Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918
AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellee.
Alejo Mabanag for appellant.
G. E. Campbell for appellee.

DECISION
STREET, J.:
In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the defendant, Frank Smith, Jr.,
the sum of P31,000, as damages alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by
the defendant. From a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union
absolving the defendant from liability the plaintiff has appealed.
The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place on December 12,
1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It appears that upon the occasion
in question the plaintiff was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half
way across, the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going
at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw
a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his
course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it
appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the
road.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he
pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going
to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient
time to get over to the other side. The bridge is shown to have a length of about 75 meters
and a width of 4.80 meters. As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward
his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant
assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. The pony had not as yet
exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. Seeing that the
pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some
distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without
diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the
horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the
right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but in so
doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened
and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it was
struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The
horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. From the evidence adduced in the
case we believe that when the accident occurred the free space where the pony stood
between the automobile and the railing of the bridge was probably less than one and one
half meters. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which
caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
The question presented for decision is whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car
in the manner above described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil
obligation to repair the damage done; and we are of the opinion that he is so liable. As the
defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider
would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was
demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have
perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle.
In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some
distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the power of the plaintiff to
escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation
had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an
immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other
side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of
doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. He was, we
think, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. But in
view of the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in
question was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get excited and jump under the
conditions which here confronted him. When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to
this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here
in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him.
The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation
must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the
facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot here be of much value
but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the
circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not
supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only
when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in
the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If
so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable
foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion
for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be
negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an
effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or
guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that
negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant,
would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught
with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable
consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant
the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have
already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to
discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the
negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the
defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference
to the prior negligence of the other party.
The decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359)
should perhaps be mentioned in this connection. This Court there held that while
contributory negligence on the part of the person injured did not constitute a bar to recovery,
it could be received in evidence to reduce the damages which would otherwise have been
assessed wholly against the other party. The defendant company had there employed the
plaintiff, as a laborer, to assist in transporting iron rails from a barge in Manila harbor to the
company’s yards located not far away. The rails were conveyed upon cars which were
hauled along a narrow track. At certain spot near the water’s edge the track gave way by
reason of the combined effect of the weight of the car and the insecurity of the road bed.
The car was in consequence upset; the rails slid off; and the plaintiff’s leg was caught and
broken. It appeared in evidence that the accident was due to the effects of the typhoon
which had dislodged one of the supports of the track. The court found that the defendant
company was negligent in having failed to repair the bed of the track and also that the
plaintiff was, at the moment of the accident, guilty of contributory negligence in walking at
the side of the car instead of being in front or behind. It was held that while the defendant
was liable to the plaintiff by reason of its negligence in having failed to keep the track in
proper repair nevertheless the amount of the damages should be reduced on account of the
contributory negligence in the plaintiff. As will be seen the defendant’s negligence in that
case consisted in an omission only. The liability of the company arose from its responsibility
for the dangerous condition of its track. In a case like the one now before us, where the
defendant was actually present and operating the automobile which caused the damage,
we do not feel constrained to attempt to weigh the negligence of the respective parties in
order to apportion the damage according to the degree of their relative fault. It is enough to
say that the negligence of the defendant was in this case the immediate and determining
cause of the accident and that the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff was a more remote
factor in the case.
A point of minor importance in the case is indicated in the special defense pleaded in the
defendant’s answer, to the effect that the subject matter of the action had been previously
adjudicated in the court of a justice of the peace. In this connection it appears that soon
after the accident in question occurred, the plaintiff caused criminal proceedings to be
instituted before a justice of the peace charging the defendant with the infliction of serious
injuries (lesiones graves). At the preliminary investigation the defendant was discharged by
the magistrate and the proceedings were dismissed. Conceding that the acquittal of the
defendant at the trial upon the merits in a criminal prosecution for the offense mentioned
would be res adjudicata upon the question of his civil liability arising from negligence — a
point upon which it is unnecessary to express an opinion — the action of the justice of the
peace in dismissing the criminal proceeding upon the preliminary hearing can have no
effect. (See U. S. vs. Banzuela and Banzuela, 31 Phil. Rep., 564.)
From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must
be REVERSED, and judgment is her rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the
sum of two hundred pesos (P200), with costs of other instances. The sum here awarded is
estimated to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or
damage occasioned to articles of his apparel, and lawful interest on the whole to the date of
this recovery. The other damages claimed by the plaintiff are remote or otherwise of such
character as not to be recoverable. SO ORDERED.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Araullo, Avanceña, and Fisher, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.