The Real & Alleged Problems of Utilitarianism

Author(s): Richard B. Brandt

Source: The Hastings Center Report , Apr., 1983, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 37-43
Published by: The Hastings Center

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3561774

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 A PROPONENT ANSWERS THE CRITICS

The Real & Alleged Problems of Utilitarian

by RICHARD B. BRANDT

some form of utilitarianism is probably convincing to the

"silent majority" of philosophers. However that may be,
E erybody believes that some actions, or types of ac-
nonphilosophers widely employ the general utilitarian
tion, are morally right or wrong; or that it is a person's
framework in thinking about moral issues. It is obvious that
moral obligation to do, or to avoid doing, these actions.
"cost-benefit analysis" is used (doubtless often misused, by
Many philosophers, however, have wanted to introduce construing it in a much oversimplified form) in evaluating
some order into this chaos of opinions, and have sought to
government projects. The utilitarian conception appears to
find a small number of fundamental principles of right pervade
and the American Law Institute's recommendations for
wrong from which all justified moral beliefs can bereform
de- of the criminal law and it underlies the currently
influential movement of "economic criticism" of the law.
duced, given relevant factual information. A few philoso-
phers-among them Immanuel Kant, with his famous
Indeed, in evaluating systems of "professional ethics" an
"categorical imperative," and recently John Rawls, with his
assessment of the general costs and benefits of recognizing
emphasis on justice-have thought that we can make do standards seems inescapable, although talk about
certain
"rights" is often introduced in this connection. (But J.S.
with just one fundamental principle. The oldest of such one-
principle theories, which has shown vitality and appeal for
Mill seems to have been correct in thinking that we can
philosophers for thousands of years, is utilitarianism, the
determine who has which rights only by utilitarian reflec-
view that the benefit or harm done by an act, or class tions.)of
actions, or prohibition of an act-type, determines whether
In it
particular, utilitarian reflection is prominent in the field
is wrong or right morally. If acts of incest or homosexualof medicine; for instance, in the literature on the "auton-
contact or deceit are wrong, for example, it is because the
omy" to be granted patients in decisions about treatment, or
acts or practice or traits of character they involve have on
im-what physicians should tell seriously ill patients about
pact for good or ill, happiness or unhappiness. their prospects. (See the exchange between M.W. Martin
Unfortunately from the point of view of simplicity, there
and B. Freedman, for example, in the July 1981 issue of
are different kinds of utilitarianism. One of them is "act- Ethics.) Utilitarian reflections, in fact, were important in the
utilitarianism"-the thesis that a particular act is right if,
thinking of physicians and surgeons of the nineteenth cen-
and only if, no other act the agent could perform at the time
tury, as Martin S. Perick brings out in his article in this
would have, or probably would have (on the agent's evi-issue of the Hastings Center Report; some of the debates he
dence), better consequences. Such important philosophers reports, incidentally, are still alive in the forthcoming report
as G.E. Moore, Henry Sidgwick, and Bertrand Russell ad- of the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
vocated this view at about the turn of the century. A secondProblems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Re-
form, which is older and probably more influential among search. Utilitarian reflections are also prominent in recent
philosophers at present, is "rule-utilitarianism"; its thesis analyses
is of U.S. foreign policy, including policy about im-
roughly that an act is morally right if, and only if, it wouldmigration, although of course some writers take different
be as beneficial to have a moral code permitting that act as approaches. The recent report of a Congressional Select
to have any moral code that is similar but prohibits the act. Committee on immigration policy is full of talk about the
There are other types of utilitarianism, but these two seem impact of a liberal policy on unemployment in the U.S.,
most important now. about the alleged long-range negative noneconomic cost of
Quite a few articulate philosophers are critical of utilitari- a society culturally more heterogeneous than at present, of
anism. A recent article in the Yale Law Review speculated the human cost of refusing admission to refugees or the
that a half-dozen adherents today are all that separates utili-poverty-stricken hoping for a better life in America, and so
tarianism from extinction. This anticipation of the demise on. Some form of utilitarian-type thinking pervades most
of utilitarianism seems decidedly premature; in my opinion present reflection about public affairs and policy making in
this country.
Philosophers who criticize utilitarianism usually center
RICHARD B. BRANDT is professor of philosophy at the Univer-
their fire on the first form of the theory (act-utilitarianism).
sity of Michigan. This article is based on a lecture given at the
University of Delaware, sponsored by the Center for the Study Unfortunately
of they often imply, if not state, that this crit-
Values. An expanded version appears in Ethical Theory in the icism disposes of utilitarianism in all its forms. This is a
Last Quarter of the Twentieth Century, edited by Norman E.mistake. Adherents of rule-utilitarianism are themselves
Bowie (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1982). quite critical of act-utilitarianism, although the theories are

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fairly closely related, especially when evaluation of a long- or desires for (partly as a matter of innate or learned benev-
range public policy is the issue. olence, but partly as a result of a process of motivational
In what follows I shall discuss rule-utilitarianism, since it learning we need not try to specify) certain types of actions.
seems to me more plausible. The choice is not eccentric; These presumably will include aversions to hurting others,
despite the number of thoughtful advocates today of act- telling lies, and breaking promises. But there are also
utilitarianism I believe most philosophers who advocate learned dispositions to experience guilt in case we act con-
utilitarianism today are in the rule-utilitarian camp. Another trary to these aversions, and disapproval of others when
reason for concentrating on rule-utilitarianism is that some they act contrary. We also admire others who do what we
of its problems have not received comparable attention. say is above and beyond the call of duty. Further, we disap-
prove of, and are averse to, various kinds of acts in different
What is Rule-Utilitarianism? degrees: we would not commit murder and we disapprove
intensely of anyone who does (without excuse); we also
One can argue that rule-utilitarianism goes back to Epi-
don't like it very much when a person brushes off a request
curus (341-270 B.C.), who was a utilitarian about laws. He
for a match, but our disapproval is slight, and we feel only
said that "natural justice is a symbol or expression of expe-
mild aversion to doing the same thing. Consciences are also
dience" and that "among the things accounted just by con-
equipped with a system of excuses; we don't feel guilty, or
ventional law, whatever in the needs of mutual intercourse
at least don't disapprove so vigorously of others, if we be-
is attested to be expedient, is thereby stamped as just .. ."
lieve infractions are the result of certain conditions, say,
(Sovran Maxims, cited by Diogenes Laertius, nos. 31 and
ignorance, insanity, extreme fear, and so on.
57). One might also argue that St. Thomas's theory of natu-
This motivational description of conscience may not be
ral law is utilitarian.
appealing, but most of it appears in Mill's third chapter, and
to some extent in the fifth chapter, of Utilitarianism. To my
mind that is conscience, and the morality of a society is
The anticipation of the demise of utilitarian-
nothing more than the consciences of its members; or, if
ism seems decidedly premature; in my opinion you like, the conscience of the average person.
some form of utilitarianism is probably convinc- If this is what a morality-or moral code-is, what is a
"rule-utilitarian"? A rule-utilitarian thinks that right actions
ing to the "silent majority" of philosophers ...
are the kind permitted by the moral code optimal for the
And some form of utilitarian-type thinking per- society of which the agent is a member. An optimal code is
vades most present reflection about public affairs one designed to maximize welfare or what is good (thus,
utility). This leaves open the possibility that a particular
and policy making in this country.
right act by itself may not maximize benefit.
This definition does not imply anything about what a util-
However, rule-utilitarianism as a theory of action-not of itarian means by "right" or "optimal," or about how a util-
right laws-goes back at least as far as Richard Cumberland itarian will justify the main thesis. Utilitarians need not
in 1672. Bishop Berkeley, in his Passive Obedience (1712), have any particular account of the meaning of these terms,
was the first to distinguish clearly between the two forms of and they need not offer any particular justification of their
utilitarianism, and he opted for the second. More specifi- thesis; they can simply advocate the utilitarian principle.
cally, he asserted that we are not morally bound to do what- On the rule-utilitarian view, then, to find what is morally
ever we believe will produce most good or happiness, but right or wrong we need to find which actions would be per-
we are morally bound to follow certain moral laws, pro- mitted by a moral system that is "optimal" for the agent's
hibiting or enjoining certain types of action-these being society.
God's laws as identified by revelation or natural reason.
These laws have been selected by God because, in his be- The First Real Puzzle
nevolence, he wants the happiness of mankind and knows
that following these laws will maximize it. God, inciden- The last phrase in this definition raises the first "proble
tally, also lets it be known that it will not be to the long- or "puzzle" I wish to discuss-for an agent's society
range interest of anyone to infringe his laws; so the theory comprise various subgroups, and it could be that the m
provides motivation to do what is right. Now, if the part code optimal for one may not be optimal for others.
about God is deleted from Berkeley's view, what remains is instance, perhaps the moral code comprising the c
the skeleton of much the kind of rule-utilitarianism I wish to sciences of physicians and lawyers should be more cle
discuss. This is the view roughly held by J.S. Mill; we of articulated in certain areas than the moral code of the
course have to flesh out the account a bit. eral public. There is no reason to burden the general pu
First, we have to think of the morality of a society: that is, with, say, aversion to refusing to treat patients who ca
of people in the society mostly sharing certain aversions to pay, or breaches of confidentiality. Remember that we hav

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to include the learing-costs in a cost-benefit analysis of a The Second Puzzle
moral system. That being so, perhaps the rule-utilitarian
The rule-utilitarian, then, says that right action is actio
must recognize special moralities for groups like physicians
permitted by the moral code for society that would max
who, unlike the general public, meet certain problems reg-
mize net-benefit or utility. But what is meant to count
ularly and need to respond to them intuitively without long
benefit or utility? The traditional answer has been: pleasure,
inference from general principles. Similarly, it is possible
hedonic tone (positive or negative), or happiness. So said
that the morality optimal for children is not the morality
Bentham, Mill, and the earlier theological utilitarians. No
optimal for adults. Rule-utilitarians, then, may be free to
many philosophers argue that this is not what we should try
think that the moral codes justified for physicians, lawyers,
to maximize, and that anyone who thinks this way is taking
children, bishops, and university students will differ. The a crude view of human nature. What then should we add?
identification of such possible special codes is part of the
J.L. Mackie suggests in Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
subject matter of "professional ethics."
(1977): "Liberty of thought and discussion, thought and dis-
This conception raises a difficult question that I shall not
cussion themselves, understanding of all sorts of things, in-
try to answer. Could the optimal moral code for a physician
cluding ourselves and other human beings, a self-reliant,
or a politician or an army officer direct a person to do some-
enterprising, and experimental spirit and way of life, artis-
thing incompatible with what the optimal code for the gen-
tic creation and craftmanship of any sort, the enjoyment
eral public would prescribe for the same situation? and appreciation of beauty, and general participatory self-
Presumably we do think that the optimal code for one soci-
government both in smaller institutions and in the deter-
ety might lead to behavior incompatible with behavior re-
mination of large scale social policies and laws" (p. 150).
quired by the optimal code for another society. If that is
He says this in criticism of utilitarianism of all kinds. Is
possible, what is the really right thing to do when these
utilitarianism in all its forms committed to a hopelessly nar-
codes conflict? For a rule-utilitarian who thinks that the ac-
row view of what is good?
tions of governments may be morally right or wrong, there
There is no logical connection between either act- or rule-
is a related question. Must we talk of an "optimal moral
utilitarianism and hedonism, and none between a deon-
code" for governments? Can we think of governments as
tological ethics and nonhedonism. True, the utilitarian says
quasi-persons, and talk of an optimal conscience for them?
we are to identify right action by appeal to maximizing net
Or may we talk not of the acts of governments being right
benefit or utility, but he leaves the definition of these terms
or wrong, but only of the morally right or wrong acts of
open. Indeed, one can say: we should maximize what is
office-holders or politicians? Rule-utilitarians should think
intrinsically good, and go on to say, as "ideal utilitarians"
more about this.
like Moore and Rashdall did, that various states of affairs
There is another complication that I shall only mention.
quite different from pleasure are intrinsically good-say,
Suppose a law-but we might generalize to any institu-
knowledge, virtue, and friendship. One could then say, as
tion-is less than optimal, by the utilitarian standard. Might
these ideal utilitarians did, that the right action is fixed by
it still be morally acceptable? Or suppose it is optimal. Is it
maximizing the intrinsically good, and then propose that
then necessarily also morally acceptable? Writers like
one can make justified comparative judgments about the in-
Rawls would say "no" to both questions; there is no neces-
trinsic worth of knowledge, virtue, and the like so as to
sary correlation between optimality and moral acceptability.
determine, roughly, when the good is being maximized.
But what would rule-utilitarians say? They might take either
However, this heterogeneity of intrinsic goods should
option. They might just identify the moral acceptability of
surely be avoided, if possible. For different persons, with
an institution, say a law, with its optimality, in the context
different intuitions about how intrinsically good some of
of other institutions in the society. Or they might deny this,
these things are, can come out in very different places in
and say that what makes an institution morally acceptable is
their estimates of the total goodness that one action or moral
not its optimality, but whether an optimal moral code would
code is likely to produce, as compared with another. So
require persons to work to change it or work to preserve it. philosophers have wanted to find a view that does not rely
So some utilitarians might say that the tax law, or welfare so much on intuitions. This is one consideration that makes
system, might be optimal but not morally acceptable, be-
cause morality requires more equality. Thus the utilitarian *Mill seems not to have reflected on these puzzles as much as he should have.
He says an act is wrong only if it is desirable that it be penalized somehow, either
might say that the optimality of the moral code is disposi- by law, or public opinion, or the individual's own conscience. He threw all three of
tive for the moral acceptability of an institution, not the these in together, as if he did not have to worry about conflicts. But it might be
expedient for the law to impose a fine for overparking, or for failing to make a
optimality of the institution itself. Very likely, of course, certain type of report about the assets of one's company, but it is far from clear that
there will be a close connection between the two. we would want to make these requirements of conscience, except in so far as
conscience may tell us that there is a presumption that the law is to be obeyed. At
One might ask: how should a utilitarian decide which of any rate, overparking and failing to make required reports do not appear to be
these lines to take? I shall not try to answer this question* immoral in themselves. What Mill should have said, I think, is that something is
morally wrong if it is a token of an act-type for which it is desirable that the agent
but will shortly consider how the rule-utilitarian must go be penalized by his own conscience, or is one which his own conscience should
about resolving such difficulties. motivate him to avoid, or disapprove of in others, on utilitarian grounds.

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hedonism attractive; for the hedonist holds that only one element of experience or activity is pleasant if it makes the
sort of thing is good in itself, so the question of which code person, at the time, want to continue or repeat it, simply for
or action maximizes the good can be reduced to a factual itself and not for extraneous reasons. This view has been
question of how much enjoyment is produced. But there is called a "motivational" theory of pleasure. If we accept
another theory that avoids both reliance on intuitions and this, we will recognize that not only physical sensations are
the alleged narrowness of the hedonist view. This is the pleasant: a person can thoroughly enjoy reading a book,
view that "utility" is to be defined not in terms of pleasure, solving a crossword puzzle, or even writing a philosophy
but of satisfaction of desires or interest. Whereas the paper. This leads to my second point. Some critics like
hedonist says state of affairs X is better than state of affairs Mackie have argued that utilitarianism, in its hedonist form,
Y if it contains more pleasure, the desire-satisfactionist says is very narrow in its conclusions about what is to be max-
X is better than Y if there is more preference for X over Y imized, or what is good. But when we start surveying the
than for Y overX. This last sounds a bit complex, but many various items philosophers have characterized as good, like
people who have observed betting behavior think that cardi- knowledge, or friendship and love, or relationships of trust,
nal numbers can be assigned to a person's desires: if so, or qualities of character like courage or fairmindedness, we
then, if the strengths among different persons' desires can need to ask whether all of these do not make life more
be compared and we can determine how many people prefer pleasant, and whether we would be much interested in them
X over Y (or Y overX) and by how much, we have a way to if they didn't. The critic may reply that of course all these
aggregate preferences of a society. So, ideally (just as does things add to happiness, but they would be worthwhile in
the traditional hedonist view, assuming pleasures can be themselves even if they didn't. But if the critic takes this
measured) the interest-satisfaction theory provides a way to line the point is much harder to establish, and one is left
identify which policy or behavior would maximize desire- feeling that the happiness theory is not so narrow after all.
satisfaction. Such criticisms are, of course, blunted if we adopt the
Thus hedonism and the desire theory have emerged as desire theory of utility, for then the utilitarian can say that
leading contenders for a conception of utility suited for a anything judged intrinsically good by the antihedonist is
simple maximizing theory of right and wrong conduct- something people desire. Hence the utilitarian will consider
simple in the sense that essentially there is only one sort of it one of the things to be maximized.
thing that is good in itself. The second theory is probably My third comment refers to some difficulties in the desire
more popular today, for one or more of three reasons. First, theory. I don't think we really want to maximize satisfac-
it allows many things to be good-anything wanted for it- tion of desire in general. People desire all sorts of things that
self. Second, it seems easier to measure the strength of de- it is idiotic to desire. At most we should want to maximize
sires than an amount of pleasure. Third, the desire theory the satisfaction of those desires that people would have if
may seem more democratic; it goes on the basis of what they were fully informed about everything that might make
people actually want, not on the basis of what will give them change their desires. Call this the "informed desire"
them happiness-we are not to deny people what they want theory. Even so, I doubt that we want to maximize desire-
just because we think it will make them happier in the long satisfaction as such; mostly we are concerned to help people
run.* get what they want because we think it will make them
From a practical point of view, the two theories are not all happy, whereas not getting it will sadden or frustrate them.
that different, since there is a close relation between desire There is a further complicated point that I cannot develop.
and pleasure. People want to attain pleasant states and avoid People's desires are continually changing. So which desires
unpleasant ones, other things being equal. Further, other should one try to satisfy at any time? Only the unchanging
things being equal, getting what one wants is pleasant and desires? The desires the person has now but won't have
not getting it is unpleasant. So there is a close connection later? Desires the person will have at the time he is to get
between desire and pleasure, but the implications of the two what he now wants? It is very difficult to find any convinc-
theories are not identical. ing formulation.
Though I shall not attempt here to adjudicate between The utilitarian, then, has to decide upon his conception of
these theories, I want to make three remarks. First, to avoid the "utility" which, when maximized, is the test of right
misunderstanding, the hedonistic theory must obviously and wrong. He ought to think more about this choice. But
make up its mind what pleasure is. I myself think that some the charge that the utilitarian is committed to a crude or
narrow view of what is good seems manifestly mistaken.
*Actually, one could argue with some force that Mill, who is supposed to be a
hedonist, was straddling the two. For he takes the odd view that virtue and wealth
are parts of happiness. He has often been accused of confusion here, and doubtless The Third Puzzle
he was confused. What he had good reason for saying was only that people want
things like money and virtue, and may be made unhappy by not obtaining them.
Could he have confused being desired and being pleasant? On a later page he For the sake of simplicity let us assume from here on that
seems to confirm such a confusion by saying that "desiring a thing and finding it
pleasant . . . are two different modes of naming the same psychological fact"
we are opting for a hedonist conception of "utility." Let u
(Utilitarianism, Ch. 4). think of pleasure as being measurable, so that the basic un

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is a "hedon-moment"-an experience, for one minute, thetic to act-utilitarianism. These writers believe that we
with a pleasure level of plus one. We shall speak of "hedon- have more of an obligation to avoid harming another person
moments" having a negative value when the pleasure level by an amount A, than we have to do something that would
is negative. An experience for one minute with a hedonic raise the utility level of another person by the same amount
tone of level plus two would be two hedon-moments, just as A. They also believe that we have some obligation to act to
an experience for two minutes with hedonic tone or level reduce the misery of another, at least when the cost to our-
plus one. And so on. selves is not very great; but we do not have a comparable
Given these concepts, we might say that moral system A obligation to bring about an equal improvement in the well-
produces more utility than moral system B if and only if the being of another who is already above the misery-range. In
net balance of hedon-moments from getting A current in the the latter case there is no obligation to act at all, or at most a
society and keeping it there would be, or would probably weak one. It is generally thought that an act-utilitarian the-
be, greater than the net balance from getting B into place ory cannot recognize such distinctions. How about a rule-
and keeping it there. When a system A is more satisfactory utilitarian theory? This issue has been far from adequately
in this sense than any other system, we can say that A is the discussed; it belongs on the agenda for the future.
optimal moral system, and that its content fixes which acts The notion that rule-utilitarianism is not beyond refine-
are morally right or wrong. ment may be discouraging, especially for those who believe
Some utilitarians, however, would like to see this concep- that at last we have produced a form of utilitarianism which
tion modified in certain ways. I shall consider three of is invulnerable to major objections. Perhaps the theory is
these. invulnerable to major objections. But it does look as if more
The first concerns the implications for population control. thinking needs to be done. From my point of view that is a
Some utilitiarians believe that one way to increase the total good thing. How boring it would be if rule-utilitarianism
net hedon-moments in the world would be to increase the were already so well stated and firmly established that the
number of people in the world, even at the cost of some only thing left to do in moral philosophy were to work out
reduction in standards of living. The premise is that people the practical implications!
are mostly happy even when not very well off, so the pro- If we have to change our form of rule-utilitarianism, how
duction of a million extra babies, with economic resources are we to decide which form to prefer? Here we have to go
held constant, could add more than enough to the net back to the theory of justification, which I have been avoid-
hedon-moment balance to offset the loss to everyone else ing. I think we have to inquire what kind of moral code a
from the reduction in available income. Some writers find person would support for the society in which he or she
this thinking highly objectionable. Hence they wish to expects to live. Here I am talking about a person who is
change the general principle so that the "optimal" system is fully rational, fully informed, and has that degree of benev-
not one that produces the greatest net balance of hedon mo- olence a fully informed person would have. Others might
ments, but one that produces the greatest average net bal- say we have to find the moral principles that fully informed,
ance. This seems to imply that a moral system ought to impartial, but otherwise normal people would subscribe to.
regulate the production of infants so as to maximize the Still others might say we have to find the principles that
average net utility per person. Such proposal might open a reflect our carefully considered moral "intuitions." The
Pandora's box: for instance, do we wish to forbid persons reader may object that thinking all this out would require a
whose genes are likely to produce offspring with an I.Q. lifetime, but the form of rule-utilitarianism stated above
less than 140 to have children? may not need any amendment for the range of cases about
This problem has principally agitated act-utilitarians. which the reader has to make practical decisions.
Quite possibly, it is much easier to solve within the frame-
work of a rule-utilitarian theory. To my knowledge, popula- The First Alleged Problem
tion control has not been thoroughly discussed by any rule-
utilitarian; it is on the agenda for the future. I now take leave of puzzles, thought about which might
A second problem, which I shall only mention, is whether lead us to some refinements of rule-utilitarianism, and turn
the hedon-moments of animals are to be weighted equally to just plain objections that have been raised against rule-
with those of rational human beings. And if not, why not? utilitarianism in any form. The ones I shall discuss are re-
(Or, within the desire-satisfaction definition of "utility," islated, and together they may be viewed as variations on a
the satisfaction of an animal's desire to be weighted less charge of Utopianism.
heavily than that of a human being, provided the desires are In order to appraise these objections, I must expand still
of equal intensity? And if so, why?) This issue clearly has more the conception of an "optimal" moral code. The term
many practical implications and rule-utilitarians ought to does not refer to a set of rules that would do most good if
think more about it. everyone conformed to them all the time. The meaning is
Still a third problem about which rule-utilitarians ought to more complex. Recall that "a moral code" is a set of desires
think is raised by some philosophers who are mostly sympa- or aversions directed at certain types of acts, and the dis-

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position to feel guilty about not conforming to these desires doing so, and this might do little immediate good; but at
or aversions, as well as to disapprove of such failure to least it would be a step in building a convention of promise-
conform on the part of others when they have no excuse. keeping.
Now these dispositions may vary both in their intensity, and The second objection is that it would cause more than a
in their prevalence in a given society. The more intense and little chaos for people to be advised to live in accordance
widespread an aversion to a certain sort of behavior, the less with an optimal moral code, when nobody has yet decided
frequent the behavior is apt to be. But the more intense and precisely what that code is and certainly the average person
widespread, the greater the cost of teaching the rule and has no idea. Act-utilitarianism has often been criticized on
keeping it alive, the greater the burden on the individual, the ground that it would be chaotic if every individual felt
and so on. morally obligated to do what seemed to him likely to have
The "optimality" of a moral code encompasses both thethe best consequence; wouldn't it be even more chaotic if
benefits of reduced objectionable behavior and the long-every individual really felt morally obligated to do what
term cost. So the moral code optimal for a given society seemed
is to be required by an optimal moral code? How
that whole system, with a given degree of average intensity,much has any individual thought about the optimal moral
and spread among the population, for each of its compo- code, and how nearly would any two individuals come to
nents, that comes out best in a cost-benefit analysis. Need-agreement about what it is? It is, however, true that, if one
less to say, like the law, the optimal moral code normallyis to advocate living by an optimal moral code, it would be
will not produce 100 percent compliance with all its rules; absurd merely to advise living by such a code, with no ex-
that would be too costly. It may do so in small homogene- planation of the conception of a moral code, the value of
ous populations: physical violence is unheard of on the moral codes, and the point of living by an optimal one.
Hopi reservation. But mostly not. According to our concep- An advocate of an optimal morality would presumably
tion, the rule-utilitarian believes that an act is prima facie
offer some explanation of how nearly the actual moral code
obligatory if and only if (and to the degree that) such an is apt to approximate to the optimal one, and we can antici-
optimal code would build in some degree of moral aversion pate that intelligent people will be incrementalists in their
to not performing it. moral thinking, not wild-eyed utopians. If people stop to
The first objection to this view is that it would be harmfulreflect, they can see that this or that provision in the tradi-
for some people to live according to the optimal code, in tional
a morality has outlived its function and be willing to
society where the optimal code is not widespread, for soforget it. On the other hand, presumably they will see that
doing could be either pointless or injurious. For instance, new problems-say of an organized metropolitan society
the optimal moral code might call for no one ever to carry a rapidly using up natural resources-demand novel features
lethal weapon, whereas living by such a code would not be in the moral code. To say this is to speculate what would
a good idea, these critics say, in a society where most per- happen if intelligent people become convinced that they
sons are trigger-happy gun-carrying demons. Furthermore, ought to live by an optimal moral code, and try to think
it is especially incoherent for a utilitarian to advocate behav-through what it would be like. I have not seen proof that the
ing in such a counterproductive way; his basic thesis is that results of this would be disastrous.
utility is the point of morality, but here the rule-utilitarian A third objection has been raised: whereas it might be
seems to be advocating behavior that is likely to be harmful. nice for people to act in accordance with an optimal moral
There is an adequate reply to this objection: it has notcode when that code is not widely accepted, one cannot
been shown that such harmful requirements would ever ap- seriously claim that it is their moral obligation. Some critics
pear in an optimal moral code. In the gun-carrying society, say it may be morally obligatory to do what will in fact do
an optimal moral code would surely give directions to be most good in an actual situation even when the conventional
prepared to defend one's self and one's family, but of moral code doesn't call for that, and that it may even be
course to defend only. The rule might be: "Never carry obligatory
a to act in accordance with an optimal moral code
gun when it can be done at no personal risk; otherwise carryif there is good reason to think that so doing would seriously
a gun but use it only in self-defense." (An actual moral tend to usher the optimal code into the status of being con-
code would rarely include injunctions as specific as this but ventional. But, these critics say, just to live by an optimal
it might, if a rule were aimed at meeting a specific problem moral code for no further reason is not one's moral obliga-
about which more abstract principles were not much help.) tion. To this objection there are adequate retorts. We may
An optimal moral code may not always provide for doing begin by asking what the ground rules are supposed to be
the very best possible thing in every situation; morality is a for deciding that one does or doesn't really have a moral
blunt instrument, like the law. But no proof has been of- obligation to do something. Doubtless answering this ques-
fered that an optimal code would prescribe doing seriously tion adequately would lead us back to the theory of the
harmful things as a result of the optimal moral code not meaning and justification of moral beliefs. But suppose it
being widely accepted in the society. True, an optimal code can be shown that what one is morally obligated to do is
might well tell one to keep a promise when few others are what an impartial, informed, otherwise normal person

42 The Hastings Center Report, April 1983

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would demand of one morally, or what would be demanded of utilitarianism suppose that there are here certain well-
by a moral system that rational, fully informed people with founded moral injunctions about both distributive and re-
a rational degree of benevolence would support in prefer- tributive justice and that these are inconsistent with the im-
ence to other moral systems and to no system at all. And plications of utilitarianism in all its forms.
suppose that these conceptions lead to the conclusion that it I shall limit my comments to the first charge, which
is obligatory to follow an optimal moral code. Then it is strikes me as the more serious, but what I say about the first
hard to see why one must then start over and do something can in principle be transposed to a discussion about the sec-
more in order to show that it is morally obligatory to follow ond.
the requirements of the optimal code. If we look at present legislation regarding the welfare of
Furthermore, we do not believe that a person has no obli- the poor or underprivileged in the United States, we find aid
gation to do things which the moral code current in his soci- to dependent children, the food stamp program, a limited
ety does not demand. We do not believe that a person has no program of negative income tax, a Medicaid program to
obligation to be kind to suffering animals, or to prisoners in take care of the health of those who are less well off, and an
a prison camp in wartime, just because other people don't or assistance program for the aged, the blind, and the disabled.
because conventional morality doesn't demand it. Are How is all this paid for? Mostly out of general funds: from a
moral reformers never correct when they martyr them- progressive income tax on those who are more well off.
selves, in order to discharge their moral obligations as they Now I do not suggest that this system is perfect; far from it.
see them? We must make at least two concessions. First, we But every one of the provisions of the system-which after
must agree that if one lives according to a moral code thatall is a system for the redistribution of income-can be de-
demands more than the traditional moral codes, one is fended on utilitarian grounds. The utilitarian justification
doing something that it would not be disgraceful not to do-for all this is that a dollar taken in taxes from the wealthy
would have done the wealthy far less good than the same
assuming that to act disgracefully is to fall a bit below the
normal level. Second, I agree that the normal social sanc- dollar spent providing food stamps, medical care, and so on
for the poor or handicapped. All this the utilitarian can de-
tions for behaving morally are absent if one is living up to a
standard that conventional morality does not require. In- fend, and it is easy to see that application of the utilitarian
deed, one may sometimes incur moral sanctions for living criterion for optimal institutions moves in the direction of
in accordance with an optimal code, for instance if one in-economic equality for all.
True, utilitarians do not take equality as an end in itself;
sists on treating persons of another race as social equals in a
place where such behavior is frowned upon. the move in the direction of equality is advocated only be-
cause maximizing the general welfare can be attained only
Some of the reasons we ordinarily have for acting morally
will be absent in such a case. But some of the reasons we by more equality. Utilitarians also do not favor taking steps
that would diminish the general welfare just for the sake of
ordinarily have for acting morally will also be present. For
one thing, as often has been pointed out, one common rea- equality-for instance, perhaps, giving a great deal of extra
son for acting morally is our own sympathy or benevolence; income to a disabled person in order to make up for a natu-
and it would appear that sympathy or benevolence will al- ral disability. (Neither, incidentally, as far as I can see, does
ways, or virtually always, be engaged on behalf of an opti-Rawls's theory.) But when we see how far a utilitarian the-
mal moral code. For another, most of us have somehow ory does take us toward economic equality, we can well
acquired a desire to do what we consider the morally right wonder how much farther the critics of utilitarianism would
thing for no further reason. And this desire will move us tolike to go. How large a percentage of the gross national
act according to the provisions of an optimal code, if we are product would they want diverted for the achievement of
convinced that we ought morally to conform our conduct to more equality than the utilitarian would ask for, and exactly
those provisions. When all these considerations are taken how would they want it distributed? I suggest that when we
reflect on how much economic equality we want in society,
into account, the claim that we have no moral obligation to
live according to what we think is the optimal code, or ac- shall not think that the implications of utilitarianism fall
we
cording to what we think we ought to do, even when that short. Many attacks on utilitarianism suppose that we are in
code or standard is not in place in our society, seems toa position to distribute happiness, not money, and it is said
evaporate. that a utilitarian must be oblivious of any inequalities in
happiness, however great, so long as the maximum amount
of happiness has been produced. But this charge, while
Two Final Alleged Problems
true, ignores the fact that the utilitarian theory does provide
Thus far I have said nothing about two rocks upon which against severe deprivation of happiness, as in the case of a
many philosophers think utilitarianism in all its forms must disabled person, on the ground that such provision is the
necessarily founder: the moral demand for economic equal- best investment of national resources. As far as I can see,
ity, and the moral requirement for legal punishment only the response of the utilitarian to the charge of an unsatisfac-
where and to the extent it is deserved. Philosophical critics tory theory of distributive justice comes off very well.

43
The Hastings Center

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