Strategic Analysis

ISSN: 0970-0161 (Print) 1754-0054 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsan20

The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the

Reshmi Kazi

To cite this article: Reshmi Kazi (2011) The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb
by Avner Cohen, Strategic Analysis, 35:3, 533-534, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2011.560008

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2011.560008

Published online: 05 May 2011.

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 Book Reviews 533

Avner Cohen, The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with the Bomb, Columbia
University Press, New York, 2010, pp. 416, $35, ISBN 978-0-231-13698-3

Reshmi Kazi*

vner Cohen’s latest volume, The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with the
A Bomb, is a thoughtful and provocative addition to the discourse on Israel’s not
so secret nuclear weapons programme. In this volume, the author makes a compelling
case for Israel’s nuclear policy. Simultaneously, he argues that it would be counter-
productive for Israel to continue refusing to acknowledge its nuclear arsenal. Much has
changed since the time Israel commenced its quest for nuclear weapons in the 1960s.
Israel would display strategic wisdom if it reoriented its nuclear policy, consistent with
the prevailing non-proliferation regime.
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The Worst Kept Secret is a modest volume divided into 10 chapters with an intro-
duction and an epilogue. It has an impressive and exhaustive bibliography of books,
journals and interviews by the author. Altogether the volume makes a significant
addition to the debate on reducing the salience of nuclear weapons.
According to Cohen, Israel’s nuclear weapons programme constitutes one of the
most important strategic issues in the Middle East. And yet Israel has never formally
acknowledged or provided any evidence of its nuclear arsenal. The issue is widely
regarded as taboo within Israel. Shrouded by a policy of opacity, Israel’s nuclear strat-
egy is institutionalised by a policy of amimut meaning secrecy. Israel’s amimut policy
has provided it with the benefit of nuclear deterrence without being accorded a pariah
status within the non-proliferation regime. This strategy has paid off to maintain a pol-
icy of deniability. It has further benefited Israel by keeping at bay any political debate
on the issue of non-proliferation. The US and Israel abstain from discussing the subject.
Israel has also been able to continue to develop its nuclear programme while adhering
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Cohen acknowledges that Israel’s nuclear policy of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ has been
remarkably successful. However, it is time that Israel came out of its nuclear closet and
openly debates this crucial issue. The policy of ambiguity was justified in the backdrop
of the holocaust and Israel’s security compulsions. However, as Cohen says, amimut is
inconsistent with the emerging non-proliferation order. In the initial period Israel had
no misgivings about the legitimacy and responsibility of its strategic programme. It
agreed not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the region. The author argues
that Israel’s policy is increasingly becoming anachronistic and counter-productive in
view of the prevailing nuclear norms. Israel’s nuclear weapons programme is globally
well known. Any denial of the status of its strategic programme reduces the credibil-
ity of Israel and contradicts its status as a responsible nuclear power. Israel’s nuclear
monopoly is challenged by two factors: Iran’s atomic energy programme and interna-
tional support for the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East.
Israel’s ambiguous nuclear policy is counter-productive given the growing demands for
a nuclear weapons-free world. There is a raging international debate for global zero in
the view of the growing possibility of nuclear weapons and materials falling into the
hands of terrorists. Israel’s amimut policy puts a question mark over whether it can be
part of this international debate as a responsible nuclear nation.
 534 Strategic Analysis

The author believes that Israel’s nuclear censorship might have strong implica-
tions for Israeli democracy. There is scarce information about the workings of the
Israeli Atomic Energy Commission that oversees nuclear research and development
in Israel. The office of secrets under the Israeli defence ministry responsible for pro-
tecting nuclear secrets disallows any public debate on the nuclear policy. The Knesset
never initiates any discussion on the nuclear issue, nor does it review it. Though the
prime minister has ultimate nuclear responsibility, there is no declaration regarding the
lines of authority, command, control systems, or detailed safeguards preventing any
unauthorised and accidental use or diversion of fissile materials.
It can be logically argued that it is vital for the governments to keep certain mat-
ters secret. But Cohen rightly argues that transparency and accountability are vital
in nuclear matters for the sustenance of democratic institutions. He asserts that it is
important that the Israelis know who authorises the use of nuclear weapons, what are
the red lines, the environmental risks involved, implications of the policy of amimut in
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the Middle East, and Arab thinking on the Israeli bomb. Cohen suggests that it is time
Israel modifies its policy of nuclear ambiguity, reiterates its commitment to a nuclear
weapons-free zone in the Middle East, and upholds its support for global zero in order
to reinforce its credentials as a responsible nuclear power. Cohen refers to the model
provided by the India-US nuclear energy deal by virtue of which India became a de
facto member of the nuclear club, gained advanced nuclear technology and established
itself as a responsible nuclear power.
Cohen has justly recognised that it would not be prudent for Israel to suddenly aban-
don its amimut policy. This might provoke the Arab states to repudiate the NPT as they
threatened to do in 2008. It can pressurise Egypt into challenging Israel’s nuclear sta-
tus as Iran is doing at present. Israel also faces the challenge of Iran’s growing nuclear
power. Cohen advocates that Israel was not the first to introduce nuclear weapons into
the region yet it should reinforce its commitment to the non-proliferation principles.
This volume makes a valuable contribution in reinforcing the debate on disarma-
ment in the Middle East and that will eventually strengthen the efforts towards global
disarmament.
∗
The reviewer is an Associate Fellow at IDSA.

Bidyut Chakrabarty and Rajat Kumar Kujur, Maoism in India: Reincarnation of Ultra-
Left Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century, Routledge, Oxon, 2010, pp. 244, £80

Nihar Nayak*
he prime minister of India has rated left wing extremism/Naxalism/Maoism the
T biggest internal security challenge of India. Presently, the menace has spread over
256 districts in nine states. Over 10,000 civilians and security personnel have been
killed by Maoists in the last five years. The recent Maoist attacks on paramilitary
forces have not only demoralised the security forces but have also managed to high-
light the fault lines within the ruling establishment and policy makers over how to
handle the problem. Differences of opinion between the union government and the
affected states have diluted any effective policy to neutralise the Maoists. In this con-
text, Maoism in India: Reincarnation of Ultra-Left Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First