B-GJ-005-309/FP-001

Supporting
Canadian Forces Joint Publication
CFJP 3-9 - Targeting

CFJP 3-9
Targeting
1st Edition

Custodian: Strategic Joint Staff

Promulgated: 12 December 2014

Canada
Cette publication est également disponible en français.

To ensure you are using the most current version of this publication, refer to the joint
doctrine DIN website at:
http://cjoc-coic.mil.ca/sites/intranet-eng.aspx?page=3560

Joint Doctrine Branch

Canadian Forces Warfare Centre
Department of National Defence
Major-General R. Pearkes Building
101 Colonel By Dive
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0K2

1st Edition, 2014

© Her Majesty the Queen as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2014
 CFJP 3-9

Preface
01. Canadian Forces Joint Publications (CFJP) are authorized joint doctrine for the guidance
of Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) operations. CFJP 3-9, Targeting is pitched at the philosophical
and high-application level. It provides doctrinal guidance for commanders and staff at all levels
of command.
02. Policy is prescriptive as represented by Defence Administrative Orders and Directives
and has legal standing. Doctrine is not policy and does not have legal standing; however it
provides authoritative and proven guidance, which can be adapted to suit each unique situation.
03. CFJP 3-9 seeks to reflect the maturing of CAF targeting from two sources; working with
Canada’s allies and coalition partners (particularly the United States) during recent operations,
and the growing importance of matching targeting efforts to the creation of desired effects in the
operational environment. The latter recognises that targeting is but one way of supporting
national military objectives. Targeting solutions may be broad, encompassing munitions-based
and non-munitions-based means to achieve physical and psycho-cognitive effects.
Note: For clarification, the terms ‘munitions-based’ and ‘non-munitions-based’ are used
here in place of the often technically incorrect and confusing terms ‘kinetic’ and ‘non-
kinetic’; the latter having a strict scientific meaning that will not always fit with usage in a
targeting context, which has become commonplace.
04. Targeting must be viewed within the context of joint operations, and therefore CFJP 3-9
should be read in conjunction with the following joint publications:
a. CFJP 01, Canadian Military Doctrine (Ref. B), which outlines the strategic military
doctrine of the CAF;
b. CFJP 2-0, Intelligence (Ref. C), which describes how the intelligence process
supports CAF operations including targeting;
c. CFJP 3-0, Operations (Ref. D), which describes operational art and campaigning,
and details the relationships between the national strategic and military strategic,
operational and tactical levels of command for the conduct of a campaign;
d. CFJP 3-0.1, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels (Ref.
E), which promulgates legal guidance to commanders for the planning and conduct
of operations;
e. CFJP 3-10, Information Operations (Ref. F), which describes the CAF’s approach to
information operations and must be coordinated and harmonised with the targeting
activities;
f. CFJP 5-0, Planning (Ref. G), which describes the CAF’s operational planning
process.
g. CFJP 5-1, Use of Force for CF Operations (Ref. H), which describes the means by
which the CAF are authorized to use force and are provided direction to do so.

v
 CFJP 3-9

05. Commander Canadian Joint Operations Command is the approval authority for this
publication.
06. Forward any amendment recommendations to the Canadian Forces Warfare Centre, Joint
Doctrine Branch.

vi
 CFJP 3-9

Table of Contents

Letter of Promulgation ................................................................................................................ iii

Preface ............................................................................................................................................ v
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................ vii
Chapter 1 - What is Targeting
Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 1-1
What is a Target ........................................................................................................................... 1-2
Characteristics of Targets ............................................................................................................ 1-3
A Full-Spectrum Approach .......................................................................................................... 1-4
Targeting Principles ..................................................................................................................... 1-5
The Concept of Effects ................................................................................................................ 1-5
Targeting Methodologies ............................................................................................................. 1-6
Targeted Effects ........................................................................................................................... 1-8
Collateral Damage ....................................................................................................................... 1-9
Targeting Criteria ......................................................................................................................... 1-9
Planning Relationship ................................................................................................................ 1-10
Intelligence Relationship ........................................................................................................... 1-10
(Joint) Fires and Information Operations Support Relationship ................................................ 1-10
Public Affairs Relationship ........................................................................................................ 1-10
Chapter 2 - Legal Considerations
Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 2-1
Requirements to Control the Use of Force .................................................................................. 2-1
The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) .......................................................................................... 2-1
Direct Accountability and Liability ............................................................................................. 2-2
Targeting, Guidance and Direction .............................................................................................. 2-2
Obligations Related to Targeting ................................................................................................. 2-2
Standard of Care .......................................................................................................................... 2-3
Relationship between Legal Advice and Intelligence .................................................................. 2-3
Legitimate Targets ....................................................................................................................... 2-3
Persons as Military Objectives: ................................................................................................... 2-4
Objects as Military Objectives ..................................................................................................... 2-5
Military Objectives ...................................................................................................................... 2-5
Concrete and Direct Military Advantage ..................................................................................... 2-5
Objects Entitled to Protection ...................................................................................................... 2-6
Proportionality Test ..................................................................................................................... 2-7
Collateral Effects not of Themselves Unlawful ........................................................................... 2-8
Indiscriminate Attacks ................................................................................................................. 2-8
Cancellation or Suspension of an Attack ..................................................................................... 2-8
Doubt Rule ................................................................................................................................... 2-9
Other Key Provisions of Additional Protocol I............................................................................ 2-9
Role of CAF Legal Advisors (LEGADs)..................................................................................... 2-9
Legal Input to Rules of Engagement ......................................................................................... 2-10

vii
 CFJP 3-9

Self-Defence and Targeting ....................................................................................................... 2-10

Legal Input to a Targeting Directive .......................................................................................... 2-10
Cyber Operations ....................................................................................................................... 2-11
PsyOps ....................................................................................................................................... 2-12
Working with Coalition Partners ............................................................................................... 2-14
Legal Interpretations and the Evolution of the Battlespace. ...................................................... 2-14
Differing National Interpretations.............................................................................................. 2-15
Targeting, LOAC and Public Affairs ......................................................................................... 2-15
Consequence Management ........................................................................................................ 2-16
Weapons ..................................................................................................................................... 2-16
Use of Nationally Prohibted Weapons by Allies ....................................................................... 2-16
Summary .................................................................................................................................... 2-17
Chapter 3 - Targeting Duties and Responsibilities
Integration of Munitions-based and Non-Munitions-Based Capabilities .................................... 3-1
Targeting Authority Framework .................................................................................................. 3-1
Target Approval Process .............................................................................................................. 3-2
Target Validation ......................................................................................................................... 3-2
Target Boards ............................................................................................................................... 3-2
Role of Designated Supported Commander ................................................................................ 3-2
Task Force Commander ............................................................................................................... 3-3
Target Approval ........................................................................................................................... 3-3
Strategic Targeting Board (STB) ................................................................................................. 3-3
Operational Targeting Board ....................................................................................................... 3-4
Theatre Target Board ................................................................................................................... 3-4
Requirement to Re-Board Targets ............................................................................................... 3-5
Audit Trail .................................................................................................................................... 3-5
Chapter 4 - Targeting Process
Section I - The Targeting Cycle
Targeting and Planning ................................................................................................................ 4-1
Deliberate and Dynamic Targeting .............................................................................................. 4-2
The Six-Steps of the Targeting Cycle .......................................................................................... 4-2
Step 1 - End State and Commander’s Objectives ........................................................................ 4-3
Step 2 - Target Development and Prioritization .......................................................................... 4-4
Step 3 - Capabilities Analysis .................................................................................................... 4-11
Step 4 – Commander’s Decision and Force Allocation ............................................................. 4-11
Step 5 – Mission Planning and Force Execution ....................................................................... 4-12
Step 6—Assessment................................................................................................................... 4-12
Section II - Dynamic Targeting
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 4-15
The Dynamic Targeting Process ................................................................................................ 4-17
Step 1 -Find ................................................................................................................................ 4-18
Step 2 - Fix ................................................................................................................................. 4-18
Step 3 - Track ............................................................................................................................. 4-18
Step 4 - Target ............................................................................................................................ 4-19

viii
 CFJP 3-9

Step 5 - Engage .......................................................................................................................... 4-19

Step 6 - Exploit .......................................................................................................................... 4-19
Step 7 - Assess ........................................................................................................................... 4-19
Considerations during Dynamic Targeting ................................................................................ 4-19
Section III - Time-Sensitive Targets
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 4-20
Prosecuting Time-Sensitive Targets (TSTs) .............................................................................. 4-20
Command and Control ............................................................................................................... 4-21
Considerations............................................................................................................................ 4-21
Chapter 5 - Influence Activity Targeting
Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 5-1
IA Targeting ................................................................................................................................. 5-4
The Intergration of Fires and Influence Activities ....................................................................... 5-5
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 5-6
Chapter 6 - Targeting in Multinational Operations
Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 6-1
Targeting in an Alliance/Coalition............................................................................................... 6-1
Targeting Responsibilities of an Coalition Lead Nation.............................................................. 6-3
Targeting Responsibilities of a Coalition Nation......................................................................... 6-3
Coordination of Targeting Activities ........................................................................................... 6-4
Glossary ................................................................................................................................... GL-1
List of Abbreviations .............................................................................................................. AL-1
List of References .................................................................................................................. REF-1
List of Figures
Figure 1-1: Targeting: The Intergration of Planning, Operations and Intelligence ..................... 1-2
Figure 1-2: Joint Targeting Relationships.................................................................................... 1-7
Figure 4-1: The Targeting Cycle.................................................................................................. 4-3
Figure 4-2: Pictorial Representation of Full-Spectrum Targeting………………...…………….4-4
Figure 4-3: Target Development Relationships ........................................................................... 4-5
Figure 4-4: The Five CDE Levels and Risk Management/Mitigation Strategy……….………4-12
Figure 4-5: Assessment levels and Measures………………………………………………….4-13
Figure 4-6: Assessment .............................................................................................................. 4-13
Figure 4-7: Correlation of Deliberate and Dynamic Targeting in JTC Step 5........................... 4-16
Figure 4-8: The Dynamic Targeting Process ............................................................................. 4-17
Figure 6-1: Joint Targeting Working Group ................................................................................ 6-5
Figure 6-2: Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) Representation ................................... 6-6

ix
 CFJP 3-9

This page was intentionally left blank

 CFJP 3-9

Chapter 1
What is Targeting?

Introduction

0101. Targeting is the “process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the
appropriate response to them, taking into account operational requirements and capabilities.” 1
This process consists of the selection and evaluation of legitimate targets followed by the
selection of the means (munitions-based or non-munitions-based) to be used to achieve the
effects desired. Its purpose is to plan, integrate and synchronize a range of planned lethal and
non-lethal targeted effects produced by the appropriate military means of action, into CAF joint
operations to achieve the ’Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)’s desired end state. Targeting is part of
a broader planning and evaluation process that enables commanders to continuously update and
assess the progress of operations.

0102. Targeting undertaken by the CAF is a full-spectrum, effects-based, inherently joint (and
where necessary, multinational activity, guided by Government of Canada (GC) aims and
priorities. It is fully integrated in the national, military strategic and subsequent lower-level
planning processes, and is constrained by national and international law.

0103. Targeting, in the military sense, is the holistic application of an effects-based approach to
military operations. It is the essence of planning the art of military operations at the highest
levels, focussing on those key adversary and other nodes critically assessed to elicit desired
change once the right type and quantity of pressure is applied. That pressure may take many
forms, as will be discussed in more detail in this publication, and the key to targeting is
identifying the right node, the right type of pressure to apply, the right time to apply it,
recognizing when the required effect is happening/has happened, and knowing what step to take
next to continue to capitalize on and develop the result. Sometimes this is relatively
straightforward (as with the application of fires against a target), but increasingly, with a truly
holistic methodology, it is extremely difficult to get right, and this is clear when aiming to
produce less tangible (and thus less measurable) non-munitions-based targeted effects, although
none the less desired. For this reason, and to be fully effective, targeting—as a concept—needs
to be completely mastered at the highest levels of military command, as well as understood
especially by those that provide input to the process at the politico-military level.

1
DTB, record 5514

1-1
 CFJP 3-9

0104. Targeting cuts across all functional and organizational boundaries. At all levels it will be
command-led, plans-directed, operations-driven and coordinated, but intelligence-enabled, as
shown at Figure 1-1. These are the primary participants, but other functional areas such as legal,
command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I), communications,
logistics and meteorology also support the targeting process. Targeting is not tied to a particular
capability, theatre of operations, level of conflict or automated support system. It supplements—
not replaces—planning at all levels.

Figure 1-1: Targeting: The Integration of Planning, Operations and Intelligence.

What is a Target?
0105. A target is “the object of a particular action, for example, a geographic area, a complex,
an installation, a force, equipment, an individual, a group or a system, planned for capture,
exploitation, neutralization or destruction by military forces.” 2 A target may also be an audience
planned for influence with a specific message. The importance of a target is dependent on how it
relates to an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities, and how achieving a desired effect on it will
support the achievement of the commander’s objectives. The nature of legitimate targets is
further discussed in Chapter 2 and CFJP 3-0.1, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational
and Tactical Levels (Ref. E).
0106. A target can be an entity (person, place, physical or virtual thing) considered for possible
engagement or action to alter or neutralize the function it performs for the adversary. A target’s
importance is derived from its potential contribution to achieving a commander’s objective(s) or

2
DTB, record 1031.

1-2
 CFJP 3-9

otherwise accomplishing assigned tasks. These objectives must be consistent with national
strategic direction and selected to accomplish the assigned missions and tasks. Targets may
include the following:
a. Facilities. A geographically located, defined physical structure, group of structures,
or area that provides a function that contributes to a target system’s capability.
b. Individuals. A person or persons who provide a function that contributes to a target
system’s capability.
c. Entity. An entity in cyberspace that provides a function that contributes to a target
system’s capability.
d. Equipment. A device that provides a function that contributes to a target system’s
capability.
e. Organization. A group or unit that provides a function that contributes to a target
system’s capability.

Characteristics of Targets
0107. Target characteristics form the basis for their detection, location, identification, and
classification for future surveillance, analysis, prosecution and assessment. In general, there are
five types of characteristics for a target:
a. Physical. The physical characteristics of a target describe what a target is in terms of
features that are discernible to the senses (see, feel, hear and smell) or through
sensor-derived signatures. These characteristics will influence the effects employed
against the target, which may be munitions-based, non-munitions-based, or both.
b. Functional. Functional characteristics describe what the target does, how it does it
and how it relates to other parts of its target system. They describe the target’s
function within the adversary system, how the target or system operates, its level of
activity, the status of its functionality and, in some cases, its importance to the
adversary. Functional characteristics are often hard to discern, because they most
often cannot be directly observed. Reaching plausible conclusions entails careful
assessment of known facts and the use of deductive and inductive reasoning.
c. Cognitive. Cognitive characteristics describe how some targets think, exercise
decision and control functions, or otherwise process information. These
characteristics can be critical to targeting a system, since nearly every system
possesses some central controlling function, and neutralizing this may be crucial to
bringing about desired changes in behaviour. As with functional characteristics,
these can be difficult to discern or deduce. While partially overlapping and linked to
cognition (how humans encode, store and process information), psychological
characteristics include emotion, morale, attitude, will and perception. Psychological
characteristics are an important part of the adversary’s capability to perform
operations and as such become a key consideration for targeting activity.
d. Environmental. Environmental factors describe the effect of the environment on
the target. These factors may also influence the methods used to affect or observe
them.

1-3
 CFJP 3-9

e. Temporal. A target’s vulnerability to detection, attack, or other type of engagement

may vary with time.
0108. Emerging targets. An emerging target is an entity that meets sufficient criteria to be
evaluated as a potential target. Emerging targets must undergo target development to be included
in any of the target lists. Since the targeting process is iterative, it is likely that new targets will
emerge during the conduct of operations and the employment of own intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance (ISR) assets.
0109. Sensitive targets (STs). Targets may be designated as STs where it is estimated that the
expected collateral damage (CD) would be excessive. 3 They may also include those targets
where the CDS or another commander determines that prosecution of the target may have
adverse political, social, cultural or other ramifications. These targets will be designated as STs
and made subject to further detailed analysis as per the CAF Sensitive Target Approval And
Review (CSTAR) Process, detailed in the CDS directive on targeting (CDS TD).
0110. High pay-off targets (HPTs) and high value targets (HVTs). HPTs and HVTs are
defined as:
a. HPT. “A target of significance and value to an adversary, the destruction, damage or
neutralization of which may lead to a disproportionate advantage to friendly
forces.” 4
b. HVT. “HVTs are those targets, which the enemy commander is likely to need for
the successful completion of his mission and are therefore, of high value to him. The
HVTs identified during this step are passed to the Targeting Team for further
refinement...” 5

A Full-Spectrum Approach
0111. Full-spectrum targeting (FSpecT) is a holistic approach; reviewing targets of all types
together and apportioning action (munitions-based or non-munitions-based) in conjunction with
the campaign information strategy, and in accordance with desired behavioural objectives.
FSpecT therefore looks to support a top-down targeting methodology, with close linkages to the
plan at all levels, and able to be audited at any stage by reference to the strategic intent. By
seeking to blend a range of targeted effects, FSpecT aims to provide a range of options and
effects, avoiding duplication of effort and ‘effects fratricide’, and ensure that the right targets are
prosecuted in the right order, at the right time by the right capability; coherent with the wider
context and direction. It recognizes that lethal prosecution will always have a specific influence
effect, and that other capabilities can deliver both physical and psycho-cognitive effects, either
directly, or as enablers.

3
Such thresholds will usually be defined by CDS in the operation-specific TD.
4
DTB, record 35044.
5
DTB, record 19439.

1-4
 CFJP 3-9

Targeting Principles
0112. The key principles of targeting are:
a. Focused. The function of targeting is to efficiently achieve the commander’s
objectives through target engagement within the parameters set by the relevant
concept of operations (CONOPS), the operational limitations within the plan and
orders, the ROE, and the law of armed conflict (LOAC). 6
b. Legitimate. All legal obligations, both domestic and international must be
understood and met.
c. Effects-based. An effects-based approach emphasises identification of the fullest
possible range of targeting options to create desired effects supporting the
commander’s objectives.
d. Interdisciplinary. Targeting entails participation from all elements of the
commander’s staff, component commander’s staffs, OGDA and multinational
partners (where appropriate).
e. Systematic. The joint targeting cycle (JTC) is designed to create effects through a
rational and iterative process that methodically analyzes, prioritizes and assigns
assets against targets in a systematic manner.

The Concept of Effects

0113. Targeting, in its true sense, cannot be fully understood without knowing the concept of
effects. An effect is the consequence of an action. Planning effects consists of taking advantage
of a full range of outcomes or consequences resulting from specific actions or activities,
affecting both the physical and psycho-cognitive domain (the domain associated with
perceptions, awareness, beliefs and values, and where, as a result, decisions are made and
impressions formed). The consequences of an activity might be intended and desired, but what
materialises might be unintended or might not be quite as predicted. An effects-based approach
requires a continuous assessment of the impact of activity (both psycho-cognitive and physical)
to exploit fleeting opportunities and to mitigate against unintended and undesired consequences.
Actions and their consequences affect both domains, achieved through fires, influence or both.
0114. Effects-based targeting (EBT) and a full-spectrum approach improve the CAF’s ability to
affect an adversary’s behaviour and/or capabilities, and to achieve the desired national-strategic
and military-strategic end states. This approach focuses on planning and delivering an effect
rather than organising activities, and considers the whole operational environment. It requires
that individuals at all levels have an understanding of the context in which they are operating and
an awareness of the consequences of all actions, be they their own, the adversary’s, other
stakeholders or environmental factors.

6
The LOAC is covered in Chapter 2, Legal Considerations.

1-5
 CFJP 3-9

0115. Targeting is a process that supports the planning and conduct of operations by identifying
the desired effects to be achieved that support the mission, objectives and end state. EBT places
emphasis on linking planning and operations activities to identify the fullest possible range of
targeting options available to the commander. The ability to develop a wide range of targeting
options depends on a detailed understanding of the adversary, targeting stakeholders, and desired
own force operational capabilities and objectives. This requires access to relevant, timely, and
accurate information and intelligence. 7
0116. Physical effects – Influencing capability and capacity. The capability to realise
physical effects will either be instrumental (to destroy/disrupt/neutralize, etc., someone or
something) or expressive (to influence behaviour, attitudes or decisions). Thus, it can be
employed to affect behaviour when there is insufficient time to alter the perceptions of an
intransigent adversary, or in a critical situation. Physical effects can be achieved directly or less
obviously by the manipulation and exploitation of information that results in physical impact.
0117. Psycho-cognitive effects – Influencing will and understanding. Psycho-cognitive
effects result from activities that alter or shape perceptions. Perceptions, ideas and conscious
decisions will generally be altered indirectly, through impressions, influences and activity that
alter the features of the context from which understanding is derived. These influences may be
physical, conscious or sub-conscious, or a combination of any or all. The orchestration and
synchronisation of activity to realize intended and desired cognitive effects is in itself a
challenging and complicated task, especially as the precise impact of cognitive effects is difficult
to measure, complex and rarely readily apparent in the short term.

Targeting Methodologies

0118. There are two methods of targeting:

a. Deliberate targeting. Deliberate targeting is conducted against targets identified
and located during the planning phase of operations, and intended to be prosecuted
on either a scheduled or on-call basis. This method best ensures that the desired
effects will contribute directly to strategic objectives, while avoiding or minimizing
CD.
b. Dynamic targeting. Dynamic targeting is conducted against either known or
unknown target of opportunity8 that have not been located during the planning phase
of operations. 9 These targets may be unplanned and/or unanticipated. Dynamic
targeting is also a planned process but uses an expedited version of deliberate
targeting procedures, to execute time-sensitive targets (TSTs) and other targets that
need to be prosecuted quickly, due to their potentially fleeting nature, or critical
importance.

7
see CFJP 2-0, Intelligence (Ref. C), for more details
8
DTB record 4987
9
And therefore the appropriate planning cycle (typically the air tasking order [ATO] cycle).

1-6
 CFJP 3-9

0119. Deliberate and dynamic targeting are formal and planned activities, fully integrated into
the respective planning processes at all levels of command. The key difference between them is
that dynamic happens faster, in response to a reduced exposure time of the relevant target. Any
type of target may be engaged by either method (in the right circumstances).
0120. Combat engagement. Combat engagement occurs during the close battle, where combat
with the adversary is actual, imminent or likely. 10 Planned targets should be engaged using
deliberate or dynamic targeting procedures wherever possible; however, during combat
engagement, targets will appear inside of the relevant planning cycles and will need to be
prosecuted when there is no time for either a deliberate or formally expedited targeting process
to take place. In these cases, their targeting follows a simplified methodology, taking into
account ROE and the LOAC. Fig. 1-2 illustrates the relationship between deliberate and dynamic
targeting, with combat engagement and self-defence.
Note: The full process of target development, prosecution approval by a target board (TB), or the formal conduct
of a collateral damage estimate (CDE) prior to prosecution, are not required when conducting operations under
combat engagement or self-defence procedures. In these circumstances only the practical application of the
LOAC is required.

Figure 1-2: Joint Targeting Relationships.

10
Dependent on the headquarters/level of command, this may not necessarily be immediate, but still within the
96 hours of the ATO cycle, or other relevant planning cycle.

1-7
 CFJP 3-9

Targeted Effects
0121. An effect is the consequence of action. Effects can be physical or non-physical and can
be achieved by both munitions-based and non-munitions-based means. An effect can be direct or
indirect:
a. Direct. Direct effects are the immediate, first-order consequence of a military action
(results of weapon employment, etc.), unaltered by intervening events or
mechanisms. They are usually immediate and easily recognizable.
b. Indirect. Indirect effects are the delayed or displaced second- or subsequent-order
consequences of action, created through intermediate events or mechanisms. These
outcomes may also be physical, virtual or behavioural in nature. Indirect effects may
be difficult to recognize, due to subtle changes in system behaviour that may make
them difficult to observe, or may manifest themselves in different forms, often with
longer lead times. Consequently, planners and targeteers should consider (as much
as practical) higher-order effects, especially political-military effects, during
planning and assessment. The implications of a single event can be magnified over
time and distance to an extent that greatly exceeds the span of the originally
intended direct effect. Therefore, potentially any (military or non-military) element
can affect, and be affected by, another’s actions.
0122. Understanding how the target interacts within its system and with other systems is critical
for commanders and targeting staff to ensure the appropriate effect is generated within the
operational environment. Thus, understanding the characteristics of both direct and indirect
effects enables the effective planning of targeting to support operations. In this sense effects can
be:
a. Cumulative effects. The cumulative result of a number of effects is equal to or
greater than the sum of their immediate consequences. The compound effect may be
felt and at different times and be produced in different forms (i.e. direct effect is
physical; secondary effect is psycho-cognitive).
b. Cascading effects. Indirect effects can ripple through a targeted system, often
impacting other systems, through common and critical nodes. As an example,
destruction of a headquarters may result in the loss of C2 and subsequently the
cohesion and effectiveness of its subordinate units.
0123. Effects may also be categorised as:
a. Desired. Military operations are planned to produce a predictable desired effect or
set of desired effects, which contribute to the conditions necessary to achieve an
objective or end state. Desired effects are what we want to achieve.
b. Undesired. An undesired effect can inhibit the achievement of an objective or end
state. An undesired effect may be realised by either action by the adversary or by the
unintended consequences of our actions, and in this sense may be either expected or
unexpected. It may also adversely impact on public support for an operation.

1-8
 CFJP 3-9

0124. Collateral effects. Collateral effects are those resulting from a specific military action
but occurring outside the target boundary. By definition, they do not directly affect the target and
may affect civilians or civilian objects. Unintended effects may create unintended consequences,
which may be either counterproductive (negative) or possibly create unexpected opportunities
(positive). Unintended collateral effects may also occur if the adversary’s reaction differs from
what was expected, complicates the operational situation, or necessitates a change to the plan. To
the extent that they can be foreseen/predicted, collateral effects are a deliberate consideration in
planning, executing, and assessing military actions on any scale. The most important collateral
effect is CD, in the form of death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects.
0125. Additional effects. Additional effects are those resulting from a specific military action
and created on the target, but additional to what was intended by that action. By definition, they
do not affect civilians or civilian objects.

Collateral Damage (CD)

0126. CD is an unintended collateral effect, but similarly may be a fully expected one (where
military advantage gained has outweighed proportionality). In accordance with Art. 57(2)(a), of
Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts of 8 Jun 1977, in that those who plan an
attack shall do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians
nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection, but are military objectives. They
must also take all feasible precautions to choose means and methods that avoid, and in any event
to minimize, incidental loss or civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.
They must also refrain from launching any attack that may be expected to cause incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. These
considerations remain valid whether the attack means is munitions-based or non-munitions-
based, or if the desired effect is physical or cognitive. Commanders minimise the undesired
effects of targeting through the best use of available resources, while accounting for the need to
minimise civilian fatalities and damage to civilian property.

Targeting Criteria
0127. For all targeting activities (less self-defence), five criteria, or ‘pillars’, must be satisfied
prior to the prosecution of any target:
a. Target engagement authority (TEA). Every planned prosecution requires approval
to prosecute by an individual with the appropriate level of authority. The appropriate
approval authority will be specified in the relevant operation-specific targeting
directives (TDs).
b. ROE. Each prosecution must be linked to an appropriate ROE under which it will
be conducted.
c. Assessment of CD. All planned targeting (both deliberate and dynamic) requires a
formal CD estimate (CDE) to be carried out prior to prosecution approval being
granted by an appropriate TEA.

1-9
 CFJP 3-9

d. Positive identification (PID). PID is determined to ascertain with reasonable

accuracy whether or not a potential target is a legitimate military target. For planned
targets, PID is likely to rest within the tactical domain, and must be gained to the
satisfaction of the relevant TEA.
e. Pattern of life (PoL). PoL is an aid to the assessment of CD around a target area.
Surveillance may indicate civilian activity in and around the target area or it may
confirm the nature of the target; both of which may have a bearing on the operation.
PoL must be accumulated to the satisfaction of the relevant TEA.

Planning Relationship
0128. The targeting process, particularly for deliberate targeting, is integrated within the
operations planning process and ensures the focus remains on achieving mission objectives and
the end state. Essentially, the targeting process aims to employ the most appropriate capabilities
to increase the likelihood of success while mitigating the risk of undesirable effects.

Intelligence Relationship
0129. Intelligence is a critical enabler to the targeting process. Intelligence may be secured from
a variety of sources, and accurate intelligence is essential for targeting to achieve the desired
effect within the operational environment. The greater the need to quantify the desired effects,
the greater the need for detailed and accurate intelligence. The collection, processing and
dissemination of intelligence require prioritisation to support the planning and targeting
processes, as capabilities are rarely sufficient to satisfy every demand for intelligence. Target
intelligence, such as target systems analysis and target materials, developed in peacetime,
provide a crucial baseline to support operational commanders. During periods of increasing
tension, more focussed commander’s guidance is provided to direct intelligence support to
targeting. 11

(Joint) Fires and Information Operations (info ops) Relationship

0130. One of the key facets of targeting is to understand how joint and component targeting–
both lethal and non-lethal fires and influence targeting–work together in a coordinated manner to
produce synergistic effects. The synchronization of (joint) fires and info ops is based on the
linkage between the commander’s objectives, planning processes and targeting. The targeting
process, matches effects to targets; joint/component fires and info ops provide most of these
effects, characterised by concentration of force, flexibility and responsiveness.

Public Affairs (PA) Relationship

0131. Targeting activities may attract media and/or political interest. PA provides support to
operations by informing the public of the actions of the CAF, including the targeting process and
rationale.

11
For further information refer to CFJP 2-0, Intelligence. (Ref C)

1-10
 CFJP 3-9

Chapter 2
Legal Considerations
Introduction
0201. This chapter outlines the key legal rules applicable to targeting and should be read in
conjunction with:
a. CFJP 3-0.1, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels
(Ref. E).
b. CFJP 5-1, Use of Force for CF Operations (Ref. H).
0202. It discusses how legal rules must be incorporated into the planning and execution of
Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) targeting. Legal considerations are not just a matter for the legal
advisor (LEGAD); all CAF members must understand and consider legal rules in performing
their roles. Commanders at all levels, and their subordinates, are responsible for the correct and
comprehensive application of the law in planning and conducting an operation.

Requirements to Control the Use of Force

0203. Jus ad bellum: Treaty law, in particular the United Nations (UN) Charter and customary
international law are among some of the key legal sources that provide States with legal bases to
resort to force on international operations. Deployment of the CAF on operations and the use of
force by the CAF are controlled by, and subject to the authority and direction of the Government
of Canada (GC). The government, military commanders and all CAF members are all subject to
domestic and international laws.
0204. Jus in bello: Jus in bello, also referred to as the “law of armed conflict” (LOAC), is the
body of international law that governs the conduct of hostilities during an armed conflict.

The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)

0205. LOAC applies throughout the targeting process. The purpose of the LOAC is to regulate
the conduct of hostilities and to protect the victims of armed conflict. Parties to a conflict have a
duty to distinguish between civilians and combatants, as well as between civilian objects and
military objectives. Civilians (as defined in Additional Protocol I [AP I]) are entitled to
protection from the dangers arising from military operations. In conducting operations, care
should always be taken to spare civilians and civilian objects. 12
0206. As a matter of law, the LOAC applies to the conduct of CAF operations whenever
Canada is a party to an armed conflict. Armed conflict could be generally defined as the resort to
the use of armed force between States 13 (international armed conflict [IAC]) or protracted armed
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups
within a State (non-international armed conflict [NIAC]). 14

12
AP I, Arts 48, 51 - 58; (Ref O) AP II, Arts 13 – 15.(Ref P)
13
Prosecutor v. Tadic, (1995), Case No.IT-94-1-A, (International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia). (Ref W)
14
Ibid. (Ref W)

2-1
 CFJP 3-9

0207. The LOAC has developed a number of legal rules to ensure that military forces select
targets that are legitimate targets. Military commanders must apply these rules when selecting
targets. These rules, such as distinction and proportionality, guide the military commander to a
determination of what objects, areas and personnel are legitimate targets. In the context of
targeting, these legal rules have largely been incorporated in treaty law, most notably, but not
exclusively in AP I. It must be remembered that AP I deals with international armed conflicts
whereas Additional Protocol II (AP II) deals with the application of humanitarian principles to
non-international armed conflicts (though significant portions of AP I are widely accepted to
form part of customary international law).
0208. This chapter concentrates on the key legal rules that impact on the planning and
execution of joint targeting operations, but also refers to certain other international agreements,
particularly those concerning specific weapons.

Direct Accountability and Liability

0209. A CAF member who uses force, or the commander who authorizes it, must be able to
identify the facts that led to the belief that the application of force was justified in the
circumstances. Commanders and individuals will be liable for the use of excessive and otherwise
unlawful force.

Targeting, Guidance and Direction

0210. The strategic-level guidance provided to the commander and any direction on the use of
force (such as rules of engagement [ROE]) authorized for targeting operations must be based on
legal considerations and requirements. There also must be a clear and coherent link between such
operations and the approved political objectives, strategic military objectives, the legal bases for
the operation, the commander’s concept of operations, targeting directives and the ROE that are
authorized for each operation.

Obligations Related to Targeting

0211. Under the LOAC, commanders, planners and staff officers have the following
obligations 15:
a. to do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are in fact
legitimate targets and are not entitled to special protection under the LOAC;
b. to take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack to
avoid, and in any event to minimize, collateral damage (CD); and
c. to refrain from launching any attack that may be expected to cause CD that would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated
(proportionality test).

15
AP l, Art 57 (2) (a). (Ref O)

2-2
 CFJP 3-9

Standard of Care
0212. Throughout the targeting process, commanders, planners and staff officers will not be
held to a standard of perfection in reaching their decisions. 16 They are however, required to take
‘all feasible’ steps to verify that potential targets are legitimate targets. Such decisions will be
based on the ‘circumstances ruling at the time’. Consideration must be paid to the honest
judgement of responsible commanders, based on the information reasonably available to them at
the relevant time, taking fully into account the urgent and difficult circumstances under which
such judgements are usually made. 17

Relationship between Legal Advice and Intelligence

0213. The legal rule of distinction imposes an obligation on commanders to distinguish between
legitimate targets and civilian objects and the civilian population. It is of primary importance
when selecting targets. This obligation is dependent on the quality of the information available to
commanders at the time decisions are made. Commanders must make reasonable, good faith
efforts to gather intelligence and to review the intelligence available to them. 18
0214. Commanders and their staff are expected to draw on the available information and the
legal rules applicable to targeting operations. Intelligence drives many targeting decisions and
the consideration of LOAC applicable to them, including the assessment of whether or not a
proposed target is a military objective, the estimation of the CD effects expected from an attack,
as well as the military advantage to be derived from an attack. The importance of the relationship
between the intelligence and legal process (and between individual intelligence personnel and the
LEGAD) cannot be overstated. Moreover, LEGADs can be expected to make specific requests
for intelligence and assessments so as to perform their advisory role for the commander.

Legitimate Targets
0215. The legal rule of distinction establishes that commanders, at all times, shall distinguish
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military
objectives. 19 Military operations shall be directed only against legitimate targets. Legitimate
targets include combatants, unlawful combatants and military objectives. Under the LOAC, a
civilian object is any object that is not a military objective.
0216. Legitimate targets are divided into two categories: persons as military objectives and
objects as military objectives. The test for targeting people is and must be different from that
applied when identifying military objects.

16
Statement of understanding made by Canada at the time of ratification of AP I in relation to Arts 48, 51 to 60
inclusive, 62 & 67.(Ref O)
17
AP I, Art 57 (2) (a) (i) (Ref O) and Statement of understanding made by Canada at the time of ratification in
relation to Arts 41, 56, 57, 58, 78 & 86 (Ref Q) and CFJP 3-0.1, Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and
Tactical Levels (Ref. E)
18
HIVR, Arts 25 & 27 (1); (Ref AA) HIX, Arts 1 (1) & 5 (1) (Ref Z); GIV, Art 53; AP I, Arts 48, 51, 52 & 57 (Ref
O)
19
API, Arts 48, 51, 52 & 57; (Ref O) AP II, Arts 13(Ref P)

2-3
 CFJP 3-9

Persons as Military Objectives

0217. In terms of persons as military objectives, only combatants (the armed forces of a party to
a conflict as further detailed in AP I, Art 43) or unlawful combatants 20 (i.e. civilians taking a
direct part in hostilities, mercenaries and spies) are legitimate targets.
a. Combatants. As a general rule, the term combatant includes any member of the
armed forces, except specially protected persons under LOAC such as medical and
religious personnel. Combatants may be attacked unless they have been captured,
surrendered, expressed a clear intention to surrender, or are otherwise hors de
combat. This latter principle is extremely important to evaluate in terms of during
the assessment phase of the targeting process, whether to reattack persons as
military objectives, or not.
b. Unlawful combatants. Civilians may not be attacked unless they participate
directly in hostilities. As a general rule, civilians are considered non-combatants and
cannot lawfully engage in hostilities. Civilians who take a direct part in hostilities
(other than a levée en masse) are unlawful combatants. Unlawful combatants may be
attacked for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities (DPH). In other words,
unlawful combatants lose their protection as civilians and become legitimate targets
for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. 21 “Treaty international
humanitarian law (IHL) does not define direct participation in hostilities, nor does a
clear interpretation of the concept emerge from State practice or international
jurisprudence. The notion of direct participation in hostilities must therefore be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its
constituent terms in their context and in light of the object and purpose of IHL.” 22
The CDS TD or other documents will contain specific determinations as to whether
particular persons who take a direct part in hostilities are considered to be lawful
targets. This may be critical where the exact composition of an opposing armed
force may not be obvious, or where the military function of an organisation or
element requires detailed analysis. The increased use by States of civilian
government and contract employees to support their operations, as well as private
military firms to maintain security, further clouds the nature of civilian
involvement. 23 The potential for confusion regarding when civilians must be
protected is further increased if the ‘unless and for such time as’ temporal
limitations of direct civilian participation are interpreted too narrowly. 24 Due to the
complexity and extent of international law considerations, a LEGAD should be
consulted prior to classifying a person as a military objective.

20
The term “unlawful combatants” is not stated in any of the Geneva Conventions
21
HIVR, Art 2; AP I,Art 51 (3); AP II, Art 13 (3). (Ref AA)
22
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art 31 [1]. (Ref X)
23
Ken Watkin, Brigadier-General Retired, “Assessing Proportionality: Moral Complexity and Legal Rules” in
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law Volume 7, (The Hague: Asser Instituut, 2004)3 at 12. (Ref DD)
24
Ibid., 13. (Ref DD)

2-4
 CFJP 3-9

Objects as Military Objectives

0218. All feasible precautions must be taken to verify that the target is a military objective, and
not a civilian or a civilian object, and that it is not subject to any of the specialized regimes of
protection that prohibit, or severely restrict, attacks on certain objects.

Military Objectives 25
0219. In so far as objectives are concerned, the test is the following:

a. military objectives are limited to those objects that, by their nature, location, purpose
or use, make an effective contribution to military action; and;

b. whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances

ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
0220. An object that is normally a civilian object, depending on the circumstances, can be
considered a military objective. Such objects are referred to as a ‘dual use’ object. Although the
term is commonly used in targeting publications, dual use is not a term of law. An object is either
a military objective or it is not. Examples might be: transportation systems for military supplies,
transportation centres where lines of communication converge, rail yards, industrial installations
producing material for armed forces, conventional power plants, and fuel dumps.

Concrete and Direct Military Advantage

0221. The military advantage at the time of the attack is that advantage anticipated from the
military campaign or operation of which the attack is part, considered as a whole, and not only
from isolated or particular parts of that campaign or operation. 26
0222. A concrete and direct military advantage exists if the commander has an honest and
reasonable expectation that the attack will make a relevant contribution to the success of the
overall operation. Military advantage may include a variety of considerations including the
security of the attacking forces.

25
API, Art 52 (2) (Ref O)
26
Statement of understanding made by Canada at the time of ratification of AP I regarding Arts 51 (5) (b), 52 (2) &
57 (2) (a) (iii) (Ref Q)

2-5
 CFJP 3-9

Objects Entitled to Protection

0223. There are a number of objects that are entitled to protection from attack under the LOAC.
However, such protection may cease and the object subjected to attack in a limited set of
circumstances. 27 Owing to the complexity and the extent of international law and policy
considerations, a LEGAD should be consulted prior to nominating objects entitled to protection
as military objectives. The following are objects entitled to protection:
a. Cultural objects. It is prohibited to commit any acts of hostility directed against the
historic monuments, works of art or places of worship that constitute the cultural or
spiritual heritage of peoples; or to use such objects in support of the military effort. 28
Not all cultural objects and places of worship are protected as cultural or religious
property by the LOAC. However, cultural objects and places of worship that are not
afforded specific protection may nevertheless remain civilian objects and are
protected as such.
b. Dams, dykes and nuclear power plants. These objects shall not be attacked, even
where they are legitimate targets, if such an attack might cause the release of
dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. 29
c. Objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. It is prohibited to
attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population for whatever motive. 30 Examples might be foodstuffs,
agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water
installations and supplies, and irrigation works.
d. Natural environment. Care shall be taken to protect the natural environment
against widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a
prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare that are intended or may be
expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice
the health or survival of the population. 31 Canada as a party to the Convention on the
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile, Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques (ENMOD Convention) 32 has undertaken not to engage in any military or
hostile use of environmental modification techniques such as the means of
destruction, damage or injury to any other State, that is a party to the Convention.
e. Medical units and establishments. Medical units and their medical personnel must
be respected, protected and shall not be made the object of attack. 33

27
For legal and policy reasons, a no-strike list (NSL) and a restricted-target list (RTL) consisting of objects to be
protected may also be incorporated into the operation-specific CDS TD to facilitate target nomination.
28
HIVR, Art 27 (1) (Ref AA); HIX, Art 5 (1); H Cultural Property Convention , Art 4 (1); AP I, Arts 53 (a) & (b) &
85 (4) (d); (Ref O) AP II, Art 16. (Ref P)
29
AP I, Art 56 (1); (Ref O) AP II, Art 15. (Ref P)
30
Ibid., Art 54 (2). (Ref P)
31
Ibid, Arts 35 (3) & 55 (1). (Ref P)
32
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques,
10 December 1976, (signed by Canada 18 May 1977, ratified 11 June 1981). (Ref T)
33
GI , Art 19 (1); GII , Arts 22 (1), 23 & 24; GIV , Arts 18 (1); (Ref Y) API , Art 12 (1) & (2); (Ref O) AP II , Art
11 (1). (Ref P)

2-6
 CFJP 3-9

f. Medical transports. Medical transport of all types (land, sea and air) is protected
and must not be attacked. 34
g. Civil defence buildings, materiel and shelters. Such buildings are provided for the
civilian population, are considered civilian objects and shall not be attacked or
subjected to reprisals. 35
h. Prisoner of war (PW) camps. Such camps will be marked with the letters “PW” or
“PG” (prisonnier de guerre) and be clearly visible from the air. 36
i. Internment camps (ICs). Such camps will be marked with the letters “IC” and be
clearly visible from the air. 37
0224. However, under certain circumstances, entities entitled to protection may lose that
protection, and, in this respect, may subsequently be subject to military action against them.
Further details are given in the CDS TD.

Proportionality Test
0225. Once the military character of a target has been ascertained, commanders must apply the
proportionality test. In deciding whether the legal rule of proportionality is being respected, the
standard of measurement is the anticipated contribution to the military purpose of an attack or
operation considered as a whole. The anticipated military advantage must be assessed against
other consequences of the action, such as the adverse effect on civilians or civilian objects. It
involves evaluating the interests arising from the success of the operation in light of the possible
harmful effects on protected persons and objects, and making a determination as to whether these
harmful effects are excessive in relation to the military advantage.
0226. The proportionality test must be used in the selection of any target. The test is as follows:
Is the attack expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated? If the answer is yes, the attack must be cancelled or
suspended. 38
0227. Where a choice is possible between several legitimate targets for obtaining a similar
military advantage, the target to be selected shall be the one on which an attack would be
expected to cause the least civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects. 39

34
GI, Art 35(1) & 36 (1); GII, Arts 22, 25 & 39 (1); GIV, Art 21 (1), 22 (1) & 56 (2); (Ref Y) AP I, Arts 21, 22 (2),
23 (1) (Ref O) & 24; AP II, Art 11 (1). (Ref P)
35
AP I, Art 62 (3). (Ref O)
36
GIII, Art 23 (4).
37
GIV, 79 & 83 (3). (Ref Y)
38
AP I, Art 57 (2) (a) (iii). (Ref O)
39
Ibid, Art 57 (3). (Ref O)

2-7
 CFJP 3-9

Collateral Effects not of Themselves Unlawful

0228. The rule of proportionality (as with the principle of military necessity) involves an
implied concession that civilian casualties and damage may in certain circumstances be justified.
That is, just because civilian casualties or damage may occur, or are even expected from an
attack on a military objective, does not necessarily make that attack unlawful, provided that the
attack does not violate the rule of proportionality. However, even if an attack is judged to comply
with the rule of proportionality, this does not excuse commanders and staff from failing to take
all feasible precautions to minimise the collateral effects (e.g. striking a munitions factory after
work hours).

Indiscriminate Attacks
0229. Indiscriminate attacks are those that may strike legitimate targets and civilians, or civilian
objects without distinction, and are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:
a. those that are not directed at a specific legitimate target;
b. those that employ a method or means of combat that cannot be directed at a specific
legitimate target, and;
c. those that employ a method or means of combat, the effects of which cannot be
limited as required by the LOAC. 40
0230. Certain types of attacks are considered indiscriminate, including treating (for the
purposes of targeting) as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct
military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration
of civilians or civilian objects. Attacks that do not comply with the principle of proportionality
are also considered indiscriminate attacks.

Cancellation or Suspension of an Attack

0231. CAF members have an obligation to cancel or suspend an attack immediately if it
becomes apparent that the objective is not a legitimate target, or that the attack may be expected
to cause CD that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated. 41
0232. An effective advance warning shall be given of attacks that may affect the civilian
population, unless circumstances do not permit such a warning to be given. For tactical reasons,
an attacking force may not give a warning, to maintain the element of surprise. 42

40
AP l, Art 51 (4). (Ref O)
41
AP l, Art 57 (2) (b) (Ref O)
42
HIVR, Art 26; (Ref AA) HIX, Art 6; AP l, Art 57 (2) (c).

2-8
 CFJP 3-9

Doubt Rule
0233. In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian or not, that person shall be considered to
be a civilian. In the case of doubt as to whether an object that is normally dedicated to civilian
purposes (such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling, or a school) is being used to
make an effective contribution to military action or not, it shall be presumed not to be so used. 43

Other Key Provisions of Additional Protocol I (AP I)

0234. Reprisals. Reprisals are acts, otherwise unlawful under the LOAC, used for the purpose
of coercing an adversary to stop violating the recognized rules of armed conflict. The use of
reprisals has great political and strategic implications, and the decision to take reprisal action
must therefore be authorized at the highest political level. Operational commanders are not
authorized to carry out reprisals on their own initiative.
0235. Terrorizing the civilian population. The protection of civilians is a fundamental
principle of the LOAC. Acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is to spread
terror among the civilian population, are prohibited.
0236. Breaches of AP I obligations. All parties are required to apply the protections in AP I
(including the precautions required by Art. 57), notwithstanding the possibility that the adversary
may act to the contrary and disregard these obligations.

Role of CAF Legal Advisors (LEGADs)

0237. The commitment undertaken by the GC under AP I is not limited to the dissemination of
the LOAC. 44 Canada has an obligation, at all times, to ensure that LEGADs are available, when
necessary, to advise commanders at the appropriate level on the application of the LOAC and on
the appropriate instruction to be given to the CAF on this subject. 45 Consequently, LEGADs will
be involved at all stages of the targeting process to assist commanders and their staff to execute
their mission in accordance with the law. Legal advice is required throughout the targeting
process. The role of the LEGAD in a particular operation will be influenced by the type of
targeting involved and the level within the command chain at which legal advice is being
provided. In relation to targeting, legal advice may also be sought with respect to the following
issues:
a. interpretation of national and international legal documents (including but not
limited to the TDs, treaties, and arrangements, including those relating to status of
forces);
b. interpretation of CAF mandate including legal bases for each task, legal authority
and limitations;
c. interpretation of various command directives;
d. LOAC, international human rights law (IHRL);
e. legal input into the targeting validation checklist (TVC);

43
AP l, Arts 50 (1) & 52 (3). (Ref O)
44
Ken Watkin, Brigadier-General Retired, “The Operational Lawyer: An Essential Resource For the Modern Commander” at 4. (Ref
EE)
45
AP I, Art 82. (Ref O)

2-9
 CFJP 3-9

f. ROE;
g. legality of weapons and their use;
h. self-defence;
i. legal input to other subordinate operational instructions and aides-mémoire;
j. legal questions specifically related to the conduct of air (air and space law), land
and/or operations at sea (law of the sea);
k. liaison and coordination with LEGAD and staffs from allied/coalition nations;
l. legal briefings and instruction, and
m. all legal matters of particular interest for commanders, and for the CAF.

Legal Input to Rules of Engagement (ROE)

0238. CAF policy on ROE is contained in CFJP 5-1, Use of Force for CF Operations (Ref. H).
ROE are the C2 instrument by which the CDS controls the application of force or actions that
may be construed as provocative. In Canada, ROE are defined as “directives issued by
competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces
will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.” 46
0239. With the exception of self-defence, ROE provide the sole authority to CAF to use force.
CAF members working with allies must understand that Canadian ROE are written as permissive
orders. It is also important to note that the CDS is the sole authority for the authorization of ROE
for all CAF members or changes to the authorized ROE. Except in an in extremis situation 47 no
commander or member of the CAF may issue orders to use force that could be construed as ROE
or guidance that is more permissive than the ROE authorized by the CDS. In certain situations a
separate use-of-force directive may be issued, which will complement the ROE. Additional
constraints inserted into this directive may be the result of other political, diplomatic and military
considerations.

Self-Defence and Targeting

0240. The engagement of targets in self-defence is limited to circumstances where the
application of force is necessary and reasonable to avert an imminent threat to life. The targeting
process has no impact on an individual’s right to self-defence as provided for under national and
international law. Nevertheless, the requirement to react rapidly or in self-defence does not allow
planners to purposely avoid the formal targeting process when situations requiring the use of
offensive means are anticipated.

Legal Input to a Targeting Directive

0241. CDS will provide additional direction and procedures on targeting issues through the
operation-specific TD, which complements the ROE. The need for a TD or inclusion of relevant
data within ROE will depend on the size and complexity of the operation. Nothing contained in
the issued TD will affect a CAF member’s right of self-defence.
46
DTB, record 5285.
47
Refers to ROE Implementation Emergency Procedures in Para 211 of CFJP 5-1, Use of Force for CF Operations
(Ref. H).

2-10
 CFJP 3-9

Cyber Operations
0242. International law, including LOAC applies to CAF cyber operations (cyber ops). The
content of this section focuses on the law that governs the way cyber ops are conducted in the
context of armed conflicts. For advice concerning the law governing the resort to force by States
through cyber ops, the Office of the Judge Advocate General (OJAG) will be able to advise.
0243. Cyber ops are the employment of cyber capabilities with the primary purpose of
achieving objectives in or by the use of cyberspace. 48 In terms of targeting, it is important to
determine if a cyber op rises to the level of an attack as prescribed in article 49 of AP I. An attack
is a concept that “serves as the basis for a number of specific limitations and prohibitions under
LOAC.” 49 The majority of the information contained in the present cyber ops section is derived
from the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Tallinn
Manual). 50 This is not an authoritative statement of the law and reference to it in this section
should not be taken as a DND/CAF endorsement or adoption of its text. It provides various rules
reflecting consensus among a group of international experts as to the application of the law
currently governing cyber conflict. Although the Tallinn Manual serves as a guide, this is an
emerging area of law with little direct consideration by courts in terms of cyber warfare at this
time. Therefore, it is crucial to seek legal advice from a LEGAD on cyber issues to ensure the
correct application of current law and DND/CAF and GC policy.
0244. The Tallinn Manual, Rule 30 establishes that a cyber attack is a cyber op, whether
offensive or defensive, if it is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons, or damage
or destruction of objects. Serious illness and severe mental suffering are equivalent to injury.
Operations that do not cause violent consequences do not qualify as attacks. However, it is
important to note that it is the consequence of the cyber op, not its nature, that characterizes it as
violent or not. With respect to attacks on objects, the majority of Tallinn Manual experts were of
the view that cyber interference with the functionality of an object may represent damage,
thereby constituting a cyber attack, if the restoration of such objects requires the replacement of a
physical component. A cyber attack that is successfully intercepted and does not result in actual
harm could still be considered an attack in accordance with the LOAC. 51 If a cyber op is an
important part of a larger operation, such as disabling defences, that also includes the use of
munitions-based means; the LOAC rules with respect to attacks would apply to the cyber ops.
Cyber ops must accord with the principles of distinction and proportionality.

48
Ibid.at 15. see also CNO Policy for definitions of Computer Network Operation and its constitutive elements.
49
Ibid.at 106.
50
Michael Schmitt, ed., Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Cambridge
University Press: 2013). The principle of distinction requires that commanders distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives, and only direct operations against
military objectives. In the cyber domain, computers, networks and cyber infrastructure may be the object of an
attack if it qualifies as a military objective. Military objectives are those objects that by their nature, location,
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization in the circumstances ruling at the time offers a definite military advantage.50 (Ref CC)
51
Ibid.at 110 (Ref CC)

2-11
 CFJP 3-9

0245. Distinction. The principle of distinction requires that commanders distinguish between
the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives, and
only direct operations against military objectives. In the cyber domain, computers, networks and
cyber infrastructure may be the object of an attack if it qualifies as a military objective. A
military objective is “an object that, by its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in
the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.” 52 With respect to dual
use objects, the Tallinn Manual experts concluded that an object used for both military and
civilian purposes (including computers networks and cyber infrastructure) is a military
objective. 53 However, if there is doubt as to whether a normally civilian computer is being used
to make an effective military contribution, the determination that it is being so used should only
be made after careful assessment. 54
0246. Proportionality. A cyber attack that may be expected to cause incidental loss of life or
injury to civilians and/or damage or destruction to civilian objects that would be excessive in
relation to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage is prohibited. It is important to
note that the incidental CD to be considered when assessing the proportionality of an attack can
include both direct damage (the immediate first-order effects of the attack), as well as indirect
damage (the subsequent consequences created through secondary events or actions). The indirect
effects of an operation take on particular significance in the cyber context when one considers
the possible consequences of an attack on a SCADA 55 system or a server that may be used by an
adversary’s military as well as providing vital civilian services. However, in the view of the
Tallinn Manual experts, effects that simply amount to stress, irritation or inconvenience may not
have to be factored into the proportionality analysis. 56

PsyOps
0247. The LOAC, including international treaty law, or customary law, applies equally to info
ops and PsyOps. Regardless of whether the method of engagement is munitions-based or non-
munitions-based, the civilian population shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising
from military operations. 57 Equally, the employment of PsyOps capabilities must accord with the
principles of distinction and proportionality, and they must not employ measures by resorting to
perfidy.
0248. Distinction. The principle of distinction imposes an obligation on commanders to
distinguish between legitimate targets and civilian objects and the civilian population. Although
the principle of distinction is framed in terms of military operations, its application to PsyOps
may vary depending on the nature of the operation in question. For example, a PsyOp directed at
the general civilian population, such as dropping leaflets, broadcasting, or even jamming public
broadcasts, is generally accepted as lawful as long as the civilian population is not endangered.
When assessing whether to conduct PsyOps directed at the general civilian population, Art. 51 of

52
AP I, Art, 51(1). (Ref O)
53
Schmitt , supra note 32 at 134.
54
Ibid atI137.
55
SCADA: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition. SCADA includes industrial control systems used to monitor
and control industrial processes and infrastructure, including power generation and gas and oil pipelines.
56
Schmitt, supra note 32 at 160160.
57
AP I, Art 51. (Ref O)

2-12
 CFJP 3-9

AP I shall be followed when examining the purpose and effect of the message to determine
whether it is lawful or not: “Acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is to
spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.” 58 On the other hand, messaging
may also act as an effective advance warning 59 system, further protecting the civilian population,
and in some circumstances, is required prior to conducting an attack. 60
0249. Proportionality. When considering the application of this rule to PsyOps, it is important
to consider the military advantage gained throughout the operation as a whole rather than only
from isolated or particular parts of it. It involves evaluating the interests arising from the success
of the operation on the one hand, against the possible harmful effects on protected persons and
objects.
0250. Perfidy, treachery and ruses. The difference between an unlawful act by way of perfidy
or treachery and lawful ruses lies in whether the message involves inviting the confidence of
adversaries to lead them to believe that they are entitled to, or obliged to provide, safety or
protection under the rules of LOAC with the intent to betray that confidence. If this is the case,
than the message constitutes perfidy and/or treachery, and any killing or injuring (or capturing, in
international armed conflict) of an adversary by way of this perfidy or treachery is unlawful. The
difference between perfidy/treachery and ruses is given below:
a. Perfidy and Treachery. When contemplating messaging, planners and decision
makers must keep in mind that it is prohibited to kill, injure or capture adversaries
by resort to perfidy. “Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to
believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence,
shall constitute perfidy.” 61 Perfidy as a term is only employed with respect to
international armed conflict. However, the prohibition with respect to perfidy may
also be used as guidance as to the meaning of treachery in non-international armed
conflicts (note that prohibitions with respect to treachery only refer to killing or
wounding, and not to capture.) 62
b. Ruses. Ruses of war are more formally defined as acts that are intended to mislead
an adversary or to induce that adversary to act recklessly. Ruses must not infringe
any rule of the LOAC. Ruses are lawful if they are not treacherous, perfidious and
do not violate any express or tacit agreement. Examples of ruses include decoys and
fake radio messages. 63

58
Ibid., Art. 51(2). (Ref O)
59
Ibid., Art. 57. (Ref O)
60
Ibid., Art. 57(2)(c). (Ref O)
61
AP I, Art 37 (Ref O)
62
Art. 8(2) (e)(ix) of the Rome Statute
63
AP l, Art 37 (2) (Ref O)

2-13
 CFJP 3-9

Working with Coalition Partners

0251. The armed forces of nations participating in multinational operations will adhere to their
own national laws and policies, and they are not obliged or permitted to execute tasks or
operations that would constitute a breach of their national laws and policies. Therefore, it must
be recognized that nations may issue caveats, and/or amplifying instructions to their ROE or
other aspects of their coalition participation agreements, in order to ensure national compliance.
0252. As an example, the US, unlike most of its allies, has not ratified AP I. The US believes
that certain provisions of AP I do not reflect customary international law. However, the US does
accept that many of the provisions of AP I, including most of the provisions relevant to targeting,
codifies customary international law. In all cases, legal advice should be sought on the effect that
differing legal obligations may have on multinational targeting operations.

Legal Interpretation and the Evolution of the Battlespace

0253. As the battlespace continues to evolve and new technologies are adopted by forces, at
first reading, LOAC, which includes international treaties and customary law, may seem to have
become outdated or irrelevant to new means and methods of warfare such as info ops. However,
on careful interpretation of the rules of the LOAC, the law applicable to targeting, including info
ops, becomes reasonably predictable, even in terms of future technologies.
0254. For instance, article 48 of AP I states that “to ensure respect for and protection of the
civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict [Canada] shall at all times
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and
military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives. 64” Although one could interpret article 48 of AP I “as prohibiting all military
operations that could affect the civilian population, it would be an over-simplification of the rule.
Thus, it and the rule of distinction, do not prohibit for example the issuing of warnings to the
civilian population in accordance with AP Article 57(2)(c), action in relation to the civilian
population under Article 58 or info ops directed towards the civilian population, whether in the
form of propaganda or disinformation from either party to a conflict.” 65 Another example is the
use of “[…] cyber operations whose purpose is to influence the thinking of the civilian
population which are lawful provided they did not reach the threshold of an attack having as its
object civilians or civilian objects; or using cyber means to threaten the civilian population in
breach of AP I article 51(2), if the purpose of the threat is to terrorise them.” 66
0255. As in all laws, proper interpretation, fact and intelligence gathering and processing are
essential to the application of LOAC to allow CAF members to deliver responsive, force
enabling and operationally focused solutions in a manner that reflects Canada’s legal obligations,
Canadian values and the rule of law. Further, orders and direction must be drafted to reflect GC
interpretation of the law. The careful use of words when the target audience (TA) is the civilian
population cannot be understated. Lastly, military commanders, planners and staff officers
conducting info ops must concern themselves with the various laws other than LOAC that may
apply specifically to info ops, in both times of armed conflict and peace.
64
AP I, Art. 48 (Ref O)
65
Air Commodore (RAF Retd) Dr. William H. Boothby, The Law of Targeting (Oxford Uni Press, 2012), p. 389.
(Ref BB)
66
Ibid.

2-14
 CFJP 3-9

Differing National Interpretations

0256. When engaged in targeting operations within an alliance/coalition, commanders and staff
from each contributing nation must consider the differences in legal obligations, the differences
in the interpretation of shared obligations and the different policy positions, which exist between
multinational partners. Differing interpretations of shared legal obligations are potentially as
important as differing legal obligations. Coalition partners, applying the same law, may reach
different conclusions as to whether a target is a military objective or whether an attack satisfies
the rule of proportionality.
0257. Policy differences. A further complication occurs when there is no difference in legal
obligations or interpretation, but a policy difference exists between multinational partners such
as divergent maritime boundary claims and air space. Such policy differences, possibly reflected
in their respective ROE (or in other strategic/policy documents), may mean that a multinational
partner will refrain from entering certain waters or attacking certain military objectives.
Additionally, differences in the levels at which internal targeting approvals are set by individual
alliance/coalition partners may also become important. While one partner may be able to quickly
approve targeting at a relatively low level, another partner may require a significant lead time to
allow the completion of their internal approval process (which may include governmental
approval).
0258. Management of multinational issues. Successful management of alliance/coalition legal
issues and policy constraints requires:
a. early and ongoing liaison to identify the differences;
b. resolution of those differences where possible, and;
c. where resolution is impossible, ensuring that:
(1) the differences are not overstated; and
(2) that action is taken to ensure that the differences are properly factored into the
planning and execution of multinational operations.
0259. The development of relationships between alliance/coalition LEGADs is an important
aspect of this process. Additionally, subject to national security considerations, the sharing of
relevant national directions and orders can greatly reduce the chance of misunderstandings.

Targeting, LOAC and Public Affairs

0260. CAF spokespersons on targeting issues must possess a working knowledge of the
relevant legal principles and terminology. Differences between alliance/coalition partners in
relation to legal obligations, legal interpretations and policy constraints can be expected to be of
public and media interest.

2-15
 CFJP 3-9

Consequence Management
0261. If targeting operations result in unintended and unexpected consequences, such as more
civilian casualties than anticipated, or following attack it is discovered that the target was not a
military objective, demonstrable compliance with LOAC principles and processes, both
generally and in relation to the specific targeting activity, will be very important. This includes
any formal investigation of the incident and any potential adverse action against individuals, as
well as developing a proactive information strategy to acknowledge the incident and mitigate any
potential negative consequences, as required.
0262. In particular, the availability of documentary evidence that the precautions required by
LOAC were undertaken will be essential. This documentary evidence may include the TVC, as
well as any instructions and briefings used in planning and executing the attack. While such
documents will not rectify the physical damage caused, they may prevent a tragic accident from
reoccurring or being mischaracterised as a war crime either by the media, or more seriously, as a
finding by a board of inquiry or court.

Weapons
0263. Some weapons are totally prohibited by the LOAC because they are either indiscriminate
in their effect or are of such a nature as to cause superfluous injury and/or unnecessary
suffering. 67 Weapons that are indiscriminate in their effect are prohibited. A weapon that cannot
be directed at a specific legitimate target or the effects of which cannot be limited as required by
the LOAC is prohibited. 68 Weapon selection is based on a number of criteria including mission
profile, desired effect, threat and legal considerations. More detail on specific weapons is
included in Chapter 5 of CFJP 3-0.1, Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical
Levels (Ref. E).
0264. Precision-guided munitions (PGMs). No principle of LOAC requires the use of PGMs
in all circumstances. A PGM may now be required for a particular attack to fulfil a party’s legal
obligations in relation to proportionality and distinction or for some other specific reason related
to the nature of that target (including the location of protected objects and persons). With the
advent of modern technology many armed forces are now able to deliver weapons on target with
unparalleled accuracy. 69
0265. Cluster munitions. Cluster munitions have significant adverse effects on civilian
populations both during armed conflict and after hostilities have ceased, and are subject to the
Convention on Cluster Munitions(Ref L). Although Canada has not yet ratified this convention,
it participated in its negotiation and signed it in December 2008. Article 21 details the
‘interoperability exception’ that permits military cooperation between States parties and non-
States parties engaging in military operations subject to certain other positive obligations. Legal
advice regarding the interoperability exception should be sought when CAF members are
involved in any multinational targeting operation.

67
HlVR, Art 23 (e) (Ref AA); AP I, Arts 35 (2) & 51. (Ref O)
68
AP I, Art 51. (Ref O)
69
HIVR, Art 23 (e) (Ref AA); AP I, Arts 35, 51 & 57 (Ref O)

2-16
 CFJP 3-9

0266. Incendiary weapons. Protocol III to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons
prohibits certain uses of incendiary weapons.
0267. Blinding lasers. Protocol IV to the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention prohibits the
use of laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their
combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision (that is, to the naked eye
or to the eye with corrective eyesight devices).

Use of Nationally Prohibited Weapons by Allies

0268. If the CAF is participating in a multinational operation where nationally prohibited
weapons may, or are intended to be deployed, specific direction will be promulgated by the CDS
concerning the relationship of CAF and these weapons. If, during a multinational operation,
commanders discover that other members of the force have deployed prohibited weapons, the
CDS shall be informed immediately.

Summary
0269. Legal considerations have a variety of applications throughout the targeting process.
Legal issues become more complex when Canada participates in a multinational operation. All
members of the CAF have a duty to comply with Canadian and international law. All targets
passed for prosecution must meet the legal requirements of relevant international law, CDS TD
and ROE. Early involvement of the LEGAD in targeting will improve the process and can
prevent possible domestic and international law violations.

2-17
 CFJP 3-9

This page was intentionally left blank

 CFJP 3-9

Chapter 3
Targeting Duties and Responsibilities

0301. The use of force during military operations is subject to careful scrutiny to ensure that its
use is consistent with strategic and operational objectives. To fulfill Canadian Armed Forces
(CAF) operational requirements within these constraints, a CAF targeting process has been
developed to support the efficient and effective validation and approval of targets. The authority
for approving the targeting and subsequent attack using any means (munitions-based or non-
munitions-based) by CAF elements rests with the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), with an
appropriate level of authority delegated to subordinate commanders and other individuals below
that level, crucially the designated supported commander and the task force commander (TF
Comd). 70 The CDS TD articulates the policy and mechanisms by which CAF targeting is
governed, and provides the guidance necessary to ensure effective and timely decision making in
the targeting process at all levels of command, both prior to and during CAF participation in
unilateral or multinational operations.

Integration of Munitions-based and Non-Munitions-Based Capabilities

0302. The planned, integrated use of a full-spectrum of munitions-based and non-munitions-
based CAF capabilities is the essence of effective targeting. These activities will have an effect
in the information environment: positive, by closing the gap between what is said/done; negative,
by contradicting other messaging. A full-spectrum approach to targeting ensures the inclusion of
info ops and public affairs staffs at every level and ensures coherence with the wider context.
Therefore, CAF targeting activities will always be planned to be coherent with the overall
Government of Canada (GC) strategic-communication framework and mission narrative.

Targeting Authority Framework

0303. Targeting carried out by the CAF is done in support of objectives established by the GC.
Directed by the Minister of National Defence (MND), the CDS in turn provides strategic
direction to operational commanders, including direction for targeting. Subject to direction
published in each operation-specific CDS directive/TD, Commander Canadian Joint Operations
Command (CJOC) or Commander Canadian Special Operations Forces Command
(CANSOFCOM) would normally exercise operational command authority over targeting for
operations in their respective domains. The Strategic Joint Staff (SJS), OJAG and the Canadian
Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM) will advise the CDS and assist the relevant
designated supported commander in the conduct of targeting. These targeting activities may also
be in support of NATO/coalition objectives conducted within formally established GC, DND or
CDS guidance.

70
The detail of delegation of targeting authority to the designated supported commander and the TF Comd is
defined in the CDS TD. For all operations an operation-specific a CDS directive and a CDS TD will be issued by the
SJS, from which the designated supported commander will issue an operational targeting directive (OTD).

3-1
 CFJP 3-9

Target Approval Process

0304. The CDS is the highest authority to approve or deny the prosecution of any CAF target,
or target that directly impacts Canada and/or the CAF. The Targeting Annex of the CDS
Directive/TD for a specific operation will clarify the authorized target sets and will delegate
targeting authorities to subordinate commanders. In circumstances where further guidance or
authority is necessary, commanders may seek direction from their chain of command.

Target Validation
0305. The authority to validate targets for CAF operations will be directed by the relevant
operation-specific CDS Directive/TD.

Targeting Boards (TBs)

0306. The purpose of a TB is to assist and facilitate a delegated target engagement authority
(TEA) in approving validated and analysed targets for future prosecution. The approval of targets
is conducted by the CAF through TBs at the strategic, operational and theatre levels, convened at
each level as required. As core membership a TB comprises a commander (who is also called
TEA), targeting and legal staffs, and is supported by intelligence staff, 71 with input from other
branches/agencies as required. A table of typical TB membership is at Annex A. The results of
each TB are passed by the TEA or J3 targeting officer through the chain of command for action,
and to the SJS for strategic consequence management and follow-up, as required. As a minimum
a TB must consider:
a. all available intelligence related to the target;
b. an indication of potential effects on the target (facility, systems or personnel);
c. the likely effect of the attack/engagement on civilians and civilian objects, collateral
damage estimate (CDE);
d. the risk and consequence of incurring unintended effects;
e. that LOAC is applied;
f. that the target can be attacked/engaged within the relevant commander’s delegated
authority level; and
g. that the technical aspects of weapons delivery meet the required standard.

Role of Designated Supported Commander

0307. The designated supported commander, at the operational level has the following targeting
responsibilities:
a. promulgating an operational target directive for each assigned mission;
b. chairing the Operational Targeting Board (OTB), as required for the onward passage
of targets at that level;
c. compiling, managing, maintaining and disseminating the restricted target list (RTL);

71
Including CFINTCOM and the strategic-level, and the J2 staff at lower levels.

3-2
 CFJP 3-9

d. directing, planning and/or coordinating at the operational-level, the prosecution of

CAF (and/or allied/coalition) targets with CAF (and/or allied/coalition) assets;
e. passing details of all targets attacked/engaged, or planned for prosecution, to
CFINTCOM (COS (Ops)), to be incorporated into the strategic assessment and
target intelligence databases;
f. providing targeting guidance, oversight, and expertise to subordinate TF Comd(s),
as required;
g. reporting of all ongoing and planned targeting events/issues to the SJS; and
h. coordinating targeting standards/training with the environmental commands, force
generators, or other agencies, to meet operational requirements.

Task Force Commander (TF Comd)

0308. The CDS will usually designate a TF Comd for CAF operations, subordinate to the
designated operational-level command authority. The TF Comds are responsible for the effective
conduct of targeting operations tasked to them, or in their area of operations (AO), if assigned.
TF Comds’ targeting responsibilities include:
a. convening and chairing the Theatre Target Board (TTB), as required;
b. planning and coordinating, within their authority, the prosecution of targets with
assigned assets;
c. coordinating the collection of targeting information (both before and after target
prosecution) in support of operations in theatre;
d. passing details of all targets prosecuted or planned for prosecution, to the designated
supported commander and CFINTCOM (COS (Ops)), for incorporation into the
strategic assessment and the target intelligence databases;
e. reporting to the CDS through the designated supported commander on a regular
basis, of ongoing and planned operations and all targeting issues; and
f. reporting of all ongoing targeting events or issues to the designated supported
commander.

Target Approval
0309. The target approval process at the tactical level will be initiated during operations based
on the commander’s guidance, or on the assignment of targets to CAF assets by higher national,
allied/coalition authority. TF Comds may approve targets commensurate with their level of
delegated authority.

Strategic Targeting Board (STB)

0310. The primary mechanism for coordinating political and military input for targeting is the
Strategic Targeting Board (STB). Chaired by the CDS, the STB assists the CDS in advising the
Government and directing the CAF on targeting policy and consequence management issues
arising from CAF targeting activities.

3-3
 CFJP 3-9

Operational Targeting Board (OTB)

0311. The OTB is the CAF operational-level TB. It acts as a mechanism for the coordination of
operational-level military input into the CAF targeting process. It will be convened by the
designated supported commander or the TF Comd, and chaired by the former. Its duties and
responsibilities include:
a. initiating the CAF operational targeting process when CAF assets are tasked on a
named operation;
b. initiating the CAF operational targeting process on receipt of targets assigned to the
designated supported commander;
c. disseminating strategic targeting guidance, and the issuing of operational guidance
and consequence-management decisions arising from TF Comd’s targeting
activities;
d. considering and approving targets that are beyond the delegated authority of the TF
Comd;
e. collecting and transmitting to the CDS the combat assessment (CA) on all targets
prosecuted by the CAF;
f. validating targets for which the CAF might be responsible for prosecution;
g. referring those targets requiring the authority of the CDS to prosecute; and
h. reporting to the CDS in a timely manner, all targets validated and cleared by the
OTB, together with all associated documentation.

Theatre Target Board (TTB)

0312. The TF Comd convenes the TTB to consider targets as previously described. Should the
TTB ascertain that the prosecution of a particular target requires higher approval; the designated
supported commander is advised so that an OTB/STB may be initiated. The duties and
responsibilities of the TTB include:
a. initiating the national targeting process on the receipt of targets assigned to the TF
Comd;
b. considering and reviewing all available targeting information;
c. validating targets for which the CAF might be responsible for prosecution;
d. referring targets that are outside the authority of the TF Comd to approve to the next
higher CAF headquarters;
e. reporting of all targets validated and approved by the TTB to the operational
commander, together with all associated documentation; and
f. transmitting targeting reports, requests for clarification, requests for information
(RFIs), etc., to the designated supported commander.

3-4
 CFJP 3-9

Requirement to Re-Board Targets

0313. Approval to prosecute a target, if not given earlier, will be done close to the time of
execution by a commander with the appropriate delegated authority. This entails confirming that
the target is cleared for prosecution at a TB, that a CDE has been conducted, and that there are
no current circumstances that would lead the commander to conclude that the need for the
prosecution is no longer valid. Planned targets with no CD concerns can usually be engaged with
no additional approval required, beyond initial TB approval. However, those cleared targets with
unresolved CDE or other concerns may require to be re-boarded for final engagement approval.
Similarly, unless they have no CD concerns, targets for prosecution through the dynamic
targeting process that may still require confirmation of CDE and re-approval prior to
prosecution.

Audit Trail
0314. The development, validation and approval of targets is an iterative process. All
information that informed the process leading to the validation and subsequent approval of a
target is to be retained within its electronic target folder (ETF) 72 for audit purposes for the time
period and in the archive location stipulated in CAF archive regulations for such documents. 73
The folder should highlight the source of the intelligence with clearly annotated validity dates.
Any additions, amendments or alterations must be clearly annotated by the author, including the
date/time the changes were incorporated. Decisions taken on the basis of this information must
be clearly indicated, including the date of the decision. The ETF and target summary sheet
(TSS) 74 of targets cleared for prosecution by a TB must contain the following:
a. the TB conducting the approval (including the Chairman’s name/date of TB);
b. the analysis of the expectation of CD;
c. all weaponeering constraints applied to the attack;
d. comments from other agencies; and
e. decisions reached in the TB process, and any explanatory
discussion/explanation/reasoning.
0315. It is the responsibility of the J3 targeting officer (or equivalent) to ensure that detailed
records as described here are assembled, and archived/disposed of in conjunction with CDS TD
direction.

72
ETFs are populated with all the -source intelligence and imagery required to conduct an effective prosecution.
They are discussed more fully in Chap 4.
73
Further specific guidance and direction may also be included in the operation-specific TD.
74
The TSS is a working document used to inform TBs that summarizes a target’s information and facilitates the TB
process.

3-5
 CFJP 3-9

This page was intentionally left blank

 CFJP 3-9

Chapter 4
The Targeting Process

Section I
The Targeting Cycle

0401. The targeting process is an iterative one that provides a framework to ensure successful
targeting during operations. It is not time-dependent and steps may occur concurrently. An
effective, disciplined targeting process minimizes undesired effects, the potential for collateral
damage (CD), and reduces inefficient actions during military operations.
0402. The targeting process integrates military capabilities to create desired effects in support
of the commander’s mission and end state. The targeting process aims to ensure that:
a. targeting effort is aligned with national objectives and the commander’s intent;
b. legal obligations are met;
c. a range of effects are generated across the operational environment that target an
adversary’s critical vulnerabilities;
d. targets selected for prosecution are valid;
e. targeting is coordinated, integrated and deconflicted with other operational
activities; and
f. target intelligence requirements are identified and tasking of collection assets is
managed according to the commander’s priorities.

Targeting and Planning

0403. The integration and synchronisation of all aspects of planning for operations, execution
and assessment is a key to the success of targeting. Targeting is fundamental to the planning
process at all levels as it is the root of all effects-based operations. Target planning and the
operations planning process (OPP) are thus interrelated and complementary activities. Both
apply the same ends, ways and means approach to generate desired effects. Although closely
aligned, the two processes have different stages that do not necessarily occur in the same order,
or at the same time. All aspects of the targeting process continue throughout the conduct of an
operation, in continuous cycles. Moreover, the targeting process needs to be flexible and
proactive to be able to readily adjust to changes as operational circumstances dictate. Planning
considerations must also take into account the requirement for assessment, which is a continuous
process, throughout mission execution, to measure progress and performance of activities
leading to mission accomplishment. Commanders continually adjust operations based on
assessment outcomes to ensure that objectives are met and the end state achieved.

4-1
 CFJP 3-9

Deliberate and Dynamic Targeting

0404. Deliberate targeting focuses on prosecuting planned targets known to exist in an AO.
Dynamic targeting focuses on prosecuting targets of opportunity—those targets identified too
late, or not selected for action in time, to be included in deliberate targeting. All steps of the
targeting process support deliberate targeting; however, dynamic targeting is conducted almost
exclusively in Step 5 of the process. Dynamic targeting is further detailed below.
0405. The targeting cycle (see Fig. 4–1) is a continuous process in which some of its steps may
occur concurrently with others. The process establishes a framework that outlines the steps that
must be satisfied to successfully conduct targeting. The targeting cycle is an integral part of
planning, informing and steering it as the mission progresses.

The Six Steps of the Targeting Cycle

0406. The targeting process is a six-step cyclical activity. Its principal activities are summarized
as follows:
a. Step 1 – End state and commander’s objectives. Mission, objectives, intent,
priorities and desired effects.
b. Step 2 – Target development and prioritization. Intelligence direction,
identification and classification, systems analysis, validation, information
production, CDE, and target list management.
c. Step 3 – Capabilities analysis. Weaponeering, best available means to affect targets
or target sets, more refined CD estimation.
d. Step 4 – Commander’s decision and force allocation. Decision on effects
required, means to be employed, allocating forces, weapons and/or other capabilities
to targets.
e. Step 5 – Mission planning and force execution. Applying the force to realize
objectives and desired effects.
f. Step 6 – Assessment. Effects assessment, battle damage assessment (BDA),
weapons effectiveness assessment (WEA) and re-attack recommendations.

4-2
 CFJP 3-9

Figure 4-1: The Targeting Cycle

Step 1 – End State and Commander’s Objectives

0407. Commander’s guidance drives the targeting process by providing the overall perspective
to subordinate commanders charged with task execution, and it specifically identifies conditions
and parameters for particular objectives. Guidance is continually refined and adjusted to fulfil the
mission. Most importantly, the planned effects should support the commander’s mission and
objectives.
0408. Commander’s guidance at the strategic-level comprises the following:
a. National strategy guidance. The CAF receive their mission mandate from the GC.
National strategic guidance should be constantly provided throughout the targeting
process thereby influencing all steps.
b. Military strategy guidance. GC objectives and guidance are translated into military
strategy by the CDS. The CDS, in turn will formulate strategic targeting guidance.
Strategic targeting guidance is promulgated in the operation-specific CDS
directive/TD to the designated supported commanders, who in turn will develop
their own guidance to component and/or subordinate commanders.
0409. Strategic guidance provides to subordinate commanders an understanding of the overall
mission and end state thereby helping define their own intent, objectives and desired effects.
Crucially, it enables all subsequent planning and actions to be audited back to that strategic
intent. Operational objectives 75 are the basis for deriving the desired effects and the scope of
target development that is presented to the commander. Measures of effectiveness (MoEs) and
measures of performance (MoPs) need to be identified and/or developed in this step of the
targeting process. In the planning for operations, this broad guidance is developed during the
mission analysis step of the OPP and/or derived for strategic level guidance. The commander’s
guidance and intent drive the subsequent steps of the targeting process.

75
Operational objectives link the military strategic end state and objectives with tactical action.

4-3
 CFJP 3-9

0410. Targeting involves understanding what effects need to be achieved, identifying the nodes
through which the effect can be realized and then applying the appropriate resourced activity
against those nodes. This broad approach, known as full-spectrum targeting (FSpecT) is
represented pictorially in Fig. 4-2. The operational commander, having identified the conditions
needed to be achieved, uses a target-system analysis (TSA) (including a target-audience analysis
[TAA]) to examine behaviours, attitudes, perceptions and vulnerabilities of potential targets,
determining whether and how they can be influenced. Further refinement determines the blend of
desired munitions-based and non-munitions-based effects. This allows identification of
behavioural objectives, the effects that will achieve them and the activities and resources
required to generate those effects.

Figure: 4-2: Pictorial Representation of Full-Spectrum Targeting (FSpecT)

Step 2 - Target Development and Prioritization

0411. Target development and prioritization entails the systematic examination of potential
target systems (their components, individual targets, and target elements) to determine the
necessary type and duration of action that must be exerted on each target and with which
priorities, to create the required effects consistent with the commander’s objectives. The US
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3370.01 document has been utilized by
the CAF as a guide for this activity. Target development is not a static, one-time event; new and
updated intelligence may continue to shape capability selection, timing, and priorities for
engagement. As a result, additional target intelligence may need to be developed prior to
execution. There are three stages of target development: basic, intermediate, and advanced.
When these three stages are complete, the entity can be considered a fully developed target.
Basic target development ensures the target has been uniquely identified. Intermediate target
development ensures the target is sufficiently developed to be vetted. Advanced target
development completes the target-characterization process and defines the minimum information
necessary to engage the target effectively. A diagram depicting the hierarchy of an adversary’s
target systems, target-system components, targets and target elements relative to the early steps
of the targeting cycle and to typical target-related products is at Figure 4-3 below.

4-4
 CFJP 3-9

Figure 4-3: Target Development Relationships

0412. Target development comprises the following steps:
a. Intelligence direction. Target development begins with intelligence requirements.
Targeting staff must work closely with collection managers to ensure that target
development, any requirements, both before and after engagement of the target, and
any changes that occur throughout the targeting process are integrated into the
collection plan.
b. Target-system analysis (TSA). A TSA is an all-source analytical process and
product that analyzes a target system, including its networks, components, their
elements and interactions, to identify those areas to best achieve an effect that
contributes to the commander’s objectives. TAAs are part of a TSA, forming the
basis of target identification/selection, and at the very centre of intelligence support
to targeting. For the creation of effects, TSAs/TAAs aid and simplify target selection
by identifying those targets, or target components, that can be prosecuted by
munitions-based or non-munitions-based means to achieve physical and psycho-
cognitive effects. A TSA will identify the relative importance of individual target
system components, elements and nodes. One system component may be a TA, and
a TAA focuses on the socio-cultural and cognitive dynamics within the operational
environment to determine which individuals and groups, when influenced, are most
able to achieve effects in support of the commander’s objectives. A TAA also
identifies the optimal method (techniques and means) to influence the target,
whether by munitions-based or non-munitions-based means. As such, a TAA must

4-5
 CFJP 3-9

not be done separately from physical targeting, but in conjunction with it, so that the
effects are complementary and take into consideration that munitions-based actions
could result in cognitive effects, and vice versa. A TSA is the preferred start point
for the building of target lists.
(1) A TSA examines:
a) a specific target system’s functions;
b) a target system’s dependencies on, and linkages to, other target systems;
and
c) the impact of exploitation of particular target elements on the overall
system as well as on other target systems that are functionally related
through those target elements.
(2) A TAA examines:
a) the ability to affect a TA to achieve the desired effect;
b) the optimal techniques and means to influence a TA to achieve the
effect required, and;
c) the events that will indicate success or failure of the effort.
c. Target development nominations (TDNs). Potential targets resulting from the
TSA/TAA process are identified for target development and become TDNs. TDNs
will be formally developed by CFINTCOM and CAF targeteers and their ETFs
established. The CAF target-development process will include the vetting, validation
and analysis of all nominated candidate targets.
(1) Vetting. Candidate targets are vetted to confirm the accuracy of the underlying
intelligence supporting the justification for their nomination. Vetting is an
intelligence function and will be conducted by CFINTCOM, but will involve
the involvement of the whole intelligence community. It aims to establish a
reasonable level of confidence in a candidate target’s functional
characterization, based on a review of its ETF. Vetting also seeks to avoid
dissent on assessments arising during target boards. The elements to be
considered in vetting are:
(2) Validation. A candidate target does not become a ‘target’ until it has been
validated by a designated target validation authority (TVA). Vetted candidate
targets will be validated to confirm that future prosecution would meet all the
objectives and criteria outlined in planning (i.e. in the strategic, operational
TDs, or other guidance issued), be legal (i.e. a target is lawful) and directly
contribute to the strategic objectives and success of the CDS’s mission.
Validation is an operations, policy and legal function, and carried out at a TB,
joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) (see chap 6) or similar review forum.
A TVC is to be completed for each nominated target, with successfully
validated targets being signed off by the appropriate commander. Validated
targets will be included on the Joint Target List (JTL).

4-6
 CFJP 3-9

(3) Analysis. Validated targets will be analyzed by targeteers, to confirm that they
are considered technically suitable for prosecution.
d. Target-intelligence production. Following identification of key targets matching
the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities, standardized target materials (TM) are
produced to support commanders and combat units. The physical and functional
characteristics of individual targets are determined and recorded to inform later
weaponeering and OPP.
e. Target-list development. The output of target development is the production of the
various target lists. It is imperative that procedures be in place to manage target lists
to ensure these products are responsive and verifiable.
f. Electronic target folder (ETF). Each target’s details are to be contained in an ETF
populated with the relevant all-source intelligence and imagery required to conduct
an effective prosecution. All target-related intelligence should be included in the
ETF and it must be retained post-conflict for audit purposes. 76 ETFs will conform to
the accepted US/NATO standard, as per US CJCSI 3370, Target Development
Standards. The information in the ETF is used to populate a TSS.
g. Target summary sheet (TSS). TSSs are produced by the J3 targeting officer (or
equivalent) and provide a summary of a target’s information and facilitate the
targeting process. They are TB’s working documents and form the operational
record of each target’s passage through the target-approval process. They also
provide a briefing tool to enable senior commanders and legal advisers to judge the
assessed military advantage of an intended attack/engagement, against the potential
CD risk. TSSs will be compiled for all targets to be prosecuted as deliberate or as
dynamic targets and presented to the relevant TB. For dynamic targeting, a TSS will
be completed before engagement, but where this is not possible it is to be completed
as soon as possible thereafter. In all cases, the TSSs for prosecuted targets are to be
returned to the designated supported commander’s targeting cell with all relevant
supporting data as soon as is practicable, but not later than two days after target
prosecution. 77
0412. Target lists. The principal target lists that will be developed are:
a. Candidate target list (CTL). On completion of a TDN review, and the
determination that a target is sufficiently developed, the target can be considered a
candidate target, eligible for vetting, and added to the CTL. The CTL is a list of
candidate targets that are being vetted and validated. Each validated target on the
CTL will be nominated to either the JTL or RTL. If a candidate target has been
assessed as being invalid, it is removed from the CTL. The rejected target should
remain on the TDN spreadsheet, but annotated as having been rejected at validation,
with date and rationale. In certain cases the rejected nomination may go onto the no-
strike list (NSL).

76
ETFs and their TSS are retained as operational records.
77
In accordance with the operation-specific CDS TD and OTD .

4-7
 CFJP 3-9

b. Joint target list (JTL). A JTL comprises those CTL targets not on the NSL that, if
prosecuted, would assist in the achievement of CDS’s strategic aim. 78 The JTL is
owned by the CDS, who will delegate management of it to the delegated supported
commander. If such delegation occurs, responsibility for further development of the
JTL will rest with the delegated supported commander, supported by CFINTCOM.
Additional targets may be nominated to the JTL at any time by any commander.
c. Restricted target list (RTL). JTL targets whose disruption might have an adverse
effect on other military options; future intelligence gathering or the post-conflict
step of operations will be placed on the RTL. Responsibility for compilation,
management, maintenance and dissemination of the RTL rests with the delegated
supported commander. Any commander may nominate targets for the inclusion in
the RTL, but authority to remove a target from the list, or change its status, rests
with the originator of that restriction. The JTL and RTL combine to form the
database of official targets, having some significance in a particular plan.
d. Joint prioritized target list (JPTL). The JTL is prioritized into a draft JPTL for
TEA approval at an appropriate level. Notwithstanding unforeseen change in
particular circumstances, targets on the JPTL will be scheduled for prosecution.
0414. No-strike list (NSL). The NSL is not considered a target list. Entities are placed on the
NSL if their deliberate or inadvertent physical destruction or damage would be particularly
sensitive for legal, political, cultural or other reasons. Special care must be taken when targeting
nearby military objectives where CD to a nearby NSL object is a possibility. 79 The NSL is
owned by the CDS but its day-to-day management may be delegated to an NSL coordinator at
the operational-level. The CDS’s authorization is required to remove objects from the NSL,
subject to additional guidance given in the operation-specific TD.
0415. Fully developed targets. CAF targets are considered to be fully developed when
sufficient intelligence exists to support the operational and legal requirements necessary to
proceed with military operations against them. Fully developed targets must still be cleared for
attack/engagement at an appropriate level of TB.
0416. Collateral-damage estimation (CDE). The LOAC requires that military operations be
directed only against legitimate targets. Military operations directed against such targets must
also meet the requirement of proportionality in accordance with the LOAC. Parties to a conflict
have a duty to distinguish between civilians and combatants as well as between civilian objects
and military objectives. Civilians are entitled to protection from the dangers arising from military
operations. When conducting operations, care should always be taken to protect civilians and
civilian objects. 80 The fact that an attack on a legitimate target may cause civilian casualties or
damage to civilian objects does not necessarily make the attack unlawful under the LOAC.
However, such CD must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated from the attack.

78
Some CTL entities may not assist in this aim, and will be rejected from inclusion in the JTL.
79
Proximity of lawful military targets to no-strike entities does not preclude engagement of the former. However, in
these circumstances, the commander must weigh the anticipated loss of life, damage to property, or other negative
effects as a result of an attack, versus the military advantage expected to be gained.
80
AP I, Arts 48, 51-58 (Ref O); AP II, Arts 13-15. (Ref P)

4-8
 CFJP 3-9

0417. CDE is a fundamental principle of the CAF target-approval process and of the
proportionality assessment. A formal CDE is undertaken for every target to be prosecuted using
a deliberate or dynamic process. Without an effective CDE it may be difficult to demonstrate due
diligence and appropriate risk management post-attack. It is recognized that there may be
situations when it is not feasible to conduct a full CDE. In these circumstances, commanders
must, as a minimum, respect their obligations under LOAC. An attack must be cancelled or
suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a legitimate target, or that the attack
may be expected to cause CD that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated. The CDE process does not form by itself a decision; is it an
estimate that assists to balance collateral risk against military requirement. Population density
and PoL surrounding the target must also be considered. Largely an exercise in military
judgment, CDE can be quantified by the use of CDE software tools to produce a statistically
realistic result. Responsibility for production of a CDE rests with the J3 Targeting staff (or
equivalent) supporting the target’s TEA.
0418. CDE methodology (CDEM). The CAF CDEM for physical effects is a five-level
process that provides the commander with empirically derived CDE mitigation tools designed to
support command decision making and weigh military necessity against CD risk. The CAF
CDEM aligns with the US, UK, AUS and NATO equivalents. It simplifies the US Joint
Munitions Effectiveness Manuals (JMEMs) empirical data into a more readily usable graphical
form to enable assessment of CD at any level of command. The concept of CDE also applies to
means that are non-munitions-based 81 although a different methodology will apply. This latter
topic is beyond the scope of this publication.
0419. In its most basic form, CDE is a process of estimating the CD that is considered by every
commander within the chain of command. CDE distils down to five questions that must be
answered before prosecuting any target:
a. Has a PID 82 been established for the object to be affected?
b. Are there protected or collateral objects, civilian or non-combatant personnel,
human shields, or significant environmental concerns within the effects range of the
weapon to be used to attack the target?
c. Can damage to those collateral concerns be mitigated by attacking the target with a
different weapon or with a different method of engagement, yet still accomplish the
mission?
d. If not, how many civilians are likely to be injured or killed, what property may be
damaged or destroyed or what adverse effect might there be on the environment if
the attack is carried out?

81
It should be noted that non-munitions-based means might also result in a lethal effect, which might be intended or
could be an unintended second or third order effect. For instance, denying power or water production through
interference with control systems might result in injury or death.
82
Positive identification (PID): In targeting, the reasonable certainty that a functionally and geospatially defined
entity is a legitimate military target.

4-9
 CFJP 3-9

e. Are the collateral effects excessive in relation to the expected military advantage
gained and, based on the ROE in use, is it necessary to request approval to attack the
target from the next level of command?
0420. The technical methods detailed in the CDE process enable a reasonable understanding of
the CD inherent in weapons employment. CDEs thereby address the LOAC requirement for
proportionality. The supporting technical data, mitigation techniques, and logic of the CDE
recognize the intelligence limitations of what can reasonably be known about a given target, its
surroundings, and collateral structure composition; the reliability of available weapon-effects
data; and the operational realities and uncertainties of weapons delivery in a combat
environment.
0421. The framework of munitions-based CDE is built around five mutually dependent CDE
levels. Each level is based on a progressively refined analysis with specific risk thresholds
established for each of the CDE levels. The CDE supports the relationship between three
principal categories of risk: risk of CD, risk to own forces, and risk to the mission. The
intersection of these is determined by the factors required to avoid, and in all cases minimize, CD
to an acceptable level, while still seeking to achieve mission success and minimizing risk to own
forces. Fig. 4-5 depicts the risk continuum and the interaction between CD and targeting factors
for each CDE level. CDEs provide easily recognizable measures of operational risk to
commanders. The CD threshold in CDE levels 1, 2, and 3 mitigate risk to less than 10%
probability of serious/lethal wounds to standing personnel, dressed in summer-weight clothing,
in open rolling terrain, from primary warhead fragmentation or debris. The threshold in CDE
Level 4 reduces this risk to less than 1% fractional structural damage to collateral structures from
primary warhead blast effects. CDE Level 5 considers the level of structural damage and/or
casualties that levels 1-4 were unable to mitigate.

Figure 4-4: The Five CDE Levels and Risk Management/Mitigation Strategy.
(Note: This is a graphical representation of risk and not a linear depiction of how the levels increase)

4-10
 CFJP 3-9

Step 3 - Capabilities Analysis

0422. The purpose of capabilities analysis is to maximize the efficiency of forces through
application of sufficient force to create the desired effects while minimizing CD, duplication of
effort and wasted resources. This step of the targeting process involves evaluating available
capabilities against desired effects to determine the appropriate options available to the
commander. Commanders also consider risks to the force and collateral concerns in evaluating
available capabilities. Capabilities analysis may also inform the TF Comd’s choice of course of
action and other decision-making processes.
0423. Once appropriate options are developed, the analysis focuses on evaluating specific
capabilities against identified target vulnerabilities to estimate likely effects. This process builds
on the analysis conducted in target development, to characterize the physical, functional, and
behavioural vulnerability of the target as well as to confirm a connection to the TF Comd’s
objectives and guidance.
0424. Consideration of weapon effects and CD on selected targets is a key aspect of this step.
Targets with associated CD concerns expected to exceed TF Comd or operational commander’s
delegated authorities are referred to the STB for review and approval.

Step 4 – Commander’s Decision and Force Allocation

0425. The Commander’s decision and force allocation step fuses capabilities analysis with
available forces, sensors, and engagement options. The process of matching prioritized targets
with the available resources and supporting intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets
lies at the heart of force allocation. Once the TF Comd approves the JPTL, either entirely or in
part, tasking orders are prepared and released to the executing force elements (see Step 5).
0426. During any operation, the targeting process links the commander’s guidance and
objectives. This process supports the selection of nominated targets and the details of the
capability-effectiveness estimates. It links operations planners and targeting specialists with the
information flow critical to reducing the likelihood of confusion between what was expected at
the joint task force (JTF) level and what was actually achieved during execution. Ultimately, the
exchange of information at this step and the reconciliation of a common operating picture (COP)
are critical elements in the assessment step of the targeting process, where outcomes are
analyzed and future actions are determined. The essential actions that take place during this step
are:
a. identify available friendly forces and any operational constraints;
b. recommend force assignment for approval;
c. allocate forces with appropriate capabilities to targets and missions to achieve
desired effects; and
d. issue orders as the link to Step 5.

4-11
 CFJP 3-9

Step 5 – Mission Planning and Force Execution

0427. On receipt of tasking orders, detailed mission planning is undertaken for the execution of
operations in support of both deliberate and dynamic targeting. The targeting process supports
this planning by providing tactical-level planners with direct access to detailed information on
the targets, supported by the nominating component’s reasoning that linked the target with the
desired effect (Step 2).
0428. Combat is inherently fluid, and the battlespace may change dramatically as the adversary
responds and deviates from friendly force assumptions. However, the targeting process is also
flexible and can adapt to these changes, allowing commanders to maintain the initiative. An
expedited approach may be required during execution and therefore, high-quality targeting,
operational and a high degree of situational awareness (SA) is required to assess appropriate
responses and possible CD.

Step 6—Assessment

0429. The assessment of effects realized is essential in the targeting and operational process.
MoEs enable commanders to identify the impact of a targeting action in relation to the overall
mission. MoEs are criteria used to evaluate how well a task has achieved the desired result. 83
These criteria focus on the results or consequences of actions taken, considering whether the
right things are being done to create the desired effects. MoPs are criteria used to evaluate the
accomplishment of a task. 84 These criteria assess the conduct of the task itself, considering
whether the task was done right. If the desired effect is not achieved, the target may need to be
reattacked using the same response, or another response selected to achieve the desired effect.
MoPs are identified to assess how well our forces are conducting the targeting effort. MoPs
enable commanders to determine performance of own forces and ensure that adequate resources
are being allocated to the targeting effort. In essence MoEs help answer “Are we doing the right
things?” and MoPs help answer “Are we doing things right?” By feeding back the results of
MoPs/MoEs against the campaign objectives, this enables the assessment phase to determine if
progress in the mission is being made. This is illustrated at Fig. 4-6.
0430. The assessment step both completes and begins the cyclic targeting process. Assessment
occurs at all levels and across the range of military operations, even those that do not include
combat. Commanders and their staff determine relevant assessment actions and measures during
planning. They consider assessment metrics and measures as early as mission analysis, and
include them and related guidance in the estimate process/OPP. This properly focuses
subsequent assessment and collection at each step and enhances the efficiency of the overall
process. Assessment is continuous and directly tied to the commander’s decisions throughout
planning, preparation, and execution of operations.

83
DTB, record 32281.
84
DTB, record 32230.

4-12
 CFJP 3-9

Figure 4-5: Assessment Levels and Measures.

0431. Components of assessment. Assessment is used to measure progress towards mission
accomplishment. As shown in Fig. 4-6 assessment includes effects assessment, CA and collateral
assessment.

Figure 4-6: Assessment.

4-13
 CFJP 3-9

0432. Effects assessment. Commanders will continuously assess the operational environment
and the progress of operations, and compare the outcomes with their initial vision and intent,
based on the effects that are produced in the operational environment. In this way they adjust the
nature and type of operations, and therefore the effects required, based on their assessment, to
ensure that objectives are met and their end state is achieved. At the operational and/or strategic
levels effects assessment is a campaign assessment that is incorporated into strategy and
guidance development.
0433. Combat assessment (CA). CA examines the effects produced on the targets to determine
if mission objectives were achieved in accordance with the commander’s intent. It also
recommends further targeting priorities in line with the assessed results. Effective CA requires an
understanding of the linkages between the targets and the higher commander’s objectives,
targeting guidance and desired effects. The linkage begins with targeting tasks, effects and
objectives that support assigned operational tasks, effects and objectives. There is a difference
between operational objectives/effects, targeting objectives/effects and munitions effects. CA
comprises four aspects: mission assessment, BDA, weapons effectiveness assessment, and re-
attack recommendation.
a. Battle damage assessment (BDA). BDA is “the timely and accurate estimate of
damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal,
against a predetermined objective.” 85 BDA is conducted in three steps:
initial/physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment and target system
assessment.
b. Mission assessment. Mission assessment is an evaluation of the effectiveness of all
preceding steps in the targeting process in the light of overall command guidance. It
informs commanders at all levels of the results of targeting operations.
c. Weapon-effectiveness assessment (WEA). WEA is a technical assessment of how
the capabilities employed performed, and of the method by which they were applied.
d. Re-attack recommendation. This phase compares the result of prosecution with the
predetermined MoEs, which may lead to a requirement to re-engage the target if the
intended result was not achieved.
0434. Engaging targets identified on a target list does not, of itself, represent the total
effectiveness of operations. CA seeks to ascertain whether required effects are being achieved.
All components, commands and sources contribute to and rely on CA. At the JTF level, the
outcomes of the assessment step will influence the commander’s future mission guidance and
force allocation.
0435. Collateral assessment. Collateral assessments are the understanding of the actual CD
caused by the use of munitions-based and cognitive weapons, and they are necessary to fully
understand the consequences of own actions. Collateral assessments measure actual CD against
the previously assessed CDE, to determine what undesired effect occurred that may require
consequence management and/or a re-assessment of the applicable CDEM. Collateral assessment
draws from the BDA process, but has different goals.

85
DTB record 26988.

4-14
 CFJP 3-9

0436. Post-conflict. In the aftermath of military operations there is a continuing requirement

for assessment data, as follows:
a. Operational data. Collection of operational or mission-specific data includes all
executed mission type orders, including executed air tasking orders, all mission
reports, and copies of aircraft cockpit video or weapon system video as a minimum.
b. Intelligence. Information collected includes national and tactical intelligence
gathered during operations, as well as continued post conflict damage assessment
and analysis of reconstruction for revising TSA and TM.
c. WEA. Optimal analysis of weapons effects is achieved by deploying WEA
exploitation teams (engineers, tacticians, and intelligence analysts) to conduct on-
site analysis. The goal of these ground-truth operations is to correlate the level of
damage described by BDA collection assets, and the actual physical and functional
damage inflicted.

Section II
Dynamic Targeting

Introduction
0437. Dynamic targeting primarily prosecutes targets of opportunity, which are targets
identified too late, or not selected for action in time to be included in deliberate targeting; or
planned targets whose status has recently changed necessitating more expedient prosecution.
Dynamic targeting is conducted almost exclusively in Step 5 of the targeting process, as shown
in Fig. 4-8. However, planning conducted during Steps 1-4 can and does support dynamic
targeting. These targets must be prosecuted on a compressed timeline compared to those that are
prosecuted using deliberate targeting. To facilitate their execution the CDS may pre-approve
certain target sets for prosecution. These target sets will largely comprise opposing
military/combatant and other similar designated groupings necessary for belligerent activities.
Examples of such targets might be, but not limited to: theatre ballistic missiles; mobile, high-
threat surface-to-air missiles; mobile command and control vehicles and facilities and key mobile
and temporary capabilities such as temporary military bridging. Dynamic targeting remains a
methodical process irrespective of the time available.
0438. Targets of opportunity. There are two types of targets of opportunity:
a. Unplanned. Unplanned targets are those known to exist in the operational
environment but that have not had action planned against them.
b. Unanticipated. Unanticipated targets are unknown, or not expected to exist in the
operational environment.

4-15
 CFJP 3-9

Figure 4-8: Correlation of Deliberate and Dynamic Targeting in the

Joint Targeting Cycle (JTC) Step 5.

0439. Although priorities may vary, the primary focus of dynamic targeting is prosecution of
the following:
a. Designated supported commander’s TSTs. The TF Comd is usually responsible for
TST prosecution and relies on the component commanders for conducting TST
operations.
b. Targets previously scheduled for attack, but that have changed status in some way.
c. Component high-priority targets that are not TSTs approved at the operational level
(dynamic targets), but are considered crucial for the success of a friendly component
commanders’ missions because of their fleeting nature and threat to friendly forces.
d. Designated HPTs and HVTs, identified during execution that friendly commanders
deem worthy of targeting.
e. Dynamic targeting supporting joint fires that require immediate engagement to
achieve desired effects.
0440. Successful dynamic targeting requires prior planning and coordination by relevant staff(s)
and/or respective components. Some common methods for creating this capability are:
a. preplanning target reference methods and fire support coordination measures
(FSCM);
b. pre-positioning available on-call ISR assets and attack resources to rapidly respond
to emerging targets;

4-16
 CFJP 3-9

c. using joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) to

determine the most probable areas where targets will emerge during execution and
target areas of interest (TAIs); and
d. coordinating and synchronizing dynamic targeting operations by streamlining and
developing procedures for rapid handover of the mission tasking to another force
element or component for mission execution if the primary force element cannot
attack a target.

Figure 4-9: The Dynamic Targeting Process (F2T2E2A).

The Dynamic Targeting Process

0441. The dynamic targeting process consists of the following seven steps and is usually
referred to as F2T2E2A: 86
a. Find;
b. Fix;
c. Track;
d. Target;
e. Engage;
f. Exploit; and
g. Assess.

86
The traditional doctrinally accepted dynamic targeting process has the F2T2EA steps. NATO work on AJP-3.9,
Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting (Ref. J) has developed the additional ‘E’ for ‘Exploit’, and it is considered
that this step is an important part of the dynamic targeting process sufficient that it should be included here.

4-17
 CFJP 3-9

Step 1 – Find
0442. The Find step involves ISR detection of an emerging target, some aspect of which
suggests that it fits within either the unplanned or unanticipated target categories. The Find step
requires clearly designated guidance from commanders, especially concerning target priorities,
and the focused ISR collection plan based on JIPOE for specific named areas of interest (NAIs)
and/or TAIs. Some of the emerging targets detected as part of the collection operations will meet
the criteria to be further developed. The time sensitivity and importance of a target may be
initially undetermined, and emerging targets usually require further ISR and analysis to develop
and confirm their status.
0443. Collection. A good collection plan is active and focused. The deployment of collection
assets should be undertaken with a clear understanding of what information/data will be
collected. Collection should be anticipatory and involve confirming anticipated results. The
result of the Find step could be an emerging target that will be nominated for further
investigation and development in the Fix step.

Step 2 – Fix
0444. In the Fix step an emerging target is positively identified and its position and other
relevant data are determined with sufficient fidelity to permit engagement. This step begins after
the detection of the emerging target, with sensors focused on confirming the identity and precise
location. This may require implementing a sensor network or diverting ISR assets. An estimation
of the target’s window of vulnerability frames the timeliness required for prosecution and may
affect the prioritization of assets and risk assessment.
0445. The Find and Fix steps may be completed near-simultaneously, without the need for
additional ISR input if the system that detects the target will also engage it. This action may also
result in the subsequent Target and Engage steps being completed without a lengthy
coordination and approval process. Battle management systems can often fix target locations
precisely enough to permit engagement without the need for further ISR collection. Growth in
sensor technology also permits non-traditional sources of ISR to supplement the Find, Fix, and
Track steps, integrating data from platforms other than those traditionally dedicated to
intelligence collection. This helps to build a COP that commanders can use to expedite the
F2T2EA process.

Step 3 – Track
0446. In the Track step a confirmed target’s position and track, if appropriate, is monitored.
Sensors may be coordinated to maintain SA or track continuity on targets. Windows of
vulnerability should continue to be identified. This step requires relative reprioritisation of ISR
assets, just as the Fix step may, to maintain SA.
0447. If track continuity is lost, it will probably be necessary to return to the Fix or possibly the
Find steps. The Track step results in track continuity and maintenance of identification on the
target, maintained by appropriate sensors or sensor combinations, and updates on the target’s
window of vulnerability (if required).

4-18
 CFJP 3-9

Step 4 – Target
0448. The Target step is a decision-making process that uses available information to produce a
particular engagement recommendation for approval by an appropriate tactical commander. Any
restrictions and deconfliction issues are also resolved in this step. Guidance on the conditions
under which prosecution can occur, and the effects required, is used in this recommendation.

Step 5 – Engage
0449. In this step, engagement of a target is ordered and transmitted to the selected engagement
system. The engagement is monitored and managed by the engaging force element/component.
The desired result of this step is successful action against the target.
0450. Prosecution of the target must continue to be audited, through appropriate mechanisms,
by the targeting staff, to ensure that it was carried-out as planned and in accordance with the
wishes of the TEA. Records of all actions concerning the prosecution, both formal (TSS, etc.)
and informal (operations/communications logs, etc.), must be included in the target records for
audit and record purposes.

Step 6 – Exploit
0451. The engagement of any target, physical or cognitive, can present immediate or longer
term opportunities for exploitation. During the planning phase, targeting and planning staffs
should identify these opportunities and develop plans that can be executed if the appropriate
conditions arise.
0452. Where a target is detected, validated and engaged, and recorded sensor data is available,
it can be analyzed to track the target back to its point of origin, such as a base camp, and thus
potentially identifying a wider threat or additional emerging targets for subsequent analysis
and/or attack.

Step 7 – Assess
0453. This step links Engage and Exploit. Here the resultant effects are measured against
actions and desired effects on the target. ISR assets collect information about the engagement
according to the collection plan and attempt to determine whether desired effects and objectives
were achieved. In cases of the most fleeting targets, quick assessment will be required to make
expeditious re-attack recommendations. Legal advice should also be sought during the Assess
step, especially if the commander is contemplating re-engaging the target.

Considerations during Dynamic Targeting

0454. Target engagement authority (TEA). The authority to engage a target is dependent on
the nature of the target, the phase of the operation and other factors, and could be retained at a
high level. However, appropriate national TEA mechanisms must be put in place specifically to
support the requirements of dynamic targeting, and this will always be a balance between C2 and
risk management. An appropriate level of SA by subordinate headquarters can streamline the C2
cycle and allow timely engagement during dynamic targeting.

4-19
 CFJP 3-9

0455. Risk management. The prosecution of any target entails a certain amount of risk.
However, to make an informed decision, the TEA must be aware of the nature and type of that
risk. Awareness of the level of acceptable risk is critical to successful targeting during planning
and execution. Compression of the decision cycle increases risk due to the time needed for the
detailed coordination and deconfliction required during dynamic targeting. TEAs must assess
risk early, determine what constitutes acceptable risk, and communicate their intent to their staff.
The prosecution of TSTs may necessitate that a higher level of risk is accepted to successfully
attack the target. Issues in the consideration of risk management include:
a. risk to the mission (LOAC/ROE compliance, mission mandate and Government
policy, the risk of not attacking the target in time or losing the opportunity to
prosecute the target);
b. risk to friendly forces;
c. increased CD potential; and
d. opportunity cost of diverting assets from their planned missions.

Section III
Time-Sensitive Targets

Introduction
0456. A TST is a JFC-designated target requiring immediate response because it is a highly
lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity or it poses (or will soon pose) a significant danger to
friendly forces. TSTs are also designated as such because their engagement is of a high enough
priority to warrant immediate action and the possible retasking of forces, to support campaign or
operational objectives. A TST may be either engaged by either deliberate or a dynamic targeting.
TST execution may involve cross-boundary issues and multicomponent or joint force assets to
prosecute them. TSTs are prioritized, categorized, coordinated, deconflicted, and directed for
engagement at the operational level. Some examples of potential TSTs are:
a. weapons of mass destruction and their supporting systems;
b. deployed theatre ballistic missile systems;
c. mobile, high-threat surface-to-air missile systems;
d. mobile rocket launchers;
e. mobile C2 vehicles and facilities; and
f. targets that have undergone a change in status (e.g. a standby C2 facility that has
recently become functional).

Prosecuting TSTs
0457. The targeting process establishes the mechanism, via which all targets are identified,
developed and engaged, this includes TSTs. However, due to the time sensitivity associated with
TSTs, they are usually prosecuted using the dynamic targeting process (F2T2E2A).

4-20
 CFJP 3-9

Command and Control

0458. Specific command guidance for designation and prioritisation of TSTs is required. Pre-
authorised TSTs may be included in the operation-specific TD. Some TSTs may be
recommended by subordinate commanders and other agencies may also put forward TST
nominations, via the TTB, for forwarding to the JFC.
0459. The JFC’s guidance will clearly define the TST coordination procedures between the
components, applicable ROE, any restrictions including CD considerations and reporting
conditions. The guidance will include details such as TST priorities, TEA, and levels of
acceptable risk.

Considerations
0460. Intelligence. Synchronization between intelligence and targeting requirements is
necessary to optimize the ability of forces to effectively locate, engage and assess the TST.
During execution planning, intelligence closely monitors target status to update final planning
before execution.
0461. Time. The TF Comd must rapidly balance the time required for coordination against the
danger of not engaging the target in time. Often this means accepting a risk of redundant attacks
against the same target, and/or possible attacks with non-optimum weapons. The best response
for each TST often depends on the level of conflict, clarity of the desired outcome, and ROE.
0462. Engagement capabilities and limitations. Determination of the most appropriate
prosecution asset begins during the Target step and continues through to Engage. Time
permitting, each component provides recommendations highlighting the benefits and limitations
of their available weapon systems based on the current situation. The designated supported
commander also provides guidance to components to allow them the flexibility to make the
proper decision regarding rapid selection of most appropriate engagement capability. Each of the
different weapon systems has associated benefits and limitations regarding effectiveness against
different target types, responsiveness, range, accuracy, vulnerability to an adversarial threat, and
associated risks of employment.

4-21
 CFJP 3-9

This page was intentionally left blank

 CFJP 3-9

Chapter 5
Influence-Activity Targeting
Introduction
0501. Info ops coordinate and integrate non-munitions-based activities with traditional military
operations. The focus of info ops is to create first-order cognitive effects on approved TAs
through the synchronized use of information-related capabilities (IRCs); operations security
(OPSEC); military deception (MD); psychological operations (PsyOps); civil-military
coordination (CIMIC); public affairs (PA); key-leader engagements (KLEs); computer network
operations (CNO); electronic warfare (EW); and presence, posture and profile (PPP), to affect
their will, behaviour and capabilities. 87 Info ops must therefore be fully integrated within the
operations planning and targeting processes.
0502. Influence activities (IAs) operate in the areas where the physical, informational, and
cognitive domains converge. If the core functions of land operations 88 consist of Find, Fix, Strike
and Exploit; then the equivalent for IAs might be along the lines of Identify, Empathise,
Communicate, Influence and Assess. Thus the aims of IA targeting are similar to those of
traditional targeting, but reached by very different methods. This chapter looks at these
differences, and hence the differences in approach taken by IA targeteers.
0503. All targeting is command-led and IA targeting is no different. It starts with the issuance
of a commander’s guidance and intent. This assists the targeting staff to identify relevant TAs.
The next step must always be about identifying what effect needs to be produced on the TA, and
this has undergone radical development in our understanding of what the TA is and how it
works/thinks. Clearly, none of this would be possible without good information and thorough
understanding. It is no surprise that the nature of the problem described earlier required
something rather more than just an analysis of the adversary—the ‘red’ picture. In this instance it
is also about ‘white’ (politics, people and their motivations) and ‘green’ (host nation partners);
and include crime, corruption, etc. Lastly, all sources need to be coordinated effectively to
answer the key questions. This process is led in the traditional way by the commander’s
information requirements, but it is important that they be disseminated very widely and updated
regularly so that they leverage not just ‘task-able’ sources, but also ‘incidental’ sources as well
as—most frequently forgotten—what is available in open source material.
0504. The employment of IAs. The key to employing IAs is to decide the effect that is to be
created and coordinate action and message across all lines of operation. Commanders must
understand and select the influence effects that will accomplish their campaign objectives, and
then assign the requisite activities required to achieve them. A wide range of activities will be
used to influence a target. IAs may include:
a. MD. MD may be applied to adversary commanders and forces to affect their
perception of the threat and intent.

87
CFJP 3-10, Information Operations (Ref. F).
88
B-GL-300-001/FP-001, Land Operations , Chap 4. (Ref K)

5-1
 CFJP 3-9

b. PsyOps. PsyOps use controlled messages to influence understanding, perceptions

and will of targeted groups and individuals. PsyOps should never deceive or spread
untruths, otherwise the message will lose credibility and may undermine campaign
legitimacy.
c. CIMIC. CIMIC is realized through support to reconstruction of public services,
social infrastructure, creation of governance, and social development activities.
d. PPP. The PPP of troops in contact with a local populace will send a specific
message. The manner (an obvious sign of commitment) in which troops interact
with a local sends an important message to this audience, which will either
undermine or engender support. The resultant message may be planned to change
over time.
e. PA. PA is an IA in that it facilitates the flow of accurate information to various
audiences through the media with the effect that understanding is enhanced. PA
must not be directly associated with PsyOps activities.
0505. IAs focus on promoting perceptions, attitudes and understanding that influence will and
affect the behaviour of governments, organizations, groups and individuals to support the
achievement of the campaign objective and ultimately the end state. The need to influence a TA
may be key to the long-term success of a mission. For example, key to success in a counter-
insurgency (COIN) campaign is the need to separate the insurgents from the physical and moral
support of the populace, and gain and maintain the support of the populace for the campaign.
Commanders at the lowest levels must understand the importance of such influence activities and
the effects, positive and negative, that may be gained from them. The conduct of individual
soldiers will influence the perceptions and support of local populations, and most notably, one
incident of poor conduct can rapidly undermine, in an exponential manner, many positive
influences.
0506. IAs are a key part of FSpecT. Given their nature, their scope, the necessary resources,
and the timeframe required, many of the IAs, particularly those related to CIMIC, will be created
in conjunction with other agencies within a Comprehensive Approach framework. To understand
what activities are required to create influence, and thus the desired psychological effects and
behaviour, commanders must understand the TA and the cultural and environmental influences,
habits, motivations, and practices that all affect the target’s psychological reasoning. In simple
terms, they must understand how the TA thinks, acts and reacts, to avoid making assumptions or
predictions based on own cultural bias. Unless the TA is properly considered, unintended
negative effects may occur and do enormous damage to the campaign and accordingly every
effort must be made to avoid them. For example, the firepower demonstration conducted to
convince belligerent commanders not to manoeuvre their forces may only serve to embarrass
them in front of their supporters, and thus cause them to react unpredictably. Likewise, activities
taken to instil fear or dissuasion in a TA may only create hatred instead. During the planning and
war-gaming processes, the staff should conduct a TAA to gauge likely reactions. Cultural and
political experts will assist in such assessments.
0507. The concept of conducting activities to influence understanding and perceptions is not a
new concept, and has been colloquially articulated in the concept of winning ‘hearts and minds,’
or more correctly, ‘minds and hearts,’ in which to create a particular will and behaviour (hearts),
perceptions and understanding require to be influenced (minds).

5-2
 CFJP 3-9

0508. Influence effects. While objectives for IAs express a condition or outcome in the
information domain, an influence effect must express a condition or outcome in the real world
(i.e. the cognitive or physical domains). These effects are generally manifested as conditions
affecting either the target’s information systems in the physical domain, decision making in the
cognitive domain, or subsequent behaviour in the physical domain. The key cognitive and
physical effects may be described as:
a. Psycho-cognitive effects. Effects in the psycho-cognitive domain should describe a
psychological condition or state that will manifest itself in the mind of the target as a
result of influence engagement. Possible psycho-cognitive effects are:
(1) Mislead. A target is misled when it believes something that is not true. This
specific effect should be used when the commander desires to drive the
adversary to make a specific decision or form a specific perception.
(2) Confuse. A target is confused when it does not know whether or not to
believe something is true. This effect is used when a commander desires that
the adversary cannot make an informed decision due to the lack of
information of sufficient quality, or confusing information.
(3) Degrade. In the physical domain, degradation means to physically reduce
the effectiveness or efficiency of adversary employment of combat power. It
also has applicability in the psycho-cognitive domain, and in this sense
degradation can reduce an adversary’s or third party’s morale, perceptions,
or attitudes (e.g. degrading popular support for a particular insurgent group).
(4) Promote. Just as a commander may want to degrade perceptions and
attitudes, it may be desirable to promote specific perceptions and attitudes.
Promote can be to increase support for, or awareness of, the friendly force
presence and activities.
(5) Inform. To increase SA and knowledge of a TA without seeking to change
perceptions and attitudes. Inform could be a preparatory condition prior to
seeking a change in the target’s cognition.
b. Physical effects. Effects in the physical domain should describe a physical,
behavioural condition or outcome exhibited by the target. For IAs, information
systems and networks (both technological and human) are attacked or engaged to
generate physical effects. Possible physical effects can include:
(1) Destroy. A familiar term to conventional operations, destruction is applicable
to describe effects in the information environment as well. Destruction
physically renders adversary information systems useless or ineffective, until
reconstituted.
(2) Degrade. For IAs, affecting the physical collection, processing, and
dissemination of particular information can add to the degradation of the
adversary’s ability to synchronize and execute operations.

5-3
 CFJP 3-9

(3) Protect. Physical protection is a defensive condition to mitigate the effects of

adversary actions in the information environment on friendly force
information systems. Stated a different way, IAs will affect how the adversary
collects, processes and disseminates information, in order to protect friendly
capabilities from physical attack.
(4) Isolate. To physically separate the target from the information needed for SA
and decision making.

IA Targeting
0509. The process of IA targeting represents the implementation level where targets residing in
the physical, informational and cognitive domains are prosecuted. Doctrinally, the IA targeting
process is executed through the JTC, and no doctrinal conflict exists between IAs and targeting.
The challenge lies in knowing where, when, and how to target an opponent as part of an overall
coherent campaign to produce the conditions for ultimate victory. Since the targeting cycle
makes no distinction between lethal and non-lethal effects, IAs’ doctrine, supporting technology,
and practices serve as significant inputs to second phase of the targeting cycle. Phase two
involves the development and prioritization of targets. This phase identifies, researches,
develops, vets and validates potential targets for approval and action during a given time period.
Although these actions can apply to any target residing in the physical, informational, and
cognitive domain, IAs target development and prioritization possess nuances that account for the
multiple domain convergence.
0510. In examining the targeting process as it relates to IAs, some key points emerge. First,
IAs’ inherent complexity impedes the traditional targeting capability to effectively align effects
with objectives. Secondly, from an informational and cognitive perspective, the term MoE
struggles to accurately capture complete progress, because it may only focus on indicators of
positive attainment. Thirdly, beyond the usage of the JTC, the doctrine does not advocate any
adherence to a single targeting methodology. Finally, and most importantly, the four principles
of targeting are equally applicable to all IA capabilities.
0511. Principles. The following principles are key to IA targeting:
a. Establishing and maintaining credibility. For fires and IAs to be successful in
creating influence on the psychological plane, the source of the fires and IAs must
have significant credibility in the eyes of the TA. The credibility of a force may have
to be established in a planned, incremental fashion. If lacking credibility, a force will
require the engagement of indigenous proxies such as social or religious leaders who
have established credibility with TAs, to broadcast the desired messages.
b. Timely counter-IAs. Even the most effective fires and IAs plans will be frustrated
in execution if deliberate actions are not taken to counter the IAs of the adversary.
With respect to IAs, the advent of real-time communications technologies forces the
commander to constantly observe and to consider whether to or not to counter the
adversary’s attempts to influence TAs, locally and internationally. Fires and IAs
planning must dedicate resources to monitoring adversary IAs and remain flexible
enough to counter erroneous information. Timeliness is paramount and in terms of
PA, the first side to get its story out into the public domain often holds the public
‘high ground.’

5-4
 CFJP 3-9

The Integration of Fires and Influence Activities

0512. Military forces will comprehensively employ a combination of fires and IAs with
resulting effects on the physical and psychological planes. Thus, much effort from the military
and from other agencies will be expended in seeking those effects and sustaining them. Firstly,
there will be a great deal of IAs to engender support for the campaign and its objectives.
Secondly, there will be many activities by the military, preferably in a supporting role to other
civilian agencies, to build institutions and capabilities among the indigenous society to secure
lasting stability and peace. Typically, fires will help defeat adversaries through the destruction of
their capability on the physical plane. This will, in turn, alter their behaviour for they cannot do
what they wish, thus supporting own campaign objectives. Well-planned physical activities that
destroy or threaten capability will, as a second-order effect, aim to alter the perceptions and will
of adversaries and thus affect their behaviour. IAs will have a first-order effect on the
psychological plane that will influence perceptions, affect will, and thus the behaviour of a TA
that will include individuals and groups, be they friendly, adversarial or neutral. When aimed at
leaders and local populace, they may seek to engender support for a campaign and its long-term
objectives. Many of the IAs will be undertaken by agencies other than the military, but ideally in
close cooperation with the military. These will seek to create the support, institutions, and
capabilities for long-term stability and peace. Therefore, physical and influence activities with
first- and second-order effects on the physical and psychological planes are conducted together
to alter a target’s behaviour, to produce synergy in the attainment of operational objectives.
0513. Fires and IAs are planned, targeted, and conducted simultaneously in a holistic fashion.
Synchronization of fires and IAs are the deliberate use and orchestration of the full range of
available capabilities to realize desired effects. The balance between the two types of activities
and resulting effects will be dictated by the campaign theme, the principles by which the
campaign is conducted, and the objectives desired by the commander. For example, while a
major combat campaign against a conventional adversary will require mainly fires supported by
some IAs, such as MD and PsyOps. Conversely, a COIN campaign may require only enough
fires to neutralize the insurgents while the military and other agencies work to gain the
confidence and support of the local populace through IAs, such as infrastructure and economic
development.
0514. The targeting process is well established in formation headquarters. For fires and IAs to
play an effective and complementary role in any campaign, the targeting of fires and IAs must be
synchronized with the planned scheme of manoeuvre. Fires and IAs involvement in the targeting
working groups and boards is vital for the successful, synchronized achievement of fires and IAs
and the mitigation of unintended negative effects. Fires and IAs staff nominate targets to the
headquarters’ targeting board so that their activities and targets may be integrated with other
actions in a harmonised fashion. Some targets will be those that are engaged in a time-critical
manner, such as adversary C2 systems nominated for physical attack. Other targets, such as those
nominated for EW exploitation or human targets identified for IAs will require detection,
tracking and engagement and assessment over an extensive period of time.

5-5
 CFJP 3-9

0515. The application of fires and IAs is accomplished through synchronization on the physical
and psychological planes, and battlespace management. The application of the full range of
capabilities to achieve desired objectives may be summarized and mapped out in a logical
sequence. Objectives and desired effects are the basis for planning and will dictate the types of
activities to be undertaken by allocated capabilities and resources. Note that the commander and
staff planners must always consider the second-order effects of planned targeting activities.

Conclusion
0516. As for all other types of targeting, the work of fires and IAs planners is guided by the
objectives of the commander and of the higher headquarters. To be successful, fires and IAs
must have an integrated approach to produce optimal effects on the physical and psycho-
cognitive planes. While the objectives and supporting effects may be planned and issued
centrally, lower level commanders require the flexibility to decide on the supporting activities
that are suitable for their particular AO and the specific targets and audiences therein. The
individuals and systems within each AO’s environment must be assessed to ascertain the
activities that are required to establish the directed effects. Additionally, MoEs/MoPs must be
continually utilized to ensure that fires and influence effects are meeting campaign objectives.
0517. In general, IAs targets should be treated like any other fires target. However, some of
those targets will require a greater level of detailed understanding, and this may require detailed
and often lengthy study prior to their engagement. To identify and display the most appropriate
targets and means of engagement for the effects and objectives sought, there must be close
liaison with intelligence staff and advisors. The TB within a headquarters must include key fires
and IAs staff. Not only will the fires and IAs staff represent their own targets, but also they will
be able to provide advice to consider for other targets. Firstly, they will be able to recommend
activities to support the engagement of targets in their area of specialization. Secondly, each
specialization will be able to advise on the limitations of nominated targets and/or engagements
that may violate overarching themes or cause undesired effects. During the targeting process,
planning staff should focus their attention to delivering their respective fires and influence
capabilities against the identified critical vulnerabilities of an enemy, adversary or other actors.

5-6
 CFJP 3-9

Chapter 6
Targeting in Multinational Operations

Introduction
0601. As stated in CFJP 5-1, Use of Force for CF Operations (Ref. H), the CAF are an
instrument of national policy and power. The use of force by the CAF is controlled by, and
subject to the authority and direction of the GC. The national domestic authority authorizing the
deployment of the CAF on international operations flows from an exercise of the Crown
prerogative. In practice, this might be commonly provided by way of strategic objective letters
from the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) in response to an initiating letter from the MND, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, or in a joint letter from both. Minor deployments, or those to
established positions, might be authorized by either minister with simultaneous prime ministerial
notification or concurrence. 89
0602. In addition to this domestic basis, CAF participation in international operations would
also require a basis under international law. This basis could be provided in several ways,
including, for example, consent of a host nation, as an exercise of individual or collective self-
defence, or pursuant to a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). When acting in
accordance with a specific mandate, those methods authorized will be obtained by the
appropriate authorities prior to commencement of operations.
0603. The multinational dimension of these operations poses significant challenges over and
above those inherent in unilateral military operations. At the strategic level, there is the need to
reach agreement on the composition and force structure of the alliance/coalition, as well as a
shared end-state for operations, and to maintain the cohesion of the alliance/coalition. At the
operational and tactical levels, there is the need to establish interoperability between participants
with differing levels of military capability and potentially operating under differing ROE and
national targeting guidance.
0604. When operating in an alliance/coalition, the CDS retains national command of CAF
elements on behalf of the GC. Strategic guidance on targeting will be given by the GC in any
arrangement for operational or tactical control of CAF units by another country. Visibility of
multinational target planning is critical at the strategic-level, and results of all targeting
operations involving CAF assets must be reported to the SJS, so that the CDS can inform the
GC.

Targeting in an Alliance/Coalition
0605. Multinational targeting is ideally a seamless, distributed enterprise operating with shared
doctrine, information systems and intelligence, and pooled munitions-based and non-munitions-
based means capabilities. This ideal is more achievable in an alliance/coalition composed of Five
Eyes or NATO nations than in a broader partnership of willing nations. In these circumstances
significant issues may include a lack of agreed doctrine, disparate sensitivities to CD, and a lack
of releasability of certain information to some participants.

89
Major Alexander Bolt, The Crown Prerogative in Canada and its Use in the Context of International Military
Deployments , Office of the Judge Advocate General Strategic Legal Paper Series, Issue 2, A-LG-007-SLA/AF-002
(Ref L)

6-1
 CFJP 3-9

0606. Targeting information is prepared, analyzed and disseminated on multinational

information systems as far as possible. The appropriate classification level for the sharing of
target-related intelligence material involves a trade-off, encompassing the desire to involve as
many participating nations as possible in the targeting effort and the willingness of those nations
to trust coalition-supplied intelligence that has been suitably sanitized. The participation of some
nations may also be diminished or precluded by the lack of releasability of such material to them.
0607. The increased visibility of adverse targeting outcomes has the potential to severely affect
the coalition’s cohesion. Establishment of national representation in targeting advisory and
decision making at all levels of an coalition is therefore highly desirable.
0608. The proposed prosecution of a target may be deemed by a multinational partner to be
inconsistent with the aims of the coalition, their national interests, or their international legal
obligations. Provision must therefore be made to allow nations to abstain from participating in
the prosecution of such targets. A nation may choose to abstain from some or all activities that
contribute to such prosecutions, including target development and combat assessment, in
addition to execution.
0609. The ability to match coalition means capabilities to intended targets relies on a thorough
knowledge of the characteristics of each capability. The targeting staff must understand the
characteristics of a weapon and its delivery mechanism to correctly assess the potential CD.
They must also be aware of the various IRCs available to create desired first-order cognitive
effects in support of mission objectives. The composition of targeting teams incorporated into
appropriate multinational headquarters should be carefully considered to ensure the availability
of participants familiar with, and to overcome limitations on releasability of these characteristics.
0610. There is a need for national collection agencies to support targeting through the
development of social models and psychological profiles of key adversary government and
military leaders. These in turn rely on data sets such as imagery and military geospatial
information libraries, in-depth country expertise and social studies, as well as databases relating
to the adversary’s weapons characteristics, installations and orders of battle. In addition to
problems arising from the lack of releasability of information, the releasability of targeting
application software and information gained through coalition members’ respective national
agencies may be an important constraint on the design of the targeting enterprise in coalitions
that are broader than Canada’s traditional partners.
0611. Management of ISR assets in support of multinational targeting reflects the priorities of
the JFC. While this is necessary to ensure optimal use of ISR assets, it may disproportionately
affect the ability of some participants to perform target development or combat assessment of
targets or detection, identification and tracking of dynamic targets/TSTs. Participating nations
may therefore choose to reserve some national assets for tasking by their national commander in
support of coalition targeting, or to contribute them to the coalition, providing they may be pre-
emptively tasked by the national commander.

6-2
 CFJP 3-9

Targeting Responsibilities of an Coalition Lead Nation

0612. The coalition lead nation may be used in two instances. The lead nation may be a NATO
member-nation chosen to lead the NATO operation. It may also be leader in its own right,
undertaking to provide the structure and means that allow other nations to contribute to the
coherent targeting process. Should Canada be a lead nation, without some other overarching C2
structure, it could be expected to fulfil the following targeting responsibilities:
a. Providing guidance on targeting resulting from multinational planning/OPP.
b. Providing support data to participants in multinational targeting, including target
lists, TSA/TAA and target materials. The lead nation will be responsible for
ensuring that this material is handled by multinational participants in accordance
with its classification and releasability. On occasion, where a partner is able to
contribute to the provision of these products, a collaborative effort will need to be
established within the coalition.
c. Providing targeting tools to enable multinational partners to actively participate in
the targeting processes. The lead nation will be responsible for ensuring that these
tools are handled by nations in accordance with their classification and releasability.
d. Coordinating the targeting processes by ensuring that participants are aware of their
responsibilities and are adhering to the required timelines and product formats.
e. Ensuring suitable multinational representation on any decision-making or advisory
body concerned with coalition targeting.
f. Embedding nations in any national targeting processes or bodies provided by the
lead nation in lieu of corresponding coalition structure.

Targeting Responsibilities of a Coalition Member

0613. As a contributing nation, Canada must:
a. represent national interests and obligations in targeting decision making for, and
abstaining from, the prosecution of targets that are not consistent with these by
ensuring that the lead nation is provided with, and fully understands, Canadian ROE,
national caveats to coalition ROE and the extant national TD (or equivalent
guidance);
b. vet and validate targets to ensure that their prosecution is consistent with Canadian
national interest and obligations; and
c. respect classifications and releasability constraints on targeting information and
tools provided by the lead nation.

6-3
 CFJP 3-9

Coordination of Targeting Activities

0614. While each coalition will have a unique organization, it is likely that procedures similar
to those that have come to be described in NATO as the Joint Targeting Coordination Board
(JTCB), itself informed by the work of the Joint Targeting Working Group (JTWG), will be
used. These are included below to give some exposure to the potential organization of a targeting
decision processes. The term JFC is used to describe the coalition’s senior military commander
at the operational level.
0615. Joint targeting working group (JTWG). To assist in the coordination and integration
throughout the targeting process, the JFC may approve the formation of a JTWG. The JTWG
supports the JTCB by conducting initial collection, consolidation, and prioritization of targets
and synchronization of target planning and coordination on behalf of the JFC. The JTWG is an
action-officer level venue, chaired by the Chief of Targets (J3 Targets) or similar representative,
and meets as required to produce the draft JPTL for JTCB approval and discuss targeting
integration and synchronization issues raised by the JFC, staff, planning teams, and the JFC’s
major subordinate commands. The purpose of the JTWG is to:
a. consolidate, deconflict, and prioritize target nominations from components,
supporting and supported commands, joint force directorates and agencies, OGDA
and multinational partners, higher headquarters, and national level offices and
organizations;
b. synchronize the munitions-based and non-munitions-based targeting effort to ensure
target engagements remain nested with JFC objectives;
c. synchronize detection and collection requirements in conjunction with the collection
management authority or team;
d. identify delivery capabilities;
e. review assessments to determine re-attack requirements and future targeting;
f. disseminate revised or new targeting guidance; and
g. identify and integrate munitions-based and non-munitions-based opportunities and
engagements.

6-4
 CFJP 3-9

Figure 6-1: Joint Targeting Working Group (JTWG).

0616. JTWG responsibilities. JTWG responsibilities include:
a. reviewing the JFC’s broad targeting guidance and components proposed schemes of
manoeuvre and to ensure compliance with the JFC’s intent and CONOPS;
b. disseminating the JFC’s targeting guidance and priorities to components and JFC
staff;
c. reviewing and refining ISR collection requirements and joint ISR assessment
guidance based on JFC priorities, intent, and CONOPS, to include refinement of
MoPs and MoEs, as appropriate;
d. Submitting the draft JPTL for JTCB review; and
e. Maintaining and updating the JTL, JPTL, RTL and NSL.
0617. Joint targeting coordination board (JTCB). Targeting coordination tasks are normally
accomplished through the JFC established JTCB, or like body. The JTCB provides a forum in
which all components can articulate strategies and priorities for future target engagements so that
they may be synchronized and integrated. The JTCB normally facilitates and coordinates joint
force targeting activities with the components’ schemes of manoeuvre to ensure that the JFC’s
priorities are met. The JTCB may be an integrating centre for targeting oversight efforts or a
JFC-level review mechanism. It should be comprised of representatives from the joint force staff,
all components and, if deemed necessary, other agencies, multinational partners, and/or
subordinate units.

6-5
 CFJP 3-9

Figure 6-2: Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) Representation.

0618. The JFC normally appoints the deputy JFC or a component commander to chair the JTCB
to provide the appropriate level of experience and focus. Component and JFC staff representation
on the JTCB should also possess the necessary rank, experience, and knowledge to speak
authoritatively for their respective components and staff elements. The JFC ensures that this is a
joint effort involving applicable subordinate commands, other agencies, and multinational
partners, as appropriate. Targeting is a highly iterative process that needs close coordination
during operations. If the JFC delegates authority for target planning, coordination, and
deconfliction to a subordinate commander, that commander should possess or have access to a
sufficient C2 infrastructure, adequate facilities, and joint planning expertise to effectively
manage and lead the JFC’s targeting operations. All components are normally involved in
targeting and should establish procedures and mechanisms to manage their part in targeting.
Membership of the JTCB should include subject matter experts in both munitions-based and
non-munitions-based capabilities. The relative importance of munitions-based versus non-
munitions-based capabilities in targeting may shift as the focus of the operation shifts during
various phases of the operation. The JTCB should be flexible enough to consider both types of
capabilities for appropriate targeting. This represents the integrated functional staff effort,
anchored by the JTWG, leading up to the JTCB. The JFC defines the role of the JTCB. Targeting
issues are generally resolved below the level of the JTCB, by direct coordination between
elements of the joint force, but the JTCB and/or JFC may address specific target issues not
previously resolved.

6-6
 CFJP 3-9

0619. JTCB responsibilities. The JTCB is typically responsible for the following:
a. reviewing operational-level assessment to guide the JFC’s decision making;
b. maintaining a macro-level view of the operational environment;
c. reviewing components’ schemes of manoeuvre and broad targeting guidance for
compliance with the JFC’s intent;
d. integrating, when appropriate, component plans according to the JFC’s CONOPS;
e. developing and refining broad component targeting guidance and priorities;
f. reviewing and refining ISR collection requirements and joint ISR assessment
guidance based on JFC priorities and intent, to include refinement of MoPs and
MoEs, as appropriate;
g. reviewing and submitting the coordinated JPTL for JFC approval or serving as
approving authority for JPTL when designated by the JFC;
h. ensuring the JTL, RTL, and other relevant target lists are maintained and updated,
based on JFC guidance; and
i. reviewing, validating, and approving targets to the JTL and RTL when such
authorities are delegated to the JTCB by the JFC.

6-7
 CFJP 3-9

This page was intentionally left blank

 CFJP 3-9

Glossary

The definitions contained in this Glossary are derived from a number of sources. Where this
publication is the source of a definition, no source is indicated. Definitions taken from other
sources are indicated in parentheses at the end of each term, utilizing the following
abbreviations:
 AP I – Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (Ref O)
 DTB – DND Defence Terminology Bank (Ref. J)
 LOAC – The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical levels. (Ref. E)

additional damage
Unintentional or incidental injury or damage affecting enemy combatants, military objects and
military objectives that would be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time.
area of operations (AO)
A geographical area, within an area of responsibility, assigned to a subordinate commander
within which that commander has the authority to plan and conduct tactical operations.
DTB, record 3528
attack
An attack is an act of violence against an adversary, whether in offence or defence.
battle damage assessment (BDA)
The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force,
either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective. DTB, record 26988
civilian objects
All objects which are not military objectives. (AP I)
combatants
Combatants are legitimate targets and may be attacked unless they have been captured,
surrendered, expressed a clear intention to surrender, or are hors de combat (i.e., out of combat),
provided they refrain from hostile acts and do not attempt to escape. (LOAC)
collateral damage (CD)
Inadvertent causalities and destructions in civilian areas caused by military operations.
DTB, record 26989

Collateral-damage estimation (CDE)

The process by which commanders and their staff estimate the negative collateral effects on non-
combatant persons, property and environment(s) occurring incidental to military operations
given the application of available methods to mitigate collateral damage(s) and consideration of
required military objectives.

GL-1
 CFJP 3-9

collection
The exploitation of sources by collection agencies and the delivery of the information obtained to
appropriate processing unit for use in the production of intelligence. DTB, record 3796
combat assessment (CA)
The determination of the effectiveness of one’s own tactical engagement.
Note: Combat assessment is usually composed of three major components: battle damage
assessment, munitions effectiveness assessment and re-attack recommendation.
DTB, record 47916
damage assessment
The determination of the effect of attacks on targets. DTB, record 3989
distinction
The principle of distinction imposes an obligation on commanders to distinguish between
legitimate targets and civilian objects and the civilian population. (LOAC)
effect
Consequences of a physical process, chemical reaction or fire.
Note: An effect can take the form of e.g. air blast, gas pressure, debris throw, fireball, thermal
radiation and toxic gases. DTB, record 42575
fires
Actions that seek to produce a first order physical effect against a target’s capabilities.
Note: They include lethal and non-lethal means. DTB, record 33777
functional damage assessment
The estimate of the effect of military force to degrade or destroy the functional or operational
capability of the target to perform its intended mission and on the level of success in achieving
operational objectives established against the target. This assessment is based on all-source
information, and includes an estimation of the time required for recuperation or replacement of
the target function.
high pay-off target (HPT)
A target of significance and value to an adversary, the destruction, damage or neutralization of
which may lead to a disproportionate advantage to friendly forces DTB, record 35044
high pay-off target list (HPTL)
A prioritised list of high pay-off targets by phase of a joint operation.
high-value target (HVT)
HVTs are those targets, which the enemy commander is likely to need for the successful
completion of his mission and are therefore, of high value to him. The HVTs identified during
this step are passed to the Targeting Team for further refinement. DTB, record 19439

GL-2
 CFJP 3-9

information operations (info ops)

Coordinated actions to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of
individuals and groups, in support of overall objectives by affecting their information,
information-based processes and systems, while exploiting and protecting one's own.
DTB, record 31721
international armed conflict (IAC)
Exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between states.
Note: This definition is for guidance purposes only as it has not been formally adopted by the
Government of Canada. This definition was accepted by the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-A, 2 October 1995, para. 70.
international law
International Law is the body of law, which governs relations between sovereign states. (LOAC)
joint fires
Fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated
action to produce desired effects in support of a common objective. (DTB, record 34148)
joint force commander (JFC)
A general term applied to a combatant commander, sub-unified commander, or joint task force
commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational
control over a joint force.
joint prioritized target list (JPTL)
A prioritized list of targets and associated data approved by the joint force commander or
designated representative and maintained by a joint force.
Note: Targets and priorities are derived from the recommendations of components in conjunction
with their proposed operations supporting the joint force commander's objectives and guidance.
DTB, record 47927
joint targeting coordination board (JTCB)
A group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions
that may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting
guidance and priorities, and refining the joint integrated prioritised target list. The board is
normally comprised of representatives from the joint force staff, all components, and if required,
component subordinate units.
joint target list (JTL)
1. The consolidated list of targets so designated because they meet the commander’s
objectives. Note: it forms part of the master target list.
2. A consolidated list of selected targets, on which there are no restrictions placed,
considered to have military significance in the joint force commander’s operational area.

GL-3
 CFJP 3-9

joint task force (JTF)

A temporary grouping of elements from more than one component, under one commander,
formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission.
Note: Typical components are maritime, land, air, special operations and support.
DTB, record 31012
law of armed conflict (LOAC)
The LOAC is the body of international law that governs the conduct of hostilities during an
armed conflict. The LOAC is often referred to as the “law of war” or “International
Humanitarian Law” (IHL). (LOAC)
lawful combatants
Lawful combatants are those persons who are legally entitled to engage in hostilities. (LOAC)
legitimate targets
Legitimate targets include combatants, unlawful combatants and military objectives. Legitimate
targets may be lawfully attacked under the LOAC, provided that the attack meets the
proportionality test. (LOAC)
lethal
The method of attack which is intended to cause physical damage to personnel, material, or
capabilities.
military advantage
The military advantage at the time of an attack is that advantage anticipated from the military
campaign or operation of which the attack is part, considered as a whole, and not only from
isolated or particular parts of that campaign or operation. a “concrete and direct” military
advantage exists if the commander has an honest and reasonable expectation that the attack will
make a relevant contribution to the success of the overall operation. Military advantage may
include a variety of considerations including the security of attacking forces. (LOAC)
military necessity
The concept of military necessity justifies the application of force not forbidden by International
Law, to the extent necessary, to bring about the complete submission of the enemy at the earliest
possible moment with the least possible expenditure of personnel and resources. (LOAC)
military objective
An object that, by its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances
ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. DTB, record 47928
munitions effectiveness assessment (MEA)
The assessment of the effectiveness of a weapon system and its ammunition to determine any
changes that may be required to the tactics, weapon system, ammunition, fuzing and weapon
delivery parameters. Note: A munitions effectiveness assessment is conducted concurrently and
interactively with battle damage assessment. DTB, record 47929

GL-4
 CFJP 3-9

non-combatant
Non-combatants comprise all persons who are not combatants. Provided they do not take a direct
part in hostilities, non-combatants are not legitimate targets. Civilians are generally the largest
category of non-combatants. Religious and medical personnel are non-combatants, even if they
are in uniform and members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict. (LOAC).
non-international armed conflict (NIAC)
Exists whenever there is protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.
Armed conflict does not include situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots,
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, in accordance with
article 1(2) of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions Of 1949, And Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) – 1977.
Note: This definition is for guidance purposes only as it has not been formally adopted by the
Government of Canada. This definition was accepted by the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-A, 2 October 1995, para.70.
non-lethal weapon
A weapon that is explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate or repel persons or
to disable equipment, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury and damage to property and
the environment. DTB, record 26986
no-strike list (NSL)
A list of geographic areas, objects or entities characterized as protected from the effects of
military operations under international law and/or rules of engagement.
Note: Attacking items on this list may violate the law of armed conflict or interfere with friendly
relations with the local population and government. DTB, record 43615
objective (obj)
A clearly defined and attainable goal for a military operation, for example seizing a terrain
feature, neutralising an adversary’s force or capability or achieving some other desired outcome
that is essential to a commander’s plan and towards which the operation is directed.
DTB, record 3119
physical damage assessment
The estimate of the quantitative extent of physical damage (through munition blast,
fragmentation, and/or fire damage effects) to a target resulting from the application of military
force. This assessment is based on observed or interpreted damage.
planned target
A target that is known to exist in the operational environment, on which actions are planned
using deliberate targeting, creating effects which support commander’s objectives. There are two
types of planned targets: scheduled and on-call.

GL-5
 CFJP 3-9

precision-guided munition (PGM)

A weapon that uses a seeker to detect electromagnetic energy reflected from a target or reference
point and, through processing, provides guidance commands to a control system that guides the
weapon to the target.
proportionality
The principle of proportionality establishes a link between the concepts of military necessity and
humanity. The test for proportionality is as follows: Is the attack expected to cause incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated? If
the answer is “yes”, an attack must be cancelled or suspended. (LOAC)
protected persons
Protected persons are persons who are protected by the LOAC. (LOAC)
restricted target
A valid target that has one or more restrictions placed on the actions authorized against it.
DTB, record 43616
restricted target list (RTL)
The RTL consists of targets that have specific restrictions imposed on them for a variety of
strategic, operational, or tactical reasons. Actions that exceed specified restrictions are prohibited
until coordinated and approved by a designated higher authority.
rules of engagement (ROE)
Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and
limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces
encountered. DTB, record 5285
scheduled target
Planned target on which fires or other actions are scheduled for prosecution at a specified time.
See also planned target, deliberate targeting.
sensitive target (ST)
A target where the commander has estimated the physical damage and collateral effects on
civilian and/or non-combatant persons, property and environments occurring incidental to
military operations exceed established national level notification thresholds.
target
The object of a particular action, for example a geographic area, a complex, an installation, a
force, equipment, an individual, a group or a system, planned for capture, exploitation,
neutralisation or destruction by military forces. DTB, record 1031
target development
The analysis, assessment and documentation processes to identify and characterize potential
targets, that when successfully engaged, support the achievement of the commander’s objectives.

GL-6
 CFJP 3-9

target intelligence
Intelligence concerning a target, target complex or target system used to determine how its
functional characteristics and vulnerabilities may be exploited to achieve a desired effect.
DTB, record 47933
targeting
The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them
taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. DTB, record 5514
target materials (TM)
Graphic, textual, tabular, digital, video, or other presentations of target intelligence, primarily
designed to support operations against designated targets by one or more weapon systems. Target
materials are suitable for training, planning, executing, and evaluating military operations.
target nomination list (TNL)
A list of targets nominated by component commanders, national agencies, or the joint force
commander staff for potential inclusion on the joint integrated prioritised target list to support
joint force commander objectives and priorities.
target of opportunity
A target which appears during combat and which can be reached by ground fire, naval fire, or
aircraft fire, and against which fire has not been scheduled. DTB, record 4987
target system
All the targets situated in a particular geographic area and functionally related.
DTB, record 5513
target system analysis (TSA)
An all-source examination of potential target systems to determine relevance to stated objectives,
military importance, and priority of attack. It is an open-ended analytic process produced through
the intelligence production process using national and theatre validated requirements as a
foundation.
time-sensitive target (TST)
A target requiring immediate response because it poses (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly
forces or is a highly lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity.
target-system assessment (TSA)
The broad assessment of the overall impact and effectiveness of the full spectrum of military
force applied against the operation of an enemy target system or total combat effectiveness
(including significant subdivisions of the system) relative to the operational objectives
established.
target system component
A set of targets belonging to one or more groups of industries and basic utilities required to
produce component parts of an end product, or one type of a series of interrelated commodities.

GL-7
 CFJP 3-9

unanticipated target
A target of opportunity that was unknown or not expected to exist in the operational
environment.
unplanned target
A target of opportunity that is known to exist in the operational environment.
unlawful combatants
Unlawful combatants are persons who engage in hostilities but are not legally entitled to do so
under the LOAC. Unlawful combatants include:
a. civilians who take a direct part in hostilities (other than as part of a levee en masse);
b. mercenaries; and
c. spies who engage in hostilities while not in the uniform of their armed forces.
validation
A part of target development that ensures all vetted targets meet the objectives and criteria
outlined in the commander’s guidance and ensures compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict
and the Rules of Engagement.
vetting
A part of target development that assesses the accuracy of the supporting intelligence to
targeting.
weaponeering
The process of determining the type, quantity and point of application of a weapon to achieve a
desired effect, considering the target's characteristics, the weapon's accuracy and reliability, and
the probability of success. DTB, record 47939
weapons effectiveness assessment (WEA)
Conducted concurrently and interactively with battle damage assessment, the assessment of the
military force applied in terms of the weapon system and weapons effectiveness to determine and
recommend changes to the methodology, tactics, weapon system, weapons, and/or weapon
delivery parameters to increase force effectiveness.

GL-8
 CFJP 3-9

List of Abbreviations

AO area of operations
AP I Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
AP II Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions
ATO air tasking order
AUS Australia

BDA battle damage assessment

C2 command and control

C4I command, control, communications, computers and intelligence
CA combat assessment
CAF Canadian Armed Forces
CANSOFCOM Canadian Special Operations Force Command
CATCODE category code
CD collateral damage
CDE collateral damage estimate
CDEM collateral damage estimate methodology
CDS Chief of Defence Staff
CFDS Canada First Defence Strategy
CFINTCOM Canadian Forces Intelligence Command
CIMIC civil-military cooperation
CJOC Canadian Joint Operations Command
CNO computer-network operations
COIN counter-insurgency
CONOPS concept of operations
COP common operating picture
COS chief of staff
CSTAR Canadian Forces sensitive target approval and review process
CTL candidate target list

DPH direct part in hostilities

EBT effects-based target

EID entity identification
ETF electronic target folder
EW electronic warfare

F2T2E2A Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Exploit and Assess

FSCM fire support coordination measures
FSpecT full-spectrum targeting

GC Government of Canada

HPT high pay-off target

AL-1
 CFJP 3-9

HVT high value target

IA influence activity
IAC international armed conflict
IC internment camp
IGL intelligence gain/loss
IHL international humanitarian law
IHRL international human rights law
IRC information-related capability
ISR intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

JFC joint force commander

JIMP joint, integrated, multinational, public
JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
JMEM US Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual
JPTL joint prioritized target list
JTCB join targeting coordination board
JTF joint task force
JTL joint target list
JTWG joint targeting working group

KLE key-leader engagement

LEGAD legal advisor
LOAC Law of Armed Conflict

MD military deception
MIDB modernized integrated database
MND Minister of National Defence
MoE measures of effectiveness
MoP measure of performance

NAI named area of interest

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIAC non-international armed conflict
NSL no-strike list

OGDA other government departments and agencies

OJAG Office of the Judge Advocate General
op operation
OPP operations planning process
OPSEC operations security
OTB operational targeting board

AL-2
 CFJP 3-9

PA public affairs
PG prisonnier de guerre
PGM precision guided munitions
PID positive identification
PMO Prime Minister’s Office
PoL pattern of life
PPP presence, posture and profile
PsyOp psychological operation
PW prisoner of war

RFI request for information

ROE rules of engagement
RTL restricted target list

SA situational awareness
SCADA supervisory control and data acquisition
SJS Strategic Joint Staff
ST sensitive target
STB strategic targeting board

TA target authority
TAA target-audience analysis
TAI target area of interest
TB target board
TD targeting directive
TDN target development nomination
TEA target engagement authority
TF Comd task force commander
TSA target-system analysis
TSS target summary sheet
TST time-sensitive target
TTB theatre target board
TVA target validation authority
TVC targeting validation checklist

UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
US United States

WEA weapons effectiveness assessment

AL-3
 CFJP 3-9

This page was intentionally left blank

 CFJP 3-9

List of References

Canada

Government of Canada
A. Canada First Defence Strategy

Canadian Armed Forces

B. CFJP 01, Canadian Military Doctrine (B-GJ-005-000/FP-001) – September 2011
C. CFJP 2-0, Intelligence (B-GJ-005-200/FP-001) – October 2011
D. CFJP 3-0, Operations (B-GJ-005-300/FP-001) – September 2011
E. CFJP 3-0.1, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels (B-GJ-005-
104/FP-021) – August 2001
F. CFJP 3-10, Information Operations (B-GJ-005-310/FP-001) – April 1998
G. CFJP 5-0, The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (B-GJ-005-500/FP-001) –
April 2008
H. CFJP 5-1, Use of Force in CF Operations. (B-GJ-005-501/FP-001) – August 2008
I. JDN 02-2014, Command and Control of Joint Operations
J. Defence Terminology Bank
K. Land Operations (B-GL-300-001/FP-001)
L. Bolt, Alexander (Major). The Crown Prerogative in Canada and its Use in the Context of
International Military Deployments. [Office of the Judge Advocate General Strategic Legal
Paper Series, Issue 2]. Ottawa: Department of National Defence (A-LG-007-SLA/AF-002)

NATO
M. AJP-3.9, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting.
N. NATO Strategic Vision: The Military Challenge (NATO, 2004)

UNITED NATIONS
O. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
P. Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
Q. Statements of understanding made by Canada at the time of ratification of Additional Protocol
I
R. Convention on Cluster Munitions of 30 May 2008
S. Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of
14 May 1954
T. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques of 10 December 1976
U. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
(Convention on Conventional Weapons) of 10 October 1980
V. International Humanitarian Law
W. Prosecutor v. Tadic, (1995), Case No.IT-94-1-A, (International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia).

REF-1
 CFJP 3-9

X. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 22 May 1969

Y. GIV, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of
12 August 1949.
Z. HlV, The Hague Convention (lV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 18
October 1907.
AA. HlVR, Regulation annexed to the Hague Convention (lV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land of 18 October 1907.

CIVILIAN
BB. Boothby, Dr. William H. (Air Commodore Retd, RAF). The Law of Targeting. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012.
CC. Schmitt, Michael (ed.). Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Warfare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013
DD. Watkin, Ken (Brigadier-General Retd). “Assessing Proportionality: Moral Complexity and
Legal Rules” in Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law Volume 7. The Hague: Asser
Instituut, 2004
EE. Watkin, Ken (Brigadier-General Retd). “The Operational Lawyer: An Essential Resource
For the Modern Commander.”

REF-2
 CFJP 3-9

This page was intentionally left blank

CFJP 3-9 – Targeting

Canada