vehicle should be the one held liable
for damages resulting from breach of contract of carriage by a common carrier.

ISSUE:

WON Gutierrez being the registered owner of the carrier is liable?

HELD:

YES.

In Peralta vs. Mangusang  this Court, in approbation of a similar argument, said:

1

The law (Sec. 20 [g], Public Service Act) really requires the approval of the Public Service
Commission in order that a franchise, or any privileges pertaining thereto, may be sold or leased
without infringing the certificate issued to the grantee. The reason is obvious. Since a franchise is
personal in nature any transfer or lease thereof should be submitted for approval of the Public
Service Commission, so that the latter may take proper safeguards to protect the interest of the
public. It follows that if the property covered by the franchise is transferred or leased to another
without obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer is not binding on the Public Service
Commission and, in contemplation of law, the grantee continues to be responsible under the
franchise in relation to the Commission and to the public for the consequences incident to the
operation of the vehicle, one of them being the collision under consideration. 

In the earlier case of Erezo vs. Jepte

That in dealing with vehicles registered under the Public Service Law, the public has the right to assume or presume
that the registered owner is the actual owner thereof, for it would be difficult for the public to enforce the actions that
they may have for injuries caused to them by the vehicles being negligently operated if the public should be required
to prove who the actual owner is. How would the public or third persons know against whom to enforce their rights in
case of subsequent transfers of the vehicles? We do not imply by this doctrine, however, that the registered owner
may not recover whatever amount he had paid by virtue of his liability to third persons from the person to whom he
had actually sold, assigned or conveyed the vehicle.

Upon the foregoing, it is quite clear that the court below erred in holding Panfilo Alajar, rather than Josefina
Gutierrez, as the one directly liable to Fe Perez for the latter's injuries and the corresponding damages incurred.
This Court notes moreover, that the court below inexplicably failed to hold the driver (Leopoldo Cordero), whom it
found guilty of reckless imprudence, jointly and solidarily liable with Josefina Gutierrez to Fe Perez in accordance
with the provisions of article 2184 in relation to article 2180 of the new Civil Code.
125. G.R. No. 70876 July 19, 1990

MA. LUISA BENEDICTO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and GREENHILLS WOOD INDUSTRIES COMPANY,
INC. respondents.

FACTS:

Private respondent Greenhills, a lumber manufacturing firm with business address at Dagupan City, operates
sawmill in Maddela, Quirino.

Sometime in May 1980, private respondent bound itself to sell and deliver to Blue Star Mahogany, Inc., ("Blue Star")
a company with business operations in Valenzuela, Bulacan 100,000 board feet of sawn lumber with the
understanding that an initial delivery would be made on 15 May 1980.  To effect its first delivery, private
respondent's resident manager in Maddela, Dominador Cruz, contracted Virgilio Licuden, the driver of a cargo truck
bearing Plate No. 225 GA TH to transport its sawn lumber to the consignee Blue Star in Valenzuela, Bulacan. This
cargo truck was registered in the name of petitioner Ma. Luisa Benedicto, the proprietor of Macoven Trucking, a
business enterprise engaged in hauling freight, with main office in B.F. Homes, Parañaque.

On 16 May 1980, the Manager of Blue Star called up by long distance telephone Greenhills' president, Henry Lee
Chuy, informing him that the sawn lumber on board the subject cargo truck had not yet arrived in Valenzuela,
Bulacan. The latter in turn informed Greenhills' resident manager in its Maddela saw-mill of what had happened. In a
letter   dated 18 May 1980, Blue Star's administrative and personnel manager, Manuel R. Bautista, formally
5

informed Greenhills' president and general manager that Blue Star still had not received the sawn lumber which was
supposed to arrive on 15 May 1980 and because of this delay, "they were constrained to look for other suppliers."

On 25 June 1980, after confirming the above with Blue Star and after trying vainly to persuade it to continue with
their contract, private respondent Greenhill's filed Criminal Case No. 668 against driver Licuden for estafa.
Greenhills also filed against petitioner Benedicto Civil Case No. D-5206 for recovery of the value of the lost sawn
lumber plus damages before the RTC of Dagupan City.

In her answer,  petitioner Benedicto denied liability alleging that she was a complete stranger to the contract of
carriage, the subject truck having been earlier sold by her to Benjamin Tee, on 28 February 1980 as evidenced by a
deed of sale.  She claimed that the truck had remained registered in her name notwithstanding its earlier sale to Tee
because the latter had paid her only P50,000.00 out of the total agreed price of P68,000.00 However, she averred
that Tee had been operating the said truck in Central Luzon from that date (28 February 1980) onwards, and that,
therefore, Licuden was Tee's employee and not hers.

ISSUE:

WON RESPONDENT BEING THE REGISTERED OWNER IS LIABLE FOR THE for the value of the undelivered or
lost sawn lumber?

HELD:

YES.

Petitioner urges that she could not be held answerable for the loss of the cargo, because the doctrine which makes
the registered owner of a common carrier vehicle answerable to the public for the negligence of the driver despite
the sale of the vehicle to another person, applies only to cases involving death of or injury to passengers. What
applies in the present case, according to petitioner, is the rule that a contract of carriage requires proper delivery of
the goods to and acceptance by the carrier.

The Court considers that petitioner has failed to show that appellate court committed reversible error in affirming the
trial court's holding that petitioner was liable for the cost of the sawn lumber plus damages.

There is no dispute that petitioner Benedicto has been holding herself out to the public as engaged in the business
of hauling or transporting goods for hire or compensation. Petitioner Benedicto is, in brief, a common carrier.

The prevailing doctrine on common carriers makes the registered owner liable for consequences flowing from the
operations of the carrier, even though the specific vehicle involved may already have been transferred to another
person. This doctrine rests upon the principle that in dealing with vehicles registered under the Public Service Law,
the public has the right to assume that the registered owner is the actual or lawful owner thereof It would be very
difficult and often impossible as a practical matter, for members of the general public to enforce the rights of action
that they may have for injuries inflicted by the vehicles being negligently operated if they should be required to prove
who the actual owner is. 

The registered owner is not allowed to deny liability by proving the identity of the alleged transferee. Thus, contrary
to petitioner's claim, private respondent is not required to go beyond the vehicle's certificate of registration to
ascertain the owner of the carrier. In this regard, the letter presented by petitioner allegedly written by Benjamin Tee
admitting that Licuden was his driver, had no evidentiary value not only because Benjamin Tee was not presented in
court to testify on this matter but also because of the aforementioned doctrine. To permit the ostensible or registered
owner to prove who the actual owner is, would be to set at naught the purpose or public policy which infuses that
doctrine.

In fact, private respondent had no reason at all to doubt the authority of Licuden to enter into a contract of carriage
on behalf of the registered owner. It appears that, earlier, in the first week of May 1980, private respondent
Greenhills had contracted Licuden who was then driving the same cargo truck to transport and carry a load of sawn
lumber from the Maddela sawmill to Dagupan City.  No one came forward to question that contract or the authority
of Licuden to represent the owner of the carrier truck.

Moreover, assuming the truth of her story, petitioner Benedicto retained registered ownership of the freight truck for
her own benefit and convenience, that is, to secure the payment of the balance of the selling price of the truck. She
may have been unaware of the legal security device of chattel mortgage; or she, or her buyer, may have been
unwilling to absorb the expenses of registering a chattel mortgage over the truck. In either case, considerations both
of public policy and of equity require that she bear the consequences flowing from registered ownership of the
subject vehicle.

Petitioner Benedicto, however, insists that the said principle should apply only to cases involving negligence and
resulting injury to or death of passengers, and not to cases involving merely carriage of goods. We believe
otherwise.

A common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for insistent reasons of public policy, is burdened by the
law with the duty of exercising extraordinary diligence not only in ensuring the safety of passengers but also in
caring for goods transported by it.   The loss or destruction or deterioration of goods turned over to the common
13

carrier for conveyance to a designated destination, raises instantly a presumption of fault or negligence on the part
of the carrier, save only where such loss, destruction or damage arises from extreme circumstances such as a
natural disaster or calamity or act of the public enemy in time of war, or from an act or omission of the shipper
himself or from the character of the goods or their packaging or container. 

Petitioner further insists that there was no perfected contract of carriage for the reason that there was no proof that
her consent or that of Tee had been obtained; no proof that the driver, Licuden was authorized to bind the registered
owner; and no proof that the parties had agreed on the freightage to be paid.

Once more, we are not persuaded by petitioner's arguments which appear to be a transparent attempt to evade
statutory responsibilities. Driver Licuden was entrusted with possession and control of the freight truck by the
registered owner (and by the alleged secret owner, for that matter). Driver Licuden, under the circumstances, was
i•t•c-aüsl 

clothed with at least implied authority to contract to carry goods and to accept delivery of such goods for carriage to
a specified destination. That the freight to be paid may-not have been fixed before loading and carriage, did not
prevent the contract of carriage from arising, since the freight was at least determinable if not fixed by the tariff
schedules in petitioner's main business office. 
126. G.R. No. L-12163             March 4, 1959

PAZ FORES, petitioner,
vs.
IRENEO MIRANDA, respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent was one of the passengers on a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle was descending
the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of speed, the driver lost control thereof, causing it to swerve and to his the
bridge wall. The accident occurred on the morning of March 22, 1953. Five of the passengers were injured,
including the respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. He was taken to the National
Orthopedic Hospital for treatment, and later was subjected to a series of operations; the first on May 23, 1953, when
wire loops were wound around the broken bones and screwed into place; a second, effected to insert a metal splint,
and a third one to remove such splint. At the time of the trial, it appears that respondent had not yet recovered the
use of his right arm.

The contention that the evidence did not sufficiently establish the identity of the vehicle as the belonging to the
petitioner was rejected by the appellate court which found, among other things, that is carried plate No. TPU-1163,
SERIES OF 1952, Quezon City, registered in the name of Paz Fores, (appellant herein) and that the vehicle even
had the name of "Doña Paz" painted below its wind shield. No evidence to the contrary was introduced by the
petitioner, who relied on an attack upon the credibility of the two policemen who went to the scene of the incident.

A point to be further remarked is petitioner's contention that on March 21, 1953, or one day before the accident
happened, she allegedly sold the passenger jeep that was involved therein to a certain Carmen Sackerman.

ISSUE:

WON the approval of the Public Service Commission necessary for the sale of a public service vehicle even without
conveying therewith the authority to operate the same?

HELD:

YES.

Section 20 of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 146) provides: Sec. 20. Subject to established
limitations and exceptions and saving provisions to the contrary, it shall be unlawful for any public service or for the
owner, lessee or operator thereof, without the previous approval and authority of the Commission previously had —

(g) To sell, alienate, mortgage, encumber or lease its property, franchises, certificates, privileges, or rights,
or any part thereof; or merge or consolidate its property, franchises, privileges or rights, or any part thereof,
with those of any other public service. The approval herein required shall be given, after notice to the public
and after hearing the persons interested at a public hearing, if it be shown that there are just and reasonable
grounds for making the mortgage or encumbrance, for liabilities of more than one year maturity, or the sale,
alienation, lease, merger, or consolidation to be approved and that the same are not detrimental to the
public interest, and in case of a sale, the date on which the same is to be consummated shall be fixed in the
order of approval: Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the
transaction from being negotiated or completed before its approval or to prevent the sale, alienation, or
lease by any public service of any of its property in the ordinary course of its business.

that a transfer contemplated by the law, if made without the requisite approval of the Public Service Commission, is
not effective and binding in so far as the responsibility of the grantee under the franchise in relation to the public is
concerned.

The proviso contained in the aforequoted law, to the effect that nothing therein shall be construed "to prevent the
transaction from being negotiated or complete before its approval", means only that the sale without the required
approval is still valid and binding between the parties 

The phrase "in the ordinary course of its business" found in the other proviso" or to prevent the sale, alienation, or
lease by any public service of any of its property". As correctly observed by the lower court, could not have been
intended to include the sale of the vehicle itself, but at most may refer only to such property that may be conceivably
disposed or by the carrier in the ordinary course of its business, like junked equipment or spare parts.

The case of Indalecio de Torres vs. Vicente Ona (63 Phil., 594, 597) is enlightening; and there, it was held:Under
the law, the Public Service Commission has not only general supervision and regulation of, but also full jurisdiction
and control over all public utilities including the property, equipment and facilities used, and the property rights and
franchise enjoyed by every individual and company engaged i the performance of a public service in the sense this
phrase is used in the Public Service Act or Act No. 3108). By virtue of the provisions of said Act, motor vehicles
used in the performance of a service, as the transportation of freight from one point to another, have to this date
been considered — and they cannot but be so considered-public service property; and, by reason of its own nature,
a TH truck, which means that the operator thereof places it at the disposal of anybody who is willing to pay a rental
of its use, when he desires to transfer or carry his effects, merchandise or any other cargo from one place to
another, is necessarily a public service property.

127. G.R. No. L-30212 September 30, 1987

BIENVENIDO GELISAN, petitioner,
vs.
BENITO ALDAY, respondent.

FACTS:

Defendant Bienvenido Gelisan is the owner of a freight truck bearing plate No. TH-2377. On January 31, 1962,
defendant Bienvenido Gelisan and Roberto Espiritu entered into a contract marked Exhibit 3-Gelisan under which
Espiritu hired the same freight truck of Gelisan for the purpose of hauling rice, sugar, flour and fertilizer at an agreed
price of P18.00 per trip within the limits of the City of Manila provided the loads shall not exceed 200 sacks. It is also
agreed that Espiritu shall bear and pay all losses and damages attending the carriage of the goods to be hauled by
him.

The truck was taken by a driver of Roberto Espiritu on February 1, 1962. Plaintiff Benito Alday, a trucking operator,
and who owns about 15 freight trucks, had known the defendant Roberto Espiritu since 1948 as a truck operator.
Plaintiff had a contract to haul the fertilizers of the Atlas Fertilizer Corporation from Pier 4, North Harbor, to its
Warehouse in Mandaluyong. Alday met Espiritu at the gate of Pier 4 and the latter offered the use of his truck with
the driver and helper at 9 centavos per bag of fertilizer.

The offer was accepted by plaintiff Alday and he instructed his checker Celso Henson to let Roberto Espiritu haul
the fertilizer. Espiritu made two hauls of 200 bags of fertilizer per trip. The fertilizer was delivered to the driver and
helper of Espiritu with the necessary way bill receipts, Exhibits A and B. Espiritu, however, did not deliver the
fertilizer to the Atlas Fertolizer bodega at Mandaluyong. The signatures appearing in the way bill receipts Exhibits A
and B of the Alday Transportation admittedly not the signature of any representative or employee of the Atlas
Fertilizer Corporation. Roberto Espiritu could not be found, and plaintiff reported the loss to the Manila Police
Department. Roberto Espiritu was later arrested and booked for theft.

Bienvenido Gelisan, upon the other hand, disowned responsibility. He claimed that he had no contractual relations
with the plaintiff Benito Alday as regards the hauling and/or delivery of the 400 bags of fertilizer mentioned in the
complaint; that the alleged misappropriation or nondelivery by defendant Roberto Espiritu of plaintiff's 400 bags of
fertilizer, was entirely beyond his (Gelisan's) control and knowledge, and which fact became known to him, for the
first time, on 8 February 1962 when his freight truck, with plate No. TH-2377, was impounded by the Manila Police
Department, at the instance of the plaintiff; and that in his written contract of hire with Roberto Espiritu, it was
expressly provided that the latter will bear and pay all loss and damages attending the carriage of goods to be
hauled by said Roberto Espiritu.

ISSUE:

WON Bienvenido Gelisan is likewise liable for being the registered owner of the truck; and that the lease contract,
executed by and between Bienvenido Gelisan and Roberto Espiritu, is not binding upon Benito Alday for not having
been previously approved by the Public Service Commission.

HELD:

YES.

The Court has invariably held in several decisions that the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible
for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation or that may be caused to any of the
passengers therein.   The claim of the petitioner that he is not hable in view of the lease contract executed by and
5

between him and Roberto Espiritu which exempts him from liability to third persons, cannot be sustained because it
appears that the lease contract, adverted to, had not been approved by the Public Service Commission. It is settled
in our jurisprudence that if the property covered by a franchise is transferred or leased to another without obtaining
the requisite approval, the transfer is not binding upon the public and third persons. 

We also find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the rule requiring the previous approval by the Public Service
Commission, of the transfer or lease of the motor vehicle, may be applied only in cases where there is no positive
Identification of the owner or driver, or where there are very scant means of Identification, but not in those instances
where the person responsible for damages has been fixed or determined beforehand, as in the case at bar.

Montoya vs. Ignacio,   thus:

7

There is merit in this contention. The law really requires the approval of the Public Service
Commission in order that a franchise, or any privilege pertaining thereto, may be sold or leased
without infringing the certificate issued to the grantee. The reason is obvious. Since a franchise is
personal in nature any transfer or lease thereof should be notified to the Public Service Commission
so that the latter mav take proper safeguards to protect the interest of the public. 

Bienvenido Gelisan, the registered owner, is not however without recourse. He has a right to be indemnified by
Roberto Espiritu for the amount titat he may be required to pay as damages for the injury caused to Benito Alday,
since the lease contract in question, although not effective against the public for not having been approved by the
Public Service Commission, is valid and binding between the contracting parties.  8

We also find no merit in the petitioner's contention that his liability is only subsidiary. The Court has consistently
considered the registered owner/operator of a public service vehicle to be jointly and severally liable with the driver
for damages incurred by passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries sustained in the operation of said
vehicles. 

ble