GONZAGA VS PEOPLE

G.R. No. 195671 January 21, 2015

Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 365 of the RPC, consists in

voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a

vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection
between such negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. To
constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more
than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle – a willful and
wanton disregard of the consequences is required. Willful, wanton or
reckless disregard for the safety of others within the meaning of reckless
driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of
action which injures another, either with knowledge of serious danger to
others involved, or with knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger
to any reasonable person. Verily, it is the inexcusable lack of precaution or
conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct which supplies the
criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence and imprudence under
the operation of the penal law, without regard to whether the private offended
party may himself be considered likewise at fault.

In the present case, the RTC and the CA uniformly found that Rogelio’s act of driving very fast on the
wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the collision, resulting to the death of Dionesio,
Sr. and serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry. Notably, the road where the incident
occurred was a curve sloping upwards towards Brgy. Bocboc where the Inguitos were bound and
descending towards the opposite direction where Rogelio was going. Indeed, the very fact of
speeding, under such circumstances, is indicative of imprudent behavior. As a motorist, Rogelio was
bound to exercise ordinary care in such affair by driving at a reasonable rate of speed
commensurate with the conditions encountered, as this would enable him to keep the vehicle under
control and avoid injury to others using the highway. Moreover, it is elementary in traffic school that
a driver slows down before negotiating a curve as it may be reasonably anticipated that another
vehicle may appear from the opposite direction at any moment. Hence, excessive speed, combined
with other circumstances such as the occurrence of the accident on or near a curve, as in this case,
constitutes negligence. Consequently, the Court finds that Rogelio acted recklessly and imprudently
in driving at a fast speed on the wrong side of the road while approaching the curve where the
incident happened, thereby rendering him criminally liable, as well as civilly accountable for the
material damages resulting therefrom
CAMINOS JR. vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 147437 May 8, 2009

The right of a person using public streets and highways for travel in relation to
other motorists is mutual, coordinate and reciprocal. He is bound to anticipate
the presence of other persons whose rights on the street or highway are equal
to his own. Although he is not an insurer against injury to persons or property,
it is nevertheless his duty to operate his motor vehicle with due and
reasonable care and caution under the circumstances for the safety of
others as well as for his own.

Hence, in prosecutions for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to

property, whether or not one of the drivers of the colliding automobiles is
guilty of the offense is a question that lies in the manner and circumstances of
the operation of the motor vehicle, and a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt requires the concurrence of the following elements, namely, (a) that
the offender has done or failed to do an act; (b) that the act is voluntary;
(c) that the same is without malice; (d) that material damage results; and
(e) that there has been inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
offender.

Among the elements constitutive of the offense, what perhaps is most central
to a finding of guilt is the conclusive determination that the accused has
exhibited, by his voluntary act without malice, an inexcusable lack of
precaution because it is that which supplies the criminal intent so
indispensable as to bring an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the
operation of the penal law. This, because a conscious indifference to the
consequences of the conduct is all that that is required from the
standpoint of the frame of mind of the accused, that is, without regard to
whether the private offended party may himself be considered likewise
at fault.

Inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code, however, does not detail what particular
act or acts causing damage to property may be characterized as reckless
imprudence, certainly, as with all criminal prosecutions, the inquiry as to
whether the accused could be held liable for the offense is a question that
must be addressed by the facts and circumstances unique to a given case.
Thus, if we must determine whether petitioner in this case has shown a
conscious indifference to the consequences of his conduct, our attention must
necessarily drift to the most fundamental factual predicate. And we proceed
from petitioner’s contention that at the time the collision took place, he was
carefully driving the car as he in fact approached the intersection on second
gear and that his speed allegedly was somewhere between 25 and 30 kph
which under normal conditions could be considered so safe and manageable
as to enable him to bring the car to a full stop when necessary.

Rate of speed, in connection with other circumstances, is one of the

principal considerations in determining whether a motorist has been
reckless in driving an automobile, and evidence of the extent of the
damage caused may show the force of the impact from which the rate of
speed of the vehicle may be modestly inferred. While an adverse inference
may be gathered with respect to reckless driving from proof of excessive speed
under the circumstances —as in this case where the TAIR itself shows that
petitioner approached the intersection in excess of lawful speed—such proof
raises the presumption of imprudent driving which may be overcome by
evidence, or, as otherwise stated, shifts the burden of proof so as to require the
accused to show that under the circumstances he was not driving in a careless
or imprudent manner.

Speeding, moreover, is indicative of imprudent behavior because a motorist is

bound to exercise such ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed
commensurate with the conditions encountered on the road. What is
reasonable speed, of course, is necessarily subjective as it must conform to the
peculiarities of a given case but in all cases, it is that which will enable the
driver to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the
highway. This standard of reasonableness is actually contained in Section 35 of
R.A. No. 4136.

SEC. 35. Restriction as to speed.—(a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a

highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor
less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width
of the highway, and of any other condition then and there existing; and no
person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such speed as to
endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than
will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance
ahead.
It is must be stressed that this restriction on speed assumes more importance
where the motorist is approaching an intersection. Ordinary or reasonable
care in the operation of a motor vehicle at an intersection would naturally
require more precaution than is necessary when driving elsewhere in a street
or highway. A driver approaching an intersection is generally under duty,
among others, to be vigilant and to have the vehicle under control as to be able
to stop at the shortest possible notice, that is, he must look for vehicles that
might be approaching from within the radius that denotes the limit of danger.
Since compliance with this duty is measured by whether an approaching
motorist has exercised the level of precaution required under the
circumstances, then with more reason that he exhibit a relatively higher level
of care when the intersection is blind at the point where the roads meet. In
other words, where the view at an intersection is obstructed and an
approaching motorist cannot get a good view to the right or left until he is
close to the intersection, prudence would dictate that he take particular care
to observe the traffic before entering the intersection or otherwise use
reasonable care to avoid a collision, which means that he is bound is to move
with the utmost caution until it is determinable that he can proceed safely and
at the slowest speed possible so that the vehicle could be stopped within the
distance the driver can see ahead.
n general, the degree of care and attention required of a driver in a particular
case in exercising reasonable care will vary with and must be measured in the
light of all the surrounding circumstances, such that it must be commensurate
with the dangers which are to be anticipated and the injuries which are likely
to result from the use of the vehicle. In other words, he must observe a sense
of proportionality between precaution and the peculiar risks attendant or
even inherent in the condition of the road which are open to ordinary
observation. The ultimate test, in other words, is to be found in the reasonable
foreseeability that harm might result if commensurate care is not exercised. It
is not necessary, however, that a motorist actually foresee the probability of
harm or that the particular injury which resulted was foreseeable; it would
suffice that he, in the position of an ordinary prudent man, knowing what he
knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of a general nature as that
suffered was to materialize. The evidence in this case is teeming with
suggestion that petitioner had failed to foresee the certainty of the collision
that was about to happen as he entered the junction in question especially
considering that his lateral vision at the intersection was blocked by the
structures on the road. In the same way, he failed to solidly establish that such
failure to foresee the danger lurking on the road could be deemed excusable as
indeed his contention that he was running at a safe speed is totally negated by
the evidence derived from the physical facts of the case.

In traffic law parlance, the term "right of way" is understood as the right of
one vehicle to proceed in a lawful manner in preference to another
approaching vehicle under such circumstances of direction, speed and
proximity as to give rise to a danger of collision unless one of the vehicles
grants precedence to the other. Although there is authority to the effect that
the right of way is merely of statutory creation and exists only according to
express statutory provision, it is generally recognized, where no statute or
ordinance governs the matter, that the vehicle first entering an intersection is
entitled to the right of way, and it becomes the duty of the other vehicle
likewise approaching the intersection to proceed with sufficient care to permit
the exercise of such right without danger of collisions.

In our setting, the right of way rule is governed by Section 42 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 4136, which materially provides:

Section 42. Right of Way.

(a) When two vehicles approach or enter an intersection at

approximately the same time, the driver of the vehicle on the left shall
yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right, except as otherwise
hereinafter provided. The driver of any vehicle traveling at an unlawful
speed shall forfeit any right which he might otherwise have hereunder.
(b) The driver of a vehicle approaching but not having entered an
intersection shall yield the right of a way to a vehicle within such
intersection or turning therein to the left across the line of travel of such
first-mentioned vehicle, provided the driver of the vehicle turning left
has given a plainly visible signal of intention to turn as required in this
Act. x x x.

The provision governs the situation when two vehicles approach the
intersection from the same direction and one of them intends make a turn on
either side of the road. But the rule embodied in the said provision, also
prevalent in traffic statutes in the United States, has also been liberally applied
to a situation in which two vehicles approach an intersection from directly
opposite directions at approximately the same time on the same street and
one of them attempts to make a left-hand turn into the intersecting street, so
as to put the other upon his right, the vehicle making the turn being under the
duty of yielding to the other.

Nevertheless, the right of way accorded to vehicles approaching an

intersection is not absolute in terms. It is actually subject to and is affected by
the relative distances of the vehicles from the point of intersection. Thus,
whether one of the drivers has the right of way or, as sometimes stated, has
the status of a favored driver on the highway, is a question that permeates a
situation where the vehicles approach the crossing so nearly at the same time
and at such distances and speed that if either of them proceeds without regard
to the other a collision is likely to occur. Otherwise stated, the statutory right
of way rule under Section 42 of our traffic law applies only where the vehicles
are approaching the intersection at approximately the same time and not
where one of the vehicles enter the junction substantially in advance of the
other.

Whether two vehicles are approaching the intersection at the same time does
not necessarily depend on which of the vehicles enters the intersection first.
Rather, it is determined by the imminence of collision when the relative
distances and speeds of the two vehicles are considered. It is said that two
vehicles are approaching the intersection at approximately the same time
where it would appear to a reasonable person of ordinary prudence in the
position of the driver approaching from the left of another vehicle that if the
two vehicles continued on their courses at their speed, a collision would likely
occur, hence, the driver of the vehicle approaching from the left must give the
right of precedence to the driver of the vehicle on his right.

Nevertheless, the rule requiring the driver on the left to yield the right of way
to the driver on the right on approach to the intersection, no duty is imposed
on the driver on the left to come to a dead stop, but he is merely required to
approach the intersection with his vehicle under control so that he may yield
the right of way to a vehicle within the danger zone on his right. He is not
bound to wait until there is no other vehicle on his right in sight before
proceeding to the intersection but only until it is reasonably safe to proceed.

Moreover, in a prosecution for reckless or dangerous driving, the negligence of

the person who was injured or who was the driver of the motor vehicle with
which the accused’s vehicle collided does not constitute a defense. In fact, even
where such driver is said to be guilty of a like offense, proof thereof may never
work favors to the case of the accused. In other words, proof that the offended
party was also negligent or imprudent in the operation of his automobile
bears little weight, if at all, at least for purposes of establishing the accused’s
culpability beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, even if we are to hypothesize that
Arnold was likewise negligent in neglecting to keep a proper lookout as he
took a left turn at the intersection, such negligence, contrary to petitioner’s
contention, will nevertheless not support an acquittal. At best, it will only
determine the applicability of several other rules governing situations where
concurring negligence exists and only for the purpose of arriving at a proper
assessment of the award of damages in favor of the private offended party.