ON THE ETHICS

OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Framing a political consensus on the unacceptability of nuclear weapons

By Nobuo Hayashi Paper No 2 of 5

ILPI-UNIDIR NPT Review Conference Series #NPT2015

• The absence of a specific ban on nuclear weapons under today’s international law mirrors our moral
ambivalence about them.
• Consequentialist arguments for or against nuclear weapons cannot refute each other, since they both
rely on alternative histories and rival futures that are ultimately unverifiable.
• As is the case with torture, certain acts can be considered intrinsically wrongful, no matter how likely
they may be to achieve their goals or however worthy such goals may be.
• The challenge now is to cultivate a political consensus that, nuclear weapons are so singularly inhumane
we ought categorically to reject their use, whatever purposes they may be said to serve.

Introduction
Today’s international law regime leaves little The ‘legal gap’ became a major focus in discus-
room for lawful use of nuclear weapons.1 At the sions at the third ‘Conference on the Humanitar-
same time, there is no prohibition of these weap- ian Impact of Nuclear Weapons’, held in Vienna
ons per se.2 This situation distinguishes them from 8 to 9 December 2014. Both Austria’s sum-
from biological and chemical weapons, which mary3 and subsequent national pledge4 noted this
are subject to comprehensive bans under the 1972 gap, as well as the desirability of filling it with
Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons Convention a prohibition. Importantly, Austria also recog-
and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, re- nized the existence of profound moral and ethical
spectively. questions concerning nuclear weapons that go
beyond questions of law. As with other contro-
versial areas of life in general, law’s ambivalence

Mr Nobuo Hayashi is a senior legal advisor at the International Law and Policy Institute, and a researcher at
PluriCourts, a Centre of Excellence project at the University of Oslo Law Faculty.
www.effectivemeasures.org
 2

often mirrors our own underlying moral ambiva- clear weapons has predominantly been framed
lence on the matter. So, if we are to eliminate in- (see Box 1). Nuclear strikes are better seen for
ternational law’s lacuna regarding nuclear weap- what they really are, rather than what purpose
ons, it helps to begin by reflecting on their moral they serve, and their moral status assessed on
status. the unparalleled suffering they inflict. Far from
being abstract or disconnected from political re-
To that end, here three major schools of thought alities, such an examination relates to important
are considered: consequentialism, just war, and practical questions of how—or even whether—
deontology. This paper advocates a break with policy makers can be persuaded that nuclear
the security-focused, consequentialist discourse weapons’ singular inhumanity makes it inher-
in which our contemporary moral debate on nu- ently unethical to use them.

Consequentialism’s inconclusiveness
The use of nuclear weapons would cause vast the Second World War.5 On this view, the fact that
physical destruction. Alongside blast and heat, there has not been war between nuclear-armed
intense and harmful ionizing radiation is created states has to do with the credible fear of mutually
within the zone of the direct effects of nuclear assured destruction. International relations theo-
detonations. Large amounts of radioactively con- rist Kenneth Waltz even suggested that, ‘[w]ith
taminated material would probably be blown into more nuclear states the world will have a promis-
the atmosphere, which would travel long distanc- ing future.’6
es and endanger human health far from ‘ground
zero’. Even one nuclear weapon detonation in a
highly populated area would be a humanitarian With more nuclear states the
disaster; the use of many would be cataclysmic.
Intuitively, this strongly suggests that any mor-
world will have a promising
al justification for using these weapons would future.
have to be grounded on some greater good that
they might serve. This is the question with which Moreover, to this way of thinking unilateral
humanity found itself grappling for much of the abandonment of one’s nuclear arsenal would only
Cold War. have a destabilizing effect. It would leave the
disarmed party vulnerable to any adversary still
armed with nuclear weapons, a situation that the
CONSEQUENTIALIST ARGUMENTS FOR latter would be tempted to exploit.7 Unilateral nu-
AND AGAINST NUCLEAR WEAPONS clear disarmament might even prompt the newly
exposed ‘umbrella states’ (i.e., allies dependent
Some perceive the greater good served by nuclear
upon a nuclear state for security) to develop their
weapon use to come in the form of international
own nuclear arsenals. For example, Japan—a
peace and stability. Nuclear weapons may be
country located in a volatile region that already
evil, but they have helped restore and maintain
possesses nuclear know-how but has thus far
it. There is still a widespread view, for instance,
chosen to remain under the United
that Hiroshima and Nagasaki hastened the end of

BOX 1

WHAT IS CONSEQUENTIALISM?
Consequentialism is a highly intuitive and prevalent mode of ethical reasoning. Consequentialists debate the moral
status of an act by assessing how likely it is to achieve its goal, and how worthy such a goal is. According to this view,
it is moral to perform an act if and to the extent it helps achieve some desirable state of affairs. If not, it is immoral to
perform that act. At its simplest, this way of thinking echoes the familiar adage: ‘The end justifies the means.’
Utilitarianism is a variety of consequentialism. Championed by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, among others,
utilitarianism treats maximum common good (e.g. pleasure, happiness, satisfaction of preferences) as the ideal end-
state, and considers the morality of action accordingly.
 3

States’ nuclear weapons umbrella—is sometimes tional peace and stability, with the actual level of
mentioned in this regard.8 global nuclear armament in it. The other is an im-
agined world with fewer, or no, nuclear weapons.
There are, of course, also those who believe that How would history have unfolded, where would
nuclear weapons should be banned. For some we be today, and what might the future hold in
people in favour of a prohibition, continued de- store for us?
pendence on these weapons is not only evil but
also detrimental to international peace and If you feel that the real world is at least as peace-
stability. It is notable in this regard that recent ful and stable as that other, counterfactual one
scholarship has cast some doubts on the idea that without nuclear weapons, then you implicitly
the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki played accept the morality of these weapons on conse-
a central role in Japan’s decision to surrender.9 quential grounds. After all, we know that, for all
And, even if nuclear deterrence added to strategic its bumps and scary moments, the nuclear world
stability between the superpower-led ideological has so far held itself together. Maintaining the
blocs during the Cold War, it clearly failed to curb status quo and, where necessary, strengthening
numerous conflicts that occurred elsewhere. In- it (for instance, reducing risks, and making sure
deed, it may have made their incidence more like- that nuclear weapons remain in the hands of reli-
ly as proxy wars. able players) may very well give us the best over-
all chance of continued peace and stability. We
know this devil, and we have learned how to live
Even with the best of with it. Besides, how can one be sure if fewer nu-
clear warheads would have generated peace and
intentions amongst nuclear- stability, or whether a future world free of nucle-
armed states, there are ar weapons is also a secure one?12 In any event,
always risks of accidents it would be idle to dwell on such what-ifs and
maybes, even if we wanted to believe in better al-
and inadvertent escalations ternatives. The genie is already out of the bottle:
that may trigger nuclear nuclear weapons cannot be dis-invented.
exchanges.
Conversely, you may feel that it is despite nuclear
weapons that our world is as peaceful and sta-
In addition, those opposed to nuclear weapons
ble as it is. Perhaps you are convinced that these
consider that the effectiveness of nuclear deter-
weapons’ continued existence would make the
rence, and the danger of its absence, is exagger-
world more dangerous. If that is the case, you are
ated. Even with the best of intentions amongst
essentially trying to neutralize consequentialist
nuclear-armed states, there are always risks of
arguments for nuclear weapons with consequen-
accidents and inadvertent escalations that may
tialist arguments of your own.
trigger nuclear exchanges.10 The possibility that
nuclear-armed states may go ‘rogue’, collapse, or
fail to prevent their arsenal from falling into the
hands of terrorists, can scarcely be ignored.11 The genie is already out of
the bottle: nuclear weapons
COUNTERFACTUALS, UNVERIFIABILITY, cannot be dis-invented.
AND UNEVEN PLAYING FIELDS
Consequentialism has three major limitations,
For the past 70 years, both consequentialist argu- however. First, both you and your opponent rely
ments for and against nuclear weapons have cap- on alternative histories and rival futures. It is im-
tured—and imprisoned—our moral imagination. possible to verify or falsify claims of ‘but-for’ cau-
Because of their use of counterfactuals, however, sation13 that are implicit in consequentialist jus-
consequentialist claims are incapable of verifica- tifications (‘The Cuban Missile Crisis would have
tion and, in fact, merely favour any workable sta- triggered a full-scale nuclear war, but for the suc-
tus quo. cessful application of nuclear deterrence’). Un-
fortunately, it is impossible to prove or disprove
In a nutshell, consequentialism asks us to com- counterfactual objections to such claims, either
pare two things. One is the actual level of interna- (‘The world would not have had to experience
 4

emergencies like the Cuban Missile Crisis, if we No matter how deftly you highlight the flaws,
had not had nuclear weapons in the first place’). dangers and risks of nuclear weapons, doing so
Nor, for that matter, do future predictions ever does not, in and of itself, validate the supposed
really go beyond the realm of educated guesses, superiority of their absence.
however technically sophisticated they may be.

Second, those opposed to nuclear weapons on Consequentialism has a built-

consequentialist grounds are essentially sug-
gesting that we should deal with the devil we do in bias in favour of the status
not know. This is an exceedingly tall order, par- quo
ticularly since you are up against a model of the
world that has more or less shown itself to ‘work’. Third, arguing consequentialism against conse-
Consequentialism has a built-in bias in favour of quentialism exposes you to being persuaded that
the status quo (all else being equal) as long as that nuclear weapons are morally acceptable, if they
status quo sustains itself tolerably well. do contribute to world stability and peace. You
are just disputing the evidence that purportedly
shows their contribution.

Just war’s explosion

The just war theory shields itself from consequen- Ultimately, just war concedes the possibility that
tialism’s troubles, at least to some extent (see Box even a great deal of evil, such as nuclear strikes
2). It does so by combining outcome-based crite- on populated areas, may need to be endured for
ria (e.g. reasonable prospect of success) with those the pursuit of a greatly important and legitimate
that are not consequentialist (e.g. just cause). aim, such as survival. ‘These weapons,’ laments
Michael Walzer, a prominent moral philosopher,
Alas, this theory collapses where it matters most. ‘explode the theory of just war. They are the first
Given the tremendous destructive power and af- of mankind’s technological innovations that are
ter-effects of nuclear weapons detonated in pop- simply not encompassable within the familiar
ulated areas, a nuclear war, it could be argued, moral world.’16
would be more evil than an ordinary war. In or-
der for nuclear war’s alternatives to be more evil
than nuclear war, such alternatives would have to Nuclear weapons ‘explode
be correspondingly more evil as well. We might
reach that point in what the International Court the theory of just war. They
of Justice called an ‘extreme circumstance of self- are the first of mankind’s
defence’ where the ‘very survival’ of a state would technological innovations
be at stake.14 Faced with a truly existential peril,
responsible leaders of an organized political com- that are simply not
munity armed with nuclear weapons may legiti- encompassable within the
mately conclude that they have no choice but to familiar moral world.’
threaten or even use them.15
BOX 2

WHAT IS THE JUST WAR THEORY?

The just war theory is a tradition deeply rooted in Catholicism and Western philosophy. Nevertheless, it is also use-
ful when debating the ethics of war in a more secular, global setting. This theory employs criteria such as the non-
availability of less harmful options, proportionality, a reasonable prospect of success, just cause, right intention, and
legitimate authority.
Just war thinkers try to reconcile the idea that, despite war’s evil, alternatives to war may sometimes be even more evil
than war. Thus, while this doctrine is sometimes said to glorify war, it takes a strong anti-war presumption as its point
of departure. Nor should just war be seen as synonymous with pacifism.
 5

Double effect’s adjustment

Perhaps not all of just war, a centuries-old intel- At the 2014 Vienna conference, the Holy See cir-
lectual tradition, is lost. Closely related to the just culated a paper that showed a possible shift in
war theory is an old tenet of Catholic teaching the Catholic position on double effect and nuclear
called ‘double effect.’ First developed by Thomas weapons.20 In the section entitled ‘the problem of
Aquinas,17 this doctrine requires that the agent (1) intention’ the paper’s authors observed: ‘[S]ince
exclusively intend to achieve good, and (2) intend what is intended is mass destruction—with ex-
to minimize the foreseeable evil that the good’s tensive and lasting collateral damage, inhumane
pursuit may cause. You can readily see some sim- suffering, and risk of escalation—the system of
ilarities with just war, particularly its right inten- nuclear weapons can no longer be deemed a poli-
tion and proportionality requirements. The Cath- cy that stands firmly on moral ground.’
olic Church has adjusted its interpretation of the
doctrine in recent years and, with it, its position
on the moral acceptability of nuclear deterrence. ‘Since what is intended is
In 1983, American Catholic bishops issued a pas- mass destruction [...] the
toral letter on war and peace.18 They made it clear system of nuclear weapons
that they ‘cannot be satisfied that the assertion can no longer be deemed a
of an intention [by nuclear-armed states] not to
strike civilians directly, or even the most hon- policy that stands firmly on
est effort to implement that intention, by itself moral ground.’
constitutes a “moral policy” for the use of nuclear
weapons.’ The bishops said, essentially, that it The Holy See’s paper effectively collapses dou-
was not enough for nuclear-armed states to sat- ble effect into single effect, i.e. the intention
isfy double effect’s first prong only. The letter re- to minimize foreseeable evil. Today’s Catholic
vealed the bishops’ deep concern about the feasi- Church seems to think that intending to use nu-
bility of strictly proportionate nuclear strikes and clear weapons would necessarily mean failing
the danger of nuclear escalations. Crucially, it to intend to minimize such evil.21 On another
seems that the bishops did not deem the nuclear- possible reading, the Catholic Church rejects the
armed states’ intention to minimize foreseeable idea that nuclear strikes could ever be genuinely
evil—that is, the purported satisfaction of double intended to achieve good.22 Or, the paper simply
effect’s second prong—entirely credible. Still, at acknowledges that a post-Cold War strategic set-
the height of the Cold War, the bishops were not ting undermines the rationale behind the Ameri-
prepared to reject the morality of nuclear deter- can bishops’ then-tentative acceptance of nuclear
rence either. Their letter concluded: ‘These con- deterrence.
siderations … lead us to a strictly conditioned
moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence. We can- Be that as it may, the Catholic Church, once a
not consider it adequate as a long-term basis for reluctant yet influential backer of nuclear deter-
peace.’19 rence, appears to be withdrawing its moral sup-
port for it.

BOX 3

WHAT IS DEONTOLOGY?
Deontologists consider the intrinsic moral status of an act, rather than the moral status of its consequences. Certain be-
haviour can be wrongful per se. Once established, the inherent wrongfulness of conduct remains unaffected, however
likely it may be to achieve its desired goal, or no matter how worthy such a goal may be. From a strictly deontological
point of view, the end in itself never justifies the means. The means must be assessed independently by reference to a
normative principle, belief, postulate, and the like.
Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative is a good example. He famously posited: ‘Persons are, therefore, not merely
subjective ends, whose existence as an effect of our actions has a value for us; but such beings are objective ends,
i.e., exist as ends in themselves.’ Acts such as the taking of hostages violate this imperative and are therefore inherently
immoral.
 6

Deontology’s potential and challenges ahead

The Vienna conference, together with its two Similarly, should the choice be between self-
predecessors held in Oslo (in March 2013) and destruction and recourse to nuclear weapons,
Nayarit (in February 2014), gathered a wealth of asserting these weapons’ absolute immoral-
scientific material on the humanitarian conse- ity would amount to demanding that a nuclear-
quences of nuclear weapons detonations.23 Many armed state choose self-destruction. This kind of
policy makers now appear to feel that nuclear rigid—indeed suicidal—fidelity to moral consist-
strikes are bound to inflict suffering so singu- ency may appeal to some abstract forms of ide-
larly inhumane they ought to be categorically re- alism. It cannot be expected to form the basis of
jected, whatever their utility. responsible and pragmatic national policy, how-
ever.26 While deontology is good at highlighting
Detaching the moral status of nuclear strikes salient ethical problems associated with an act, it
from that of their purpose is to engage in an es- is sometimes a mistake to disregard other impor-
sentially deontological line of reasoning (see Box tant considerations.
3). It has two distinct tactical advantages. If the
discourse is kept focused, opponents have to ar- Deontological absolutes in real life are perhaps
gue either that it is not wrongful per se to cause more meaningful as restraints on our consequen-
such unique suffering, or that the suffering in tialist reasoning than as its substitutes.27
question is not so unique. Also, if opponents de-
viate from deontology and try to steer the debate
to consequentialism, such a move may be chal- IT HAPPENED TO TORTURE
lenged as a deflection: ‘You are changing the sub- You may wonder if, in view of the foregoing, an
ject. Can we stick to the suffering nuclear weap- act’s inherent immorality can ever lead to its cat-
ons cause, please?’ egorical rejection.

Deontology, however, is not without difficulties. It can, and it has. Take the unreserved condem-
First, it awkwardly commits its adherents to sac- nation and categorical prohibition of torture,28
rificing themselves on the altar of an absolute for example. There are, of course, occasional dis-
rule. That is, can we really insist that we accept senters who invoke the so-called ‘ticking bomb’
our own demise, rather than act immorally by scenario,29 or those in the aftermath of the 11 Sep-
using nuclear weapons? Second, not all people, tember 2001 attacks who sought to reopen the
particularly those in positions of political au- matter.30 Most people, however, agree that torture
thority and responsibility who can make the real is a moral wrong in itself and that under no cir-
difference, may agree that deontology offers the cumstances is it ever justified.
strongest moral case against nuclear weapons.
How persuasive can it be? Torture’s inherent immorality remains the
same—not only because it often does not work,31
but also even if it happens to ‘work’ in some situ-
RULE FETISH ations. Our rejection of torture is independent of
There is no such thing as expedient deontology. its utility or disutility. ‘The claim that torture
In his exchange with another philosopher, Imma- might be justified in ticking bomb situations is,
nuel Kant argued that lying is inherently immoral, fundamentally, a claim that certain individuals
and stood by the notion that ‘it would be a crime do not have the right to have rights and, thus, that
to tell a lie to a murderer who asked whether our the human can be reduced to a status other than
friend who is being pursued by the murderer had human.’32
taken refuge in our house.’24 Kant might be given
credit for being consistent. It is doubtful, howev- Admittedly, condemnation of torture did not
er, whether such radical steadfastness would ac- emerge overnight. On the contrary, it has evolved
cord with our ordinary sense of a lie’s immorality gradually and intricately.33 In medieval times,
in similar circumstances. Some even suggest that torture was tolerated as an unpleasant yet neces-
only ‘rule fetishists’25 would go that far. Obsess- sary tool of justice and state power. It was state-
ing about the deontological unacceptability of ly- craft’s subsequent refinement that rendered tor-
ing comes at the expense of the broader context ture dispensable. Meanwhile, Enlightenment
and other weighty considerations. progressivism embraced human dignity as its
 7

centrepiece. Only then did a truly robust moral fering that is necessary or unnecessary for this
case against torture gather momentum and lead or that purpose. We categorically reject nuclear
to its unqualified prohibition that we now take as strikes because they rob their victims, fellow hu-
self-evident. man beings, of human qualities by subjecting
them to unspeakable inhumanity and reducing
them to the status of mere instruments for the
THE SAME CAN HAPPEN TO NUCLEAR benefit of the rest of us.
WEAPONS
Key to torture’s condemnation has been the
steady erosion of its perceived utility, accompa- We categorically reject
nied by the gradual rise of humanitarian senti- nuclear strikes because they
ments against it. Today, we are at a stage where
our deontological conviction against torture is
rob their victims, fellow
largely immune to accusations of rule fetishism. human beings, of human
Similarly, the end of the Cold War has dimin- qualities by subjecting them
ished the weight of its once all-encompassing
logic and, with it, the perceived strategic value of
to unspeakable inhumanity
nuclear weapons. At the same time, we are rap- and reducing them to the
idly improving our awareness of their terrible hu- status of mere instruments for
manitarian impacts.
the benefit of the rest of us.
These changes in the features of our moral land-
scape should enable us to free ourselves of the The challenge now is to foster a broader political
Cold War’s existential, consequentialist yoke. consensus on the intrinsic wrongfulness of nu-
This should, in turn, allow policy makers to see clear weapons. Such a consensus would furnish
nuclear weapons for what they really are, rather a solid conviction with which to fill the legal gap.
than what purpose they serve. The morally rel-
evant suffering here is suffering per se, not suf-

BOX 4

SUGGESTED READING
T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, 1274.
J. Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1789.
J.W. Child, Nuclear War: The Moral Dimension, Transaction Publishers, 1986.
Catechism of the Catholic Church, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1993.
I. Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 1785.
S.P. Lee, Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
J. McMahan, ‘Deterrence and deontology’, Ethics, vol. 95 no. 3, 1985, pp. 517-536.
J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, 1861.
K.N. Waltz, ‘Why Iran should get the bomb: Nuclear balancing would mean stability’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 91 no. 4, 2012,
pp. 2-5.
M. Walzer, Just and Unjust War: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 4th edn, Basic Books, 2006.
D. Whetham (ed), Ethics, Law and Military Operations, Palgrave MacMillan, 2011.
 8

Endnotes
1 International Court of Justice, Legality of The son, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford Univer-
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory sity Press, 1980.
Opinion, 1996.
14 See supra note 1.
2 G. Nystuen, ‘Conclusions on the status of nuclear
15 M. Koskenniemi, ‘Faith, identity, and the killing
weapons under international law’, in G. Nystuen,
of the innocent: international lawyers and nuclear
S. Casey-Maslen and A. Golden Bersagel (eds),
weapons’, Leiden Journal of International Law,
Nuclear Weapons Under International Law, Cam-
vol. 10 no. 1, 1997, pp. 137-162.
bridge University Press, 2014, pp. 483-486.
16 M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argu-
3 http://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/
ment with Historical Illustrations, 4th edn, Basic
Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/
Books, 2006, p. 282.
HINW14_Chair_s_Summary.pdf.
17 T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, 1274.
4 http://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/
Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/ 18 US Conference of Catholic Bishops, ‘The challenge
HINW14_Austrian_Pledge.pdf. of peace: God’s promise and our response, a pas-
toral letter on war and peace by the National Con-
5 E.C. Stowell, ‘The laws of war and the atomic
ference of Catholic Bishops’: http://www.usccb.
bomb’, American Journal of International Law,
org/upload/challenge-peace-gods-promise-our-
vol. 39 no. 4, 1945, pp. 784-788; R.J. Maddox,
response-1983.pdf.
Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision
Fifty Years Later, University of Missouri Press, 19 Ibid.
1995.
20 Permanent Mission of the Holy See to the United
6 K. Waltz, ‘The spread of nuclear weapons: more Nations and Other International Organizations
may be better,” Adelphi Papers, vol. 21 no. 171, in Geneva, ‘Nuclear disarmament: time for aboli-
1981. tion, a contribution of the Holy See’: http://www.
bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/
7 S. Raghavan, ‘The ethics of nuclear deterrence’, in
Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/HINW14_
D. Whetham (ed), Ethics, Law and Military Opera-
Holy_See_Contribution.pdf.
tions, Palgrave MacMillan, 2011, pp. 207-220.
21 N. Hayashi, ‘Catholic Church pivots on the accept-
8 S. Pifer et al., ‘U.S. nuclear and extended deter-
ability of nuclear deterrence’: http://unidir.ilpi.
rence: considerations and challenges’, Brookings
org/?p=93.
Arms Control Series Paper no. 3, May 2010, pp.
33-36: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/ 22 The author is grateful to G. Reichberg for this in-
research/files/papers/2010/6/nuclear-deter- sight.
rence/06_nuclear_deterrence.pdf.
23 See supra note 4.
9 W. Wilson, ‘The winning weapon? Rethinking
24 I. Kant, ‘On a supposed right to lie because of
nuclear weapons in light of Hiroshima’, Interna-
philanthropic concerns’, Berlinische Blätter, 1799.
tional Security, vol. 31 no. 4, 2007, pp. 162-179; K.
Berry et al., Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons: 25 L. May, War Crimes and Just War, Cambridge Uni-
Examining the Validity of Nuclear Deterrence, versity Press, 2007, pp. 196-197.
Monterey Institute of International Studies, May
26 See supra note 15.
2010: http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/delegiti-
mizing_nuclear_weapons_may_2010.pdf. 27 T. Nagel, ‘War and massacre’, Philosophy & Public
Affairs, vol. 1 no. 2, 1972, pp. 123-144.
10 J. Borrie, ‘A limit to safety: risk, ‘normal acci-
dents’, and nuclear weapons’, ILPI-UNIDIR Paper 28 Article 5 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Hu-
no. 3, December 2014. man Rights; Articles 4 and 7 of the 1966 Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Ar-
11 L. Maddrell, ‘More is not better – why Kenneth
ticle 2 of the 1984 Convention Against Torture and
Waltz is wrong on nuclear proliferation’: http: //
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
alochonaa.com/2014/03/26/more-is-not-better-
Punishment.
why-kenneth-waltz-is-wrong-on-nuclear-prolif-
eration-3/. 29 J.B. Elshtain, ‘Reflection on the problem of “dirty
hands”’, in S. Levinson (ed), Torture: A Collection,
12 T.C. Schelling, ‘A world without nuclear weap-
Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 77-92.
ons?’, Dædalus, vol. 138 no. 4, 2009, pp. 124-129.
30 A. Dershowitz, ‘Tortured Reasoning’, in ibid., pp.
13 H.L.A. Hart and T. Honoré, Causation in the Law,
257-280.
2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 1985; D. David-
 9

31 P. Carter, ‘The road to Abu Ghraib’, Washington

Monthly, November 2004: http://www.wash-
ingtonmonthly.com/features/2004/0411.carter.
html.
32 M. Farrell, The Prohibition of Torture in Excep-
tional Circumstances, Cambridge University
Press, 2013, p. 246.
33 Generally, see ibid.
10
 11

PREVIOUS POLICY PAPERS BY ILPI & UNIDIR

This series follows six earlier briefing papers for the third conference on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons
(HINW), which was convened in Vienna, Austria, from 8 to 9 December 2014:
§§ NICK RITCHIE, The story so far: the humanitarian initiative on the impacts of nuclear weapons.
§§ JOHN BORRIE, A harmful legacy: the lingering humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons testing.
§§ JOHN BORRIE, A limit to safety: risk, ‘normal accidents’, and nuclear weapons.
§§ SIMON BAGSHAW, Population displacement: displacement in the aftermath of nuclear weapon detonation events.
§§ ANNE GURO DIMMEN, Gendered impacts: the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons from a gender perspec-
tive.
§§ GRO NYSTUEN, Legal aspects of nuclear weapons: a ‘birds-eye view’ of international law and nuclear weapons.
TITLES IN THIS SERIES

The International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI) and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
(UNIDIR) produced this series of briefing papers to coincide with the 2015 Review Conference of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty:

1. NICK RITCHIE, The humanitarian initiative in 2015: expectations are building for the need for nuclear
disarmament progress.

2. NOBUO HAYASHI, On the ethics of nuclear weapons: framing a political consensus on the unaccept-
ability of nuclear weapons.

3. TIM CAUGHLEY, Analysing effective measures: options for multilateral nuclear disarmament and imple-
mentation of NPT article VI.

4. TORBJØRN GRAFF HUGO, On builders and blockers: states have different roles to play to complete the
nuclear disarmament puzzle.

5. JOHN BORRIE, TIM CAUGHLEY AND NICK RITCHIE, NPT success and the humanitarian initiative: a range
of initiatives is required to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world.

The papers were edited by John Borrie ([email protected]) and Tim Caughley ([email protected]) of UNIDIR,
and Torbjørn Graff Hugo ([email protected]) and Magnus Løvold ([email protected]) of ILPI.
Production of this series was made possible thanks to the support of the Governments of Norway, Ireland and
Austria.
This series follows six earlier papers prepared for the third conference on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear
weapons (HINW), which was convened in Vienna, Austria, from 8 to 9 December 2014.
Electronic copies of any of these papers can be downloaded for free from www.unidir.org and wmd.ilpi.org.
For more information, including commentary and news about international developments related to the hu-
manitarian initiative on nuclear weapons, visit unidir.ilpi.org / www.effectivemeasures.org.