G.R. No.

147437 May 8, 2009

LARRY V. CAMINOS, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The right of a person using public streets and highways for travel in relation to other motorists is
mutual, coordinate and reciprocal.1 He is

bound to anticipate the presence of other persons whose rights on the street or highway are equal to
his own.2Although he is not an insurer against injury to persons or property,3 it is nevertheless his
duty to operate his motor vehicle with due and reasonable care and caution under the circumstances
for the safety of others4 as well as for his own.5

This Petition for Review6 seeks the reversal of the Decision7 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 14819 dated 28 February 1995. The assailed decision affirmed the judgment of
conviction8 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163 in Criminal Case No.
76653—one for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property—against petitioner Larry V.
Caminos, Jr. but reduced the latter’s civil liability on account of the finding that the negligence of
Arnold Litonjua, the private offended party, had contributed to the vehicular collision subject of the
instant case.

The case is rooted on a vehicular collision that happened on the night of 21 June 1988 at the
intersection of Ortigas Avenue and Columbia Street in Mandaluyong City, right in front of Gate 6 of
East Greenhills Subdivision. The vehicles involved were a Mitsubishi Super Saloon9 driven by
petitioner and a Volkswagen Karmann Ghia10 driven by Arnold Litonjua (Arnold). The mishap
occurred at approximately 7:45 in the evening.11 That night, the road was wet.12 Arnold, who had
earlier passed by Wack Wack Subdivision, was traversing Ortigas Avenue toward the direction of
Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue. He prepared to make a left turn as he reached the intersection of
Ortigas Avenue and Columbia Street, and as soon as he had maneuvered the turn through the
break in the traffic island the Mitsubishi car driven by petitioner suddenly came ramming into his car
from his right-hand side. Petitioner, who was also traversing Ortigas Avenue, was headed towards
the direction of San Juan and he approached the same intersection from the opposite direction.13

The force exerted by petitioner’s car heaved Arnold’s car several feet away from the break in the
island, sent it turning 180 degrees until it finally settled on the outer lane of Ortigas Avenue.14 It
appears that it was the fender on the left-hand side of petitioner’s car that made contact with
Arnold’s car, and that the impact—which entered from the right-hand side of Arnold’s car to the left—
was established on the frontal center of the latter vehicle which thus caused the left-hand side of its
hood to curl upward.15

Arnold immediately summoned to the scene of the collision Patrolman Ernesto Santos (Patrolman
Santos),16 a traffic investigator of the Mandaluyong Police Force who at the time was manning the
police outpost in front of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Building.17 Patrolman
Santos interrogated both petitioner and Arnold and made a sketch depicting the relative positions of
the two colliding vehicles after the impact.18 The sketch, signed by both petitioner and Arnold and
countersigned by Patrolman Santos, shows petitioner’s car—
which, it seems, was able to keep its momentum and general direction even upon impact—was
stalled along Ortigas Avenue a few feet away from the intersection and facing the direction of San
Juan whereas Arnold’s car had settled on the outer lane of Ortigas Avenue with its rear facing the
meeting point of the median lines of the intersecting streets at a 45-degree angle.19

At the close of the investigation, a traffic accident investigation report (TAIR)20 was forthwith issued
by P/Cpl. Antonio N. Nato of the Eastern Police District. The report revealed that at the time of the
collision, Arnold’s car, which had "no right of way,"21 was "turning left" whereas petitioner’s car was
"going straight" and was "exceeding lawful speed."22 It also indicated that the vision of the drivers
was obstructed by the "center island flower bed."23

Petitioner was subsequently charged before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City with reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to

property.24 He entered a negative plea on arraignment.25

At the ensuing trial, Patrolman Santos admitted having executed the sketch which depicts the post-
collision positions of the two vehicles.26 Arnold’s testimony established that his vehicle was at a full
stop at the intersection when the incident happened.27 Told by the trial court to demonstrate how the
incident transpired, he executed a sketch which showed that his car had not yet invaded the portion
of the road beyond the median line of the island and that the path taken by petitioner’s car, depicted
by broken lines, came swerving from the outer lane of the road to the left and rushing toward the
island where Arnold’s car was executing a turn.28 On cross-examination, he admitted the correctness
of the entry in the TAIR to the effect that he was turning left when hit by petitioner’s car,29but he
claimed on re-direct examination that he had stopped at the intersection in order to keep the traffic
open to other vehicles and that it was then that petitioner bumped his car. On re-cross examination,
however, he stated that he had brought his car to a full stop before turning left but that the front
portion thereof was already two (2) feet into the other lane of Ortigas Avenue and well beyond the
median line of the traffic island.30

Antonio Litonjua (Antonio), the father of Arnold in whose name the Volkswagen car was registered,
testified that the estimation of the cost of repairs to be made on the car was initially made by SKB
Motors Philippines, Inc. The estimation report dated 30 June 1988 showed the total cost of repairs to
be ₱73,962.00. The necessary works on the car, according to Antonio, had not been performed by
SKB Motors because the needed materials had not been delivered.31 Meanwhile, SKB Motors
allegedly ceased in its operation, so Antonio procured another repair estimation this time from
Fewkes Corporation.32 The estimation report was dated 13 December 1991, and it bloated the total
cost of repairs to ₱139,294.00.33 Ricardo Abrencia, resident manager of Fewkes Corporation,
admitted that he personally made and signed the said estimation report and that Antonio had already
delivered a check representing the payment for half of the total assessment.34

Petitioner, the lone defense witness, was a company driver in the employ of Fortune Tobacco, Inc.
assigned to drive for the company secretary, Mariano Tanigan, who was with him at the time of the
incident. In an effort to exonerate himself from liability, he imputed negligence to Arnold as the cause
of the mishap, claiming that that he, moments before the collision, was actually carefully traversing
Ortigas Avenue on second gear. He lamented that it was Arnold’s car which bumped his car and not
the other way around and that he had not seen Arnold’s car coming from the left side of the
intersection—which seems to suggest that Arnold’s car was in fact in motion or in the process of
making the turn when the collision occurred. His speed at the time, according to his own estimate,
was between 25 and 30 kph because he had just passed by the stoplight located approximately 100
meters away at the junction of Ortigas Avenue and EDSA, and that he even slowed down as he
approached the intersection.35
In its 18 September 1992 Decision,36 the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. The trial court
relied principally on the sketch made by Patrolman Santos depicting the post-collision positions of
the two vehicles—that piece of evidence which neither of the parties assailed at the trial—and found
that of the two conflicting accounts of how the collision happened it was Arnold’s version that is
consistent with the evidence. It pointed out that just because Arnold had no right of way, as shown in
the TAIR, does not account for fault on his part since it was in fact petitioner’s car that came colliding
with Arnold’s car. It concluded that petitioner, by reason of his own admission that he did not notice
Arnold’s car at the intersection, is solely to be blamed for the incident especially absent any showing
that there was any obstruction to his line of sight. Petitioner, according to the trial court, would have
in fact noticed on-coming vehicles coming across his path had he employed proper precaution.
Accordingly, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay civil indemnity in the amount of ₱139,294.00 as
well as a fine in the same amount.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the factual findings of the trial court. In its Decision dated 28
February 1995, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court
against petitioner. However, it mitigated the award of civil indemnity on its finding that Arnold himself
was likewise reckless in maneuvering a left turn inasmuch as he had neglected to look out, before
entering the other lane of the road, for vehicles that could likewise be possibly entering the
intersection from his right side.37

This notwithstanding, petitioner was still unsatisfied with the ruling of the appellate court. Seeking an
acquittal, he filed the present petition for review in which he maintains Arnold’s own negligence was
the principal determining factor that caused the mishap and which should thus defeat any claim for
damages. In declaring him liable to the charge despite the existence of negligence attributable to
Arnold, petitioner believes that the Court of Appeals had misapplied the principle of last clear chance
in this case.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment,38 argues that petitioner’s negligence is the
proximate cause of the collision and that Arnold Litonjua’s negligence was contributory to the
accident which, however, does not bar recovery of damages. Additionally, it recommends the
reduction of both the fine and the civil indemnity as the same are beyond what the prosecution was
able to prove at the trial.

The Court denies the petition.

Reckless imprudence generally defined by our penal law consists in voluntarily but without malice,
doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.39

Imprudence connotes a deficiency of action. It implies a failure in precaution or a failure to take the
necessary precaution once the danger or

peril becomes foreseen.40 Thus, something more than mere negligence in the operation of a motor
vehicle is necessary to constitute the offense of reckless driving, and a willful and wanton disregard
of the consequences is required.41 Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within
the meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of
action which injures another, either with knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with
knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any reasonable person.42
Hence, in prosecutions for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, whether or not one
of the drivers of the colliding automobiles is guilty of the offense is a question that lies in the manner
and circumstances of the operation of the motor vehicle,43 and a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt requires the concurrence of the following elements, namely, (a) that the offender has done or
failed to do an act; (b) that the act is voluntary; (c) that the same is without malice; (d) that material
damage results; and (e) that there has been inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
offender.44

Among the elements constitutive of the offense, what perhaps is most central to a finding of guilt is
the conclusive determination that the accused has exhibited, by his voluntary act without malice, an
inexcusable lack of precaution because it is that which supplies the criminal intent so indispensable
as to bring an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law.45 This,
because a conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct is all that that is required from
the standpoint of the frame of mind of the accused,46 that is, without regard to whether the private
offended party may himself be considered likewise at fault.

Inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code, however, does not detail what particular act or acts causing
damage to property may be characterized as reckless imprudence, certainly, as with all criminal
prosecutions, the inquiry as to whether the accused could be held liable for the offense is a question
that must be addressed by the facts and circumstances unique to a given case. Thus, if we must
determine whether petitioner in this case has shown a conscious indifference to the consequences
of his conduct, our attention must necessarily drift to the most fundamental factual predicate. And we
proceed from petitioner’s contention that at the time the collision took place, he was carefully driving
the car as he in fact approached the intersection on second gear and that his speed allegedly was
somewhere between 25 and 30 kph which under normal conditions could be considered so safe and
manageable as to enable him to bring the car to a full stop when necessary.

Aside from the entry in the TAIR, however, which noted petitioner’s speed to be beyond what is
lawful, the physical evidence on record likewise seems to negate petitioner’s contention. The
photographs taken of Arnold’s car clearly show that the extent of the damage to it could not have
been caused by petitioner’s car running on second gear at the speed of 25-30 kph. The fact that the
hood of Arnold’s car was violently wrenched as well as the fact that on impact the car even turned
around 180 degrees and was hurled several feet away from the junction to the outer lane of Ortigas
Avenue—when in fact Arnold had already established his turn to the left on the inner lane and into
the opposite lane—clearly demonstrate that the force of the collision had been created by a speed
way beyond what petitioner’s estimation.

Rate of speed, in connection with other circumstances, is one of the principal considerations in
determining whether a motorist has been reckless in driving an automobile,47 and evidence of the
extent of the damage caused may show the force of the impact from which the rate of speed of the
vehicle may be modestly inferred.48 While an adverse inference may be gathered with respect to
reckless driving49 from proof of excessive speed under the circumstances50 —as in this case where
the TAIR itself shows that petitioner approached the intersection in excess of lawful speed—such
proof raises the presumption of imprudent driving which may be overcome by evidence,51 or, as
otherwise stated, shifts the burden of proof so as to require the accused to show that under the
circumstances he was not driving in a careless or imprudent manner.52

We find, however, that petitioner has not been able to discharge that burden inasmuch as the
physical evidence on record is heavy with conviction way more than his bare assertion that his
speed at the time of the incident was well within what is controllable. Indeed, the facts of this case do
warrant a finding that petitioner, on approach to the junction, was traveling at a speed far greater
than that conveniently fixed in his testimony. Insofar as such facts are consistent with that finding,
their truth must reasonably be admitted.53

Speeding, moreover, is indicative of imprudent behavior because a motorist is bound to exercise

such ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions
encountered on the road. What is reasonable speed, of course, is necessarily subjective as it must
conform to the peculiarities of a given case but in all cases, it is that which will enable the driver to
keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the highway.54 This standard of
reasonableness is actually contained in Section 35 of R.A. No. 4136. It states:

SEC. 35. Restriction as to speed.—(a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive
the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having
due regard for the traffic, the width of the highway, and of any other condition then and there
existing; and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such speed as to endanger
the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the
vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.

Even apart from statutory regulations as to speed, a motorist is nevertheless expected to exercise
ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the conditions
encountered 55 which will enable him to keep the vehicle under control and, whenever necessary, to
put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the highway. 56

It is must be stressed that this restriction on speed assumes more importance where the motorist is
approaching an intersection. Ordinary or reasonable care in the operation of a motor vehicle at an
intersection would naturally require more precaution than is necessary when driving elsewhere in a
street or highway.57 A driver approaching an intersection is generally under duty, among others, to
be vigilant and to have the vehicle under control as to be able to stop at the shortest possible
notice,58 that is, he must look for vehicles that might be approaching from within the radius that
denotes the limit of danger.59

Since compliance with this duty is measured by whether an approaching motorist has exercised the
level of precaution required under the circumstances, then with more reason that he exhibit a
relatively higher level of care when the intersection is blind at the point where the roads meet. In
other words, where the view at an intersection is obstructed and an approaching motorist cannot get
a good view to the right or left until he is close to the intersection, prudence would dictate that he
take particular care to observe the traffic before entering the intersection or otherwise use
reasonable care to avoid a collision,60 which means that he is bound is to move with the utmost
caution until it is determinable that he can proceed safely and at the slowest speed possible61 so that
the vehicle could be stopped within the distance the driver can see ahead.62

On this score, what brings certain failure in petitioner’s case is his own admission that he had not
seen Arnold’s car making a left turn at the intersection. Of course, there had been an arduous
debate at the trial as to whether Arnold’s car was in motion or at a full stop at the intersection
moments before the collision; nevertheless, inasmuch as he (Arnold), as shown by the evidence,
had been able to establish himself at the intersection significantly ahead of petitioner, it defies logic
to accord even a semblance of truth to petitioner’s assertion that he had not seen Arnold’s car
entering the intersection laterally from his left especially when the said car admittedly had already
taken two feet of the other lane of the road—the lane on which petitioner was proceeding to cross—
and well beyond the median line of the intersecting road on which Arnold proceeded after making
the turn. Indeed, not even the fact that the view at the intersection was blocked by the flower bed on
the traffic island could provide an excuse for petitioner as it has likewise been established that he
approached the intersection at such a speed that could not, as in fact it did not, enable him to arrest
his momentum and forestall the certainty of the collision.

It can only be surmised at this point that petitioner had inexcusably fallen short of the standard of
care in a situation which called for more precaution on the highway in failing to make an observation
in the interest at least of his own safety whether or not it was safe to enter the crossing. Since he is
chargeable with what he should have observed only had he exercised the commensurate care
required under the circumstances of the case, the inescapable conclusion is that he had inexcusably
breached the elementary duties of a responsible, prudent and reasonable motorist.

In general, the degree of care and attention required of a driver in a particular case in exercising
reasonable care will vary with and must be measured in the light of all the surrounding
circumstances, such that it must be commensurate with the dangers which are to be anticipated and
the injuries which are likely to result from the use of the vehicle.63 In other words, he must observe a
sense of proportionality between precaution and the peculiar risks attendant or even inherent in the
condition of the road64 which are open to ordinary observation.65 The ultimate test, in other words, is
to be found in the reasonable foreseeability that harm might result if commensurate care is not
exercised. It is not necessary, however, that a motorist actually foresee the probability of harm or
that the particular injury which resulted was foreseeable; it would suffice that he, in the position of an
ordinary prudent man, knowing what he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of a
general nature as that suffered was to materialize.66The evidence in this case is teeming with
suggestion that petitioner had failed to foresee the certainty of the collision that was about to happen
as he entered the junction in question especially considering that his lateral vision at the intersection
was blocked by the structures on the road. In the same way, he failed to solidly establish that such
failure to foresee the danger lurking on the road could be deemed excusable as indeed his
contention that he was running at a safe speed is totally negated by the evidence derived from the
physical facts of the case.

Yet, petitioner clings to a chance of acquittal. In his petition, he theorizes that the negligence of
Arnold, which according to the Court of Appeals was incipient in character, was actually the principal
determining factor which caused the mishap and the fact that the TAIR indicated that Arnold had no
right of way, it is he himself who had the status of a favored driver. The contention is utterly without
merit.

In traffic law parlance, the term "right of way" is understood as the right of one vehicle to proceed in
a lawful manner in preference to another approaching vehicle under such circumstances of direction,
speed and proximity as to give rise to a danger of collision unless one of the vehicles grants
precedence to the other.67 Although there is authority to the effect that the right of way is merely of
statutory creation and exists only according to express statutory provision,68 it is generally
recognized, where no statute or ordinance governs the matter, that the vehicle first entering an
intersection is entitled to the right of way, and it becomes the duty of the other vehicle likewise
approaching the intersection to proceed with sufficient care to permit the exercise of such right
without danger of collisions.69

In our setting, the right of way rule is governed by Section 42 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
4136,70 which materially provides:

Section 42. Right of Way.

(a) When two vehicles approach or enter an intersection at approximately the same time, the
driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right, except
 as otherwise hereinafter provided. The driver of any vehicle traveling at an unlawful speed
shall forfeit any right which he might otherwise have hereunder.

(b) The driver of a vehicle approaching but not having entered an intersection shall yield the
right of a way to a vehicle within such intersection or turning therein to the left across the line
of travel of such first-mentioned vehicle, provided the driver of the vehicle turning left has
given a plainly visible signal of intention to turn as required in this Act. x x x.

The provision governs the situation when two vehicles approach the intersection from the same
direction and one of them intends make a turn on either side of the road. But the rule embodied in
the said provision, also prevalent in traffic statutes in the United States, has also been liberally
applied to a situation in which two vehicles approach an intersection from directly opposite directions
at approximately the same time on the same street and one of them attempts to make a left-hand
turn into the intersecting street, so as to put the other upon his right, the vehicle making the turn
being under the duty of yielding to the other.71

Nevertheless, the right of way accorded to vehicles approaching an intersection is not absolute in
terms. It is actually subject to and is affected by the relative distances of the vehicles from the point
of intersection.72 Thus, whether one of the drivers has the right of way or, as sometimes stated, has
the status of a favored driver on the highway, is a question that permeates a situation where the
vehicles approach the crossing so nearly at the same time and at such distances and speed that if
either of them proceeds without regard to the other a collision is likely to occur.73 Otherwise stated,
the statutory right of way rule under Section 42 of our traffic law applies only where the vehicles are
approaching the intersection at approximately the same time and not where one of the vehicles enter
the junction substantially in advance of the other.

Whether two vehicles are approaching the intersection at the same time does not necessarily
depend on which of the vehicles enters the intersection first. Rather, it is determined by the
imminence of collision when the relative distances and speeds of the two vehicles are
considered.74 It is said that two vehicles are approaching the intersection at approximately the same
time where it would appear to a reasonable person of ordinary prudence in the position of the driver
approaching from the left of another vehicle that if the two vehicles continued on their courses at
their speed, a collision would likely occur, hence, the driver of the vehicle approaching from the left
must give the right of precedence to the driver of the vehicle on his right.75 1avvphi1

Nevertheless, the rule requiring the driver on the left to yield the right of way to the driver on the right
on approach to the intersection, no duty is imposed on the driver on the left to come to a dead stop,
but he is merely required to approach the intersection with his vehicle under control so that he may
yield the right of way to a vehicle within the danger zone on his right.76 He is not bound to wait until
there is no other vehicle on his right in sight before proceeding to the intersection but only

until it is reasonably safe to proceed.77 Thus, in Adzuara v. Court of Appeals,78 it was established that
a motorist crossing a thru-stop street has the right of way over the one making a turn; but if the
person making the turn has already negotiated half of the turn and is almost on the other side so that
he is already visible to the person on the thru-street, he is bound to give way to the former.

Moreover, in a prosecution for reckless or dangerous driving, the negligence of the person who was
injured or who was the driver of the motor vehicle with which the accused’s vehicle collided does not
constitute a defense.79 In fact, even where such driver is said to be guilty of a like offense, proof
thereof may never work favors to the case of the accused.80 In other words, proof that the offended
party was also negligent or imprudent in the operation of his automobile bears little weight, if at all, at
least for purposes of establishing the accused’s culpability beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, even if
we are to hypothesize that Arnold was likewise negligent in neglecting to keep a proper lookout as
he took a left turn at the intersection, such negligence, contrary to petitioner’s contention, will
nevertheless not support an acquittal. At best, it will only determine the applicability of several other
rules governing situations where concurring negligence exists and only for the purpose of arriving at
a proper assessment of the award of damages in favor of the private offended party.

But it must be asked: do the facts of the case support a finding that Arnold was likewise negligent in
executing the left turn? The answer is in the negative. It is as much unsafe as it is unjust to assume
that Arnold, just because the TAIR so indicated that he at the time had no right of way, that Arnold
had performed a risky maneuver at the intersection in failing

to keep a proper lookout for oncoming vehicles. In fact, aside from petitioner’s bare and self-serving
assertion that Arnold’s fault was the principal determining cause of the mishap as well as his
allegation that it was actually Arnold’s car that came colliding with his car, there is no slightest
suggestion in the records that could tend to negate what the physical evidence in this case has
established. Clearly, it was petitioner’s negligence, as pointed out by the OSG, that proximately
caused the accident. 1avv phi1

Finally, on the issue of damages, inasmuch as petitioner had not extended efforts to present
countervailing evidence disproving the extent and cost of the damage sustained by Arnold’s car, the
award assessed and ordered by the trial court must stand.

All told, it must be needlessly emphasized that the measure of a motorist’s duty is such care as is,
under the facts and circumstances of the particular case, commensurate with the dangers which are
to be anticipated and the injuries which are likely to result from the use of the vehicle, and in
proportion to or commensurate with the peculiar risk attendant on the circumstances and conditions
in the particular case,81 the driver being under the duty to know and to take into consideration those
circumstances and factors affecting the safe operation of the vehicle which would be open to
ordinary observation.82

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
14819 dated 28 February 1995 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Branch 163 in Criminal Case No. 76653 dated 18 September 1992 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

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WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES*

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA LEONARDO DE CASTRO**

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

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